THE SREE NARAYANA DHARMASANGHOM TRUSTversusSWAMI PRAKASANANDA AND ORS.

        THE SREE NARAYANA DHARMASANGHOM TRUST                                       A
                                        v.
                  SWAMI PRAKASANANDA AND ORS.

                                APRIL 9, 1997

              [K. RAMASWAMY AND D.P. WADHWA, JJ.]                                   B

        Constitution of India, 1950 :

      Art. 136-Special Leave Petition-Dismissal of in limine--Operates as
q_Jinal order between the paities and any order passed by the High Court or         C
Tlibunal subsequent.ly operates as res judicata as far as the p01ties thereto are
co11cemed.

     State of Maharashtra v. Prabhakar Bhimaji Ingle, [1996] 3 SCC 463
and Yogendra Narayan Choudhary v. Union of India, [1996] 7 SCC 1, relied
on.                                                                                 D

      A1ticles 32, 226-Dismissal of writ petition in limine u11der A11. 32 does
11ot operate as res judicata-Jurisdictio11 of High Cowt under Art. 226 not
precluded.

        Indian Oil C01pn. Ltd. v. State of Bihar, [1986] 3 SCR, relied on.          E

        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 3013 of
1997.

     From the Judgment and Order dated 16.1.96 of tho.: Kerala High
Court in R.P. No. 204/95 in C.R.P. No. 2727 of 1994.
                                                                                    F

        P.S. Pot~ E.M.S. Anam and Fazlin Anam for the Appellant.

     A.S. Nambiar, C.S. Ananthalingam, S. Balakrishnan, S. Prasad for
Mrs. S. Revathy for the Respondents.                                                G

        The following Order of the Court was delivered :

      Leave granted. This appeal, by special leave, arises from the judg-
ment of the Kerala High Court, made on January 16, 1996 in R.P. No.
204/95 in C.R.P. No. 2724/94.                                                       H
                                  799
    800                  SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [1997] 3 S.C.R.

A         The dispute has arisen with regard to the election to the Committee
    of Sree Narayana Dharmasanghom Trust. The Trust is governed by the
    scheme framed by the High Court in A.S. No. 14/56, dated March 26, 1959.
    Since the term of the elected body was to expire on 10.8.94, the Trust
    Board on 4.7.94 decided to conduct election on 26.7.94. Disputes had
    arisen as to the validity of the elections held on 26.7.94 and the suit came
B   to be filed. Ad- interim injunction was granted by the learned Sub-ordinate
    Judge, Attingal in O.S. No. 247/94 on 22.11.94. Against the interlocutory
    order passed by the appellate authority in C.M.A. No. 167/94, dated
    December 2, 1994 C.R.P. No. 2727/94 came to be filed. The High Court
    by judgment dated June 19, 1995 allowed the revision, set aside the order
C   of the appellate authority and gave certain directions. Calling that matter
    in question S.L.P. (C) No. 13667/95 came to be filed in this Court. This
    Court on June 29, 1995 passed the following order :

             "We <lo nol find any ground warranting interference since it is an
             individual case and that too by an interim order. The S.L.P. is
D
             dismissed. However, the trial Court is directed to dispose of the
             suit as expeditiously as possible preferably within a period of six
             months from the date of receipt of this order.'"

          Thereafter, an application came to be filed to review the order
E passed by the High Court in the revision, which had been dismissed by the
    High Court holding that the order passed by the High Court stood merged
    with the order of this Court. As a consequence, the High Court cannot
    review the order. Thus this appeal, by special leave.

