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Supreme Court of India

THE VICE CHAIRMAN DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITYversusNARENDER KUMAR & ORS

Citation
2022 INSC 276
Decided
8 March 2022
Disposal
Disposed off

Holding

The MACP scheme is operative from 1 September 2008, and employees have no vested right to a second ACP financial up‑gradation; the High Court’s order is set aside.

Summary

The Delhi Development Authority (DDA) introduced the Modified Assured Career Progression (MACP) scheme on 1 September 2008, superseding the earlier Assured Career Progression (ACP) scheme under which certain employees claimed a second financial up‑gradation effective January 2009. The Delhi High Court, relying on Union of India v. Balbir Singh Turn, held that MACP benefits should be applied retrospectively from 1 January 2006, granting the employees the ACP benefit. The Supreme Court held that the MACP scheme became operative only from 1 September 2008, not from 1 January 2006, and that eligibility for a second ACP up‑gradation did not create a vested right; the benefit was an incentive, not a statutory entitlement. Consequently, the High Court’s order was set aside, the DDA’s appeals were allowed, and the employees’ claims for ACP benefits were dismissed.

Issues considered

  • The correct operative date of the Modified Assured Career Progression (MACP) scheme for DDA employees.
  • Whether employees have a vested right to the second financial up‑gradation under the ACP scheme after the MACP scheme was introduced.
  • Whether the reasoning in Union of India v. Balbir Singh Turn is applicable to this civil service context.
  • Whether the DDA, as an autonomous statutory body, automatically adopts central government pay schemes.
  • Whether courts may interfere with executive policy on pay incentives and scheme implementation.

Subjects

Assured Career Progression SchemeModified Assured Career Progression Schemevested rightpay commissionDelhi Development Authorityservice laweligibility vs entitlementexecutive policyjudicial review

Judgment

480            SUPREME COURT
                         [2022]REPORTS
                                4 S.C.R. 480                 [2022] 4 S.C.R.


A     THE VICE CHAIRMAN DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
                                        v.
                        NARENDER KUMAR & ORS.
                        (Civil Appeal No(s). 1880 of 2022)
B                               MARCH 08, 2022
            [UDAY UMESH LALIT, S. RAVINDRA BHAT AND
                      BELA M. TRIVEDI, JJ]
             Service Law: Delhi Development Authority – Assured Career
      Progression Scheme – In the instant case, the employees
C
      (respondents) sought applicability of Assured Career Progression
      Scheme, which if applies, will give them the benefit of grant of second
      financial up-gradation w.e.f 03.01.2009 – On the other hand,
      appellant-authority sought application of Modified Assured Career
      Progression Scheme upon the ground that the same become operative
D     from 01.09.2008 – Respondents successfully filed application before
      the Central Administrative Tribunal – Appellant authority
      approached High Court – High Court relied on the decision in Union
      of India v. Balbir Singh Turn, in which case it was held that the Armed
      Forces Personnel had to be given benefit of MACP from the date of
      the recommendation of the Sixth Central Pay Commission i.e. from
E
      01.01.2006 and not from 1.09.2008 as decided by the Central
      Government and therefore upon the same logic, in the instant case
      the MACP shall come into effect from 01.01.2006 – Held: None of
      the employees actually earned a second financial up-gradation,
      though they undoubtedly became eligible for consideration but the
F     eligibility does not ipso facto translate into entitlement as per the
      scheme of the ACP and therefore second ACP up-gradation was
      not automatic but dependent on external factors, eg. employees’
      record – The contention of the employees that they had vested right
      is not tenable as benefit under the ACP scheme was by way of
      incentive granted to avoid stagnation with respect to those employee
G
      who could not get promoted for an ascertained period of time –
      Such benefit by way of incentive are not embodied under rules but
      is in the form of executive order and since MACP is aimed to benefit
      a sizable section of the employees, and not only the respondent, as
      in this case, hence the same cannot be interfered with.
H
                                       480
  THE VICE CHAIRMAN DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v.                      481
                NARENDER KUMAR & ORS.

       Service Law: Assured Career Progression Scheme – Policy          A
Behind Financial Up-Gradation – Financial up-gradation under
the ACP Scheme was available only if regular promotion during the
stipulated intervals, 12 years and 24 years, was not granted to an
employee – Its intent was to extend relief for stagnation faced by
employees’ due inadequate promotional probabilities – A singular
                                                                        B
feature of the ACP scheme was that while the benefit was pay based,
the employee had to fulfil the prescribed criteria to be eligible for
the benefits.
       Service Law: Modified Assured Career Progression Scheme
– Essential features and distinction from – Held: Assured Career
Progression Scheme – Distinction – The noticeable feature of the        C
MACP Scheme is that three increments are to be granted to employees
on completion of 10, 20 and 30 years of service – According to the
MACP scheme, financial up-gradation is admissible on completion
of 10 years of continuous service -in the same grade pay – The
distinction between the ACP and the MACP scheme is not only with        D
respect to the number of benefits (i.e., two under the ACP scheme,
and three under the MACP scheme) but also that the former assured
the promotional grade, where the latter (MACP scheme) only assured
higher pay.
       Delhi Development Authority – Scope of Application of MACP       E
upon its employees – DDA is an autonomous – statutory-organization
– It largely follows the Central Government’s policies, in respect of
pay and allowances, and other benefits for its employees, however,
any revision of pay-structure or revision in other terms and
conditions, of Central Government personnel cannot and do not
automatically apply to the DDA – It has to consider the new or          F
fresh scheme formulated by the Central Government, and adopt it,
if necessary, after appropriate adaptation, to suit its needs.
      State of Gujarat v. Raman Lal Keshav Lal Soni [1983]
      2 SCR 287; Chairman, Railway Board v. C.R.
      Rangadhamaiah [1997] Supp (3) SCR 63; Shankarsan                  G
      Dash v. Union Of India (1991) 3 SCC 47 : [1991]
      2 SCR 567; Ajoy Kumar Banerjee v. Union of India
      [1984] 3 SCR 252; Union of India v. M.V. Mohanan
      Nair (2020) 5 SCC 421; Union of India v. R.K. Sharma
      (2021) 5 SCC 579 – relied on.                                     H
482          SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2022] 4 S.C.R.


