Holding

Section 28‑A’s limitation period is to be counted from the award on which the re‑determination is sought, and the Collector may award interest on the additional compensation under Section 34.

Summary

The case concerned applications under Section 28‑A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (as amended in 1984) for re‑determination of compensation for land acquired for the Beas Dam project. The petitioners argued that the three‑month limitation for filing such applications should be measured from the first court award made after the amendment, and that the Collector could not award interest on the additional compensation. The Supreme Court held that Section 28‑A is a beneficent provision and the limitation period must be counted from the award on which the applicant seeks re‑determination, not from the first award after the amendment. It also held that the Collector may award interest on the additional compensation under Section 34 of the Act. Consequently, the review petitions were dismissed.

Issues considered

The three‑month limitation period for filing an application under Section 28‑A is to be computed from the first award after the amendment or from the award on which the application is based?
Whether the Collector is empowered to award interest on the additional compensation determined under Section 28‑A.

Legislation cited

Land Acquisition Act, 1894s. 11, s. 18, s. 26, s. 28, s. 28-A, s. 34, s. 4
Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984s. 28-A

Subjects

Land acquisitionSection 28-ACompensation re‑determinationLimitation periodInterest on compensationBeneficent legislationCollector's powers

Judgment

UNION OF INDIA AND ANR. A
v.
PRADEEP KUMARI AND ORS.

M..<\RCH 10, 1995

[KULDIP SINGH, S.C. AGRAWAL AND B.P. JEEVAN REDDY, JJ.] B

Land Acquisition Act, 1894-Section 28-A-Awards made after inser-
tion o/S.88-A-Period of 3 months not to be counted from the earliest award-
To be counted from award on which claim is based--lnterest can be granted
by the Collector on additional compensation. C
The lands of the respondents were acquired for Beas Dam Project
vide various Notifications under Section 4 of the Land Acqui~ition Act and
awards were made by the Collector. Certain other persons whose lands
were also acquired under the same notification sought reference under
Section 18 of the Act and on such reference, the Court awarded additional D
amounts to such persons. Few of such references to the Court were
disposed of by the Court after 24.9.1984, that is, after the enactment of the
Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 ·by which Section 28-A was
introduced in the Act. The earliest award after the amendment was made
by the Court on 27.12.1984. E
The respondent No. 1 filed an application before the Collector
claiming the benefit of additional amount of compensation under Section
28-A.

The Collector awarded additional amount of compensation on the F
basis of one such award of the Court dated 21.2.1987. The writ petition

'
filed by the petitioners against the order of the Collector was dismissed.

y Respondent No. 2 on the other hand, filed an application under
Section 28-A of the Act for enhancement of compensation claiming the
benefit of the decision of the High Coui:t in R.F.A.166of1977. The Collec- G
tor dismissed the application on the ground that the benefit of Section
28-A is available only on the basis of an award of the reference court under
the Act and not on the basis of any judgment of the High Curt. Respondent
No. 2 filed a writ petition 'against the order of the Collector in the High
Court contending that if she is not entitled to the benefit of the Judgment H
703
I
704 ' SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995] 2 S.C.R.

A of the High Court, she may be given the benefit of the award of the
reference Court under Section 28-A. The writ petition was disposed of
alongwith the writ petition of Respondent No. 1 and the High Court
allowed the writ petition of Respondent No. Z.

The petitioners filed appeals against the aforesaid orders of the High
B Court which were dismissed. Thereupon they filed these Review Petitions.
The petitioners contended that (1) the benefit of Section 28-A could
be extended only if the application is made within three months from the
date of the first award made by the reference court after the Amendment
C Act. As the applications by the respondents were made more than three
months after the date of the first award i.e. 27.12.1984, the applications
were barred by limitation. Reliance was placed upon decisions of two Judge
bench of this court in Babua Ram and Ors. v. State of U.P. and Anr., JT
[1994) 7 SC 377 and Union of India v. Kamai/ Singh, [1995) 7 SCALE 21.
(2) The Collector was not competent to award interest on the additio~al
D amount of compensation and only the Court is competent to do so under
Section 28 of the Act.

