Holding

The Debts Recovery Tribunal is empowered under Section 22 (and Section 19(6)) of the Act to grant interim ex‑parte injunctions or stays, provided the order is issued in the interest of justice, complies with natural‑justice principles and is reasoned.

Summary

ICICI filed an application under Section 19 of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 seeking recovery of about Rs 36.5 crore from Grapco Industries Ltd. and others. The Debts Recovery Tribunal, on the same day, issued an ex‑parte injunction restraining the respondents from alienating hypothecated property and appointed a special officer to take inventory. Grapco approached the Calcutta High Court under Article 227, which stayed the Tribunal’s order but did not restrain the respondents from dealing with the assets in the ordinary course of business. The High Court held that the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to grant ex‑parte injunctions and that the order was an unreasoned, omnibus order. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined Sections 19 and 22 of the Act and held that the Tribunal is empowered to pass interim injunctions, including ex‑parte ones, provided the principles of natural justice are observed and reasons are recorded. The Court affirmed that the High Court’s stay could not be interfered with merely because of the passage of time and remitted the matter, but dismissed the appeal. The judgment clarifies the DRT’s jurisdiction to grant interim relief under the Act.

Issues considered

Whether the Debts Recovery Tribunal under the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 has jurisdiction to grant interim ex‑parte injunctions or stays against a defendant.

Legislation cited

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
Consumer Protection Act, 1986s. 13(4)
Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973s. 53
Limitation Act, 1963s. 24
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988s. 169
Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993s. 19, s. 22

Subjects

Debts Recovery Tribunalex parte injunctioninterim ordernatural justiceRecovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions ActSection 19Section 22jurisdictionArticle 227banking law

Judgment

THE INDUSTRIAL CREDIT AND INVESTMENT A
CORPORATION OF INDIA LTD.
v.
GRAPCO INDUSTRIES LTD. AND ORS.

MAY 14, 1999
B
[S. SAGHIR AHMAD AND D.P. WADHWA, JJ.]

Recove1y of Debts Due to Banks and financial Institution Act, 1993
Sections 19,22-Ex parte order of injunction-Jurisdiction of Debts Recovery
Tribunal-Held, Tribunals empowered to make interim order by way of C
injunction or stay-It also has power to grant that order even ex parte-
Requirement of passing a reasoned order.

The appellant, a financial Company filed an application u/s I9 of the
Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and financial Institutions Act, I993, claiming D
an amount of over Rupees thirty six and a half crore against respondents I
and 2 jointly and severally. The Debts Recovery Tribunal constituted under
the Act granted on ex-parte order of injunction restraining the respondent
from transferring or alienating the properties hypothecated to ICICI. High
Court in petition under Art 227 of the Constitution stayed the operation of
the order of Tribunal, putting no restraints on the respondents not to deal E
with the assets and properties. Holding that on merits also the Tribunal was
wrong in granting an ex parte order as the Tribunal did not give any reasons
and that it was an ominbuns order. However, the High Court did not refer
at all to the facts of the case. These appeals had been filed against the
judgment of the High Court. The questions which arose for consideration in F
these appeals is whether the Debts Recovery Tribunal has jurisdiction to
grant an interim ex parte order of injunction or stay against the defendants
on an application filed by the bank or financial institution for recovery of
debt as defined under clause (g) of Sec 2 of the Act.

Disposing of the appeals, this Court
G
HELD : I. I. When Section 22 of the Recovery of Debts to Banks and
Financial Institutions Act says that the Tribunal shall not be bound by the
procedure laid by the Code of Civil Procedure, it does not mean that it will
not have jurisdiction to exercise powers of a Court as contained in the Code
of Civil Procedure. Rather, the Tribunal can travel beyond the Code of/Civil H
759
760· SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999] 3 S.C.R.

