Holding

Disputes arising from the concession agreement, being a works contract, fall exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Madhya Pradesh Arbitration Tribunal under the 1983 Act, rendering private arbitration under the 1996 Act non est and barred by the doctrines of election, estoppel, and constructive res judicata.

Summary

Umri Pooph Pratappur (UPP) Tollways Pvt. Ltd. entered into a 2012 concession agreement with Madhya Pradesh Road Development Corporation (MPRDC) for a state highway project. Disputes over cost overruns and delays led the appellant to first file a reference before the Madhya Pradesh Arbitration Tribunal under the 1983 Act, then simultaneously invoke Clause 44.3.1 of the agreement to commence private arbitration before the International Centre for Alternative Dispute Resolution (ICADR) under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The High Court quashed the ICADR proceedings, holding the 1983 Act provided exclusive jurisdiction, a decision the appellant challenged before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court affirmed that the concession agreement is a "works contract" falling within the 1983 Act, rendering private arbitration non est and barred by the doctrine of election, estoppel, and constructive res judicata. It also noted the appellant’s withdrawal of the reference without permission barred re‑filing, but, in the interest of justice, allowed the appellant to seek restoration of the reference before the Madhya Pradesh Arbitration Tribunal. The appeal was disposed of with directions to file the restoration application.

Issues considered

The nature of the concession agreement: whether it qualifies as a "works contract" under the Madhya Pradesh Madhyastham Adhikaran Adhiniyam, 1983.
Whether the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 can be invoked for disputes arising from a works contract that is subject to a special statutory tribunal.
The effect of the appellant’s parallel initiation of private arbitration under Clause 44.3.1 while a reference was pending before the Madhya Pradesh Arbitration Tribunal.
The applicability of the doctrine of election, estoppel, and constructive res judicata to the appellant’s conduct.
The legal consequences of withdrawing a reference without obtaining liberty to re‑agitate under Rule 53(3)(b) of the Madhya Pradesh Madhyastham Adhikaran Regulations, 1985.

Legislation cited

Arbitration Act, 1940
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996s. 11, s. 16, s. 2, s. 34, s. 37
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
Limitation Act, 1963
Madhya Pradesh Highways Act, 2004
Madhya Pradesh Madhyastham Adhikaran Adhiniyam, 1983s. 20, s. 2(1)(d), s. 2(1)(i), s. 3, s. 7
Madhya Pradesh Madhyastham Adhikaran Regulations, 1985s. Rule 53(3)(b)

Headnote

Issue for Consideration The core issue in the present matter revolves around determining the appropriate forum for the adjudication of disputes arising out of the Concession Agreement dated 05.01.2012 entered into between the appellant and Madhyastham Adhikaran Adhiniyam, 1983 – s.7 – Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – The appellant and respondent no.1-Madhya Pradesh Road Development Corporation entered into a Concession Agreement for the augmentation of the road – Disputes arose between the parties

Subjects

Concession AgreementWorks contractExclusive jurisdictionPrivate arbitrationDoctrine of electionEstoppelConstructive res judicataForum shoppingWithdrawal of referenceRule 53(3)(b)Madhya Pradesh Arbitration Tribunal

Judgment

[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1768 : 2025 INSC 907

Umri Pooph Pratappur (UPP) Tollways Pvt. Ltd.
v.
M.P. Road Development Corporation and Another
(Civil Appeal No. 9920 of 2025)
30 July 2025
[J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan,* JJ.]

Issue for Consideration
The core issue in the present matter revolves around determining
the appropriate forum for the adjudication of disputes arising out of
the Concession Agreement dated 05.01.2012 entered into between
the appellant and respondent no.1.

Headnotes†
Madhya Pradesh Madhyastham Adhikaran Adhiniyam, 1983 –
s.7 – Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – The appellant
and respondent no.1-Madhya Pradesh Road Development
Corporation entered into a Concession Agreement for the
augmentation of the road – Disputes arose between the
parties – The appellant raised claims before the Independent
Engineer for amicable resolution and compensation, which
were mostly rejected – With no resolution forthcoming,
appellant initiated proceedings before the Madhya Pradesh
Arbitration Tribunal – Thereafter, the appellant invoked
Cl.44.3.1 of the Concession Agreement and approached
the International Centre for Alternative Dispute Resolution-
respondent no.2 – Respondent no. 1 raised objections – ICADR
by order dated 02.06.2022 appointed arbitrators – On the other
side, the Arbitral Tribunal issued notice for preliminary hearing,
by order dated 07.06.2022 – Subsequently, the appellant filed
an application before Madhya Pradesh Arbitration Tribunal
for seeking withdrawal, which was allowed – Aggrieved by
the orders dated 02.06.2022 and 07.06.2022 of the ICADR and
the Arbitral Tribunal, respondent no.1 filed writ petition which
was allowed and orders dated 02.06.2022 and 07.06.2022 were
quashed:

* Author
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1769

Umri Pooph Pratappur (UPP) Tollways Pvt. Ltd. and Anr. v.
M.P. Road Development Corporation and Another

Held: The present Concession Agreement pertains to the
construction of a State Highway situated entirely within the State
and was awarded by respondent no.1, a State-controlled entity,
the agreement clearly qualifies as a “works contract” u/s.2(1)(i)
of the 1983 Act – Consequently, the dispute arising therefrom
falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Madhya Pradesh
Arbitration Tribunal – The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996
stands excluded by operation of law in such matters – The private
arbitration proceedings initiated by the appellant are therefore, non
est in law, and the proper forum for adjudication is the Madhya
Pradesh Arbitration Tribunal established under the 1983 Act – It
is not in dispute that the appellant had initiated Reference Case
before the Madhya Pradesh Arbitration Tribunal and had obtained
issuance of notice – While the said reference was pending, the
appellant simultaneously invoked arbitration under Clause 44.3.1
of the Concession Agreement and initiated private arbitration
proceedings before the ICADR (Respondent No. 2) under the 1996
Act – This parallel invocation of remedies is impermissible in law
and squarely hit by the doctrine of election and estoppel – A party
cannot pursue two mutually inconsistent remedies under different
legal regimes arising from the same cause of action – Clause
44.3.1 of the Concession Agreement to the extent it purports to
permit private arbitration, cannot override the statutory mandate of
the 1983 Act – Accordingly, the attempt of the appellant to invoke
Clause 44.3.1 of the Concession Agreement and re-agitate the
issue of private arbitration-already settled in Viva Highways and
affirmed by this Court-is barred by the doctrine of constructive
res judicata and amounts to an abuse of the process of law –
Additionally, the appellant’s conduct in withdrawing the reference
petition before the Madhya Pradesh Arbitration Tribunal, without
seeking liberty to re-agitate the claims, and simultaneously
initiating proceedings under the 1996 Act, constitutes forum
shopping – This conduct, aimed at circumventing the statutory
mechanism and reviving abandoned claims, is tainted with mala
fides – In terms of the statutory mandate under Rule 53(3)(b) of
1985 Regulations, once a reference is withdrawn without obtaining
liberty to re-agitate the same, the appellant stands precluded
from initiating a fresh reference on the same subject matter –
This substantive bar also applies to any attempt to pursue the
same claims before alternative fora – Nonetheless, considering
1770 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

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the nature of the dispute and in the interests of justice, appellant
directed to seek revival of Reference Petition before the Madhya
Pradesh Arbitration Tribunal. [Paras 11.9, 11.10, 12, 12.1, 13.1,
14, 16, 17, 17.1]

Case Law Cited
Federal Bank Ltd. v. Sagar Thomas [2003] Supp. 4 SCR 121 :
(2003) 10 SCC 733; Binny Ltd v. Sadasivan [2005] Supp. 2 SCR
421 : (2005) 6 SCC 657; Gangotri Enterprises Ltd v. Madhya
Pradesh Road Development Corporation [2018] 4 SCR 260 :
(2018) 16 SCC 296; Madhya Pradesh Rural Road Development
Corporation Ltd v. L.G. Chaudhary Engineers and Contracts
[2012] 2 SCR 162 : (2018) 10 SCC 826; Gayathri Project Ltd v.
M.P. Road Development Corporation Ltd. [2018] 4 SCR 260 :
2025 SCC OnLine SC 1136; Booz Allen and Hamilton Inc v.
SBI Home Finance Ltd. [2011] 7 SCR 310 : (2011) 5 SCC
532 – relied on.
S.Shobha v. Muthoot Finance Ltd. [2025] 1 SCR 1147 : SLP(C)
Nos. 2625-2627 of 2025; Jagmittar Sain Bhagat v. Director,
Health Services, Haryana and Others [2013] 8 SCR 77 : (2013)
10 SCC 136; Kanwar Singh Saini v. High Court of Delhi [2011]
15 SCR 972 : (2012) 4 SCC 307; State of Chhattisgarh v. M/s.
KMC Construction [2018] 4 SCR 270 : (2018) 10 SCC 839;
ARSS Damoh - Hirapur Tolls (P) Ltd. v. M.P. Road Development
Corporation, 2018 SCC OnLine SC 3899; Madhya Pradesh Rural
Road Development Authority v. Backbone Enterprises Limited
[2018] 4 SCR 255 : (2018) 15 SCC 660; Deep Industries Ltd v.
Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. [2019] 17 SCR 995 : (2020)
15 SCC 706 – referred to.
Viva Highways Ltd v. Madhya Pradesh Road Development
Corporation Ltd., 2017 SCC OnLine MP 1448 – referred to.

