Holding

The Supreme Court held that the serious charges proved amounted to gross misconduct, the High Court was not justified in setting aside the dismissal, and the order of dismissal from service stands.

Summary

Sri M. Narasimha Prasad, a Civil Judge (Junior Division) of Karnataka, was suspended on allegations of gross misconduct and subjected to departmental inquiries. The Full Court of the Karnataka High Court, after finding several serious charges proved—particularly pronouncing the operative portion of judgments without the full text ready and conducting an auction of seized properties—imposed dismissal from service, which was confirmed by the Governor. The judge challenged the dismissal through writ petitions, which were dismissed, but a Division Bench of the High Court later set aside the penalty and ordered that no further inquiry could be conducted against him. The Registrar General of the High Court appealed to the Supreme Court, contending that the High Court erred in overturning the dismissal and in creating a new rule barring further inquiry. The Supreme Court held that the proven serious charges amounted to gross misconduct justifying dismissal, that the High Court had not applied the correct parameters of natural justice, procedural fairness, and proportionality, and therefore set aside the High Court's order and upheld the dismissal. The appeal was allowed and the respondent's writ petitions were dismissed.

Issues considered

Whether the charges of pronouncing operative portions of judgments without the full text constitute gross misconduct warranting dismissal.
Whether the High Court was justified in setting aside the dismissal and directing that no further departmental inquiry be conducted.
Whether the procedural requirements, including issuance of a second show‑cause notice and observance of natural justice, were complied with.
Whether the penalty of dismissal was proportionate to the misconduct.

Legislation cited

Constitution (42nd Amendment) Act, 1976
Constitution of Indias. Article 311

Subjects

service lawdisciplinary proceedingsjudicial misconductdismissal from servicenatural justicesecond show cause noticegross misconductappellate jurisdiction

Judgment

[2023] 4 S.C.R. 51 51

THE REGISTRAR GENERAL, HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA A
AND ANR.
v.
SRI M. NARASIMHA PRASAD
(Civil Appeal Nos. 2519-2522 of 2019) B
APRIL 10, 2023
[V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN AND PANKAJ MITHAL, JJ.]
Service Law – Respondent was appointed as a Civil Judge
(Junior Division) – Respondent was suspended from service on
C
allegations of gross misconduct, followed by the initiation of
disciplinary proceedings – As per the enquiry reports, some charges
stood proved and the other charges were not proved – Full Court of
the High Court resolved to impose the penalty of dismissal from
service upon the respondent – Based on the resolution, respondent
was dismissed from service – Respondent challenged the findings D
of the enquiry officer and the order of dismissal from service by
filing writ petitions before the High Court – High Court dismissed
the same – The respondent filed intra-court appeals against the
same – Division Bench of the High Court set aside the order of
penalty and the findings of the enquiry officer and also directed
E
that no further inquiry can be held against the respondent – On
appeal, held: Some of the charges against the respondent were very
serious in nature, such as pronouncing the operative portion of the
judgment in open court without the whole text of the judgment being
ready, and similarly the conduct of auction sale of properties seized
during the investigation – Judicial Officer pronouncing the F
concluding portion of his judgment in open court without the entire
text of the judgment being prepared/dictated would amount to gross
misconduct – Such conduct is completely unacceptable and
unbecoming of a judicial officer – High Court was not justified in
setting aside the penalty and in ordering that there shall be no
G
further enquiry against the Respondent – Judgment of High Court
set aside.
Allowing the appeals, the Court
HELD: 1. Once those charges which revolve around the
manner of disposal of certain cases are ignored, what remains H
51
52 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 4 S.C.R.

A are certain serious charges that revolve around pronouncement
of operative portion of the judgment in open court without the
whole text of the judgment being ready. Take for instance, Charge
Nos. 1, 2, 4 and 5 in DI No.3/2005. These Charges are very serious
in nature, where the respondent is alleged to have pronounced
B the operative portion of the judgment in open court without the
whole of the judgment being ready. Similarly Charge No.1 in DI
No.5/2005 related to the conduct of auction sale of properties,
seized during the investigation. These are very serious in nature
and the reply given by the respondent to these charges is wishy
washy. [Para 12][59-D-E]
C
2. A judicial officer cannot pronounce the concluding portion
of his judgment in open court without the entire text of the
judgment being prepared/dictated. All that the respondent has
done in the departmental enquiry is just to pass on the
responsibility to the inefficient and allegedly novice stenographer.
D This Court does not know how the findings with regard to such
serious charges have been completely white-washed by the High
Court in the impugned judgment. A look at the impugned judgment
of the High Court shows that the Division Bench of the High
Court was swayed away unduly by the animosity attributed by the
E respondent to a member of the local Bar and the Assistant Public
Prosecutor. If it is assumed for a minute that the charges were
on the basis of complaints initiated by persons bearing ill-will
and motive against the respondent. Even then, such ill-will and
motive may not make the conduct of the respondent in not
F preparing judgments but pronouncing the outcome of the case, a
condonable conduct. It is true that some of the charges revolve
around judicial pronouncements and the judicial decision-making
processes and that they cannot per se, without anything more,
form the foundation for departmental proceedings. Therefore,
this Court is ignoring those charges. But the charges which
G revolve around gross negligence and callousness on the part of
the respondent in not preparing/dictating judgments, but
providing a fait accompli, is completely unacceptable and
unbecoming of a judicial officer. [Paras 13, 14, 15][59-F-H; 60-A-
B]
H
THE REGISTRAR GENERAL, HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA v. 53
SRI M. NARASIMHA PRASAD

