Holding

The injury did not arise out of nor occur in the course of the employee's employment and therefore does not qualify as an "employment injury" under the Act.

Summary

The employee, Francis De Costa, was injured in a road accident while riding his own bicycle to work, about one kilometre from his factory and fifteen minutes before his shift began. He claimed disablement benefit under the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948, and the ESIC Court allowed the claim, which was later dismissed by the Kerala High Court. The Supreme Court examined whether the injury qualified as an "employment injury" under Section 2(8) of the Act, which requires the injury to have "arisen out of and been in the course of" the employee's employment. The Court held that the accident did not arise out of the employment because the employee’s work had not yet commenced, and it was not in the course of employment since the journey to the workplace is excluded unless the employee travels in employer‑provided transport as per Section 51‑C. Consequently, the injury was not an employment injury and the employee was not entitled to the benefit. The appeal was allowed, setting aside the High Court's order.

Issues considered

Whether an injury sustained by an employee while travelling on his own bicycle to the workplace constitutes an "employment injury" under Section 2(8) of the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948.
Whether Section 51‑C of the Act, which deems accidents in employer‑provided transport as arising out of employment, applies to the facts of this case.

Legislation cited

Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948s. 2(8), s. 51, s. 51-C
Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923s. 3(1)

Subjects

employment injuryEmployees' State Insurance Actdisablement benefitarising out of and in the course of employmentSection 51-Croad accidentnotional extension of employment

Judgment

THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR, E.S.I. CORPORATION AND ANR. A
v.
, FRANCIS DE COSTA AND ANR.
....,.
SEPTEMBER 11, 1996

(A.M. AHMADI, C.J., SUHAS C.SEN AND SUJATA V. B
MANOHAR, JJ.)

Labour Law :

Employees' State I11sura11ce Act, 1948: Sections 2(8) a11d 51-C.
c
Employment injury-Employee suffered injwy caused by accident while
going to his place of employment 011 his bicycl&--Employee was to rep01t for
duty within a short tim&--Accide11t took pl~ce at a sh01t distance from his
place of employment-Held : employment of workman did 11ot commence
until he reached place of employme11t-Wlzat happened before was not i11 D
course of employment-Injury should have wisen out of and in the course of
employme11t-171e accident must have its origin i11 the employment.

Disablement benefit--Claim to-lfcld : in order to succeed employee
must prove that accident had casual co1111ection with his work a11d suffered
ill the course of his work and suffered in the course of his employment. E
Words and Phrases :

''Arising ollt of a11d in the course of his employme11t''-,!Jea11i11g of-In
the context of S.2(8) of the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948.
F
The respondent while going to his place of employment, a factory, on
a bicycle met with an accident at a place which was about one kilometer
away from the factory. The accident occurred at 4.15 p.m. while his
_;. duty-shift was to commence at 4.30 p.m. The respondent's collar-bone was
.... fractured as a result of the accident. The respondent's claim for disable·
ment benefit was allowed by the Employees' State Insurance Court. The G
appeal filed against that order was dismissed by the High Court. Being
aggrieved the appellant preferred the present appeal. The question before
this Court was whether the said injury amounted to 'employment injury'
within the meaning of Section 2(8) of the Employees' State Insurance Act,
1948 entitling the respondent to claim disablement benefit. H
797
798 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1996) SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A Allowing the appeal, this Court

HELD : 1.1. In view of the definition of "employment injury" in
Section 2(8) of the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948, in order to
succeed in his claim to disablement benefit, the respondent-employee must
prove that the injury he had suffered arose out of and was in the course
B of his employment. Both the conditions will have to be fulfilled before the
employee could claim any benefit under the Act. The injury suffered by the
employee did not ;irise in any way out of his employment. Unless it can be
said that his employment began as soon as he set out for the factory from
his home, it cannot be said that the injury was caused by an accident
C "arising out of ........ his employment". A road accident may happen
anywhere at any time. But such accident cannot be said to have arisen out
of employment unless it can be shown that the employee was doing some-
thing incidental to his employment. (802-C-F]

1.2. By using the words "arising out of ....... his employment", the
D Legislature gave a restrictive meaning to "employment injury". The injury
must be of such an extent as can he attributed to an accident or an
occupational disease arising out of his employment. "Out of', in this
context must mean caused by employment. Of course, the phrase "out of'
has an exclusive meaning also. If a man is described to be out of his
E employment, it means he is without a job. In the context of Section 2(8),
the words "out ol" indicate that the injury must be caused by an accident
which had its origin in the employment. A mere road accident, while an
employee is on his way to his place of employment cannot be said to have
its origin in his employment in the factory. (802-G-H; 803-A]

F Webster's Comprehensive Dictionary (Intemational Edition, 1984),
referred to.