List of Acts
Madhya Pradesh Madhyastham Adhikaran Adhiniyam, 1983;
Constitution of India; Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Civil
Procedure Code, 1908; Madhya Pradesh Highways Act, 2004;
Arbitration Act, 1940; Limitation Act, 1963; Madhya Pradesh
Madhyastham Adhikaran Regulations, 1985.
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1771

Umri Pooph Pratappur (UPP) Tollways Pvt. Ltd. and Anr. v.
M.P. Road Development Corporation and Another

List of Keywords
Concession Agreement; Determining the appropriate forum for the
adjudication of disputes; Independent Engineer; Amicable resolution
and compensation; Withdrawal; State-controlled entity; Works
contract; Exclusive jurisdiction; Private arbitration proceedings;
Doctrine of election and estoppels; Mutually inconsistent remedies;
Same cause of action; Private arbitration; Doctrine of constructive
res judicata; Abuse of the process of law; Forum shopping; Liberty
to re-agitate; Fresh reference on the same subject matter; Proper
forum for adjudication.

Case Arising From
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 9920 of 2025
From the Judgment and Order dated 09.09.2024 of the High Court
of Madhya Pradesh Principal Seat at Jabalpur in WP No. 14569
of 2022

Appearances for Parties

Advs. for the Appellant:
Siddharth Dave, Sr. Adv., Ms. Sadapurna Mukherjee, Saurabh
Kumar, Manvi Sharma, Rajat Mittal.
Advs. for the Respondents:
Tushar Mehta, Solicitor General, Siddharth Sharma, Bhuvan
Kapoor, Ms. Rajeshwari Shankar, Ms. Ishika Chauhan.

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

R. Mahadevan, J.

Leave granted.
2. This appeal has been preferred against the final judgment and
order dated 09.09.2024 passed by the High Court of Madhya
Pradesh at Jabalpur1 in Writ Petition (Civil) No. 14569 of 2022

1 Hereinafter referred to as “the High Court”
1772 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

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filed by Respondent No. 1 – Madhya Pradesh Road Development
Corporation. By the impugned judgment, the High Court allowed
the writ petition and quashed the orders dated 02.06.2022 and
07.06.2022 passed by the International Centre for Alternative
Dispute Resolution2 – Respondent No.2 and the Arbitral Tribunal,
respectively. For ease of reference, the orders impugned in the writ
petition, are extracted below:

Order dated 02.06.2022 passed by the ICADR
“…
The ICADR has made thorough examination of all the
points of the Claimant and Respondent including the
aforesaid nine attachments with email dated 24.05.2022
and due deliberation and consideration of all the points
raised by both the Claimant and Respondent particularly
Arbitration Agreement, the judgement in Writ Petition
no. 11783/2021 dt.03.09.2021 and Orders sheets of
Madhyastham Adhikaran at Bhopal and it has come to
the following conclusions:
1. ICADR is the proper forum for the arbitration of disputes
arising out of execution of Concession Agreement dated
05.01.2012 between M/s. Umri Pooph Pratappur Tollway
Private Limited and Madhya Pradesh Road Development
Corporation Ltd. and the same can be ascertained from
Arbitration Agreement incorporated in Article 44.3.1 and
44.3.2.
2. The Judgement in Writ Petition nо. 11783/2021
dt.03.09.2021 gives clear finding that ICADR is the proper
forum for Arbitration of dispute arising from the Concession
agreement dated 05.01.2012.
3. In view of and from the orders sheets of Madhyastham
Adhikaran at Bhopal, it is ascertained that the Madhyastham
Adhikaran at Bhopal has not entered upon reference of the

2 For short, “ICADR”
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1773

Umri Pooph Pratappur (UPP) Tollways Pvt. Ltd. and Anr. v.
M.P. Road Development Corporation and Another

arbitration and therefore not in seisin of the aforementioned
arbitrable disputes.
Therefore, in view of Rule 5(2) of the ICADR Arbitration
Rules, 1996, inter alia, provides that where a party
fails to appoint an arbitrator within 30 days from the
receipt of a request to do so from the other party, the
appointment shall be made upon request of the party,
by ICADR. However, in view of Reply of MPRDCL
vide letter No. 2941/83/BOT/MPRDC Bhopal dated
13.05.2022 to Arbitration Notice dated 06.05.2022 of
the Claimant whereby the Respondent has declined to
nominate their Arbitrator, hence, ICADR need not wait
for expiry of 30 days.
Since the Respondent has failed to appoint their
arbitrator in terms of clause 44.3.1 of the Agreement,
now, therefore, I, R.K. Rathore, Secretary General of the
International Centre for Alternative Dispute Resolution
(ICADR), in exercise of the powers vested in me under
Rule 5(2) read with Rule 35(3) of ICADR Arbitration Rules,
1996, do hereby appoint the following arbitrator on the
behalf of Respondent:
Shri Jagdish Prasad Shukla, IRSE (Retd.)
Former Principal Engineer/Northern Railway Chief
Managing Director/
Rail Vikas Nigam Ltd. &
Member Administration/Central Administrative Tribunal
Add: 501, Ridgewood, Omaxe Forest Sector-92,
Noida.
Cell No. 9958998686
E-mail: jpshukla46@gmail.com
The two appointed arbitrators will select the third Arbitrator,
i.e. Presiding Arbitrator, as provided in clause 44.3.2 of
the above mentioned Agreement.”
1774 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

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Order dated 07.06.2022 passed by the Arbitral Tribunal
“…
Notice for preliminary hearing
1) The Concessionaire/ Claimant has appointed Shri
Kamlesh Kumar as Arbitrator on their behalf. The ICADR on
behalf of Madhya Pradesh Road Development Corporation
Limited has nominated Shri J. P. Shukla as Arbitrator for
MPRDC Ltd.
2) The above said nominee Arbitrators of the parties by
mutual consent have appointed me the Presiding Arbitrator
to adjudicate the matter in dispute relating to the above-
mentioned subject vide email date 05.06.2022. I have
accepted to act as Presiding Arbitrator in the above referred
dispute on 05.06.2022 and the same was communicated
to all concerned by email.
3) In pursuance there off, the parties to the dispute are
hereby notified that Preliminary hearing of the Arbitral
Tribunal will be held on 18.06.2022 (11.00 AM) through
video conferencing Wherein timeline for submission of the
Statement of Claims (SOC) and Statement of Defense
(SOD) and the procedure for conducting the Arbitration
will be discussed and decided. The claimant shall arrange
to send meeting link to all concerned for the video
conferencing well in advance.
4) The Parties to dispute may kindly note that I have received
the proposal of my appointment as Presiding Arbitrator on
05.06.2022 and on same day i.e., on 05.06.2022 accepted
to act as Presiding Arbitrator. Therefore, the period of
6 months for filing the statement of claims (SOC) and
statement of defense (SOD) as specified in Sub Section
4 of Section 23 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996
(Amendment 2019) shall be reckoned from 05.06.2022
and such period end on 04.12.2022.
5) In the meantime, the Respondent is directed to file
a certified copy of Agreement between the Respondent
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1775

Umri Pooph Pratappur (UPP) Tollways Pvt. Ltd. and Anr. v.
M.P. Road Development Corporation and Another

and Claimant to all the Tribunal Members with a copy to
the Claimant.
6) My Disclosure under section 12(1 b) as schedule VI
of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996 (Amendment
2019) is enclosed for reference of parties to the dispute.
….”
3. The brief facts necessary for adjudication of the present appeal are
as follows:
3.1. The appellant and Respondent No.1 entered into a Concession
Agreement dated 05.01.2012 for the development of the Umari –
Pooph – Pratappur Road on a Build, Operate and Transfer
(BOT – Toll + Annuity) basis. The total cost of the project was
Rs. 73.68 crores for the augmentation of the existing road
from T-Junction of SH-45 at Umari Village to 43.775 km on the
Umri – Pooph – Pratappur section of Major District Road (MDR)
in the State of Madhya Pradesh, as stipulated in Clause 48.1
of the Concession Agreement. The implementation period was
fixed at 24 months from the appointed date.
3.2. In accordance with Article 9.1.1 and Schedule F of the
Concession Agreement, the appellant furnished a performance
security of Rs. 3.68 crores in the form of an irrevocable and
unconditional bank guarantee, vide Bank Guarantee No.
00494121PG000028 dated 03.07.2012 issued by Allahabad
Bank. An Escrow Agreement was also executed on 20.06.2012
among the appellant, Respondent No.1 and Allahabad
Bank.
3.3. M/s. S&P Infrastructure Developers Private Limited and M/s.
BLA Infrastructure Private Limited, by Deeds of Guarantee
dated 20.06.2012 and 15.05.2012 respectively, guaranteed
the performance of the appellant under the Common Loan
Agreement. The appellant alleged that Respondent No.1
arbitrarily fixed the appointed date as 20.06.2012. Thereafter,
the appellant submitted the project completion schedule, work
programme, and designs and drawings for review by the
Divisional Manager, who had been temporarily appointed as
the Independent Engineer. Upon acceptance, the appellant
1776 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

