THE STATE OF RAJASTHAN & ORS.versusPHOOL SINGH

140                      [2022]REPORTS
               SUPREME COURT   11 S.C.R. 140               [2022] 11 S.C.R.


A                   THE STATE OF RAJASTHAN & ORS.
                                        v.
                                 PHOOL SINGH
                         (Civil Appeal No. 5930 of 2022)
B                            SEPTEMBER 02, 2022
        [S. RAVINDRA BHAT AND SUDHANSHU DHULIA, JJ.]
             Service Law – Penal Code, 1860 – s.392 – Arms Act – ss.3/25
      – Respondent-delinquent employee’s dismissal from service was
      quashed by High Court on the ground that he was acquitted by
C
      criminal court on the same set of facts and charges on which he
      faced departmental proceeding, directed reinstatement in service –
      Correctness of – Held: A departmental proceeding is different from
      a criminal proceeding – A delinquent employee after his dismissal
      from service, nevertheless, seeks reinstatement when he is acquitted
D     by a criminal court on the same set of charges and facts – Merely
      because a person has been acquitted in a criminal trial, he cannot
      be ipso facto reinstated in service when found guilty in a departmental
      proceeding – In the present case, High Court erred in interfering
      with the order of the Disciplinary Authority and placing reliance
      on Capt. M. Paul Anthony v. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd. & Anr. reported
E
      as [1999] 2 SCR 257 – It is the Disciplinary Authority which is best
      equipped to reach a finding whether a “misconduct” has been
      committed – The prime concern of a Judge should be whether such
      a finding has been arrived after following a fair procedure, the
      principles of natural justice and fairness – Further, Capt. M. Paul
F     Anthony case must be appreciated for its unique facts and it does
      not lay down a law of universal application – Also, in the instant
      case, the respondent was convicted by the Trial Court and in appeal
      the Appellate Court only acquitted him by giving him a benefit of
      doubt – Thus, the acquittal of the respondent was not an honourable
      acquittal, but an acquittal given due to benefit of doubt – Order of
G
      Single Judge and Division Bench of High Court set aside – Police
      Act – s. 34.
            Service Law – Departmental proceeding vis-à-vis criminal
      proceeding – Held: Both are different – The fundamental difference
      between the two is that whereas in a departmental proceeding a
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                                       140
    THE STATE OF RAJASTHAN & ORS. v. PHOOL SINGH                          141


delinquent employee can be held guilty on the basis of                    A
“preponderance of probabilities”, in a criminal court the prosecution
has to prove its case “beyond reasonable doubt” – Difference
between the two proceedings would lie in the nature of evidence
and the degree of its scrutiny – The two forums therefore run at
different levels.
                                                                          B
      Capt. M. Paul Anthony v. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd. &
      Anr. (1999) 3 SCC 679 : [1999] 2 SCR 257 –
      distinguished.
      Union of India v. Sitaram Mishra (2019) 20 SCC 588 :
      [2019] 9 SCR 585; Ajit Kumar Nag v. General Manager                 C
      (PJ), Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. (2005) 7 SCC 764 : [2005]
      3 Suppl. SCR 314; State of Rajasthan v. Heem Singh
      (2020) SCC OnLine SC 886 – relied on.
                       Case Law Reference
[1999] 2 SCR 257                 distinguished       Para 9               D
[2019] 9 SCR 585                 relied on           Para 11
[2005] 3 Suppl. SCR 314          relied on           Para 11
      CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 5930
of 2022.                                                                  E
      From the Judgment and Order dated 09.09.2020 of the High Court
of Judicature for Rajasthan at Jaipur in D.B. Special Appeal (Writ) No.
1274 of 2014.
      Vishal Meghwal, Milind Kumar, Advs. for the Appellants.
                                                                          F
      Vikas Verma, Ms. Sapna Verma, Shafik Ahmed, V. Elanchezhiyan,
Advs. for the Respondent.
      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
      SUDHANSHU DHULIA, J.
                                                                          G
      1. Leave granted. The State of Rajasthan is in appeal before this
Court against the order dated 09.09.2020, passed by a Division Bench
of Rajasthan High Court (Jaipur Bench). By the impugned order the
Division Bench has upheld the order of the learned Single Judge which
had allowed the writ petition of the present respondent, quashing his
dismissal from service.                                                   H
142            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2022] 11 S.C.R.


