UNION OF INDIAversusUZAIR IMRAN & ORS.

                 [2023] 13 S.C.R. 1135 : 2023 INSC 901



                            CASE DETAILS

                           UNION OF INDIA
                                     v.
                        UZAIR IMRAN & ORS.
                 (Civil Appeal Nos. 6668-6669 of 2023)
                           OCTOBER 11, 2023
       [BELA M. TRIVEDI AND DIPANKAR DATTA, JJ.]
                             HEADNOTES
     Issue for consideration: Whether the concurrent findings returned
by the tribunal and the High Court that denial of appointment to the third
respondent was unwarranted, is justified.
     Service Law – Appointment/selection – Post of Postal Assistant
– Third respondent considered ineligible for the post placed, though
placed in the merit list, sent for training but later excluded on basis of
the certificate of educational qualification, whereby he completed 10+
2 education from the vocational stream – Tribunal and the High Court
decided in favour of the respondent – Correctness:
      Held: Third respondent was not considered ineligible at the threshold
based on the certificate but he went through selection process, was sent
for training, and later excluded on certificate’s connotation – Unfettered
discretion, unaccountable approach and arbitrariness in State action are
antithesis to Art. 14, and, particularly when two views could possibly emerge
looking at the certificate of educational qualification, with both views not
being wholly unworthy of acceptance, fairness in administrative procedure
demanded that the appellant-Department ought to have given reason – It
was highly improper for the appellant to reject the candidature of the third
respondent outright in the absence of a proper appreciation of the certificate
– There has been utter carelessness on part of the appellant in not producing
the Amendment Rules and the gazette notification before the tribunal – Third
respondent cannot suffer for such carelessness and should be given what is
due to him – He has been discriminated against and arbitrarily deprived of
the selection – Furthermore, third respondent has crossed the maximum age
                                       1135
1136          SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2023] 13 S.C.R.


for entry into public employment – Appellant being responsible for the lis
being prolonged in excess of two decades not worth to remand the matter
– In view thereof, issuance of directions to appoint the third respondent,
initially on probation on the post of Postal Assistant, and if no post is vacant,
a supernumerary post to be created. [Para 16, 17, 20, 21]
     Service Law – Appointment – Equivalence of the educational
qualification required for the post – Determination of, by the court:
      Held: It is not the function of the court to determine equivalence of
two qualifications and/or to scrutinise a particular certificate and on the
basis thereof, hold that the holder thereof satisfies the eligibility criteria
and, thus, is qualified for appointment – It is entirely the prerogative of the
employer, to decide whether any such candidate intending to participate in
the selection process is eligible in terms of the statutorily prescribed rules
for appointment and also as to whether he ought to be allowed to participate
in the selection process – When evidence of a sterling quality is produced
before the court which tilts the balance in favour of one party, the court
could decide either way based on acceptance of such evidence. [Para 14]
     Constitution of India – Art. 16 – Right to claim public employment
by the candidate:
      Held: Candidate has no legal right to claim public employment –
Candidate has only a right to be considered therefor – Once a candidate is
declared ineligible to participate in the selection process at the threshold
and if he still wishes to participate in the process perceiving that his
candidature has been arbitrarily rejected, it is for him to work out his
remedy – However, if the candidature is not rejected at the threshold and the
candidate is allowed to participate in the selection process and ultimately
his name figures in the merit list, though such candidate has no indefeasible
right to claim appointment, he does have a limited right of being accorded
fair and non-discriminatory treatment – He has a reasonable expectation of
being appointed having regard to his position in the merit list could arise
– Employer-State would have no authority to act in an arbitrary manner
and throw the candidate out without rhyme or reason – Law places an
obligation, nay duty, on such an employer to provide some justification by
way of reason – If plausible justification is provided, the courts would be
loath to question the justification but the justification must be rational and
            UNION OF INDIA v. UZAIR IMRAN & ORS.                         1137


justifiable, and not whimsical or capricious, warranting non-interference –
Arts. 12, 14. [Para 15]

       LIST OF CITATIONS AND OTHER REFERENCES

      Malik Mazhar Sultan v. U.P. Public Service Commission (2006) 9 SCC
507 : [2006] 3 SCR 689; Ashish Kumar v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2018) 3
SCC 55 : [2018] 1 SCR 695 – referred to.
       OTHER CASE DETAILS INCLUDING IMPUGNED
              ORDER AND APPEARANCES

     CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 6668-6669
of 2023.
     From the Judgment and Order dated 04.04.2017 in SB No.1822 of
2000 and dated 10.12.2021 in CMA No.105840 of 2017 of the High Court
of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench.
     Appearances:
    Ms. Aishwarya Bhati, A.S.G., Gurmeet Singh Makker, B K Satija,
Ashok Panigrahi, Ishaan Sharma, Annirudh Sharma-ii, Ms. B.L.N. Shivani,
Advs. for the Appellant.
    Kaushal Yadav, Nandlal Kumar Mishra, Dr. Ajay Kumar, Arjun
Raghuvanshi, Ritul Tandon, Advs. for the Respondents.

       JUDGMENT / ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT

                               JUDGMENT
      DIPANKAR DATTA, J.
     1. Leave granted.
     2. The challenge in this appeal by the Union of India (“appellant”,
hereafter) is to the judgment and order dated 4th April, 2017 passed by the
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench (“High Court”,
hereafter) dismissing a Writ Petition1 of the appellant as well as the judgment


1   No. 1822 of 2000
1138          SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2023] 13 S.C.R.


and order dated 10th December, 2021 of the High Court dismissing its Review
Application2. By the judgment and order dated 4th April, 2017, the High
Court affirmed the judgment and order dated 6th May, 1999 passed by the
Central Administrative Tribunal (“Tribunal”, hereafter) allowing an Original
Application3 under section 19 read with section 14 of the Administrative
Tribunals Act, 1985 as well as a subsequent order dated 30th May, 2000
dismissing a Review Application4.
      3. At the outset, it is relevant to underline that the present appeal is
confined to consideration of the relief granted by the Tribunal, since upheld
by the High Court, to Ankur Gupta (“the third respondent”, hereafter), the
sole contesting party, as the other respondents are not interested in the service
any longer, according to the information presented to us from the Bar.
     4. The factual matrix of the appeal, culled out from the records, is as
follows:
       a. The President of India vide a Notification dated 27th December,
          1990, framed the Department of Posts (Postal Assistants and
          Sorting Assistants) Recruitment Rules, 1990 (“1990 Rules”,
          hereafter). The Schedule to the 1990 Rules outlined the educational
          qualifications required for the post of Postal Assistants and Sorting
          Assistants for direct recruits as “10+2 standard or 12th class pass
          of recognised University/ Board of School Education/Board of
          Secondary Education”. The 1990 Rules stood amended by the
          Department of Posts (Postal Assistants and Sorting Assistants)
          Recruitment (Amendment) Rules 1991 (“Amendment Rules”,
          hereafter) vide a Notification dated 31st January, 1992. As a result
          of the amendment in the Schedule to the 1990 Rules, candidates
          who had pursued their intermediate education in “vocational
          stream” were excluded from being considered for the post of Postal
          Assistants and Sorting Assistants.
       b. This being the position of the recruitment rules, the Superintendent
          of Post Office, Kheri vide a letter dated 17 th April, 1995


2    C.M. Application No.105840 of 2017
3    Original Application No.384 of 1996
4    Review Application No.7 of 1999
      UNION OF INDIA v. UZAIR IMRAN & ORS.                         1139
             [DIPANKAR DATTA, J.]

    requisitioned from the District Employment Officer, Lakhimpur
    Kheri a list of eligible candidates for the purpose of recruitment of
    10 (ten) Postal Assistants in Lakhimpur Kheri postal division for
    the year 1995. According to the requisition, the candidates were
    required to have qualified in the intermediate examination from
    the Uttar Pradesh Intermediate Education Council, Allahabad or
    equivalent. Apart from such requisition, applications were also
    invited through an advertisement dated 12th June, 1995.
c. All the respondents herein, among other candidates, took the
   written, typing, aptitude and computer tests and attended the
   interview which were conducted as a part of the selection process.
   A merit list was notified vide a Notification dated 22nd November,
   1995 on the basis of marks obtained by the participating candidates.
   The names of the respondents figured quite high in the merit list,
   following which all of them were attached to the Kheri Post Office
   for 15 days pre-induction training starting from 15th March, 1996.
   The same was to be followed by a long-term training. However,
   the Chief Post Master General sent a letter dated 22nd March, 1996
   to various Postmasters General. Referring to letters dated 31 st
   January, 1991 and 5th January, 19965 (sic) regarding recognition of
   educational qualification of 10+2/Intermediate from the vocational
   stream for direct recruitment, it was conveyed that certificates
   issued by the Board of High School and Intermediate Education
   should be admitted unless “these are marked as vocational stream
   or vocational”. This resulted in holding back of the respondents,
   who were not sent for long-term training. This triggered the instant
   litigation.
d. Dissatisfied with the aforesaid letter dated 22nd March, 1996,
   the respondents approached the Tribunal contesting the legality
   thereof. Since they had already succeeded in clearing the
   prescribed examinations, consequent to which their names figured
   in the merit list, it was prayed that the appellant be directed to
   send the respondents for the long-term training and consequently,
   be appointed as Postal Assistants in Lakhimpur Kheri. The
   Tribunal, vide order dated 6th May, 1999, decided in favour of the
   respondents. The relevant part of the order is extracted hereunder:
1140           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2023] 13 S.C.R.


