Holding

Section 4(4) of the Apprentices Act is directory; non‑registration does not invalidate the apprenticeship contract nor convert the apprentice into a workman, and apprentices remain trainees outside the ambit of labour statutes.

Summary

The Supreme Court examined whether apprentices appointed under the Apprentices Act, 1961 become "workmen" under the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and whether the requirement in Section 4(4) of the Apprentices Act to send the contract to the Apprenticeship Adviser for registration is mandatory. The Court held that an apprentice is a trainee who enters into a contract for a fixed period and stipend, and the employer’s only obligation is to provide training and pay the stipend; the contract does not create an employer‑employee relationship. The word "shall" in Section 4(4) is directory, not mandatory, and non‑registration does not invalidate the contract or convert the apprentice into a workman. Consequently, labour statutes do not apply to apprentices and disputes must be resolved under Section 20 of the Apprentices Act. The appeals of the employers were allowed and the apprentices’ claims under industrial‑dispute legislation were dismissed.

Issues considered

The legal status of an apprentice under the Apprentices Act, 1961 – whether an apprentice becomes a workman under the Industrial Disputes Acts.
Whether Section 4(4) of the Apprentices Act, which uses the word "shall" for registration of the apprenticeship contract, imposes a mandatory duty or is merely directory.
The effect of non‑registration of the apprenticeship contract on the validity of the contract and on the applicability of labour laws.

Legislation cited

Apprentices Act, 1961s. 18, s. 20, s. 21, s. 22, s. 2(aa), s. 2(aaa), s. 2(r), s. 30, s. 31, s. 4(4), s. 6, s. 7
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947s. 25F, s. 2(s)
U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947s. 2(z), s. 6N

Subjects

apprenticeshipworkman definitionindustrial disputesstatutory interpretationshall vs maydirectory provisionspecial vs general lawlabour law exclusioncontract registration

Judgment

U.P. STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD A
v.
SHRI SHIV MOHAN SINGH AND ANR.

OCTOBER 1, 2004

[N. SANTOSH HEDGE, S.B. SINHA AND A.K. MATHUR, JJ.]
B

Apprentices Act, 1961:

Sections 18, 2(r), 2(aa), 2(aaa), 6, 7, 20, 21 and 22-Contract of
apprenticeship-Appointment of, apprentice trainee-Nature and character
of-Held: Apprentice trainee enters into contract to serve for fixed period
c
on fixed stipend-Apprentice is a trainee and his position will not change
to workman under employer where he is undergoing apprenticeship training-
Obligation of employer-Held: Employer is only under an obligation to
impart training and pay stipend and not to accept the apprentice as his
employee and confer the status of workman-There is no relationship of D
master and servant or employer and employee.

Sections 4(4)--Contract of apprenticeship-Non-registration of, with
Apprenticeship Advisor by employer-Effect of-Held: Registration ofcontract
with Apprenticeship Advisor is purely an administrative act-Non-registration E
of contract will not render the contract invalid-Status of apprentice does
not change to that ofa workman irrespective of the contract being registered
or not.

Section 4(4)--Contract of Apprenticeship shall be sent by employer to
Apprenticeship Adviser for registration-Expression 'shall '-Inte1pretation F
of, mandatory or directory-Held: Interpretation ofexpression 'shall' in any
enactment depends upon the context in which it appears and its effect
thereof-From social legislation point of view expression 'shall' in section
4(4) should be construed as directory because it will be for the benefit of
apprentice-Treating it as mandatory will be more counter productive to the G

-- interest of apprentices-Also no penalty is provided for breach of non-
registration-Thus, expression 'shall' cannot be construed to be mandatory
and is directory-Interpretation of Statutes.

Object of the Ac1-Held: Is to recruit apprentices and train them for
developing a strong industrial base. H
953
954 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004) SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A Industrial Disputes Act, I947 and UP. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-
Application of, to Apprentices Act, I 96 I-Held: Expression 'workmen' under
Section 2(z) and 2(s) includes apprentice but is not applicable to apprentice
appointed under Apprentices Act, 196 I-Reading definition of apprentice in
sections ~(aa) and 2(r) with section I8, it is clear that Apprentice Act which
B is a special Act, does not cover workman and labour laws are not applicable
to apprentice-As such application of Labour Laws is excluded and labour
Court/Industrial Tribunal will not have jurisdiction to entertain any dispute
arising therefrom-Disputes are to be resolved under Section 20 of the
Apprentice Act-Sections 2(aa), 2(r), I8 and 20-Industrial Disputes Act,
I947, section 2(s)-UP. Industrial Disputes Act, I947, section 2(z).
c
The question which arose for consideration in these appeals filed
by the apprentices and the employers is with regard to the scope of
Apprentices Act, 1961 vis-a-vis the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947,
the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and the Indian Boilers Act, 1923.
D
Incumbents, in these appeals were appointed as apprentice trainees
in the designated trade except for few who were appointed otherwise.
The contract of apprenticeship was drawn for the incumbents except
few of them. In majority of the cases the contract was not registered
with the Apprenticeship Adviser and on completion of training their
E services were terminated. Respondents raised industrial dispute claiming
status of worker under the Apprenticeship Act, 1961, benefit of section
25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 or under section 6N of the U.P.
-- Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

F U.P. State Electricity Board contended that if an incumbent is
appointed as an apprentice trainee and contract Of apprenticeship has
not been registered, incumbent does not cease to be an apprentice and
his position does noi become that of a workman.

Apprentice trainees contended that the word 'shall' appearing in
G sub-section 4 of section 4 of the 1961 Act means that the registration of
the contract is mandatory and if the contract of apprenticeship under
the section is not registered with the Apprenticeship Adviser, contract
would cease and the incumbent becomes workman; and that the 1961
Act is a welfare legislation, and it should be construed liberally for the
H benefit of the workman.
U.P. STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD v. S.M. SINGH 955

Allowing the appeals of the employers and dismissing of the appeals A
of the apprentices, the Court

HELD: Per A.K. Mathur, J (for himself and N. Santosh Hegde, J.):

1.1. A combined reading of the sections 2(aa), 2(r), 6, 7, 18(b), B
21and 22 of the Apprentices Act, 1961 as well as the Rule 11 of the
Apprentices Rules, 1962 makes it clear that the contract of apprenticeship
is entered with the employer and apprentice, and the apprentices are
only the persons who undergo training and during the training they are
entitled to get a particular stipend, they have to work for fixed hours
and at the end of period of training they have to appear in the test and C
a certificate is issued to them as per section 21 of the Act. During the
training period he will be treated as an apprentice and he shall not be
deemed as a workman as per Section 18 of the Act read with definition
of 'workman' under section 2(r). (973-D-E-F; 973-A-B)
D
1.2. There is no obligation on the part of the employer to give the
apprentices any employment whatsoever and give them a status of
workmen. Only obligation on the part of the employer is to impart them
training as per the provisions of Act and the Rules and to pay them
stipend as required under Rule 11. There is no relation of master and
servant or employer and employee. It is open for the employer to offer E
him employment but it will not be obligatory on the part of the apprentice
to serve that employer as per Section 22 except when there is specific
condition of contract to that effect. (973-E, F, G, C-D]

1.3. Sub-section (4) of section 4 only lays down that contract of F
apprenticeship should be registered with the Apprenticeship Adviser which
is purely an administrative act so that he can monitor and keep a record
thereof. Non-registration will not renderthe contract as invalid resulting in
change of status of an apprentice to that of a workman. It is more than clear
from the scheme of the Act, the apprentice is recruited for the purpose of
training as defined in section 2(aa) of the Apprentices Act, 1961, that an G
apprentice is a person who is undergoing apprenticeship training in
pursuance of a contract of apprenticeship and the apprenticeship training
has been defined under section 2(aaa). Therefore, reading of all these
provisions of the Act and Rules together makes it clear that the nature and
character ofapprentice is that of trainee only and will not change to that of H
956 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A a workman under the employer where he is undergoing the apprenticeship
training. This is irrespective of the fact that the contract was registered or
not. [977-E-F; 978-H; 979-A)

3.1. The Objects and Reasons reveal that the Act was enacted for
the purpose of recruiting the apprentices for developinp, a strong
B
industrial base for which trained man power is essential. The purpose
is to train the people for employing them in the industries; it was never
the intention that those trained candidates automatically become the
workmen. Therefore, the intention of the Act is basically to recruit and
train persons capable of being employed in the industries. (979-B-D)
c
3.2. With regard to the interpretation of the expression 'shall'
appearing in any enactment, one has to see the context in which it
appears and the effect thereof. The interpretation of the expression 'shall'
appearing in sub-section (4) of section 4, as mandatory, depends upon
D the context in which it appears. [979-B)

3.3. If the contract of apprenticeship is to be treated as a mandatory
and contract· is not sent to the Advisor then the effect will be that the
apprentice will not be entitled to any benefit flowing from the Act. In
fact, by treating the expression 'shall' as a mandatory it will be more
E counter productive to the interest of the trainees rather than for their
benefit. The employer can take a shelter under the plea that since the
contract of employment has not been registered with the Apprentice
Adviser, he is not under any obligation to pay stipend or impart training
to the apprentke trainees. Had that been the intention of the Legislature
then they would have provided the necessary penalty for breach of non-
F
registration of the contract of apprenticeship but the non-registration of
the contract has not been construed to be an offence so as to expose the
employer for any penalty. Therefore, the expression 'shall' appearing in
sub-section (4) of section 4 of the Act cannot be construed to be
mandatory and is directory. [979-G-H; 980-A-B, D, F]
G
f.T. Rajan v. T.P.M Sahir qnd Ors., [2003) 8 SCC 498, relied on.

3.4. Social legislations are primarily meant for welfare of the
particular section of the society and it should be construed liberally so
H as to advance the cause· of the public at large. Viewing from social
U.P. STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD v. S.M. SINGH 957

legislation point of view the word 'shall' appearing in section 4(4) cannot A
be construed to be mandatory and it is directory because it will be for
the benefit of the apprentice trainee; otherwise it will be oppressive to
the welfare of the apprentice. [981-F, G, BJ

Secretary, HSEB v. Suresh and Ors., [1999) 3 SCC 601; Air India
Statutory Corpn. and Ors. v. United Labour Union and Ors., [1997] 9 SCC
B
377 and Steel Authority of India Ltd v. National Union Waterfi·ont Workers,
[2001) 7 sec 1, referred to.

3.6. The definition of the word 'workman' in Section 2(z) of the U.P.
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes c
Act, 1947 includes apprentice but the expression 'workman' appearing in
section 2(z) and section 2(s) are not applicable to the apprentices appointed
under the Apprentices Act, 1961. Workmen specifically excludes the
apprentices as defined in Section 2(r) as such the trained persons shall not
fall in the definition of workmen. The Apprentices Act is a complete code in
itself, and it clearly stipulates that in Section 2 (aa) apprentice means a D
person who is undergoing apprenticeship training in pursuance of contract
of training and the workers are employed for wages for work done by them.
Section 18 clearly mentions that apprentices will not be treated as workmen
and will be treated as trainees and the provisions of any law with respect to
labour law shall not apply to or in relation to such apprentices. Therefore, E
reading of definition of apprentice in Sections 2(aa) and 2(r) read with
Section 18 of the Apprentices Act leaves no manner of doubt that the
Apprentice Act which is special Act, does not cover the workman and it
precludes the application of any other labour laws, i.e. U.P. Industrial
Disputes Act and Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. As such application of
these Acts automatically stand excluded and the Labour Court/Industrial F
Tribunal will not have any jurisdiction to entertain any dispute arising
therefrom. If any dispute arises then settlement has to be done by
Apprenticeship Adviser as per section 20 and his decision is final.
(982-B-C-D-E-F; 977-DJ
G
Hanuman Prasad Choudhary Etc. v. Rajasthan State Electricity Board,
Jaipur (1986) LAB I.C. 1014; Bhaskaran v. Kera/a State Electricity Board,
(1986) KLT 447 and U.P. State Electricity Board and Ors. v. P.O. Labour
Court, Kanpur and Ors., (1998) 78 FLR 511, approved.

Ballkhan Doskhan Joya and Gujarat Electricity Board (2002) 92 FLR H
958 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

·., A 914; State of Gujarat and Anr. v. Chauhan Ramjibhoi Karsanbhai. (2004)
102 FLR 347 and MP. Electricity Board anc/ Ors. v. Basant Kumar and
Ors., (1989) JLJ 253, disapproved.

.
Per S.B. Sinha, J. (Concurring):
B HELD: 1.1. U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is a general law. The
Parliament enacted Apprentices Act, 1961 which is a special law. It
deals with the regulation and control of training of apprentices and for
matters connected therewith. Therefore, the special statute shall prevail
over the general statute having regard to the maxim 'genera/ia specialibus
C non derogant". (1002-C-E]

Ta/cher Municipality v. Talcher Regulated Mkt. Committee & Anr.,
[2004) 6 sec 178, relied on.

1.2. If the language used in a statute is capable of bearing more than
D one construction, the true meaningthereofshould be selected having regard
to the consequences resulting from adopting the alternative constructions.
A construction resulting in hardship, 'non-fulfillment of the purpose for
which statute has been brought in force, should be rejected and should be
given that construction which avoids such results. (1006-E-G)
E
1.3. Having regard to the mischief rule laid down in Heydon 's case
that court must adopt a construction which 'shall suppress the mischief
and advance the remedy', sub-section (4) of section 4 of the Apprentices
Act, 1961 has to be directory. (1006-G; 1007-B]

F Ashok Leyland Ltd v. State of Tamil Nadu and Anr., (2004) 3 SCC 1
and Ameer Trading Corporation Ltd v. Shapoorji Data frocessing Ltd,
(2004) 1 sec 702, relied on.