A             2. Respondent Phool Singh had entered Rajasthan Police Service
      as a constable, in the year 1987. The same year, while he was posted at
      the Police Station Mania, District Dholpur (Rajasthan), he allegedly
      committed a criminal offence, apart from an act of gross indiscipline.
      On the fateful day of 15.10.1987, he was wandering around the town in
      the evening, in company of one Lokman. Respondent was off duty but
B
      in police uniform, when he allegedly caught one Mahesh Kumar and
      demanded Rs.100/- from him. On his refusal, Mahesh Kumar was asked
      to show the papers of his motorcycle and when he failed to show these
      papers, Phool Singh took hold of this motorcycle, and then tried to run
      away with it. Meanwhile, due to the alarm raised by Mahesh Kumar a
C     crowd also gathers in support of Mahesh Kumar. At this point, Phool
      Singh is alleged to have waved a gun (“Pachpera”), towards the crowd
      but was nevertheless chased by the crowd, till Phool Singh succeeds in
      getting inside his house, which was nearby. Once inside his house, he
      fires from his gun which injures the inmates of the house, i.e., his family
      members, besides damaging the property. All this results in lodging of an
D
      FIR (No. 146/1987) against the respondent, at Police Station Mania,
      under Sections 392, 307 IPC and Section 34 of Police Act read with
      Section 3/25 of Arms Act. After investigation in the case a chargesheet
      was filed against Phool Singh and Lokman. Ultimately charges were
      framed under Section 392 IPC and Section 3/25 of the Arms Act by the
E     Trial Court. The Trial Court then convicts Phool Singh, under Section
      392 IPC and Section 3/25 Arms Act and sentences him for one-year
      rigorous imprisonment and fine for each of the above two offences, with
      default stipulations, vide order dated 31.03.1994. The co-accused Lokman
      is acquitted. This order was challenged by Phool Singh in appeal and the
      learned Sessions Judge, Dholpur, allows the appeal, and sets aside the
F
      order of the Trial Court, giving “benefit of doubt” to the accused.
            3. Meanwhile, a departmental proceeding had also been initiated
      against the delinquent constable on three charges, which are as follows:-
            “CHARGE NO. l :- In the year 1987 when on 15.10.87 you, Shri
G           Phool Singh Constable No.386 was deputed with Police Station
            Mania at that time while off duty as Guard time at around 3:00
            PM dressed in police uniform you had consumed alcohol and under
            the influence of alcohol being highly intoxicated continued to roam
            around in Kasba Mania and snatched away licensed Pachpcra
            (rifle) of Shivram Kachhi.
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    THE STATE OF RAJASTHAN & ORS. v. PHOOL SINGH                            143
               [SUDHANSHU DHULIA, J.]