mobilized men, materials, and machinery at the site and
commenced work.
3.4. Vide Letter No. VO/TL/2012/Gen/02 dated 27.06.2012, the
appellant was informed that M/s. Vaidya Organisation had
been appointed as the Independent Engineer with effect
from 01.06.2012. The Independent Engineer did not approve
the designs and drawings earlier submitted and directed the
appellant not to proceed with construction until the already
executed work was reviewed and approved. The appellant was
further directed to submit revised designs and drawings. Despite
objections, revised submissions were made by the appellant
on 11.07.2012, which were eventually approved. Consequently,
the appellant was compelled to dismantle and re-execute
substantial portions of the work, resulting in an escalation of
the total project cost to Rs. 99.80 crores.
3.5. Subsequent delays and disruptions allegedly occurred due
to breaches of contractual obligations by Respondent No.
1. Consequently, the appellant raised 19 claims before the
Independent Engineer invoking Article 44.2 of the Concession
Agreement for amicable resolution and compensation. These
claims were also submitted to the Secretary, PWD. While some
claims were accepted during conciliation proceedings, most
were rejected, and no payments were released to the appellant.
3.6. With no resolution forthcoming, the appellant initiated
proceedings before the Madhya Pradesh Arbitration Tribunal
by filing Reference Case No. 61 of 2018. Notice in the said
reference was issued on 13.08.2018.
3.7. Thereafter, the appellant invoked Clause 44.3.1 of the
Concession Agreement and approached the ICADR.
Respondent No. 1 raised objections under Section 7 of
the Madhya Pradesh Madhyastham Adhikaran Adhiniyam,
19833. Nevertheless, the ICADR, by order dated 02.06.2022,
proceeded to appoint arbitrators to adjudicate the disputes.
The Arbitral Tribunal issued a notice for preliminary hearing,
by order dated 07.06.2022.

3 For short, “the 1983 Act”
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1777

Umri Pooph Pratappur (UPP) Tollways Pvt. Ltd. and Anr. v.
M.P. Road Development Corporation and Another

3.8. Subsequently, on 24.06.2022, the appellant filed an application
before the Madhya Pradesh Arbitration Tribunal, seeking
withdrawal of Reference Case No.61 of 2018.
3.9. Aggrieved by the orders dated 02.06.2022 and 07.06.2022
passed by the ICADR and the Arbitral Tribunal, respectively,
Respondent No.1 filed Writ Petition No.14569 of 2022 before
the High Court. During the pendency of the writ petition, the
Madhya Pradesh Arbitration Tribunal allowed the appellant’s
withdrawal application by order dated 08.02.2023.
3.10. Ultimately, by judgment dated 09.09.2024, the High Court
allowed the writ petition and quashed the orders dated
02.06.2022 and 07.06.2022. Aggrieved thereby, the appellant
has preferred the present appeal before this Court.
4. The learned Senior Counsel for the appellant submitted that the
writ petition filed by Respondent No. 1 before the High Court was
not maintainable as the appellant is a private company and does
not function as an instrumentality of the State. Reliance was placed
on the judgment of this Court in S.Shobha v. Muthoot Finance Ltd4,
wherein it was held that a writ petition is maintainable only against
a body that qualifies as ‘State’ under Article 12 of the Constitution.
Therefore, the High Court erred in entertaining the writ petition and
passing the impugned order against the appellant.
4.1. Reference was also made to the decisions of this Court in
Jagmittar Sain Bhagat v. Director, Health Services, Haryana
and others5 and Kanwar Singh Saini v. High Court of Delhi6, to
submit that the issue of maintainability of a writ petition can be
raised at any stage of the proceedings, and must be determined
at the threshold.
4.2. The learned Senior Counsel submitted that the arbitration
proceedings were initiated by the appellant under the Arbitration
and Conciliation Act, 1996 7, strictly in accordance with

4 SPL(C) Nos. 2625-2627 of 2025
5 (2013) 10 SCC 136
6 (2012) 4 SCC 307
7 For short, “the 1996 Act”
1778 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

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Clause 44.3.1 of the Concession Agreement dated 05.01.2012,
and not as an alternative or secondary remedy. Both parties,
being fully aware of the existence of the Madhya Pradesh
Arbitration Tribunal constituted under the 1983 Act, had mutually
agreed to resolve disputes through arbitration governed by the
1996 Act and the ICADR Rules. Accordingly, the invocation of
the 1996 Act was not barred by the 1983 Act.
4.3. It was further emphasized that if the parties had intended to refer
disputes to the Tribunal under the 1983 Act, the agreement would
have specifically provided for such reference. Whereas, Clause
44.3.1 of the Concession Agreement mandates arbitration under
the aegis of ICADR, New Delhi. Therefore, the jurisdiction of
the Madhya Pradesh Arbitration Tribunal cannot override this
binding contractual mechanism.
4.4. The learned Senior Counsel placed reliance on paragraph 79 of
the decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Viva Highways
Ltd v. Madhya Pradesh Road Development Corporation Ltd8,
which held that the Madhya Pradesh Arbitration Tribunal under
the 1983 Act has jurisdiction only over “ascertained” claims. It
also acknowledged that “ascertained” claims have a specific
connotation. In the present case, the appellant’s claims are, at
best, “ascertainable”, and therefore, outside the jurisdiction of
the Tribunal. Even assuming, without conceding, that the claims
could be considered “ascertained”, it was incumbent upon the
High Court or Tribunal to undertake an inquiry to classify the
nature of the claims. However, no such determination was
carried out in the present case.
4.5. It was contended that the Doctrine of Election has no application
to the present case. Firstly, the appellant invoked arbitration
proceedings under the Concession Agreement and did not
approach the Madhya Pradesh Arbitration Tribunal under the
1983 Act on its own volition. Secondly, arbitration was not
resorted to as an alternative, but as a binding and mutually
agreed remedy under the contract.

8 2017 SCC OnLine MP 1448
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1779

Umri Pooph Pratappur (UPP) Tollways Pvt. Ltd. and Anr. v.
M.P. Road Development Corporation and Another

4.6. It was further submitted that the 1996 Act is a self-contained
and exhaustive code, based on the UNCITRAL Model Law,
enacted with the objective of promoting speed, efficiency, and
uniformity in arbitral proceedings. Therefore, allowing statutory
tribunals such as the one under the 1983 Act to override the
framework of the 1996 Act would defeat the legislative intent
and undermines India’s aspiration to be country that can provide
early dispute settlement mechanism for commercial disputes
through promotion of arbitration.
4.7. It was also submitted that the Madhya Pradesh Arbitration
Tribunal constituted under the 1983 Act functions more akin
to a civil Court than an Arbitral Tribunal. Section 2(d) restricts
its jurisdiction to “ascertained” claims. Section 7(5) permits
summary dismissal, similar to Order 37 of the Civil Procedure
Code, 19089. Section 19 limits the revisional jurisdiction of the
High Court to narrow grounds under Section 115 of the CPC,
thereby excluding recourse under Section 34 of the 1996 Act.
Section 16 mandates delivery of an award within four months
of notice. However, in the present case, even after three and
a half years, no effective progress has been made, highlighting
the Tribunal’s inefficacy.
4.8. Additionally, it was submitted that although the appellant had
initially invoked the jurisdiction of the Tribunal under the 1983
Act, it was compelled to withdraw the reference due to an
inordinate delay of over four years, and because the claims were
only “ascertainable” and not “ascertained”. Therefore, the ratio
in Madhya Pradesh Rural Road Development Corporation Ltd
v. L.G. Chaudhary Engineers and Contracts10 is not applicable
to the present case.
4.9. Finally, it was submitted that the appellant’s claims, aggregating
to Rs.280.1566 crores pertain to expenses incurred, damages
under Clauses 4.2 and 10.3.4 of the Concession Agreement,
and other project related costs. The quashing of the arbitration

9 For short, “the CPC”
10 (2018) 10 SCC 826
1780 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

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proceedings by the High Court without directing adjudication
either under the 1996 Act or the 1983 Act, has left the appellant
without any effective legal remedy.
4.10. In light of the above submissions and case laws, the learned
Senior Counsel prayed that this appeal be allowed and the
impugned order be set aside.
5. Per contra, the learned Solicitor General of India appearing for
Respondent No.1 submitted that there is no dispute between the
parties regarding the nature of the Concession Agreement dated
05.01.2012 – it constitutes a works contract. The Government of
Madhya Pradesh enacted the Madhya Pradesh Madhyastham
Adhikaran Adhiniyam, 1983, which provides for the establishment
of the Madhya Pradesh Arbitration Tribunal to adjudicate disputes
arising out of ‘works contracts’, where the State Government or a
State Public Undertaking is a party. Section 2(1)(d) of the 1983 Act
defines a “dispute” as a claim for ascertained or ascertainable money
valued at Rs. 50,000 or more relating to differences arising from the
execution or non-execution of a works contract.
5.1. It was further submitted that Respondent No.1 is a wholly
owned entity of the State of Madhya Pradesh, and that any
Concession Agreement executed by it falls within the ambit
of a ‘works contract’ under Section 2(1)(i) of the 1983 Act.
Section 7(1) provides for mandatory reference of such disputes
to the Madhya Pradesh Arbitration Tribunal, notwithstanding
any arbitration clause in the agreement. Section 20 bars the
jurisdiction of civil Courts in such matters, thereby establishing
the Tribunal as the exclusive forum. Furthermore, Section 2(4)
of the 1996 Act, preserves the operation of special statutory
forums like the Madhya Pradesh Arbitration Tribunal, reinforcing
this exclusivity.
5.2. Reliance was placed on the judgment of a three-judge bench
of this Court in Madhya Pradesh Rural Road Development
Authority v. L. G. Chaudhary Engineers and Contractors
(supra), which upheld the exclusive jurisdiction of the Madhya
Pradesh Arbitration Tribunal for disputes arising out of works
contracts. Similarly, in Viva Highways Ltd. (supra), a Full Bench
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1781

