THE NEW INDIA ASSURANCE CO. LTD.versusGOPU & ANR.

           [2025] 5 S.C.R. 169 : 2025 INSC 511

           The New India Assurance Co. Ltd.
                          v.
                     Gopu & Anr.
                 (Civil Appeal No. 5300 of 2025)
                            08 April 2025
  [Sudhanshu Dhulia and K. Vinod Chandran, JJ.]


                     Issue for Consideration
Matter pertains to the correctness of the order passed by the High
Court enhancing the compensation awarded to the claimants under
the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.

                             Headnotes†
Limitation Act, 1963 – ss.5, 6 – Legal Disability – Death of wife
in motor vehicle accident – Claim petition by the husband
and two minor children – Tribunal awarded compensation –
Thereagainst, after 10 years, children alone preferred appeal
before High Court, wherein one child had attained majority five
years back – High Court enhanced compensation – Correctness:
Held: Appeal filed before the High Court was grossly delayed and
hence not maintainable – s.6 enables a person disabled, by reason
of minority, etc., to institute a suit or make an application for the
execution of a ‘decree’, within the period of limitation provided, after
the disability has ceased – Provision applies only with respect to a
suit or an application for the execution of a decree and not in an
appeal or any other proceeding – Impliedly, the exemption by reason
of a disability applies to the institution of an original proceeding or
an application for execution of a final decree, which will not apply
in the case of an appeal – Father as the natural guardian has
instituted the original proceeding before the tribunal, with both the
minor children in the party array of claimants, represented by the
father, the natural guardian – Father who is the natural guardian
took a conscious decision not to file an appeal and was satisfied
with the award – Intention of the legislature being very clear, it is
not for the courts to extend the period of limitation on misplaced
sympathies – Even s.5 has no application in the facts of the case,
insofar as the long delay occasioned, especially when in the original
proceedings, the children were represented by the father, the
natural guardian – Judgment of the Single Judge of the High Court
set aside – Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – s.166. [Paras 9, 12, 13]
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                                 Case Law Cited
       Ajay Gupta v. Raju [2016] 3 SCR 225 : (2016) 14 SCC 314;
       Bechi v. Ahsan-Ullah Khan, 1890 SCC OnLine All 1; Musthafali
       v. Subair, 1991 SCC OnLine Ker 269; H.H. Maharana Sahib Shri
       Bhagwat Singh Bahadur of Udaipur v. State of Rajasthan, 1963
       SCC OnLine SC 119 – referred to.

                                   List of Acts
       Motor Vehicles Act, 1988; Limitation Act, 1963; Limitation Act of
       1871; Limitation Act of 1908; Limitation Act (XV of 1877).

                                List of Keywords
       Compensation; Motor Accident; Claim petition; Enhancement of
       claim; Limitation to file appeal; Natural guardian; Exemption by reason
       of a disability; Delay; Natural guardian; Intention of the legislature.

                               Case Arising From
       CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 5300 of 2025
       From the Judgment and Order dated 01.03.2019 of the High Court
       of Kerala at Ernakulam in MACA No. 627 of 2016

                            Appearances for Parties
       Advs. for the Appellant:
       Sanjay Kumar Dubey, Ms. Shuchi Singh, Shuchi Singh, Vivek
       Kumar Pandey, Ms. Shivani Mishra.
       Adv. for the Respondents:
       Venkita Subramoniam T.R.

                  Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

                                      Order

       Leave granted.

2.     This appeal is directed against an order dated 01.03.2019, passed
       by the High Court of Kerala in MACA No.627 of 2016, by which the
       compensation awarded to the claimants by the Motor Accidents
       Claims Tribunal, Alappuzha (for short, `the Tribunal’) was enhanced.
[2025] 5 S.C.R.                                                       171

            The New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Gopu & Anr.


