Holding

The Central Administrative Tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction by quashing the charge‑sheet; disciplinary proceedings may proceed and the Tribunal may only intervene when the charges are legally untenable, not to assess their truth.

Summary

The Union of India filed disciplinary proceedings against IRS officer Upendra Singh alleging that, while handling income‑tax proceedings under sections 133A, 144A and 143(1) of the Income Tax Act, he acted illegally by ignoring incriminating evidence, acquiescing to a reduced disclosure by the assessee and directing premature assessment. Singh approached the Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT) which, after an interim stay, quashed the charge‑sheet on the ground that the allegations related to his quasi‑judicial functions. The Supreme Court held that the CAT’s order exceeded its jurisdiction because a tribunal (or High Court under Art 226) may only interfere with framed charges if they are legally untenable, not to examine the truth of the allegations. The Court affirmed that a disciplinary inquiry can be instituted even for conduct in discharge of judicial or quasi‑judicial duties and that the CAT cannot substitute the disciplinary authority’s inquiry. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, the CAT’s order set aside and the disciplinary proceedings were ordered to continue.

Issues considered

The scope of disciplinary action against a government servant for conduct in discharge of judicial or quasi‑judicial functions.
Whether the Central Administrative Tribunal can examine the truth or correctness of charges at the framing stage of a disciplinary inquiry.
Whether the CAT exceeded its jurisdiction by quashing the charge‑sheet.
The applicability of Article 226 jurisdiction to the CAT’s powers.

Legislation cited

Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985
Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964s. 3(1)(i), s. 3(1)(ii), s. 3(1)(iii)
Constitution of Indias. 226
Income Tax Act, 1961s. 133A, s. 143(1), s. 144A, s. 256(1), s. 256(2), s. 263

Subjects

disciplinary inquiryquasi‑judicial functionsCentral Administrative TribunalArticle 226Income Tax Actconduct rulesjurisdictionjudicial reviewtax assessment

Judgment

\

A UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.
v.
UPENDRA SINGH

FEBRUARY 17, 1994

B [B.P. JEEVAN REDDY AND B.L. HANSARIA, JJ.]

Constitution of India, 1950: Article 226-Govemment servant-Discipli- ~

n_ary proceedings High Court's power to inteifere with-Held, Court/Tribunal >-
can inteifere only if on charges framed no misconduct or i"egularity alleged
c can be said to have been made out or charges are contrary to law.

Administrative Tribunals ~ct, 1985: s.l'>-Central Administrative
Tribunal-Power of-Inspecting Assistant Commissioner of Income
Tax-Disciplinary proceedings against-Tribunal quashing charge-
sheet-Held a Tribunal cannot inteifere with co"ectness of charges even in a
-.1111
D proceeding against final order much less at the stage of framing of char-
ges-Jurisdiction of Tribunal is that of High Court under Article 226 of
Constitution-Function of High Court/Tribunal is one of judicial review.
,,
Service Law: Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules: ".3(1)(i), 3(1)(ii),
3(1)(iii)-Respondent Inspecting Assistant Commissioner of Income
E
Tax-Conducting proceedings against assessee under s. 144A of Income Tax
Act, 1961-Charges against alleging illegal and improper conduct on his
part-lnspite of voluminous evidence gathered and incriminating documents
pointing out to a huge amount of unaccounted income with assesses, respon-
dent acquiescing in their offer to disclose afar smaller amount-Direction by
F respondent to assessing officer to complete assessment under s. 143(1) of
Income Tax Act during pendency of proceedings under s. 144A-Held, a
disciplinary inquiry can be held even with respect to conduct of an officer in
discharge of his judicial/quasi-judicial duties.

