THE STATE OF WEST BENGAL & ORS.versusGITASHREE DUTTA (DEY)

                       [2022] 4 S.C.R. 1061                            1061


            THE STATE OF WEST BENGAL & ORS.                            A
                                 v.
                   GITASHREE DUTTA (DEY)
                  (Civil Appeal No. 4254 of 2022)
                         APRIL 20, 2022                                B
       [S. ABDUL NAZEER AND VIKRAM NATH, JJ.]
       Doctrines/Principles – Doctrine of legitimate expectation –
Principle of Estoppel – When not applicable–National Food Security
Act, 2013 – Cancellation of declaration of Fair Price Shop (FPS)
                                                                       C
vacancies in view of the implementation of 2013 Act– Correctness
of – Held: Appellants were reposed with a responsibility of
implementing the mandate of the 2013 Act and to bring about
reforms in the existing Public Distribution System – In the present
case, upon scrutiny, it was found that declaration of vacancies vide
notification dtd. 30.01.14 was not in conformity with the 2013 Act     D
and thus, cancellation of the said notification was necessary for
the implementation of the said Act –Thus, the plea of legitimate
expectation of the respondent does not have any basis – Respondent
being a mere applicant in an un-finalised selection process has no
vested right to seek continuation of the notified vacancies, when by
                                                                       E
recalling the vacancy notification, the appellants endeavored to
enforce the statute –There can be no estoppel against a statute –
No material irregularity in issuing the impugned notification dtd.
17.08.15 cancelling the declaration of vacancies –Respondent has
not made out a case of arbitrariness or unreasonableness or mala
fide – Judgment of Division Bench set aside and that of the Single     F
Judge is restored.
      Doctrines/Principles – Doctrine of legitimate expectation vis-
à-vis Principle of Estoppel – Discussed.
      Allowing the appeal, the Court
                                                                       G
      HELD: 1.1 The doctrine of “legitimate expectation” has
been developed in the context of principles of natural justice.
‘Legitimate expectation’ is a public law right whereas ‘promissory
estoppel’ is a private law right. The doctrine of legitimate
expectation in public law is based on the principle of fairness and
                                                                       H
                               1061
1062            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2022] 4 S.C.R.


 A     non-arbitrariness in governmental actions. However, the doctrine
       of legitimate expectation ordinarily would not have any application
       when the legislature has enacted the statute. Further, the
       legitimate expectation cannot prevail over a policy introduced
       by the Government, which does not suffer from any perversity,
       unfairness or unreasonableness or which does not violate any
 B
       fundamental or other enforceable rights vested in the respondent.
       When the decision of public body is in conformity with law or is in
       public interest, the plea of legitimate expectation cannot be
       sustained. [Paras 10 and 11][1067-B-E]
             1.2 There is a necessary inter-play between the plea of
 C     legitimate expectation and Article 14. For a decision to be non-
       arbitrary, the reasonable/legitimate expectations of the claimant
       have to be considered. However, to decide whether the
       expectation of the claimant is reasonable or legitimate in the
       context, is a question of fact in each case. Whenever the question
 D     arises, it is to be determined not according to the claimant’s
       perception but in larger public interest wherein other more
       important considerations may outweigh what would otherwise
       have been the legitimate expectation of the claimant. The 2013
       Act was enacted to provide for food and nutritional security in
       human life cycle approach, by ensuring access to adequate quantity
 E     of quality food at affordable prices to people to live a life with
       dignity and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto.
       [Paras 14 and 15][1069-A-C, G]
             1.3 It is clear from the different provisions of the 2013 Act
       that there is a paradigm shift in addressing the problem of food
 F     security from the current welfare approach to a right based
       approach. The Act confers legal right on the eligible beneficiaries
       to get the essential commodities through fair price shops at a
       highly subsidized price. The Act also envisages reforms
       necessary for distribution of essential commodities to the ration
 G     card holders. In the present case, upon scrutiny, it was found
       that declaration of vacancies vide notification dated 30.01.2014
       was not in conformity with the 2013 Act and thus, cancellation of
       the said notification was necessary for the implementation of the
       provisions of the said Act. In view of above, the plea of legitimate