      CHARGE NO.2:- On 15.10.87, you in a drunken state dressed             A
      in uniform alongwith Lokman Gurjar went to Bedia Kasba
      Mohalla where being off duty and without any authority you
      demanded for documents pertaining to Rajdoot Motorcycle from
      Mahesh Kumar S/o Shiv Hare Brahmin R/o Patpara Dholpur and
      also indecently abused and demanded for a bribe of Rs.100/- and
                                                                            B
      forcibly looted and took away Motorcycle bearing registration
      No.RJD 7722 from Mahesh Kumar and due to which a lot of
      people gathered and they chased behind you.
      CHARGE NO. 3:- On being chased by public you ran and
      reached your quarter in the compound of Police Station Mania
      and in a drunk state fired in your self-defence inside your house     C
      from the Pachpera snatched away by you from Shiv Ram but the
      gunshot hit the balcony in the chowk of the quarter and as a result
      broken pieces of balcony fell on your family members and due to
      which your family members got injured and the said incident led
      to the registration of FIR No.146 dated 15.10.87 against you u/s      D
      392, 307/34 of Police Act & 3/25 of Arms Act thereafter
      investigation was conducted.”
       In the departmental enquiry fourteen prosecution witnesses were
examined. Some of these witnesses supported the case of the prosecution,
others did not. Additionally, material exhibits were also examined such     E
as, the first information report, the memorandum of seizure of the
motorcycle and more importantly the Breath Alcohol Analysis Test of
respondent which was positive for alcohol consumption. The delinquent
constable had also examined nine defence witnesses.
       All the three charges were ultimately proved against the             F
respondent in the disciplinary proceedings and he was dismissed from
service, vide order dated 18.12.1989. This order of the disciplinary
authority was taken in appeal by respondent which was also dismissed
by the Appellate Authority on 23.08.1990. Then a review was also filed,
which was also dismissed on 03.06.1994. By the time the Reviewing
Authority had dismissed the review of the respondent (i.e., on              G
03.06.1994), the respondent who was also facing a criminal trial was
convicted by the Trial court, under Section 392 IPC and under Section 3/
25 of the Arms Act, on 31.03.1994, as already referred above. Later, as
we know, his conviction was set aside by the Sessions Court.
                                                                            H
144            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2022] 11 S.C.R.


A            4. Respondent Phool Singh after his acquittal moves an application
      before the authorities for his reinstatement. Since the authorities did not
      respond favourably, he filed a writ petition in the year 1998 before a
      learned Single Judge of Rajasthan High Court. The challenge of his
      dismissal from service though was made only after his acquittal in the
      criminal case, yet the challenge was on various other grounds as well,
B
      such as the order of termination not being passed by the appointing
      authority, non-supply of inquiry report, not being allowed to cross examine
      the witness, etc. All these grounds did not find favour with the learned
      Single Judge, except for the ground raised by the respondent that now
      since he has faced a criminal trial on the same set of charges, where he
C     was ultimately acquitted by the Sessions Court, his dismissal order is
      liable to be quashed and he should be reinstated in service. The learned
      Single Judge allowed his writ petition and his dismissal order was quashed
      and orders for his reinstatement were made with 50% back wages.
      State of Rajasthan filed an appeal against this order before Division
      Bench of the High Court which was dismissed on 09.09.2020. The State
D
      is now before this Court against the order of reinstatement passed by
      the Rajasthan High Court.
            5. We must reiterate that the High Court of Rajasthan, both in the
      writ petition and special appeal had allowed the case of respondent,
      Phool Singh only on the ground, that now since he has been acquitted by
E     a criminal court, on the same set of facts and charges on which he had
      faced a departmental proceeding, the orders passed in departmental
      proceedings are liable to be quashed and he must be reinstated in service.
      As we have already referred above, none of the other arguments raised
      on behalf of the private respondent challenging procedural anomalies in
F     the departmental proceedings, violation of principles of natural justice
      and fair play or lack of jurisdiction of the authority, had found favour
      with either the learned Single Judge or the Division Bench.
             6. The case of the State, who is the appellant before this Court is
      that the respondent was a member of a disciplined force. There were
G     extremely serious charges against the respondent in the departmental
      proceedings. He was charged of threatening and extorting money from
      a member of public, roaming in a public place under influence of liquor,
      and then using a fire arm and causing injuries, which were all very serious
      charges. Respondent was given full opportunity to defend his case in the
      departmental proceedings. He was given the opportunity to cross-
H
       THE STATE OF RAJASTHAN & ORS. v. PHOOL SINGH                          145
                  [SUDHANSHU DHULIA, J.]