A Procedure and the only fetter that is put on its powers is to observe the
principles of natural justice. [766-D-FJ
1.2. Further, when power is given to the Tribunal to make interim
order by way of injunction or stay, it inheres in it the power to grant that
order even ex parte, if it is so in the interest of justice and as per the
B requirements as spelt out in the judgment of this Court in Morgan's Case.
[768-B)
Morgan Stanely Mutual Fund v. Kartick Das, (19941 4 SCC 225,
relied on.
1.3. An ex parte order is only of short duration and it is granted to
C safeguard the interest of the applicant, but, at the same time, such an order
cannot be granted as a matter of course. A Court or Tribunal has also to
consider the consequences of such an order if ultimately the order is to be
revoked after hearing the defendant. In such circumstances, the Tribunal
must put the applicant on terms while granting an ex parte order and
D compensate the defendant in case the ex parte order was obtained without any
justification and harm has been caused to the defendant. An ex parte order
can also affect the reputation of the person against" whom it is issued and
sometimes it may be difficult to undo the damage caused by an interim order.
A Tribunal while granting ex parte order of stay or injunction must record
reasons, may be brief one, and cannot pass a stereo-typed order in terms of
E the prayer made. Then an ex parte order cannot be allowed to continue
indefinitely and the continuance of interim order has to be decided without
undue delay when the defendant puts in his appearance. Sub-section (8) of
Section 19 requires that application for recovery of debt itself is to be
disposed of finally within a period of six months from the date of receipt of
F the application. That also shows the urgency to decide whether an interim
order of injunction or stay granted ex parte has to be continued or not.
[768-C-F)
1.4. Criticism of the High Court that even on merits, the Tribunal was
wrong in granting an ex parte order, without it itself examining the facts of
G the case, was based on abstract principles of Law. There was no bar on the
High Court to itself examine the merits of the case in the exercise of its
jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution if the circumstances so
require. High Court can even interfere with interim orders of the courts and
· tribunals under Article 227 of the Constitution if the order is made without
jurisdiction. But a too technical approach is to be avoided. When facts of the
H case brought before the High Court are such that High Court can itself
I.C.I.C.I. v. GRAPCO INDUS. LTD. [D.P. WADHWA, J.] 761
correct the error, then it should pass appropriate orders instead of merely A
setting aside the impugned order of the Tribunal and leaving everything in
vacuum. [768-G-H; 769-A-B)

l.5. When High Court stayed the order of the Tribunal it put no
restraint on the respondents not to deal with the assets and properties except
in the normal course of its working. High Court itself did not consider it B
appropriate to consider as to what were the merits of the case filed by ICICI.
When the Tribunal issued ex parte order, it granted 15 days time to
respondents to show cause. Instead of merely setting aside the order, High
Court could have remanded the matter to the Tribunal to take a decision
expeditiously while, at the same time, continuing the interim order, in modified C
form or otherwise, since the circumstances of the case certainly so warranted.
At this point of time, considering that the object with which the Tribunal
passed the ex parte order appears now to have been lost, the impugned
judgment of the High Court setting aside the order of the Tribunal is not
to be interfered. But that is only because of passage of time and without this
Court knowing the stage of proceedings before the Tribunal on the application D
filed by ICICI under Section 19(1) of the Act. It will, however, be open to the
Tribunal to pass an interim order on the plea of the ICICI if the matter is
still pending before it. [769-F-H; 770-A)

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No .. 3167of1999
Etc. E
From the Judgment and Order dated 6.1.98 of the Calcutta High Court
in C.O. No. 3321 of 1997.

Harish N.Salve, Ms. Purnima Singh and Suman Jyoti Khaitan for the
Appellants. F
Rajiv K. Garg, Atul Sharma, N.D. Garg, Sanjay Kapur and Rajinder
Mathur for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

D.P. WADHWA, J. Leave granted. G
Question of law that arises for consideration in these appeals is : if the
Debts Recovery Tribunal constituted under Section 3( 1) of the Recovery of
Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (for short, the 'Act')
has jurisdiction to grant ad interim ex parte order of injunction or stay against
the defendant on an application filed by the bank or financial institution for H
, '

762 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999] 3 S.C.R.

A recovery of debt as defined under clause (g) of Section 2 of the Act. Tribunal
under clause (o) of Section 2 of the Act means the Tribunal established under'
sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Act. These appeals are from the judgments
of the Cal~utta High Court given on petitions filed under Article 227 of the
Constitution holding that the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to grant ex parte
orders under the Act. It is further held on merit as well that the Tribunal was
B wrong in granting an ex parte order of injunction.