Umri Pooph Pratappur (UPP) Tollways Pvt. Ltd. and Anr. v.
M.P. Road Development Corporation and Another

of the Madhya Pradesh High Court confirmed the Tribunal’s
exclusive jurisdiction, and the Special Leave Petition (Civil)
No.17070/2017 filed against the same was dismissed by this
Court on 18.04.2018.
5.3. The learned Solicitor General also referred to the decisions
in State of Chhattisgarh v. M/s. KMC Construction11, ARSS
Damoh - Hirapur Tolls (P) Ltd. v. M.P. Road Development
Corporation12, and Madhya Pradesh Rural Road Development
Authority v. Backbone Enterprises Limited13, where this Court
reiterated that disputes arising out of a works contract, must
be adjudicated exclusively by the Madhya Pradesh Arbitration
Tribunal.
5.4. Accordingly, the learned Solicitor General contended that
since the Concession Agreement is a “works contract” and
Respondent No. 1 is a State-owned corporation, any dispute
arising therefrom falls squarely within the Tribunal’s exclusive
jurisdiction. The appointment of a private arbitral tribunal under
the aegis of ICADR is in direct contravention of the statutory
framework, and the High Court rightly intervened to quash the
arbitration proceedings under the 1996 Act.
5.5. It was further submitted that the appellant had raised inflated
claims amounting to Rs.280.1566 crores before the Madhya
Pradesh Arbitration Tribunal in Reference Case No. 61 of
2018, including claims for loss of profits and damages. These
claims were ex facie time-barred under Section 7-B the 1983
Act, which requires claims to be filed within one year from the
date of communication of the decision of the final authority. The
appellant, having failed to comply with the limitation, sought to
circumvent the statutory bar by initiating private arbitration under
the 1996 Act, reflecting forum shopping and lack of bona fides.
5.6. The learned Solicitor General pointed out that Reference Case
No. 61 of 2018 was admitted on 06.09.2021, and Respondent

11 (2018) 10 SCC 839
12 2018 SCC OnLine SC 3899
13 (2018) 15 SCC 660
1782 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

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No.1 filed its written statement on 05.11.2021, raising limitation
as a preliminary objection. Thereafter, the appellant invoked
Clause 44.3.1 of the Concession Agreement and issued a
notice under Section 21 of the 1996 Act. Simultaneously, the
appellant filed an application to withdraw the reference before
the Tribunal on 24.06.2022, which was allowed on 08.02.2023.
5.7. According to the learned Solicitor General, as per Rule
53(3)(b) of the Madhya Pradesh Madhyastham Adhikaran
Regulations, 1985, a party that withdraws a reference without
the permission contemplated under Rule 53(2) is barred from
instituting a fresh reference on the same subject matter. Since
the appellant withdrew its claim without such leave, it is now
barred from re-agitating the same claims before any forum,
including private arbitration. The conduct of the appellant,
therefore, amounts to an impermissible attempt to sidestep
statutory restrictions.
5.8. Reference was made to Deep Industries Ltd v. Oil and Natural
Gas Corporation Ltd14, where this Court upheld the High
Court’s power to exercise writ jurisdiction and quash arbitration
proceedings coram non judice.
5.9. It was argued that contractual terms cannot override statutory
mandates. If a statute designates a specific forum for
adjudication, parties cannot, by mutual agreement, confer
jurisdiction on an alternate forum. Clause 44.3.1 of the
Concession Agreement, to the extent that it provides for
private arbitration, is void ab initio in the context of a works
contract governed by the 1983 Act. In support, reliance
was placed on Booz Allen and Hamilton Inc v. SBI Home
Finance Ltd15.
5.10. It was further submitted that the term ‘ascertained money’ under
Section 2(1)(d) includes consequential reliefs. Moreover, the
amendment to the 1983 Act post – Viva Highways, includes
unascertained money claims within the definition of “dispute”.

14 (2020) 15 SCC 706
15 (2011) 5 SCC 532
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1783

Umri Pooph Pratappur (UPP) Tollways Pvt. Ltd. and Anr. v.
M.P. Road Development Corporation and Another

Thus, the Tribunal has jurisdiction even over claims where
quantification may occur during adjudication.
5.11. The learned Solicitor General also submitted that the appellant’s
claims totalling Rs. 280.1566 crores were clearly quantified and
sought money relief alone. No declaratory or indeterminate
relief was prayed for. The appellant’s conduct in attempting
to re-agitate these very claims before the ICADR Tribunal –
despite having withdrawn the earlier reference under Rule
53(3)(b) – reveals its intent to circumvent the statutory bar.
Accordingly, the Madhya Pradesh Arbitration Tribunal under
the 1983 Act remained the appropriate and exclusive forum,
and the High Court rightly quashed the arbitration proceedings
initiated under the 1996 Act.
5.12. It was further submitted that by withdrawing the reference
without seeking liberty under Rule 53(2), the appellant has
irrevocably abandoned its claims. The consequence under Rule
53(3)(b) is substantive and bars re-litigation of the same subject
matter. This bar applies irrespective of whether arbitration
is under the 1983 Act or under the 1996 Act. Furthermore,
even dehors the special limitation under the 1983 Act, the
appellant’s claims are now time-barred under the general law
of limitation, as per Section 43 of the 1996 Act. The disputes
arose between 2013 and 2015, and the invocation of arbitration
in 2022 and thereafter in 2025 is clearly beyond the prescribed
three-year limitation.
5.13. However, it was submitted that Respondent No.1 would have
no objection, if the appellant were to file an application for recall
of the withdrawal order and seek restoration of the Reference
Petition before the Madhya Pradesh Arbitration Tribunal, which
may be directed to be considered in accordance with law.
6. We have heard the learned Senior Counsel appearing for both sides
and also perused the materials available on record.
7. The core issue in the present matter revolves around determining
the appropriate forum for the adjudication of disputes arising out of
the Concession Agreement dated 05.01.2012 entered into between
the appellant and Respondent No.1.
1784 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

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8. At the outset, the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant submitted
that the writ petition filed by Respondent No.1 was not maintainable
against the appellant as it was directed against a private party. It
is well settled that the remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution
is not confined to individuals seeking enforcement of fundamental
rights. Even juristic persons, including State Corporations, are
entitled to invoke the writ jurisdiction for enforcement of legal rights.
However, when a State Corporation seeks relief against a private
party, the maintainability of the writ petition must satisfy certain
threshold requirements, namely, that the dispute involves a public law
element rather than being confined to the realm of private contractual
obligations, and that the private party is performing a public duty
or is subject to a statutory obligation in relation to the State entity.
8.1. In the present case, Respondent No.1 is a State - owned entity
and the project in question pertains to the development of Umri –
Pooph – Pratappur Road under a Concession Agreement on
a BOT (Toll + Annuity) basis. Although the dispute emanates
from a works contract governed by the said agreement, the
writ petition was not filed for enforcement of any contractual
obligation. Rather, it was filed to challenge the invocation of
arbitration by the appellant under the Arbitration and Conciliation
Act, 1996, despite the existence of a statutory remedy before
the Madhya Pradesh Arbitration Tribunal constituted under the
Madhya Pradesh Madhyastham Adhikaran Adhiniyam, 1983.
The issue, therefore, pertained to the availability and exclusivity
of a statutory dispute resolution mechanism, and not merely
to the adjudication of a claim on merits arising out of a private
contractual dispute.
8.2. In this context, reference was made to the decision in Federal
Bank Ltd. v. Sagar Thomas16, wherein, this Court provided a
classification of entities against whom a writ petition may be
maintainable. The following paragraph is pertinent:
“18. From the decisions referred to above, the position
that emerges is that a writ petition under Article 226

16 (2003) 10 SCC 733
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1785

Umri Pooph Pratappur (UPP) Tollways Pvt. Ltd. and Anr. v.
M.P. Road Development Corporation and Another

of the Constitution of India may be maintainable
against (i)the State (Government); (ii)an authority; (iii)
a statutory body; (iv)an instrumentality or agency of
the State; (v)a company which is financed and owned
by the State; (vi)a private body run substantially on
State funding; (vii)a private body discharging public
duty or positive obligation of public nature; and
(viii)a person or a body under liability to discharge
any function under any statute, to compel it to perform
such a statutory function.”
8.3. This Court in Binny Ltd v. Sadasivan17, noted the distinction
between public and private functions; and clarified the scope
of writ jurisdiction under Article 226 in the context of private
contractual disputes involving entities that may be performing
public functions. The relevant paragraphs are extracted below
for ready reference:
“11……. It is difficult to draw a line between public
functions and private functions when they are being
discharged by a purely private authority. A body
is performing a “public function” when it seeks to
achieve some collective benefit for the public or a
section of the public and is accepted by the public
or that section of the public as having authority to do
so. Bodies therefore exercise public functions when
they intervene or participate in social or economic
affairs in the public interest.”
“29. Thus, it can be seen that a writ of mandamus
or the remedy under Article 226 is pre-eminently a
public law remedy and is not generally available
as a remedy against private wrongs. It is used
for enforcement of various rights of the public
or to compel the public/statutory authorities to
discharge their duties and to act within their
bounds. It may be used to do justice when there is