examine the prosecution witnesses and in fact, he also presented nine        A
defence witnesses who were examined in the departmental proceedings.
The disciplinary authority concluded that the delinquent constable
(respondent) had committed an act of gross indiscipline and negligence,
as well as dereliction of duties and of misbehavior and misconduct, and
all this had tarnished the image of Rajasthan Police in public. Under the
                                                                             B
circumstances, the delinquent officer cannot be retained in Police service
and was thus dismissed from service with immediate effect. The State
would also argue that the acquittal by the criminal court is of no
consequence, as far as departmental proceedings are concerned.
       7. The question before this Court is therefore only to see whether
the respondent can be reinstated in service for the reason that now on       C
the same set of charges he has been acquitted by a criminal court?
       8. There should be no ambiguity in law on this subject. A
departmental proceeding is different from a criminal proceeding. The
fundamental difference between the two is that whereas in a
departmental proceeding a delinquent employee can be held guilty on          D
the basis of “preponderance of probabilities”, in a criminal court the
prosecution has to prove its case “beyond reasonable doubt”. In short,
the difference between the two proceedings would lie in the nature of
evidence and the degree of its scrutiny. The two forums therefore run at
different levels. For this reason, this Court has consistently held that     E
merely because a person has been acquitted in a criminal trial, he cannot
be ipso facto reinstated in service.
       9. Be that as it may, a delinquent employee after his dismissal
from service, nevertheless, seeks reinstatement when he is acquitted by
a criminal court on the same set of charges and facts. A very heavy          F
reliance is then placed on a decision of this Court given in Capt. M.
Paul Anthony v. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd. & Anr.1 Reliance was
placed on this decision by the present respondent as well, before the
learned Single Judge, as well as before the Division Bench of Rajasthan
High Court. Both the courts have relied on this judgment while giving
their decision in favour of the respondent. In Capt. M. Paul Anthony,        G
this Court had indeed held that as the petitioner before them had been
acquitted on the same set of charges by a criminal court, he should be
reinstated in service, though he was dismissed from service after facing

1
    (1999) 3 SCC 679
                                                                             H
146             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2022] 11 S.C.R.


A     a departmental proceeding. But then the case of Capt. M. Paul Anthony
      must be appreciated in the background of its unique facts.
             10. Capt. M. Paul Anthony was working in the year 1985 as a
      ‘Security Officer’ with ‘Bharat Gold Mines Ltd.’, which was engaged
      in the mining of gold in the Kolar Gold mines in Karnataka. On 02.06.1985
B     a raid was conducted by the Superintendent of Police at the residence
      of Capt. M. Paul Anthony (whom we should refer here also as the
      ‘petitioner’), from where a sponge gold ball weighing 4.5 grams and
      1276 grams of ‘gold bearing sand’ were recovered. He was immediately
      suspended from his services and the same day an F.I.R. was registered.
      The next day petitioner received a charge sheet and hence departmental
C     proceedings were also initiated against him. The petitioner then moved
      an application before his disciplinary authorities praying that the
      departmental proceedings be stayed till the conclusion of the criminal
      proceedings, but his request was turned down. Meanwhile he returned
      to his home State of Kerala and requested for an adjournment of the
D     disciplinary proceedings. This request was also turned down. The
      departmental proceedings went ex-parte against the petitioner where
      he was found guilty of misconduct. On 07.06.1986 petitioner was
      dismissed from service. During his entire period of suspension, he was
      not given any subsistence allowance.
E            On 03.02.1987 Capt. M. Paul Anthony was acquitted in the
      criminal trial, on the grounds that the prosecution had failed to establish
      its case, particularly the police raid on which the entire case was based.
      The petitioner, immediately after his acquittal, placed a copy of the
      judgment of the criminal court before his departmental authorities and
      prayed for his reinstatement. This was denied and consequently the
F     petitioner filed a departmental appeal which was also dismissed. He
      then approached the High Court of Karnataka, where his writ petition
      was allowed by the Court and his reinstatement was ordered on the
      ground that on the same set of charges, the petitioner has been acquitted
      by a criminal court and hence he must be reinstated in service. The
G     State filed a special appeal before the Division Bench which was allowed
      and the order of the learned Single Judge was set aside. The petitioner
      (Capt. M. Paul Anthony) then challenged the order of the Division Bench
      of the Karnataka High Court before this Court.
            There were two factors which weighed with the Supreme Court,
H     while deciding that case. The first was the admitted fact that the petitioner
       THE STATE OF RAJASTHAN & ORS. v. PHOOL SINGH                         147
                  [SUDHANSHU DHULIA, J.]