Income Tax Act, 1961: ss. 133A, 143(1), 144A-Assessment-lnspect-
G
ing Assistant Commissioner-Directions-To assessing officer to complete
assessment under s. 143(1)-Held, during the pendency of proceedings under ,_,
s. 144A such direction was contrary to law. - ..,_

The respondent, was served with a charge-sheet alongwith a state·
H ment of imputations of misconduct/misbehaviour in support thereof. The
1070
{

U.0.1. v: UPENDRASINGH 1071

-'.. charges were to the effect that as an Inspecting Asstt. Commissioner of A
Income Tax, the respondent, while conducting proceedings under s.144-A

... of the Income Tax Act against a group of builders. acted in illegal and
improper manner and inspite of voluminous evidence gathered he neither
examined the incriminating documents and evidence nor passed any order
under s.144-A but acquiesced in the assessees' offer to disclose a far
smaller amount as unaccounted income. He also gave directions to the
B
..... assessing officer to complete the assessments under s.143(1) though the
proceedings under s.144-A were pending. The conduct of the respondent
-'
was stated to have shown an intention to confer undue and improper
benefits on the assessees and violated Rules 3(l)(i), 3(l)(ii) and 3(l)(iii)
of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules. c
The respondent filed an application before the Central Administra-
tive Tribunal seeking to quash the charges on the ground that no proceed-
ings could be taken against him in respect of bis judicial/quasi-judicial
function. The Tribunal passed an interim order restraining the appellants
from proceeding with disciplinary action. The appellants challenged the D
order in an appeal before this Court. The appeal was allowed and the
Tribunal was directed to deal with the matter in the light of the decision
in Union of India & Ors. v. A.N. Saxena, [1992) 3 S.C.C. 124. This Court
further directed that meanwhile the disciplinary proceedings would con-
tinue. Thereafter, the Tribunal went into correctness of the charges on the E
basis of the material produced by the respondent and quashed the charge-
sheet holding that the charges did not indicate any corrupt motive or any .•
culpability on the part of the respondent. Hence the appeal by special leave.

•Allowing the appeal, this Court
F
HELD: 1.1. The order of the Tribunal is clearly in excess of its
jurisdiction. It undertook the inquiry which ought to be held by the
-. disciplinary authority or the inquiry officer. [1078-A, BJ

Union of India and Ors. v: A.N. Saxena, [1992) 3 S.C.C. 124; relied
on.
G

1.2. The jurisdiction of the Central Administrative Tribunal is akin
to that of High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. Therefore, the
principles, norms and the constraints applicable to the said jurisdiction
apply equally to the Tribunal. If the original applkation of the respondent H
1072 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994] 1 S.C.R.

A were to be filed in the High Court it would have been termed, properly '>-
speaking, as a writ of prohibition. A writ of prohibition is issued only when
patent lack of jurisdiction is made out. (1067-G-H]

T.C. Basappa v. T. Nagappa andAnr., A.I.R. (1954) S.C. 440 and Smt.
...
Ujjam Bai v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Anr., A.I.R. (1962) S.C. 1621,
B followed.

1.3. In the case of charges framed in a disciplinary inquiry, the ~

Tribunal or Court can interfere only if on the charges framed (read with ~

imputation or particulars of the cha1-ges, if any) no misconduct or ir·
regularity alleged can be said to have been made out, or the charges framed
c are contrary to any law. At this stage, the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to go
into the correctness or truth of the charges. It cannot take over the function
of the disciplinary authority. The truth or otherwise of the charges is a
matter for the disciplinary authority to go into. Even after the conclusion of
the disciplinary proceedings, if the matter comes to Court or Tribunal, they
D have no jurisdiction to look into the truth of the charges or into the
correctness of the findings recorded by the disciplinary authority or the
appellate authority as the case may be. Their function is one of judic~al
review. It can not go into the correctness of the decision as a matter of fact
but only into the correctness of decision making process. (1074-H; 1075-A-C]
E H.B. Gandh~ Excise and Taxation Officer-cum- Assessing Authority,
Kamal & Ors. v. Mis Gopi Nath & Sons and Ors., (1992) Supp. 2 S.C.C.
312, relied on.
.....
1.4. In the instant case, the Tribunal has held that the charges are
F not sustainable, not on the basis of the articles of charges and the state·
ment of imputation but mainly on the basis of the material produced by
the respondent before it. On the other hand, the charges clearly allege the
illegal and improper conduct on the part of the re3pondent. He is said to
have improperly and illegally acquiesced in the offer of the assessee to
disclose a much smaller amount and failed to direct the assessing officer
G to bring to tax the full amount of undisclosed income, which was admitted
by the assessee during the survey. During the pendency of the proceedings
11-
under s. 144A of the Incoine Tax Act, he issued a direction, contrary to
law, to the assessing officer to complete the assessment_ of the concerns
under s. 143(1). Besides, the Tribunal examined the truth of ihe charges
H with reference to the material and orders produced by the respondent, in
.,,,
U.0.1. v. UPENDRASINGH [JEEVAN REDDY,J.] 1073

particular the proceedings taken against the assessee by the Commissioner A
of Income Tax under s.263 and the order of the Income Tax Appellate
Tribunal in the appeal preferred by the assessee. [1079-F-H; 1080-A)