Dismissing the Review Petitions, the Court,

HELD: 1. The object underlying the enactment of Section 28-A of
E uind Acquisition Act is to remove inequality in the payment of compensa-
tion for the same or similar quality of land arising on account of inarticu-
late and poor people not being able to take advantage of the right of the
refennce to the civil court under Section 18 of the Act. Section 28-A is,
therefore, in .the nature of a beneficient provision intended to remove
F inequality and to give relief to the inarticulate and poor people who are .
not able to take advantage of right of reference to the civil court. The
provisions of Section 28-A should, therefore, be construed keeping in view
the object underlying the said provision. [717-B-E]

2. The right to make application under Section 28-A arises from the
G award of the court on the basis of which the person making the application
is seeking re-determination of the · compensation. There is nothing in
Section 28-A (1) to indicate that this right is confined in respect of the
earliest award that is made by the Court after the coming into force of
Section 28-A. In the matter of construction of a beneficent provision it is
H not permissible by judicial interpretation to read words which are not
U.O.I. v. P. KUMARI 705

there and thereby restrict the scope of the said provis-ion. (711-H, 712-A-B] A
J11a11 Ra11ja11 Sen Gupta a11d Ors. v. Arnn Kumar Bose, (1975] 2 SCC
526, relied on.

3. A person would be able to seek re-determination of the amount of
compensation payable to him provided the following conditions are satis- B
fied:·

(i) An award bas been made by the Court under Part III after
coming into force of Section 28-A;

(ii) By the said award the amount of compensation in excess of C
the amount awarded by the Collector under Section 11 has
been allowed to the applicant in that reference;

(iii) The person moving the application under Section 28-A is
interested in other land covered by the same notification D
under Section 4(1) to which the said award relates;

(iv) The person moving the application did not make an applica·
tion to the collector under Section 18;

(v) The application is moved within three months from the date E
of the award on the basis of which the redermination of
amount of compensation is sought, and

(vi) Only one application can be moved under Section 28-A for
redetermination of compensation by an applicant. (713-D-H]
F
Babua Ram and Ors. v. State of U.P. and Anr., JT (1994) 7 SC 377
and Union of lndi.a v. Kamai/ Singh, (1995) 1 SCALE 21, reversed.

3. After an application has been submitted under Section 28-A (1)
for redetermination of the amount of compensation the process of such
re-determination results in making of an award by the Collector and a G
person not accepting the said award can move the Collector to refer the
matter to the Court for determination and such reference is governed by
Sections 18 to 28. If that is so, Section 34 of the Act would be applicable
to the award that is made by the Collector under Section 28·A(2) and it
would be permissible for him to award interest under Section 34 on the H
I
706 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995] 2 S.C.R.

A additional amount of compensation awarded by him. (715-B-C]
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Review Petitions (C) Nos.
364-65 of 1992.

IN
B
Civil Appeals Nos. 2320-21 of 1991.

Ftom the Judgment and Order dated 24.10.90 of the Himachal
Pradesh High Court in C.W.P. No. 181of1989 & 580 of 1987.

C N.N. Goswamy, B.K. Prasad, T.C. ShMma, R.D. Upadhyay and Ms.
Neelam Sharma for C.V.S. Rao for the Petitioner/Appellants.

M.R. Sharma, Prem Malhotra, Ms. Anjana Sharma and Naresh K.
Sharma for (NP) the Respondents.

D The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

S.C. AGRAWAL, J. By·these Review Petitions the petitioners are
seeking review of the order dated October 8, 1991 whereby Civil Appeals
Nos. 2320-21of1991 filed by the petitioners have been dismissed. The said
E Civil Appeals arose out of proceedings for acquisition of land for the Beas
Dam Project. Notifications dated January 11, 1962, April 1, 1963 and
November 10, 1964 were issued under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition
Act, 1894 [hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'] during the period 1962-64
in respect of lands in District Kangra which was a part of the erstwhile
State of Punjab. After the re-organisation of the State of Punjab by the
F Punjab Reorganisation Act, 1966 the said lands came fall in the State of
Himachal Pradesh. Proceedings for acquisition of land were thereafter
conducted in the State of Himachal Pradesh. The awards were made by
the Land Acquisition Collector, Beas Dam Project, Talwara. The respon-
dents in these petitions did not seek a reference under Section 18 of the
G Act but other persons whose lands were acquired under the said notifica-
tions sought a reference. Most of these references were disposed of by the
Court prior to September 24, 1.984 but in some references the award by
the Court was made after the enactment of the Land Acquisition (Amend-
ment) Act, 1984 [hereinafter referred to as 'the Amendment Act') which
H eame into force on September 24, 1984. By the Amendment Act Section
U.0.1.v. P.KUMARl[S.C.AGRAWAL,J.] 707