2. The other words of limitation in Section 2(8) of the Act is "in the
course of his employment". The dictionary meaning indicates that the
accident must take place within or during the period of employment. If the
G employee's work shift begins at 4.30 P.M., any accident before that time
will not be "in the course of his employment". The journey to the factory
may have been undertaken for working at the factory at 4.30 P.M. But this
journey was certainly not in course of employment. If "employment" begins
from the moment the employee sets out from his house for the factory,
H then even if the employee stumbles and falls down at the door-step of his
REGNL. DIRECTOR, E.S.I. CORPN. v. FRANCIS DE COSTA 799

house, the accident will have to be treated as to have taken place in the A
course of his employment. This interpretation leads to absurdity and has
;· to be avoided. (803-D-F]

171e Concise Oxford Dictiollal)' (New Seventh Edition), referred to.

3.1. If the employee meets with an accident while riding his own B
bicycle on the way to his place of work, it cannot be said that the accident
was in the course of his employment. The deeming provision of Section
51-C does not come into play in this case because the employee was not
travelling as a passenger in any vehicle owned or operated by or on behalf
of the employer or by some other person in pursuance of an arrangement
made by the employer. (805-C-D]
c
3.2. The fact that the accident took place only 15 minutes before the
employee was to report for duty and only one kilometer away from the
factory cannot be made a ground for departing from the principle that the
employment of the workman does not commence until he has reached the D

- place of employment. What happens before that is not in course of employ-
ment. In the instant case it cannot be said that the injury suffered by the
workman one kilometer away from the factory while he was on his way to
the factory was caused by an accident arising out of and in the course of
his employment. [806~H; 807-A; 811-G]
,/},., E
Saurashtra Salt ·Manufacturing Co. v. Bai Valu Raja, AIR (1958) SC
881, relied on.

South Maitland Railways Proprietary Ltd. v. James, 67 CLR 496;
Regina v. National Insurance Commissione1; Ex. Paree Michel, (1977) 1 WLR
109; J.J. O'Leary, Deputy Coinmissioner, Fourteenth Compensation District
F
v. Brown-Pacific Maxon, Inc., 95 L.ed. 483 and O'Keeffee Deputy Commis-
sioner v. Smith, Minchman & G1ylls Associates, Inc., 13 L. ed. 2d 895,
referred to.

General M011ager, B.E.S. T. Undertaking, Bombay v. Mrs. Agnes, (1964] G
3 SCR 930 and Begubai v. Central Railway, Bombay, (1954) II L.LJ., held
inapplicable. ·

4. In order to succeed, it has to be proved by the employee that (1)
there was an accident, (2) the accident had a causal connection with the
employment and (3) the accident must have been suffered in course of H
800 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 5 S.< '.R.

A employment. In the instant case, the employee was unable to prove that I.he
accident had any causal connection with the work he was doing at the
factory and in any event, it was not suffered in the course of employment.
(812-D]
Dover Navigation Company Ltd. v. Isabella O·aig, (1940) A.C. 190,
B referred to.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1174 of
1979.

From the Judgment and Order dated 25.11.77 of the Kerala High
C Court in AS. No. 638 of 1974.
V.V. Vaze, Ms. Suvira Lal and Chava Badri Nath Babu for C.V.S.
Rao for the Appellants.