Heydon's case (1584) 3 Co. Rep. 7a, referred to.
G
1.4. Ordinarily, although the word "shall" is considered to be
imperative in nature but it has to be interpreted as directory if the
context or the intention otherwise demands. (1003-F-G)

Mis. Sainik Motors, Jodhpur and Ors. v. State of Rajasthan, AIR
.....
•,

H (1961) SC 1480, relied on.
U.P. STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD v. S.M. SINGH 959
,•
Crawford on Statutory Construction p 539, referred to. A

2.1. Only because the expression "shall" has been employed in sub-
section (4) of Section 4, the same may not be held to be imperative in
character having regard to the fact that not only a contract of
apprenticeship commences but also in view of the fact that an application
·for registration of apprenticeship contract is required to be made within
B
a period of three months in terms of Rule 4B of the Apprenticeship
Rules, 1962. The Act nowhere provides for the consequences of non-
registration. The _definition of 'apprentice' nowhere states that an
apprentice with a view to obtain the benefits of the said Act must also
be registered. Section 18 of the said Act says that an apprentice shall not C
be a worker. It does not say that an unregistered apprentice shall be a
worker. (1005-D-E, C-D]

2.2. Prior to 1973, the provision for registration of contract of
apprenticeship with the Apprenticeship Advisor within the period D
prescribed was mandatory in character. Only having regard to the delay
which has occasioned for registration of contract of apprenticeship, the
amendment had been brought about; pursuant whereto or in furtherance
whereof the contract of apprenticeship commences, there is no reason as
to why the provision should be construed as imperative in character so
as to render a contract of apprenticeship a nullity which is possible to E
be avoided and the object thereof can be achieved by taking recourse to
the penal provisions. (1007-C-E]

2.3. Ifa contract of apprenticeship is entered into; the violation of the
terms and conditions thereof, although may lead to penal consequences but F
the same would not render the contract of apprenticeship void or illegal. If
in a given case, employer fails to get the contract of apprenticeship registered
and/or fails to carry on his obligations in terms of Section 11 of the Act, he
faces penal consequences in terms of Section 31 of the Act, and is also liable
to pay compensation for termination of apprenticeship under Rule 6
of the Apprenticeship Rules, 1962. In the ev~nt, the Apprenticeship G
Advisor obtains information about such violations; he can resolve a
conflict by and between an employer and an apprentice, under
Section 20. Indisputably, he can issue directions which the employer
will have to comply with and on his failure to do so, he would run the risk
of being prosecuted in terms of Section ·30 of the Act, but he has not been H
960 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A · conferred with any power to declare such contract of apprenticeship to be
ipso facto void ab initio. [1004-F-H; 1005-A-B, F-G]

2.4. The contract of apprenticeship like any other contract can be
brought to an end by the parties thereto. Once a contract of
apprenticeship commences, the same cannot be brought to an end except
B in accordance with law. If it is to be held that by reason of non-
registration of such contract of apprenticesnip the contract itself comes
to an end, it would be detrimental to the interest of the apprentices,
which would frustrate the object of the Act. (1005-B-C]

C 2.5. No provision of the Act or the Rules framed thereunder was brought
to notice to show that non-registration of the contract of apprenticeship or
violation and/or neglect on the part of the employer to comply with the
other provisions of the Act would result in invalidation of the contract.
Status of apprentice does not change to that of a workman only because the
D contract has not been registered or the employer has not carried out his
obligations thereunder. Ifsuch a construction is placed, an apprentice may
be held to have ceased to be an apprentice ifhe himself defaults in performing
his obligations under the contract. (1006-B-D]

Canbank Financial Services Ltd. v. The Custodian and Ors., (2004) 7
E SCALE 495, referred to.

2.6. It is not a case where any of the apprentices repudiated the
contract. Whether a relationship of an employer and workman or an
employer and an apprenticeship had been brought about, is essentially
a question of fact. The Court while determining such a dispute must
F
consider the factual matrix involved therein in the light of the provisions
of the said Act. Once it is held that a contract of apprenticeship entered
into by and between the employer and the workman is a genuine one
and not a camouflage or a ruse, a presumption would arise that the
concerned person is not a workman. (1007-F, G-H]
G
2.7. It is one thing to say that a contract is illegal being opposed to
public policy so as to render the same void in terms of Section 23 of the
Contract Act but it is another thing to say that by reason of breaches
of the terms and conditions thereof by one of the parties it becomes
H voidable at the instance of the other party to the contract. If a contract
U.P. STA TE ELECTRICITY BOARD v. S.M. SINGH 96 l

is valid in law the breaches thereof would not render it invalid but the A·
same may only enable a party thereto, who had suffered by reason of
such breach, to avoid the contract. Unless the terms and conditions of
a contract are avoided by a party thereto the contract remains valid and
all consequences flowing therefrom would enure. to the benefit of the
parties thereto. In absence of any specific provision in the statute, it B
cannot be said that in the event of breach by the employer the contract
of apprenticeship shall become a contract of employment. Such a novation
of contract is not contemplated in law. [1008-A-B, E-F)

F.C. Shepherd & Co. Ltd. v Jerrom, (1986) 3 All ER 589, referred to.
c
2.8. With a view to become a workman, not only the apprentice has
to show that he comes within the purview of the definition of the term
'workman' as contained in Section 2(z) of the U.P. Industrial Disputes
Act, 1947 but he must further plead and establish that his job is such
which fulfil~s the requirements of the said term. [1008-F-G) D
Mukesh K .Tripathi v. Sr. Divn. Manager LIC and Ors., JT (2004) 7
SC 232, relied on.

2.9. It is necessary to ascertain as to how the parties to the contract
thought thereabout. Ordinarily, it is impermissible in law for a party to E
the contract of apprenticeship to allow it to be worked out and then
contend that it was a contract of employment. (1009-A-B)

Bruton v. London and Quadrant Housing Trust, [1999] 3 All ER 481
and Street v Mountford, (1985) AC 809, referred to. F
Mitrangshu Roy Choudhary v. Union of India & Ors., [1999) 3 SCC
649, relied on.

Rajendra Singh and Ors. v. UP. State Electricity Board, Shakti Bhawan,
Lucknow and Ors., (2000) 86 FLR 155; Sri Chittaranjan Das v. Durgapore
G
Project Limited & Ors., (1995) 2 CLJ 388 and Babula! and Others v.
Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation and Anr., (2000) 84 FLR 847,
approved.

Ballkhan Doskhan Joya v. Gujarat Electricity Board, (2002) 92 FLR H
962 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2004] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A 914 and Ram Dular Paswan and Ors. v. P.O. Labour Court, Bokaro Steel "·
City and Ors., (1998) 80 FLR 399, disapproved.

The Employees' State Insurance Corporation and Anr. v. The Tata
Engineering and Locomotive Co. Ltd. and Anr. (1975] 2 SCC 835, referred
to.
B
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2429 of2003.

From the Judgment and Order dated 26.9.2002 of the Allahabad High
Court in C.M.W.P. No. 21560 of 1995.

c WITH

C.A.Nos.8386, 7005, 7006,8383,8385,8384,9231,9234,9232,9233,
9679, 9680, 9681, 8683/2003, 122, 14, 1965 and 2193 of 2004.

P.K. Goswami, Rajiv Mehta, B. Aggarwala and Saurabh Srivastava for
D the Appellant.

J.N. Dubey, R. Venkataramani; Anurag Dubey, Ms. Upasana Dubey,
K.B. Upadhyay, Ms. Salini Ranjan, Manish Kumar, S. R. Setia, Satya Mitra
Garg, Ms. Manju Aggarwal, Ashok Panighari, Imtiaz Ahmed, Ms. Nashma
Imtiaz, Kamran Malik, V.N. Raghupathy, Pradeep Misra, Sudhir Kulshrestha
E
for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court were delivered by

A.K. MATHUR, J. : In all these appeals common question of law is
F involved, therefore, they are disposed of by common order.

The main question involved in these appeals is what is the scope of
Apprentices Act, 1961 vis-a-vis the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947,
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and the Indian Boilers Act, 1923.

G The Apprentices Act, 1961 was promulgated primarily for the purpose
of recruiting the apprentices. The idea behind was strong industrial base
across the country. For the industrial growth it was necessary to have trained
man power and for that purpose the apprentices were recruited.

The Introduction, Objects and Reasons for enacting this Act reads as
H under:-
U.P. STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD v. S.M. SINGH [MATHUR, J.] 963

INTRODUCTION A
"After India gained independence, a wave to have its own strong
industrial base swept the country. Backed by Government policies,
industrial growth had a quantum leap. With the industrial growth a
need was felt to have trained man-power and for that steps were
taken to arrange for training of apprentices in the industry. After
B
some years it necessitated that the training being imparted to the
apprentices should be regulated by legislation. Accordingly the
Apprentices Bill, 1961 was introduced in a Parliament to provide
for the regulation and control of training of apprentices.

STATEMENT OF OBJECTS AND REASONS
c
The question of undertaking legislation for regulating the training
of apprentices in industry has been under the consideration of the
Government for a long time. Expert committees which went into the
question have recommended such legislation. Although certain D
establishment in the public and private sectors have been carrying
out programmes of training of skilled workers on a systematic basis,
industry in general has not as yet fully organized such programmes.
In the context of the Five Year Plan and the large scale industrial
development of the country, there is an increasing demand for
skilled craftsmen. The Government considers that it is necessary E
fully to utilize the facilities available for the training of apprentices
and to ensure their training in accordance with the progr.cmmes,
standards and syllabi, drawn up by expert bodies.

The Bill is intended to give effect to these objectives." F
Now we shall examine the necessary provisions of the Act. Section 2
deals with the definition. Section 2 (aa) defines "apprentice" which means
a person who is undergoing apprenticeship training in pursuance of a contract
of apprenticeship.
G
Section 2 (aaa) deals with "apprenticeship training" which means a
course of training in any industry or establishment undergone in pursuance
of a contract of apprenticeship and under prescribed terms and conditions
which may be different for different categories of apprentices.

Section 2 (b) deals with" Apprenticeship Adviser" which reads as under: H
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2004] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A " 'Apprenticeship Adviser' means the Central Apprenticeship Adviser
appointed under sub-section (1) of Section 26 or the State
Apprenticeship Adviser appointed under sub-section (2) of that
section."

B Section 2 (d) defines "Appropriate Government" .

. Section 2 (e) defines 'designated trade' which means a trade of any
vocational course which the Central Government, after consultation with the
Central Apprenticeship Council, may by notification in the Official Gazette
specify as a designated trade for the purposes of this Act.
c
. ' Section 2 (t) deals with "employer" which means any person who
<;:mploys one or more other persons to do any work in an establishment for
remuneration and includes any person entrusted with the supervision and
control of employees in such establishment.

D Section 2 (q) defines "trade apprentice" which means an apprentice who
undergoes apprenticeship training in any such trade or occupation as may be
prescribed.

Section 2 (r) deals with "worker" which means any person who is
E employed for wages in any kind of work and who gets his wages directly
from the employer but shall not include an apprentice referred to in clause
(aa).

Section 3 defines qualification for being engaged as an apprentice. Only
two qualifications are required that he should not be less than fourteen years
F of age and satisfies such standards or education and physical fitness as may
be prescribed.

Section 4 which is relevant for our purpose reads as under:-

"Contract of apprenticeship-(!) No person shall be engaged
G as an apprentice to undergo apprenticeship training in a designated
trade unless such person or, ifhe is a minor, his guardian has entered
into a contract of apprenticeship with the employer.

(2) The apprenticeship training shall be deemed to have
H commenced on the date on which the contract of apprenticeship has
U.P. STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD v. S.M. SINGH [MATHUR, J.) 965

been entered into under sub-section (I). A

(3) Every contract of apprenticeship may contain such terms
and conditions as may be agreed to by the parties to the contract:
·-
Provided that no such term or condition shall be inconsistent
with any provision of this Act or any rule made thereunder. B

(4) Every contract of apprenticeship entered h~~o under sub-
section ( l) shall be sent by the employer within such period as may
be prescribed to the Apprenticeship Adviser for registration.

(5) The Apprenticeship Adviser shall not register a contract of
c
apprenticeship unless he is satisfied that the person described as an
apprentice in the contract is qualified under this Act for being
engaged as an apprentice to undergo apprenticeship training in the
designated trade specified in the contract.
D
(6) Where the Central Government, after consulting the Central
Apprenticeship Counsel, makes any rule varying the terms and
conditions of apprenticeship training, of any category of apprentices
undergoing such training, then, the terms and conditions of every
contract of apprenticeship relating to that category of apprentices
E
and subsisting immediately before the making of such rule shall be
deemed to have been modified accordingly."

Section 5 deals with the Novation of contract of apprenticeship which
reads as under:
F
"Where an employer with whom a contract of apprenticeship has
been entered into, is for any reason, unable to fulfil his obligations
under the contract and with the approval of the Apprenticeship
Adviser it is agreed between the employer, the apprentice or his
guardian and any other employer that the apprentice shall be
engaged as an apprentice under the other employer for the unexpired
G
portion of the period of apprenticeship training, the agreement, on
registration with the Apprenticeship Adviser, shall be deemed to be
the contract of apprenticeship between the apprentice or his guardian
and the other employer, and on and from the date of such registration,
the contract of apprenticeship with the first employer shall terminate H
966 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

·A and no obligation under that contract shall be enforceable at the
instance of any party to the contract against the other party thereto."

Section 6 deals with the period of apprenticeship training which reads _.
as under:-
B
"6, Period of apprenticeship training :-

The period of apprenticeship training, which shall be specified
in the contract of apprenticeship, shall be as follows -
·-
c (a) in the case apprentices who, having undergone instinitional
training in a school or other institution recognized by the
National Cou!'lcil, have passed the trade tests or examinations
conducted by that Council or by an institution recognized by
that Council the period of apprenticeship training shall be such
as may be determined by that Council;
D
(aa) in the case of trade apprentices who, having undergone
institutional training in a school or other institution affiliated to or
recognized by a Board or State Council of Technical Education or
any other authority which the Central Government may, by
E notification in the Official Gazette specify in this behalf, have passed
the trade tests or examinations conducted by that Board or State
Council or authority, the period of apprenticeship training shall be
such as may be prescribed;

(b) in the case of other apprentices the period of apprenticeship
F training shall be such as may be prescribed;

(c) in the case of graduate or technician apprentice technician
(vocational) apprentice, the period of apprenticeship training shall
be such as may be prescribed."
G
Section 7 deals with the te~ination of apprenticeship Contract which
reads as under:

" 7. Termination of apprenticeship contract -

H (I) The· contract of apprenticeship shall terminate on the
U.P. STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD v. S.M. SINGH [MATHUR, J.] 967

expiry of the period of apprenticeship training. A
(2) Either party to a contract of apprenticeship may make
an application to the Apprenticeship Adviser for the termination of
the contract, and when such application is made, shall send by post
a copy thereof to the other party to the contract. B
(3) After considering the contents of the application and the
objections, if any, filed by the other party, the Apprenticeship
Adviser may, by order in writing, terminate the contract if he is
satisfied that the parties to the contract or any of them have or has
failed to carry out the terms and conditions of the contract and that C
it is desirable in the interests of the parties or any of them to
terminate the same:

Provided that where a contract is terminated-

(a) for failure on the part of the employer to carry out the terms D
and conditions of the contract, the employer shall pay to the
apprentice such compensation as may be prescribed;

(b) for such failure on the part of the apprentice the apprentice
or his guardian shall refund to the employer as cost of training such E
amount as may be determined by the Apprenticeship Adviser.