             “4. […] The column of educational qualification provides that
             a candidate who passed the Intermediate Examination of Board
             of secondary Education or equivalent. Copy, as published in
             the Newspaper, on 12.6.95 Annexure A-1 to the O.A. shows
             that the educational qualification required was Intermediate
             (10+2) Examination passed. Thus neither, in the communication
             (Annexure R-1) sent to the Employment Exchange Lakhimpur
             Kheri or in the advertisement given in the Newspaper (Annexure
             A-1 to the O.A.) there was mention that the candidates who
             cleared the Intermediate (10+2) examination with ‘vocational
             subject’ would not be eligible. In view thereof, all the 4 applicants
             fulfilled educational qualification as published in the newspaper.
             advertisement and as mentioned in the communication sent to
             the Employment Exchange for sponsoring the names.
             ***
             6. In view of the discussions made above, the respondents are
             directed to send the applicants for further required training and
             on completion thereof, and other formalities, to appoint the
             applicants as Postal Assistants. The seniority of the applicants
             would not be affected by reason of their subsequent appointment
             and they would get their seniority as may be admissible in the
             rules, as if they were sent for training along with their juniors.”
       e. Aggrieved thereby, the appellant preferred a Review Application
          before the Tribunal which dismissed it vide order dated 30th May,
          2000 with an observation that the grounds for review under Order
          XLVII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (“CPC”,
          hereafter) are very limited, and the appellant has failed to raise
          any substantial ground for review.
       f.   Questioning the aforesaid judgment and order of the Tribunal,
            the appellant approached the High Court praying that the same
            be set-aside.
       g. The High Court, vide the impugned judgement dated 4th April, 2017,
          upheld the orders of the Tribunal reasoning that no amendment
          in the 1990 Rules had been effected and that the letter dated 22 nd
            UNION OF INDIA v. UZAIR IMRAN & ORS.                       1141
                   [DIPANKAR DATTA, J.]

         March, 1996 was only an executive order/clarificatory instruction
         which could not have amended the 1990 Rules; hence, denial of
         appointment to the third respondent (alongside other respondents
         impleaded therein) based solely on such letter was unwarranted.
         Finding no manifest error in the impugned judgment and order of
         the Tribunal, the High Court dismissed the Writ Petition.
     h. After dismissal of the Writ Petition, the appellant preferred a
        Review Application before the High Court. Vide order dated 10th
        December, 2021, the High Court dismissed the review application
        observing that a court exercising review jurisdiction under section
        114 of the CPC read with Order XLVII Rule 1 thereof has a
        very narrow and limited scope to interfere and that the judgment
        and order under review did not suffer from any mistake or error
        apparent on the face of the record warranting interference.
      5. Ms. Bhati, learned Additional Solicitor General appearing on behalf
of the appellant, while taking exception to the impugned judgments and
orders raised the following contentions:
     a. The Amendment Rules were already on record as Annexure 7 to the
        Writ Petition filed before the High Court. As the Amendment Rules
        had not been taken note of by the High Court during arguments,
        the judgment and order dated 4th April, 2017 suffered from an
        error apparent on the face of the record which necessitated the
        Review Application. In this light, she submitted that the Review
        Application urged a substantial ground within the framework of
        Order XLVII of the CPC which, unfortunately, the High Court
        failed to consider. Dismissal of the Review Application, in the
        circumstances, was manifestly erroneous.
     b. As the Amendment Rules had come into force prior to the
        commencement of the present selection process in 1995, it was
        imperative that the educational qualifications for appointment on
        the posts of Postal Assistants conformed to the amended Schedule,
        i.e., 10+2 standard or 12th class pass from a recognized University
        or Board, excluding vocational streams; consequently, selection
        of any candidate possessing vocational qualification would stand
1142          SUPREME COURT REPORTS                        [2023] 13 S.C.R.