Romy Chacko and N. Sudhakaran for the Respondents.
D
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

SEN, J. Francis De Costa, the first respondent herein, met with an
accident on June 26, 1971 while he was on his way to his place of
employment, a factory at Koratty. The accident occurred at a place which
E was about one Kilom_eter away to the north of the factory. The time of
occurrence was 4.15 P.M. It has been stated that the duty-shift of the
respondent would have commenced at 4.30 P.M. The respondent was going
to his place of work on bicycle. He was hit by a lorry belonging to his
employers, M/s. J and P Coats (P) Ltd.
...
p The respondent's collar-bone was fractured as a result of the acci-
dent and he had to remain in hospital for 12 days. His claim for disable-
ment benefit was allowed by the Employees' State Insurance Court. The
appeal filed against that order was dismissed by the Kerala High Court
which also dismissed an application for a certificate of fitness to appeal to
the Supreme Court. The petitioner filed an application for Special Leave
G to appeal to this Court on 16.4.1979. Special leave was given by this Court,
but the Employees' State Insurance Corporation was directed to pay the
first respondent the compensation due to him in terms of the order of the
Employees' State Insurance Court and also the costs of this appeal in any
event. It has been stated that the compensation money has already been
H paid to the first respondent.
REG NL. DIRECTOR, E.S.I. CORPN. v. FRANCIS DE COSTA [SEN, J.] 801

Since there was difference of opinion between the two Judges who A
heard the appeal, the matter was directed to be placed before a larger
Bench for deciding the controversy.

In order to appreciate the scope of the controversy, it will be neces-
sary to set out the relevant provisions of the Employees' State Insurance
Act, 1948: B

"2(8) "employment injury" means a personal injury to an employee
caused by accident or an occupational disease arising out of and
in the course of his employment, being an insurable employment,
whether the accident occurs or the occupational disease is con- C
tracted within or outside the territorial limits of India;

51. Disablement benefit - Subject to the provisions of this Act -
D
(a) a person who sustains temporary disablement for not less
... than three days (excluding the day of accident), shall be
entitled to periodical payment at such rates and for such
period and subject to such conditions as may be prescribed
by the Central Government;
E
(b) a person who sustains permanent disablement, whether total
or partial, shall be e11titled to periodical payment at such rates
and for such period and subject to such conditions as may be
prescribed by the Central Government.

51-C. Accidents happening while travelling in employer's transport F
- (1) An accident happening while an insured person is, with the
express or implied permission of his employer, travelling as a
passenger by any vehicle to or from his place of work shall,
-•,. notwithstanding that he is under no obligation to his employer to
travel by that vehicle, be deemed to arise out of and in the course G
of his employment, if -

(a) the accident would have been deemed so to have arisen had
he been under such obligation; and

(b) at the time of the accident, the vehicle - H
802 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996) SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A (i) is being operated by or on behalf of his employer or
some other person by whom it is provided in pursuance
of arrangements made with his employer, and ...
(ii) is not being operated in the ordinary course of public
transport service.
B
(2) In this section "vehicle" includes a vessel and an aircraft."

That the first respondent has suffered a personal injury is not in
dispute. The only dispute is whether the injury will amount to "employment
injury" within the meaning of Section 2(8), so as to enable the respondent
c to claim benefit under the Act. The definition given to "employment injury''
in sub-section (8) of Section 2 envisages a personal injury to an employee
caused by an accident or an occupational disease "arising out of and in the
course of his employment". Therefore, the employee, in order to succeed
in this case, will have. to prove that the injury that he had suffered arose
D out of and was in the course of his employment. Both the conditions will
have to be fulfilled before he could claim any benefit under the Act. It does
not appear that the injury suffered by the employee in the instant case
arose in any way out of his employment. The injury was sustained while the
employee was on his way to the factory where ht was employed. The
accident took place one kilometer away from the place of employment.
E
Unless it can be said that his employment began as soon as he set out for
the factory from his home, it cannot be said that the injury was caused by
an accident "arising out of ....... his employment". A road accident may
happen anywhere at any time. But such accident cannot be said to have
arisen out of employment, unless it can be shown that the employee was
F doing something incidental to his employment.