was not given any subsistence allowance during his period of suspension     A
and therefore, he was not in a position to face the departmental
proceedings in Karnataka while he was residing in Kerala. The second
aspect was that the petitioner was being charged on the same set of
facts in the two proceedings and therefore, he had made request to the
departmental authorities to stay the departmental proceedings till the
                                                                            B
conclusion of the criminal case, a request which was denied. This aspect
seems to be the most important factor weighing in the mind of this Court,
as this Court was of the opinion that the charges, (both in the criminal
court and with the department), involved a complicated question of fact
and law, relating to the “raid” made by the police, and therefore the
departmental proceedings should have been stayed and it should have         C
awaited the result of the criminal proceedings. It was in the raid made
by the Police that the ‘Gold sponge ball’ and ‘Gold bearing sand’ were
allegedly recovered from his residence. This factum of “raid and
recovery” which was the fulcrum of the case, stood disproved. Under
these circumstances, it was held that the petitioner was liable to be
                                                                            D
reinstated. Capt. M. Paul Anthony thus must be appreciated for its
unique facts and to our mind it does not lay down a law of universal
application.
       11. We say this because as against Capt. M. Paul Anthony, we
have a large number of cases where this Court has consistently held
that the two proceedings, i.e., criminal and departmental, are entirely     E
different and merely because one has been acquitted in a criminal trial
that itself will not result in the reinstatement in service when one has
been found guilty in a departmental proceeding. We may refer to a few
of these decisions.
       In the case of Union of India v. Sitaram Mishra2, a constable        F
in Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) was charged for being negligent
and careless and therefore, was removed from service. The facts of the
case were that the constable while removing the magazine of his 9mm
carbine gun, accidently fired eight rounds which resulted in the death of
one constable who was at the relevant time in the same barrack. The         G
constable was held guilty of misconduct in the disciplinary proceedings
and was dismissed from service. Meanwhile the constable was also
tried for the offence under Section 304 of IPC in a criminal trial where
he was acquitted. He thereafter filed a writ petition before the High
2
    (2019) 20 SCC 588                                                       H
148             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2022] 11 S.C.R.


A     Court challenging his dismissal from service. The writ petition was
      dismissed but later on an appeal before a Division Bench, the order of
      the learned Single Judge was set aside and it was ordered that since the
      constable by that time had been acquitted in the criminal court, he is
      liable to be reinstated in service and since by that time he had retired
      from service, he was to be treated in service with directions that he be
B
      given back wages and pension. This Court while deciding the appeal
      filed by the Union of India came to the conclusion that the grounds
      which weighed with the High Court were specious, and merely because
      the employee was acquitted by the criminal court it does not mean, ipso-
      facto that he is entitled to be reinstated in service, since he was dismissed
C     from service after facing a disciplinary proceeding. The reason being
      that the disciplinary proceedings are governed by a different standard of
      proof, which are different from what is applied in a criminal proceeding.
      Whereas, in a criminal trial the burden lies on the prosecution to establish
      the charge beyond reasonable doubt and in a departmental proceeding,
      the charges have to be proved on the basis of preponderance of
D
      probabilities.
               In the above case a distinction has also been drawn by this Court
      between a “criminal offence” and “misconduct”. One has to be proved
      in a criminal court, the other in a departmental proceeding, and though
      both may arise from the same set of facts, yet there is a clear distinction
E     between the two and merely because one has been acquitted in a criminal
      trial, it would not amount to a reversal of the findings of “misconduct”,
      which were arrived in a departmental proceeding. This Court also observed
      that the High Court fell into an error in doing exactly this, which was
      done by drawing an ‘erroneous inference’ from the decision of this Court
F     given in Capt. M. Paul Anthony. We must therefore, reproduce here
      the two paragraphs from the judgment of this Court in Sitaram Mishra
      (supra) :-
            “14. The fact that the first respondent was acquitted in the course
            of the criminal trial cannot operate ipso facto as a ground for
G           vitiating the finding of misconduct which has been arrived at during
            the course of the disciplinary proceedings. The High Court, in our
            view, has drawn an erroneous inference from the decision of this
            Court in M. Paul Anthony v. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd. [M. Paul
            Anthony v. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd., (1999) 3 SCC 679 : 1999
            SCC (L&S) 810]. The High Court adverted to the following
H
       THE STATE OF RAJASTHAN & ORS. v. PHOOL SINGH                              149
                  [SUDHANSHU DHULIA, J.]