3. The defence taken by the respondent that the lack of A
experience and the inefficiency on the part of the stenographer
has to be blamed, for the whole text of the judgment not getting
ready even after several days of pronouncement of the result in
open court, was entirely unacceptable. But unfortunately, the High
Court not only accepted this panchatantra story, but also went to
B
the extent of blaming the administration for not examining the
stenographer as a witness. Such an approach is wholly
unsustainable. If it was the case of the respondent that the entire
blame lay upon the stenographer, it was for him to have summoned
the stenographer as a witness. The High Court unfortunately
reversed the burden of proof. [Para 16][60-C-D] C
Himachal Pradesh State Electricity Board Limited vs.
Mahesh Dahiya (2017) 1 SCC 768 : [2016] 9 SCR
879; Union of India vs. Tulsiram Patel (1985) 3 SCC
398 : [1985] 2 Suppl. SCR 131; Union of India and
Ors. vs. E. Bashyan (1988) 2 SCC 196 : [1988] 3 SCR D
209; Union of India and Ors. vs. Mohd. Ramzan Khan
(1991) 1 SCC 588 : [1990] 3 Suppl. SCR 248; The
Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad and Ors. vs. B.
Karunakar and Ors. (1993) 4 SCC 727 : [1993] 2 Suppl.
SCR 576 – referred to.
E
Case Law Reference
[2016] 9 SCR 879 referred to Para 20
[1985] 2 Suppl. SCR 131 referred to Para 21
[1988] 3 SCR 209 referred to Para 21 F
[1990] 3 Suppl. SCR 248 referred to Para 21
[1993] 2 Suppl. SCR 576 referred to Para 21
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 2519-
2522 of 2023.
G
From the Judgment and Order dated 02.08.2019 of the High Court
of Karnataka at Bengaluru in WA Nos. 14, 1040, 1041 and 1042 of
2012.

H
54 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 4 S.C.R.

A Basava Prabhu S Patil, Sr. Adv., V. N. Raghupathy, Geet Ahuja,
Manendra Pal Gupta, Advs. for the Appellants.
Ms. Anitha Shenoy, Sr. Adv., Narendra Kumar, Ms. T S Shanthi,
Sanjeev Kumar, Advs. for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
B
V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, J.
Leave granted.
2. Challenging a common order passed by the Division Bench of
the High Court of Karnataka, setting aside a penalty of dismissal from
C service imposed upon the respondent herein, who happened to be a Civil
Judge (Junior Division), the Registrar General of the High Court of
Karnataka has come up with the above appeals.
3. We have heard Mr. Basava Prabhu S. Patil, learned senior
counsel appearing the appellant-High Court and Ms. Anitha Shenoy,
D learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent.
4. The respondent was appointed as a Civil Judge (Junior Division)
vide a notification dated 31.01.1995.
5. On certain allegations of gross misconduct, the respondent was
placed under suspension by an order dated 25.01.2005, followed by the
E initiation of disciplinary proceedings, with the issue of Charge Memos
dated 23.03.2005 in DI No.2/2005; DI No.3/2005; DI No.4/2005 and DI
No.5/2005.
6. Separate enquiries followed in connection with all the four
Charge Memos namely DI Nos. 2,3,4,5 of 2005, after the culmination of
F which, separate reports were submitted by the enquiry officer on
29.03.2007 and 27.04.2007. As per the enquiry reports, some charges
stood proved and the other charges were not proved.
7. Therefore, second show cause notices were issued and
thereafter the Full Court of the High Court of Karnataka resolved on
G 04.10.2008 to impose the penalty of dismissal from service upon the
respondent. Based on the resolution of the Full Court, an order of dismissal
from service was passed by the Governor of Karnataka, vide order
dated 19.03.2009.
8. Challenging the findings of the enquiry officer, the respondent
H filed a set of three writ petitions and challenging the order of dismissal
THE REGISTRAR GENERAL, HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA v. 55
SRI M. NARASIMHA PRASAD [V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, J.]