In our judgment, by using the words "arising out of ............ his
employment", the Legislature gave a restrictive meaning to "employment
injnry". The injury must be of such an extent as can be attributed to an
accident or an occupational disease arising out of his employment. "Out
G of', in this context, must mean caused by employment. Of course, the
phrase "out of' has an exclusive meaning also. If a man is described to be
out of his employment, it means he is without a job. The other meaning of
the phrase "out of' is "influenced, inspired or caused by; out of pity; out of
respect for him". (Webster Comprehensive Dictionary-International Edi-
H tion-1984). In the context of Section 2(8), the words "out of' indicate that
REGNL. DIRECTOR, E.S.I. CORPN. v. FRANCIS DE COSTA[SEN, J.] 803

the injury must be caused by an accident, which had its origin in the A
employment. A mere road accident, while an employee is on his way to h~
place of employment cannot be said to have its origin in his employment
in the factory. The phrase "out of the 'employment" was construed in the
case of South Maitland Railways Pty. Ltd. v. James, 67 C.L.R. 496, where
construing the phrase "out of the employment'', Starke, J ., held "the words
B
'out of' require that the injury had its origin in the employment."

Unless an employee can establish that the injury was caused or had
its origin in the employment, he cannot succeed in a claim based on Section
2(8) of the Act. The words "accident ....... arising out of ....... his employ-
ment" indicate that any accident which occurred while going to the place C
of employment or for the purpose of employment, cannot be said to have
arisen ·out of his employment. There is no causal connection between the
accident and the employment.

The other words of limitation in sub-section (8) of Section 2 is "in D
the course of his employment". The dictionary meaning of "in the course
of' is during (in the course of time, as time goes by), while .doing" (The
Concise Oxford Dictionary, New Seventh Edition). The dictionary meaning
indicates that the accident must take place within or during the period of
employment. If the employee's work shift begins at 4.30 P.M., any accident
before that time will not be "in the course of his employment". The journey E
to the factory may have been undertaken for working at the factory at 4.30
P .M. But this journey was certainly not in course of employment. If
"employment" begins from the moment the employee sets out from his
house for the factory, then even if the employee stumbles and falls down
at the door-step of his house, the accident will have to be treated as to
have taken place in the course of his employment. This interpretation leads F
to absurdity and has to be avoided.

We were referred to a number of cases on this point. It the case of
_,. Regina v. National Insurance Commissioner, Ex. pane Michael, (1977) 1
Weekly Law Reports 109, the Court of Appeal in England had to construe G
a phrase "caused by accident arising out of and in the course of his
employment" in Section 5(1) of the National Insurance (Industrial Injuries)
Act, 1965. Lord Denning M.R. started his judgment with the observation:

"So we come back, once again, to those all too familiar words
'arising out of and in the course of his employment'. They have H
804 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1996) SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A been worth-to lawyers-a King's ransom. The reason is because,
although so simple, they have to be applied to facts which vary
infinitely. Quite often the primary facts are not in dispute; or they
are proved beyond question. But the inference from them ;s matter
of law. And matters of law can be taken higher. In the old days
they went up to the House of Lords. Nowadays they have to be
B determined, not by the courts, but by the hierarchy of tribunals set
up under the National Insurance Acts."

l!nder the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948, a tribunal has been
set up io decide, inter alia, any claim for recovery of a benefit admissible
in this Act. A reference lies to the High Court on a question of law. In
c other words, the decision of the Insurance Court set up under the statute
is final and binding, so far as the findings of fact are concerned. But, i~ any
error of law has been committed, the Courts are expected to correct it and
to give guidance to the Insurance Court.

D Construing the meaning of the phrase "in the course of his employ-
ment", it was noted by Lord Denning that the meaning of the phrase had
gradually been widened over the last 30 years to include doing something
which was reasonably incidental tO' the employee's employment. The test
of "reasonably incidental" was applied in a large number of English
E decisions. But, Lord Denning pointed out that in all those cases the
workman was at the premises where he or she worked and was injured
while on a visit to the canteen or other place for a break. Lord Denning,
however, cautioned that the words "reasonably incidental" should be read
in that context and should be limited to the cases of that kind. Lord
Denning observed :
F
"Take a case where a man is going to or from his place of work
on his own bicycle, or in his own cat. He might be said to be doing
something "reasonably incidental" to his employment. But if he has
an accident on the way, it is well settled that it does not "arise out
G
of and in the course of his employment". Even if his employer
provides the transport, so that he is going to work as a passenger --
in his employer's vehicle (which is surely "reasonably incidental"
to his employment), nevertheless, if he is injured in an accident, it
does not arise out of and in the course of his employment. It
needed a special "deeming" provision in a statute to make it
H "deemed" to arise out of and in the course of his employment."
REGNL.DlRECTOR, E.S.I. CORPN. v. FRANCIS DECOSTA[SEN,J.] 805