 H
THE STATE OF WEST BENGAL & ORS. v. GITASHREE DUTTA (DEY) 1063



expectation of the respondent is without having any basis. In the       A
instant case, no promise of any kind was made to continue the
existing policy on the part of the State. Furthermore, Clause 4 of
the Conditions of the Notification dated 30.01.2014, calling for
vacancies, provided that the State could reject applications without
ascertaining any reasons. The agency which initiated the selection
                                                                        B
process is entitled to recall it upon reasonable grounds.
Participation in the selection process or being a selected candidate
does not vest such candidate with the right to direct the Authorities
to give him appointment. Having regard to the above, it cannot
be said that the State has acted with material irregularity in
issuing the impugned notification dated 17.08.2015. [Paras 19,          C
21 & 22][1071-D-E; 1072-A-D]
       1.4 There can be no estoppel against a statute. In the instant
case, the appellants were reposed with a responsibility of
implementing the mandate of the 2013 Act, and more importantly,
to bring about reforms in the existing Public Distribution System       D
as stipulated under Section 12 of the said Act. The respondent
herein being a mere applicant in an un-finalised selection process,
has no vested right in his favour to seek continuation of the
notified vacancies, when by recalling the vacancy notification, the
appellants endeavored to enforce the statute. Moreover, there
can be no estoppel against a statute. Even going by the                 E
observations of the Division Bench in the impugned judgment,
that the State was aware of the 2013 Act while issuing the
30.01.2014 vacancy notification, the said notification cannot be
sustained, being contrary to the mandate of the National Food
Security Act, 2013, more importantly of Section 12 thereof.             F
[Paras 25 and 29][1073-A; 1074-B-E]
       1.5 The 2013 Act came into effect on 10.09.2013. The
vacancy notice is dated 30.01.2014. The vacancy notice does not
refer to the provisions of 2013 Act. It would be improper to infer
that the provisions of 2013 Act were kept in mind while issuing         G
vacancy notice dated 30.01.2014. The respondent has not made
out a case of arbitrariness or unreasonableness or mala fide. The
judgment of the Division Bench impugned is set aside and the
judgment of the Single Judge is restored. [Paras 30 and 31]
[1074-F-G, H; 1075-A]
                                                                        H
1064            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2022] 4 S.C.R.


 A           Thakur Amar Singhji v. State of Rajasthan (1955) 2
             SCR 303; Electronics Corpn. of India Ltd. v. Secy.
             Revenue Deptt., Govt. of A.P. (1999) 4 SCC 458 : [1999]
             2 SCR 1078 – followed.
             Punjab Communications Ltd. v. Union of India and Ors.
 B           1999 (4) SCC 727 : [1999] 2 SCR 1033; Sethi Auto
             Service Station and Another v. Delhi Development
             Authority and Others (2009) 1 SCC 180 : [2008] 14
             SCR 598; Union of India v. Lt. Col. P.K. Choudhary
             2016 (4) SCC 236 : [2016] 2 SCR 426; Food
             Corporation of India v. M/s Kamdhenu Cattle Feed
 C           Industries (1993) 1 SCC 71 : [1992] 2 Suppl. SCR 322;
             Swaraj Abhiyan v. Union of India & Ors. (2018) 12
             SCC 170; Sarkari Sasta Anaj Vikreta Sangh v. State of
             M.P. (1981) 4 SCC 471; A.P. Dairy Development Corpn.
             Federation v. B Narasimha Reddy (2011) 9 SCC 286 :
 D           [2011] 14 SCR 1; A.P. Pollution Control Board II v.
             Prof. M.V. Nayudu & Ors. (2001) 2 SCC 62 : [2000] 5
             Suppl. SCR 249 – relied on.
                              Case law reference
       [1999] 2 SCR 1033               relied on               Para 11
 E
       [2008] 14 SCR 598               relied on               Para 12
       [2016] 2 SCR 426                relied on               Para 13
       [1992] 2 Suppl. SCR 322         relied on               Para 14
       (2018) 12 SCC 170               relied on               Para 20
 F
       (1981) 4 SCC 471                relied on               Para 23
       [1955] 2 SCR 303                followed                Para 25
       [1999] 2 SCR 1078               followed                Para 26
       [2011] 14 SCR 1                 relied on               Para 27
 G
       [2000] 5 Suppl. SCR 249         relied on               Para 28
             CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 4254
       of 2022.
             From the Judgment and Order dated 06.03.2019 of the High Court
 H     at Calcutta in M.A.T. No.1341 of 2018.
THE STATE OF WEST BENGAL & ORS. v. GITASHREE DUTTA (DEY) 1065