2. A disciplinary inquiry can be held even with respect to the conduct
of an officer in discharge of his judicial/quasi-judicial duties. [1081-C]
B
Union of India v. KK Dhawan, [1993] 2 S.C.C. 56 and Union of India
& Ors. v. A.M. Saxena, [1992] 3 S.C.C. 124," relied on. [1081-D] .

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 7484 of
1993.
c
From the Judgment and Order dated 19..l.93 of the Central Ad-
ministrative Tribunal Principal Bench, New Delhi in O.A.No. 806 of 1991.

Altaf Ahmad, Additional Solicitor General, N.N. Goswamy, Ashok
K. Srivastava and D.S. Mahra for the Appellants.
D
R.K. Jain, s:T. Sambindia, Ashish Varma and P.N. Misra for the
Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
E
B.P. JEEVAN REDDY, J., 1. This appeal is preferred against the
judgment of the Central Administrative Tribunal, Principal Bench, New

-- Delhi quashing the charges (charge-sheet) framed on February 7, 1991
against the respondent. The respondent is a member of the Indian Revenue
Service (I.R.S.) and. is presently working as Deputy Commissioner of
Income Tax. On February 7, 1991, a memorandum of charges was issued F "
to him accompanied by 'Statement of imputations of misconduct or mis-
behaviour in support of article of charges' framed against him. The articles
., of charges are the following:

ARTICLE - I
G
The said Shri U pendra Singh while posted as Inspecting Assistant
Commissioner of Income Tax, B.S.D. (North) Range Bombay
during the financial year 1986-87, got a survey u/s 133A of Income
Tax Act, 1961 conducted in the cases of Raghuvanshi group of
builders on 9.1.87. During the course of this survey incriminating H
i-

1074 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994) 1 S.C.R.

A documents and a confessional statement of the assessees showing
unaccounted receipts of Rs. 1.56 crores and admitted unaccounted
incomes of Rs. 46.60 lakhs earned by four firms of this group, viz.,
M/s Raghuvanshi Builders, · M/s Raghuvanshi Developers, M/s
Raghuvanshi Associates and M/s Raghani Builders, were obtained:

B (a) The said Shri Upendra Singh initiated proceedings u/s
144-A in the case of M/s Raghuvanshi Builders, Mis Ragh~van
.shi Developers and M/s Raghuvanshi Associates in an illegal
and improper manner.

c (b) During the aforementioned proceedings u/s 144A, the said
Shri Upendra Singh neither examined the incriminating docu-
ments and evidence collected during the survey, nor passed any
orders u/s 144A, inspite of being aware of the evidence
gathered during the survey.

D (c)· The said Shri Upendra Singh during the aforementioned
proceedings u/s 144A improperly and illegally acquiesced in
the assessee's offer to disclose only an amount of Rs. 11,27,794
in the names of the aforesaid firms and did not direct the
assessing officer to bring to tax the full amount of undisclosed
incomes of these firms as admitted during the survey on
E
9.1.1987.

(d) The said Shri Upendra Singh gave illegal and improper

F
directions to the assessing officer to complete the assessments
in the cases of M/s Raghuvanshi Builders, M/s Raghuvanshi
Developers and M/s Raghuvanshi Associates u/s 143(1) even
-.
though at the relevant time proceedings u/s 144A of LT. Act,
1961 were pending before him and these cases did not come
within the purview of the Summary Assessment Scheme or the
Amestry Scheme of the C.B.D.T.
G 2. Shri Upendra Singh has, therefore, violated Rules 3(1)(i),
3(1)(ii) and 3(1)(iii) of the C.C.S. (Conduct) Rules, 1964."

