Holding

The Court held that unless the punishment shocks the conscience of the court, there is no scope for judicial interference, and therefore the appellate authority’s order of compulsory retirement stands.

Summary

The respondent K.G. Soni, a store attendant in the Bank Note Press, was charged with misconduct for not disclosing his first wife's name on an attestation form and for marrying a second woman while his first marriage subsisted. A departmental inquiry under the Central Civil Services (Clarification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965, found him not guilty, but the disciplinary authority disagreed, held him guilty and ordered removal from service. On appeal, the appellate authority reduced the penalty to compulsory retirement. The Central Administrative Tribunal dismissed the petition on limitation grounds, and the Madhya Pradesh High Court remitted the matter to the appellate authority for reconsideration of the quantum of punishment, deeming compulsory retirement disproportionate. The Union of India appealed, and this Court held that judicial review of disciplinary orders is limited to procedural irregularities or irrationality; unless the punishment shocks the conscience, courts cannot interfere with the quantum of penalty. Consequently, the High Court’s remand was set aside and the appellate authority’s order of compulsory retirement was restored.

Issues considered

Whether the High Court could interfere with the quantum of punishment imposed by the appellate authority
Whether the punishment of compulsory retirement for the alleged misconduct is disproportionate
What is the scope of judicial review of disciplinary orders under the Central Civil Services Rules
Whether the Wednesbury test and principles of proportionality apply to such cases

Legislation cited

Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985s. 21(2)

Subjects

service lawmisconductcompulsory retirementdisciplinary proceedingsjudicial reviewproportionalityWednesbury testadministrative lawpunishment quantumhigh court interference

Judgment

A UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.
v.
K.G.SONI

AUGUST 17, 2006

B [ARIJIT PASA YAT AND LOKESHWAR SINGH PANTA, JJ.)

Service law:

Misconduct-Compulsory retirement-Quantum of punishment-
C Interference by High Court-Propriety of-Central Government employee
did not fill his wife's name in al/estation form-later married another woman
during subsistence of his first marriage-Disciplinary authority imposed
penalty of removal from service-Appellate authority converted the punishment
into one of compulsory retirement--Central Administrative Tribunal declined
D to interfere--High Court in writ jurisdiction remilled the matter to the appellate
authority for reconsideration as regards quantum ofpunishment-Held. unless
the punishment imposed by disciplinary authority or appellate authority
shocks the conscience of the court. there is no scope for interference-High
Court has not even indicated as why the punishment was considered
disproportionate and why it considered the misconduct to be not serious-·
E Judgment of High Court set aside and that of appellate authority restored-
Central Civil Services (Clarification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965.

Administrative law:

Orders of administrative authorities-Judicial review of-Scope of
F
Respondent was an employee in the Bank Note Press. A departmental
inquiry under the Central Civil Services (Clarification, Control and Appeal)
Rules, 1965, was initiated against him for the misconduct on the allegation
that he did not disclose the name of his wife in the attestation form and later
G married another woman during the subsistence of his first marriage. Though
the Inquiry Officer recorded findings in favour of the respondent, the
disciplinary authority held him guilty of misconduct and imposed punishment
of removal from service. The appellate authority converted the punishment of
removal into one of r.ompulsory retirement. The Central Administrative
Tribunal declined to interfere. The respondent filed a writ petition before the
H 5~
U.O .I. v. K.G. SONI 561
High Court, which remitted the matter to the appellate authority for A
reconsideration with regard to quantum of punishment Aggrieved, the Union
of India filed the present appeal.

Allowing the appeal, the Court

HELD: I.I. On the scope of judicial review of the orders of B
administrative authorities, the judicial pronouncements are to the effect that
the Court should not interfere with administrator's decision unless it was
illogical or suffers from procedural impropriety or was shocking to the
conscience of the court in the sense that it was in defiance of logic or moral
standards. The scope of judicial review is limited to the deficiency in decision- C
making process and not the decision. Further, to shorten litigations it may,
in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment by recording
cogent reasons in support thereof. In a normal course if the punishment
imposed is shockingly disproportionate, it would be appropriate to direct the
disciplinary authority or the appellate authority to reconsider the penalty
imposed. 1565-G-H; 566-A-CI D
Damoh Panna Sagar Rural Regional Bank and Ors. v. Munna Lal Jain,
12005) 10 SCC 84; Union of India and Anr. v. G. Ganayutham, 11997) 7 SCC
463 and B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India and Ors., 1199516 SCC 749, relied
on.
E
1.2. In the instant case, the High Court has not kept the correct position
in view. It has not even indicated as to why the punishment was considered
disproportionate and why it considered the misconduct to be not serious. The
order of the High Court is set aside and that of the appellate authority is
restored. (566-D-E)
F
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 3528 of2006.