28-A was introduced in the Act. According to the petitioners the earliest A
~
\ award by the Court after the coming into force of the Amendment Act was
made on December 27, 1984. Awards were, however, made by the Court
in pending references subsequent to December 27, 1984 also. One such
award was made on February 21, 1987. Smt. Pradeep Kumari, respondent
No. 1, filed an application under Section 28-A for claiming the benefit -of B
the said award dated February 21, 1987. On the said application the
Collector made an order dated March 14, 1988 awarding additional
amount of compensation on the basis of the award of the court dated
February 21, 1987. Feeling aggrieved by the said order of the Collector
dated March 14, 1988 the petitioners filed Civil Writ Petition No. 181 of C
1989 in the High Court of Himachal Pradesh. Respondent No. 2, Smt.
Savitri Devi, also filed an application under Section 28-A of the Act
whetein she contended that the benefit of the decision of the High Co'lirt
of Himachal Pradesh dated September 5, 1986 in R.F.A. No. 166 of 1977
be extended to her and the amount of compensation be enhanced on that
basis under Section 28-A. The said application of respondent No. 2 was D
dismissed by the Collector on January 29, 1987 on the view that the benefit
under Section 28-A is available only on the basis of an award of the
reference court and re-determination of the amount of compensation could
not be sought on the basis of the judgment of the High Court. Feeling
aggrieved by the said order of the Collector respondent No. 2 filed Civil E
Writ Petition No. 580 of 1987 in the High Court of Himachal Pradesh. In
the said writ petition respondent No; 2 submitted that in case she was not
entitled to get ~nhanced compe~ation on the basis of the judgment of the
' \
High Court dated September 5, 1986, she may be given the benefit of
I Section 28-A on the basis of the award made by the reference court on F
November 10, 1986.

Both the writ petitions were disposed of by a Division Bench of the
High Court by common judgment dated October 24, 1990. On behalf of
was
the petitioners it submitted before the High Court that the expression
'award of the court' in Section 28-A of the Act means the first award made G
by the court after the coming into force of the Amen.dment Act and as the
said award was made on December 27, 1984 the applications submitted by
the respondents are barred by fu:i:ritation since they were submitted after
the expiry of the period of three months from the date of the making of
the said award. The High Court rejected the said contention and held that H
708 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1995) 2 S.C.R.

A all that is required for the applicability of Section 28-A is ·that there should
be an award made under Part III of the Act by the court in which excess
amount is allowed and that Section 28-A nowhere provides that it should
be the first after coming into force of the Amendment Act. The High Court
held that the other requirement for the applicability of Section 28-A is that
the land of the person interested should be covered by the same notifica-
B tion which is the subject matter of the award of the court and in that event
the application should be moved within the period of three months from
the date of the making of the award. The High Court, however held that
the said right has. to be exercised only once and that once the right has
been exercised by a person by applying to the Collector for re-determina-
C tion, no application can be made thereafter. The High Court dismissed the
writ petition filed by the petitioners. The writ petition filed by respondent
No. 2 was allowed by the High Court on the view that respondent No. 2
could invoke the benefit of Section 28-A on the basis of the award made
by the District Judge on November 10, 1986 in another land Reference No.
D 15 of 1984. Civil Appeal nos. 2320-21 of 1991 filed by the petitioners against
the said judgment of the High Court were dismissed by this Court by order
dated October 8, 1991 whereby it has been held that the High Court was
right in extending the benefit of enhanced compensation as well as the
enhanced rate of interest and solatium to the respondents.

