TUSHAR HIMATLAL JANIversusJASBIR SINGH VIJAN & ORS.
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 663
- Decided
- 12 May 2025
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Bench
- SURYA KANT
Holding
The High Court erred in granting the interim injunction as the respondent failed to make out a prima facie case and the balance of convenience and irreparable injury favoured the appellant.
Summary
The appellant inherited a 22,000‑sq‑ft plot in Chembur and terminated a 1972 lease to a partnership firm, filing an eviction suit. Respondent No.1, claiming tenancy rights over 550 sq ft based on a family settlement agreement, obtained an interim injunction restraining the appellant from dispossessing him, which the High Court later restored. The Supreme Court examined whether the High Court was justified in maintaining the injunction, applying the three‑prerequisite test for interim injunctions: prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable injury. It found that the respondent had not established a prima facie case, the balance of convenience favoured the appellant, and the injunction would cause irreparable loss to the appellant’s redevelopment project. Accordingly, the appeal was allowed, the High Court order was set aside, and the appellant was directed to reserve 550 sq ft in the developed property as security pending the pending tenancy dispute.
Issues considered
- Whether the High Court was justified in restoring the interim injunction in favour of Respondent No.1 during the pendency of the eviction suit
- Whether Respondent No.1 established a prima facie case for the injunction
- Whether the balance of convenience and the possibility of irreparable injury favoured the appellant
Headnote
Issue for Consideration Whether the High Court was justified in restoring the interim injunction in favour of Respondent No.1 in a modified term during the pendency of the Suit. Headnotes† Interim injunction – Grant of – When not proper – High Court restored the order of injunction in favour of Respondent No.1 restraining the appellant from dispossessing him or creating any third-party interest in the disputed premises – Interference with: Held: High Court erred in granting the injunction in favour of Respondent No.1 – Respondent No.1 failed to
Subjects
Judgment
[2025] 6 S.C.R. 414 : 2025 INSC 663
Tushar Himatlal Jani
v.
Jasbir Singh Vijan & Ors.
(Civil Appeal No. 6636 of 2025)
13 May 2025
[Surya Kant* and Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh, JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
Whether the High Court was justified in restoring the interim
injunction in favour of Respondent No.1 in a modified term during
the pendency of the Suit.
Headnotes†
Interim injunction – Grant of – When not proper – High Court
restored the order of the small causes court and granted
injunction in favour of Respondent No.1 restraining the
appellant from dispossessing him or creating any third-party
interest in the disputed premises – Interference with:
Held: High Court erred in granting the injunction in favour of
Respondent No.1 – Respondent No.1 failed to establish a prima
facie case in his favour as the question of tenancy rights claimed
by him is pending adjudication before the Small Causes Court –
Balance of convenience also tilts in favour of the Appellant as the
disputed area is merely 550 square feet out of the total area of
22,000 square feet and the Appellant has already entered into a
leave and license agreement with one M/s KMG Global covering a
built-up area of 2,200 square feet – Thus, the injunction inordinately
impeded the entire redevelopment project for a relatively small
disputed portion – Moreover, the Appellant would suffer irreparable
injury if the injunction is allowed to operate, given that the protracted
delay is not only causing substantial financial losses but also
affecting the Appellant’s contractual obligations which cannot be
adequately compensated at a belated stage – Impugned order set
aside. [Paras 16, 17, 19]
Interim injunction – Grant of – Pre-requisites for – Discussed.
[Para 15]
* Author
[2025] 6 S.C.R. 415
Tushar Himatlal Jani v. Jasbir Singh Vijan & Ors.
List of Keywords
Interim injunction; Injunction; Tenancy rights; Tenancy dispute;
Disputed premises; Prima facie case; Balance of convenience;
Irreparable injury or harm; Not adequately compensable in
damages; Small Causes Court; Impleadment; Partnership firm;
Family Settlement Agreement; Leave and license agreement;
Redevelopment project; Small disputed portion; Surrender of
tenancy rights; Equities balanced.