           incompatible with the amended Schedule and any appointment in
           breach of the 1990 Rules, as amended, would be void ab initio.
       c. The third respondent fell short of the prescribed eligibility
          qualifications for being directly recruited, as specified in the
          relevant recruitment rules and as a sequel thereto, his selection
          was by mistake which the appellant had/has a right to rectify. Since
          the third respondent was sought to be disqualified not based on
          any executive order but based on a true and proper interpretation
          of recruitment rules framed under Article 309 of the Constitution,
          the High Court committed grave error in not interfering with the
          direction of the Tribunal to appoint the applicants before it.
     6. Resting on the aforesaid submissions, Ms. Bhati prayed that the
orders under challenge be set aside and the original application before the
Tribunal dismissed.
      7. Mr. Yadav, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the third
respondent while supporting the impugned judgments and orders, advanced
the following submissions:
       a. Concurrent findings returned by the Tribunal and the High Court
          should not be interfered with as the letter dated 22nd March, 1996,
          through which the words “excluding vocational streams”, were
          made the basis of depriving the third respondent of an appointment
          is nothing but an executive order.
       b. Rule 1(2) of the Amendment Rules itself provided that the
          amendment would be enforced after publication of the same in
          the official gazette and there is no gazette publication in respect
          of said rules till date.
       c. The name of the third respondent was sponsored by the District
          Employment Officer in view of the requisition made by the
          appellant. Through the letter dated 17th April, 1995, the appellant
          had explicitly stated that the educational requirement for Postal
          Assistant will be intermediate education from a recognised board.
          It was neither mentioned in the advertisement nor in the aforesaid
          letter that candidates with “vocational streams” would be excluded.
          As such, the third respondent had fulfilled the requisite criteria;
            UNION OF INDIA v. UZAIR IMRAN & ORS.                     1143
                   [DIPANKAR DATTA, J.]

         and denying him an appointment is against the settled law that
         rules of the game cannot be changed during the recruitment
         process.
     d. Even otherwise, the certificate of the third respondent issued
        by the Board of High School and Intermediate Education, Uttar
        Pradesh (“said Board”, hereafter) on 24th July, 1991 clearly
        manifests that he was a student of the ‘Regular’ stream and
        could not have been disqualified on the ground that he had
        pursued education at the 10+2 level in the vocational stream.
     8. Asserting that the impugned judgments and orders are free
from legal infirmities and stressing on the concurrent findings recorded
therein, Mr. Yadav submitted that the appeal is devoid of any merit and,
consequently, warrants outright dismissal.
     9. We have heard counsel for the parties and perused the materials
on record.
      10. The submission of Mr. Yadav that the Amendment Rules were
not published in the official gazette is without any substance. It appears
that the Amendment Rules were duly published in the Gazette of India
dated 15th February, 1992, a copy whereof has been produced by Ms.
Bhati. She is, therefore, right in her contention that the Amendment Rules
became operational on and from 15th February, 1992, much before the
process for recruitment had commenced.
      11. It is true that neither in the letter dated 17 th April, 1995
requisitioning names of eligible candidates from the Employment
Exchange nor in the advertisement dated 12 th June, 1995 inviting
applications from eligible candidates was it mentioned that the candidates
clearing the requisite examination conducted by a recognized University
or Board through vocational stream would stand excluded. However,
nothing much turns on it. Law is well-settled that if qualifi cations
mentioned in an advertisement inviting applications are at variance with
statutorily prescribed qualifications, it is the latter that would prevail.
Profitable reference in this connection may be made to the decisions of
1144          SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2023] 13 S.C.R.