This is precisely the case before us. Here also, we have a case of a A
person going from his home to his place of work. But he suffers injury in
an accident on the way. It cannot be said that the accident arose out of
and in the course of his employment. It was faintly suggested by Mr.
Checko, appearing on behalf of the respondent, that the bicycle was bought
· by taking a loan from the employer. That, however, is of no relevance. He
might have borrowed money from his Company or from somewhere else B
for purchasing the bicycle. But the fact remains that the bicycle belonged
to him and not the employer. If he meets with an accident while riding his
own bicycle on the way to his place of work, it cannot be said that the
accident was reasonable incidental to the employment and was in the
course of his employment. The deeming provision of Section 51-C, which C
came into force by way of an amendment effected by Employees' Life
Insurance (Amendment) Act of 1966 (Act No. 44 of 1966), enlarged the
scope· of the phrase "in the course of employment" to include travelling as
a passenger by the employees vehicle to or from the place of work. The
legal fiction contained in Section 51-C, however, does not came into play
in this case because the employee was not travelling as a passenger in any D
vehicle owned or operated by or on behalf of the employer or by some
other person in pursuance of an arrangement made by the employer.
~.

The meaning of the words "in the course of his employment" appear-
ing in Section 3(1) of Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, was examined E
by this Court in the case of Sauraslitra Salt Ma1111facturi11g Co. v. Bai Valu
Raja, AIR (1958) SC 881. There, the appellant, a salt manufacturing
company, employed workmen both temporary and permanent. The salt
works was situated near a creek opposite to the town of Porbandar. The
salt works could be reached by at least two ways from the town, one an
over land route nearly 6 to 7 miles long and the other via a creek which F
had to be crossed by a boat. In the evening of 12.6.1952, a boat carrying
some of the workmen, capsized due to bad weather and over-loading. As
a result of this, some of the workmen were drowned. One of the questions
that came up for consideration was whether the accident had taken place
•· ·~ in the course of the employment of the workers, S. Jafar Imam, J., speaking G
for the Court, held, "As a rule, the employment of a workman does not
commence until he has reached the place of employment and does not
continue when he has left the place of.employment, the journey to and from
the place of employment being excluded." After laying down the principle
broadly, S. Jafar Imam, J., went on to observe that there might be some
reasonable extension in both time and place to this principle. A workman H
806 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A might be regarded as in the course of his employment even though he had
not reached or had left his employer's premises in some special cases. The
facts and circumstances of each case would have to be examined very
carefully in order to determine whelher the accident arose out of and in
the course of the employment of a workman, keeping in view at all times
this theory of notional extension. But, examining the facts of the case, in
B particular, after noticing the fact that the workman used a boat, which was
also used as public ferry for which they had to pay the boatman's dues, S.
J afar Imam, .J ., observed :

"It is well settled that when a workman is on a public road or a
public place or on a public transport he is there as any other
c member of the public and is not there in the course of his employ-
ment makes it necessary for him to be there. A workman is not in
the course of his employment from the moment he leaves his home
and is on his way to his work. He certainly is in the course of his
employment if he reaches the place of work or a point or an area
D which comes within the theory of notional extension, outside of
, which the employer is not liable to pay compensation for any
accident happening to him. In the present case, even if it be
assumed that the theory of notional extension extends upto point
D, the theory cannot be extended beyond it. The moment a
workman left point B in a boat or left point A but had not yet
E
reached point B, he could not be said to be in the course of his
employment and any accident happening to him on the journey
between these two points could not be said to have arisen out of
and in the course of his employment. Both the Commissioner for
Workmen's Compensation and the High Court were in error in
F supposing that the deceased workmen in this case were still in the
course of their employment when they were crossing the creek
between points A and B. The accident which took place when the
boat was almost at point A resulting in the death of so many
workmen was unfortunate, but for that accident the appellant
cannot be made liable."
G
The point raised before us can be answered on the basis of the
principle laid down in the aforesaid two cases. But Mr. Chacko, appearing
on behalf of the respondent has contended that proximity of time and place
is a factor to be borne in mind. The employee was to report for duty at
H 4.30 P .M. The accident took place at 4.15 P.M., only one kilometer away
REGNL. DIRECTOR, E.S.I. CORPN. v. FRANCIS DECOSTA[SEN,J.] 807