When we see Preamble to the Act, it provides for the establishment of
Tribunals for expeditious adjudication and recovery of debts due to banks
and financial institutions and for matters connected therewith or incidental
C thereto. Under Section 17 of the Act a Tribunal shall exercise jurisdiction,
powers and authority to entertain and decide applications from the banks and
financial institution for recovery of debts due to such banks and financial
institutions. There is also a provision for establishment of Appellate Tribunal.
Under section 18 of the Act, no court or other authority shall have, or be
entitled to exercise, any jurisdiction, powers or authority in relation to the
D matters specified in Section 17 of the Act. This bar of jurisdiction, however,
does not apply to the Supreme Court or to a High Court exercising jurisdiction
under Articles 226 and 227 Of the Constitution. It is not necessary for us to
consider as to how a Tribunal and Appellate Tribunal are established and
their qualifications.
E
Chapter IV of the Act provides for the procedure of Tribunals. Section
19, which is relevant for our purpose, is as under :

"19. Application to the Tribunal--(1) Where a Bank or a Financial
Institution has to recover any debt from any person, it may make an application
F to the Tribunal within the local limits of whose jurisdiction,--

(a) the defendant, or each of the defendants where there are more
than one, at the time of making the application, actually and
voluntarily resides, or carries on business, or personally works
for gain; or
G
(b) any_ofthe defendants, where there are more than one, at the time
of making the application, actually and voluntarily resides or
carries on business, or pers5mally works for gain; or
··•..
(c) the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises.
H (2) Every application under sub-section (1) shall be in such form
I
4.,

LC.LC.I. v. GRAPCO INDUS. LTD. [D.P. WADHWA, J.] 763
and be accompanied by such documents or other evidence and A
any such documents or other evidence anq by such fee for filing
the application as may be prescribed :

~
provided that the fee may be prescribed having regard to the
amount of debt to be recovered.

Provided further that nothing contained in this sub-section
B
relating to fee shall apply to cases transferred to the Tribunal
under sub-section( 1). of Section 31.

(3) On receipt of the application under sub-section (1), the Tribunal
shall issue summons : requiring the defendant to show cause
within thirty days of the service of summons as to why the relief
c
prayed for should not be granted.

(4) The Tribunal may, after giving the applicant and the defendant
an opportunity of being heard, pass such orders on the application
as it thinks fit to meet the ends of justice. D
(5) The Tribunal shall send a copy of every order passed by it to
the applicant and the defendant.

(6) The Tribunal may make an interim order (whether by way of
·~
injunction or stay) against the defendant to debar him from
transferring, alienating or otherwise dealing with, or disposing E

- (7)
of, any property and assets belonging to him without the prior
permission of the Tribunal.

The Presiding Officer shall issue a certificate under his signatures
on the basis of the order of the Tribunal, to the Recovery Officer
for recovery of the amount of debt specified in the certificate.
F

(8) The application made to the Tribunal under sub-section ( 1) shall
be dealt with by it as expeditiously as possible and endeavour
~~
shall be made by it to dispose of the application finally within
six months from the date of receipt of the application."
G
Section 22 prescribes the procedure and powers of the Tribunal and
that of the Appellate Tribunal and, in relevant part, it is as under :

"22. Procedure and powers of the Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal-
(l) The Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal shall not be bound by H
764 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999] 3 S.C.R.

A the procedure laid down by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
(5 of 1908), but ·shall be guided by the principles of natural
justice and, subject to the other provisions of this Act and of
any rules, the Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal shall have
their sittings. ........
·B (2) The Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal shall have, for the
purposes of discharging their functions under this Act, the same
powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 (5of1908), while trying a suit, in respect of the
following matters, namely :-

c (a) summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person and
examining him on oath;
(b) requiring the discovery and. production of documents;
(c) receiving evidence on affidavits;

D (d) issuing commissions for the examination of witnesses or
documents;
(e) reviewing its decisions;
(t) dismissing an application for default or deciding it ex parte;
#'
E (g) setting aside miy order of dismissal of any application for default
or any order passed by it ex parte;
(h) any other matter which may be prescribed,

(3) "

F Under Section 24 of the Act, provisions of the Limitation Act 1963
apply to the applications made to a Tribunal. As per requirement of Section
19(2) of the Act, a form of appliCation has been prescribed under the Debt
Recovery Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1993 framed under the Act.

