UNION OF INDIAversusINDIAN NAVY CIVILIAN DESIGN OFFICERS ASSOCIATION AND ANR.
- Citation
- 2023 INSC 152
- Decided
- 22 February 2023
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Bench
- AJAY RASTOGI
Holding
Classification of posts and determination of pay scales is the exclusive domain of the Executive and cannot be interfered with by courts absent a clear case of arbitrariness, leading to the quashing of the Tribunal and High Court orders equating JDOs with CTOs.
Summary
The Union of India appealed against orders of the Central Administrative Tribunal and the Delhi High Court that had equated Junior Design Officers (JDOs) with Civilian Technical Officers (CTOs) and fixed the JDO pay scale at Rs.7500-12000, the same as CTOs, under the Fifth Central Pay Commission. The respondents, the Indian Navy Civilian Design Officers Association, argued that the two posts performed equal work and deserved equal pay. The Court examined whether the judiciary could intervene in the executive's classification of posts and pay determination. It held that such classification and pay fixation are the primary function of the Executive and can be reviewed only in cases of clear arbitrariness or unfairness. Finding no such error, the Court quashed the Tribunal and High Court orders and restored the original pay scales. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, maintaining the distinction between JDO and CTO pay structures.
Issues considered
- Whether the courts can interfere with the executive's classification of posts and determination of pay scales under the Fifth Central Pay Commission.
- Whether the doctrine of equal pay for equal work applies to the JDO and CTO posts in the Indian Navy.
- Whether there was a gross error or arbitrariness in the Tribunal and High Court's decision to equate JDOs with CTOs.
Subjects
Judgment
[2023] 2 S.C.R. 529 529
UNION OF INDIA A
v.
INDIAN NAVY CIVILIAN DESIGN OFFICERS ASSOCIATION
AND ANR.
(Civil Appeal No. 8329 of 2011) B
FEBRUARY 22, 2023
[AJAY RASTOGI AND BELA M. TRIVEDI, JJ.]
Service Law : Pay scale – Grant of – Respondent association
seeking pay scale of Rs.7500-12000 to the Junior Design Officers
C
as allowed to the Civilian Technical Officers (Design), consequent
to the implementation of the Fifth Central Pay Commission – Allowed
by the tribunal and the High Court, by equating the posts of JDOs
with CTOs, and in fixing the pay scales of JDOs equivalent to that
of CTOs – Justification of – Held: Equation and classification of
posts and determination of pay scales is the primary function of the D
Executive and not of the Judiciary – Courts should not enter upon
the task of job evaluation which is generally left to the expert bodies
like the Pay Commissions – Wisdom and advisability of the Courts
in the matters concerning the finance, are ordinarily not amenable
to judicial review unless a gross case of arbitrariness or unfairness
E
is established by the aggrieved party –Though the doctrine equal
pay for equal work is not an abstract doctrine and is capable of
being enforced in a Court of Law, the equal pay must be for equal
work of equal value – On facts, the probation period in case of
CTOs is longer than that of JDOs –Duties and responsibilities of
both the posts are different and the promotional avenues also have F
different duration and different criteria – Tribunal and the High
Court erred in interfering with the pay scales recommended by the
Fifth Central Pay Commission and accepted by the appellant for
the posts of JDOs and CTOs, and in upgrading the pay scale of
JDOs making it equivalent to the pay scale of CTOs – Thus, the
G
orders passed by the High Court and the tribunal quashed and set
aside – Doctrine of equal pay for equal work.
Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1.1 The power of judicial review of the High Courts
in the matter of classification of posts and determination of pay H
529
530 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 2 S.C.R.