(4) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other provision
of this act, where a contract of apprenticeship has been terminated
by the Apprenticeship Adviser before the expiry of the period of
apprenticeship training and a new contract of apprenticeship is being F
entered into with a new employer, the Apprenticeship Adviser may,
if he is satisfied that the contract of apprenticeship with the previous
employer could not be completed because of any lapse on the part
of the previous employer, permit the period of apprenticeship
training already undergone by the apprentice with his previous G
employer to be included in the period of apprenticeship training to
be undertaken with the new employer."

Section 8 deals with the number of apprentices for a designated trade.

Section 9 deals with practical and basic training of apprentices. H
968 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A Section 10 deals with the related instruction of apprentices.

Section 11 deals with the obligations of employers which is relevant for
our purpose which reads as under:-

"Jl. Obligations of employers - Without prejudice to the
B other provisions of this Act every employer shall have the following
obligations in relation to an apprentice, namely -

(a) to provide the apprentice with the training in his trade in
accordance with the provisions of this Act, and the rules made
c thereunder;

(b) if the employer is not himself qualifi,ed in the trade, to
ensure that a l?erson who possesses the prescribed qualifications is
placed in charge of the training of the apprentice;

D (bb) to provide adequate instructional staff, possessing such
qualifications as may be prescribed for imparting practical and
theoretical training and facilities for trade test of apprentices; and

(c) to carry out his obligations under the contract of
E apprenticeship."

Section 12 deals with the Obligations of apprentices which ,reads as
under:

"12. Obligations of apprentices (1) Every apprentice undergoing
F apprenticeship training shall have the following obligations, namely:-

(a) to learn his trade conscientiously and diligently and endeavour
to qualify himself as a skilled craftsman before the expiry of
the period of training;
G
(b) to attend practical and instructional classes regularly;

©to carry out all lawful orders of his employer and superiors in the
establishment; and

H ( d) to carry out his obligations under the contract of apprenticeship.
U.P. STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD v. S.M. SINGH [MATHUR, J.] 969

(2) Every graduate or technician apprentice or technician .A
(vocational) apprentice undergoing apprenticeship training shall
have the following obligations, namely:-

(a) to learn his subject field in engineering or technology or
vocational course conscientiously and diligently at his place of B
training;

(b) to attend the practical and instructional classes regularly;

©to carry out all lawful orders of his employer and superiors in the
establishment; c
(c) to carry out his obligations under the contract of apprenticeship
which shall include the maintenance of such records of his
work as may be prescribed."

Section 13 regarding payment to apprentices which reads as under: D

"13. Payment to apprentices -

(l) The employer shall pay to every apprentice during the
period of appr-enticeship training such stipend at a rate not less than E
the prescribed minimum rate, or the rate which was being paid by
the employer on 1st January, 1970 to the category of apprentices
under which such apprentices falls, whichever is higher, as may be
specified in the contract of apprenticeship and the stipend so
specified shall be paid at such intervals and subject to such
conditions as may be prescribed. F

(2) An apprentice shall not be paid by his employer on the basis
of piece work nor shall he be required to take part in any output
bonus or other incentive scheme."
G
Section 14 deals with Health, safety and welfare of apprentices.

Section 15 deals with hours of work, overtime, leave and holidays.

Section 16 deals with the employer's liability for compensation for
injury. H
970 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A Section 18 deals with the Apprentices are trainees and not workers
which reads as tinder:

" 18. Apprentices are trainees and not workers -

Save as otherwise provided in this Act, -
B
(a) every apprentice undergoing apprenticeship training in a
designated trade in an establishment shall be a trainee and not
a worker; and

c (b) the provisions of any law with respect to labour shall not apply
to or in relation to such apprentice."

Section 19 deals with the records and returns.

Section 20 deals with settlement of disputes which is relevant for our
D purpose reads as under:

"20. Settlement of disputes - (1) Any disagreement or dispute
between an employer and an apprentice arising out of the contract
of apprenticeship shall be referred to the Apprenticeship Adviser for
E decision.

(2) Any person aggrieved by the decision of the Apprenticeship
Adviser under sub-section (I) within thirty days. from the date of
communication to him of such decision, prefer an appeal against the
decision to the Apprenticeship Council and such appeal shall be
F heard and determined by a Committee of that Council appointed for
the purpose.

(3) The decision of the Committee under sub-section (2) and
subject only to such decision of the Apprenticeship Adviser under
G sub-section (I) shall be final."

Section 21 deals with holding of test and grant of certificate and
conclusion of training which reads as under:-

"21- Holding of test and grant ofcertificate and conclusion of
H training - (I) Every apprentice who has completed the period of
U.P. STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD v. S.M. SINGH [MATHUR, J.] 971

training shall appear for a test to be conducted by the National A
Council to determine his proficiency in the designated trade in
which he has served his apprenticeship training.

(2) Every apprentice who passes the test referred to in sub-
section (1) shall be granted a certificate of proficiency in the trade B
by the National Council.

(3) The progress in apprenticeship training of every graduate
or technician apprentice technician (vocational) apprentice shall be
assessed by the employer from time to time.
c
(4) Every graduate or technician apprentice or technician
(vocational) apprentice who completes his apprenticeship training to
the satisfaction of the concerned Regional Board, shall be granted
a certificate of proficiency by the Board."

Section 22 deals with offer and acceptance of employment which reads D
as under:

"22. Offer and acceptance of employment- (1) It shall not be
obligatory on the part of the employer to offer any employment to
any apprentice who has completed the period of his apprenticeship E
training in his establishment, nor shall it be obligatory on the part
of the apprentice to accept an employment under the employer.

(2) Notwithstanding anything in sub-section (I), where there
is a condition in a contract of apprenticeship that the apprentice
shall, after the successful completion of the apprenticeship training, F
serve the employer, the employer shall, on such completion, be
bound to offer suitable employment to the apprentice, and the
apprentice shall be bound to serve the employer in that capacity for
such period and on such remuneration as may be specified in the
contract:
G
Provided that where such period or remuneration is not, in the
opinion of the Apprenticeship Adviser, reasonable, he may revise
such period or remuneration so as to make it reasonable, and the
period or remuneration so revised shall be deemed to be the period
or remuneration agreed to between the apprentice and the employer." H
972 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.
)

A Chapter III of the Act deals with the authorities like the powers of the
Apprenticeship Adviser, Powers of entry, inspection, etc. Offences and
penalties, etc.

Section 3 7 deals with the power to make rules. In exercise of this power
Central Government in consultation with Central Apprenticeship Council has
B
framed "The Apprenticeship Rules 1992".

Rule 6 requires that every employer shall send to the Apprenticeship
Adviser the contract of apprenticeship for registration within three months
of the date on which it was signed.
c
Rule 7 deals with the period of apprenticeship training as may be
specified in the schedule.

Rule 8 deals with the termination of the apprenticeship which reads as
under:
D
j

"8 Compensation for termination of apprenticeship --..,. Wher·.!
the contract of apprenticeship is terminated through failure on tbe
part of any employer in carrying out the terms and conditions
thereof, · such employer shall be liable to pay the apprentice
E compensation of an amount equivalent to his three months last
drawn stipend.

Rule 11 deals with payment of stipend to apprentices.

Rule 12 deals with the hours of work.
F
Rule 13 deals with the grant of leave to apprentices.

Rule 14 deals with the records and returns.

In this background of the Act and Rules, the question which arises for
G
interpretation is wl:at is the effect of non-registration of the contract because
sub-section (4) of Section 4 read with Rule 6 require that every contract of
apprentice shall be sent by the employer to the apprenticeship adviser for
registration within three months. Therefore, in case the contract of
apprenticeship is not sent to the apprenticeship adviser for registration what
H will be the effect thereof ?
U.P. ST ATE ELECTRICITY BOARD v. S.M. SINGH [MA THUR, J.] 973

As per the scheme of the Act it appears that the contract of apprentice A
is entered with employer & apprentice, and he has to undergo a training for
fixed duration & he will get stipend for that. After the successfully
undergoing training he appears for test for certificate as required under
Section 21. During the training period he will be treated as an apprentice and
he shall not be deemed as a workman as per Section 18 of the Act read with B
definition of 'workman' under section 2(r). It is ordained in sub-section (b)
of Section 18 that provisions of any law with respect to labour shall not apply
to or in relation to such apprentices. Therefore, on a reading of all the
provisions together what it transpires is that apprentices will be treated as
<
apprentice and he will not acquire a status of workman in that establishment.
After the successful completion of the training he will undergo a test and on c
being successful in the test a certificate to that effect will be issued to him
as per Section 21. It is open for the employer to offer him employment but
it will not be obligatory on the part of the apprentice to serve that employer
as per Section 22 except when there is specific condition of contract to that
effect. During the course when he undergoes the apprenticeship training he D
is only entitled to get stipend under Rule 11 at such rate as are prescribed
in the Rules.

Therefore a combined reading of the Sections as well as Rules makes
it clear that the apprentices are only the persons undergo training and during
that training they are entitled to get a particular stipend, they have to work E
for a fixed hours and at the end of period of training they have to appear
in the test and a certificate is issued to them. There is no obligation on the
part of the employer to give them any employment whatsoever. The position
of the apprentice remains as an apprentice/a trainee and during the period of
training they will not be treated as a workman. Only obligation on the part F
of the employer is to impart them training as per provisions of Act & Rules
and to pay them stipend as required under Rule 11 and beyond that there is
no obligation on the part of the employer to accept them as his employees
and give them a statUs of workmen. There is no relation of master & servant
or employer & employee.
G
In this background, we will examine the position vis-a-vis the U.P.
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and the
Indian Boilers Act, 1923. In this connection, a reference may be made to
Section 2(z) of the U.P.Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. This definition of the
workman is pari materia with that of the Industrial Disputes Act Section 2(s). H
974 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A Section 2(z) of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 which reads as under:

" 'workman' means any person (including an apprentice)
employed in any industry" to do any skilled or unskilled manual,
supervisory, technical or clerical work for hire or reward, whether
the terms of employment be expressed or implied, and for the
B
purposes of any proceeding under this Act in relatior to an industrial
dispute, includes any such person who has been dismissed, discharged
or retrenched in connection with, or as a consequence of, that
dispute, or whose dismissal, discharge or retrenchment has led to
that dispute, but does not include any such person-
c
(i) who is subject to the Army Act, 1950 or the Air Force Act,
1950, or the Navy (Discipline) Act,1934; or

(ii) who is employed in the police service or as an officer or
other employee of a prison; or
D
(iii) who is employed mainly in a managerial or administrative
capacity; or

(iv) who, being employed in a supervisory capacity, draws
E wages exceeding five hundred rupees per mensem or exercises,
either by the nature of the duties attached to the office or by reason
of the powers vested in him, functions mainly of a managerial
nature."

Since the definition of 'workman'"as given in Section 2(z) of the U.P.
F Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is pari materia with that of Section 2(s) of the
In~ustrial Disputes Act, 1947, therefore, no useful purpose would be served
by reproducing the definition of 'workman' as given in Section 2(s) of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Our attention was also invited to Section 6(N)
of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, which lays down the conditions
precedent to retrenchment of workmen. Section 6(N) of the U.P. Industrial
G
Disputes Act, 1947 reads as under:

"6N. Conditions precedent to retrenchment ofworkmen.- No
workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous
service for not less than one year under an employer shall be ~-

H retrenched by that employer until-
U.P. STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD v. S.M. SINGH [MATHUR, J.] 975

(a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing A
indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice
has expired or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice
wages for the period of the notice;

Provided that no such notice shall be necessary if the
retrenchment is under an agreement which specifies a date for the B
termination of service;

(b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment,
compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average
pay for every completed year of service or any part thereof in C
excess of six months, and

(c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the State
Government."

It is pari materia with that of Section 25(F) of the Industrial Disputes D
Act, 194 7. Therefore, no useful purpose would be served by reproducing that
definition.

In this connection, reference may be made to the definition of 'Industrial
Dispute' as defined in Section 2(1) of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
which reads as under : E
" (I) ' Industrial Dispute' means any dispute or difference
between employees and employers, or between employers and
workmen, or between workmen and workmen, which is connected
with the employment or non-employment or the term of employment
or with the conditions oflabour, or any person; but does not include F
an industrial dispute concerning- ·

(i) any industry carried on by or under the authority of the
Central Government or by a Railway Company, or

(ii) such controlled industry as may be specified in this behalf G
by Central Government, or

(iii) banking and insurance companies as defined in the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, or

(iv) a mine or an oil-field;" H
976 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A This definition of 'Industrial Dispute' is pari materia with that of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 as defined in Section 2(k) but the definition
of Section 2(k) is not as wide as that of Section 2(1) of the U.P. Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947. Therefore, the said definition is reproduced as under:

" (k) "industrial dispute" means any dispute or difference
B
between employers and employers, or between employers and
workmen, or between workmen and workmen, which is connected
with the employment or non-employment or the terms of employment
or with the conditions of labour, of any person;"