from the factory. In our view, this cannot be a ground for departing from A
the principle laid down by the aforementioned cases that the employment
of the workman does not commence until he has reached the place of
employment. What happens before that is not in course of employment. It
was also pointed out by Lord Denning in the aforesaid case of Regina v.
National Insurance Commissioner, Ex. Parte Michael (supra) that the ex-
tension of the meaning of the phrase "in the course of his employment" has B
taken place in some cases but in all those cases, the workman was at the
premises where he or she worked and was injured while on a visit to the
canteen or some other place for a break. The test of what was "reasonably
incidental" to employment, may be extended even to cases while an
employee is sent on an errand by the employer outside the factory C
premises. But in such cases, it must be shown that he was doing something
incidental to his employment. There may also be cases where an employee
has to go out of his work place in the usual course of his employment.
Latham, CJ. in South Maitland Railways Proprietary Limited v. James, (67
CLR 496) observed that when the workmen on a hot day in course of their
employment had to go for short time to get some cool water to drink so D
enable them to continue to work without which they could not have
otherwise continued, they were in such cases doing something in the course
of their employment when they went out for water. But the case before us
does not fall within the exceptions mentioned by Lord Denning or Latham,
C.J. The case squarely comes within the proposition of law propounded by
S. Jafar Imam, J. E

Strong reliance was placed by Shri Chacko on a decision of this Court
in General Manage1; B.E.S. T. Undertaking, Bombay v. Mrs. Agnes, [1964] 3
SCR 930. In this case, one bus driver of the appellant-Corporation after
finishing the day's work left for home in a bus belonging to employer's F
undertaking which met with an accident as a result of which he died. His
widow claimed compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act
and the question was whether the accident had arisen out of and in course
of employment. It was held by Subba Rao and Mudholkar, JJ. (Raghubar
Dayal, J. dissenting) that the bus driver was given facility by the manage- G
ment to travel in any bus belonging to the undertaking. It was given because
efficiency of the service demanded it. Therefore, the right of the bus driver
to travel in the bus was to discharge his duty punctually and efficiently.
This was a condition of service and there was an obligation to travel in the
said buses as a part of his duty. It was held that in the case of a factory,
the premises of an employer was a limited one but in the case of a City H
808 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1996] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A Transport Service, the entire fleet of buses forming the service would be
"premises". This decision in our view, does not come to the assistance of
the employee's case. An employee of a Transport Undertaking was travell- >-
ing in a vehicle provided by the employer. Having regard to the purpose
for which 'he was travelling and also having regard to the obligation on the ~.

part of the employee to travel in the said buses as a part of his duty, the <"
B Court came to the conclusion that this journey was in the course of his
employment because the entire fleet of buses formed the premises within
which he worked.

But in the case before us, the facts are entirely different. The
c employee was not obliged to travel in any particular way under the terms
....
of employment nor can it be said that he was travelling in a transport ,
provided by the employer.

lq the case of Sadgunaben Ammtlal and Others v. The Employees'
D State Insurance Corporation, Aizmedabad, (1981) LAB.LC. 1653), it was
held by the Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court that though as a
rule, employment of a workman did not commence until he reached the
place of employment and did not continue after he has left the place of
employment, the proposition was subject to the theory of notional exten-
sion of the employer's premises. The notional extension theory could not
E be related to the place of employment only. It could also be taken recourse
to in order to extend the time in a reasonable manner. The Court took the
view in the case, where an employee on his way to the factory died of acute
cardiac arrest, that it was caused by accident arising out of and in course
of employment. The employee was employed as a jobber in the Wrapping c
F Department of the mill. He worked in the premises from 8 AM. to 4.30
P.M. On December 22, 1974, while he was on duty in the mill, he felt
unwell. He took medical treatment on the next day (December 23, 1974)
which was an off-day for him. On December 24, 1974, he left his residence
at about 7.20 AM. i.e. 40 minutes before the reporting time. He walked a
short distance from his house to the nearest bus stop and was waiting for
G a bus to take him to the mill. While waiting for the bus, he felt unwell. He
complained to an ex-employee of the mill who was also waiting to board
5
the bus that it was due to the excessive and strenuous nature of work which
he was required to do at the mill that he was feeling unwell. When the bus
arrived, Amrut Lal, the employee was about to step into the bus when he
H collapsed and became unconscious. He was taken to an hospital where he
REGNL. DIRECTOR, E.S.L CORPN. v. FRANCIS DECOSTA!SEN,J.] 809