    Rakesh Dwivedi, Sr. Adv., Soumitra G. Chaudhuri, Chanchal                A
Kumar Ganguli, Advs. for the Appellants.
       Supriyo Chattopadhaya, Arup Banerjee, Prakash Sharma, Advs.
for the Respondent.
      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
                                                                             B
      S. ABDUL NAZEER, J.
      Leave granted.
        2. This appeal is directed against the judgment dated 06.03.2019
in M.A.T No.1341 of 2018 whereby the Division Bench of the High
Court of Calcutta has allowed the appeal and set aside the order of the      C
learned Single Judge in Writ Petition No. 661(W) of 2017. The question
for consideration in this appeal is whether the State of West Bengal was
justified in cancelling the declaration of FPS (Fair Price Shop) vacancies
in view of the implementation of National Food Security Act, 2013 (for
short ‘2013 Act’).                                                           D
       3. Shorn of details, by a Gazette Notification dated 30.01.2014,
the vacancy for FPS dealership was declared in the District of Alipurduar.
The respondent participated in the selection process and was
recommended as a first priority candidate in respect of the said vacancy.
However, no final order appointing the respondent was issued by the
                                                                             E
State Authority. While the application of the respondent was pending, a
notification dated 17.08.2015 was issued by the Food and Supplies
Department of the State of West Bengal cancelling the declaration of
vacancies. This notification was issued in the light of implementation of
the 2013 Act, which is as under:
                                                                             F
      “In view of the implementation of the National Food Security Act,
      2013 in the State, the Governor is pleased to cancel with immediate
      effect the FPS vacancies notified vide Memo. Nos. 2480/FS/O/
      Sectt./CSS/7S-16/2013 dated 26.08.2013, 3062-FS/Sectt/Food/
      4M-04/2013 dated 06.11.2013, 152-FS/Sectt/Food/4M-16/2013
      dated 20.01.2014, 540-FS/Sectt/Food/4M-16/2013 dated                   G
      04.03.2014 and G-295/FS/Sectt/Food/6F-19/2009 dated
      08.01.2015. No further action will be taken in connection with
      applications received against such vacancies.”
       4. Being aggrieved by the cancellation of declaration of vacancies,
the respondent moved an application under Article 226 of the Constitution    H
1066             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2022] 4 S.C.R.


 A     before the High Court of Calcutta inter alia praying for quashing of the
       Notification dated 17.08.2015. The State of West Bengal contested the
       writ petition by filing affidavit in opposition and the said writ petition was
       dismissed by the learned Single Judge. The said judgment of the learned
       Single Judge was assailed by the respondent before the Division bench
       of the Calcutta High Court. This intra Court appeal along with three
 B
       other matters were taken up by the Division Bench simultaneously and
       decided finally by a judgment dated 06.03.2019. The Division Bench
       while deciding the said appeals held that the State of West Bengal has
       failed to justify the decision to recall the vacancies and that it has acted
       in an arbitrary and unreasonable manner, and hence, quashed the
 C     Notification dated 17.08.2015. As noticed above, the State of West Bengal
       and its functionaries have challenged the legality and correctness of the
       said judgment in this appeal.
              5. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties.

 D            6. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellants is that
       the Notification dated 17.08.2015 was issued in public interest in view of
       the 2013 Act. Therefore, the plea of legitimate expectation of the
       respondent is without any basis. It is argued that there is no estoppel
       against the statute. It is further argued that the Division Bench failed to
       appreciate that due to the implementation of the 2013 Act, the number
 E     of beneficiaries has been reduced in the State at that time after mapping
       of ration card holders, thus it was no more viable to create or go through
       with the process of filling up of vacancies. It is urged that the selection
       shown pursuant to the Notice dated 30.01.2014 does not vest the
       respondent with any justiciable right to agitate before the Writ Court.
 F             7. However, the learned counsel for the respondent while
       supporting the judgment of the Division Bench submits that the respondent
       had participated in the selection process and became successful thereat.
       The respondent altered the material position to her prejudice, on the
       basis of the directions issued by the State in terms of the said notification.
 G     The justification for cancellation given in the impugned notification dated
       17.08.2015 is the coming into effect of the 2013 Act. The said Act was
       in force prior to the notification dated 30.01.2014. Therefore, the
       Authorities are deemed to have taken into consideration the parameters
       laid down in the 2013 Act while declaring vacancy on 30.01.2014. At
       this stage, the Authorities cannot resile from their declared position.
 H
THE STATE OF WEST BENGAL & ORS. v. GITASHREE DUTTA (DEY) 1067
                  [S. ABDUL NAZEER, J.]