C ' Similarly, our attention was also drawn to some of the provisions of the
Indian Boilers Act, 1923 which lays down as to how the employer should
maintain the boilers, and prohibits using uncertificated boiler. It is required
to obtain necessary certification. It also deals with the penalties for breach
of the conditions for maintenance of the boilers.
D
In the background of the provisions of the four enactments, the main
question.which has been agitated by learned counsel for the appellant is that
if an incumbent is appointed as an apprentice/trainee and even if a contract
of such apprenticeship has not been registered, then also he does not cease
to be an apprentice and his position does not become that of a workman, As
E against this, learned counsel for the respondents has strenuously urged before .
us that non-registration of the contract of apprenticeship under sub~section
(4) of Section 4 of the Apprentices Act, 1961, with the Apprenticeship
Adviser would result in the breach of the contract and the status of an
incumbent is changed from the apprentice to that of a workman. Therefore,
F the question arose that whether registration of the contract under sub-section
(4) of Section 4 is mandatory or directory and in case, it is a mandatory, then
what is the effect, if it is directory, then what is the effect thereof. In this
connection, it was submitted that the word 'shall' appearing in sub-section
4 of Section 4 means the registration of the contract is mandatory and if it
is not registered then the contract ceases and the incumbent becomes
G workman. In this connection reference was made to a decision in the case
of P. T. Rajan v. T.P.M Sahir & Ors. reported in [2003] 8 SCC 498. It was
also submitted that the Apprentices Act, 1961 is a welfare legislation and it
should be construed liberally for the benefit of the workman. In this
connection, our attention was drawn to the decisions of this Court in the cases
H of Air India Statutory Corporation and Ors. v. United Labour Union & Ors.
U.P. STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD v. S.M. SINGH [MATHUR, J.] 977

and Secretary, H.S.E.B. V. Suresh & Ors. reported in (1997) 9 sec 377 and A
( 1999) 3 SCC 60 l. It was also submitted that the nature of work and the
nomenclature of the post is not decisive. In this connection, our attention was
also drawn to a decision of this Court in the case of Surya Prasad Singh and
Anr. v. labour Court fl Kanpur and Anr. reported in [1995] Supp.(4) SCC
38. B
Therefore, now going back to the basic question that in the light of the
aforesaid statutory provisions whether non-registration of the contract can
render the contract void or illegal and what is the result thereof. From the
scheme of things it is more than apparent that the Apprentices Act, 1961 is
a complete code in itself and it lays down the conditions of the apprentices, c
what shall be their tenure, what shall be their terms and conditions and what
are their obligations and what are the obligations of the employer. It also lays
down that the apprentices are trainees and not workmen and if any dispute
arises then the settlement has to be done by the Apprenticeship Adviser as
per Section 20 of the Apprentices Act, 1961 and his decision thereof is final.
D
Now, under the scheme of these things, it clearly shows that the nature and
character of the apprentice is nothing but that of a trainee and he is supposed
to enter into a contract and by virtue of that contract he is to serve for a fixed
period on a fixed stipend. This will not change the character of the apprentice
to that of a workman under the employer where he is undergoing the
apprentice training. Sub-section (4) of Section 4 only lays down that such E
contract should be registered with the Apprenticeship Adviser. But by non-
registration of the contract, the position of the apprentice is not changed to
that of a workman. It is more than clear from the scheme of the Act, the
apprentice is recruited for the purpose of training as defined in Section 2(aa)
of the Apprentices Act, 1961, that an apprentice is a person who is
F
undergoing apprenticeship training in pursuance of a contract of apprenticeship
and the apprenticeship training has been defined under Section 2(aaa). That
clearly speaks that an apprentice is to undergo apprenticeship training in any
industry or establishment under the employer in pursuance of the contract
and in terms of the conditions pertaining to that particular trade. Section 6
lays down that what shall be the period of training and Section 7 very clearly G
shows that the contract of apprenticeship shall terminate on the expiry of the
period of apprenticeship training. Therefore, it is more than clear that the
nature and character of the apprentice is that of a trainee only and on the
expiry of the training there is no corresponding obligation on the part of the
employer to employ him which is also very clear from the provisions of H
978 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.
4 -
A Section 7 that the apprenticeship training shall terminate on the expiry of the
period of training. It further makes clear that by virtue of ~ection 18 that the
apprentice trainees are not workers. It clearly lays down that if an apprentice
trainee is undergoing apprenticeship training in a designated trade in an
establishment, he shall be a trainee and not a worbr. It further contemplates
that the provisions of labour laws shall not apply in relation to such
B
apprentice. In this connection reference to definition of workman given in
Section 2(r) also emphasis that it will not include apprentice. Section 20 also
lays down that how a dispute arising under this Apprentices Act, I 96 I can
be settled. The authority for resolving such a dispute has been given to the
Apprenticeship Adviser. Therefore, any dispute which arises with the
c apprentice and the employer then remedy has been provided under this Act
and not by way of resorting to the Labour Court. Therefore, throughout the
Act stres~~·bas been laid that the apprentices are never being treated as
workers. Simply because the contract has not been registered with the
Apprenticeship Adviser, that will not change the nature and character of the
D apprentices. It is true that sub-section (4) of Section 4 lays down that the
contract of apprenticeship should be registered with the Apprenticeship
Adviser so that the Apprenticeship Adviser can monitor and keep a record
. thereof. Just because the contract of apprenticeship is not registered that will
not render the contract as invalid resulting in change of status of an apprentice
to that of a workman. Section 21 further lays down that after the completion
E , of the training of the apprentice, an incumbent will have to appear for a test
to be conducted by the National Council to determine his proficiency in the
designated trade in which he has undergone his apprenticeship training.
Therefore, had there been an intention of the Legislature to confer them the
status of a workman then all the provisions would not have been warranted
F at all. Section 22 makes it abundantly clear that at the end of the apprenticeship
training, it is not· obligatory on the part of the employer to offer an
employment to an apprentice who has completed the period of apprenticeship.
It is only if the terms of the contract of the apprenticeship lays down a
condition that on successful completion of an apprenticeship training, an
employer will offer him an employment then it is obligatory on the part of
G the employer to do so. If there is no such condition stipulated in the
apprentices.hip contract then the employer cannot be compelled to offer
employment to such apprentice. At the same time, it is not obligatory on the .
part of apprentice to serve that employer if there is no such stipulation to this
effect. So it is mutual thing & it depends on the terms of contract. The survey
H Of all these provisions of the Acts and the Rules as mentioned above, makes.
U.P. STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD v. S.M. SINGH [MATHUR, J.] 979

· · it clear that the character & status of apprentice remains the same & he does A
not become workman and labour laws are not attracted.

Now, coming to the question that the expression appearing in sub
section (4) of Section 4, "shall" should be interpreted as mandatory. It
depends upon the context in which such expression appears. In order to B
interpret the word "shall" appearing in any enactment one has to see the
context in which it appears and the effect thereof. We have already quoted
the Introduction, Statement of Objects and Reasons above. The Objects and
Reasons reveal that the Act was enacted for the purpose of recruiting the
apprentices for developing a strong industrial base. In order to have a strong
industrial base, trained man power is essential and for that purpose the Act C
was enacted so that for the industrial growth in the country the trained man
power is made easily available. The purpose is to train the people for
employing them in the industries, it was never the intention that those trained
candidates automatically become the workmen. Though training was imparted
by Private & Public Sector but industry in general did not fully organize such D
programme. Therefore, the intention of the Act is basically to recruit and train
person capable of being employed in the industries. Apart from the statement
of Objects and Reasons we have already reproduced above relevant provisions
of the Act which clearly contemplates that such trained persons shall not fall
in the definition of the workmen as the definition of workmen specifically
excludes the apprentices as defined in Section 2 (r). The- definition makes E
it clear that they are apprentices for a purpose undergoing a training and in
Section 18 it has been clearly mentioned that they will not be tre'lted as a
workmen and they will be treated as a trainee and no labour laws will apply
in relation to such apprentices. Viewing the expression "shall" in this context,
cannot be construed as a mandatory. Sub-section (4) of Section 4 only says F
that the contract of apprenticeship should be forwarded to the Adviser that
is purely ministerial/administrative act so that a proper record is maintained
by the Apprenticeship Adviser. Nothing turns beyond this. It is purely
administrative act and not forwarding contract of the apprenticeship to the
Apprenticeship Adviser will not change the character of the incumbent and
it will not render the contract of apprenticeship invalid or void. If the contract G
of apprenticeship is to be treated as a mandatory and contract is not sent then
the effect will be that the apprentice will not be entitled to any benefit flowing
from the Act. In fact, by treating the expression "shall" here as a mandatory
it will be more counter productive to the interest of the trainees rather than
for their benefit. The employer can take a shelter under the plea that since H
980 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2004] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.
f .
A the contract of the employment has not been registered with the Apprentice
Adviser, therefore, he is not under any obligation to pay stipend to the
apprentice trainees and he is not under an obligation to impart the training
to him also. Had that been the intention of the Legislature then they would
have provided the necessary penalty for breach of the non-registration of the
contract of apprenticeship. But that has not been done so because under
B
Section 30 of the Apprentices Act, 1961 any offence arising under this Act
has been penalized, like apprentice who is not qualified but he has been
engaged or fails to carry out the terms and conditions of contract of
apprenticeship or contravenes the provisions of the Act relating to number
of apprentices or any information required to be furnished or the apprentice
c has been allowed to work overtime without approval of the Apprenticeship
Adviser or employs an apprentice on any work which is not connected with
his training or makes any payment to apprentice on the basis of piece work
or requires an apprentice to take part in any output bonus or scheme. These
breaches have been termed as offences and have been made punishable. But
the non-registration of it has not been construed to be an offence so as to
D expose the employer for any penalty. Therefore, the expression "shall"
appearing in sub-section (4) of Section 4 does not appear to be mandatory.
Had that to be construed to be mandatory it will be doing a great violence
to the intention of the Act as well as to the interest of the apprentices/trainees.
If the non-registration is to result in the breach of a contract resulting in to
E invalidity & unenforceable then in that case it will be oppressive to the
interest of the apprentices as the employer can get away by seeking a
declaration that the apprentice contract was not registered therefore he is not
under an obligation to abide by the terms of the contract. Therefore, viewing
the expression "shall" in this context, it can not be construed to be mandatory
and it is directory. In this connection, reference may be made to the decision
F of this Court in the case of P.T. Rajan v. T.P.M Sahir & Ors., (2003] 8 SCC
498. Their Lordships observed that context, purport and object of the statute
is to be ascertained that whether "shall" to be construed as a mandatory or
directory. In that context, their Lordships referred to an earlier catena of
decisions and observed "where a statutory functionary is asked to perform
G a statutory duty between time prescribed same would be directory and not
mandatory. Furthermore, a provision in a statute which is procedural in nature
although employs the word "shall" may not be held to be mandatory if
thereby no prejudice is caused. The Court cannot supply casus omissus."
Their Lordships have further observed as follows:

H "A statute must be read in the text and context thereof. Whether
U.P. STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD v. S.M. SINGH [MATHUR, J.] 981

statute is a directory or mandatory would not be dependent on the A
user of the word "shall" or "may". Such a question must be posed
and answered having regard to the purpose and object it seeks to
achieve. The construction of statute will depend on the purport and
object for which the same had been used."
B
Therefore, viewing the provision of this Act in the light of the discussion
made above, we are of the opinion that the expression "shall" appearing in
sub-section (4) of Section 4 shall be construed directory and not mandatory.

· It was also submitted by the learned counsel for the appellants that this
is a labour legislation which should be construed liberally and in that context c
our attention has been invited to a decision of this Court in Secretary, HSEB
v. Suresh & Ors., [1999] 3 SCC 601. In this case, their Lordships held that
Court must decide in interest of the public inspired by principle of justice,
equity and good conscience. Similarly, in the case of Air India Statutory
Corpn.& Ors. v. United Labour Union & Ors., [1997] 9 SCC 377 (though D
this case is no more a good law with regard to the Contract Labour
(Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 because subsequent decision of the
Constitution Bench has reversed this decision in the case of Steel Authority
of India Ltd v. National Union Watrerfront Workers reported in [2001] 7
SCC 1. But this case has been cited in the context of the interpretation of
statute that how social welfare legislation should be interpreted. In that E
context their Lordships have observed that such a social legislation providing
for a economic empowerment to workers and poor class a provision ~hould
be considered in the light of the public law principles not of private or a
common laws. So far as the philosophy behind construing a social legislation
is concerned, there is no two opinion, social legislation are primarily meant F
for welfare of the particular section of the society and it should be construed
liberally so as to advance the cause of the public at large. But the question
is in the present case whether the expression "shall" should be read
mandatory so as to advance the cause of the apprentice or not. In our orinion,
viewing from social legislation point of view the word "shall" appearing in
sub-section (4) of Section 4 should be construed as directory because it will G
be for the benefit of the apprentice trainee otherwise it will be oppressive
to the welfare of the apprentice as the employer can get away by not getting
the contract of apprentice registered, seeking a declaration that this is a
unregistered document and all benefits flowing from the Act cannot be
enforced against him.
H
982 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A Therefore, we hold that the expression "shall" appearing in sub-section
--.
(4) of Section 4 of the Apprentices Act, 196 l is directory and non-registration
of the contract will not change the character of the apprentice and they will
not acquire the status ofa workmen. Once an incumbent is appointed as an
apprentice he will continue t6 be apprentice unless a formal order of
B appointment is followed.

It is also necessary to mention here that the defmition of the word
'workman' as given in Section 2(z) of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
and Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Both the definitions
includes apprentice. But the expression appearing in Section 2 (z) of the U.P
c Industrial Disputes Act and Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 are not applicable
to the apprentices appointed under the Apprentices Act, 1961. The Apprentices
Act is a code in itselfand it clearly stipulates that in Section 2 (aa) apprentice
means a person who is undergoing apprenticeship training in pursuance of
contract of training and the workers are employed for wages for work done
by them. Section 18 clearly mentions that the apprentices are not workmen
D
and "the provisions of any law with respect to labour law shall not apply or
in relation to such apprentices". Therefore, reading of definition of apprentice
in Sections 2(aa) and 2(r) read with Section 18 of the Apprentices Act leaves
no manner of doubt that this Act which is special Act it does not cover the
apprentices and it precludes the application of any other labour laws, i.e. U.P.
E Industrial Disputes Act & Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. When both these
Acts are not applicable then labour court/industrial Tribunal will not have any
jurisdiction to entertain any dispute arising therefrom. The application of the
U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 ·
automatically stand excluded.
F In this connection reference may be made to a decision of the Rajasthan
High Court in the case of Hanuman Prasad Choudhary and Etc. v. Rajasthan
State Electricity Board, Jaipur, (1986) LAB J.C. 1014 wherein Justice S.C.
Agrawal (as he then was) observed thus:-

G "An apprentice governed by the Apprentices Act is not a workman
for the purpose of the Industrial Disputes Act and the provisions of
the Industrial Disputes Act would not be applicable to him.

There is apparent conflict between the provisions of S.2(s)
Industrial Disputes Act and S.18 of the Apprentices Act inasmuch
H as S.2(s) postulates that an apprentice is a workman to whom the
U.P. STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD v. S.M. SINGH [MATHUR, J.] 983

provisions of Industrial Disputes Act would be applicable whereas A
S.18 of the Apprentices Act declares that an apprentice governed by
the Apprentices Act is not to be treated as a workman and the
provisions of the Industrial. Disputes Act would not be applicable
to him. The conflict between the two laws can be resolved by
applying the principle of harmonious construction. Apprentices Act B
is not an exhaustive Act to cover all types of apprentices because
in view of the definition of term "apprentice" as contained in S.2(aa)
of the Apprentices Act, it is applicable only to persons who are
undergoing apprenticeship training in pursuance of the contract of
Apprentices executed under S.4 of the said Act. It is possible to
visualise persons who may be engaged as apprentices but who are c
not covered by the Apprentices Act. In that view of the matter, it
can be said that for the purpose of S.2(s) of the Industrial Disputes
Act a person who is designated as Apprentice but is not governed
by the Apprentices Act would be a workman governed by the
provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act. But an apprentice who is D
governed by the provisions of the Apprentices Act would not be a
workman under S.2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act and would not
be governed by the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act.

Apart from the principle of harmonious construction, the
Apprentices Act 1961 being a subsequent particular law as compared E
to l.D. Act, 1947 which is prior and general, the provisions of
Apprentices Act, 1961 would prevail over those of I.D. Act."