from service, the respondent filed a separate writ petition. All these writ A
petitions were dismissed by a learned Judge, through a common order
dated 30.11.2011.
9. Aggrieved by the same, the respondent filed intra-court appeals.
Those appeals were allowed by the Division Bench of the High Court
by a very strange order, not only setting aside the order of penalty and B
the findings of the enquiry officer but also directing that no further inquiry
can be held against the respondent. It is against such a common order
passed in a batch of four intra-court appeals that the Registrar General
of the High Court has come up with these civil appeals.
10. Before we proceed to consider the correctness of the view C
taken by the High Court, in the light of the rival contentions, it will be
useful to extract in a tabular column the charges framed against the
respondent under each of the Charge Memos; his reply to each of the
charges and the findings of the enquiry officer in respect of those charges.
Charges against the Judicial Officer D

E

F

G

H
56 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 4 S.C.R.

A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H
THE REGISTRAR GENERAL, HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA v. 57
SRI M. NARASIMHA PRASAD [V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, J.]

A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H
58 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 4 S.C.R.

A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H
THE REGISTRAR GENERAL, HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA v. 59
SRI M. NARASIMHA PRASAD [V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, J.]

A

B

11. It is seen that among the charges held proved, some related to
the judicial orders passed by the respondent. Therefore, we are prepared
straightaway, to ignore those charges and see whether the order of penalty C
of dismissal from service was justified qua the other charges and whether
the Division Bench of the High Court was right in setting aside the same.
12. Once those charges which revolve around the manner of
disposal of certain cases are ignored, what remains are certain serious
charges that revolve around pronouncement of operative portion of the D
judgment in open court without the whole text of the judgment being
ready. Take for instance, Charge Nos. 1, 2, 4 and 5 in DI No.3/2005.
These Charges are very serious in nature, where the respondent is alleged
to have pronounced the operative portion of the judgment in open court
without the whole of the judgment being ready. Similarly Charge No.1 in E
DI No.5/2005 related to the conduct of auction sale of properties, seized
during the investigation. These are very serious in nature and the reply
given by the respondent to these charges is wishy washy.
13. A judicial officer cannot pronounce the concluding portion of
his judgment in open court without the entire text of the judgment being F
prepared/dictated. All that the respondent has done in the departmental
enquiry is just to pass on the responsibility to the inefficient and allegedly
novice stenographer. We do not know how the findings with regard to
such serious charges have been completely white-washed by the High
Court in the impugned judgment.
G
14. A look at the impugned judgment of the High Court shows
that the Division Bench of the High Court was swayed away unduly by
the animosity attributed by the respondent to a member of the local Bar
and the Assistant Public Prosecutor. Let us assume for a minute that the
charges were on the basis of complaints initiated by persons bearing ill-
will and motive against the respondent. Even then, such ill-will and motive H
60 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 4 S.C.R.

A may not make the conduct of the respondent in not preparing judgments
but pronouncing the outcome of the case, a condonable conduct.
15. It is true that some of the charges revolve around judicial
pronouncements and the judicial decision-making processes and that they
cannot per se, without anything more, form the foundation for
B departmental proceedings. Therefore, we are ignoring those charges.
But the charges which revolve around gross negligence and callousness
on the part of the respondent in not preparing/dictating judgments, but
providing a fait accompli, is completely unacceptable and unbecoming
of a judicial officer.

C 16. The defence taken by the respondent that the lack of experience
and the inefficiency on the part of the stenographer has to be blamed,
for the whole text of the judgment not getting ready even after several
days of pronouncement of the result in open court, was entirely
unacceptable. But unfortunately, the High Court not only accepted this
panchatantra story, but also went to the extent of blaming the
D administration for not examining the stenographer as a witness. Such an
approach is wholly unsustainable. If it was the case of the respondent
that the entire blame lay upon the stenographer, it was for him to have
summoned the stenographer as a witness. The High Court unfortunately
reversed the burden of proof.
E 17. While considering a challenge to an order of penalty imposed
upon a judicial officer pursuant to the disciplinary proceedings followed
by a resolution of the Full Court of the High Court, the Court is obliged
only to go by established parameters namely, (i) whether the charges
stood proved; (ii) whether the findings of the inquiry officer are reasonable
and probable and not perverse; (iii) whether the rules of procedure and
F the principles of natural justice have been followed; and (iv) whether
the penalty is completely disproportionate, especially in the light of the
gravity of the misconduct, his past record of service and any other
extenuating circumstances.
18. Unfortunately, the High Court did not test the correctness of
G the order of penalty in this case, on the above parameters. Instead, the
High Court has recorded a finding in Paragraph 26 of the impugned
order, as though the learned judges had first hand information about the
problems that the judicial officers faced at the lower level. The opinion
of the High Court in Paragraph 26 of the impugned order that the acts of
H omission and commission attributed to the respondent do not constitute
THE REGISTRAR GENERAL, HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA v. 61
SRI M. NARASIMHA PRASAD [V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, J.]