E
· The first contention urged by Shri N.N. Goswamy, the learned senior
counsel appearing for the petitioners, was that the benefit of Section 28-A
could be extended only if the application is made within three months from
the date of the making of the first ~ward after the coming into force of the ..·'
Amendment Act and, as in the present case the first such award was made \ ..
F by the court on December 27, 1984, the application for re-determination
of compensation under Section 28-A could only be moved within three
months from the date of the said award of the court. Shri Goswamy has
submitted that since the applications under Section 28-A of both the
respondents were made after the expiry of the said period of three months
G from the date of the first award the said applications could not be enter-
tained and were liable to be dismissed and that the benefit of Section 28-A
could not be extended to the respondents. Shri Goswamy has placed
reliance on the decisions of this Court in Babua Ram and Ors. v. State of
U.P. and Anr., JT (1994) 7 SC 377, and Union of India v. Kamai/ Singh,
H [1995} 1 SCALE 21.
U.O.I. v. P. KUMAR I (S.C. AGRAWAL, J. J 709

It would be convenient at this stage to refer to the provisions con- A
tained in Section 28-A of the Act which reads as under:-
"'('
' "Sectio11 28-A. Redete1111i11utio11 of the a111ou11t of compe11satio11 011
the basis of the award of the Cowt:

(1) Where in an award under this part, the court 'allows to the B
applicant any amount of compensation in excess of the amount
awarded by the Collector under Section 11, the persons interested
in all the other land covered by the same notification under Section
..,.
4, sub-section (1) and who are also aggrieved by the award of the
( Collector may, notwithstanding th4t they had not made an applica-
tion to the Collector under Section 18, by written application to
c
the Collector within three months from the date of the award of
y the Court require that the amount of compensation payable to
them may be redetermined on the basis of the amount of compen-

- sation awarded by the court.

Provided that in computing the period of three months within
which an application to the Collector shall be made under this .
D

sub-section, the day on which the award was pronounced and the
-+ time requisite for obtaining a copy of the award shall be excluded.

(2) The Collector shall, on receipt of an application under sub- E
section (1), conduct an inquiry after giving notice to all the persons
interested and giving them a reasonable opportunity of being heard
and made an award determining the amount of compensation
payable to the applicants.

(3) Any person who has not accepted the award under sub-section F

1
(2) may, by written application to the Collector, require that the
matter be referred by the Collector for the determination of the

>/ court and the provisions of Sections 18 to 28 shall, so far as may
be, apply to such reference as they apply to a reference under
Section 18." G
The object underlying the enactment of these provisions, as indicated
---~... in the Statement of Objects and Reasons, was:-

"(ix) Considering that the right of reference to the civil court under
Section 18 of theAct is not usually taken advantage of by inarticu- H
r
710 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995] 2 S.C.R.

A late and poor people and is usually exercised by the comparatively
affluent landowners and that this causes considerable inequality in
the payment of compensation for the same or similar quality of
land to different interested parties, it is proposed to provide an
opportunity to all aggrieved parties whose land is covered under
the same notification to seek re-determination of compensation,
B once any one of them has obtained orders for payment of higher
compensation from the reference court under Section 18 of the
Act."

In Babua Ram (supra), decided by a bench of two Judges, it has been
C held that the period of three months prescribed for moving an application
for re-determination of compensation under Section 28-A has to be com-
puted from the date of the making of the first award. It has been observed:-

"Limitation begins to run from the date the award was pronounced
by the court under S.26. It is well settled that the law of limitation
D limits the time after which a suit or other proceeding cannot be
entertained in a court of justice or before appropriate authority,
though it does not affect the substantive rights of the parties. Once
the limitation begins to run, it runs in its full course until its running
is interdicted by an order of the court." [p.397]
E
"It is true that in a given set of facts, there could be more than one
reference under S.18 at the behest of different claimants of the
lands covered by S.4(1) Notification and the court may make
successive awards at various times. Compensation given in the
respective awards may vary and may be higher than the one given
F in an earliest award. In the teeth of the express language in
sub-section (1) of Section 28-A, limitation of three months once
expires in respect of earliest award by efflux of time, none of the
later awards could provide any assistance to revive the lapsed time
under s.28-A(l) nor provide fresh cause of action or successive
causes of action when multiple awards are made at different times
G
or dates." [pp. 397-398]

This view was reiterated by the same bench in Kamail Singh (supra).

'/ After giving our thoughtful consideration to the aforementioned
H reasons we are unable to pursuade ourselves to take the view that the
U.0.1.v. P.KUMARl[S.C.AGRAWAL,J.] 711

period of limitation for making an application under Section 28-A of the A
Act has to be computed from the date of the making of the first award
after the coming into force o.f .Section 28-A and any subsequent award has
no bearing on the right conferred by Section 28-A.