A scale is no more res integra. Equation of posts and equation of
salaries is a complex matter which is best left to an expert body
unless there is cogent material on record to come to a firm
conclusion that a grave error had crept in while fixing the pay
scale for a given post and the interference of the Court was
absolutely necessary to undo the injustice. [Para 9][536-G-H; 537-
B
A]
1.2 Though the doctrine “equal pay for equal work” is not
an abstract doctrine and is capable of being enforced in a Court
of Law, the equal pay must be for equal work of equal value. The
equation of posts and determination of pay scales is the primary
C function of the Executive and not of the Judiciary. The Courts
therefore should not enter upon the task of job evaluation which
is generally left to the expert bodies like the Pay Commissions
which undertake rigorous exercise for job evaluation after taking
into consideration several factors like the nature of work, the
D duties, accountability and responsibilities attached to the posts,
the extent of powers conferred on the persons holding a particular
post, the promotional avenues, the Statutory rules governing the
conditions of service, the horizontal and vertical relativities with
similar jobs etc. It may be true that the nature of work involved
in two posts may sometimes appear to be more or less similar,
E however, if the classification of posts and determination of pay
scale have reasonable nexus with the objective or purpose sought
to be achieved, namely, the efficiency in the administration, the
Pay Commissions would be justified in recommending and the
State would be justified in prescribing different pay scales for the
F seemingly similar posts. A higher pay scale to avoid stagnation
or resultant frustration for lack of promotional avenues or
frustration due to longer duration of promotional avenues is also
an acceptable reason for pay differentiation. There could be more
than one grade in a particular service. The classification of posts
and the determination of pay structure, thus falls within the
G exclusive domain of the Executive, and the Courts or Tribunals
cannot sit in appeal over the wisdom of the Executive in
prescribing certain pay structure and grade in a particular service.
[Para 14][541-C-G; 542-A]
H
UNION OF INDIA v. INDIAN NAVY CIVILIAN DESIGN 531
OFFICERS ASSOCIATION
1.3 The Recruitment Rules governing the JDOs are as per A
the SRO 367 dated 08.12.1996, as amended by SRO 246 dated
21.11.2002, whereas the Recruitment Rules governing the CTOs
(Design) are as per the SRO 132 dated 12.05.1982. The probation
period in case of CTOs is longer than that of JDOs. The duties
and responsibilities of both the posts are different and the
B
promotional avenues also have different duration and different
criteria. There was not a single error, much less grave error in
the fixation of the pay scales for the JDOs and CTOs, which would
have justified the interference of the Tribunal. [Para 15][542-B-
C]
1.4 Much emphasis was placed on the noting made by the C
Officer of the Naval Department in the file recommending pay
scale of JDOs equivalent to that of CTOs, however, it may be
noted that a noting recorded in the file is merely an expression
of opinion by a particular officer, and by no-stretch of imagination
such noting could be treated as a decision of the Government. D
[Para 16][542-D]
1.5 The powers of judicial review in the matters involving
financial implications are also very limited. The wisdom and
advisability of the Courts in the matters concerning the finance,
are ordinarily not amenable to judicial review unless a gross case E
of arbitrariness or unfairness is established by the aggrieved party.
[Para 17][542-E]
1.6 The tribunal and the High Court had committed gross
error in interfering with the pay scales recommended by the Fifth
Central Pay Commission and accepted by the appellant for the F
posts of JDOs and CTOs, and in upgrading the pay scale of JDOs
making it equivalent to the pay scale of CTOs. The impugned
orders passed by the High Court and the tribunal are quashed
and set aside. [Para 18, 19][542-F-G]
State of U.P. and Others vs. J.P. Chaurasia and Others G
1989(1) SCC 121 : [1988] 3 Suppl. SCR 288; Union
of India and Others vs. Makhan Chandra Roy 1997
(11) SCC 182 : [1997] 2 SCR 1167; Secretary, Finance
Department and Others vs. West Bengal Registration
Service Association and Others 1993 Suppl. (1) SCC
153 : [1992] 1 SCR 897; State of Haryana and Others H
532 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 2 S.C.R.
A vs. Charanjit Singh and Others 2006 (9) SCC 321 :
[2005] 4 Suppl. SCR 57; Union of India through
Secretary, Department of Personnel, Public Grievances
and Pensions and Anr. vs. T.V.L.N Mallikarjuna Rao
(2015) 3 SCC 653 : [2014] 13 SCR 149 – referred to.
B Case Law Reference
[1988] 3 Suppl. SCR 288 referred to Para 10
[1997] 2 SCR 1167 referred to Para 11
[1992] 1 SCR 897 referred to Para 11
C [2005] 4 Suppl. SCR 57 referred to Para 12
[2014] 13 SCR 149 referred to Para 13
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.8329
of 2011.
D From the Judgment and Order dated 02.08.2010 of the High Court
of Delhi at New Delhi in WPC No.1006 of 2008.