2. For the purposes of this case, it is not necessary to set out the
statement of imputations wJiich is a very lengthy one referring elaborately
H to the material and evidence which was ought to be relied upon against the
U.0.1. v. UPENDRASINGH [JEEVAN REDDY,J.) 1075

respondent at the propo:.cd inquiry. As soon as the memo of charges was A
served upon the respondent, he approached the Tribunal for quashing the
charges. The Tribunal admitted the original application and P!iSSed the
following interim order:

"The learned counsel submitted that the applicant has been served
with a chargesheet on account of the charges which relate to the B
discharge of quasi-judicial functions by the applicant. He, there-
fore, prayed for that as per Supreme Court's decision in the case
of V.D. Trivedi v. Union of India, interim directions may be issued
restraining the respondents from proceeding against the applicant
under the Disciplinary & Appeal Rules. C
We have considered the matter and in the interest of justice, we
restrain the respondents from proceeding with disciplinary action
in pursuance of the charge-sheet dt. 7.2.1991 for a period of 14
days. List the case on 18.4.1991 for further consideration of interim
relief. D
Order Dasti."

3. Against the said interim order, the Union of India approached this
Court by way of Civil Appeal No. 4316 of 1991. The appeal was allowed
by this Court by its order dated September 10, 1992 and the Tribunal was E
directed to "deal with the matter in the light of the observations made by
this Court in Union of India and Others v. A.N. Saxena, (Supra)." It was
further directed that "in the meanwhile the disciplinary proceedings in-
itiated against the respondent on the basis of the memorandum dated
February 7, 1991 would continue." It is necessary to notice the observations p
in the said judgment. The Bench first dealt with the submission that no
disciplinary proceedings can be taken against an officer in respect of his
judicial or quasi-judicial functions. It rejected the contention following the
decision of this Court in Union of India and Ors. v. A.N. Saxena, (19921 3
S.C.C. 124. While rejecting the said contention the Bench drew particular
attention to the following observations in A.N. Saxena: "In the first place, G
we cannot, but confess our astonishment at the impugned order passed by
the Tribunal. In a case like this the Tribunal, we feel, should have been
very careful before granting stay in a disciplinary proceedings at an inter-
locutory stage. The imputations made against the respondent were ex-
tremely serious and the facts alleged, if proved, would have established H
1076 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994) 1 S.C.R.

A misconduct and misbehaviour. It is surprising that without apparently
considering whether the memorandum of charges deserved to be enquired
into or not, granted a stay of disciplinary proceedings as it has done. If the
disciplinary proceedings in such serious matter are stayed so lightly as the
Tribunal appears to have done, it would be extremely difficult to bring any
wrongdoer to book. We have, therefore, no hesitation in setting aside the
B impugned order of the tribunal and we direct that the disciplinary proceed-
ings against the respondent in terms of the charge-sheet dated March 13,
1989 shall be proceeded with according to law. In fact, we would suggest
that disciplinary proceedings should be proceeded with as early as possible
and with utmost zeal." The Bench further opined that "the present case is
c fully covered by the aforesaid decision of this Court and considering the
facts and circumstances of the present case, in the light of the said decision,
the impugned order passed by the Tribunal can not be upheld." Evidently
because the said appeal was preferred against an interlocutory order made
by the Tribunal, the Bench directed the Tribunal to deal with the original
D application in the light of the decision in A.N. Saxena. The Bench directed
expressly that the disciplinary proceedings against the respondent were to
continue.

4. When the matter went back to the Tribunal, it went into the
correctness of the charges on the basis of the material produced by the
E respondent and quashed the charges holding that the charges do not
indicate any corrupt motive or any culpability on the part of the respon-
dent. We must say, we are not a little surprised at the course adopted by
the Tribunal. I.n its order dated September 10, 1992 this Court specifically
drew attention to the observations in A.N. Saxena that the Tribunal ought
F not to. interfere at an interlocutory stage and yet the Tribunal chose to
interfere on the basis of the material which was yet to be produced at the
inquiry. In short, the Tribunal undertook the inquiry which ought to be held
by the disciplinary-authority (or the inquiry officer appointed by him) and
found that the charges are not true. It may be recalled that the jurisdiction
of the Central Administrative Tribunal is akin to the jurisdiction of the
G High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. Therefore, the prin-
ciples, norms and the constraints which apply to the said jurisdiction apply
equally to the Tribunal. If the original application of the respondent were
to be filed in the High Court it would have been termed, properly speaking,
as a writ of prohibition. A writ of prohibition is issued only when patent
H lack of jurisdiction is made out. It is true that a High Court acting under
U.0.1. v., UPENDRASINGH [JEEVAN REDDY,J.) 1077