17 (2005) 6 SCC 657
1786 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

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wrongful exercise of power or a refusal to perform
duties. This writ is admirably equipped to serve
as a judicial control over administrative actions.
This writ could also be issued against any private
body or person, especially in view of the words used in
Article 226 of the Constitution. However, the scope
of mandamus is limited to enforcement of public
duty. The scope of mandamus is determined
by the nature of the duty to be enforced, rather
than the identity of the authority against whom
it is sought. If the private body is discharging a
public function and the denial of any right is in
connection with the public duty imposed on such
body, the public law remedy can be enforced.
The duty cast on the public body may be either
statutory or otherwise and the source of such
power is immaterial, but, nevertheless, there
must be the public law element in such action.
Sometimes, it is difficult to distinguish between public
law and private law remedies. According to Halsbury’s
Laws of England, 3rd Edn., Vol. 30, p.682,
“1317. A public authority is a body, not
necessarily a county council, municipal
corporation or other local authority which
has public statutory duties to perform and
which perform the duties and carries out
its transactions for the benefit of the public
and not for private profit.”
There cannot be any general definition of public
authority or public action. The facts of each case
decide the point.”
…..
Applying these principles, it can very well be said
that a writ of mandamus can be issued against a
private body which is not a State within the meaning
of Article 12 of the Constitution and such body is
amenable to the jurisdiction under Article of the
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1787

Umri Pooph Pratappur (UPP) Tollways Pvt. Ltd. and Anr. v.
M.P. Road Development Corporation and Another

Constitution and the High Court under Article 226
of the Constitution can exercise judicial review of
the action challenged by a party. But there must
be a public law element and it cannot be exercised
to enforce purely private contracts entered into
between the parties.”
8.4. Respondent No. 1 was incorporated on 14.07.2004 to develop,
build, maintain, and operate the State Highways, District or other
local body roads, expressways, and government buildings in
Madhya Pradesh. Respondent No. 1 also, on contract, develops
and maintains National Highways in or passing through Madhya
Pradesh. The Madhya Pradesh Highways Act, 2004, repealing
the 1936 Act, also reiterates the State’s role in the development,
construction, and maintenance of roads in the State. Since the
right to access any part of the country, with certain exceptions
and restrictions under certain circumstances, is a fundamental
right guaranteed under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution,
and the right to safe, well-maintained, and motorable roads
is recognised as a part of the right to life under Article 21 of
the Constitution of India, it is the responsibility of the State to
develop and maintain the roads directly under its control. The
contract for laying of a State Highway/District Road, when
assigned by the Corporation owned and run by the government,
assumes the character of a public function – even if performed
by a private party – and would satisfy the functionality test to
sustain the writ petition. Accordingly, in view of the statutory
framework and the nature of relief sought, the writ petition
involves a public law element and was thus maintainable before
the High Court. The decisions relied upon by the appellant
are factually distinguishable and pertain to materially different
contexts. As such, they do not advance the appellant’s case
and have no application to the facts and legal issues involved
in the present case.
9. Assailing the impugned judgment passed by the High Court, the
learned Senior Counsel for the appellant submitted that the Madhya
Pradesh Arbitration Tribunal constituted under the 1983 Act is
competent to entertain disputes only where there is an ascertained
claim exceeding Rs.50,000/-. In the present case, there is no such
1788 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

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ascertained monetary claim raised, and hence, the appellant was
not obliged to approach the said Tribunal. Further, it was submitted
that Clause 44.3.1 of the Concession Agreement contains a valid
arbitration clause, which entitles the appellant to invoke arbitration
under the 1996 Act.
9.1. In contrast, the learned Senior Counsel for Respondent No.1
contended that the Concession Agreement relates to the
construction and development of a State Highway/District
Road and squarely falls within the ambit of a ‘works contract’
as defined under section 2(1)(i) of the 1983 Act. It was further
submitted that the 1983 Act, being a special law, has an
overriding effect and mandates that disputes arising out of
such works contracts must be adjudicated exclusively by the
Madhya Pradesh Arbitration Tribunal.
10. It is not in dispute that the road in question is a State Highway/
District Road and forms part of the assets of the State of Madhya
Pradesh. Admittedly, the Concession Agreement qualifies as a
“works contract”. The State Legislature enacted the 1983 Act to
establish a special statutory mechanism for adjudication of disputes
arising out of works contracts involving the State Government or
its instrumentalities, including public sector undertakings. The
relevant provisions of the 1983 Act are extracted below, for better
appreciation:
“Section 2 (1)(d) – “Dispute” means claim of ascertained
or ascertainable money valued at Rupees 50,000 or more
relating to any difference arising out of the execution or
non-execution of a works contract or part thereof.”
Section 2 (1)(i) - “works-contract” means an agreement
in writing or a letter of intent or work order issued for the
execution of any work relating to construction, repair or
maintenance of any building or superstructure, dam, weir,
canal, reservoir, tank, lake, road, well, bridge, culvert,
factory, work-shop, powerhouse, transformer or such other
works of the State Government or Public Undertakings or
of the Corporations of the State as the State Government
may, by notification, specify in this behalf at any of its
stages, entered into by the State Government or by an
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1789

Umri Pooph Pratappur (UPP) Tollways Pvt. Ltd. and Anr. v.
M.P. Road Development Corporation and Another

official of the State Government or by Public Undertakings
or Corporation or by any official of the State Government for
and on behalf of such Corporation or Public Undertakings
and includes an agreement for supply of goods or material
and all other matters relating to the execution of any of
the said works and also includes the services so hired for
carrying out the aforesaid works and shall also include
all concession agreement, so entered into by the State
Government or public undertakings or Corporation, wherein
a State support is involved or not.
18
[The agreements in writing for the execution of the work
relating to construction, repair or maintenance of electric
lines, water supply and sewerage/drainage system shall
also be “works contract”]”
“Section 3 - Constitution of Tribunal
The State Government shall by notification constitute
an Arbitration Tribunal for resolving all such disputes or
differences pertaining to works contract or arising out of
or connected with execution, discharge or satisfaction of
any such works contract.”
“Section 7 – Reference to Tribunal
(1) Either party to a works contract shall irrespective of
the fact whether the agreement contains an arbitration
clause or not, refer in writing the dispute to the Tribunal”
….
7-A Reference Petition
(1) Every reference petition shall include whole of the
claim which the party is entitled to make in respect
of the works contract till the filing of the reference
petition but no claims arising out of any other works
contract shall be joined in such a reference petition
(2) …

18 Notification No.17/E/85/96/XXI-B(II)-21 Dt.4.11.1996 of Govt. of M.P. Law Deptt.
1790 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

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7-B Limitation
(1) The Tribunal shall not admit a reference petition
unless –
(a) the dispute is first referred for the decision of the
final authority under the terms of the works contract; and
(b) the petition to the Tribunal is made within one year
from the date of communication of the decision of the
final authority:
Provided that if the final authority fails to decide the
disputes within a period of six months from the date
of reference to it, the petition to the Tribunal shall be
made within one year of the expiry of the said period
of six months.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section
(1), where no proceeding has been commenced at all
before any Court preceding the date of commencement
of this Act or after such commencement but before the
commencement of the Madhya Pradesh Madhyastham
Adhikaran (Sanshodhan) Adhiniyam, 1990, a reference
petition shall be entertained within one year of the date
of commencement of Madhya Pradesh Madhyastham
Adhikaran (Sanshodhan) Adhiniyam, 1990 irrespective
of the fact whether a decision has or has not been made
by the final authority under the agreement.
(2-A) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section
(1), the Tribunal shall not admit a reference petition unless
it is made within three years from the date on which the
works contract is terminated, foreclosed, abandoned or
comes to an end in any other manner or when a dispute
arises during the pendency of the works contract:
Provided that if a reference petition is filed by the State
Government, such period shall be thirty years.
Section 20 - Bar of jurisdiction of Civil Court. —
(1) As from the date of the constitution of the Tribunal
and notwithstanding anything contained in Arbitration Act,
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1791

Umri Pooph Pratappur (UPP) Tollways Pvt. Ltd. and Anr. v.
M.P. Road Development Corporation and Another