Case Arising From
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 6636 of 2025
From the Judgment and Order dated 30.07.2024 of the High Court
of Judicature at Bombay in WP No. 763 of 2024
Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Appellant:
Shyam Divan, Sr. Adv., Amit Dhingra, Anirudh Arunkumar, Rohit
Mahajan, M/s. Dua Associates.
Advs. for the Respondents:
Arunabh Chowdhury, Sr. Adv., Anuroop Chakravarti, Ramit Singh,
M S Vishnu Sankar, Mitesh Parekh, Ms. Athira G Nair, M/s. Lawfic,
C. George Thomas.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
Surya Kant, J.
Leave granted.
2. The instant appeal is directed against the order dated 30.07.2024
passed by the High Court of Bombay (High Court) restraining
the Appellant from dispossessing Respondent No. 1 or creating any
third-party interest in the disputed premises.
3. The facts leading to the instant appeal are that the Appellant’s father
was the owner of a plot admeasuring 22,000 square feet bearing
C.T.S. Nos.443(part), 451(part), 452A(part) at Vittalwadi, Ghatala
416 [2025] 6 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
Village, Chembur, Mumbai. Out of the said area, the Appellant’s father
leased out 11,250 square feet i.e. the subject land, to a partnership
firm, namely M/s Silver Chem (India)/Respondent No.2, which was
owned by the Vijan family members in 1972. It seems that upon the
death of his father, the entire property devolved upon the Appellant.
The Appellant terminated the above-mentioned lease agreement
vide notice dated 11.02.2008 and, in furtherance thereof, filed Eviction
Suit No. 119/148 of 2008 before the Small Causes Court at Bombay
(Small Causes Court).
4. Notably, Respondent No.1, who claims to be the legal heir of one of
the partners of Respondent No. 2, allegedly runs a business from the
suit structure in the name and style of M/s Asset Motors. He, thus,
filed an Impleadment Application in the Eviction Suit, contending that
he is a necessary and proper party whose rights would be directly
affected by the outcome of the proceedings. Respondent No.1
postulated his undivided share in the business of Respondent No. 2
by virtue of a Memorandum of Understanding executed amongst
the Vijan family members and further relied on his institution of a
separate suit (bearing No.441/2014) before the High Court seeking
partition of his 1/6th undivided share in all the properties owned
and held by the Vijan family. The Small Causes Court allowed the
impleadment application vide order dated 06.10.2016. The Appellant,
being aggrieved by the aforesaid order, preferred a revision petition
before the Appellate Small Causes Court, which was allowed vide
order dated 03.05.2019, setting aside the order of impleadment.
5. Members of the Vijan family, i.e. the partners of Respondent
No. 2 and Respondent No. 1, purportedly entered into a Family
Settlement Agreement on 09.06.2021 to resolve their inter se
differences, which referred to Respondent No. 1’s entitlement to 550
square feet area within the subject land. This Family Settlement was
the outcome of mediation efforts facilitated by a learned Mediator
appointed by this Court in several petitions between members of the
Vijan family. According to Respondent No.1, the Agreement ostensibly
provided him with an undivided share in the premises, wherein he
claims to have been allocated 550 square feet out of the total area
of 22,000 square feet with entitlement to ‘receive right, title, interest,
free of any encumbrances’ therein.
[2025] 6 S.C.R. 417
Tushar Himatlal Jani v. Jasbir Singh Vijan & Ors.
6. In the aftermath of this settlement, several consequential events
unfolded. Evidently, the partners of Respondent No. 2, along with
Respondent No.1, entered into a Lease and License Agreement
dated 15.10.2021, with M/s KMG Global as the licensee, for a
period of 12 months in respect of the subject land. The Appellant
has categorically asserted that this Agreement was executed without
his consent and knowledge. Subsequently, Respondent No. 2 firm
and its partners claimed to have surrendered their tenancy rights on
19.10.2022 qua the subject land. Pursuant to these developments,
Respondent No. 1 once again filed an impleadment application in
the Eviction suit relying on the Family Settlement Agreement. He
simultaneously lodged an application before the Registrar of Firms
seeking recognition as a partner in Respondent No. 2 firm. Whilst
these applications remained pending, Respondent No. 1 instituted
a separate suit, which, according to the Appellant, was merely an
attempt to create a paper trail of Respondent No. 1’s alleged physical
possession of the disputed area in the subject land.