R Bala, Sr. Adv., Ms. Aakanksha Kaul, Mrs. Indira Bhakar,
Sharath Nambiar, Varun Chugh, Digvijay Dam, Rajan Kumar Chourasia,
Chitransh Sharma, Arvind Kumar Sharma, Ms. Sujatha Bagadhi, Advs.
E for the Appellant.
Salman Khurshid, Sr. Adv., Mrs. Naghma Imtiaz, Zargham Ahmed,
Saif Naseem, Mrs. Arushi Jain, Mrs. Shama Usmani, Ishu Dixit, M/s.
Equity Lex Associates, Advs. for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
F
BELA M. TRIVEDI, J.
1. By way of present appeal, the appellant-Union of India
haschallenged the judgment and order dated 02.08.2010 passed by the
High Court of Delhi, in WP(C)No. 1006 of 2008, whereby the High
Court had dismissed the Writ Petition filed by the appellant and confirmed
G
the judgment and order dated 08.06.2007 passed by the Central
Administrative Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Tribunal’) in O.A.
No. 2228 of 2006.
2. The respondent-Indian Navy Civilian Design Officers
Association had by way of filing the O.A. No.2223/2006 before the
H
UNION OF INDIA v. INDIAN NAVY CIVILIAN DESIGN 533
OFFICERS ASSOCIATION [BELA M. TRIVEDI, J.]
Tribunal, challenged the decision of the appellant rejecting their A
representation for the grant of pay scale of Rs.7500-12000 to the Junior
Design Officers as allowed to the Civilian Technical Officers (Design),
consequent to the implementation of the Fifth Central Pay Commission.
As per the case of the respondent-association, the cadre of Design
officers in the Indian Navy was created in the year 1965 in order to
B
meet with the functional requirements of Navy regarding specific
assignments to the Naval dockyards, Training, Establishments, Directorate
of Naval Design and other Technical Directorates of Naval Headquarters.
The drawing staff in the Navy belonged to diverse disciplines such as
Construction, Electrical, Engineering and Armament. So far as the
disciplines of Construction, Electrical and Engineering were concerned, C
the Group ‘B’ gazetted posts were designated as Junior Design Officers
(JDOs), and for Armament disciplines, the Group ‘B’ gazetted posts
were designated as Civilian Technical Officers (CTOs) (Design). The
Recruitment Rules governing the JDOs notified by SRO 367 dated
08.12.1996, were amended by SRO 246 dated 21.11.2002. The
D
Recruitment Rules for the post of CTOs (Design) were notified by SRO
132 dated 12.05.1982.
3. As per the further case of the respondent-Association, up to
the Fifth Central Pay Commission, all the pay scales of all the disciplines
and all grades were the same, however, after the recommendations of
the Fifth Pay Commission, the pay scale of Rs.7500-12000 was fixed E
for the CTOs, whereas the pay scale of Rs.7450-11500 was fixed for
the JDOs. Since the pay scales of the feeder cadre had remained the
same in all the disciplines, the respondent-Association had made
representation to the appellant for the grant of revised pay scale of Rs.
7500-12000 to the JDOs as allowed to the CTOs (Design) consequent F
upon the implementation of the Fifth Central Pay Commission. The
Ministry of Finance having rejected the respondent’s proposal for
upgradation of the pay scale, the respondent-Association had filed the
O.A. No. 1730 of 2003 before the Tribunal. The Tribunal vide the order
dated 01.11.2004 disposed of the said O.A. with direction to the appellant
to consider the parity of pay scale of JDOs along with CTOs by evaluating G
their duties and responsibilities and to pass a detailed speaking order.
4. The Ministry of Finance reconsidered the said representation
of the respondent-Association, however, again rejected the same by a
speaking order on 07.04.2006. Being aggrieved by the said order, the
H
534 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 2 S.C.R.
A respondent-Association had preferred the O.A. No. 2228 of 2006 before
the Tribunal, which came to be allowed vide the order dated 08.06.2007.
The Tribunal set aside the order dated 07.04.2006 passed by the appellant-
UOI and directed the appellant to grant to the JDOs, the pay scale of
Rs. 7500-12000 at par with Group ‘B’ gazetted posts of CTOs (Design)
from the same date as it was given to the Group ‘B’ gazetted posts with
B
all consequential benefits. The appellant being aggrieved by the said
order passed by the Tribunal had filed W.P(C) No. 1006 of 2008, which
came to be dismissed by the High Court vide the impugned order.