A          Union of India v. Balbir Singh Turn (2018) 11 SCC 99
           : [2017] 12 SCR 421 –distinguished.
           Chandi Prasad Uniyal v. State of Uttarakhand 2012
           (8) SCC 417 : [2012] 7 SCR 307; State of U.P. & Ors.
           v. U.P. Sales Tax Officer Grade-II Officer 2003 (6) SCC
B          250 : [2003] 3 SCR 617; Secretary Government (NCT
           of Delhi) and Ors. v. Grade-I officers Associations &
           Ors. 2014 (13) SCC 296 : [2014] 8 SCR 976; State of
           Tamilnadu v. Arumugham (1998) 2 SCC 198 : [1997]
           5 Suppl. SCR 295; State of Haryana & Anr. v. Haryana
           Civil Secretariat Personal Staff Association 2002 (6)
C          SCC 72 : [2002] 1 Suppl. SCR 118; Himachal RTC v.
           Retired Employees Union (2021) 4 SCC 502; Govt of
           AP v. N. Subbarayadu 2008 (14) SCC 702; Ami Lal Bhat
           v State of Rajasthan (1997) 6 SCC 614; State of
           Bihar v. Ramjee Prasad (1990) 3 SCC 368; Union of
D          India v. Sudhir Kumar Jaiswal (1994) 4 SCC 212;
           Union of India v. Shivbachan Rai (2001) 9 SCC
           356; Council       of     Scientific    &    Industrial
           Research v. Ramesh Chandra Agrawal (2009) 3 SCC
           35 – referred to.
E                          Case Law Reference
      [2017] 12 SCR 421                distinguished       Para 11
      [2012] 7 SCR 307                 referred to         Para 13
      [2003] 3 SCR 617                 referred to         Para 14
F     [2014] 8 SCR 976                 referred to         Para 14
      [1997] 5 Suppl. SCR 295          referred to         Para 15
      [2002] 1 Suppl. SCR 118          referred to         Para 15
      (2020) 5 SCC 421                 relied on           Para 15
G     (2021) 5 SCC 579                 relied on           Para 16
      (2021) 4 SCC 502                 referred to         Para 16
      (2008) 14 SCC 702                referred to         Para 28
      (1997) 6 SCC 614                 referred to         Para 28
H
      THE VICE CHAIRMAN DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v.                            483
                    NARENDER KUMAR & ORS.

(1990) 3 SCC 368                          referred to             Para 28         A
(1994) 4 SCC 212                          referred to             Para 28
(2001) 9 SCC 356                          referred to             Para 28
(2009) 3 SCC 35                           referred to             Para 28
[1983] 2 SCR 287                          relied on               Para 33         B
[1997] Supp (3) SCR 63                    relied on               Para 33
[1991] 2 SCR 567                          relied on               Para 35
[1984] 3 SCR 252                          relied on               Para 37
                                                                                  C
      CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1880
of 2022.
      From the Judgment and Order dated 09.01.2020 of the High Court
of Delhi at New Delhi in WP (C) No.476 of 2019.
         With                                                                     D
         Civil Appeal Nos. 1881, 1882-1885, 1886, 1887, 1888 of 2022.
       Kailash Vasdev, Sr. Adv., Anshay Dhatwalia, Vishnu Mohan Nair,
Ashwani Kumar, Anand Mishra, Amrendra Kumar Singh, Anant Vijay
Palli, Nikhil Palli, Deepak Goel, Ms. Samta Pushkarna Mishra, Kamal
Kumar Pandey, M. K. Bhardwaj, Ashutosh Kumar, Rajendra Beniwal,                   E
Ms. Bano Deswal, R. C. Kaushik, Mishra Saurabh, Advs. for the
appearing parties.
         The following Order of the Court was passed:
                                    ORDER
                                                                                  F
      1. Special leave granted, in all these proceedings. With consent of
counsel, this batch of appeals was heard finally.
       2. In all these appeals, the common question which arises is
whether the reasoning adopted by the Delhi High Court to hold, and
direct that the Modified Assured Career Progression Scheme (“MACP”)               G
had to be applied from 01-01-2006, is correct. The appellant, Delhi
Development Authority (hereafter called “DDA” or “the employer”) is
primarily aggrieved by the ruling of the Delhi High Court 1. Some of the
successful petitioners (respondents in those proceedings, hereafter called
1
    Delivered on 9 January, 2020 in WP 5927/2018, WP 5932/2018 and WP 476/2019.   H
484                SUPREME COURT REPORTS                             [2022] 4 S.C.R.


A     “the employees”), have also appealed to this court, contending that the
      High Court’s directions were not correct and seek a modification of the
      relief granted by the impugned judgment. The DDA has preferred another
      appeal against a subsequent order2 which followed the previous order
      (dated 9th January, 2020).
B               Relevant facts
            3. The Government of India introduced the Assured Career
      Progression Scheme (in short, ACP Scheme), by an office memorandum,
      in August, 19993, to remove stagnation. The salient features of the scheme
      are extracted below:
C               “1. The ACP Scheme envisages merely placement in the higher
                pay scale/grant of financial benefits (through financial up-
                gradation) only to the government servant concerned on
                personal basis and shall, therefore, neither amount to
                functional/regular promotion nor would require creation of
D               new posts for the purpose;
                2. The highest pay scale up to which the financial up-
                gradation under the Scheme was available was to be Rs
                14,300-18,300. Beyond this level, there shall be no financial
                up-gradation and higher posts were filled strictly on vacancy-
E               based promotions;
                                            ***
                4. The first financial up-gradation under the ACP Scheme
                shall be allowed after 12 years of regular service and the
                second financial up-gradation after 12 years of regular
F               service from the date of the first financial up-gradation
                subject to fulfilment of prescribed conditions. In other words,
                if the first up-gradation gets postponed on account of the
                employee not found fit or due to departmental proceedings,
                etc. this would have consequential effect on the second up-
                gradation which would also get deferred accordingly;
G                                             ***
                5.1. Two financial up-gradations under the ACP Scheme in
                the entire government service career of an employee shall be