was pronounced dead. The postmortem revealed that he died of cardiac A
failure. Both the Employees' Insurance Court and the Single Judge of the
-" High Court held that the employee had not died as a result of an accident
in the course of employment. On appeal, the Division Bench held that both
the Employees' Insurance Court and the Single Judge were in error in
holding that the death was not in course of employment.
B
It is doubtful whether this decision can be reconciled with the
principle laid down by S Jafar Imam, J. in the case of Saurashtra Salt
Ma11ufacturi11g Co. (supra). It is also to be noted that the death was not
caused by an 'accident'. The death was due to acute cardiac failure. The
causal connection between the death and employment had not been estab- C
lished. Moreover, walking to the bus stop from the employee's residence
and boarding the bus for going to the place of work cannot be acts in
course of employment.

In the case of Blwgubai v. Central Railway, Bombay, (1954) II L.L.J., D
a Division Bench of Bombay High Court dealt with a case where a
workman on his way to work was murdered. There was no evidence to show
that the murder was due to any motive against the deceased workman. It
was hdd that the death took place because of an accident arising out of
employment. Chagla, CJ. emphasised that there must be a causal connec-
tion between the accident and the death before it could be said that the E
accident arose out of employment of the concerned, workman. In that case,
·l the deceased was employed by Central Railway at Kurla Station and he
lived in the railway quarters adjoining the station. It was found as a fact
that the only access for the deceased from his quarters to the Kurla railway
station was through the compound of the railway quarters. On December F
20, 1952, the deceased left his quarters a few minutes before midnight in
order to join duty. While on his way, he was stabbed by some unknown
persons. It is not disputed by the railway company that the deceased died
as a result of an accident nor was it disputed that the accident arose in the
course of his employment. The dispute was limited to the question whether
the accident arose out of the employment of the deceased. G

It is of significance that the deceased used to live in the railway
quarters adjoining the railway station and the compound through which he
had to go to the place of work belonged to the railway company. In other
words, he died on the premises belonging to the railways. It was found as H

1'1:11
810 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996) SUPP.5 S.C.R.

A a fact that the stabbing which led to the death was not due to any personal
enmity. That means it was an occupational hazard of the employee who
went to join work at midnight from the railway quarters to the railway
station through the railway compound. The facts of the case before us are
quite dissimilar to the facts on the basis of which the case of Bhagubai
(supra) was decided.
B
We were also referred to two American decisions. The first case is
J.J. O'Leary, Deputy Commissioner, Fowteenth Compensation District, Etc.
v. Brown-Pacific-Maxon, Inc., et al., (95 L.ed. 483 = 340 US 504-510). In
this case, an employee of a Government contractor was at a recreation
C center maintained by his employer near an ocean shore along which ran a .-
channel so dangerous for swimmers that its use was forbidden and signs to
that effect erected. On perceiving that two men standing on reef beyond
the channel were signalling for help, he undertook, with others, to swim
the channel, and was drowned. The Administrative Tribunal found that the
D employee's death arose "out of and in course of his employment". Six
members of the U.S. Supreme- Court concurred with the opinion of
Frankfurter, J. that the administrative decision was supported by "substan-
tial evidence" and, therefore, was beyond the scope of permissible judicial ,..
review. Minton, J., with whom Jackson and Burton, JJ. agreed was of the
opinio_n that the administrative finding was without any evidence.
E
This case really is an authority on the scope and extent of power of
judicial review of an administrative order. The important fact which was [.
noted in that case was that the deceased along with other employees had
discovered that third persons who were in danger were in a recreation area
p maintained by his employer for the benefit of the employees. This finding
was held to be based on substantial evidence. Frankfurter, J. observed that
"We do not mean that the evidence compelled this inference; we do not
suggest that when the Deputy Commissioner had decided against the claim,
the Court had been justified in disturbing his conclusions. We hold only
that on this record, the decision of the District Court that the award should ~
G not be set aside should be sustained". In other words, Frankfurter, J. was --{..
of the view that from the evidence on record, either of the two conclusions
could have been drawn. It is well-settled that the Court will not disturb a
finding of an administrative tribunal merely because it could have taken a
contrary view had it heard the case on evidence, when the view taken by
H the Tribunal is also a plausible view.

