Holding

Rule 4(a) of the Allahabad High Court Rules, 1951 is valid and not ultra vires Article 215; the High Court may assign civil contempt matters to a single judge under its rule‑making powers.

Summary

The Allahabad High Court, through its Registrar, challenged a Division Bench judgment that declared Rule 4(a) of the Allahabad High Court Rules, 1951 ultra vires Article 215 of the Constitution because it required civil contempt matters to be heard by a single judge. The Supreme Court examined whether the rule conflicted with the High Court’s status as a court of record and its rule‑making powers under Article 225, the Government of India Acts of 1915 and 1935, and the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. It held that the rule is a valid exercise of the High Court’s administrative authority to assign contempt cases to a single judge and does not infringe Article 215. The Court also rejected the relevance of Order 39 Rule 2A of the CPC and affirmed that contempt jurisdiction is an independent original jurisdiction. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s order and allowed the appeal.

Issues considered

Whether Rule 4(a) of the Allahabad High Court Rules, 1951 is inconsistent with Article 215 of the Constitution of India.
Whether the High Court, under Article 225 and the pre‑Constitutional statutes, can make a rule assigning civil contempt cases to a single judge.
Whether Order 39 Rule 2A of the Civil Procedure Code is applicable to the procedure for civil contempt in a High Court.
Whether contempt jurisdiction is an independent original jurisdiction under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.

Legislation cited

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. Order 39 Rule 2A
Constitution of Indias. 214, s. 215, s. 216, s. 225
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971s. 11, s. 23, s. 2(d)
Government of India Act, 1935s. 223

Subjects

civil contempthigh court rulesArticle 215Article 225rule‑making powercourt of recordultra virescontempt jurisdictionSupreme CourtAllahabad High Court

Judgment

THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD A
THROUGH ITS REGISTRAR
v.
RAJ KISHORE YADAV AND ORS.

FEBRUARY 24, 1997
B
[A.M. AHMADI, CJ., S.B. MAJMUDAR AND
SUJATA V. MANOHAR, JJ.]

Constitution of lndia:--Articles 215 and 225-Powers of High
Cowt-Allahabad High Courts Rules, 1951-01. 35-E, R 4(a)-Framed by C
Full Bench of the High Court-Civil Contenipt-Rule requiring that all civil
contempt cases be presented before the Bench of a Single Judge constituted
for the purpos~He/d valid, Not ultravires of Article 215.

Contempt of Courts Act, 1971-Sec. 2( d), 11, 23-civi/ Con-
·'·' temp~-Contempt Jurisdiction is an independent Jurisdiction of original 1zac D
ture.

Civil Procedure Code, 1908-0rder 39, Rule 2-A-Nature and Ap-
plicability of-Analogy of Order 39 Rule 2-A C.P. C. not relevant in the context
of validity of Rule 4(a) of Allahabad High Cowt Rules, 1951.
E
Govemment of India Act, 1915-Section IO~Administration of High

- Courts.

Govemment of India Act, 1935-Sections 223, 22(r-Powers of High
Courts. ·
F
On 16.12.1989, an inten·m order was passed by a Division Bench of
the High Court of Allahabad in a Writ petition staying the termination of
services of ad hoc teachers, who were petitioners before the High Court.
By an order dated 13.5.1993 a Single Judge of the High Court allowed the
writ petition and issued directions to the concerned Respondent- G
authorities. On 18.10.1993 respondent No. 1 moved an application for
taking S!Jitable action against the concerned respondent in the writ peti-
tion on the allegation that they have committed contempt of court by
flouting final order in the writ petition. On 9.11.1993, the original writ
petitioners by an application submitted that the nomination of a Judge for H
429
430 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997] 2 S.C.R.

A hearing civil contempt of the High Court as per impugned rule 4(a) of the
High Court Rules, militates against Article 215 of the Constitution of
India. On 6.11.1996, the Division Bench of the High Court declared the
impugned Rule as ultravires of Article 215 of the Constitution of India.

B The Registrar, High Court of Judicature of Allahabad filed a special
'leave petition against the judgment and order dated 6.11.1996 rendered
by a Division Bench.