5. The main question that falls for consideration before this Court
is whether the Tribunal and the High Court were justified in equating the
C posts of JDOs with CTOs, and in fixing the pay scales of JDOs equivalent
to that of CTOs, in utter disregard of the legal position settled by this
Court in catena of decisions to the effect that the Courts should not
interfere with the complex issues of evaluating the nature of duties and
responsibilities of posts, and of fixing the pay scales, which task otherwise
D is best done by the expert bodies like the Pay Commission.
6. The learned Senior Advocate Mr. R. Bala Subramanyam
appearing for the appellant placing heavy reliance upon the decision of
the Ministry of Finance dated 07.04.2006 submitted as under:
(i) The posts of JDOs and CTOs are governed by two different
E sets of Rules. Accordingly, the qualifications for recruitment/
promotion in the case of CTOs are higher than that of the
JDOs;
(ii) The probation period in case of CTOs is longer than that of
JDOs;
F
(iii) The duties and responsibilities attached to the posts of CTOs
are more onerous, varied and challenging as compared to
that of JDOs;
(iv) The post of CTOs also exists in other streams like R&D in
the revised pay scale of Rs. 7500-12000. These posts could
G
not be given the lower pay scale of Rs. 7450-11500, as the
feeder post of foreman exists in the said pay scale.
(v) As the post of CTOs in different streams within the Naval
Armament Inspection Organizations were already in the
higher pay scale of Rs. 7500-12000, the same pay scale
H
UNION OF INDIA v. INDIAN NAVY CIVILIAN DESIGN 535
OFFICERS ASSOCIATION [BELA M. TRIVEDI, J.]
had to be extended to the CTOs (Design) as well, whereas A
no such exigency existed in case of the post of JDOs.
(vi) The pay scales for the posts of the JDOs and CTOs were
fixed on the basis of the specific recommendations of the
Fifth Central Pay Commission, and therefore the Tribunal
as well as the High Court had committed gross error in B
interfering with the same and in upgrading the pay scale of
JDOs to put them at par with CTOs (Design).
7. Mr. R. Bala Subramanyam has also placed on record the chart
showing the promotional hierarchy of CTOs and JDOs in different CPCs:-
Promotional hierarchy of CTO and JDO in different CPCs C
D
E
F
G
* New grade of PTO(D) created in the cadre restructuring on 29
Oct. 2020.
# The posts of D’Man in NAI cadre has been abolished in the
cadre restricting on 29 Oct. 2020.
- Grade/Posts doesn’t exists in cadre. H
536 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 2 S.C.R.
A 8. Per contra, learned senior advocate Mr. Salman Khurshid
appearing for the respondent-Association made the following
submissions-
(i) The Fifth Pay Commission had ignored the fact that from
the very beginning, the posts of JDOs and CTOs (Design)
B carried the same pay scales, as they were having the same
duties and responsibilities.
(ii) The post of Senior Foreman was granted the pay scale of
Rs. 7450-11500, which was the pay scale granted to the
JDOs, though the JDOs in the course of their duties had to
C supervise the work of Chief Draughtsman and Senior
Foreman.
(iii) The department itself had strongly supported the case of
JDOs by putting a note dated 16.02.2005 recorded by the
Joint Director who had recommended upgradation of the
D pay scale of JDOs and for putting them at par with CTOs
(Design).
(iv) Up to the Fourth Pay Commission, both the posts were
carrying the same pay scale.
(v) There would not have been any cascading effect if the pay
E scale of JDOs was upgraded, as the post of JDOs did not
exist in the other organizations like EME, MES, and Air
Force etc. and the financial implications were also not very
big.
(vi) The essential qualifications in the Recruitment Rules for
F CTO (Design) and in the Recruitment Rules for JDO were
also more or less same and the promotional avenues in both
the cadres were also similar.
9. Before adverting to the rival contentions raised by the learned
counsels for the parties, it deserves to be noted that the power of judicial
G review of the High Courts in the matter of classification of posts and
determination of pay scale is no more res integra. It has been consistently
held by this Court in plethora of decisions that equation of posts and
equation of salaries is a complex matter which is best left to an expert
body unless there is cogent material on record to come to a firm
conclusion that a grave error had crept in while fixing the pay scale for
H
UNION OF INDIA v. INDIAN NAVY CIVILIAN DESIGN 537
OFFICERS ASSOCIATION [BELA M. TRIVEDI, J.]
a given post and the interference of the Court was absolutely necessary A
to undo the injustice.