..( Article 226 is not bound by the technical rules applying to the issuance of A
prerogative writs like certiorari, prohibition and mandamus in United
Kingdom, yet the basic principles and norms applying to the said writs must
be kept in view, as observed by this Court in T.C. Basappa v. T. Nagappa
and another, A.LR. (1954) S.C. 440. It was observed by Mukherjea, J.
speaking for the Constitution Bench:
B
"The language used in Articles 32 and 226 of our Constitution is
very wide and the powers of the Supreme Court was well as of all
the High Courts in India extend to issuing of orders, writs or
directions including writs in the nature of 'habeas corpus, man-
damus, quo warranto, prohibition and certiorari' as may be con- c
sidered necessary for enforcement of the fundamental rights and
in the case of the High Courts, for other purposes as well. In view
of the express provisions in our Constitution we need not now look
back to the early history or the procedural technicalities of these
writs in English law, nor feel oppressed by any difference or change
of opinion exptessed in particular cases by English Judges. We can
D
make an order or issue a writ in the nature of 'certiorari' in all
appropriate cases and in appropriate manner," so long as we keep
to the broad and fundamental principles that regulate the exercise of
jurisdiction in the matter of granting such writs in English law."
E
5. The said statement of law was expressly affirmed by a Seven- Judge
Bench in Smt. Ujjam Bai v. State of Uttar Pradesh and another, A.LR.
(1962) S.C. 1621 at 1625. The reason for this dictum is self-evident. If we do
not keep to the broad and fundamental principles that regulate the exercise
of jurisdiction in the matter of granting such writs in English law, the exercise F
of jurisdiction becomes rudderless and unguided; it tends to become arbitrary
and capricious. There will be no unifomtity of approach and there will be the
danger of the jurisdiction becoming personalised. The parameters of jurisdic-
tion would vary Judge to Judge and from Court to Court. (Some say, this has
already happened.) Law does advance. Jurisprudence does undoubtedly
develop with the passage of time, but not by forgetting the fundamentals. You G
-.(
have to build upon the existing foundations and not by abandoning them. It
leads to confusion; it does not assist in cohererice in thought or action.

6. In the case o~ chi.•.rges framed in a disciplinary inquiry the Tribunal
or Court can interfere only if on the charges framed (read with imputation H
!)

1078 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994) 1 S.C.R.

A or particulars of the charges, if any) no misconduct or other irregularity
alleged can be said to have been made out or the charges framed are
contrary to any law. At this stage, the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to go
into the correctness or truth of the charges. The Tribunal cannot take over
the functions of the disciplinary authority. The truth or otherwise of the
.
charges is a matter for the disciplinary authority to go into. Indeed, even
B after the conclusion of the disciplinary proceedings, if the matter comes to
Court or Tribunal, they have no jurisdiction to look into the truth of the
charges or into the correctness of the findings recorded by the disciplinary
authority or the appellate authority as the case may be. The function of the
Courtffribunal is one of judicial review, the parameters of whjch are
c repeatedly laid down by this Court. It would be sufficient to qnote the
decision in H.B. Gandhi, Excise and Taxation Officer-cum-Assessing
Authority, Kamal & Ors v. Mis Gopi Nath & Sons and Ors., (1992} Suppl.
2 S.C.C. 312. The Bench comprising M.N. Venkatachaliah, J. (as he then
was) and A.M. Ahmadi, J., affirmed the principle thus:
D
"Judicial review, it is trite, is not directed against the decision but
is confined to the decision making process. Judicial review cannot
extend to the examination of the correctness or reasonableness of
a decision as a matter of fact. The purpose of judicial review is to
ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure
E that the authority after according fair treatment reaches, on a
matter which it is authorised by law to decide, a conclusion which
is correct in the eyes of the Court. Judicial review is not an appeal
from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision
is made. It will be erroneous to think that the Court sits in judgment
F not only on the correctness of the decision making process but'also
on the correctness of the decision itself."