1940 (No.10 of 1940) or any other law, for the time being
in force, or in any agreement or usage to the contrary, no
Civil Court shall have jurisdiction to entertain or decide
any dispute of which cognizance can be taken by the
Tribunal under this Act.
10.1. It is thus evident that Section 2(1)(i) of the 1983 Act defines
‘works contract’ to expressly include concession agreements
executed by the State or its instrumentalities, regardless of
whether direct financial support from the State is involved.
Section 7 clearly mandates that all disputes arising from
such works contract shall be referred to the Madhya Pradesh
Arbitration Tribunal, even if the agreement contains an
arbitration clause to refer the dispute under any enactment. The
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 repealed the Arbitration
Act, 1940. The 1940 Act was in force when the Madhya
Pradesh Arbitration Tribunal Act, 1983 came into force. The
reference contemplated under the 1983 Act implies that the
claims covered by the Act shall be decided only by the Tribunal
constituted under its provisions, when it comes to a works
contract with the State Government, an instrumentality of the
State, or a State Corporation. The Arbitration and Conciliation
Act, 1996 came into force on 22nd August, 1996. A reading of
sub-sections (3), (4), and (5) of Section 2 of the 1996 Act also
illustrates that reference to a special tribunal under a special
enactment would survive, irrespective of the existence of a
mechanism under the 1996 Act. Further, we do not see any
repugnancy between the enactments. Section 20 of the Act,
1983 imposes a bar on the jurisdiction of civil Courts, thereby
reinforcing the exclusive and overriding nature of the statutory
mechanism established under the 1983 Act.
11. In Viva Highways Ltd (supra), a Full Bench of the Madhya Pradesh
High Court categorically held that where an agreement qualifies as
a “works contract” under Section 2(1)(i) of the 1983 Act, and the
dispute falls within the scope of Section 2(1)(d), the reference to
the Madhya Pradesh Arbitration Tribunal constituted under Section
3 of the 1983 Act is mandatory, notwithstanding the presence of any
arbitration clause in the agreement. The relevant portion of the Full
Bench decision is extracted below:
1792 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

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“82. On the basis of foregoing analysis, we may
summarize our conclusions as under:
(i) If an agreement by whatever name called falls within
the definition of “works contract” and difference between
the parties is covered in the definition of ‘dispute’ as
defined under the Adhiniyam of 1983, it has to be referred
for adjudication before the Tribunal constituted under
Section 3 of the Adhiniyam of 1983.
(ii) In view of statutory provision of Section 7 of the
Adhiniyam of 1983, even in cases where the parties
have incorporated a clause in such agreement regarding
resolution of dispute by some other forum or under the
Act of 1996, the forum subject to (i) above, would be the
Tribunal under the Adhiniyam of 1983. This conclusion,
however, will presently not include the cases of terminated
contract, which aspect is pending consideration before
a Larger Bench of the Supreme Court. The decision of
Larger Bench will draw the curtains on this aspect.
(iii) The judgment of Jabalpur Corridor (supra) reported
in 2014 (2) MPLJ 276 and Ashoka Infraways Ltd. (supra)
reported in 2016 (2) MPLJ 685 are overruled.
(iv) The substituted definition of “works contract” is
clarificatory in nature, hence it will be retrospective in
operation.
(v) The words “claim of ascertained money” have a definite
connotation and therefore only such difference arising out
of execution or non-execution of a ‘works contract’ which
are related with claims of above nature will be covered
under Section 2(1)(d) of the Adhiniyam of 1983”.
11.1. The correctness of the aforesaid judgment was challenged
before this Court in SLP (C) No. 17070 of 2017 and SLP (C)
Nos.1635-1637 of 2018, both of which were dismissed. As a
result, the legal position laid down in Viva Highways stands
affirmed. It is also pertinent to note that the appellant herein
was a party to those very proceedings before this Court and
is thus fully aware of the binding nature of the ruling.
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1793

Umri Pooph Pratappur (UPP) Tollways Pvt. Ltd. and Anr. v.
M.P. Road Development Corporation and Another

11.2. While the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant has
attempted to distinguish the decision in Viva Highways on
the ground that the appellant’s claims are not “ascertained”,
such an argument is untenable. The list of claims filed by
the appellant clearly discloses a quantified monetary claim
of Rs.280.1566 crores, which was specifically pleaded in the
reference petition. This squarely falls within the definition of
“dispute” under Section 2(1)(d) of the 1983 Act, which includes
both ascertained and ascertainable monetary claims. The list
of claims is reproduced below for better understanding:

Claim Description Amount
No. (in crores)
1. Damages under clause 4.2 of Concession 0.736
Agreement
2. Damages under clause 10.3.4 of Concession 0.235
Agreement
3. Compensation for re-working of GSB/ 8.63
WMM and preparation of sub grade due
to decision beyond contract and delayed
appointment of I.E
4. Additional work done as per instructions of 13.43
Independent Engineer
5 Revision of rates in cost of working due to 7.07
delay in completion, due to changed time
of execution
6. Extra cost of utility duct, private land
acquisition cost, cost of Non-destructive
testing and cost of six extra Hume pipe
culverts:
i) Cost of construction of Utility Ducts
ii) Acquisition of land for ROW by 0.27
Concessionaire
0.05
iii) Cost for Non-destructive testing
0.06
iv) Construction of 6 additional Hume pipe
Culverts 0.28
1794 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

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7. Extra cost of carriage due to collapse of the 0.65
Major Bridge in Km. 9+600 of the Project
stretch
8. Loss of Two Annuities (Bonus) 13.94
9. Loss of Toll Revenue due to delay in 8.83
achieving COD and thereafter collapse of
Bridge
10. Loss of Two Annuities 13.94
11. Idling charges of Manpower and Machinery 31.21
12. Additional Bank Interest 13.22
13. Loss of profit to EPC contractor due to 10.67
delay in completion of work
14. Amount recovered from 1st Annuity due to 0.1656
non-sanction of EOT beyond 20.05.2015
to 04.07.2015 (45 days)
15. Amount deducted under negative change 1.43
of scope
16. Bank Charges and interest (Market interest 0.32
deposit interest) on margin money of
performance security retained beyond
contract
17. Interest on delayed release of Annuities (1st 0.76
2nd and 3rd Annuity)
18. Additional expenditure on completion of 0.46
Punch List item
19. Loan installment amount of bank which 15.00
could not be paid till date due to delayed
payments of Annuity by MPRDC
20. Loss of further business 138.80
21. Declaring award of grant of extension 0
of time for 941 days against 335 days
approved by MPRDC in light of letter No.
UPP/MDR/MPRDC/2012/HQ-11, dated
30.04.2014 and UPP MDR MPRDC/2012
HQ-21 dated 20.06.2015
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1795

Umri Pooph Pratappur (UPP) Tollways Pvt. Ltd. and Anr. v.
M.P. Road Development Corporation and Another

22. Cost of Litigation As per
award
23. Interest antelite, pendentelite and future As
awarded
by the
Tribunal
TOTAL 280.1566

11.3. It is well settled that a claim which can be determined
through evidence and quantification falls within the ambit
of the term ‘ascertained’. Furthermore, post Viva Highways,
the Legislature amended section 2(1)(d) of the 1983 Act to
expressly include “unascertained” money claims within the
definition of “dispute”. This amendment was enacted precisely
to override the restrictive interpretation of “ascertained” claims
and to expand the Tribunal’s jurisdiction to cover all monetary
disputes – whether ascertained or not.
11.4. In this context, reference may be made to the decision
in Gangotri Enterprises Ltd v. Madhya Pradesh Road
Development Corporation19, where this Court observed that:
“3. We consider it appropriate to clarify that
the expression “ascertained money” as used in
Section 2(d) of the 1983 Act will include not only
the amount already ascertained but the amount
which may be ascertained during the proceedings
on the basis of claims/ counter claims of the
parties.”
11.5. Further, in M.P. Rural Road Development Authority v. L.G.
Chaudhary Engineers & Contractors (supra), a three-Judge
Bench of this Court reaffirmed that in the context of a “works
contract” in Madhya Pradesh, the 1983 Act has overriding
effect over the 1996 Act. The relevant paragraphs are extracted
below for ease of reference:

19 (2018) 16 SCC 296
1796 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

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“3. The appellants raised objection that the matter
being covered by a special State Act, namely, M.P.
Madhyastham Adhikaran Adhiniyam, 1983 (“the M.P.
Act”, in short), the application under Section 11 of
the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 could not
be entertained. The High Court, however, overruled
the said objection relying upon the judgment of this
Court in VA Tech Escher Wyass Flovel Ltd. v. M.P.
SEB [VA Tech Escher Wyass Flovel Ltd. v. M.P. SEB,
(2011) 13 SCC 261: (2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 468].
4. When the matter was considered by a Bench of
this Court on 24-1-2012 (order in M.P. Rural Road
Development Authority v. L.G. Chaudhary Engineers
and Contractors [M.P. Rural Road Development
Authority v. L.G. Chaudhary Engineers and Contractors,
(2012) 3 SCC 495 : (2012) 2 SCC (Civ) 210]), this
Court held that the judgment in VA Tech Escher Wyass
Flovel Ltd. [VA Tech Escher Wyass Flovel Ltd. v. M.P.
SEB, (2011) 13 SCC 261 : (2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 468]
was per incuriam insofar as it held that the M.P. Act
stands impliedly repealed by the Central Act. While
Hon’ble Ganguly, J., held that the State Act will cover a
dispute even after termination of the “works contract”,
Hon’ble Gyan Sudha Mishra, J. took a different view
as follows: (M.P. Rural Road Development case [M.P.
Rural Road Development Authority v. L.G. Chaudhary
Engineers and Contractors, (2012) 3 SCC 495 : (2012)
2 SCC (Civ) 210], SCC p. 511, para 51)
“51. It is no doubt true that if the matter
were before an arbitrator appointed under
the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996
for adjudication of any dispute including
the question regarding the justification and
legality as to whether the cancellation of
works contract was legal or illegal, then
the said arbitrator in view of the ratio of the
judgment of the Supreme Court in Maharshi
Dayanand University v. Anand Coop.
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1797