         principle of law laid down in the above judgment: (SCC p. 687,          A
         para 13)
             “13….While in the departmental proceedings the standard of
             proof is one of preponderance of the probabilities, in a criminal
             case, the charge has to be proved by the prosecution beyond
             reasonable doubt. The little exception may be where the             B
             departmental proceedings and the criminal case are based on
             the same set of facts and the evidence in both the proceedings
             is common without there being a variance.”
         15. It is undoubtedly correct that the charge in the criminal trial
         arose from the death of a co-employee in the course of the incident     C
         resulting from the firing of a bullet which took place from the
         weapon which was assigned to the first respondent as a member
         of the Force. But the charge of misconduct is on the ground of
         the negligence of the first respondent in handling his weapon and
         his failure to comply with the departmental instructions in regard
         to the manner in which the weapon should be handled.                    D
         Consequently, the acquittal in the criminal case was not a ground
         for setting aside the penalty which was imposed in the course of
         the disciplinary enquiry. Hence, having regard to the parameters
         that govern the exercise of judicial review in disciplinary matters,
         we are of the view that the judgment [Sitaram Mishra v. Union           E
         of India, 2007 SCC OnLine Cal 718 : (2008) 1 Cal LJ 863] of the
         Division Bench of the High Court is unsustainable.”
      A three Judge Bench of this Court in Ajit Kumar Nag v. General
Manager (PJ), Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd.3 held the position of law, was
explained as follows :-                                                          F
         “11….. In our judgment, the law is fairly well settled. Acquittal by
         a criminal court would not debar an employer from exercising
         power in accordance with Rules and Regulations in force. The
         two proceedings criminal and departmental - are entirely different.
         They operate in different fields and have different objectives.         G
         Whereas the object of criminal trial is to inflict appropriate
         punishment on offender, the purpose of enquiry proceedings is to
         deal with the delinquent departmentally and to impose penalty in
         accordance with service Rules. In a criminal trial, incriminating
3
    (2005) 7 SCC 764                                                             H
150               SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2022] 11 S.C.R.


A              statement made by the accused in certain circumstances or before
               certain officers is totally inadmissible in evidence. Such strict rules
               of evidence and procedure would not apply to departmental
               proceedings. The degree of proof which is necessary to order a
               conviction is different from the degree of proof necessary to record
               the commission of delinquency. The rule relating to appreciation
B
               of evidence in the two proceedings is also not similar. In criminal
               law, burden of proof is on the prosecution and unless the
               prosecution is able to prove the guilt of the accused ‘beyond
               reasonable doubt’, he cannot be convicted by a court of law. In
               departmental enquiry, on the other hand, penalty can be imposed
C              on the delinquent officer on a finding recorded on the basis of
               ‘preponderance of probability’…..”
             12. Thus, in the present case, the learned Single Judge as well as
      the Division Bench of Rajasthan High Court were clearly wrong in
      interfering with the order of the Disciplinary Authority of the Rajasthan
D     Police and placing their reliance on Capt. M. Paul Anthony. It is the
      Disciplinary Authority which is best equipped to reach a finding whether
      a “misconduct” has been committed. The prime concern of a Judge
      should be whether such a finding has been arrived after following a fair
      procedure, following the principles of natural justice and fairness. This
      aspect has been underlined in a recent judgment of this Court (State of
E     Rajasthan v. Heem Singh4). The relevant para is reproduced as
      hereunder:-
               “39. In exercising judicial review in disciplinary matters, there are
               two ends of the spectrum. The first embodies a rule of restraint.
               The second defines when interference is permissible. The rule of
F              restraint constricts the ambit of judicial review. This is for a valid
               reason. The determination of whether a misconduct has been
               committed lies primarily within the domain of the disciplinary
               authority. The judge does not assume the mantle of the disciplinary
               authority. Nor does the judge wear the hat of an employer.
G              Deference to a finding of fact by the disciplinary authority is a
               recognition of the idea that it is the employer who is responsible
               for the efficient conduct of their service. Disciplinary enquiries
               have to abide by the rules of natural justice. But they are not
               governed by strict rules of evidence which apply to judicial
      4
H         (2020) SCC OnLine SC 886
    THE STATE OF RAJASTHAN & ORS. v. PHOOL SINGH                               151
               [SUDHANSHU DHULIA, J.]