7. Now, if a Court cannot inteifere with the truth or comxtness of the
G charges even in a proceeding against the final order, it is un-understandab/e
how can .that be done by the Tribunal at the stage of framing of charges? In
this case, the Tribunal has held that the charges are not sustainable (the
finding that no culpability is alleged and no corrupt motive attributed), not
on the basis of the articles of charges and the statement of imputations but
mainly on the basis of the material produced by the respondent before it,
H as we shall presently indicate.
U.0.1. v. UPENDRASINGH [JEEVAN REDDY,J.] 1079

8. The gravamen of the charges against the respondent is that he A
conducted a survey under section 133-A of the Income Tax Act, 1961 in
respect of Reghuvanshi group of builders on 9th January, 1987; during the
course of survey, several incriminating documents were found; the assessee
also gave a statement (referred to as confessional statement in t.i1c memo
of charges) admitting unaccounted receipts of Rs. 1.56 crores and also
admitting unaccounted income of Rs. 46.60 lakhs; the respondent initiated
B
proceedings under Section 144-A of the Income Tax Act against the said
group in illegal and improper manner and that inspite of voluminous
evidence gathered, he neither examined the incriminating documents and
evidence nor passed any order under Section 144-A but improperly and
illegally acquiesced in the assessees' offer to disclose a far smaller amount; c
further the respondent gave directions to the assessing officer to complete
the assessments of the said builder under Section 143(1) (summary assess-
ment procedure) even though at the relevant time the proceedings under
section 144A were pending; during the pendency of such proceedings, no
such direction could have been issued by the respondent. On the above D
basis it was alleged that the respondent has violated Rules 3(1)(i), 3(1)(ii),
and 3(iii) of C.C.S. Conduct Rules, 1944. The statement of imputations
elaborately sets out the evidence and material in support of the said
charges. It is alleged that the conduct of the respondent "shows an intention
to confer undue and improper benefits on these assessees. He has thus
displayed lack of integrity, lack of devotion to duty and conduct unbecom- E
ing of a government servant ....".

9. The Tribunal observed in the first instance that in the articles of
charges there is no reference to culpability of respondent and that it is
found only in the statement of imputations. This is not correct. The charges F
which we have set out hereinabove clearly allege the illegal and improper
conduct on the part of the respondent. It was also alleged that he im-
properly and illegally acquiesced in the offer of the assessee to disclose a
much smaller amount and that he failed to direct the assessing officer to
bring to tax the full amount of undisclosed income, which was admitted by
the assessee during the survey. As a matter or fact, it was alleged, he issued G
a direction, contrary to law, to the assessing officer to complete the
assessment of the concerns under section 143(1). Secondly, the Tribunal
examined the truth of the charges with reference to the material and orders
produced by the respondent, in particular the proceedings taken by the
Commissioner of India Tax under Section 263 and the order of the Income H
1080 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994} 1 S.C.R.

A TatX Appellate Tribunal (I.T.A.T.) in the appeal preferred by the aforesaid .\.-
assessee against the order of the Commissioner of Income Tax. After
extensively referring to the findings and observations in the order of the
l.T.A.T., the Tribunal concluded:

"Thus, according to the order of the ITAT dated 21..7.92, there is
B no evidence that the action taken by the applicant in regard to the
assessments in question was pursuant to any corrupt motive or an
improper motive to oblige any one indicting culpability. Assuming
A..
that the assessments made. were erroneous or wrong, no discipli-
nary action can be taken against the applicant as he had only
c discharged quasi-judicial functions. In the instant case, the Income
Tax Appellate Tribunal allowed the appeal filed by the assessees
against lhe orders passed by the C.I.T. under Section 263 of the
Income Tax Act. The decision of the Income Tax Tribunal which
is the highest fact finding authority lends support to the stand of
the applicant in the instant case."
D
(It is significant to notice that the order of I.T.A.T. is dated July 21,
1992, whereas the charges were frnmed against the respondent and com-
municated to him along with statement of imputations on February 7, 1991
- about lV2 years earlier.)
-
E
10. It may be noticed that the proceedings taken by the C.I.T. under
Section 263 and the appeal before the I.T.A.T. were between the Revenue
and the assessee aforesaid. In those proceedings, the conduct of the -4 ..