Our attention was invited to a decision of Kerala High Court in the case
of Bhaskaran v. Kera/a State Electricity Board reported in (1986) KL T 44 7
wherein Chief Justice Malimath speaking for the Bench observed as under: F

"In order to answer the definitions of the word "apprentice",
two conditions are required to be satisfied viz, ( l) that the person
is undergoing apprenticeship training and (2) that he is undergoing
such training in pursuance of a contract of apprenticeship. On a plain G
reading of the definition of the expression " apprentice" occurring
in S.2 (aa) it becomes clear that registration of a contract of
apprenticeship not necessary for the person answering the description
of the word "apprentice". Sub-section 4 of Section 4 contemplates
the existence of a concluded contract of apprenticeship, which is
required to be sent up for registration. It therefore, becomes clear H
984 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004) SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A that it is the existing contract of apprenticeship that is required to
be registered and not that such contract becomes a contract of
apprenticeship only after it is registered as required by sub-section
4 of Section 4 of the Act. As it is admitted that the petitioners have
entered into a contract of apprenticeship and were undergoing
B training in pursuance of such a contract, they satisfy all the
requirements of the definition of the expression "apprentice" occurring
in Section 2(aa) of the Act. That being the position, the provisions
of Section 18 of the Act come into operation. Therefore, the
petitioners cannot be regarded as workers and therefore, the provisions
of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act are not attracted to the
c facts of the case."

Similarly, the Single Bench of the Allahabad High Court in the case of
UP. State Electricity Board & Ors. v. P.O. Labour Court, Kanpur & Ors.
reported in (1998) 78 FLR 511 observed as under:-
D
" Section 18 of the Act provides that an apprentice shall be a
a
trainee and not worker. and the provisions of any law with respect
to Jabour shall not app~y to or in relation to such apprentice. The
responderit No.2 was -tiius not a workman and no dispute could be
referred to the Labour Court and the period of his training having
E come to an end, the action of the petitioner employer in not engaging
him any further was in accordance with the contract entered into
between the parties and the provisions of the Act."

As against this our attention was also invited to a decision of Division
F Bench of Gujarat High Court between Bal/khan Doskhan Joya and Gujarat
Electricity Board reported in (2002) 92 FLR 914. The Gujarat High Court
has taken the view that as a result of non-registration of contract of
apprenticeship an incumbent shall not be deemed to be a trainee and he would
be covered by the definition of 'workman' under Section 2(s) of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 194 7 and he will get the protection of Section 25-F of the said
G Act. Similarly, Single Judge of Gujarat High Court took the same view in
the case of State of Gujarat & Anr. v. Chauhan Ramjibhai Karsanbhai ---
reported (2004) 102 FLR 347. And our attention was also invited to a
decision of Madhya Pradesh High Court in MP. Electricity Board & Ors.
v. BasantKumar & Ors. reported in (1989) JLJ 253. This was a case decided
H on the facts that the M.P. Electricity Board did not notify the incumbent for
U.P. STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD v. S.M. SINGH [MATHUR, J.] 985

a designated trade and employee continued undergone apprentice training A
and it was not proved that the concerned employee was undergoing apprentice
training. It was in that context it was found that the termination of services
of the incumbent was bad.

In view of the conflicting decisions of the various High Courts, we are
of the opinion that the view taken by the Rajasthru: Kerala and Allahabad B
High Courts appears to be in consonance with the, view taken by us and we
do not agree with the view subscribed by the High Courts of Gujarat and
Madhya Pradesh.

In view of the legal position crystallized above, we shall examine the
individual cases.
c
Civil Appeal No.242912003.

Respondent No. 1 , Shiv Mohan Singh was appointed as a apprentice
Boiler Attendant under the Apprentices Act, 1961 from 11.4.1985 to
D
·~
10.4.1988 and underwent training of the U.P. State Electricity Board. His
contract was drawn up but not registered with the Apprenticeship Adviser.
He completed his three years training and a certificate to this effect was issued
to him and he was directed to appear before the National Council and on
passing thereof he was to be awarded a certificate of proficiency as a Boiler
Attendant. From this fact it is apparent that he was appointed as an apprentice E
trainee in the designated Trade of Boiler Attendant. After completion of his
training his services were terminated on 10.4.1988. It is clear from this fact
that he was a Boiler Attendant. He completed three years training and after
end of the training he was relieved as per the terms and conditions of the
appointment as an apprentice in designated trade of Boiler Attendant and
therefore he cannot be declared to be a worker under the Act he cannot claim
F
the benefit of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 or under
Section 6N of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. In this light the award
given by the Labour Court in Award Dispute No.166/1991dated12.8.1993
and the order dated 26.9.2002 passed in W.P.No.21560/1995 by the High
Court cannot be sustained. Civil Appeal is allowed. Both the orders of the G
High Court dated 26.9.2002 and the award of the Labour Court dated
12.8.1993 are set aside.

Civil Appeal No. 700512003:
' ..
In this case also respondent No. I- Ram Niwas Pal was appointed on H
986 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004) SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A 31.3 .1986 as an apprentice in the designated trade of Boiler Attendant and _
his services were terminated on 31.3 .1989. He also entered into a contract
of apprenticeship and the contract of apprenticeship was registered with the
Apprenticeship Adviser as per the reply sent by Shri G.K. Chaturvedi,
Principal and Asst. Apprenticeship Adviser, LT.I., Kanpur. So far as this case
B is concerned, there is no manner of doubt that the contract of apprenticeship
was registered with the Apprenticeship Adviser and at the end of the contract
his services had been terminated as he was an apprentice and an apprentice
is not a workman. Therefore, termination of service after the expiry of the
contract period was justified and the order passed by the Labour Court as
well as by the High Court cannot be sustained. Accordingly, the Civil Appeal
c is allowed and the award dated 28.12.1994 made in Adjudication Case
No.107 /1991 by the Labour Court and the order dated 12.4.2002 passed by
the High Court in Civil Misc. Writ .Petition No.15022 of 1995 are set aside.

Civil Appeal No. 700612003.

D In this case respondent No.2-Amar Nath Mishra was appointed on
,..
l. 7 .1987 as an apprentice in the designated trade of Boiler Attendant and his
services were terminated on 30.6.1990. A contract was entered into between
respondent No.g and the employer-company. But the contract was not
registered with"the Apprenticeship Adviser. As mentioned above, as an
E apprentice train.ee he cannot acquire the status of a workman and therefore,
he cannot get the benefit of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as
well as Section 6N of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. As suc:h the
award dated 11.l 0.1993 made by the Labour Court in Industrial Dispute
No.25211992 and the order dated 12.4.2002 passed by the High Court in Civil
Misc. Writ Petition No.29962/1994 are set aside. The Appeal is allowed. No
F order as to costs.

Civil Appeal No.838312003.

Respondent No. l- Navneet Kumar Sharma was appointed as an apprentice
G in the designated trade of Boiler Attendant on 9 .3 .1982 and his services were
terminated on 8.3.1985. It is alleged that his contract was not registered with
the Apprenticeship Adviser. He raised the industrial dispute in 1994 which
came to be registered as Industrial Dispute No.330/1994 before the Labour
Court( 2nd), U.P. Kanpur. The allegation was that he is a workman and his
termination is bad because he has already worked for more than 240 days
H but his services were terminated without complying with the provisions of
U.P. STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD v. S.M. SINGH [MATHUR, J.] 987

Section 6N of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The respondent No. l A
· · approached the Labour Court after ten years and an objection was raised by
the employer in their affidavit in opposition before the Labour Court.
However, in view of the fact that the incumbent was appointed as an
apprentice under the Apprentices Act, 1961 in a designated trade of Boiler
Attendant and that he is not a workman and he is not entitled to the benefit B
of Section 6N of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and secondly he
raised the dispute after ten years, therefore, the order passed by the Labour
Court dated 13.5.1998 and that of the Single Judge of the High Court cannot
be sustained. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed. Award dated 13.5.1998
passed by the Labour Court in Industrial Dispute No.330/1994 and the order
dated .15.7.2003 passed by the High Court in Civil Misc. Writ Petition C
No.37450/1999 cannot be sustained and the same are set aside.

Civil Appeal No. 838412003.

Respondent- Jagat Pal was appointed on 19.9.1975 as an apprentice in
the designated trade of Lineman under the Apprentices Act, 1961. His D
services were terminated on 23 .12.1978. The Labour Court in its award dated
9. l l.1998 has recorded a finding that respondent was appointed by the
Establishment on 19.9.1975 under the Apprentices Act, 1961 and he worked
up to 18.9.1978. A dispute was raised by the employee which came to be
registered as Industrial Dispute No.90/1997 and an objection was raised by E
the Management that the services had been terminated in 1978 and the dispute
has been raised in 1997. More so in view of the legal position as mentioned
above that the incumbent having been appointed as apprentice under the
Apprentices Act, cannot be treated as a workman and consequently the award
given by the Labour Court on 9. l l .1998 and affirmed by the High Court vide
order dated 15.7.2003 passed in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No.16394/1999 F
cannot be sustained. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed and the order dated
15. 7.2003 passed by the High Court and the award passed by the Labour
Court dated 9.11.1998 are set aside. No order as to costs.

Civil Appeal No.923112003.
G
In this case, a dispute was raised by the U.P. Rashtriya Vidyut Shramik
Sangh about six of its members who were appointed as a trade apprentice
and their services were terminated illegally.

Details of the members are as under: H
988 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004) SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A
Name of Incumbent Period of service Date of tennination

Abhitabh Chatterjee 21.4.1982 to 20.4.1983 21.4.1983

B Sadhna Srivastava 19.10.1984 to 18.10.1985 19.10.1985
Suman Srivastava 19.10.1984 to 18.10.1985 19.10.1985
Prem Chandra 30.4.1986 to 29.4.1987 30.4.1987
Akhilesh Kumar 10.10.1988 to 9.10.1989 10.10.1989
c Kumari Kiran 10.10.1988 to 9.10.1989 10.10.1989

The case of the Union was all these incumbents were appointed as
apprentices in various trades and no contract fonn was got filled up from
them under the provisions of the Apprentices Act, 1961 nor was the same
D registered nor any examination of National Council was held for them nor
any certificate was issued to them, therefore they continued to be workmen
of the Management as per the Standing Orders of the Management. The
Management took the stand that they are apprentices and they cannot be
treated as workmen. It was stated on affidavit in reply by the Superintending
E Engineer (Headquarters), Kanpur Electricity Supply Administration (U.P.
State Electricity Board, Kanpur) that all these incumbents were appointed as
apprentices for a period of one year as Clerks 7 to 9 years back and their
services were tenninated after the expiry of apprentice period and the labour
dispute was raised in 1996. It was also pointed out ~hat the tenure of their
apprenticeship was for a period of one year. It was stated by him that
F concerned persons were engaged as apprentices.

Therefore, from these facts it is more than apparent that these incumbents
were appointed as trade apprentices in the cadre of Clerk for a period of one
year and after expiry of one year their services came to an end and as
G mentioned above, a dispute was raised in 1996 and an award was passed by
the Labour Court treating them as workmen and giving them the benefit of
workmen. We are of the opinion that the view taken by the Labour Court
is absolutely erroneous as they were appointed as general clerks for a fixed
period of one year and after the expiry of fixed period their services
automatically came to an end and the dispute which has been raised is
H extremely belated. They cannot be treated as workmen as they were
U.P. STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD v. S.M. SINGH [MATHUR, J.] 989

appointed as apprentices irrespective of the fact that the contract was A
registered or not. Therefore, the view taken by the Labour Court as well -as
by the High Court cannot be sustained. Consequently, the appeal is allowed.
Award dated I6.l l.2000 made by the Labour Court in Industrial Dispute No.
236/1999 and the interim order dated 19.9.2003 passed by the High Court
in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 42446/2003 are set aside. No order as to B
costs.

Civil Appeal No. 923412003

In this case, respondent Ashok Kumar was appointed on the designated
trade as Draftsman (Mechanical) from 30.3.1991to29.3.1992. His allegation c
was that the contract of apprenticeship was not entered into between the
parties and the same was also not registered. He was treated as a regular
appointee. It was stated by the incumbent himself in his claim petition before
the Labour Court (Kanpur) that he was appointed as an apprentice under the
Apprentices Act, 1961 with effect from 30.3.1991 to 29.3.1992 for training D
as a Draftsman an1'_his services were terminated on 30.3.1992. His case was
that his application was neither got registered from the LT.I. Kanpur nor was
any course got done from him nor any NCTPT examination was taken from
him and no certificate was got issued to him from the National Council and
his services were taken as a regular nature of Draftsman (Mechanical). The
stand of the Management was that he was appointed as Draftsman under the E
Apprentices Act, 1961 and after the expiry of the training period, his contract
automatically stood terminated and, therefore, he cannot claim to have been
appointed on the post of Draftsman. If there is any dispute, this can be
decided by the Apprenticeship Adviser under the Apprentices Act, 1961.
Before the Labour Court, respondent-Ashok Kumar examined himself as F
W.W. l and he admitted that he was kept on training of Mechanical Draftsman
and used to work as Draftsman for Mechanical, Electrical and Civil and he
further admitted that no contra~t was registered. From the fact that the
incumbent himselfhad admitted that he was undergoing training as apprentice
under the Apprentices Act, 1961, therefore, after expiry of the period of one
year, he cannot claim himself to be workman and more so, when his services G
were terminated way back 1992 i.e. 30.3.1992. After completion of the
training he cannot claim himself as workman and raise the dispute in 1996.
Therefore, in view of the legal position crystalised above, we are of the
opinion that the award dated 30.8.1997 given by the Labour Court and
affirmed by the High Court by judgment dated 15.7.2003 passed in the Civil H
990 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A Misc. Writ Petition No. 9153/1998 cannot be sustained. Accordingly, the
civil appeal is allowed and the order passed by the High Court dated
15.7.2003 in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 9153/1998 and the award made
by the Labour Court in Industrial Dispute No. 347/1996 are set aside. No
order as to costs.
B
Civil Appeal No. 923212003.