Umri Pooph Pratappur (UPP) Tollways Pvt. Ltd. and Anr. v.
M.P. Road Development Corporation and Another

L/C Society Ltd. [Maharshi Dayanand
University v. Anand Coop. L/C Society
Ltd., (2007) 5 SCC 295], as also in view of
the persuasive reasoning assigned in the
judgment and order in Heyman v. Darwins
Ltd. [Heyman v. Darwins Ltd., 1942 AC
356 : (1942) 1 All ER 337 (HL)] would
have had the jurisdiction to adjudicate
the dispute regarding the justification and
legality of cancellation of works contract
also. But the same cannot be allowed
to be raised under the M.P. Act of 1983
since the definition of “works contract”
unambiguously lays down in explicit terms
as to what is the nature and scope of
“works contract” and further enumerates
the specific nature of disputes arising out
of the execution of works contract which
would come within the definition of a “works
contract”. However, the same does not
even vaguely include the issue or dispute
arising out of cancellation and termination
of contract due to which this question,
in my considered opinion, would not fall
within the jurisdiction of the M.P. State
Arbitration Tribunal so as to be referred for
adjudication arising out of its termination.”
5. We find from the definition under Section 2(d) of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 that even after a
contract is terminated, the subject matter of dispute is
covered by the said definition. The said provision has
not been even referred to in the judgment rendered
by Hon’ble Gyan Sudha Mishra, J.
6. In view of the above, we are of the opinion that
the view expressed by Hon’ble Ganguly, J. is the
correct interpretation and not the contra view of
Hon’ble Gyan Sudha Mishra, J. Reference stands
answered accordingly.
1798 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

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7. Taking up appeal on merits, we find that the High
Court proceeded on the basis of the judgment of
this Court in VA Tech Escher Wyass Flovel Ltd. [VA
Tech Escher Wyass Flovel Ltd. v. M.P. SEB, (2011)
13 SCC 261 : (2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 468] which has
been held to be per incuriam. The M.P. Act cannot
be held to be impliedly repealed.
8. We are, thus, in agreement with the proposed
opinion of Hon’ble Ganguly, J. in para 42 of the
reported judgment which reads as follows: (M.P.
Rural Road Development case [M.P. Rural Road
Development Authority v. L.G. Chaudhary Engineers
and Contractors, (2012) 3 SCC 495: (2012) 2 SCC
(Civ) 210], SCC p. 509, para 42)
“42. Therefore, appeal is allowed and the
judgment of the High Court which is based
on the reasoning of VA Tech Escher Wyass
Flovel Ltd. v. M.P. SEB [VA Tech Escher
Wyass Flovel Ltd. v. M.P. SEB, Misc. Appeal
No. 380 of 2003, order dated 5-3-2003
(MP)] is set aside. This Court holds the
decision in VA Tech Escher Wyass Flovel
Ltd. v. M.P. SEB [VA Tech Escher Wyass
Flovel Ltd. v. M.P. SEB, (2011) 13 SCC 261:
(2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 468] has been rendered
in per incuriam. In that view of the matter
the arbitration proceeding may proceed
under the M.P. Act of 1983 and not under
the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.”
The appeal is accordingly disposed of.”
11.5.1. In a recent decision in Gayathri Project Ltd v. M.P. Road
Development Corporation Ltd20, this Court reiterated the
exposition of law laid down in L.G. Chaudhary in clear
terms, as follows:

20 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1136
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1799

Umri Pooph Pratappur (UPP) Tollways Pvt. Ltd. and Anr. v.
M.P. Road Development Corporation and Another

“38 …..
i. Where the arbitration proceedings are
still underway, but no statement of
defence has been filed, there it would
be open for the parties to raise an
objection of lack of jurisdiction in view
of the applicability of MP Act, 1983. The
parties will also be at liberty to approach
the High Court by way of a petition
under Article 227 of the Constitution
for seeking a transfer of the arbitration
proceedings to the M.P. State Arbitration
Tribunal under the MP Act, 1983.
ii. Where the arbitration proceedings are still
underway, but statement of defence has
already been filed i.e., the relevant stage
for raising an issue of jurisdiction is already
crossed, there it would not be open for
the parties to raise an objection of lack of
jurisdiction in view of the applicability of MP
Act, 1983. Furthermore, in such scenarios
since the arbitration proceedings have
already commenced and made substantial
progress, it would not be appropriate to
transfer such proceedings to the M.P.
State Arbitration Tribunal under the MP
Act, 1983, and the better course of action
would be to let the arbitration proceedings
conclude.
iii. As per L.G. Chaudhary (II) (supra) where
the arbitration proceedings have concluded
and an award has been passed, and if no
objection to the jurisdiction in view of the
applicability of MP Act, 1983 was taken
at the relevant stage then such an award
cannot be annulled only on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction.
1800 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

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iv. Any award passed by an arbitral tribunal
under the Act, 1996, where otherwise the
MP Act, 1983 was applicable, such an
award may be challenged or assailed in
terms of Section 34 and thereafter Section
37 of the Act, 1996 and other relevant
provisions thereunder.
v. Any award passed by an arbitral tribunal
under the Act, 1996, where otherwise the
MP Act, 1983 was applicable, such an
award must be executed in terms of the
MP Act, 1983 and the relevant provisions
thereunder.
vi. Where the objection based on applicability
of the MP Act, 1983 had been raised
in the written statement or statement of
defence, but the parties never took steps
towards challenging the jurisdiction of the
arbitral tribunal under Section 16 of the
Act, 1996 or where such plea of jurisdiction
was turned down in view of the position
of law that was prevailing prior to L.G.
Chaudhary (II) (supra) i.e., such challenge
to the jurisdiction was decided prior to the
date of pronouncement of L.G. Chaudhary
(II) (supra), then even in such cases, as
per the decision of this Court in Modern
Builders (supra), the award should not be
disturbed or set-aside only on the ground
of lack of jurisdiction.”
11.6. Likewise, in State of Chhattisgarh v. KMC Constructions Ltd
(supra), this Court set aside the appointment of an arbitrator
under the 1996 Act, holding that when a statutory mechanism
under the 1983 Act exists, even a court order under the 1996
Act cannot prevail, and parties must be relegated to the
jurisdiction of the Madhya Pradesh Arbitration Tribunal. The
relevant paragraphs are extracted below for ready reference:
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1801

Umri Pooph Pratappur (UPP) Tollways Pvt. Ltd. and Anr. v.
M.P. Road Development Corporation and Another

“In view of judgment of this Court in Madhya Pradesh
Rural Road Development Authority and Anr. v. L.G.
Chaudhary Engineers and Contractors, (2012) 3
SCC 495 and the order passed by this Court on 8th
March, 2018 in the same matter, the M.P. Arbitration
Tribunal constituted under the M.P. Madhyastham
Adhikaran Adhiniyam, 1983, (M.P. Act) has the
exclusive jurisdiction to deal with the dispute in
question. Accordingly, the impugned direction under
Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,
1996 cannot be sustained and is set aside.
The parties are relegated to M.P. Arbitration Tribunal
which may decide the dispute as per provisions of M.P.
Madhyastham Adhikaran Adhiniyam, 1983 (M.P. Act)”
11.7. In ARSS Damoh – Hirapur Tolls Pvt. Ltd v. M.P. Road
Development Corporation (supra), this Court refused to allow
private arbitration to continue where a works contract was
involved, and directed the transfer of the pending arbitration
proceedings to the Madhya Pradesh Arbitration Tribunal,
thereby upholding the exclusive statutory forum.
11.8. Similarly, in Madhya Pradesh Rural Road Development
Authority v. Backbone Enterprises Limited (supra), this Court
once again reinforced the exclusive jurisdiction of the Madhya
Pradesh Arbitration Tribunal in matters arising from works
contracts covered by the 1983 Act.
11.9. Given that the present Concession Agreement pertains
to the construction of a State Highway situated entirely
within the State of Madhya Pradesh and was awarded by
Respondent No.1, a State-controlled entity, the agreement
clearly qualifies as a “works contract” under section 2(1)(i)
of the 1983 Act. Consequently, the dispute arising therefrom
falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Madhya Pradesh
Arbitration Tribunal.
11.10. In view of the above statutory framework and judicial
pronouncements, the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996
stands excluded by operation of law in such matters. The
1802 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

private arbitration proceedings initiated by the appellant are
therefore, non est in law, and the proper forum for adjudication
is the Madhya Pradesh Arbitration Tribunal established under
the 1983 Act.
12. It is further not in dispute that the appellant had, in 2018 initiated
Reference Case No.61 of 2018 before the Madhya Pradesh
Arbitration Tribunal and had obtained issuance of notice. While the
said reference was pending, the appellant simultaneously invoked
arbitration under Clause 44.3.1 of the Concession Agreement
and initiated private arbitration proceedings before the ICADR
(Respondent No. 2) under the 1996 Act. This parallel invocation of
remedies is impermissible in law and squarely hit by the doctrine
of election and estoppel. A party cannot pursue two mutually
inconsistent remedies under different legal regimes arising from
the same cause of action.
12.1. Even otherwise, Clause 44.3.1 of the Concession Agreement to
the extent it purports to permit private arbitration, is inoperative
insofar as it seeks to override the statutory mandate of the 1983
Act. For proper appreciation, the relevant clauses relating to
arbitration in the Concession Agreement are extracted below:
“44.3 Arbitration
44.3.1 Any Dispute which is not resolved amicably
by conciliation, as provided in Clause 44.2, shall be
finally decided by reference to arbitration by a Board
of Arbitrators appointed in accordance with Clause
44.3.2. Such arbitration shall be held in accordance
with the Rules of Arbitration of the International
Centre for Alternative Dispute Resolution, New
Delhi (the ‘’Rules’’), or such other rules as may
be mutually agreed by the Parties, and shall be
subject to the provisions of the Arbitration Act.
The venue of such arbitration shall be Bhopal and
the language of arbitration proceedings shall be
English.
44.3.2 There shall be a Board of three arbitrators,
of whom each Party shall select one, and the third
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1803