grave misconduct, is very-very curious. Adding fuel to fire, the High A
Court has recorded in Paragraph 36 of the impugned order that
“dismissing him from service itself is very atrocious”. Such a finding
is nothing but a veiled attack on the Full Court of the High Court. After
holding so, the High Court has gone to the extent of certifying the
respondent as an innocent and honest officer. We do not know wherefrom
B
the High Court came to such a conclusion.
19. One more reason articulated in the impugned order of the
High Court is that the second show cause notice indicated the penalty
proposed and that therefore, the same was contrary to law. In this regard
the High Court placed reliance upon the decision of this Court in
Himachal Pradesh State Electricity Board Limited vs. Mahesh C
Dahiya 1.
20. But the decision of this Court in Himachal Pradesh State
Electricity Board Limited (supra), is one where the disciplinary
authority-cum-whole time members of the Electricity Board were found
to have formed an opinion to impose a major penalty even before D
forwarding the copy of the enquiry report to the delinquent. But in this
case the Full Court of the High Court did not consider the enquiry report
and did not take a decision in advance to impose the penalty of removal
from service.
21. As a matter of fact, the history of evolution of law relating to E
second show cause notice is almost forty years old. The requirement of
a second show cause notice relating to the proposed penalty was removed
from Article 311 of the Constitution by the Constitution (42nd Amendment)
Act, 1976. The same was upheld by a Constitution Bench of this Court
in Union of Indiaand Anr. vs. Tulsiram Patel2. However, a two-
member Bench of this Court opened a small window in Union of India F
and Ors. vs. E. Bashyan3, which led to the decision in Union of India
and Ors. vs. Mohd. Ramzan Khan4, wherein this Court held that the
opportunity to respond to the findings of the inquiry officer is different
from the opportunity to respond to the penalty proposed. Eventually, the
issue got clarified in The Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad and G
Ors. vs. B. Karunakar and Ors.5.
1
(2017) 1 SCC 768
2
(1985) 3 SCC 398
3
(1988) 2 SCC 196
4
(1991) 1 SCC 588
5
(1993) 4 SCC 727 H
62 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 4 S.C.R.

A 22. It is not the case of the respondent that the Full Court of the
High Court took a decision to impose the penalty of dismissal from service
even before furnishing the copies of the enquiry reports to the respondent.
The show cause notices enclosing the enquiry reports, are dated
11.10.2007. The representations made by the respondent are dated
26.10.2007. It is only thereafter that the Administrative Committee No.1
B
considered the matter on 28.08.2008 and it was placed before the Full
Court on 04.10.2008. Therefore, the opinion of the High Court that the
second show cause notices were in violation of the principles of natural
justice is not factually and legally correct.
23. We have not come across a case where the High Court, while
C setting aside an order of penalty has held that there shall not be any
further inquiry against the delinquent. But in this case, the High Court
has done exactly the same, creating a new jurisprudence. The relevant
portion of the impugned order of the High Court reads as follows:-
“Writ Appeal is allowed. Impugned order passed by the learned
D Single Judge in W.P.Nos.10756/2009 & 11030-32 of 2009 (S.DIS)
dated 30.11.2011 is hereby set aside. Punishment order dismissing
the appellant from service is hereby quashed. All Inquiry reports
are quashed. There shall not be any further enquiry against the
appellant. The appellant is to be treated as if he had been in service
E till the date of superannuation and pay all consequential monetary
benefits with interest at 8% p.a. The compliance shall be within a
period of three months.”
24. For all the above reasons, the appeals are liable to be allowed.
Accordingly, they are allowed and the impugned order of the Division
F Bench of the High Court is set aside. The order of penalty imposed upon
the respondent is upheld and the writ petitions filed by the respondent
shall stand dismissed. No costs.

Ankit Gyan Appeals allowed.
(Assisted by : Sirgapoor Sahil Reddy and Aarsh Choudhary, LCRAs)
G

H