Appellant-Lal Man Verma was appointed as an apprentice on the post
of Book Keeping and Accountancy Store on 8.1.1981. It is alleged that Book
Keeping and Accountancy is not a designated trade within the meaning of
c Section 2(e) of the Apprentices Act, 1961. It is further alleged that the
contract of service entered into between the parties was not sent to the
Apprenticeship Adviser for registration, therefore, it was not registered and /

appellant was not imparted any training under the Act, but appellant's
services were terminated with effect from 8.1.1982 without complying with
D the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The appellant raised an
industrial dispute and a reference was made under Section 4K of the U.P.
Industrial Disputes Act, 194 7 by the State Government to the Labour Court.
The Labour Court made the award in favour of the appellant and held that
the Management has failed to prove that the appellant was appointed as an
apprentice and held that the appellant was not 'working as an apprentice but
E as a workman. This award was challenged by the Management by filing a
writ petition being Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 10370/1998 before the High
Court of Allahabad and the High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the
Managemer;t and set aside the award made by the Labour Court holding that
since the contract of apprenticeship was entered into between the parties and
F the incumbent was appointed as an apprentice under the Apprentices Act,
1961 a~d his contract was not sent for registration to the Apprenticeship
Adviser that will not change the characte!" of the incumbent. Hence, the
present appeal by the appellant by way of special leave. Though in the
grounds of the Special Leave Petition an objection was taken by the appellant
that his trade is not covered by the designated trade within Section 2(e) of
G the Act, this objection was never pressed before the Labour Court nor was
it pressed before the High Court. Therefore, no finding has been given either
by the Labour Court or by the High Court whether this trade is covered by
the Act or not. However, for the first time, the appellant has raised. this
objection in his Special Leave Petition. Whether it is a designated trade or
H not, it is a question of fact and since the parties have not gone on trial on
U.P. STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD v. S.M. SINGH [MATHUR, J.] 991
----; I

this issue nor this question has been referred by the Government for decision A
of the Labour Court, therefore, we cannot permit this question to be raised
at this stage. Since it is a question of fact whether this trade is covered by
the designated trade or not and this question for the first time sought to be
agitated in the present appeal, it will not be proper to permit the appellant
to raise this question of fact at this belated stage after a lapse of 21 years. B
An objection of delay was raised before the Labour Court that the appellant
has approached the Labour Court after lapse of 11 years i.e. in 1993, his
services having been terminated in the year 1982. Therefore, we do not find
any merit in this appeal filed by the appellant and the same is liable to be
dismissed.
c
Civil Appeal No. 967912003 ..

Appellant-Ahmad Ali was appointed on 9.3.1982 in the designated trade
of Boiler Attendant under the Apprentices Act, 1961 and his services were
terminated on 9.3.1985 and the contract was entered into between the parties
though the same was not registered with the Apprenticeship Adviser. But,
D
in view of the legal position crystalised above, we are of the opinion that since
the appellant was appointed as a Boiler Attendant under the Apprentices Act,
1961, and therefore his termination after the expiry of the period of tenure
of the contract, he cannot claim any benefit and he cannot be designated as
a workman. Therefore, the view taken by the Labour Court is not correct and E
the High Court has rightly set aside the order of the Labour Court and we
uphold the approach of the High Court to this extent. The appeal is dismissed
and the order dated 15.7.2003 passed by the High Court in Civil Misc. Writ
Petition No. 11846/1998 to this extent is upheld.

Civil Appeal No. 968012003. F

Appellant-Rakesh Kumar Tripathi was appointed on 31.3 .1986 in the
designated trade of Boiler Attendant under the Apprentices Act, 1961 and
his services were terminated on 31.3 .1989 and the contract was entoced
between the parties though the contract was not registered with the G
Apprenticeship Adviser. But in view of the legal position crystalised above,
we are of the opinion that since he was appointed as a Boiler Attendant under
the Apprentices Act, 1961 and therefore his termination after the expiry of
the period of tenure of the contract, he cannot claim any benefit and he cannot
be designated as a workman. Therefore, the view taken by the Labour Court
is not correct and the High Court has rightly set aside the order of the Labour H
992 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.
''
A Court and we uphold the approach of the High Court to this extent. The
appeal is dismissed and the order dated 15.7.2003 passed by the High Court
in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 23762/1998 to this extent is upheld.

Civil Appeal No. 968112003.

B Appellant-Jai Prakash Tiwari was appointed as apprentice Cable Jointer
on 31.3 .1986 and his services were terminated on 31.3 .1989. Contract of
apprenticeship was entered into between the parties though not registered.
The appellant raised industrial dispute and the Labour Court gave an award
in his favour. This award was challenged by the Management holding that
C the apprentice is worker. The High Court set aside the award in favour of
the Management. Therefore, the view taken by the High Court is correct and
there is no ground to interfere with the same. The Civil Appeal is dismissed.

Civil Appeal No. 968312003

D Appellant- Urmila was appointed as Switch Board Attendant on
16.10.1984 under the Apprentices Act, 1961. Her services were terminated
on 16.l 0.1987. Apprenticeship contract was entered in to between the parties
but the same was not registered with the Apprenticeship Adviser. The award
given in favour of the appellant by the Labour Court treating her t<> be
E .workman and it was reversed by the High Court in a writ petition filed by
the Management and rightly so in our view in view of the legal position
mentioned above, we do not find any merit in this civil appeal. Same is
dismissed.

Civil Appeal No. 12212004.
F
Appellant- Ashok Kumar Shukla was appointed in a designated trade
as an apprentice Boiler Attendant on 9.4.1985 and his services were
terminated on 8.4.1988. A contract was entered into but not sent for
registration to the Apprenticeship Adviser. Labour Court made the award in
his favour treating him to be workman and on a writ petition filed by the
G
Management against the award, the High Court allowed the writ petition and
set aside the award of the Labour Court holding that since the appellant is
appointed as apprentice, therefore he cannot be treated as a workman under.
the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The view taken by the High Court is correct
in· view of the legal position crystalised above. Hence, we do not find any
H merit in this appeal. Same is dismissed. No order as to costs.
U.P. STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD v. S.M. SINGH [MATHUR, J.] 993
-~
Civil Appeal No. 196512004. A

Respondent Virendra Kumar Bajpai was appointed on 31.3.1986 as a
.- Cashier under the Apprentices Act, 1961. His services were terminated on
31.3 .1987. He worked as a Cashier (General) which is not a designated trade.
Contract was not sent for registration to the Apprenticeship Adviser. The B
Labour Court set aside the termination order. Against that a writ petition was
'. filed before the High Court and the High Court dismissed the writ petition
and the present appeal by way of special leave by the Management. As per
the award dated 29.4. 1994, the respondent himself admits that he was
appointed as a Cashier on 31.3.1986 under the provisions of the Apprentices
Act, 1961 and his services were terminated on 31.3 .1987 but no registration C
of the apprenticeship was sent to the Apprenticeship Adviser. Since it is the
case of the respondent himself that he was appointed as apprentice in the
Branch as Cashier and his appointment was for fixed period of one year, we
fail to understand how can respondent be given the benefit of Section 6N of
the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 after the expiry of the period of one D
year. His services automatically stood terminated and he cannot claim that
he has become the employee of the Management. He was a trainee for a
period of one year as an apprentice in Cash Branch and after the expiry of
the period of one year he cannot claim that he be treated as a workman. In
this view of the matter, his services stood terminated in 1987 and dispute was
raised in 1993. Therefore, the view taken by the Labour Court as well as by E
the High Court cannot be sustained and accordingly, we allow this appeal,
set aside the award dated 29.4.1994 made by the Labour Court in Industrial
Dispute No. 277/1993 and the order dated 14.7.2003 passed by the High
Court in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 34389/1994.
F
Civil Appeal No. 219312004.

Respondent-Sushma Gupta was appointed on I. 7.1988 as an apprentice
Clerk for a period of one year. She was getting a salary of Rs. 290 per month.
Since her work was satisfactory hence the employer extended her tenure by
one year. Her services were terminated on 1. 7.1990 without any prior notice. G
She raised an industrial dispute and the matter was referred for adjudication
by the Labour Court. The appellant-Management filed their reply and pointed
out that she was recruited as an apprentice trainee as a Clerk for a period
from 4.7.1988 to 3.7.1989 under the provisions of the Apprentices Act, 1961
and on completion of the training the Management is not under an obligation H
994 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A to give her employment. It was also alleged that the regular recruitment to
the post of Clerk is done by the Electricity Service Commission according
to the prescribed Rules and it was pointed out that she was only appointed
as apprentice trainee and not recruited through the Electricity Service
Commission. Though the respondent has denied that she was not appointed
B by the appellant-Management for training but she was working against a
regular post of the nature. The Management examined four witnesses and
they said that the respondent was engaged for a training purpose only. They
produced the copy of the training form which was filled up by the respondent
as Ext.Ell with her signature and she also admitted her signature on the form
which was filled up by her for training purpose. The Management examined
c one Layak Singh as EW-1 who is Head Clerk on the establishment of the
Management and he produced the agreement Ext.Ell and.it was pointed out
that after the completion of the training as apprentice he~ services were
terminated but on the recommendations she is allowed to continue for some
time. From these facts it is more than apparent that an agreement was filled
D up by the respondent-incumbent and she admitted herself her signature on
that agreement/contract. It may be that said agreement/contract has no_t been
sent for registration before the Apprenticeship Adviser but the fact remains
that she was recruited as apprentice and if she was recruited as apprentice
then she cannot be treated as a workman as discussed above in detail and
therefore, the award given by the Labour Court treating her to be workman
E under Section 2(s) of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 cannot be
sustained. This award made by the Labour Court was affirmed by the High
Court by order dated 15.7.2003 passed in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No.
3016511999 filed by the Management challenging the award of the Labour
Court. The view taken by the High Court in this case cannot be sustained
F in view of the legal position already examined above. Hence, we allow this
appeal, set aside the order of the High Court as well as the award made by
the Labour Court. No order as to costs.

Civil Appeal No. 9233/2003.

G Respondent-Avnindra Kumar Sharma was engaged in the establishment
of the appellants on 27.7.1991 due to death of his brother on 11.10.1984 on
humanitarian ground. It is alleged that he was engaged as a apprentice under
the Apprentices Act, 1961 on the post of Switch Board Attendant without
completing the formalities. He was engaged as apprentice by the Engineer
H at 220 Grim Union, UPSEB, U.P., Kanpur. Then his services were transferred
U.P. STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD v. S.M. SINGH [MATHUR, J.] 995

to J.E., 132, K.V. Asainee, Dibiyapur, District. Etawa. He was paid at the A
rate of Rs. 330 per month initially. Thereafter, it was increased to Rs. 380
per month. It is alleged that instead of accepting his demand for enhancement
of salary, the services were suddenly terminated on 27.7.1993. The case of
the Management is that neither he was appointed as a workman nor his
services were ever terminated and there was no necessity of complying with B
the provisions of Section 6N of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. It was
contended that the respondent applied to the Principal and Assistant
\ Apprenticeship Adviser, Industrial Training Institute, Kanpur and his name
was forwarded. Thereafter, he was engaged for training for a specified period
of two years. The respondent filed a rejoinder and pointed out that neither
any contract for apprenticeship was registered with him nor any registration c
number· was allotted to him. The case of the respondent was that he was
engaged as a dependent of the deceased employee on a condition that after
training he will be made regular. He has already received a compensation
for the death of his brother. It is stated that at the time of termination he was
getting Rs.380 per month whereas under the Apprentices Act, 1961 he would D
have got Rs.700. The Management examined one Shri R.P.Gupta, J.E.,
Dibiyapur under whom he was working and he has stated that the respondent
was paid at the apprentice rate. The Management also examined one Shri
Mohammuddin Ansari, Head Clerk (Construction Division). He has deposed
that respondent has not given any application as dependent of the deceased
employee and he also pointed out that as per Ext.E/2 the rules for employment E
to the dependent of the deceased employee there is no provision to provide
employment to the brother of a deceased and he deposed that the name 1f
the respondent was referred by the Apprenticeship Adviser according to
Ext.E/3 and respondent was selected as a Switch Board Attendant apprentice.
However, he pleaded that he cannot say that any registration form was filled F
up by the respondent or not. Management also examined Shri S.R. Chowdhary,
Sub-Divisional Officer, Etawa and he has deposed that the respondent was
working as a trainee under him and he admitted that he worked from
1.12.1991 to 27.7.1993. But the case of the respondent was that he was
employed as a brother of deceased employee, but that cannot be sustained
because there was no provision for giving employment to the brother of the G
deceased employee of the Board and the Labour Court also found that 26
names were sent by the Principal and Assistant Apprenticeship Adviser.
Respondent's name appeared in that list and it was stated· that respondent has
been selected for training as provided under the Apprentices Act but neither
any contract was executed nor the same was registered. Therefore, in this H
996 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A context the Labour Court came to the conclusion that though he was recruited
under the Apprentices Act, 196 l but· no contract was executed nor was it
registered. The fact of the matter is that the incumbent was recruited and
·-
appointed as apprentice Switch Board Attendant, therefore, his recruitment
for all purposes will be deemed to be under the Apprentices Act, 1961. The
B case put up by the respondent that he was employed on the basis of being
the brother of the deceased employee of the Board has not been found
established by the Labour Court and rightly so because there is no provision
for appointment of a brother of the deceased as a dependent under the Rules.
Therefore, his case failed on that ground. From the above facts it also
transpires that his name was sent by the Principal and Assistant Apprenticeship
c Adviser for registering him as a trainee and he has worked as a Switch Board
Attendant for a period of two years that is the tenure for th~ training and after
the lapse of the training his services were terminated. In these circumstances,
the view taken by the Labour Court cannot be sustained and the respondent
cannot be treated as a workman so as to be covered by Section 6N of the
D U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. This award has been upheld by the High
Court on a writ petition filed by the Managemt;-nt challenging the award. In
view of the position that emerges that the respondent was engaged under the
Apprentices Act, 1961 as a Switch Board Attendant for a period of two years,
as such, he cannot be treated as a workman. Therefore, the view taken by
the Labour Court in the award dated 10.11.1998 in Adj. Case No. 99/1998
E and. affirmed by the High Court in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 13481/1999
cannot be sustained. The Civil Appeal is allowed. The order of the High Court
dated 15.7.2003 as well as the award dated 10.11.1998 made by the Labour
Court is set aside.

F Civil Appeal No. 838612003.

The case of the respondent-Manoj Kumar Shukla is that he was
appointed on the post of Store Keeper as an apprentice under the Apprentices
Act, 1961 with effect from l 0.10.1988. His services were terminated on
9.10.1989. It is alleged that no examination of National Council was
G undertaken and work was taken from him as, the regular worker. Further, the
case of the respondent is that he was not an apprentice under the Apprentices
Act and he was a workman under the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and
his services were terminated on l O. l 0.1989 without following the provisions
of Section 6N of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Hence, the
H termination of his services is illegal. Management contested the matter and
U.P. STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD v. S.M. SINGH [MATHUR, J.] 997

pointed out that the incumbent was appointed under the Apprentices Act and A
he was not given any independent work of Store Keeper and he appeared
in the examination conducted by the National Council and the incumbent was
given regular training for Store Keeper and the training period of the
incumbent was for one year and only after expiry of period of one year on
9.10.1989 his services stood terminated automatically. Therefore, it is pointed B
out that he cannot be treated as a workman as his appointment was for a
period of one year as an apprentice.