From the Judgment and Order dated 12.12.2003 of the High Court of
Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur in W.P. No. 2106/2003.

Vikas Singh, A.S.G., Arijit Prasad, P.Parmeswaran and B.V. Balaram Das G
for the Appellants.

Chinmoy Pradip Sharma and Dr. Kailash Chand for the Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
H
562 SUPREME COURf RF.PORTS [2006] Sl!PP. 4 S.C.R.

A ARIJIT PASA VAT, J. Leave granted.

Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment rendered by a Division
Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court at Jabalpur holding that the
punishment of compulsory retirement imposed on the respondent was
disproportionate to the alleged misconduct. Therefore. the Appellate Authority
B was directed to consider the matter afresh with regard to the quantum of
punishment.

Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:

Respondent was a Store Attendant in the Bank Note Press, District
c Dewas (M.P). A charge-sheet was issued against him on the foundation that
though he had got married with one Parvathibai in the year 1973, while filling
up the attestation form on 16.3.1974. he did not show her name as his wife.
It was further alleged that he got married for the second time in October, 1974
with one Ushabai. On the basis of this non-disclosure, which, authorities
D considered to be a misconduct. a disciplinary proceeding was initiated. It is
to be noted that the non-disclosure came to the notice of the authorities when
Parvath ibai made a complaint about the second marriage. The enquiry was
conducted under Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal)
Ru ks, 1965 (in short the 'Rules'). The Enquiry Officer recorded findings in
favour of the respondent. The Disciplinary Authority differed with the findings
E of the Inquiry Offil;er and came to hold that second marriage had in fact been
performed and accordingly it issued show cause notice to the respondent and
eventually came to hold that the respondent was guilty of misconduct and
imposed the punishment of removal by order dated 2.4.1996.

The respondent being aggrieved preferred an appeal and the Appellate
F Authority converted the punishment of removal into one of compulsory
retirement. The said order was passed on 15.4.1997.

Being aggrieved with the aforesaid order. the respondent approached
the Central Administrative Tribunal. Jabalpur Bench (in short the 'Tribunal')
G on 13.12.1998. The Tritunal came to hold that the application was barred by
lim ltation and accordingly declined to entertain the same. The Tribunal recorded
a finding that no application for condonation of delay has been filed.

Assailing order passed by the Tribunal a Writ application was filed. It
was submitted that the Tribunal had erroneously held that there was no
H application for condonation of delay. This is not one of those cases where
U.0.1.v. K.G.SONl[PASAYAT,J.] 563
cognizance cannot be taken by the Tribunal under Section 21 (2) of the A
Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985 (in short the 'Tribunal Act'). It was, therefore,
submitted that the Tribunal should have condoned the delay and dealt with
the matter on merits. It was further submitted that the quantum of punishment
awarded did not commensurate with the alleged misconduct.

The appellants took the stand that the punishment awarded was rather B
liberal and no interference was called for.

The High Court was of the view that ordinarily it would have remanded
the matter to Tribunal for fresh consideration on merits but it was of the view
that this is a fit case where the matter should be remitted to the Appellate C
Authority for reconsideration with regard to the quantum of punishment. The
only basis for coming to the conclusion that the complaint was made by the
wife about the alleged second marriage belatedly, and this is not such a
misconduct which warrants compulsory retirement before his superannuation.

In support of the appeal learned counsel for the appellants submitted D
that the High Court has clearly lost sight of the scope for interference with
the quantum of punishment.

In response, learned counsel for the respondent supported the judgment.

It is to be noted that the Appellate Authority had noted as follows:- E
"Although, after careful consideration of22 years services rendered
by him in Bank Note Press, the undersigned as an Appellate Authority
has cordially considered the appeal using the powers conferred under
Rule 27 of Central Civil Service (Classification, Central and Appeal)
Rule, 1965 that the penalty imposed upon him the removal from services p
has been termed as cancelled and in place of this, Sh. K.G. Soni, Ex.Sr.
Attendant has been awarded a penalty of Compulsory Retirement
w.c.f. 02.04.1996. As a result of Compulsory Retirement, Sh. K.G. Soni
has entitled for payment of full pension, Gratuity etc. under Rule
Central Civil Services (Pension) Rule, 1972."
G
In B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India and Ors., [1995] 6 SCC 749 it was
observed:

"A review of the above legal position would establish that the
disciplinary authority, and on appeal the appellate authority, being
fact-finding authorities have exclusive power to consider the evidence H
564 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (20061SUPP.4 S.C.R.