We may, at the outset, state that having regard to the Statement of
Objects and Reasons, referred to earlier, the object underlying the enact- B
ment of Section 28-A is to remove inequality in the payment of compensa-

., tion for same or similar quality of land arising on account of inarticulate
and poor people not being able to take advantage of the right of reference
to the civil court under Section 18 of the Act. This is sought to be achieved
f by providing an opportunity to all aggrieved parties whose land is covered C
by the same notification to seek re-determination once any of them has
obtained orders for payment of higher compensation from the reference
court under Section 18 of the Act. Section 28-A is, therefore, in the nature
of a beneficient provision intended to remove inequality and to give relief
to the inarticulate and poor people who are not able to take advantage of D
right of reference to the civil court under Section 18 of the Act. In relation
to beneficient legislation, the law is well-settled that while construing the
provisions of such a legislation the court should adopt a construction which
advances the policy of the legislation to extend the benefit rather than a
construction which has the effect of curtailing the benefit conferred by it.
The provisions of Section 28-A should, therefore, be construed keeping in E
view the object underlying the said provision.

A perusal of the provisions contained in sub-section (1) of Section
28-A of the Act would show that after an award is made under Part III
whereby the court allows to the applicant any amount of compensation in F
excess of the amount awarded by the Collector under Section 11, a right

} accrues to a person interested in the other land covered by the same
notification under sub-section (1) of Section 4 who is also aggrieved by the
award of the Collector but who had not made an application to the
Collector under Section 18, to move an application before the Collector
for re-determination of the amount of compensation payable to him on the G
basis of the amount compensation awarded by the court. This application
for re-determination of compensation is required to be made within three
months from the date of the award of the court. The right to make the
application under Section 28-A arises from the award of the court on the
basis of which the person making the application is seeking re-determina- H
712 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995) 2 S.C.R.

A tion of the compensation. There is nothing in sub-section (1) of Section
28-A to indicate that this right is confined in respect of the earliest award
that is made by the Court after the coming into force of Section 28-A. By
construing the expression 'where in an award under this Part' in sub-section
(1) of Section 28-A to mean 'where in the first award made by the court
B under this Part', the word 'first', which is not found in sub-section (1) of
Section 28-A, is being read therein and thereby the amplitude of the said
provision is being curtailed so as to restrict the benefit conferred by it. In
the matter of construction of a beneficient provision it is not permissible
by judicial interpretation to read words which are not there and thereby
restrict the scope of the said provision. [See : Jnan Ranjan Sen Gupta and
C Ors. v. Arnn Kumar Bose, (1975) 2 SCC 526. at p.530.]

It is possible to visualise a situation where in the first award that is
made by the court after the coming into force of Section 28-A the enhan-
cement in the amount of compensation by the said award is not very
D significant for the reason that the person who sought the reference was not
able to produce adequate evidence in support of his claim and in another
reference where the award was made by the .court subsequently such
evidence is produced before the court and a much higher amount is
awarded as compensation in the said award. By restricting the benefit of
Section 28-A to the first award that is made by the court after the coming
E into force of Section 28-A the benefit of higher amount of compensation
on the basis of the subsequent award made by the court would be denied
"to the persons invoking Section 28-A and the benefit of the said provision
would be confined to re-determination of compensation on the basis of
lesser amount of compensation awarded under the first award that is made
F. after the . coming into force of Section 28-A. There is nothing in the
wordings of Section 28-A to indicate that the legislature intended to confer
such a limited benefit under Section 28-A. Similarly, there may be a
situation, as in the present case, where the notification under Section 4(1)
of the Act covers lands falling in different villages and a number of
references at the instance of persons having lands in different villages were
G pending in ,the court on the date of coming into force of Section 28-A and
awards in those references are made by the court on different dates. A
person who is entitled to apply under Section 28-A belonging to a par-
ticular village may come to know of the first award that is made by the
court after the coming into force of Section 28-A in a reference at the
H instance of a person belonging to another village, after the expiry of the
U.O.I.v. P.KUMARI[S.C.AGRAWAL,J.] 713