7. It appears that following the surrender of tenancy rights by Respondent
No. 2 and its partners, the Appellant unconditionally withdrew the
Eviction Suit vide order dated 13.01.2023, wherein the Small Causes
Court also rejected Respondent No. 1’s second application for
impleadment. Consequently, the Appellant effectuated a leave and
license agreement dated 11.04.2023 with M/s KMG Global over a
built-up area of 2,200 square feet.
8. Thereafter, Respondent No.1, asserting his status as one of the
partners of Respondent No.2, on the basis of the Family Settlement
Agreement, filed a suit bearing R.A.D. Suit No. 519/2023 before the
Small Causes Court seeking declaration of his tenancy rights with
respect to an undivided area of 550 square feet purportedly forming
part of the premises leased to Respondent No. 2. Respondent No.1
averred in this fresh suit that by virtue of his partnership status in
Respondent No.2 as per the Family Settlement Agreement, any
surrender of tenancy rights by Respondent No.2 firm qua the subject
land without his signature or consent would be illegal and non-binding.
Respondent No.1 also filed an application bearing No. Exhibit 10
praying for interim protection in the form of his possession over the
area measuring 550 square feet and restraining the Appellant from
dispossessing him therefrom. The Small Causes Court, vide order
418 [2025] 6 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
dated 27.04.2023 granted interim protection to Respondent No.1
and subsequently confirmed the same vide order dated 10.05.2023.
The aggrieved Appellant preferred an appeal which was allowed
by the Appellate Bench of the Small Causes Court vide order
dated 20.12.2023.
9. Respondent No.1 consequently filed Writ Petition (C) No.763/2024,
which stands allowed and by way of impugned order, the High Court
has restored the order dated 27.04.2023 of the Small Causes Court
and granted injunction in favour of Respondent No. 1.
10. The aggrieved Appellant is thus before this Court.
11. Mr. Shyam Divan, learned Senior Counsel for the Appellant, contended
that the impugned injunction order has effectively paralyzed the
Appellant’s legitimate redevelopment plans, causing substantial
financial detriment. He underscored that despite the disputed area of
550 square feet being merely a small fragment of the entire property,
the restraint qua this portion has brought the entire project to a grinding
halt. He further propounded that the High Court gravely erred in issuing
an injunction in the absence of any eviction proceedings initiated
by the Appellant against Respondent No. 1. Mr. Divan posited that
Respondent No. 1 lacks the locus standi to obstruct the Appellant’s
development rights as he is neither in lawful nor actual possession
of the subject land. It was advanced that the original tenants had
unequivocally surrendered their tenancy rights, thereby conferring
complete and unencumbered rights upon the Appellant to deal with
his property.
12. Per Contra, Mr. Arunabh Chowdhury, learned Senior Counsel
appearing on behalf of Respondent No. 1, vigorously urged that
the impugned order is in the nature of a simpliciter injunction not
to dispossess Respondent No.1 from the subject property without
due process of law and has been in force for more than 20 months
with only a brief hiatus in the interregnum. He staunchly maintained
that the Appellant has not filed any suit to evict Respondent No. 1,
rather he withdrew the Eviction Suit filed against Respondent No. 2
unconditionally vide order dated 13.01.2023. He further expounded
that rights in the disputed property emanate from a Family Settlement
Agreement mediated through a Mediator appointed by this Court, and
allowing the instant petition would overturn the Consent Order passed
[2025] 6 S.C.R. 419
Tushar Himatlal Jani v. Jasbir Singh Vijan & Ors.
by this Court in SLP (Crl.) No. 5587 of 2020. Mr. Chowdhury adduced
that the putative Surrender Letter relied upon by the Appellant is ex
facie forged and illegal, inasmuch as it is bereft of any reference to
any area being surrendered; it is not signed by all partners; and it
inexplicably purports to surrender valuable property rights without
any consideration.