However, Labour Court by its order dated 23.1.1995 found that no
document had been produced by the Management. Although the respondent
has produced documents/certificates Exts.W/l and W/2 dated 6.11.1989 and c
29 .1.1990 issued by the Management and the trade shown therein is that of
the Apprentice (Store Keeper) but no document of the registration was
produced. It was also stated by the Management that the river side centre
where respondent was working as a trainee was closed on 7.1.1991 and the
respondent was recruited by the Kanpur Electricity Supply Administration D
(KESA) but still the Labour Court concluded that the removal ofworkman-
Manoj Kumar Shukla is not constitutional, legal and he is entitled to full
wages. Then a review application was filed by the Management and it was
stated that the award was received in the office from there it appears that
certificate Exts. W/1 and W/2 issued by the Management it is clear that
incumbent was appointee! as a Store Keeper in the Power House and not in E
the river side Power House and he never worked there and the river side
Power House has been closed. It was alleged by the Management tr \t they
did not get proper opportunity to lead evidence to this effect. The Labour
Court observed that sufficient opportunity was given to the Management but
they failed to avail the same. F
However, it was admitted by the Presiding Officer that there is an error
that Manoj Kumar Shukla was appointed in the KESA and not in the river
side Power House and this is the error which crept in the award dated
23. l .1995 and therefore he rectified this error and it is also observed that
since both the parties agree that the incumbent was appointed in the KESA G
at Kanpur and not in the river side Power House, accordingly the award was
modified to this extent. However, the award passed by him on 23. l .1995 was
upheld. Aggrieved by this order, the Management filed a writ petition before
the Allahabad High Court and the High Court affirmed the award. After going
through the award as well as the order of the High Court it appears more than H
998 Sl_JPREME COURT REPORTS (2004] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A apparent that there might have been failure on the part of the Management
to lead the evidence bµt the fact of the matter is that it is the case of the
applicant himself that he was appointed as apprentice Store Keeper as is
apparent from Exts.W/l and W/2. Therefore, we cannot lose sight of the fact
• that h~ ~as appointed apprentice Store Keeper in the Power House' and after
B the expiry of the period of one year applicant cannot claim to have been
treated as workman. He was appointed on l 0.10.1988 to 9.10.1989 and he
put up the case before the Labour Court that he was appointed as an
apprentice Store Keeper under the Apprentices Act, 1961. Now, he cannot
be permitted to deny that he was not appointed under the Apprentices Act '
and he was appointed as a workman and therefore he seeks the benefit of
c Section 6N of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. He cannot be permitted
to withdraw from this position. From Exts.W/l and W/2, certificates issued
by the Management on 6.11.1989 and 29.1.1990, it is apparent that he was
shown as an apprentice Store Keeper. Just because of the failure of the
Management to defend the case properly the benefit cannot be claimed by
D the workman. Because of his own showing it is apparent that his appointment
was Store Keeper for a period of one year, therefor.: the award given by the
Labour Court cannot be justified. More so the termination was in the year
1989 and he raised the dispute in 1993. Therefore, taking into consideration
all these factors, we are of .the opinion that respondent cannot claim any
benefit of being a workman. He was apprentice and after the completion of
E the period of apprenticeship as a Store Keeper he has no right to continue
and he cannot be treated to be a workman. Accordingly, the award given by
the Labour Court dated 23. l.1995 and modified on 28.1.1997 are set aside,
likewise the order of the High Court affirming the award. Consequently, the
appeal is allowed.
F
Civil Appeal No. 1412004.

The case of the respondent- Subodh Kumar was that he was appointed
to the post of a Clerk in August, 1981 and as per the letter of the Electricity
Board he had participated in the sports events in 1982-1983 and also obtained
G three certificates. He worked on the post of Clerk till 16.2.1984 and his
services were terminated on the morning of 16.2.1984'. Therefore, he raised
industrial dispute that since he has worked for more than 240 days as such
he is a workman and entitled to the protection of Section 6N of the U.P.
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The Labour Court found that there is non-
.H compliance of Section 6N of the Act and set aside his termination/ retrenchment.
U.P. STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD v. S.M. SINGH [MATHUR, J.] 999

The Electricity Board contested the matter and submitted that the recruitment A
to the Electricity Board is regulated by the Rules for appointment/transfer/
selection/promotion of employees and it is also contended that in fact the
respondent was engaged as an apprentice trainee in the appellants' organization
under the Apprentices Act, 1961 for one year. He started his training on
17.2.1983 and on completion of the one year training, his services automatically B
came to an end on 16.2.1984 and it was contended that acco1uing to Section
18 of the Act a trainee does not fall under the definition of workman and
accordingly labour laws are not applicable to him and the Management is not
obliged to appoint him in the Department. The learned Labour Court after
considering the evidence and relying on the sports certificates inferred that
the incumbent was appointed as a workman and not apprentice trainee. c
'However, the Labour Court disbelieved the evidence ofHarish Chandra, WE-
1 who deposed that on the basis of Ext.Ell the incumbent was selected
- apprentice. Though, the incumbent has denied his own signature, Ext.Ell is
the application by the concerned workman and Ext.E/2 is the list of the
persons selected as the apprentice trainees and name of the incu1'1.bent D
appears at SI.No. 96. But curiously enough learned Labour Court has
. ~ disbelieved them on the ground that since respondent has denied his ·
signature, therefore, they should have produced the handwriting expert and
the list, Ext.E/2 in which name of the respondent appears at SI.No. 96 was
also disbelieved. The learned Judge says, "on what basis it has been shown
is not on record''. He further goes to say that ifthe workman has been engaged E
apprentice trainee then an agreement ought to have been executed but no such
agreement is available on record. He says that an agreement should also be
brought on record and same is to be proved and in the absence of the same
the story of the apprentice trainee was subsequently developed and he held
that respondent cannot be deemed to be an apprentice trainee under the F
.) Apprentices Act, 1961. This finding of the learned Labour Court appears to
be perverse on the face of it. Just on the basis of the two sports certificates
he has rushed to conclude that the incumbent was appointed as a workman.
The recruitment in the Electricity Board is under service rules and when the
evidence has been produced, Ext.E/2, a list of the apprentices recorded in
pursuance of his application, Ext.Ell and the name of the incumbent appears G
at SI.No. 96, we fail to understand how such primary evidence of the
Management could be so lightly brushed aside. The application by the
respondent and that name of the respondent appears at SI.No. 96 of the list
of the apprentices go to show that he was apprentice and there was no
necessity for the Management to bring hand-writing expert to substantiate H
'
1000 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A that the application bears the signature of the respondent when there is
already corroborating evidence available on record that the name of the
respondent appears in Ext.E/2, list of the apprentices and that has been proved
by the Management, that is sufficient to show that the incumbent was
recruited as a trainee apprentice and after the tenure of the period of
apprenticeship, his services came to an end. Just because his agreement was
B
not set for registration that will not change the character of the incumbent
as apprentice trainee. Apart from this, the service was terminated on
16.2.1984 and the dispute has been raised in 1997. Unfortunately, High Court
has also affirmed the same. The award as well as the order of the High Court
cannot be sustained on the basis of the fact that there is primary evidence
c which goes to show that the incumbent was recruited as apprentice trainee
as a Clerk for a period of one year and after the expiry of one year he has
no right to continue and he cannot be treated as workman. The view taken
by the Labour Court in the award dated 2.1.1998 affirmed by the High Court
cannot be sustained. Consequently, we allow this appeal, set aside the award
D of th!! Labour Court dated 2.1.1998 and the order of the High Court dated
15.7.2003 in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 4102711998.

Civil Appeal No. 838512003.

Respondent-Shiv Kumar Bhatia was appointed by Mis. Kanpur Electricity
E · Supply Administration, Kanpur on 31.3.1986 on the post of Store Keeper.
The case of the respondent was that his services were wrongly terminated
by order dated 31.3 .1987 which was not legal. Therefore, he raised an
industrial dispute and the matter was referred to the Labour Court and Labour
Court found that the Board has not produced any evidence except the
F application vide 13-B on behalf of the Management wherein it is stated that
the contract was entered into between one S.K. Bhatia and the Management
under the provisions of the Apprentices Act, 1961. Though opportunities
were given to the LT.I. Kanpur for producing the contract but they did not
file the contract alleged to have been entered into between workman and the
Management. It was alleged that the application was neither registered nor
G any certificate issued to him after examination of the National Council and
it was alleged that the Management took the work from the respondent as
a permanent employee. But they illegally terminated the services on 31.3.1987.
Though the Labour Court has held that the respondent remained an apprentice
although he was a workman under the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
H which establishes a relationship of a master and servant between them and
U.P. STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD v. S.M. SINGH [MATHU_R, J.]1001

that the Management terminated his services without complying with the A
provisions of Section 6N, therefore, it concluded that the order of termination/
retrenchment is bad. The Management's stand was that he was an apprentice
trainee from 31.3.1986 to 30.3.1987 and he cannot be treated as a workman
and they led evidence of Shri K.L. Mehrotra who submitted that the
incumbent was an apprentice trainee which is apparent from his own B
application and a contract was entered into between con::;:med workman and
the Management. Shri Mehrotra stated that contract was got signed for the
work of apprentice but the same is not available in the official record. The
learned Labour Court on these facts inferred that formalities required under
the Apprentices Act, 1961 were not complied with and therefore, the
incumbent shall be treated as a workman and accordingly granted relief. Once C
it is accepted by the Labour Court that the incumbent was recruited under
the Apprentices Act, 1961 though the formalities might not have been
completed/produced but the fact remains that it is the finding of the Labour
Court that the incumbent was appointed und~r the Apprentices Act, 1961,
which is apparent from the period that is 31.3 .1986 to 31.3 .1987 (one year) D
which is a normal period for training for apprentice Store Keeper and after
the end of this period respondent was not allowed to continue. It is apparent
that he worked for a period of one year and the Management has produced
his application that he was apprentice trainee but just because they could not
produce the contract that will not change the character of the appointment
of the incumbent. The Labour Court has observed, "since the Management E
has not complied with the formalities required under the Apprentices Act,
1961 therefore, the concerned workm~n is not an apprentice". This pre-
supposes that the Labour Court accepted the incumbent as apprentice under
the Apprentices Act though the necessary formalities might not have been
completed that would not change the character of the incumbent from the F
apprentice to workman. The character of the incumbent as an apprentice
trainee cannot be changed as he owes his existence under. the Apprentices
Act, 1961 and after the tenure of one year his services were bound to come
to an end and he cannot convert this character of a trainee to an employee
of the Management. Apart from this, the services were terminated way back
March 1987 and the dispute was raised in 1994. Therefore, the view taken G
by the Labour Court of treating the respondent apprentice/ trainee to that of
a workman cannot be sustained, likewise the order of the High Court dated
15.7.2003 in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No.19422/1999 whereby this order of
the Labour Court has been affirmed by the High Court. Accordingly, we
allow this appeal, set aside the order of the High Court dated 15.7.2003 as H

[_
1002 SU?REME COURT REPORTS (2004] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A well as the award.dated 13.5.1998 made by the Labour Court. No order as (

to costs.

S.B. SINHA, J: Section 2(z) of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
defines 'Workman' to mean "any person (including an apprentice) employed
in any industry to do any skilled or unskilled, manual, supervisory, technical
B or clerical work for hire or reward, whether the terms of employment be
express or implied, and for the purposes of any proceeding urtder this Act
in relation to an industrial dispute, includes any such person who has been
dismissed, discharged or retrenched in connection with, or as a consequence
of, that dispute, or whose dismissal, discharge or retrenchment has led to that
C dispute, .... " A workman includes apprentice in terms of the said provision.

U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is a general law. The Parliament
enacted Apprentices Act, 1961 (for short 'the said Act') which is a special
law. It deals with the regulation and control of training of apprentices and
for matters connected therewith.
D
The special statute, therefore, shall prevail over the general statute
having regard to the maxim "generalia specialibus non derogant (See
Talcher Municipality v. Talcher Regulated Mkt. Committee & Anr., [2004]
6 sec 178.J
E
The said Act is a complete code in itself. An apprentice, as defined in
Section 2(aa) of the said Act, is a person who enters into a contract of
apprenticeship for the purpose of undergoing apprenticeship training in a
designated trade. Entering into a contract of apprenticeship, therefore, is the
basis for attracting the provisions of the said Act. ·
F
The primal question which arises for consideration is as to whether a
person who is an apprentice within the meaning of Section 2(aa) of the said
Act would become a workman and, con~equently, would be entitled to the
benefits of various labour laws in the event of breaches of the terms of the
G said contract as also non-registration thereof.

It is neither in doubt nor in dispute that an 'apprentice' within the
meaning of the provisions Of the said Act would per se not be a workman
within the meaning of Section 2(z) of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act. It is
further not in dispute that in terms of Section 18 of the Act the apprentices
H being trainees and not workers would not be entitled to the benefits of
U.P. STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD v. S.M. SINGH (SINHA, J.] 1003

provisions of any labour laws. A

Section 4( 1) of the said Act provides that a contract of apprenticeship
will have to be executed by the employers and the apprentice before the
apprenticeship training begins. Such training commences as soon as the said
contract is executed. Sub-sections (4) and (5) of Section 4 of the said Act,
B
however, provide that every contract of apprenticeship shall be sent to the
, ' Apprenticeship Advisor for registration within the period prescribed therefor
whereupon, he would register the same if he is satisfied that they meet the
qualifications provided in Section 3 thereof.

It is relevant to no_tice at this juncture that prior to amendment of the c
said Act in the year 1973 by Act No. 27 of 1973, Section 4 postulated that
apprenticeship training would not commence till a contract of apprenticeship
was entered into by and between the apprentice and the employer and the
same was registered with the Apprenticeship Advisor. The provision of
Section 4 of the said Act as it existed prior to 1973 assumes importance for
the purpose of interpretation thereof.
D
+

It is furthermore not in dispute that the said amendment was brought
about with a view to avoid delay in commencement of training of the
apprentices.
E
Mr. R. Venkataramani, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of
the Respondents would suggest that despite such amendment the importance
of the registration of the contract of apprenticeship cannot be held to be
diluted having regard to the expressions used therein which are imperative
in character. The learned counsel is not entirely correct.
·F
Ordinarily, although the word "shall" is considered to be imperative in
nature but it has to be interpreted as directory if the context or the intention
otherwise demands. (See Mis. Sainik Motors, Jodhpur and Others v. State
of Rajasthan, AIR (1961) SC 1480, para 12).
G
It is important to note that in Crawford on Statutory Construction at
page 539, it is stated :

- "271. Miscellaneous Implied Exceptions from the Requirements of
Mandatory Statutes, In General.-Even where a statute is clearly
mandatory or prohibitory, yet, in many instances, the courts will H
1004 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A regard certain conduct beyond the prohibition of the statute through
the use of various devices or principles. Most, if not all of these
devices find their jurisdiction in considerations of justice. It is a Nell
known fact that often to enforce the law to its letter produces
manifest injustice, for frequently equitable and humane
considerations, and other considerations of a closely related nature,
B
would seem to be of a sufficient caliber to excuse or justify a
technical violation of the law." 1

It is no doubt true that the Apprenticeship Advisor has certain statutory
duties and functions as contained in Sections 4(5), 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 15 and 29.
c It is furthermore true that Sections 19 and 20 provide for certain obligations
upon the employer to obtain approval of the Apprenticeship Advisor and
forward the records to the concerned authorities.