period of three months from the date of the said award but he may come A
to know of the subsequent award that is made by the court in the reference
at the instance of a person belonging to the same village before the expiry
of the period of three months from the date of the said award. This is more
likely to happen in the case of inarticulate and poor people who cannot be
expected to keep track of all the references that were pending in court on B
the date of coming into force of Section 28-A and may not be in a position
to know, in time, about the first award that is made by the court after the
coming into force of Section 28-A. By holding that the award referred to
in Section 28-A(l) is the first award made after the coming into force of
Section 28-A, such persons would be deprived of the benefit extended by
Section 28-A. Such a construction would thus result in perpetuating the C
inequality in the payment of compensation which the legislature wanted to
remove by enacting Section 28-A. The object underlying Section 28-A
would be better achieved by giving the expression "an award" in Section
28-A its natural meaning as meaning the award that is made by the court
in Part III of the Act after the coming into force of Section 28-A. If the D
said expression in Section 28-A(l) is thus construed, a person would be
able to seek re-determination of the amount of compensation payable to
1llm provided the following conditions are satisfied :-

(i) An award has been made by the court under Part III after the
coming in to force of Section 28-A; E

(ii) By the said award the amount of compensation in excess of
the amount awarded by the Collector under Section 11 has been
- ·'
allowed to the applicant in that reference;

(iii) The person moving the application under Section 28-A is F
interested in other land covered by the same notification under
Section 4(1) to which the said award relates;

(iv) The person moving the application did riot make an application
to the Collector under Section 18;
G
(v) The application is moved within three months from the date
of the award on the basis of which the re-determination of amount
of compensation is sought; and

(vi) Only one application can be moved under Section 28-A for H
r

714 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1995] 2 S.C.R.

A re-determination of compensation by an applicant.

Since the cause of action for moving the application for re- deter-
mination of compensation under Section 28-A arises from the award on
the basis of which re-determination of compensation is sought, the prin-
ciple that "once the limitation begins to run, it runs in its full course until
B its running is interdicted ey an order of the court" can have no application
because the limitation for moving the application under Section 28-A will
begin to run only from the date of the award on the basis of which
re-determination of compensation is sought.

C We are, therefore, unable to agree with the view expressed'in Babua
Ram( supra) and Kamai/ Singh (supra) that application under Section 28-A
for re-determination of compensation can only be made on the basis of the
first award that is made after the coming into force of Section 28-A. In our
opinion, the benefit of re-determination of amount of compensation under
D Section 28-A can be availed of on the basis of any one of the awards that
has been made by the court after the coming into force of Section 28-A
provided the applicant seeking such benefit makes the application under
Section 28-A within the prescribed period of three months from the making
of the award on the basis of which re-determination is sought. The first
contention urged by Shri Goswamy in support of the Review Petitions is,
E therefore, rejected.

Shri Goswamy has next contended that while re-determining the
amount of compensation under Section 28-A it is not permissible for the
Collector to award interest on the additional amount of compensat!on
F awarded by him for the reason that under Section 28 of the Act only the
court can direct payment of interest on the excess amount awarded as
compensation and no such power is conferred on the Collector and,
therefore, interest cannot be awarded by the Collector on the additional
amount of compensation determined under Section 28-A. It is no doubt
true that under Section 28 only the court can direct payment of interest on
G the excess amount awarded as compensation and the Collector is not
competent to award interest on the additional amount of compensation
under the said provision. But sub-section (2) of Section 28-A provides that
after an application has been submitted under sub-section (1) of Section28-
A the Collector after conducting an inquiry makes an award determining
H the amount of compensation payable to the applicants and under sub-sec-
- '
U.0.1. v. P. KUMARI [S.C.AGRAWAL,J.) 715

tion (3) of Section 28-A any person who has not accepted the award under A
sub-section (2) may move the Collector requiring that the matter be
referred for determination to the court and the provisions of Sections 18
to 28 have been made applicable to such reference. This would show that
after an application has been submitted under Section 28-A(l) for re-
determination of the amount of compensation the process of such re-deter-
mination results in making of an award by the Collector and a person not
B
accepting the said award can move the Collector to refer the matter to the
court for determination and such reference is governed by Sections 18 to
28. If that is so Section 34 of the Act would be applicable to the award that
is made by the Collector under sub-section (2) of Section 28-A and it would
be permissible for him to award interest under Section 34 on the additional c
amount of compensation awarded by him. The second contention urged by
Shri Goswamy is, therefore, rejected.

In the result, we find no merit in the Review Petitions and the same
are accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.
' D
B.K.M. Petitions dismissed.