F         Shri P.S. Poti, learned senior counsel for the appellant contends that
  ·this Court did not decide the matter on merits. When the patent error is
   apparent on the face of the record, it is always reviewable by the High
   Court and, therefore, the order dismissing the S.L.P. does not operate as
   a final order. Therefore, the High Court has the power to review its order.
   We find no merit in the contention. In State of Maharashtra v. Prabhakar
G Bhimaji Ingle, [1996] 3 sec 463 this Court has considered the similar
   controversy. The facts therein were that the Maharashtra Administrative
   Tribunal passed an order in O.A. No. 1169/93 against which S.L.P. was
   filed in this Court. It was dismissed by this Court on August 28, 1993~
   Pending the S.L.P ., a review petition was filed in the Tribunal. The
H Tribunal reviewed its order. When that order came to be challenged, this
      DHARMASANGHOM TRUSTv. SWAMI PRAKASANANDA                             801

Court held thus :                                                                 A
        "4. But in this case, when the self-same main order was confirmed
        by this Court, the question arises whether the Tribunal has had
        power under Order 47, Rule 1 CPC or any other appropriate
        provision under the Tribunals Act to review the orders passed by
        it and confirmed by this Court by refusing to grant leave. We find        B
        that the exercise of the review power is deleterious to the judicial
        discipline. Once this Court has confirmed the order passed by the
        Tribunal, that becomes final. Therefore, the Tribunal cannot have
        any power to review the previous order which stands merged with
        the order passed by this Court.                                           C

        5. It is next contended by the learned counsel for the respondent
        that though the Tribunal was communicated with the order of this
        Court dated 25.8.1995, it has thereafter passed the order. It would
        mean that though it had the knowledge of dismissal of the order
        passed by this Court, the Tribunal has exercised the power of             D
        review and that, therefore, it cannot be said to be illegal. We are
        wholly unable to appreciate the contention of the learned counsel.
        We could appreciate that if the Tribunal had no knowledge of
        dismissal of the SLP it might, in certain circumstances, review its
        earlier order, e.g., if it was found that the crder was vitiated by       E
        any manifest error of law apparent on the face of the record. But
        having received the communication that this Court has already
        upheld its order, the Tribunal's exercise of power can be said to
        be audacious and without any judicial discipline. Under those
        circumstances, we do not think that the Tribunal is justified in
        reviewing its own order when this Court had confirmed the order           F
        passed earlier."

       Therefore, once this Court has passed an order, the order passed by
the High Court stands merged with the order passed by this Court. There-
after, the High Courtffribunal is devoid of the jurisdiction to review the        G
order. This question also was reiterated in Yogendra Narayan Choudhary
v. Union of India., [1996] 7 SCC 1, thus:

        "It is settled law that even the dismissal of special leave petition in
        limine without assigning reasons does not operate as res judicata.
        Under these circumstances, we are of the view that the view of the        H
    802                    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    (1997] 3 S.C.R.

A            latter Bench of the CAT, Calcutta and of the Cuttack Bench are
             clearly consistent with the above reasoning. Therefore, we do not
             find that there are fit cases warranting interferences."

            Thus, it is settled law that even the dismissal of special leave petition
    i11 liminc operates as a final order between the parties and any order passed
B   by the High Court ur Tribunal subsequently operates as a res judicata as
    far as the parties tkreto are concerned. It is true that in Indian Oil C01p11.
    Ltd. v. State of Bihm; [1986] 3 SCR at 558, this Court had pointed out that
    when the writ petition was dismissed by thi:- Court in limine, the jurisdiction
     of the High Court under Article 226 is not precluded. The dismissal of the
C   writ petition under Article 32 does not operate as res judicata. That
    principle is entirely different from the review of an order under Order 47
     Rule l. Under these circumstances, we are of thc view that the High Court
     is well justified in refusing to review the order passed in the revision.
     However, since the records have heen calkd by the High Court and the
     matter is pending, the trial Court could not di;po>c of the matter within
D    the time limit, specified earlier, by this Court. Therefore, we cannot find
     fault with the trial Court for non-disposal of the matter. However, the civil
     court is directed to dispose of the suit as indicated earlier within six months
     from now.

           The appeal is accordingly dismissed. No costs.
E
    G.N.                                                         Appeal dismissed.