A with a view to maintain discipline. They are invested with the discretion
to impose appropriate punishment keeping in view the magnitude or
gravity of the misconduct. The High Court/Tribunal, while exercising
the power of judicial review, cannot normally substitute its own
conclusion on penalty and impose some other penalty. If the
punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate
B authority shocks the conscience of the High Court/Tribunal, it would
appropriately mould the relief, either directing the disciplinary/appellate
authority to reconsider the penalty imposed, or to shorten the litigation,
it may itself, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate
punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof." ..
c In Union of India and Anr. v. G. Ganayutham, [1997) 7 SCC 463, this
Court summed up the position relating to proportionality in paragraphs 31 and
32, which read as follows:

"The current position of proportionality in administrative law in
D England and India can be summarized as follows:

(I) To judge the validity of any administrative order or
statutory discretion, nonnally the Wednesbury test is to be
applied to find out if the decision was illegal or suffered from
procedural improprieties or was one which no sensible
E decision-maker could, on the material before him and within
the framework of the law, have arrived at. The court would
consider whether relevant matters had not been taken into
account or whether irrelevant matters had been taken into
account or whether the action was not bona fide. The court
would also consider whether the decision was absurd or
F perverse. The court would not however go into the
correctness of the choice made by the administrator amongst
the various alternatives open to him. Nor could the court
substitute its decision to that of the administrator. This is the
Wednesbury (1948 I KB 223) test.
G (2) The court would not interfere with the administrator's
decision unless it was illegal or suffered from procedural
impropriety or was irrational - in the sense that it was in
outrageous defiance of logic or moral standards. The
possibility of other tests, including proportionality being
brought into English administrative law in future is not ruled
H
U.O.I. v. K.G. SONI[PASA YAT,J.] 565

out. These are the CCSU (1985 AC 374) principles. A
(3)(a) As per Bugdaycay (1987 AC 514), Brind (1991 (1)
AC 696) and Smith (1996 (1) All ER 257) as long as the
Convention is not incorporated into English law, the English
courts merely exercise a secondary judgment to find out if
the decision-maker could have, on the material before him, B
arrived at the primary judgment in the manner he has done.

(3)(b) If the Convention is incorporated in England
making available the principle of proportionality, then the
English courts will render primary judgment on the validity
of the administrative action and find out if the restriction is C
disproportionate or excessive or is not based upon a fair
balancing of the fundamental freedom and the need for the
restriction thereupon.

(4)(a) The position in our country, in administrative law,
where no fundamental freedoms as aforesaid are involved, is D
that the courts/tribunals will only play a secondary role
while the primary judgment as to reasonableness will remain
with the executive or administrative authority. The secondary
judgment of the court is to be based on Wednesbury and
CCSU principles as stated by Lord Greene and Lord Diplock E
respectively to find ifthe executive or administrative authority
has reasonably arrived at his decision as the primary
authority.

._, (4)(b) Whether in the case of administrative or executive
action affecting fundamental freedoms, the courts in our F
country will apply the principle of "proportionality" and
assume a primary role, is left open, to be decided in an
appropriate case where such action is alleged to offend
fundamental freedoms. It will be then necessary to decide
whether the courts will have a primary role only if the
freedoms under Articles 19, 21 etc. are involved and not for G

- Article 14."

The common thread running through in all these decisions is that the
Court should not interfere with the administrator's decision unless it was
illogical or suffers from procedural impropriety or was shocking to the
H
566 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2006] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A conscience of the Court, in the sense that it was in defiance of logic or moral
standards. In view of what has been stated in the Wednesbury 's case (supra)
the Court would not go into the correctness of the choice made by the
administrator open to him and the Court should not substitute its decision
to that of the administrator. The scope of judicial review is limited to the
B deficiency in decision-making process and not the decision.

To put differently, unless the punishment imposed by the Disciplinary
Authority or the Appellate Authority shocks the conscience of the Court/
Tribunal, there is no scope for interference. Further to shorten litigations it
may, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment by recording
C cogent reasons in support thereof. In a normal course if the punishment
imposed is shockingly disproportionate, it would be appropriate to direct the
Disciplinary Authority or the Appellate Authority to reconsider the penalty
imposed.

The above position was recently reiterated in Damoh Panna Sagar
0 Rural Regional Bank and Ors. v. Munna Lal Jain, (2005] 10 SCC 84.

The High Court has not kept the correct position in view. It has not
even indicated as to why the punishment was considered disproportionate
and why it considered the misconduct to be not serious.

E The impugned order of the High Court is set aside and that of the
Appellate Authority, the operative part of which has been quoted above, is
restored.

The appeal is allowed without any order as to costs.

RP. Appeal allowed.

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