      proceedings. The standard of proof is hence not the strict standard      A
      which governs a criminal trial, of proof beyond reasonable doubt,
      but a civil standard governed by a preponderance of probabilities.
      Within the rule of preponderance, there are varying approaches
      based on context and subject. The first end of the spectrum is
      founded on deference and autonomy – deference to the position
                                                                               B
      of the disciplinary authority as a fact finding authority and
      autonomy of the employer in maintaining discipline and efficiency
      of the service. At the other end of the spectrum is the principle
      that the court has the jurisdiction to interfere when the findings in
      the enquiry are based on no evidence or when they suffer from
      perversity. A failure to consider vital evidence is an incident of       C
      what the law regards as a perverse determination of fact.
      Proportionality is an entrenched feature of our jurisprudence.
      Service jurisprudence has recognized it for long years in allowing
      for the authority of the court to interfere when the finding or the
      penalty are disproportionate to the weight of the evidence or
                                                                               D
      misconduct. Judicial craft lies in maintaining a steady sail between
      the banks of these two shores which have been termed as the
      two ends of the spectrum. Judges do not rest with a mere recitation
      of the hands-off mantra when they exercise judicial review. To
      determine whether the finding in a disciplinary enquiry is based
      on some evidence an initial or threshold level of scrutiny is            E
      undertaken. That is to satisfy the conscience of the court that
      there is some evidence to support the charge of misconduct and
      to guard against perversity. But this does not allow the court to
      re-appreciate evidentiary findings in a disciplinary enquiry or to
      substitute a view which appears to the judge to be more
                                                                               F
      appropriate. To do so would offend the first principle which has
      been outlined above. The ultimate guide is the exercise of robust
      common sense without which the judges’ craft is in vain.”
      It is true that this Court, apart from the case of Capt. M. Paul
Anthony, has in a few cases not interfered with the reinstatement of an
employee who was dismissed as a result of disciplinary proceedings,            G
and was only reinstated in service because of his acquittal in criminal
proceedings, but again the reasons which weighed with the Court in
such cases were that in almost in all such cases, the acquittal was an
honourable acquittal and not an acquittal on a technicality, or on acquittal
given because of “benefit of doubt”.                                           H
152              SUPREME COURT REPORTS                        [2022] 11 S.C.R.


A           13. In the case at hand, respondent was convicted by the Trial
      Court and in appeal the Appellate Court only acquitted him by giving him
      a “benefit of doubt”. The operative part of order dated 26.11.1994 of the
      Appellate Authority reads as under: -
             “Hence, on the basis of aforesaid analysis the present appeal on
B            behalf of the appellant accused against the respondent/ prosecution
             is allowed and the judgment and sentence dated 21.3.94 passed
             by the Subordinate Court of Munsif & Judicial Magistrate Dholpur
             is hereby quashed and the above appellant/accused Phool Singh
             is acquitted for the charge u/s 392 IPC & u/s 3/25 of Arms Act by
             giving benefit of doubt.”
C
              14. Therefore, in the present case the acquittal of the respondent
      is not an honourable acquittal, but an acquittal given due to a “benefit of
      doubt”. Under these circumstances and in view of the position of law as
      stated above, this appeal is allowed and the order dated 29.01.2014 of
      the learned Single Judge and the order dated 09.09.2020 of the Division
D     Bench of Rajasthan High Court, Jaipur Bench are hereby set aside.

      Divya Pandey                                                 Appeal allowed.
      (Assisted by : Roopanshi Virang, LCRA)


E




F




G




H