ir·
REGNL. DIRECTOR, E.S.I. CORPN. v. FRANCIS DE COSTA [SEN, J.] 811

The other American decision is in the case of O'Keeffe, Deputy A
Commissioner v. Smith, Mi11chma11 & Grylls Associates, Inc., et. al. (13 L.
ed. 2d 895). In that case, a private engineering concern's employee hired
_,
. to work in South Korea on a 365-day basis was drowned while boating on
a South Korean lake. The Deputy Workmen's Compensation Commis-
sioner determined that theiemployee's death arose out of and in course of
B
employment so as to entitled his widow and minor child to death benefits.
The decision being challenged by a writ, a panel of the Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit reversed the award. The Supreme Court held that
there was no scope for reviewing the decision of the Deputy Commissioner.
The Court of Appeals erred in summarily reversing the judgment. It was
observed that "while this Court may not have reached the same conclusion c
as the Deputy Commissioner, it cannot be said that his holding that the
decedent's death, in a zone of danger, arose out of and in the course of
his employment is irrational or without substantial evidence on the record
as a whole."

Here again, the U.S. Supreme Court declined to intervene with the
D
decision reached by the Deputy Commissioner on evidence and reversed
the decision of the Court of Appeals for doing what it should not have
done by adopting what appeared to the Court to be a better view.

We fail to understand how these two American decisions which really E
dealt with the scope and extent of judicial review of a decision based
essentially on finding of fact can come to the aid of the employee in this
case .
..>

It has to be borne in mind that this is not a case of judicial review.
The Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948 provides for reference to the F
High Court by the statutory courts set up under the Act, any question of
law arising out of its decision (Section 81). There is also a provision for
appeal in certain cases on a substantial question of law (Section 82) .
., We are of the view that in the facts of this case, it cannot be said
G
--" that the injury suffered by the workman one kilometer away from the
factory while he was on his way to the factory was caused by an accident
arising out of and in the course of his employment.

In the case of Dover Navigation Company Limited v. Isabella Craig,
(1940 AC. 190), it was observed by Lord Wright that - H
812 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A "Nothing could be simpler than the words "arising out of and in
the course of the employment." It is clear that there are two
conditions to be fulfilled. What arises "in the course of' the employ-
ment is to be distinguished from what arises "out of the employ-
ment." The former words relate to time conditioned by reference
to the man's service, the latter to causality. Not every accident
B which occurs to a man during the time when he is on his employ-
ment, that is directly or indirectly engaged on what he is employed
to do, gives a claim to compensation unless it also arises out of the
employment. Hence the section imports a distinction which it does
not define. The language is simple and unqualified."
c Although the facts of this case are quite dissimilar, the principles laid
down in this case, are instructive and should be borne in mind. In order to
succeed, it has to be proved by the employee that (1) there was an accident,
(2) the accident had a causal connection with the employment and (3) the
accident must have been suffered in course of employment. In the facts of
D this case, we are of the view that the employee was unable to prove that
the accident had any causal connection with the work he was doing at the
factory and in any event, it was not suffered in the course of employment.

The appeal, therefore, succeeds. The judgment dated 25.11.1977
E passed by the High Court is set aside. However, in terms of the order
passed by this Court on 16.4.1979, the appellants will have to bear the costs
of this appeal in any event. The costs are assessed at Rs. 3000 and will be
paid by the appellants to the first respondent within a period of four weeks
from date. The first respondent will also be entitled to retain the money '-
paid to him by the Regional Director, Employees' State Insurance Cor-
p poration pursuant to the order of this Court passed on 16.4.1979.

v.s.s. Appeal allowed.