      2
          Dated 11.02.2020, in WP. 528/2017.
      3
H         OM dated 09.08.1999, which came into force on 09.08.1999
     THE VICE CHAIRMAN DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v.                      485
                   NARENDER KUMAR & ORS.

         counted against regular promotions (including in situ             A
         promotion and fast track promotions availed through Limited
         Departmental Competitive Examination) availed from the
         grade in which an employee was appointed as a direct recruit.
         This shall mean that two financial up-gradations under the
         ACP Scheme shall be available only if no regular promotions
                                                                           B
         during the prescribed periods (12 and 24 years) have been
         availed by the employee. If an employee has already got one
         regular promotion, he shall qualify for the second financial
         up-gradation only on completion of 24 years of regular
         service under the ACP Scheme. In case two prior promotions
         on regular basis have already been received by an employee,       C
         no benefit under the ACP Scheme shall accrue to him;”
      4. The Sixth Central Pay Commission submitted its report on 24-
3-2008. These recommended the salary structure and allowances,
conditions of service and retirement benefits of the Central Government
employees and other public bodies, personnel belonging to the Defence      D
Forces, Officers and employees of the Audit and Accounts Departments
and Chairpersons and Members of Regulatory Bodies, except Reserve
Bank of India. By a resolution dated 29-8-2008, the recommendations
of the Central Pay Commission concerning civilian employees were
accepted by the Central Government with respect to revised scales of
pay and dearness allowances. It was resolved that these pay and            E
allowances benefits would be applicable with effect from 01-01-2006.
       5. The Central Government, in supersession of the ACP Scheme,
introduced the MACP scheme, by an office memorandum in May, 20194.
The MACP was made applicable from an earlier date, i.e. 1stSeptember,
2008, through a specific condition in that scheme. The respondent          F
employees had been appointed as regular Work Charged Malis, by the
DDA, with effect from various dates, beginning from 03.01.1985. They
were granted the first financial up-gradation under the ACP Scheme,
w.e.f. 03.01.1997, i.e., on completion of 12 years of regular service.
Subsequently, they became eligible for grant of the second financial up-   G
gradation under the ACP Scheme, w.e.f. 03.01.2009, i.e., upon completion
of 24 years of service. This benefit was not given to them by DDA.
There is no dispute that under the MACP Scheme, the employees were

4
    OM dated 19.05.2009                                                    H
486               SUPREME COURT REPORTS                        [2022] 4 S.C.R.


A     granted the second MACP benefits- later. The employees’ grievance
      was that the DDA introduced the MACP scheme with effect from (01/
      09/2008) by an order dated 06.10.2009 and according to them, as their
      eligibility (indeed, as claimed, their entitlement) to claim the second ACP
      benefit had accrued to them earlier, they should have been granted the
      benefit of second ACP. Consequently, they approached the Central
B
      Administrative Tribunal (CAT) by filing original applications5.
               Proceedings before CAT
             6. Before CAT, the employee- respondents contended that the
      ACP Scheme was more beneficial to them, in comparison with benefits
C     under the MACP Scheme. Therefore, as they had completed 24 years
      of service on various dates in January, 2009, before introduction of the
      MACP Scheme, (by OM dated 19.05.2009) they were entitled for the
      second financial up-gradation under ACP Scheme, even though the
      MACP Scheme was introduced with retrospective date, i.e., w.e.f.
      01.09.2008.
D
              7. The DDA contended that since the MACP scheme become
      operative w.e.f. 01.09.2008, the employees were not qualified for the
      second ACP benefits, as they had not completed 24 years of service
      on that date. As a result, the grant of second ACP benefits w.e.f. January,
      2009 could not arise. The ACP Scheme was valid up-to 31.08.2008. It
E     was urged that the OM dated 19.05.2009 under which the MACP Scheme
      was introduced in supersession of ACP Scheme of 1999, which
      categorically stated that financial up-gradations in terms of the earlier
      ACP Scheme would be granted till 31.08.2008. None of the respondent
      employees challenged that provision of the MACP Scheme. As a result,
F     they could not claim that their case for granting of second financial up-
      gradation benefits under ACP Scheme had to be considered w.e.f.
      January, 2009. DDA also relied on Para 11 of the MACP scheme which
      is as follows:
               “11. It is clarified that no past cases would be re-opened.
G              Further, while implementing the MACP Scheme, the differences
               in pay scales on account of grant of financial up-gradation
               under the old ACP Scheme (of August 1999) and under the
               MACP Scheme within the same cadre shall not be construed
               as an anomaly.”
      5
H         O.A.No.2005/2014; OA 1945/2014; OA 434/2016
      THE VICE CHAIRMAN DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v.                       487
                    NARENDER KUMAR & ORS.

       8. The DDA’s contention was that the MACP scheme clearly              A
envisioned a situation where past benefits, which had actually accrued
and been granted to employees, under the ACP scheme, could not be
withdrawn; however, the MACP scheme contained nothing enabling the
employees to claim that, though it was introduced with effect from
1stSeptember 2008, yet since the memorandum was issued on 19.05.2009,
                                                                             B
they would be entitled to the benefits of the previous (i.e. ACP) scheme).
       9. The CAT, after considering the submission of parties, noticed
judgments of the Delhi, Madras and Bombay High Court and was of the
opinion that employees were entitled to the claim. Therefore, it allowed
the applications preferred by the employees and directed DDA to consider
their cases for granting of the financial up-gradations under the ACP        C
Scheme till 19.05.2009, i.e., the date of issuance of the MACP Scheme,
if they were otherwise qualified and eligible, and to grant appropriate
pay scales accordingly, with all consequential benefits. Arrears were
however, denied to the employees.
         Proceedings before the Delhi High Court                             D

       10. The DDA’s argument before the Delhi High Court, which it
approached, being aggrieved by CAT’s order, was that with effect from
1st September, 2008, the MACP Scheme had become operational and
that the applicants- employees were no longer entitled to receive the
benefits under the (erstwhile) ACP scheme. It was contended that the         E
ACP scheme was valid only until 31st August, 2008. By that date the
employees had not completed 24 years of service. It was submitted that
since the MACP scheme was introduced by the Office Memorandum
(“OM”) dated 19th May, 2009, superseding the earlier ACP scheme, the
question of granting any benefit under the ACP scheme after 31st August,     F
2008 did not arise.
       11. The High Court relied on the decision of this court, in Union
of India v. Balbir Singh Turn6 where it was held that Armed Forces
Personnel, had to be given the benefit of the MACP from the date of the
recommendations of the 6th Central Pay Commission (‘CPC’) i.e. 1 st          G
January, 2006 and not from 1st September 2008, as decided by the Central
Government. Based on this logic, the High Court, in the impugned order,
directed that MACP benefits should be extended to the employees of
DDA from 1st January, 2006.
6
    (2018) 11 SCC 99                                                         H
488             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2022] 4 S.C.R.