      8. We have carefully considered the submission of the learned               A
counsel made at the bar and perused the materials placed on record.
       9. The respondent has contended that she has legitimate
expectation to be treated fairly even if she may not have a vested right
in getting the appointment. It is the duty and the obligation of the State to
act fairly and not arbitrarily. A decision not to fill up the vacancies must      B
be bona fide and for justifiable and appropriate reasons.
       10. The doctrine of “legitimate expectation” has been developed
in the context of principles of natural justice. ‘Legitimate expectation’ is
a public law right whereas ‘promissory estoppel’ is a private law right.
The doctrine of legitimate expectation in public law is based on the principle    C
of fairness and non-arbitrariness in governmental actions.
       11. However, the doctrine of legitimate expectation ordinarily would
not have any application when the legislature has enacted the statute.
Further, the legitimate expectation cannot prevail over a policy introduced
by the Government, which does not suffer from any perversity, unfairness
                                                                                  D
or unreasonableness or which does not violate any fundamental or other
enforceable rights vested in the respondent. When the decision of public
body is in conformity with law or is in public interest, the plea of legitimate
expectation cannot be sustained. In Punjab Communications Ltd. v.
Union of India and Ors.1 this Court held that policy decision creating
the legitimate expectation which is normally binding on the decision maker,       E
can be changed by the decision maker in overriding public interest. It
was held as under:
         “37. The above survey of cases shows that the doctrine of
         legitimate expectation in the substantive sense has been accepted
         as part of our law and that the decision-maker can normally be           F
         compelled to give effect to his representation in regard to the
         expectation based on previous practice or past conduct unless
         some overriding public interest comes in the way…….”
      12. In Sethi Auto Service Station and Another v. Delhi
Development Authority and Others2, this Court after referring to
                                                                                  G
various precedents observed as under:
         “32. An examination of the aforenoted few decisions shows that
         the golden thread running through all these decisions is that a
1
    1999 (4) SCC 727
2
    (2009) 1 SCC 180                                                              H
1068                SUPREME COURT REPORTS                             [2022] 4 S.C.R.


 A              case for applicability of the doctrine of legitimate expectation,
                now accepted in the subjective sense as part of our legal
                jurisprudence, arises when an administrative body by reason of a
                representation or by past practice or conduct aroused an
                expectation which it would be within its powers to fulfil unless
                some overriding public interest comes in the way. However, a
 B
                person who bases his claim on the doctrine of legitimate
                expectation, in the first instance, has to satisfy that he has relied
                on the said representation and the denial of that expectation has
                worked to his detriment. The Court could interfere only if the
                decision taken by the authority was found to be arbitrary,
 C              unreasonable or in gross abuse of power or in violation of principles
                of natural justice and not taken in public interest. But a claim
                based on mere legitimate expectation without anything more cannot
                ipso facto give a right to invoke these principles.
                    33. It is well settled that the concept of legitimate expectation
 D              has no role to play where the State action is as a public policy or
                in the public interest unless the action taken amounts to an abuse
                of power. The court must not usurp the discretion of the public
                authority which is empowered to take the decisions under law
                and the court is expected to apply an objective standard which
                leaves to the deciding authority the full range of choice which the
 E              legislature is presumed to have intended. Even in a case where
                the decision is left entirely to the discretion of the deciding authority
                without any such legal bounds and if the decision is taken fairly
                and objectively, the court will not interfere on the ground of
                procedural fairness to a person whose interest based on legitimate
 F              expectation might be affected. Therefore, a legitimate expectation
                can at the most be one of the grounds which may give rise to
                judicial review but the granting of relief is very much limited. [Vide:
                Union of India v. Hindustan Development Corporation –
                (1993) 3 SCC 499]”
 G            13. In Union of India v. Lt. Col. P.K. Choudhary3, this Court
       held that the legitimate expectation, as an argument, cannot prevail over
       the policy introduced by the Government which does not suffer from
       any perversity, unfairness or unreasonableness or which does not violate
       any fundamental or other enforceable rights vested in the respondents.
       3
 H         2016 (4) SCC 236
THE STATE OF WEST BENGAL & ORS. v. GITASHREE DUTTA (DEY) 1069
                  [S. ABDUL NAZEER, J.]