this Court in Malik Mazhar Sultan v. U.P. Public Service Commission5
and Ashish Kumar v. State of Uttar Pradesh 6.
      12. It is observed that the Tribunal or the High Court did not have the
occasion to advert to the certificate issued in favour of the third respondent
and proceeded to decide the Original Application, the Writ Petition and
the Review Applications without any reference to the Amendment Rules
because of inept handling of the case by the appellant. We are in agreement
with Ms. Bhati that at least the High Court, having regard to the disclosure
of the Amendment Rules in the Writ Petition as well as the ground urged in
the Review Application, was clearly wrong in not rectifying the error which
was apparent on the face of the record.
      13. However, the aforesaid observations of ours do not advance the
cause of the appellant in view of the contention advanced on behalf of the
third respondent referring to the certificate which was issued to him by the
said Board. Such certificate enumerates the subjects which he read during his
intermediate education. Out of a total of four subjects, two of them (Hindi
and English) are described as vocational subjects. Importantly, the certificate
which is partly in vernacular also bears at its foot the remark ‘Regular’
in English. It has been contended on behalf of the third respondent that
‘Regular’ in the certificate signifies regular stream and not vocational stream.
      14. Normally, it is not the function of the court to determine equivalence
of two qualifications and/or to scrutinise a particular certificate and say,
on the basis of its appreciation thereof, that the holder thereof satisfies
the eligibility criteria and, thus, is qualified for appointment. It is entirely
the prerogative of the employer, after applications are received from
interested candidates or names of registered candidates are sponsored by
the Employment Exchanges for public employment, to decide whether any
such candidate intending to participate in the selection process is eligible
in terms of the statutorily prescribed rules for appointment and also as to
whether he ought to be allowed to enter the zone of consideration, i.e., to
participate in the selection process. It is only when evidence of a sterling
quality is produced before the court which, without much argument or deep


5   (2006) 9 SCC 507
6   (2018) 3 SCC 55
            UNION OF INDIA v. UZAIR IMRAN & ORS.                         1145
                   [DIPANKAR DATTA, J.]

scrutiny, tilts the balance in favour of one party that the court could decide
either way based on acceptance of such evidence.
      15. Notwithstanding this settled legal position, the stage when
ineligibility is cited for not offering employment also assumes importance.
It is indeed indisputable that none has any legal right to claim public
employment. In terms of Article 16 of the Constitution, a candidate has only
a right to be considered therefor. Once a candidate is declared ineligible
to participate in the selection process at the threshold and if he still wishes
to participate in the process perceiving that his candidature has been
arbitrarily rejected, it is for him to work out his remedy in accordance with
law. However, if the candidature is not rejected at the threshold and the
candidate is allowed to participate in the selection process and ultimately
his name figures in the merit list - though such candidate has no indefeasible
right to claim appointment - he does have a limited right of being accorded
fair and non-discriminatory treatment. Given the stages of the process that
the candidate has successfully crossed, he may not have a vested right
of appointment but a reasonable expectation of being appointed having
regard to his position in the merit list could arise. The employer, if it is a
State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution, would have no
authority to act in an arbitrary manner and throw the candidate out from
the range of appointment, as distinguished from the zone of consideration,
without rhyme or reason. The employer-State being bound by Article 14 of
the Constitution, the law places an obligation, nay duty, on such an employer
to provide some justification by way of reason. If plausible justification
is provided, the courts would be loath to question the justification but the
justification must be such that it is rational and justifiable, and not whimsical
or capricious, warranting non-interference.
      16. In the facts of the present case, the stage of declaration of
ineligibility seems to us to turn the tide in favour of the third respondent.
If the appellant had declared the third respondent as ineligible based on
the appellant’s appreciation of the educational qualification of the third
respondent at the threshold, the situation would have entirely been different.
However, it was not at the threshold that the third respondent was considered
ineligible. As the factual narrative would reveal, the appellant had considered
the third respondent eligible, allowed him to take part in the various tests
1146          SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2023] 13 S.C.R.