respondent was not in issue but the liability of the assessee. Any observa-
F tion made therein with respect to the action/orders of the respondent is
only incidental. May be, the said orders are relevant - we do not propose
to express any opinion on the issue ~ in the disciplinary proceedings against
the Tribunal, but they are certainly not conclusive. Those were the
proceedings taken by the assessee to protect his own rights. Moreover, it
is stated by the learned counsel for the Revenue before us that the
G department has not accepted the order of the Income Tax Appellate
Tribunal and that it has filed an application under section 256(1) before
the Tribunal which no doubt has been dismissed but that the department
is filing an application before the High Court under Section 256(2). We do
not know whether the said observations/findings of the Tribunal will ul-
H timately be upheld or not. They are not yet final. In the circumstances, we
U.O.I. v. UPENDRA SINGH [JEEV AN REDDY, J.] 1081

..(_ are inclined to agree with the learned counsel for the Revenue that the A
order of the Tribunal is clearly in excess of its jurisdiction.

11. Sri R.K. Jain, learned counsel for the respondent referred us to
certain material which according to him establishes the innocence and
good faith of the respondent. We do not propose to refer to the said
material or to comment upon it since any such comment is bound to B
prejudice the case of the parties before the disciplinary authority, which
should now proceed expeditiously according to law.

12. We must mention that Sri R.K. Jain, learned counsel for the
respondent did not dispute the proposition that a disciplinary inquiry can C
be held even with respect to judicial/quasi-judicial orders passed by an
officer. His main contention was that the charges are not sustainable, which
contention, as we have indicated above, cannot be countenanced at this
stage of the proceedir.gs.

13. Before parting with this case, we may refer to the decision of this D
court in Union of India v. KK Dhawan, [1993) 2 S.C.C. 56. FollowingA.N.
Saxena, this court held that a disciplinary inquiry can be held even with
respect to the conduct of an officer in discharge of his judicial or quasi-
judici~l duties. Having said so, this court set out the situations in which
disciplinary action can be taken with respect to the judicial/quasi-judicial
E
conduct. Paragraphs (28) and (29) of the judgment will bring out the ratio:

"Certainly, therefore, the officer who exercises judicial or quasi-
judicial powers act negligently or recklessly or in order to confer
undue favour on a person is not acting as a Judge. Accordingly,
the contention of the respondent has to be rejected. It is important F
to bear in mind that in the present case, we are not concerned
with the correctness or legality of the decision of the respondent
but the conduct of the respondent in discharge of his duties as an
officer. The legality of the orders with reference to the nine
assessments may be questioned in appeal or revision under the G
Act. But we have no doubt in our mind that the Government is
not precluded from taking the disciplinary action for violation of
the Conduct Rules. Thus, we conclude that the disciplinary action
can be taken in the following cases:

(i) Where the officer had acted in a manner as would reilect on H
1082 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1994) 1 S.C.R.

A his reputation for integrity or good faith or devotion to duty;

(ii) if there is prima f acie material to show recklessness or miscon- .
duct in the discharge of his duty;

(iii) if he has acted in a manner which is unbecoming of a Govern-
B ment servant;

(iv) if he had acted negligently or that he omitted the prescribed _.__ '

conditions which are essential for the exercise of the statutory
powers;

c (v) if he had acted in order to unduly favour a party;

(vi) if he had been actuated by corrupt motive, however small the
bribe may be because Lord Coke said long age "though the bribe
may be small, yet the fault is great."
D The instances above catalogued are not exhaustive. However,
we may add that for a mere technical violation or merely because
the order is wrong and the action not falling under the above
enumerated instances, disciplinary action is not warranted. Here,
we may utter a word of caution. Each case will depend upon the
E facts and no absolute rule can be postulated."

14. Sri Jain submitted that the allegations made against the respon-
dent do not fall within any of the six clauses. It is not possible to agree. In
any event, the truth or otherwise of the charges is a matter for inquiry.

F 15. For the above reasons, the appeal is allowed, the order of the
Tribunal is set aside, the disciplinary inquiry against the respondent shall
proceed unhindered and expeditiously. It is in the interest of everyone
concerned that the truth or otherwise of the charges is determined at the
earliest. The respondent shall pay the costs of the appellant in this appeal
assessed at Rs. 5,000.

R.P. Appeal allowed.