       14. There is a necessary inter-play between the plea of legitimate         A
expectation and Article 14. For a decision to be non-arbitrary, the
reasonable/legitimate expectations of the claimant have to be considered.
However, to decide whether the expectation of the claimant is reasonable
or legitimate in the context, is a question of fact in each case. Whenever
the question arises, it is to be determined not according to the claimant’s
                                                                                  B
perception but in larger public interest wherein other more important
considerations may outweigh what would otherwise have been the
legitimate expectation of the claimant. In Food Corporation of India
v. M/s Kamdhenu Cattle Feed Industries4, this Court has pointed
out as under:
         “8. The mere reasonable or legitimate expectation of a citizen, in       C
         such a situation, may not by itself be a distinct enforceable right,
         but failure to consider and give due weight to it may render the
         decision arbitrary, and this is how the requirement of due
         consideration of a legitimate expectation forms part of the principle
         of non-arbitrariness, a necessary concomitant of the rule of law.        D
         Every legitimate expectation is a relevant factor requiring due
         consideration in a fair decision-making process. Whether the
         expectation of the claimant is reasonable or legitimate in the context
         is a question of fact in each case. Whenever the question arises,
         it is to be determined not according to the claimant’s perception
         but in larger public interest wherein other more important               E
         considerations may outweigh what would otherwise have been
         the legitimate expectation of the claimant. A bona fide decision of
         the public authority reached in this manner would satisfy the
         requirement of non-arbitrariness and withstand judicial scrutiny.
         The doctrine of legitimate expectation gets assimilated in the rule      F
         of law and operates in our legal system in this manner and to this
         extent.”
       15. Bearing in mind the above legal principles, let us examine the
present case. The 2013 Act was enacted to provide for food and nutritional
security in human life cycle approach, by ensuring access to adequate             G
quantity of quality food at affordable prices to people to live a life with
dignity and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. It is
beneficial to refer to the ‘Introduction’ to the 2013 Act in order to
understand the scope and purpose of the Act:
4
    (1993) 1 SCC 71                                                               H
1070             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2022] 4 S.C.R.


 A                                   “INTRODUCTION
                 Eradicating extreme poverty and hunger is one of the goals
             under the Millennium Development Goals of the United Nations.
             It casts responsibilities on all State parties to recognize the right
             of everyone to adequate food. Food security means availability of
 B           sufficient foodgrains to meet the domestic demand as well as
             access, at the individual level, to adequate quantities of food at
             affordable prices.
                Providing adequate food has always been focus of the
             Government’s planning and policy. However, this legislation marks
 C           a paradigm shift in addressing the problem of food security from
             the current welfare approach to a right based approach. This
             legislation would confer legal rights on eligible beneficiaries to
             receive entitled quantities of foodgrains at highly subsidized prices.
             Besides, it also confers legal rights on women and children and
             other special groups such as destitute, homeless, disaster and
 D           emergency affected persons and persons living in starvation to
             receive meal free of charge or at affordable price.”
              16. The ‘Statement of Objects and Reasons’ of 2013 Act, inter
       alia, states as follows:
                 “(i) progressively undertake necessary reforms by the Central
 E
             and State Governments in the Targeted Public Distribution System
             in consonance with the role envisaged for them in the proposed
             legislation.”
             17. Section 3 of the 2013 Act provides for the right to receive
       foodgrains at subsidized prices and Section 4 provides for nutritional
 F     support to pregnant women and lactating mothers. Similarly, Section 5
       provides for the nutritional support to the children. Section 6 provides for
       prevention and management of child malnutrition.
             18. Section 12 reposes a duty on the State to progressively
       undertake reforms necessary in the Targeted Public Distribution System
 G     and the same should be in consonance with the Act. The same is
       reproduced as under:
             “12. (1) The Central and State Governments shall endeavour to
             progressively undertake necessary reforms in the Targeted Public
             Distribution System in consonance with the role envisaged for
 H           them in this Act.”
THE STATE OF WEST BENGAL & ORS. v. GITASHREE DUTTA (DEY) 1071
                  [S. ABDUL NAZEER, J.]