G Bank or a financial institution which files an application for recovery of
debt is called the applicant under the Act and the person from whom debt
is to be recovered is called the defendant. But when we see the form prescribed
for the application for recovery of debt, the terms given are applicant and
respondent. For all intent and purpose, an application is like a plaint in civil
suit and applicant would be plaintiff and respondent a defendant. The details
H which are required to be given in the application in substance conform to the
LC.LC.I. v. GRAPCO INDUS. LTD. [D.P. WA.DHWA, J.] 765
requirements of a plaint under the Code of Civil Procedure. To understand the A
rival contentions, it may perhaps to better to describe the applicant as a
plaintiff, an application as a plaint and respondent as defendant.

Under sub-section (1) of the Section 19, a bank or a financial institution
which has to recover any debt from any person can file a plaint before the
Tribunal having jurisdiction in the matter. Under sub-section (2) a plaint is to B
be in the form prescribed. Under Rule 10 of the Rules, a plaint shall not seek
relief or reliefs based on more than a single cause of action in one single plaint
unless the reliefs prayed for are consequential to one another, under sub-
section (3) of Section 19, on receipt of the plaint, Tribunal shall issue summons
to the defendant requiring him to show cause as to why relief prayed for C
should not be granted. Under sub-section (4), the Tribunal may, after giving
the plaintiff and the defendant an opportunity of being heard, pass such order
on the plaint as it thinks fit to meet the ends of justice. Thereafter under
sub-section (5), a copy of every order passed by the Tribunal is to be sent
to the plaintiff and the defendant. Under sub-section (7), the Tribunal is to
issue a certificate on the basis of its order to the Recovery Officer as defined D
in clause (k) of Section 2 of the Act for recovery of the amount of debt
specified in the certificate. That is the scheme of Section 19. But here we have
left out sub-section (6) which empowers the Tribunal to pass interim order.
The dispute is if the Tribunal can pass ex parte order.

High Court relied on a decision of this Court in Morgan Stanley Mutual E
Fund v. Kartick Das, (1994] 4 SCC 225, to hold that the Tribunal has no
jurisdiction to grant ex parte order. The aforesaid judgment of this Court was
under Section 14 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 which Section did
not provide for grant of any interim relief or even ad interim relief and
provided only for final relief. At the same time, High Court noticed that this F
Court in this very judgment laid down principles to be taken into consideration
by a court or tribunal while granting ex parte injunction. This Court has said
that an ex parte order should be granted only under exceptional circumstances.
Grant of ex parte order is not a rule but an exception. The factors which this
Court said should weigh with the court to tribunal for the grant of ex parte
injunction may be noted. These are : G
"(a) whether irreparable or serious mischief will ensure to the plaintiff;

(b) whether the refusal of ex parte injunction would involve greater
injustice than the grant of it would involve;

(c) the court will also consider the time at which the plaintiff first H
I
)

766 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999] 3 S.C.R.

A had notice of the act complained so that the making of improper
order against a party in his absence is prevented;
(d) the court will consider whether the plaintiff had acquiesced for
sometime and in such circumstances it will not grant ex parte ~

injunction;
B (e) the court would expect a party applying for ex parte injunction
to show utmost good faith in making the application.
(f) even if granted, the ex parte injunction would be for a limited
period of time;

c (g) general principles like primafacie case, balance of convenience
and irreparable Joss would also be considered by the court."

High Court, in its judgment which is quite interminable considered the
provisions of the Act and the Rules framed therein and came to the conclusion
that grant of ad interim or ex parte order of injunction or stay would be against
D the principles of natural justice and is not contemplated by the Act and the
Rules. Reference was made to Section 22 of the Act which provides that the
Tribunal shall not be bound by procedure laid down by the Code of Civil
Procedure bttt shall be guided by the principles of natural justice and subject
to other provisions of the Act and (he Rules. High Court was of the view that
grant of ex parte order was very antithesis of the principle of natural justice.
E
We, however, do not agree with the reasoning adopted by the High
Court. When Section 22 of the Act says that the Tribunal shall not be bound ......
by the procedure laid by the Code of Civil Procedure, it does not, mean that
it will not have jurisdiction to exercise powers of a Court as contained in the
F Code of Civil Procedure. Rather, the Tribunal can travel beyond the Code of
Civil Procedure and the only fetter that is put on its powers is to observe the
principles of natural justice. Contrast Section 22 of the act with Section 13(4)
of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 which vests certain powers on the
authorities under the Act :

G "(4) For the purposes of this section, the District Forum shall have the
same powers as are vested in Civil Court under the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), while trying a suit in respect of the
following matters, namely,-

(i) the summoning and enforcing attendance of any defendant or
H Witness and examining the witness on oath;
1.C.I.C.I. v. GRAPCO INDUS. LTD. [D.P. WADHWA, J.] 767

W' (ii) the discovery and production of any document or other material A
,objection producible as evidence;
. ---
(iii) the reception of evidence on affidavits;

(iv) the requisitioning of the report of the concerned analysis or test
from the appropriate laboratory or from any other relevant source;
B
(v) issuing of any commission for the examination of any witness;
and
(vi) any other matter which may be prescribed."

We may also have a look at Section 53 of the Foreign Exchange
Regulation Act, 1973, which is as under : C
"53. Powers of the adjudicating officer and the Appellate Board to
summon witnesses, etc.-(I) without prejudice to any other provision
contained in this Act, the adjudicating officer and the Appellate
Board shall have all the powers of a civil court under the Code of Civil D
procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), while trying a suit, in respect of the
following matters, namely :-

(a) summoning and enforcing the attendance of witness;

(b) requiring the discovery and production of any document;
(c) requisitioning any public record or copy thereof from any court E
or officer;

(d) receiving evidence on affidavits; and

(e) issuing commissions for the examination of witnesses or
documents. F
2 ......."

Similarly, Section 169 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 provides for
procedure and powers of Claims Tribunals, says that in holding an inquiry,
the Claims Tribunal may, subject to any rules follow such summary procedure G
as it thinks fit and that the Claims Tribunal shall have all the powers of a civil
court for the purpose of taking evidence on oath and of enforcing the
attendance of witnesses and of compelling the production of documents and
material objects and such other purposes as may be prescribed. It will, thus,
be seen that while there are no limitations on the powers of the Tribunal under
the Act, the legislature has thought fit to restrict the powers of the authorities H
768 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999] 3 S.C.R.

A under various enactments while exercising certain powers under those
enactments. We have to give meaning to Section 22 of the Act as here the
Tribunal is exercising powers of a Civil Court trying a money suit. Further,
when power is given to the Tribunal to make interim order by way of injunction
or stay, it inheres in it the power to grant that order even ex parte, if it is so
B in the interest of justice and as per the requirements as spelt out in the
judgment of this Court in Morgan's case which has been quoted above.

An ex parte order is only of short duration and it is granted to safeguard
the interest of the applicant, but, at the same time, such an order cannot be
granted as a matter of course. A Court or Tribunal has also to consider the
C consequences of such an order if ultimately the order is to be revoked after
hearing the defendant. In such circumstances, the Tribunal must put the
applicant on terms while granting an ex parte order and compensate the
defendant in case the ex parte order was obtained without any justification
and harm has been caused to the defendant. It must be remembered that an
ex parte order can also affect the ·reputation of the person against whom it
D is issued and sometimes it may be difficult to undo the damage caused by
an interim order. A Tribunal while grantini; ex parte order of stay or injunction
must record reasons, may be brief one, and cannot pass a stereo-typed order
in terms of the prayer made. Then an ex parte order cannot be allowed to
continue indefinitely and the continuanc~ of interim order has to be decided
E without undue delay when the defendant puts in his appearance. It is not
necessary to hear long drawn arguments. Principles on which an interim order
can be granted are well settled. Sub-section (8) of Section 19 requires that
application for recovery of debt itself is to be disposed of finally within a
period of six months from the date of receipt of the application. That also
shows the urgency to decide is an interim order of injunction or stay granted
F el< parte is to be continued or not. In our view, the High Court was not correct
in holding that a Tribunal under the Act has no power to grant an ex parte
order of injunction or stay.

High Court also said that on merits as well the Tribunal was wrong in
G granting an ex parte order. It is not that High Court itself considered the
merits of the case. Objection of the High Court was twofold : ( 1) the Tribunal
did not give any reasons and (2) it was an omnibus order and that there was
no reference even to prayers in the application and that the prayers stood
allowed "in terms of entire hog". Criticism of the High Court appears to be
correct on that account. Judgment of the High Court, however, does not refer
H at all to the facts of the case and it proceeds more on abstract principles of
I
i

I.C.l.C.I. v. GRAPCO INDUS. LTD. [D.P. WADHWA, J.] 769
Jaw. There was no bar on the High Court to itself examine the merits of the A
case in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution
if the.circumstances so require. There is no doubt that High Court can even
interfere with interim orders of the courts and tribunals under Article 227 of
the Constitution if the order is made without jurisdiction. But then a too
technical approach is to be avoided. When facts of the case brought before B
the High Court are such that High Court can itself correct the error, then it
should pass appropriate orders instead of merely setting aside the impugned
order of the Tribunal and leaving everything in vacuum.

We may refer, in brief, facts of the case in the civil appeal arising out
of SLP (C) No. 8208 - The Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation of C
India Ltd. (ICICI) v. Grapco Industries Ltd. & Anr., ICICI filed an application
under Section 19 of the Act on May 15, 1997 claiming an amount of over
Rupees thirty-six and a half crore against respondents 1 and 2 jointly and
severally. On that very day, Tribunal granted an order of injunction and
restrained the respondents from transferring or alienating the properties
hypothecated to ICICI and further appointing a special officer for making D
inventory of the assets and properties hypothecated and mortgaged by the
respondents in favour of ICICI. By the same order, a show-cause notice was
also issued by the Tribunal to respondents calling upon them show-cause
within 15 days why temporary injunction could not be granted. On June 23,
1997, respondents moved the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution E
praying for setting aside the order of the Tribunal dated May 15, 1997. High
Court stayed the operation of the order of the Tribunal. By the impugned
judgment, the order of the Tribunal dated May 15, 1997 was set aside. When
High Court stayed the order of the Tribunal dated May 15 1997, it put no
restraint on the respondents not to deal with the assets and properties except
in the normal course of its working. High Court itself did not consider it F
appropriate to consider as to what were the merits of the case filed by the
ICICI. When the Tribunal issued ex parte order, it granted 15 days time to
respondents to show cause. Instead of merely setting aside the order, High
Court could have remanded the matter to the Tribunal to take a decision
expeditiously while, at the same time, c~ntinuing the interim order, in modified G
form or otherwise, since the circumstances of the case certainly so warranted.
At this point of time, we do not know the stage of proceedings before the
Tribunal. We do not know ifthere is any interim order passed by the Tribunal
after the High Court stayed the operation of the ex parte order dated May 15,
1997. The object with which the Tribunal passed the ex parte order appears
now to have been Jost. We may not, therefore, interfere with the impugned H
!
....

770 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
I
[1999] 3 S.C.R.

A judgment of the High Court setting aside the order dated May 15, 1997 of the
Tribunal. But that is only because of passage of time and without our knowing
the stage of proceedings before the Tribunal on the application filed by the
ICICI under Section 19(1) of the Act. It will, however, be open to the Tribunal
to pass an interim order on the plea of the ICICI if the matters is still pending
before it.
B
While not agreeing with the views expressed by the High Court, we will
not interfere with impugned judgment in view of the circumstances narrated
above. The appeals are disposed of accordingly. Appellants shall, however,
be entitled of costs.
c R.A. Appeals disposed of.

'
,~

-