in connection with the selection process, interviewed him, placed his name
quite high in the merit list, and thereafter sent him for 15 days’ pre-induction
training starting from 15th March, 1996. It was after a week that the letter
dated 22nd March, 1996 was issued which resulted in ouster of the third
respondent from the range of appointment.
      17. There is little doubt that the decision to treat the third respondent
as ineligible was based on the certificate; however, there is no gainsaying
that the certificate produced by the third respondent in support of his claim
that he had qualified in the relevant examination and, thus, was eligible to
be considered for appointment, did leave room for two views. It is settled
law that unfettered discretion, unaccountable approach and arbitrariness in
State action are antithesis to Article 14; and, particularly when two views
could possibly emerge looking at the certificate of educational qualification
placed by the third respondent, with both views not being wholly unworthy of
acceptance, fairness in administrative procedure demanded that the appellant
ought to have given reason, howsoever brief, as to why it preferred to
consider the third respondent to have succeeded in the relevant examination
through “vocational stream”, thereby attracting ineligibility, without
considering the effect of the remark ‘Regular’ at the foot of the certificate.
The contents of the letter dated 22nd March, 1996, which sounded the death
knell for the third respondent, is clearly suggestive of a general direction
given to the addressee Postmasters General; they were not called upon to
scrutinise each certificate on its merits. As such, there was no individual
rejection but a general rejection without applying one’s mind to the contents
of the certificate. It was, thus, highly improper for the appellant to reject
the candidature of the third respondent outright in the absence of a proper
appreciation of the certificate.
      18. Even if it is assumed that the certificate was duly looked into, we are
inclined to the view on facts (given the contents of the certificate produced
by the third respondent and in the absence of conclusive information as to the
nature of education imparted to the third respondent at the intermediate level)
that the appellant ought to have, in the least, requested for a clarification
from the said Board as to whether the third respondent could be treated to
have cleared the intermediate examination of 1991 in “vocational stream”
or in the category of ‘Regular’ and, thus, was (in)eligible to compete for
             UNION OF INDIA v. UZAIR IMRAN & ORS.                         1147
                    [DIPANKAR DATTA, J.]

appointment in terms of the 1990 Rules, as amended. It was not within the
province of the appellant to scrutinise the certificate of the third respondent
with an approach of “one eye open, one eyed closed” and declare that his
intermediate education was in a “vocational stream”, overlooking or ignoring
that the self-same certificate bore the remark ‘Regular’. The determination
of the appellant, in the present case, undoubtedly hinged on its scarce
knowledge of the nature of the third respondent’s education, evincing that
his exclusion was not on the basis of a valid and proper reason and was,
decidedly, arbitrary.
      19. The principle that if two views are reasonably possible on a given
set of facts and that the courts would stay away from interference and not
substitute its view for the view taken by the employer, may not apply in a
case of the present nature where the conflicting views could be resolved
by a mere reference to the certificate issuing authority to clarify what the
certificate connoted. After all, the future of a prospective appointee called
for an approach consistent with the preambular promise of securing justice
and equality of opportunity, which the appellant failed to secure.
      20. The third respondent, in our view, has been discriminated against
and arbitrarily deprived of the fruit of selection. At this distance of time, it
would not be worthwhile to order a remand particularly when the appellant
is responsible for the lis being prolonged in excess of two decades. There
has been utter carelessness on its part in not producing the Amendment
Rules and the gazette notification before the Tribunal. The third respondent,
therefore, cannot suffer for such carelessness and has to be given what is
due to him. At the same time, we cannot overlook that by passage of time,
the third respondent has crossed the maximum age for entry into public
employment. He is 50 years old now and the age of superannuation is
reported to be 60 years. In such a situation, we propose to dispose of this
appeal by making appropriate directions in exercise of our power to do
complete justice between the parties under Article 142 of the Constitution.
     21. Accordingly, it is directed that:
     (i)      The third respondent shall be offered appointment, initially on
              probation, by the appellant on a post of Postal Assistant (for
              which he was selected) within a month from date;
1148           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2023] 13 S.C.R.


       (ii)    If no post is vacant, a supernumerary post shall be created;
       (iii)   Subject to satisfactory completion of the period of probation,
               the third respondent shall be confirmed in service;
       (iv)    Should service rendered during probation be considered
               not satisfactory, the appellant will be entitled to proceed in
               accordance with law;
       (v)     Having not actually worked, the third respondent shall neither
               be entitled to arrears of salary nor shall he be entitled to claim
               seniority from the date of appointment of other candidates who
               participated in the recruitment process of 1995;
       (vi)    Since the third respondent, if confirmed after successful period
               of probationary service, would have less than 10 years’ service
               to his credit and consequently would fall short of qualifying
               service for pension and other retiral benefits, the appellant
               shall treat him to have been notionally appointed on the date
               the last of the selected candidates was appointed pursuant to
               the process of 1995 only for the purpose of release of such
               benefits in accordance with law; and
       (vii)   In such case, his retiral benefits shall be computed based on
               the last pay drawn by him while in service.
       (viii) These directions will not be applicable to any respondent, other
              than the third respondent.
      22. With the above directions, the appeal stands disposed of together
with pending applications, if any. Parties shall, however, bear their own costs.


Headnotes prepared by:                                         Appeals disposed of.
Nidhi Jain