Umri Pooph Pratappur (UPP) Tollways Pvt. Ltd. and Anr. v.
M.P. Road Development Corporation and Another

arbitrator shall be appointed by the two arbitrators so
selected and in the event of disagreement between
the two arbitrators, the appointment shall be made
in accordance with the Rules.
44.3.3 The arbitrators shall make a reasoned award
(the “Award”). Any Award made in any arbitration held
pursuant to this Article 44 shall be final and binding
on the Parties as from the date it is made, and the
Concessionaire and MPRDC agree and undertake
to carry out such Award without delay.
44.3.4 The Concessionaire and MPRDC agree that an
Award may be enforced against the Concessionaire
and/or MPRDC, as the case may be, and their
respective assets wherever situated.
44.3.5 This Agreement and the rights and obligations
of the Parties shall remain in full force and effect,
pending the Award in any arbitration proceedings
hereunder.
44.4 Adjudication by Regulatory Authority or
Commission
In the event of constitution of a statutory Regulatory
Authority or Commission with powers to adjudicate
upon disputes between the Concessionaire and the
MPRDC, all Disputes arising after such constitution
shall, instead of reference to arbitration under Clause
44.3, be adjudicated upon by such Regulatory
Authority or Commission in accordance with the
Applicable Law and all references to Dispute
Resolution procedure shall be construed accordingly.
For the avoidance of doubt, the Parties hereto agree
that the adjudication hereunder shall not be final and
binding until an appeal against such adjudication has
been decided by an appellate tribunal or high Court,
as the case may be, or no such appeal has been
preferred within the time specified in the Applicable
Law.”
1804 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

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12.1. It is trite law that parties cannot contract out of a statutory
obligation enacted in furtherance of public interest. In Booz
Allen & Hamilton Inc. v. SBI Home Finance Ltd21, this Court
held that arbitration is not permissible where the legislature
has reserved adjudication of disputes to a special forum. The
relevant observation is as follows:
“35. The Arbitral Tribunals are private fora chosen
voluntarily by the parties to the dispute, to adjudicate
their disputes in place of courts and tribunals
which are public fora constituted under the laws
of the country. Every civil or commercial dispute,
either contractual or non-contractual, which can be
decided by a court, is in principle capable of being
adjudicated and resolved by arbitration unless the
jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunals is excluded either
expressly or by necessary implication. Adjudication
of certain categories of proceedings are reserved by
the legislature exclusively for public fora as a matter
of public policy. Certain other categories of cases,
though not expressly reserved for adjudication by
public fora (courts and tribunals), may by necessary
implication stand excluded from the purview of
private fora. Consequently, where the cause/dispute
is inarbitrable, the court where a suit is pending,
will refuse to refer the parties to arbitration, under
Section 8 of the Act, even if the parties might have
agreed upon arbitration as the forum for settlement
of such disputes.”
13. The appellant’s submission that both parties intended to arbitrate
under the 1996 Act carries no legal weight. The object and scheme
of the 1983 Act is to channel all disputes arising from works contracts
involving the State and its instrumentalities into a specialized statutory
forum to ensure uniformity, efficiency, and public accountability. This
intent is also reflected in Clause 44.4 of the Concession Agreement,
which acknowledges that in the event of constitution of a competent

21 (2011) 5 SCC 532
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1805

Umri Pooph Pratappur (UPP) Tollways Pvt. Ltd. and Anr. v.
M.P. Road Development Corporation and Another

statutory forum, such forum would override the contractual arbitration
clause. Although it was argued that the Madhya Pradesh Arbitration
Tribunal was not expressly contemplated under Clause 44.4, the
existence of the Tribunal under the prevailing law and its exclusive
jurisdiction cannot be contractually overridden or ignored.
13.1. Accordingly, the attempt of the appellant to invoke Clause
44.3.1 of the Concession Agreement and re-agitate the issue
of private arbitration – already settled in Viva Highways and
affirmed by this Court – is barred by the doctrine of constructive
res judicata and amounts to an abuse of the process of law.
The appellant is estopped from challenging the binding nature
of Viva Highways, having itself been a party to the earlier SLP
proceedings, wherein the said judgment was upheld.
14. Additionally, the appellant’s conduct in withdrawing the reference
petition before the Madhya Pradesh Arbitration Tribunal, without
seeking liberty to re-agitate the claims, and simultaneously initiating
proceedings under the 1996 Act, constitutes forum shopping. This
conduct, aimed at circumventing the statutory mechanism and
reviving abandoned claims, is tainted with mala fides and deserves
to be deprecated.
15. Further, the appellant’s claims – which arise from events dating back
to 2013-2015 – are also barred by limitation under Section 43 of the
1996 Act read with the Limitation Act, 1963. The belated invocation
of arbitration in 2022, and its continuation in 2025, is thus clearly
time-barred and legally unsustainable.
16. In view of the above, we find no infirmity in the reasoning or conclusion
of the High Court in quashing the private arbitration proceedings and
reaffirming the exclusive jurisdiction of the Madhya Pradesh Arbitration
Tribunal established under the 1983 Act to adjudicate disputes arising
from works contract involving the State or its instrumentalities.
17. At this juncture, it is to be noted that the appellant had voluntarily
withdrawn the Reference Petition No.61 of 2018 under Rule 53(3)
(b) of the M.P Arbitration Tribunal Regulations without seeking liberty
to re-file the same. Rule 53 of the Madhya Pradesh Madhyastham
Adhikaran Regulations, 1985, deals with the withdrawal and
adjustment of references and reads as follows:
1806 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

“53. Withdrawal and adjustment of references –
(1) At any time after the institution of a reference, the
petitioner may as against all or any of the respondents
abandon his reference or abandon a part of his claim.
(2) Where the Tribunal is satisfied –
(a) that a reference must fail by reason of some formal
defect, or
(b) that there are sufficient grounds for allowing the
petitioner to institute a fresh reference for the subject
matter of such reference or part of a claim; it may, on
such terms as it thinks fit, grant the petitioner permission
to withdraw from such reference or such part of the claim
with liberty to institute a fresh reference in respect of the
subject matter of such reference or such part of the claim.
(3) Where the petitioner-
(a) abandons any reference or part of claim under sub-
regulation (1); or
(b) withdraws from a reference or part of a claim without
the permission referred to in sub-regulation (2); he shall
be liable for such costs as the Tribunal may award and
shall be precluded from instituting any fresh reference in
respect of such subject matter or such part of the claim.”
In terms of the statutory mandate under Rule 53(3)(b), once a
reference is withdrawn without obtaining liberty to re-agitate the same,
the appellant stands precluded from initiating a fresh reference on
the same subject matter. This substantive bar also applies to any
attempt to pursue the same claims before alternative fora.
17.1. Nonetheless, considering the nature of the dispute and in the
interests of justice, and in view of the submission made by
the learned Solicitor General appearing for Respondent No.1,
we are of the opinion that the appellant can be permitted to
seek revival of Reference Petition No.61 of 2018 before the
Madhya Pradesh Arbitration Tribunal.
18. Accordingly, we direct the appellant to file an application to recall the
withdrawal order dated 08.02.2023 and seek restoration of Reference
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1807

Umri Pooph Pratappur (UPP) Tollways Pvt. Ltd. and Anr. v.
M.P. Road Development Corporation and Another

Petition No.61 of 2018 within two weeks from the date of receipt
of a copy of this judgement. Upon such filing, the Madhya Pradesh
Arbitration Tribunal shall consider the application on its own merits
and pass appropriate orders, within a further period of two weeks.
If the Tribunal allows the restoration, the Reference Petition shall
be disposed of on merits, in accordance with law, after affording
reasonable opportunity of hearing to both parties, preferably within
four months from the date of restoration.
19. This appeal stands disposed of in the above terms. There shall be
no order as to costs.
20. Pending application(s), if any, also stand disposed of.

Result of the case: Appeal disposed of.

†
Headnotes prepared by: Ankit Gyan