3.   On 02.06.2000 at 3.00 P.M., the deceased was riding pillion on a
     motorcycle being driven by one V.G. Shibu, 1st respondent before
     the Tribunal. Near the Avalookunnu Post office, respondent No.1
     applied sudden brake to save a cyclist and the deceased fell and
     was injured. Ultimately, the deceased succumbed to her injuries on
     07.06.2000 at the Medical College Hospital. It is alleged that the
     accident was due to the rash and negligent driving by the bike driver.
     The owner and driver were ex-parte in the Tribunal.
4.   The legal representatives of the deceased, husband and two
     minor children, preferred a claim petition under Section 166 of the
     Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal
     awarded compensation of Rs.6,53,000/- (Rupees Six Lakh Fifty
     Three Thousand only). Against the award dated 23.11.2006, after 10
     years, in 2016, the children alone preferred an appeal before the High
     Court. The High Court of Kerala enhanced the compensation from
     Rs.6,53,000/- to Rs.14,95,000/- and further directed the appellant-
     Insurance Company to pay interest @ 7% p.a. interest. This is the
     order which has been challenged before us.
5.   Heard learned counsel for the parties and carefully perused the
     material placed on record.
6.   Learned counsel for the respondent-claimants submits the deceased
     was working as a Junior Public Health Nurse at PHC, Thenipalam and
     was getting an amount of Rs.5,955/- per month. The appellants Gopu
     and Goukul are her children, who were minors, when the deceased
     aged 32 died as a result of the accident. Learned counsel submits
     that just amount was not awarded by the Tribunal; as after the death
     of Rasimol (the deceased), three Pay Commission Reports dated
     25.03.2006, 26.02.2011 and 20.01.2016 were implemented. And a
     considerable increase in the salary was recommended in the Pay
     Commission. Learned counsel contends that the future prospects
     and the hike in salary was not considered by the Tribunal while
     awarding compensation.
7.   Per contra, learned counsel for the appellant-Insurance Company
     submits that there are discrepancies in the judgment of the High
     Court in apportioning the enhanced compensation and that the cause
     of action had occurred in the year 2000, hence the salary received
     at the time of accident alone can be considered. Learned counsel
     further submits that the judgment passed by the High Court is not
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       sustainable in the eye of law as respondent No.1-Gopu himself
       attained majority in the year 2011 as per his affidavit filed with the
       MAC appeal in year 2016 and he has not given any satisfactory
       explanation as to why the MAC Appeal was not filed immediately
       thereafter; when he attained majority. The respondents/claimants
       have filed the MAC appeal after 10 years of the award and further
       after about 8 years (2877 days) from the date of attaining majority.
8.     Learned counsel for the respondents rely upon Sections 6 and 7 of
       the Limitation Act, 1963, which read as under:
            “6. Legal disability.—(1) Where a person entitled to institute
            a suit or make an application for the execution of a decree
            is, at the time from which the prescribed period is to be
            reckoned, a minor or insane, or an idiot, he may institute
            the suit or make the application within the same period
            after the disability has ceased, as would otherwise have
            been allowed from the time specified therefor in the third
            column of the Schedule.
            (2) Where such person is, at the time from which the
            prescribed period is to be reckoned, affected by two such
            disabilities, or where, before his disability has ceased, he
            is affected by another disability, he may institute the suit
            or make the application within the same period after both
            disabilities have ceased, as would otherwise have been
            allowed from the time so specified.
            (3) Where the disability continues up to the death of that
            person, his legal representative may institute the suit or
            make the application within the same period after the
            death, as would otherwise have been allowed from the
            time so specified.
            (4) Where the legal representative referred to in sub-
            section (3) is, at the date of the death of the person whom
            he represents, affected by any such disability, the rules
            contained sub-sections (1) and (2) shall apply.
            (5) Where a person under disability dies after the disability
            ceases but within the period allowed to him under this
            section, his legal representative may institute the suit
            or make the application within the same period after the
[2025] 5 S.C.R.                                                              173

            The New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Gopu & Anr.


           death, as would otherwise have been available to that
           person had he not died.
           Explanation.— For the purposes of this section, ‘minor’
           includes a child in the womb.
           7. Disability of one of several persons.—Where one of
           several persons jointly entitled to institute a suit or make
           an application for the execution of a decree is under any
           such disability, and a discharge can be given without the
           concurrence of such person, time will run against them
           all; but, where no such discharge can be given, time will
           not run as against any of them until one of them becomes
           capable of giving such discharge without the concurrence
           of the others or until the disability has ceased.
           Explanation I.—This section applies to a discharge from
           every kind of liability, including a liability in respect of any
           immovable property.
           Explanation II. —For the purposes of this section, the
           Manager of a Hindu undivided family governed by the
           Mitakshara law shall be deemed to be capable of giving a
           discharge without the concurrence of the other members
           of the family only if he is in management of the joint family
           property”
9.   Section 6, of the Limitation Act, 1963, as is evident from the extract
     enables a person disabled, by reason of minority, insanity or idiocy,
     to institute a suit or make an application for the execution of a
     ‘decree’, within the period of limitation provided, after the disability
     has ceased. The provision applies only with respect to a suit or an
     application for the execution of a decree and not in an appeal or
     any other proceeding. Here, we must notice the definition clause,
     Section 2(l) which though does not define a suit but provides that
     ‘a suit does not include an appeal or an application’. An appeal, an
     application and a suit are hence dealt with differently insofar as the
     Limitation Act is concerned, as evidenced from Section 3 also. In this
     context, we have also to notice the distinction, insofar as Section 5
     of the Limitation Act, providing for admission of an appeal, or any
     application, other than an application under any of the provisions of
     Order XXI of the C.P.C., even after the prescribed period, if sufficient
     cause is shown to satisfy the Court.
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10. It is pertinent that till the Act of 1963 came into effect applications
    for execution of the decree were not specifically excluded from the
    purview of the provision allowing condonation of delay, (Section 5(b)
    of the Limitation Act of 1871 and Section 5 of the Limitation Act of
    1908) which was excluded for the first time under Section 5 of the
    Act of 1963. It has been held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act does
    not apply to a suit in Ajay Gupta v. Raju.1 Likewise legal disabilities
    specified in Section 6 creates an exemption and enables the period of
    limitation to run from the date on which the disability has ceased, only
    in the case of a suit or an application for the execution of a decree;
    the last of which we already noticed is excluded under Section 5.
11. In this context, we refer to the decision of the Full Bench of the
    High Court of Allahabad in Bechi v. Ahsan-Ullah Khan 2 [ILR (1890)
    12 All 461 (FB)] and make the following extract from Mahmood, J’s
    opinion which was concurred by all the other three Hon’ble Judges:
            “What effect the minority of some of the defendants has
            upon the case is the subject of the second question
            as enunciated by me. And upon this point, I am of the
            opinion that the defendants-respondents have no case.
            It is true that some of them are minors, but they are duly
            represented by guardians whose interests are the same
            as theirs, and the fact of minority could not prevent the
            guardians from showing due diligence on behalf of the
            minors. It is noticeable that Section 7 of the Limitation
            Act, in extending the period of limitation on account of
            minority, refers only to suits and applications and makes
            no mention of appeals, and its provisions are, therefore,
            unavailable to the minor defendants.”
       Section 7 referred to in the above extract is from the: Limitation
       Act (XV of 1877) and the provisions we are concerned with also is
       similarly worded, without any mention of appeals.
12. In Musthafali v. Subair,3 the High Court of Kerala considering the
    word ‘suit’ used in Section 6 and defined in the Limitation Act held