10. In State of U.P. and Others Vs. J.P. Chaurasia and Others1,
while answering the questions as to whether the Bench Secretaries in
the High Court of Allahabad were entitled to pay scale admissible to the
Section Officers and whether the creation of two grades with different B
scales in the cadre of Bench Secretaries who were doing the same and
similar work was violative of the right to have “equal pay for equal
work”. This Court observed as under: -
“18. The first question regarding entitlement to the pay scale
admissible to Section Officers should not detain us longer. The C
answer to the question depends upon several factors. It does not
just depend upon either the nature of work or volume of work
done by Bench Secretaries. Primarily it requires among others,
evaluation of duties and responsibilities of the respective posts.
More often functions of two posts may appear to be the same or
similar, but there may be difference in degrees in the performance. D
The quantity of work may be the same, but quality may be different
that cannot be determined by relying upon averments in affidavits
of interested parties. The equation of posts or equation of pay
must be left to the executive Government. It must be determined
by expert bodies like Pay Commission. They would be the best E
judge to evaluate the nature of duties and responsibilities of posts.
If there is any such determination by a Commission or Committee,
the court should normally accept it. The court should not try to
tinker with such equivalence unless it is shown that it was made
with extraneous consideration.”
F
11. The afore-stated ratio was followed by this Court in Union of
India and Others Vs. Makhan Chandra Roy2. Again, in Secretary,
Finance Department and Others Vs. West Bengal Registration
Service Association and Others3, the claim of Sub-Registrars of West
Bengal Registration Service claiming parity in pay scale with Munsiffs
on the basis that Sub-Registrars were conferred gazetted status, was G
examined by this Court. It was elaborately observed in para 12 as under:-
1
1989(1) SCC 121
2
1997 (11) SCC 182
3
1993 Suppl. (1) SCC 153
H
538 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 2 S.C.R.
A “12. We do not consider it necessary to traverse the case law on
which reliance has been placed by counsel for the appellants as it
is well settled that equation of posts and determination of pay
scales is the primary function of the executive and not the judiciary
and, therefore, ordinarily courts will not enter upon the task of job
evaluation which is generally left to expert bodies like the Pay
B Commissions, etc. But that is not to say that the Court has no
jurisdiction and the aggrieved employees have no remedy if they
are unjustly treated by arbitrary State action or inaction. Courts
must, however, realise that job evaluation is both a difficult and
time-consuming task which even expert bodies having the
C assistance of staff with requisite expertise have found difficult to
undertake sometimes on account of want of relevant data and
scales for evaluating performances of different groups of
employees. This would call for a constant study of the external
comparisons and internal relativities on account of the changing
nature of job requirements. The factors which may have to be
D kept in view for job evaluation may include (i) the work programme
of his department (ii) the nature of contribution expected of him
(iii) the extent of his responsibility and accountability in the
discharge of his diverse duties and functions (iv) the extent and
nature of freedoms/limitations available or imposed on him in the
E discharge of his duties (v) the extent of powers vested in him (vi)
the extent of his dependence on superiors for the exercise of his
powers (vii) the need to co-ordinate with other departments, etc.
We have also referred to the history of the service and the effort
of various bodies to reduce the total number of pay scales to a
reasonable number. Such reduction in the number of pay scales
F has to be achieved by resorting to broad banding of posts by placing
different posts having comparable job charts in a common scale.
Substantial reduction in the number of pay scales must inevitably
lead to clubbing of posts and grades which were earlier different
and unequal. While doing so care must be taken to ensure that
such rationalisation of the pay structure does not throw up
G
anomalies. Ordinarily a pay structure is evolved keeping in mind
several factors, e.g., (i) method of recruitment, (ii) level at which
recruitment is made, (iii) the hierarchy of service in a given cadre,
(iv) minimum educational/technical qualifications required, (v)
avenues of promotion, (vi) the nature of duties and responsibilities,
H (vii) the horizontal and vertical relativities with similar jobs, (viii)
UNION OF INDIA v. INDIAN NAVY CIVILIAN DESIGN 539
OFFICERS ASSOCIATION [BELA M. TRIVEDI, J.]
public dealings, (ix) satisfaction level, (x) employer’s capacity to A
pay, etc. We have referred to these matters in some detail only to
emphasise that several factors have to be kept in view while
evolving a pay structure and the horizontal and vertical relativities
have to be carefully balanced keeping in mind the hierarchical
arrangements, avenues for promotion, etc. Such a carefully evolved
B
pay structure ought not to be ordinarily disturbed as it may upset
the balance and cause avoidable ripples in other cadres as well. It
is presumably for this reason that the Judicial Secretary who had
strongly recommended a substantial hike in the salary of the Sub-
Registrars to the Second (State) Pay Commission found it difficult
to concede the demand made by the Registration Service before C
him in his capacity as the Chairman of the Third (State) Pay
Commission. There can, therefore, be no doubt that equation of
posts and equation of salaries is a complex matter which is best
left to an expert body unless there is cogent material on record to
come to a firm conclusion that a grave error had crept in while
D
fixing the pay scale for a given post and Court’s interference is
absolutely necessary to undo the injustice.”
12. In State of Haryana and Others Vs.Charanjit Singh and
Others4, a three-judge Bench in a referred matter considered whether
the doctrine of “equal pay for equal work”, was an abstract doctrine,
and observed thus: - E
“19. Having considered the authorities and the submissions we
are of the view that the authorities in the cases of Jasmer
Singh [(1996) 11 SCC 77 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 210 : AIR 1997 SC
1788 : (1997) 2 LLJ 667] , Tilak Raj [(2003) 6 SCC 123 : 2003
SCC (L&S) 828] , Orissa University of Agriculture & F
Technology [(2003) 5 SCC 188 : 2003 SCC (L&S) 645 : (2003) 2
LLJ 968] and Tarun K. Roy [(2004) 1 SCC 347 : 2004 SCC (L&S)
225] lay down the correct law. Undoubtedly, the doctrine of “equal
pay for equal work” is not an abstract doctrine and is capable of
being enforced in a court of law. But equal pay must be for equal G
work of equal value. The principle of “equal pay for equal work”
has no mechanical application in every case. Article 14 permits
reasonable classification based on qualities or characteristics of
persons recruited and grouped together, as against those who were
4
2006 (9) SCC 321 H
540 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 2 S.C.R.
A left out. Of course, the qualities or characteristics must have a
reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved. In service
matters, merit or experience can be a proper basis for classification
for the purposes of pay in order to promote efficiency in
administration. A higher pay scale to avoid stagnation or resultant
frustration for lack of promotional avenues is also an acceptable
B
reason for pay differentiation. The very fact that the person has
not gone through the process of recruitment may itself, in certain
cases, make a difference. If the educational qualifications are
different, then also the doctrine may have no application. Even
though persons may do the same work, their quality of work may
C differ. Where persons are selected by a Selection Committee on
the basis of merit with due regard to seniority a higher pay scale
granted to such persons who are evaluated by the competent
authority cannot be challenged. A classification based on difference
in educational qualifications justifies a difference in pay scales. A
mere nomenclature designating a person as say a carpenter or a
D
craftsman is not enough to come to the conclusion that he is doing
the same work as another carpenter or craftsman in regular
service. The quality of work which is produced may be different
and even the nature of work assigned may be different. It is not
just a comparison of physical activity. The application of the
E principle of “equal pay for equal work” requires consideration of
various dimensions of a given job. The accuracy required and the
dexterity that the job may entail may differ from job to job. It
cannot be judged by the mere volume of work. There may be
qualitative difference as regards reliability and responsibility.
Functions may be the same but the responsibilities make a
F
difference. Thus normally the applicability of this principle must
be left to be evaluated and determined by an expert body. These
are not matters where a writ court can lightly interfere. Normally
a party claiming equal pay for equal work should be required to
raise a dispute in this regard. In any event, the party who claims
G equal pay for equal work has to make necessary averments and
prove that all things are equal. Thus, before any direction can be
issued by a court, the court must first see that there are necessary
averments and there is a proof. If the High Court is, on basis of
material placed before it, convinced that there was equal work of
equal quality and all other relevant factors are fulfilled it may
H
UNION OF INDIA v. INDIAN NAVY CIVILIAN DESIGN 541
OFFICERS ASSOCIATION [BELA M. TRIVEDI, J.]
direct payment of equal pay from the date of the filing of the A
respective writ petition. In all these cases, we find that the High
Court has blindly proceeded on the basis that the doctrine of equal
pay for equal work applies without examining any relevant factors.”