13. Having heard learned Senior Counsels on behalf of both the parties
and after perusing the record, we deem it approprite to clarify at the
outset that the issue regarding the tenancy rights of Respondent
No. 1 or of the partners of Respondent No. 2, who happen to be
his family members, is sub-judice before the Small Causes Court
in R.A.D. Suit No. 519/2023. The short question that falls for our
consideration thus is whether the High Court was justified in restoring
the interim injunction in favour of Respondent No. 1 in a modified
term during the pendency of the Suit.
14. The High Court has, in the impugned order, noted that Respondent
No.1 is a tenant/joint tenant of the subject land based on the
Appellant’s alleged admission acknowledging his possession. Mr.
Shyam Divan, however, strongly refuted this finding, contending
that the Appellant’s counsel had characterized Respondent No. 1
as a rank trespasser during the course of inter-party negotiations
and such references, made in the context of settlement discussions,
cannot be construed as conclusive admissions for the purpose of
granting injunction by the High Court.
15. The law governing the grant of interim injunction is well-settled. This
Court, through a catena of decisions, has consistently held that
before granting an interim injunction, the Court must satisfy itself of
three essential prerequisites: firstly, the existence of a prima facie
case in favour of the applicant evincing a reasonable probability of
success at trial; secondly, that the balance of convenience lies in
favour of granting the injunctive relief; and thirdly, that the applicant
would suffer irreparable injury or harm not adequately compensable
in damages if the injunction is refused. It is only when these three
conditions are cumulatively fulfilled that an interim injunction ought
to be granted.
16. Applying the principles delineated above to the facts at hand, we
are of the considered view that the High Court erred in granting the
420 [2025] 6 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
injunction in favour of Respondent No.1. We say so for the reason that
the Appellant is incontrovertibly the absolute owner of the property,
with the disputed area constituting merely a fraction of the entire
premises. The Appellant has already entered into an agreement to
redevelop the property. In these circumstances, the restraint imposed
by the impugned injunction significantly circumscribes the Appellant’s
legal right to derive commercial benefit from his property.
17. It further seems to us that Respondent No.1 has failed to establish
a prima facie case in his favour as the question of tenancy rights
claimed by him is pending adjudication before the Small Causes
Court, and at this stage, material ambiguities persist regarding the
validity of his claim. Even though Respondent No. 1 claims rights
and partnership in the Respondent No. 2 firm through a Family
Settlement Agreement, such contention requires deeper scrutiny,
which can only be undertaken during the course of trial of his civil
suit. Concerning the balance of convenience, it decidedly tilts in
favour of the Appellant, considering that the disputed area is merely
550 square feet out of the total area of 22,000 square feet, and the
Appellant has already entered into a leave and license agreement
dated 11.04.2023 with M/s KMG Global covering a built-up area of
2,200 square feet. The injunction has thus inordinately impeded the
entire redevelopment project for a relatively small disputed portion.
Moreover, the Appellant would suffer irreparable injury if the injunction
is allowed to operate, given that the protracted delay is not only
causing substantial financial losses but also affecting the Appellant’s
contractual obligations, which cannot be adequately compensated
at a belated stage.
18. Conversely, Respondent No. 1 would not suffer any irremediable loss
as his alleged tenancy rights over an area measuring 550 square
feet can be adequately safeguarded.
19. For the reasons aforestated, we allow the instant appeal and set
aside the impugned order of the High Court dated 30.07.2024.
However, with a view to balance equities, the Appellant is hereby
directed to keep one unit measuring about 550 square feet reserved
in the developed property as a security to protect the alleged rights
of Respondent No.1, in the event that the Suit pending before the
Small Causes Court is decided in his favour.
[2025] 6 S.C.R. 421
Tushar Himatlal Jani v. Jasbir Singh Vijan & Ors.
20. We clarify that this order does not express any opinion on the merits
of the tenancy dispute pending before the Small Causes Court. The
said Court shall proceed to adjudicate the matter in R.A.D. Suit
No.519/2023 in accordance with law, uninfluenced by any observations
made herein and expeditiously.
Result of the case: Appeal allowed.
†
Headnotes prepared by: Divya Pandey
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