       Further under Section 12(2)(e), the Act envisages power of the           A
State to undertake various steps in furtherance to reform the system,
which shall, inter alia, include that the state can give preference to any
public bodies/panchayats/SHGs/cooperative societies etc. The same has
been reproduced herein :-
       “12. (2) The reforms shall, inter alia, include—                         B
       (e) preference to public institutions or public bodies such as
       Panchayats, self-help groups, co-operatives, in licensing of fair
       price shops and management of fair price shops by women or
       their collectives;”
       Sub-section (23) of Section 2 defines the expression “Targeted           C
Public Distribution System” is as under:
       “Targeted Public Distribution System” means the system for
       distribution of essential commodities to the ration card holders
       through fair price shops”.
       19. It is clear from the different provisions of the 2013 Act that
                                                                                D
there is a paradigm shift in addressing the problem of food security from
the current welfare approach to a right based approach. The Act confers
legal right on the eligible beneficiaries to get the essential commodities
through fair price shops at a highly subsidized price. The Act also
envisages reforms necessary for distribution of essential commodities to
the ration card holders.                                                        E
       20. This Court in Swaraj Abhiyan v. Union of India & Ors.5
has held that the 2013 Act is a social welfare legislation and its provisions
are mandatory. It is held thus:
           “42. The provisions in the NFS Act mentioned above are
       mandatory and yet almost four years down the line they have not          F
       been fully implemented by some States.
                                      XXXXX
           44. These questions have been troubling us since this matter
       was listed on 24-10-2016 subsequent to our order dated 13-5-
       2016 in Swaraj Abhiyan (II) [Swaraj Abhiyan (2) v. Union of              G
       India, (2016) 7 SCC 498 : (2016) 7 SCC 534 : AIR 2016 SC
       2953] . We had expected the State Governments concerned to
       implement the provisions of the NFS Act with all due seriousness
       since it is a social welfare legislation enacted by Parliament.”
5
    (2018) 12 SCC 170                                                           H
1072                SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2022] 4 S.C.R.


 A           21. In the present case, upon scrutiny, it was found that declaration
       of vacancies vide notification dated 30.01.2014 was not in conformity
       with the 2013 Act and thus, cancellation of the said notification was
       necessary for the implementation of the provisions of the said Act. In
       view of above, the plea of legitimate expectation of the respondent is
       without having any basis.
 B
              22. We are also of the view that, in the instant case, no promise of
       any kind was made to continue the existing policy on the part of the
       State. Furthermore, Clause 4 of the Conditions of the Notification dated
       30.01.2014, calling for vacancies, provided that the State could reject
       applications without ascertaining any reasons. The agency which initiated
 C     the selection process is entitled to recall it upon reasonable grounds.
       Participation in the selection process or being a selected candidate does
       not vest such candidate with the right to direct the Authorities to give
       him appointment. Having regard to the above, it cannot be said that the
       State has acted with material irregularity in issuing the impugned
 D     notification dated 17.08.2015.
             23. This Court in Sarkari Sasta Anaj Vikreta Sangh v. State of
       M.P.6 has held that no person can claim a right to run a fair price shop as
       an agent of the government and he could only have a right to be considered
       for appointment. In this context, this Court observed as follows:
 E              “11. ……………… No one could claim a right to run a fair price
                shop as an agent of the Government. All that he could claim was
                a right to be considered to be appointment to run a fair price shop.
                If the Government took a policy decision to prefer cooperative
                societies for appointment as their agents to run fair price shops, in
 F              the light of the frustrating and unfortunate experience gathered in
                the last two decades, we do not see how we can possibly hold
                that there was any discrimination.”
              24. The appellant has contended that the State Government was
       reposed with a responsibility for implementing the 2013 Act which, inter
 G     alia, entrusted a responsibility to reform the existing Targeted Distribution
       System. The respondent in an unfinalized selection process has no vested
       right in his favour to seek continuation of the notified vacancies. Hence,
       by recalling the vacancy notification, the State endeavored to enforce
       the statute and that there can be no estoppel against a statute.
       6
 H         (1981) 4 SCC 471
THE STATE OF WEST BENGAL & ORS. v. GITASHREE DUTTA (DEY) 1073
                  [S. ABDUL NAZEER, J.]

      25. It is trite law that there can be no estoppel against a statute.    A
This Court has settled this principle in a catena of judgments, starting as
early as 1955. A Constitution Bench of this Court in Thakur Amar
Singhji v. State of Rajasthan7 held as follows:
       “….We are unable on these facts to see any basis for a plea of
       estoppel. The letter dated 28.11.1953 was not addressed to the         B
       petitioner; nor does it amount to any assurance or undertaking not
       to resume the jagir. And even if such assurance had been given, it
       would certainly not have been binding on the Government, because
       its powers of resumption are regulated by the statute, and must
       be exercised in accordance with its provisions. The Act confers
                                                                              C
       no authority on the Government to grant exemption from
       resumption, and an undertaking not to resume will be invalid, and
       there can be no estoppel against a statue”.
       26. A Constitution of Bench of this Court in Electronics Corpn.
of India Ltd. v. Secy. Revenue Deptt., Govt. of A.P.8 also upheld
                                                                              D
this principle and held as follows:
       “21. There are two short answers to this contention. In the first
       place, there can be no estoppel against a statute…….”
      27. This Court in A.P. Dairy Development Corpn. Federation
v. B Narasimha Reddy 9, has held that when the actions of the                 E
government are not in conformity with law, the doctrine of estoppel would
not apply. This Court observed:
       “40.….The State, being a continuing body can be stopped from
       changing its stand in a given case, but where after holding enquiry
       it came to the conclusion that action was not in conformity with       F
       law, the doctrine of estoppel would not apply.”
       28. It is clear that this Court in several judgments has also upheld
that the plea of promissory estoppel would stand negated when the
mandate of a statute is followed. This Court in A.P. Pollution Control
Board II v. Prof. M.V. Nayudu & ors.10, held as under:                        G


7
  (1955) 2 SCR 303
8
  (1999) 4 SCC 458
9
  (2011) 9 SCC 286
10
   (2001) 2 SCC 62                                                            H
1074            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2022] 4 S.C.R.


 A               “69. The learned Appellate Authority erred in thinking that
             because of the approval of plan by the Panchayat, or conversion
             of land use by the Collector or grant of letter of intent by the
             Central Government, a case for applying principle of “promissory
             estoppel” applied to the facts of this case. There could be no
             estoppel against the statute….”
 B
              29. In the instant case, we have already noticed that the appellants
       were reposed with a responsibility of implementing the mandate of the
       2013 Act, and more importantly, to bring about reforms in the existing
       Public Distribution System as stipulated under Section 12 of the said
       Act. The respondent herein being a mere applicant in an un-finalised
 C
       selection process, has no vested right in his favour to seek continuation
       of the notified vacancies, when by recalling the vacancy notification, the
       appellants endeavored to enforce the statute. Moreover, as discussed
       above, there can be no estoppel against a statute. Even going by the
       observations of the Division Bench in the impugned judgment, that the
 D     State was aware of the 2013 Act while issuing the 30.01.2014 vacancy
       notification, the said notification cannot be sustained, being contrary to
       the mandate of the National Food Security Act, 2013, more importantly
       of Section 12 thereof as held in A.P. Dairy Development Corpn.
       Federation (supra).
 E            30. There is also no merit in the contention of the respondent that
       the Authorities have taken into consideration the parameters laid down
       in 2013 Act while declaring the vacancies on 30.01.2014. There is nothing
       on record to suggest that when the vacancies were declared on
       30.01.2014, the Authorities kept in mind the provision of the 2013 Act.
       The 2013 Act came into effect on 10.09.2013. The vacancy notice is
 F
       dated 30.01.2014. The vacancy notice does not refer to the provisions
       of 2013 Act. In our view, it would be improper to infer that the provisions
       of 2013 Act were kept in mind while issuing vacancy notice dated
       30.01.2014. The respondent has not made out a case of arbitrariness or
       unreasonableness or mala fide. In our view, the Division Bench ought
 G     to have held that the notification dated 17.08.2015 was issued to keep
       the public distribution system in tune with the mandate of 2013 Act,
       more specifically Section 12 which provides for reform in the public
       distribution system.
             31. Resultantly, the appeal succeeds and it is accordingly allowed.
 H     The judgment of the Division Bench impugned herein is set aside and
THE STATE OF WEST BENGAL & ORS. v. GITASHREE DUTTA (DEY) 1075
                  [S. ABDUL NAZEER, J.]

the judgment of the learned Single Judge is restored. Parties are directed     A
to bear their respective costs.
      32. All pending applications also stand disposed of.


Divya Pandey                                                 Appeal allowed.   B




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