13. In Union of India through Secretary, Department of
Personnel, Public Grievances and Pensions and Anr. Vs. T.V.L.N B
Mallikarjuna Rao5, this Court reiterated the said position: -
“26. The classification of posts and determination of pay structure
comes within the exclusive domain of the executive and the
Tribunal cannot sit in appeal over the wisdom of the executive in
prescribing certain pay structure and grade in a particular service.
There may be more grades than one in a particular service.” C
14. In view of the afore-stated legal position, it clearly emerges
that though the doctrine “equal pay for equal work” is not an abstract
doctrine and is capable of being enforced in a Court of Law, the equal
pay must be for equal work of equal value. The equation of posts and
determination of pay scales is the primary function of the Executive and D
not of the Judiciary. The Courts therefore should not enter upon the task
of job evaluation which is generally left to the expert bodies like the Pay
Commissions which undertake rigorous exercise for job evaluation after
taking into consideration several factors like the nature of work, the
duties, accountability and responsibilities attached to the posts, the extent E
of powers conferred on the persons holding a particular post, the
promotional avenues, the Statutory rules governing the conditions of
service, the horizontal and vertical relativities with similar jobs etc. It
may be true that the nature of work involved in two posts may sometimes
appear to be more or less similar, however, if the classification of posts
and determination of pay scale have reasonable nexus with the objective F
or purpose sought to be achieved, namely, the efficiency in the
administration, the Pay Commissions would be justified in recommending
and the State would be justified in prescribing different pay scales for
the seemingly similar posts. A higher pay scale to avoid stagnation or
resultant frustration for lack of promotional avenues or frustration due
G
to longer duration of promotional avenues is also an acceptable reason
for pay differentiation. It is also a well-accepted position that there could
be more than one grade in a particular service. The classification of
posts and the determination of pay structure, thus falls within the exclusive
domain of the Executive, and the Courts or Tribunals cannot sit in appeal
5
(2015) 3 SCC 653 H
542 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 2 S.C.R.
A over the wisdom of the Executive in prescribing certain pay structure
and grade in a particular service.
15. So far as the facts of the present case are concerned, it is not
disputed that the Recruitment Rules governing the JDOs are as per the
SRO 367 dated 08.12.1996, as amended by SRO 246 dated 21.11.2002,
B whereas the Recruitment Rules governing the CTOs (Design) are as
per the SRO 132 dated 12.05.1982. The probation period in case of
CTOs is longer than that of JDOs. The duties and responsibilities of
both the posts are different and the promotional avenues also have
different duration and different criteria. There was not a single error,
much less grave error pointed out by learned Senior Advocate. Mr.
C Khurshid, in the fixation of the pay scales for the JDOs and CTOs,
which would have justified the interference of the Tribunal.
16. Much emphasis was placed by the learned senior advocate
Mr. Khurshid on the noting made by the Officer of the Naval Department
in the file recommending pay scale of JDOs equivalent to that of CTOs,
D however, it may be noted that a noting recorded in the file is merely an
expression of opinion by a particular officer, and by no-stretch of
imagination such noting could be treated as a decision of the Government6.
17. The powers of judicial review in the matters involving financial
implications are also very limited. The wisdom and advisability of the
E Courts in the matters concerning the finance, are ordinarily not amenable
to judicial review unless a gross case of arbitrariness or unfairness is
established by the aggrieved party.
18. In that view of the matter, we are of the opinion that the
Tribunal and the High Court had committed gross error in interfering
with the pay scales recommended by the Fifth Central Pay Commission
F and accepted by the appellant for the posts of JDOs and CTOs, and in
upgrading the pay scale of JDOs making it equivalent to the pay scale of
CTOs.
19. Consequently, the impugned orders passed by the High Court
and the Tribunal are quashed and set aside. The appeal stands allowed
G accordingly.
Nidhi Jain Appeal allowed.
(Assisted by : Bhavyata Kapoor and Shashwat Jain, LCRAs)
6
H (2009) 15 SCC 705
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