Similarly, the rules framed under Sectfon 37 of the Act confer certain
benefits upon the apprentices. If an employer fails to perform his statutory
·n duties or deprives an apprentice from the benefits to which he is entitled to,
the Apprenticeship Advisor can file an appropriate complaint before a
competent court of law. In terms of Section 31 of the Act the only penalty
which can be imposed upon the employer is fine which shall not be less than
one thousand rupees but may extend to three thousand rupees. Violation of
E the provisions of the Act, therefore, does not result in imprisonment.

A question which also arises for consideration is as to whether Section
18 of the said Act must be strictly construed.

If a contract of apprenticeship is entered into; the violation of the terms
F and conditions thereof, in our opinion, although may lead the penal
consequences but the same would not render the contract of apprenticeship
void or illegal.

In the event, the Apprenticeship Advisor obtains informations about
such violations, he is entitled to take suitable steps in that behalf under the
G Act or the rules but he ha!J not been conferred with any power to declare such
contract of apprenticeship to be ipso facto void ab initio. Section 20 also
provides resolution of disputes between an apprentice and the employer
arising out of the contract of apprenticeship which shall be referred to the
Apprenticeship Advisor for decision. While resolving a conflict by and
H between an employer and an apprentice under Section 20 of the said Act,
t . U.P. STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD v. S.M. SINGH [SINHA, J.] 1005

indisputably he can issue directions which the employer will have to comply A
with and on his failure to do so, he would run the risk of being prosecuted
in terms of Section 30 of the Act, but even in such a situation he cannot bring
an end to the contract. The contract of apprenticeship like any other contract
can be brought to an end by the parties thereto.

Once a contract of apprenticeship commences, the same cannot be
B
brought to an end except in accordance with law. By reason of non-
registration of the contract of apprenticeship, the same does not become a
nullity. If it is to be held that by reason of non-registration of such contract
of apprenticeship the contract itself comes to an end, it would be detrimental
to the interest of the apprentices, which would frustrate the object of the Act. c
The definition of 'Apprentice' nowhere states that an apprentice with
a view to obtain the benefits of the said Act must also be registered. Section
18 of the said Act says that an apprentice shall not be a worker. It does not
say that an unregistered apprentice shall be a worker.
D
Only because the expression "shall" has been employed in sub-section
(4) of Section 4, the same may not be held to be imperative in character
having regard to the fact that not only, as noticed hereinbefore, a contract
of apprenticeship commences but also in view of the fact that an application
for registration of apprenticeship contract is required to be made withil). a E
period of three months in terms of Rule 48 of the Apprenticeship Rules,
1992. The Act nowhere provides for the consequences of non-registration.

It is not in dispute that the list of apprentices used to ht: sent by the
Apprenticeship Adviser himself and, thus, presumably the preliminary
scrutiny in that regard had been made by the said authority. If in a given case, F
as noticed hereinbefore, the employer fails to get the contract of apprenticeship
registered and/or fails to carry on his obligations in terms of Section 11 of
the Act, he faces penal consequences in terms of Section 31 of the Act. ·Tue
employer, furthermore, is liable to pay compensation for termination of
apprenticeship as would appear from Rule 6 of the Apprenticeship Rules, G
1992, which reads thus :

"Compensation for termination of apprenticeship.-Whereas the
contract of apprenticeship is terminated through failure on the part
of any employer in carrying out the terms and conditions thereof,
such employer shall be liable to pay the apprentice compensation H
1006 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2004] SUPP. 4 S.C.R. . 1

A of an amount equivalent to is three months' last drawn stipend; and
when the said termination is due to failure on the part of an
apprentice in the above manner, then a training cost of an amount
equivalent to his three months last drawn stipend shall be made
recoverable from such apprentice or from his guardian in case he
B is minor."

No provision of the Act or the rules framed thereunder was brought to
our notice to show that non-registration of the contract of apprenticeship or
violation and/or neglect on the part of the employer to comply with the other
provisions of the Act it would result in invalidation of the contract. An
c apprentice remains an apprentice having regard to the definition contained
in Section 2(aa) of the Act and continues to work in the said capacity. His
status does not change to that of a workman only because the contract has
not been registered or the employer has not carried out his obligations
thereunder. If such a construction is placed, an apprentice may be held to have
ceased to be an apprentice if he himself defaults in performing his obligations
D
under the contract. \ .'
Recently, in Canbank Fif!ancial Services Ltd v. The Custodian and
Ors., (2004) 7 SCALE 495, this Bench has held that even if a benami
transaction is prohibited the same per se would not render the transaction void
E ab initio and illegal.

It is now well-settled principle of law that if the language used in a
statute is capable of bearing. more than one construction, the true meaning
thereof should be selected having regard to the consequences resulting from l
adopting the alternative constructions. A construction resulting in hardship,
F non-fulfilment of the purpose for which statute has been brought in force \..i .
should be rejected and should be given that construction which avoids such
results.

Sub-section (4) of Section 4 of the said Act can also be .held to be
directory having regard to the rule laid down in Heydon's case. ((1584) 3
G
Co. Rep. 7a]. (See Ashok Leyland Ltd v. State o/Tamil Nadu & Anr., (2004]
3 SCC I and Ameer Trading Corporation Ltd v. Shapoorji Data Processing
Ltd, (2004] 1 sec 102.1

The mischief rule enables the court to take into consideration the
H following four factors for construing an Act:
-
U.P. STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD v. S.M. SINGH [SINHA, J.] 1007
t•
(i) What was the law before the making of the Act, A

(ii) What was the mischief or defect for which the law did not provide,

(iii) What is the remedy that the Act has provided, and

(iv) What is the reason of the remedy. B

The rule then directs that the courts must adopt that construction which
"shall suppress the mischief and advance the remedy".

Prior to 1973, the provision for registration was mandatory in character.
Only having regard to the delay which has occasioned for registration of
c
contract of apprenticeship, the said amendment had been brought about;
pursuant whereto or in furtherance whereof the contract of apprenticeship
commences. If the purpose of amendment was to make the contract workable
even without registration, we fail to see any reason as to why the provision
should be construed as imperative in character so as to render a contract of D
apprenticeship a nullity which is possible to be avoided and the object thereof
can be achieved by taking recourse to the penal provisions.

It may be true that rules framed under Section 37 of the Act are required
to be laid before both Houses of Parliament after formulation; but even such
a provision is directory in nature.
E

It is not a case where any of the apprentices repudiated the contract.
No argument has also been advanced to the effect that the contract of
apprenticeship was merely a camouflage or a ruse so as to establish that in
effect and substance, while appointing a person as an apprentice, the F
employer has been taking work from him malafide or with a view to deprive
him from the benefits of the Jabour legislations, nor any material in respect
thereof had been brought on records.

Whether a relationship of an employer and workman or an employer
and an apprenticeship had been brought about, is essentially a question of G
fact. The Court while determining such a dispute must consider the factual
matrix involved therein in the light of the provisions of the said Act. Once
it is held that a contract of apprenticeship entered into by and between the

•
<
employer and the workman is a genuine one and not a camouflage or a ruse,
a presumption would arise that the concerned person is not a workman. H
1008 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. 4 S.C.R. L
A It is one thing to say that a contract is illegal being opposed to public
policy so as to render the same void in terms of Section 23 of the
Indian Contract Act but it is another thing to say that by reason of
breaches of the terms and conditions thereof by one of the parties it becomes
voidable at the instance of the other party to the contract. If a contract is valid
B in law the breaches thereof would not render it invalid but the same may only
enable a party thereto, who had suffered by reason of such breach, to avoid
the contract. Unless the terms and conditions of a contract are avoided by
a party 'thereto the contract remains valid and all consequences flowing
therefrom would enure to the benefit of the parties thereto.

C Mr. Venkataramani has relied upon a decision of the Court of Appeals
in F.C. Shepherd & Co. Ltd. v. Jerrom, [1986] 3 All ER 589 wherein it is
stated:

"If the party against whom frustration is asserted can by way of
answer rely on his own misconduct, injustice results .... "
D
Ex facie the said decision has no application in the present case. The . \
plea of frustration was not pleaded or established. It is one thing to specify
as what would be the legal consequences of a breach of a contract but it is
another thing to say that despite subsistence of a valid contract, the statutory
E benefits thereof shall not enilre to the parties thereto. In absence of any
specific provision in the statute, we are unable to accede to. the submissions
of the learned counsel to the effect that in the event of commission of a breach
by the employer the contract of apprenticeship shall become a contract of
employment. Such a novation of contract is not contemplated in law.

F . With a view to become a workman, not only the apprentice has to show
that he comes within the purview of the definition of the term 'workman'
as contained in Section 2(z) ·.of the U.P. Industrial Disputes
Act, 1947 but he must further plead ~nd establish that his job is such
which fulfills the requirements of the said term. [See Mukesh K. Tripathi v.
G Sr. Divn. Manager, LIC & Ors., JT (2004) 7 SC 232 = (2004) 7 SCALE 442.]

In Bruton v. London and Quadrant Housing Trust, [1999] 3 All ER 481,
a contract of tenancy was held to be binding upon the parties even though
the grantor lacked the necessary power. A housing association which itself
was a licensee granted a licence which in view of the decision in Street v.
H Mountford, (1985] AC 809 was treated to be a tenancy even though the
U.P. STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD v. S.M. SINGH [SINHA, J.] 1009
l ..
hcusing association, being themselves mere licensees had no power to grant A
a legal tenancy valid against all the world. It is, therefore, necessary to
ascertain as to how the parties to the contract thought thereabout. Ordinarily,
it is impermissible in law for a party to the contract of apprenticeship to allow
it to be worked out and then contend that it was a contract of employment.

In The Employees' State Insurance Corporation and Another v. The
B
Tata Engineering & Locomotive Co. Ltd. and Another, [1975] 2 SCC 835,
it was held :

"The concept of apprenticeship is, therefore, fairly known and
has now been clearly recognized in the Apprentices Act. Apart from c
that, as we have noticed earlier, the terms and conditions under
which these apprentices are engaged do not give any scope for
holding that they are employed in the work of the company or in
connection with its work for wages within the meaning of Section
2(9) of the Act... "
D
Decisions are galore to show that despite a contract of apprenticeship
r •
coming to an end, the concerned workman must fulfil the eligibility criteria
of appointment. [See Rajendra Singh and Others v. U.P. State Electricity
Board, Shakti Bhawan, Lucknow and Others, (2000) 86 FLR 155, Sri
Chittaranjan Das v. Durgapore Project Limited & Ors., (1995) 2 CLJ 388, E
Babula[ and Others v. Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation and
Another, (2000) 84 FLR 847 and Mitrangshu Roy Choudhary v. Union of
India & Others, (1999] 3 SCC 649.]

A Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in Bal/khan Doskhan Joya
v. Gujarat Electricity Board, (2002) 92 FLR 914, whereupon Mr. F
Venkataramani, relied, observed : ·

" ... The Central Legislature was, therefore, fully alive to the situation
that an apprentice, undergoing an apprenticeship training under an
apprenticeship contract duly registered, would be only a 'trainee'
and not a 'workman', to which other Jaws in respect of labour shall G
not apply. Therefore, in inclpding, in the definition of 'workman',
'apprentice' as well, the legislative intention appears to be obvious
that such apprentices, who are not undergoing apprenticeship training
under a duly registered 'apprenticeship contract, envisaged by the
Apprentices Act, and to whom provisions of Section l 8 of the said H
1010 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A Act are not applicable, would, nonetheless, be included in the
definition of 'workman' under the l.D. Act and would get all the
protection of labour laws. The learned single Judge may be right in
his reasoning that even after non-registration of the contract of
apprenticeship, the appellant would pnly be a 'trainee', or an
'apprentice', as intended by the parties and he would not be an
B
'.employee' or a 'workman', within the meaning of the Apprentices
Act. Even if, as stated by the learned single Judge, the appellant, as
a result of non-registration of contract of apprenticeship, is deemed
to be a trainee or an 'apprentice', he would, nonetheless, be covered
within the definitfon of 'workman' under Section 2(s) of the l.D.
c Act."

The ratio enunciated in the said decision appears to be self-contradictory.
An apprentice cannot both be an apprentice and a workman under the 1947
Act.
D Similarly, the observations made by the Patna High Court in Ram Dular
Paswan and Others v. P.O. Labour Court, Bokaro Steel City and Others,
(1998) 80 FLR 399 to the effect that
.
\.

"The Apprentices Act does not deal with the investigation and
E settlement of industrial disputes between the employer and the
workmen. Therefore, so far as the settlement of the industrial
disputes is concerned, the l.D. Act will prevail over the Apprentices
Act. If the employer takes the kind of work mentioned in Section
2(s) of the l.D. Act from the apprentice, the dispute between them ·
has to be settled under and in accordance with the said Act. But if
F the apprentice does not perform such ,work, the l.D. Act will not
apply to him. The line of demarcation between the apprentice and
the workman is very clear. If and when a question as to whether an
apprentice is really an apprentice or is a workman wearing the mask
of an apprentice, is raised the appropriate authority/Labour Court
G will have to apply mind to the nature of his work. The veil has to
be lifted in order to find out the reality. But such a question cannot
be decided merely on the basis of apprenticeship contract or on the
basis of the label, which a person wears."

does not appear to be correct, particularly for the reasons that the High Court
H has failed to consider tp.at Section 20 of the 1961 Act provides for settlement
U.P. STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD v. S.M. SINGH [SINHA, J.] 101 l
' ...
of disputes. Furthermore, as observed hereinbefore, such a contention has to A
be specifically pleaded and established.

Moreover in terms of Section 22 of the Act, the employer has no
statutory liability to give employment to an apprentice.

We are, therefore, of the considered view that non-registration of the
B
contract of apprenticeship would not render the same nugatory.
'.
Subject to the foregoing supplemental reasons, I respectfully concur
with the judgment of Mathur, J.

N.J. Appeals allowed.
c

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