1   (2016) 14 SCC 314
2   1890 SCC OnLine All 1
3   1991 SCC OnLine Ker 269
[2025] 5 S.C.R.                                                             175

             The New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Gopu & Anr.


     that the proceedings under Section 110A of the Motor Vehicles Act
     are in the nature of a suit under the Code of Civil Procedure; since
     the lis is instituted by presentation of an application, which is more
     or less like a plaint. The Division Bench of the High Court relied on a
     Constitution Bench decision of this Court in H.H. Maharana Sahib Shri
     Bhagwat Singh Bahadur of Udaipur v. State of Rajasthan 4 which held
            “A proceeding which does not commence with a plaint or
            petition in the nature of plaint, or where the claimant is
            not in respect of dispute ordinarily triable in a civil court,
            would prima facie not be regarded as falling within Section
            86 of Code of Civil Procedure..” [sic paragraph 5].
     Impliedly, the exemption by reason of a disability applies to the
     institution of an original proceeding or an application for execution
     of a final decree, which will not apply in the case of an appeal.
     Appeal is a continuation of the original proceeding and if, as is the
     case here, when the original proceeding was instituted at the time
     of minority, why should there be a subsequent disability inferred,
     when the natural guardian, the father, who instituted the appeal was
     alive and did not suffer from any disability himself, even when the
     appeal period stood expired. The above observation of ours may
     not be taken as Section 6 being applicable to appeals, which the
     legislature did not intend.
13. In the present case, the father as the natural guardian has instituted
    the original proceeding before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal,
    filed for compensation on the death of his wife in a motor vehicle
    accident, with both the minor children in the party array of claimants,
    represented by the father, the natural guardian. The father did not
    choose to file an appeal from the award. In fact, as per Annexure
    P-4, it is seen that the Insurance Company had filed an appeal from
    the award of the Tribunal on the ground of the policy not covering
    the risk of a pillion rider, which stood dismissed by a Division Bench
    of the High Court, based on a clarification issued by the Insurance
    Regulatory Development Authority that a package policy will also
    cover the risk of a pillion rider. In the said appeal the father and the
    two minor children were made parties, and they appeared through



4   1963 SCC OnLine SC 119
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       counsel. The father did not choose to file a cross appeal seeking
       enhancement of the claim amounts. The father who is the natural
       guardian took a conscious decision not to file an appeal and was
       satisfied with the award. The statements made in the application for
       condonation of delay, that; the father had married again; the children
       were abandoned; who were in the care of their grandparents are
       not substantiated. We make this observation fully conscious of the
       fact that any substantiation would also have not enabled the filing
       of an appeal under Section 6, the exemption under which, based
       on a disability, is confined to suits and applications for execution
       of a decree. The intention of the legislature being very clear, it is
       not for the courts to extend the period of limitation on misplaced
       sympathies. Even Section 5 has no application in the facts of the
       case, insofar as the long delay occasioned, especially when in the
       original proceedings, the children were represented by the father,
       the natural guardian.
14.     On the above reasoning, we set aside the judgment of the learned
       Single Judge finding the appeal filed to be grossly delayed and hence
       not maintainable. The appeal stands allowed.

       Result of the case: Appeal allowed.



       †
           Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain