TOTA RAMversusSTATE OF U.P. AND ORS.
- Citation
- 1997 INSC 550
- Decided
- 9 July 1997
- Disposal
- Dismissed
Holding
The limitation period for an application under Section 28‑A begins from the date of the court’s award, excluding the day of award and the time required to obtain a certified copy, and does not depend on the applicant’s knowledge.
Summary
The petitioner’s land was acquired under a Section 4 notification of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and the reference court awarded compensation on 18 May 1990. He filed an application under Section 28‑A on 22 July 1992, claiming he only learned on 19 July 1992 that compensation for other lands had been enhanced and argued that the three‑month limitation should start from the date of knowledge. The Collector and the Allahabad High Court rejected this contention, holding that the limitation period begins from the date of the court’s award, with the day of award and the time taken to obtain a certified copy excluded. The Supreme Court examined the language of Section 28‑A, found no reference to knowledge, and affirmed that the limitation runs from the award date, not from when the applicant becomes aware of it. Consequently, the special leave petition was dismissed.
Issues considered
- Whether the three‑month limitation for filing an application under Section 28‑A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, commences from the date of the court’s award or from the date the applicant gains knowledge of the award.
Legislation cited
- Land Acquisition Act, 1894s. 11, s. 16, s. 18, s. 28-A, s. 4(1)
Subjects
Judgment
A TOTA RAM
v.
STATE OF U.P. AND ORS.
JULY 9, 1997
B [K. RAMASWAMY AND D.P. WADHWA, JJ.]
Land Acquisition Act; 1894 :.
S.28-A-Application u11de1~Limitation---Held, application is to be
C made within three months from the date of award of compensation by
reference court-'-Time take11 in obtai11i11g certified copy of the award ;s to be
excluded i11 computing the period of three months-The plea that limitation
of three months begins to s(alt from the date of tire knowledge of the award
is unsustainable. ·
D CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Special Leave Petition (C)
No. 11171of1997. .
From the Judgment and Order dated 19. 11.96 of the Allahabad High
Court in W.P. No. 12843 of 1994.
E R.C. Srivastava, Ms. Rachna Srivastava and Ms. Rani Chhabra for
the Petitioner.
The following Order of the Court was delivered :
This special leave petition arises from the judgment of the High
F Court of Allahabad, made on November.19, 1996 in Writ Petition No.
12843/94.
Admittedly, on reference under Section 16 of the Land Acquisition
Act, 1894 (for short, the "Act"), the ~eference Court passed its award and
decree on May 18, 1990. The petitioner filed an application under Section
G 28~A of the Act on July 22, 1992 stating that ~e came to know on 19th July,
1992 that in another reference compensation for the lands had been
enhanced and claimed compensation at the said enhanced rates as he had
filed application ~nder proviso to Section 28-A of the Act within three
months of his knowledge. The Collector as well as the High Court have
H negatived the contention. The question that arises for consideration is
184
TOTA RAM v. STATE 185
whether the limitation for the purpose of application under Section 28-A A
of the Act begins to start from the date of the knowledge. Section 28-A
reads as under :
"28-A Re-determination of the amount of compensation on the
basis of the award of the court - ( 1) Where in an award under this
Part, the Court allows to the applicant any amount of compensa- B
tion in excess of the amount awarded by the Collector under
Section 11, the persons interested in all the other land covered by
the same uotification under Section 4 sub-section (1) and who are
also aggrieved by the award of the Collector ipay notwithstanding
that they _had not made an application to the Collector under C
Section 18, by written application tO the Collector within three
months·from the date of the award of the Court require that the
amount of compensation payable to them may be re-determined
on the basis of the amount of compensation awarded by the
Court:
D
Provided that in computing the period of three months within art
application to the Collector shall be made under this sub-section,
the day on which the award was pronounced and the time requisite
for obtaining a copy of the award shall be excluded.
. E
(2) The Collector shall, on receipt of an application under sub-
section (1) cqnduct an inquiry after giving notice to all the persons"
a
interested and giving them reasonabl~ opportunity of being heard
and ·make an award determining the amount of compensation
payable to the applicants.
F
(3) Any person who has not accepted the award under sub-section
(2) may, by written application to the Collector, require that the
matter be referred by the Collector for the determination of the
Con.rt and the provisions of Section 18 to 28 shal~ so far as may
be, apply to such reference as they apply to a reference under G
. Section 18."
A reading thereof dearly indicates that a person. whose land is
acquired under a common notification issued _under Section 4 (1) of the
Act but who failed to avail of the remedy of re.ference under Section 18,
is eligible to make a written application within three months from the date H
186 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.
A of the award of the Court enhancing the compensation. It has been
interpreted by this Court that the "court" means court of original civil
jurisdiction to whom reference under Section 18 would lie. Admittedly, the
award of the reference Court having been made on May 18, 1990, the
limitation began to run from tha~ date. The proviSI) to Section 28-A gives
a right to the persons to obtain the certified copy of the award and decree
B and the time iaken for obtaining the certified copy of the award and .the
decree shall be excluded in computing the period of three months. In view
of the express language, the question of knowledge does not arise and,
therefore, the plea of the petitioner that the limitation of three months
begins to start from the date of the knowledge is clearly unsustainable and
C cannot be accepted. The High Court, therefore, is right in its decision in
that behalf.
The special leave petition is accordingly dismissed.
R.P. Petition dismissed.
c
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