A            Contentions of parties
             12. It was argued by Mr. Kailash Vasudev, Senior Counsel for
      DDA that the MACP scheme came into effect on 01.09.2008 and this
      should be the criteria with respect to which applicability of whether the
      old ACP or the MACP should be decided. The employees completed 24
B     years in January 2009 i.e. after the date of coming into force of the
      MACP, and hence were not entitled to up-gradation under the old ACP.
      It was argued that the decision in Balbir Singh(supra), relied on by the
      Delhi High Court, applied only to Armed Forces personnel and not civil
      establishments like the DDA.
C           13. Counsel urged that it has been 12 years since the MACP
      scheme was implemented and a decision such as the impugned judgment
      would constitute judicial interference in policy matters and result in
      enormous financial implications. The decision of this court in Chandi
      Prasad Uniyal v State of Uttarakhand7 was cited to urge that excess
      payments of public money cannot be permitted to be retained. It was
D     contended that the High Court failed to recognise that the respondents
      became eligible for the second up-gradation only after the date of issuance
      of the MACP and consequently were not entitled to an up-gradation
      under the old ACP scheme.
            14. It was emphasized, by citing this court’s judgment in State of
E     U.P. & Ors. Vs. U.P. Sales Tax Officer Grade-II Officer8, that :-
             “decision of expert bodies like the pay commission is not
             ordinarily subject to judicial review, obviously because pay
             fixation is an exercise requiring going into various aspects
             of the posts held in various services and nature of the duties
F            of the employees.”
            This court’s judgment in Secretary Government (NCT of Delhi)
      and Ors. Vs. Grade-I officers Associations & Ors9, was also relied
      on. The court had, in that judgment, refused to interfere with the ACP
      Scheme as it would have violated the government’s policy and further
G     held that exercise of judicial review would not be proper. The court
      upheld the ACP Scheme and the conditions therein.


      7
        2012 (8) SCC 417
      8
        2003 (6) SCC 250
      9
H       2014 (13) SCC 296
     THE VICE CHAIRMAN DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v.                            489
                   NARENDER KUMAR & ORS.

       15. Learned senior counsel also relied on State of Tamilnadu v            A
Arumugham10 where it was observed that the state has the right to
frame a policy to ensure efficiency and proper administration and to
provide the suitable avenues for promotion to officers working in different
departments. The court further observed that the Tribunal cannot
substitute its own views for the views of the government or direct new
                                                                                 B
policy based on the views of the tribunal. Likewise, the judgment in
State of Haryana & Anr. v Haryana Civil Secretariat Personal Staff
Association11 was cited to urge that fixation of pay and determination
of responsibilities is a complex matter in the realm of executive decision
making and that the courts should approach such matters with restraint.
The decision of this court in Union of India v. M.V. Mohanan Nair12              C
was cited to urge that this court had, in its decision, outlined the nature of
the MACP benefits, and also held that the scheme fell within the realm
of executive decision making.
       16. Mr. Saurabh Mishra, who also appeared on behalf of the DDA,
relied on the later judgment of this court in Union of India v. R.K.             D
Sharma13, which held that the benefits from the MACP scheme could
not be given from 01.01.2006, and could be availed of only from
01.09.2008. Counsel also relied on Himachal RTC v. Retired Employees
Union14 that in matters of pay structure or promotion, the choice of a
cut-off date, when the new policy regime has to operate, cannot lightly
be interfered with by courts.                                                    E

       17. Mr. M.K. Bhardwaj, learned counsel appearing for some of
the employees, urged that the High Court’s direction to operate the MACP
scheme from 01.01.2006 had not been sought by the employee-applicants.
What they in fact, sought was the grant of ACP benefits, which were in
force, in January 2009, before the MACP scheme was launched – by                 F
an order dated 19 May, 2009, but with effect from 01-09-2008. In other
words, the employees’ eligibility and entitlement was crystallized as in
January and February, 2009 when the MACP scheme had not been
published. It was argued that since on the date of the employees’ eligibility-
or entitlement, they should be granted benefits in terms of the existing         G

10
   (1998) 2 SCC 198
11
   2002(6) SCC 72
12
   (2020) 5 SCC 421
13
   (2021) 5 SCC 579
14
   (2021) 4 SCC 502                                                              H
490            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2022] 4 S.C.R.


A     scheme which were ACP benefits, - which in turn meant a higher or
      promotional grade, that right could not be defeated on account of a policy
      which was adopted later, albeit with effect from an anterior date.
              18. Mr. Bhardwaj and other learned counsel stressed that the
      employees’ claim for second ACP was warranted in accordance with
B     the ACP scheme, because it is clearly postulated by the MACP scheme
      itself, which, by clause 9 stated as follows:
            “9. Any interpretation/ clarification or doubt as to the scope
            and meaning of the provisions of the MACP scheme shall be
            given by the Department of Personnel and Training
C           (Establishment-I)). The scheme would be operational w.e.f.
            01.09.2008. In other words, financial up-gradations as per
            the earlier ACP Scheme (of August, 1999) would be granted
            till 31-08-2008.”
            19. It was further submitted by learned counsel that the right to
D     be considered for the ACP benefits, was in the nature of a vested right,
      which had to be granted even after the coming into force, of the MACP
      scheme. In this regard it was argued that the rights which crystallize in
      accordance with an old scheme, inure and can be enforced by the
      beneficiary, regardless of the fact that a new scheme replaces it.
E           Analysis and Conclusions
             20. The original scheme, i.e. the ACP scheme, (introduced by the
      OM dated 9-8-1999) granted career progression to Central Government
      civilian employees. Its intent was to extend relief for stagnation faced
      by employees’ due inadequate promotional probabilities. The ACP Scheme
F     was introduced by the Central Government -with modifications- based
      on the recommendations of the Fifth Central Pay Commission. That
      scheme, granted financial up-gradation after 12 years of regular service
      and a second, after 12 years of regular service from the date of the first
      financial up-gradation, subject to fulfilment of prescribed conditions. The
G     relevant conditions, i.e. Nos. 5.1 and 10 are extracted below:
            “5.1. Two financial upgradation under the ACP Scheme in
            the entire Government Service career of an employee shall
            be counted against regular promotions (including in situ
            promotion and fast track promotion availed through limited
H           departmental competitive examination) availed from the grade
THE VICE CHAIRMAN DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v.                    491
              NARENDER KUMAR & ORS.

  in which an employee was appointed as a direct recruit. This      A
  shall mean that two financial up-gradation under the ACP
  Scheme shall be available only if no regular promotion during
  the prescribed periods (12 and 24 years) have been availed
  by an employee. If an employee has already got one regular
  promotion, he shall qualify for the second financial
                                                                    B
  upgradation only on completion of 24 years of regular service
  under the ACP Scheme. In case two prior promotions on
  regular basis have already been received by an employee, no
  benefit under the ACP Scheme shall accrue to him.
                               ***
                                                                    C
  10. Grant of higher pay scale under the ACP Scheme shall
  be conditional to the fact that an employee, while accepting
  the said benefit, shall be deemed to have given his unqualified
  acceptance for regular promotion on occurrence of vacancy
  subsequently. In case he refuses to accept the higher post on
  regular promotion subsequently, he shall be subject to normal     D
  debarment for regular promotion as prescribed in the general
  instructions in this regard. However, as and when he accepts
  regular promotion thereafter, he shall become eligible for the
  second upgradation under the ACP Scheme only after he
  completes the required eligibility service/period under the ACP   E
  Scheme in that higher grade subject to the condition that the
  period for which he was debarred for regular promotion shall
  not count for the purpose. For example, if a person has got
  one financial upgradation after rendering 12 years of regular
  service and after 2 years therefrom if he refuses regular
  promotion and is consequently debarred for one year and           F
  subsequently he is promoted to the higher grade on regular
  basis after completion of 15 years (12+2+1) of regular
  service, he shall be eligible for consideration for the second
  up-gradation under the ACP Scheme only after rendering ten
  more years in addition to two years of service already rendered   G
  by him after the first financial up-gradation (2+10) in the
  higher grade i.e. after 25 years (12+12+1) of regular service
  because the debarment period of one year cannot be taken
  into account towards the required 12 years of regular service
  in that higher grade.”
                                                                    H
492              SUPREME COURT REPORTS                                   [2022] 4 S.C.R.


A            21. As is apparent, financial up-gradation under the ACP Scheme
      was available only if regular promotion during the stipulated intervals, 12
      years and 24 years, were not granted to an employee. A singular feature
      of the ACP scheme was that while the benefit was pay based, the
      employee had to fulfil the prescribed criteria (i.e. qualifications,
      experience, and also possess the requisite service records) to be eligible
B
      for the benefits. The ACP benefit was a promotional grade, divorced
      from the existence or otherwise of any vacancy, and without necessarily
      being functional in the higher grade, with attendant responsibilities.
            22. The MACP scheme, which replaced the ACP scheme, with
      effect from 01-09-2008 (although the scheme was introduced on
C     19.05.2009) was preceded by the Sixth Central Pay Commission report
      dated 24-3-2008. That report dealt with the pay-structure, allowances,
      conditions of services and retiral benefits of Central Government
      employees, etc. By a Resolution dated 29-8-2008, recommendations of
      the Pay Commission concerning civilian employees were accepted by
D     the Central Government regarding revised pay-scales and dearness
      allowances with effect from 01-01-2006. As regards revised allowances,
      (excluding dearness allowance), the effective date designated by the
      memorandum is 1-9-2008.
             23. The noticeable feature of the MACP Scheme- is that three
E     increments are to be granted to employees on completion of 10, 20 and
      30 years of service. According to the MACP scheme, financial up-
      gradation is admissible on completion of 10 years of continuous service
      -in the same grade pay. The distinction between the ACP and the MACP
      scheme is not only with respect to the number of benefits (i.e., two
      under the ACP scheme, and three under the MACP scheme) but also
F     that the former assured the promotional grade, where the latter (MACP
      scheme) only assured higher pay.15

      15
        Para 2 of the MACP scheme- through Annexure I to the Office Memorandum, states
      as follows:
G         “The MACPS envisages merely placement in the immediate next higher grade pay
      in the hierarchy of the recommended revised pay bands and grade pay as given in
      Section 1, Part-A of the first schedule of the CCS (Revised Pay) Rules, 2008. Thus, the
      grade pay at the time of financial upgradation under the MACPS can, in certain cases
      where regular promotion is not between two successive grades, be different than what
      is available at the time of regular promotion. ln such cases, the higher grade pay
      attached to the next promotion post in the hierarchy of the concerned cadre/organisation
H     will be given only at the time of regular promotion.”
   THE VICE CHAIRMAN DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v.                           493
                 NARENDER KUMAR & ORS.

       24. The first issue which arises, is the correctness of the impugned   A
judgment, in applying the reasoning in Balbir Singh. In that decision,
the question which arose for consideration was the correct date from
which the MACP up-gradation scheme, was applicable to employees
(below the rank of officer). This court held that the scheme had to be
applied from 01.01.2006, and not the date designated by the concerned
                                                                              B
order (01.09.2008). The Armed Forces Tribunal (AFT) held that ACP
benefits granted to employees is part of the pay structure which not only
affects pay but also pension. ACP then ruled that it is not an allowance
but a part of pay relied on a Government Resolution to hold that the
MACP scheme was payable w.e.f. 01.01.2006. This Court in Balbir
Singh Turn (supra) upheld that finding recorded by the AFT. Instructions      C
issued on 30-5-2011 were found to be contrary to the Resolution dated
30-8-2008 as, according to the resolution 1-1-2006 was the effective
date for implementation of Macps in matters relating to pay and dearness
allowance. There is no such parallel, in the facts of this case.
       25. In M.V. Mohanan Nair (supra) a three judge Bench of this           D
court held, in the context of a dispute, which asserted that MACP benefits
would result in regular promotional advancement, that:
      “The change in policy brought about by supersession of ACP
      Scheme with the MACP Scheme is after consideration of all
      the disparities and the representations of the employees. The           E
      Sixth Central Pay Commission is an expert body which has
      comprehensively examined all the issues and the
      representations as also the issue of stagnation and at the same
      time to promote efficiency in the functioning of the
      departments. MACP Scheme has been introduced on the
      recommendation of the Sixth Central Pay Commission which                F
      has been accepted by the Government of India. After accepting
      the recommendation of the Sixth Central Pay Commission, the
      ACP Scheme was withdrawn and the same was superseded
      by the MACP Scheme with effect from 01.09.2008. This is not
      some random exercise which is unilaterally done by the                  G
      Government, rather, it is based on the opinion of the expert
      body – Sixth Central Pay Commission which has examined
      all the issues, various representations and disparities. Before
      making the recommendation for the Pay Scale/Revised Pay
      Scale, the Pay Commission takes into consideration the
                                                                              H
494                SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2022] 4 S.C.R.


A               existing pay structure, the representations of the government
                servants and various other factors after which the
                recommendations are made. When the expert body like Pay
                Commission has comprehensively examined all the issues and
                representations and also took note of inter-departmental
                disparities owing to varying promotional hierarchies, the court
B
                should not interfere with the recommendations of the expert
                body. When the government has accepted the recommendation
                of the Pay Commission and has also implemented those, any
                interference by the court would have a serious impact on the
                public exchequer.”
C            26. This court, in R.K. Sharma & Ors.16, commented on the effect
      of M.V. Mohanan Nair (supra) on the MACP scheme, especially the
      date from which it was operative. It was held that:
                “The judgment in M.V. Mohanan Nair clinches the issue.
                Benefits flowing from ACP and MACP Schemes are incentives
D               and are not part of pay. The Resolution dated 29-8-2008 is
                made effective from 1-9-2008 for implementation of
                allowances other than pay and DA which includes financial
                upgradation under ACP and MACP Schemes. Therefore, the
                respondents and other similarly situated officers are not
                entitled to seek implementation of the benefits of Macps with
E
                effect from 1-1-2006 according to the Resolution dated 29-8-
                2008. Moreover, the implementation of Macps by granting
                financial upgradation only to the next grade pay in the pay
                band and not granting pay of the next promotional post with
                effect from 1-1-2006 would be detrimental to a large number
F               of employees, particularly those who have retired.”
             27. It is therefore, quite clear that both Mohanan Nair(supra)
      and R.K. Sharma(supra), examined the MACP scheme; the latter,
      especially, ruled that the scheme was operable from 01-09-2008,
      and that the respondents “officers are not entitled to seek
G     implementation of the benefits of Macps with effect from 1-1-2006
      according to the Resolution dated 29-8-2008”. Having regard to this
      clearly enunciated principle, which, in this court’s opinion, stems from a
      correct reading of the scheme, the reasoning of the High Court, that the
      MACP scheme is operative not from 01-09-2008, but from 01-01-2006,
      16
H          (2021) 5 SCC 579
     THE VICE CHAIRMAN DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v.                                 495
                   NARENDER KUMAR & ORS.

is untenable. The mere circumstance that the resolution of the                        A
Government which led to adoption of the MACP also contained the
effective date for implementation of the pay-benefits of the Pay
Commission recommendations, did not obliterate the fact that the date
from which the scheme was to be made effective, was another one.
        28. The submissions of the DDA, that the executive agency’s                   B
considerations, while extending a benefit or new regime such as the
promotion or career advancement program, is to be effective, involves
decision making that is complex and nuanced, is justified. The date of
operation of new pay scales cannot be per se the same when the
operation of another scheme (which may also involve pay benefits) need
not be the same. The shifting of dates (once settled by the executive                 C
after due deliberations) may seemingly have no consequences, but
inevitably would have radical financial implications. Given these factors,
it has been held, in previous decisions17 that courts should in the absence
of any facially compelling reason disclosing arbitrariness desist from
stepping into the arena of decision making, and avoid directing their re-             D
formulation or even requiring such schemes to be administered from
any anterior period.
       29. The other reason why the High Court went wrong, in holding
what it did, is that DDA is an autonomous – a statutory – organization.
No doubt, it largely follows the Central Government’s policies, in respect            E
of pay and allowances, and other benefits for its employees. However,
any revision of pay-structure or revision in other terms and conditions,
of Central Government personnel cannot and do not automatically apply
to the DDA; it has to consider the new or fresh scheme formulated by
the Central Government, and adopt it, if necessary, after appropriate
adaptation, to suit its needs. Therefore, the Central Government’s MACP               F
scheme did not apply to it automatically. The DDA decided to apply it,
through an office order dated 06.10.2009. 18 The High Court has
overlooked this aspect, and apparently assumed that the MACP scheme
applied automatically, upon its adoption by the Central Government, to
the DDA.
                                                                                      G
17
   Govt of AP v N. Subbarayadu 2008 (14) SCC 702; Ami Lal Bhat v State of Rajasthan
(1997) 6 SCC 614; State of Bihar v. Ramjee Prasad (1990) 3 SCC 368; Union of
India v. Sudhir Kumar Jaiswal (1994) 4 SCC 212 Union of India v. Shivbachan Rai
(2001) 9 SCC 356 and Council of Scientific & Industrial Research v. Ramesh Chandra
Agrawal (2009) 3 SCC 35
18
   Establishment Order, dated 6 October, 2009                                         H
496             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2022] 4 S.C.R.


A            30. This brings the court to the next point, which is whether the
      employees can assert what is termed as a vested right. The first
      submission in this regard is that according to Para 9 of the MACP scheme,
      those who are in employment on the date when MACP scheme was
      brought into force and who are entitled to the ACP benefits, especially
      the second financial up-gradation had a right to insist that their second
B
      up-gradation should be granted in terms of the ACP scheme. In this
      context, the argument advanced is that Rule 9 preserves and protects
      such a right (for entitlement) to be granted the ACP benefits even after
      the introduction of the MACP scheme.
             31. Para 9 recognises the fact that if there is any ambiguity in the
C     interpretation of the MACP scheme it would be resolved by the
      Department of Personnel and Training. It also clarifies in the last sentence
      that financial up-gradation would be granted till 31.08.2008 (given that
      the MACP scheme itself became operative on 01.09.2008), although
      the office memorandum was issued on 19.05.2009. In the opinion of this
D     Court the undue influence placed upon the last sentence cannot be met
      much of by the employees given that the ACP scheme itself ended on
      31.08.2008. This provision (i.e. Para 9) was made to cater to the situations
      where the grant of ACP benefits was under process, this would mean
      both types of benefits i.e. the first and the second up-gradation.
      Doubtlessly, the first up-gradation under the ACP scheme was to be
E     granted after 12 years. If Para 9 were to be considered in the context of
      the first up-gradation it is a clarification to the effect that the individual
      concerned who has crossed 12 years’ service (and therefore became
      eligible and whose case is under active consideration) would get the
      ACP benefits. However, this provision cannot be understood as an
F     independent transitional provision, enabling all employees awaiting the
      up-gradation to insist that the benefit of the ACP scheme should
      indefinitely continue despite its ceasing to exist after 31.08.2008.
              32. The second aspect in this regard is the argument that a vested
      right accrued in favour of the employees who had completed the eligibility
      for a financial up-gradation to insist that such up-gradation ought to be
G
      only under the ACP scheme and not under the MACP scheme.
             33. The concept of “vested right” has arisen for consideration
      before this court in several contexts especially with respect to alteration
      of service condition of public employees. That the Central Government
      in the exercise of its legislative powers conferred under provision of
H
      THE VICE CHAIRMAN DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v.                      497
                    NARENDER KUMAR & ORS.

Article 309 of the Constitution can frame rules which has the force of      A
law has been settled several decades ago. This court has also held that
such rules can be made to operate from anterior date by giving
retrospective effect to them. The determination of an anterior date for
the operation of a rule which has the effect of nullifying or refacing
intervening events or invalidating benefits which had been granted to
                                                                            B
public employees was held to be unconstitutional in State of Gujarat vs
Raman Lal Keshav Lal Soni19. Several previous judgments of this Court
dealing with the question that what is accrued or vested right were
considered in Chairman, Railway Board v. C.R. Rangadhamaiah20
wherein the impugned rule in question sought to disturb the method of
calculating the last pay drawn for the purposes of pension and related      C
allowances. This impacted the pension disbursement of a large number
of employees who had retired much earlier. The court observed that the
amendments applied to employees who had already retired and were no
longer in service on the date the impugned notifications were issued, and
adversely impacted the pension they were drawing. In such context the
                                                                            D
court held as impermissible, those benefits which accrued or in other
words had been actually enjoyed and were taken away by the devise of
giving retrospective effect to the rule. The court observed as follows:
         “22. In State of Gujarat v. Raman Lal Keshav Lal
         Soni [(1983) 2 SCC 33] decided by a Constitution Bench of
         the Court, the question was whether the status of ex-ministerial   E
         employees who had been allocated to the Panchayat service
         as Secretaries, Officers and Servants of Gram and Nagar
         Panchayats under the Gujarat Panchayat Act, 1961 as
         government servants could be extinguished by making
         retrospective amendment of the said Act in 1978. Striking down     F
         the said amendment on the ground that it offended Articles
         311 and 14 of the Constitution, this Court said:
         “52. … The legislature is undoubtedly competent to legislate
         with retrospective effect to take away or impair any vested
         right acquired under existing laws but since the laws are made     G
         under a written Constitution, and have to conform to the do’s
         and don’ts of the Constitution, neither prospective nor
         retrospective laws can be made so as to contravene
19
     (1983) 2 SCR 287
20
     1997 Supp (3) SCR63                                                    H
498     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                        [2022] 4 S.C.R.


A     Fundamental Rights. The law must satisfy the requirements of
      the Constitution today taking into account the accrued or
      acquired rights of the parties today. The law cannot say,
      twenty years ago the parties had no rights, therefore, the
      requirements of the Constitution will be satisfied if the law is
      dated back by twenty years. We are concerned with today’s
B
      rights and not yesterday’s. A legislature cannot legislate today
      with reference to a situation that obtained twenty years ago
      and ignore the march of events and the constitutional rights
      accrued in the course of the twenty years. That would be most
      arbitrary, unreasonable and a negation of history.”
C     23. The said decision in Raman Lal Keshav Lal Soni (1983) 2
      SCR 287 of the Constitution Bench of this Court has been
      followed by various Division Benches of this Court. ( K.C.
      Arora v. State of Haryana (1984) 3 SCR 623; T.R. Kapur v.
      State of Haryana [(1987) 1 SCR 584]; P.D. Aggarwal v. State
D     of U.P. [(1987) 3 SCR 427] ; K. Narayanan v. State of
      Karnataka [1994 Supp (1) SCC 44] ; Union of India v. Tushar
      Ranjan Mohanty [(1994) 5 SCC 450] and K. Ravindranath
      Pai v. State of Karnataka [1995 Supp (2) SCC 246).
      24. In many of these decisions the expressions “vested rights”
E     or “accrued rights” have been used while striking down the
      impugned provisions which had been given retrospective
      operation so as to have an adverse effect in the matter of
      promotion, seniority, substantive appointment, etc., of the
      employees. The said expressions have been used in the context
      of a right flowing under the relevant rule which was sought
F     to be altered with effect from an anterior date and thereby
      taking away the benefits available under the rule in force at
      that time. It has been held that such an amendment having
      retrospective operation which has the effect of taking away a
      benefit already available to the employee under the existing
G     rule is arbitrary, discriminatory and violative of the rights
      guaranteed under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. We
      are unable to hold that these decisions are not in consonance
      with the decisions in Roshan Lal Tandon [ (1968) 1 SCR 185]
      B.S. Vedera [ (1968) 3 SCR 575] and Raman Lal Keshav Lal
      Soni [(1983) 2 SCR 287] .
H
      THE VICE CHAIRMAN DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v.                          499
                    NARENDER KUMAR & ORS.

        34. In the present context, none of the employees actually earned       A
a second financial up-gradation. They undoubtedly became eligible for
consideration. However, the eligibility ipso facto could not, having regard
to the terms of the ACP scheme translate into an entitlement. The eligibility
was, to put it differently, an expectation. To be entitled to the benefits,
the public employer (here DDA) had to necessarily review and consider
                                                                                B
the employees’ records, to examine whether they fulfilled the eligibility
conditions and, based on such review individual orders had to be made
by DDA. In other words, second ACP up-gradation was not automatic
but dependant on external factors. Furthermore, as held by this Court in
M.V. Mohanan Nair (supra), MACP benefits are only an incentive
meant to relieve stagnation – framed under the executive policy. Its            C
continued existence cannot be termed as an enforceable right.
       35. Such expectation is akin to a candidate being declared successful
in a recruitment process and whose name is published in the select list.
That, such candidate has no vested right to insist that the public employer
must issue an employment letter, has been held by a Constitution Bench          D
Judgment of this Court in Shankarsan Dash vs Union Of India21.
Therefore, it is held that employees’ contention that they acquire a vested
right in securing the second ACP benefit is insubstantial.
       36. The employees in this case approached the High Court,
complaining that their vested right, which was the assumed entitlement          E
to be given by second ACP, was taken away by the MACP, introduced
with effect from 01-09-2008, by an order dated 19-05-2009. No doubt,
the MACP scheme is an executive order. Usually, such orders are
expressed to be prospective. However, the executive has the option of
giving effect to such an order, from an anterior date; especially if it
confers some advantages or benefits to a sizeable section of its                F
employees, as in this case. The nature of benefits- as emphasized by
this court earlier, were by way of incentives. They are not embodied
under rules. In such circumstances, a set of employees, who might
have benefitted from the then prevailing regime or policy, cannot in the
absence of strong and unequivocal indications in the later policy (which        G
might be given effect to from an anterior date, like in this case), insist
that they have a right to be given the benefits under the superseded
policy. It is noteworthy that a larger section of employees would benefit
from the MACP benefits, because they are to be given after 10-, 20-
21
     (1991) 3 SCC 47                                                            H
500                SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2022] 4 S.C.R.


A     and 30-years’ service (as compared with two benefits, falling due after
      12 and 24 years of service) and further that such benefits under MACP
      scheme are subjected to less rigorous eligibility requirements, than under
      the ACP scheme.
             37. The myriad intricate details which the executive has to consider,
B     while framing a scheme applicable generally, to a large section of the
      employees, may not always admit of one, or one set of solutions. To
      insist that a particular kind of benefit, hitherto applicable, should be
      continued for a set of employees, while the others should be governed
      by another, new set or scheme, would be imposing a significant burden
      on the administration, apart from swelling financial costs as well as
C
      administrative energies. Such directions would result in creating different
      time warps, rendering efficient administration of personnel policies
      impracticable. Sans palpable or facial arbitrariness, the courts should be
      circumspect in adding conditions, or tampering with such arrangements.
      In Ajoy Kumar Banerjee v Union of India22 a five judge Bench of this
D     court had emphasized this aspect in the following terms:
                “46…. The legislature however is free to recognise the degree
                of harm or evil and to make provisions for the same. Making
                dissimilar provisions for one group of public sector
                undertakings does not per se make a law discriminatory as
E               such. It is well-settled that courts will not sit as super-
                legislature and strike down a particular classification on the
                ground that any under-inclusion, namely, that some others
                have been left untouched so long as there is no violation of
                constitutional restraints…… The same principle was reiterated
                by this Court in the case of State of Gujarat v. Shri Ambica
F
                Mills Ltd., Ahmedabad [1974 (3) SCR 760]. In that case, this
                Court was of the view that in the matter of economic legislation
                or reform, a provision would not be struck down on the vice
                of under-inclusion, inter alia, for the reason that the
                legislature could not be required to impose upon administrative
G               agencies task which could not be carried out or which must
                be carried out on a large scale at a single stroke. It was further
                reiterated that piece meal approach to a general problem
                permitted by under-inclusive classifications, is sometimes

      22
H          (1984) 3 SCR 252
   THE VICE CHAIRMAN DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v.                            501
                 NARENDER KUMAR & ORS.

       justified when it is considered that legislatures deal with such        A
       problems usually on an experimental basis. It is impossible to
       tell how successful a particular approach might be, what
       dislocation might occur, and what situation might develop and
       what new evil might be generated in the attempt. Administrative
       expedients must be forged and tested. Legislators recognizing
                                                                               B
       these factors might wish to proceed cautiously, and courts
       must allow them to do so….”
      This court is of the opinion that the same considerations apply in
the present case. That, some employees could have benefitted more
under the ACP benefits, if the MACP scheme had not been introduced
from an earlier date, is no ground to hold so and compel an executive          C
agency to grant the claimed benefits.
        38. For the foregoing reasons, the impugned judgment and order
is set aside. The appeals filed by the DDA are hereby allowed. During
the pendency of the proceedings before the CAT, the benefits sought by
the employees were granted, under interim orders, but subject to the           D
final outcome. In these circumstances, the benefits claimed by such of
the applicant/employees, granted to them under the ACP scheme, can
be reversed by the DDA. However, where the applicants were given
MACP benefits by DDA, on its consideration that they were entitled to
it, from later dates (such as from 2010-2011 or later dates) shall not be      E
disturbed. The appeals preferred by the employees claiming that they
ought to be given ACP benefits from the date as claimed by them for the
same reasons are hereby dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.

Devika Gujral                                           Appeals disposed of.   F
(Assisted by : Mahendra Yadav, LCRA)




                                                                               G




                                                                               H


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