Allowing the appeal, this Court

c HELD: 1. Clause (a) of Rule 4, Chapter XXXV ·E of the Rule of High
Court of Judicature at Allahabad is valid and legal and not inconsistent
with Article 215 of the Constitution of India. [432·A]

2.1. A canjoint reading of Section 108 of the Government of India Act,
D 1915, Section 223 of the Govt. of India Act, 1935 and Article 225 of the
Constitution of India makes it clear that every High Court by its own rules .
can provide for exercise of its jurisdiction, original or appellate by one or
more judges or by division courts, consisting of two or more judges of the
High Court and it is for the Chief Justice of each High Court to determine
E which judge in each case is to sit alone or which judges of the Court whether
with or without the Chief Justice are to constitute several division courts.
In exercise of the aforesaid rule making power which inherited in all exist·
ing High Court at the time of the advent of the Constitution of India and
which was expressly saved by Article 225 of the Constitution of India the
full court of the High Court had framed these rules in 1952. The procedure
F for exercise for contempt jurisdiction can be laid down by tile High Court
concerned by framing suitable rules vi de Section 23 of the Contempt of
Courts Act, 1971. Pursuant to Rule 4(a) of the said Rules the Chief Justice
was entitled to nominate a learned Single Judge to decide civil contempt
cases arising under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. The aforesaid rule,
therefore clearly falls in line with the constitutional scheme in connection
G with the exercise of jurisdiction of the High Court. Thus enactment of the
impugned rule squarely falls within the administrative power of the High
Court well prescribed by the aforesaid provisions. [436-F-H, 437·A·C]

National Sewing thread Co. Ltd. v. Tames Chandwick Bros Ltd., AIR
H (1953) SC 357, relied on.
H.C. OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABADv. R.K YADA V [S.B. MAJMUDAR, J.) 431

3.1. All that Article 215 states is that every High Court shall be a A
court of record meaning thereby all the original record of the court will be
preserved by the said court and it shall have all the powers of such a
superior court of record including the power to punish for contempt of
itself. As a superior court of record the High Court is entitled to preserve
its original record in perpetuity. Even apart from the aforesaid attribute B
of a superior court of record the High Court as such has two fold powers
being a court of record the High Court viz. (i) has power to determine the
question about its own jurisdiction; and (ii) has inherent power to punish
for its contempt summarily. (438-C-E]

Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar v. State of Maharashtra, AIR (1967) SC 1, C
relied on.

Special Reference No. 1 of 1964 AIR (1965) SC 745, cited.

. 4.1. The analogy of order 39, Rule 2-A CPC cannot be pressed into
service while judging the validity of the impugned rule on the touchstone D
of Article 215 of the Constitution of India. [443-A]

5.1. Contempt jurisdiction is an independent jurisdiction of original
nature, whether emanating from the Contempt of Courts Act or Article 215
of the Constitution of India. [443-H]
E
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1562 of
1997.

From the Judgment and Order dated 6.11.96 of the Allahabad High
Court in C.M.W.P. No. 23189 of 1989.
F
Rakesh Dwivedi, Rajiv Dutta, Vipin Nair and D.R. Nigam for the
Appellant.

Anil Srivastava for the Respondent Nos. 2-4.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by G
S.B. MAJMUDAR, J. Leave granted.

This appeal arises out of a Special Leave Petition moved by the High
Court of Judicature at Allahabad through its Registrar having obtained'·
permission from this Court to file the same against the judgment and order H
432 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997] 2 S.C.R.

A dated 6th November 1996 rendered by a Division Bench of the High Court
of Allahabad. By the impugned order Rule 4(a) of Chapter XXXV-E of
the High Court Rules, 1951 was declared. to be ultra vires Article 215 'of
the Constitution of India in so far as the said Rule permits hearing of a
petition alleging civil contempt in connection with breach or violation of
B an order, direction or judgment of a Bench of the High Court by a learned
Judge to whom such work is assigned by the Chief Justice and who is other
than the juclge or judges who have passed the concerned order, direction
or judgment; The learned judges by their impugned order have taken the
view that as the High Court is a court of record as provided by Article 215
of the Constitution of India once a Bench of the High Court has passed an
C order or direction breach of which is complained of by the aggrieved party,
the same Bench which has the record of the case must hear the Contempt
Petition and in so far a~ the impugned Rule permits hearing of such
Contempt Petition by any other judge of the High Court, it flies in the face
of Article 215 of the Constitution of India and, therefore, would be to that /
D extent null and void and inoperative in law. Rule 4(a) of the High Court
Rules provides as under :

"4(a). Every case relating to civil contempt shall he presented
before the bench of a Single Judge constituted for that purpose."

E Al the outset it may be stated that it is indeed surprising how the Division
Bench considered the merits of the question without notice to the High
Court on its administrative side through its Registrar for giving it an
opportunity to defend this Rule as it was the author thereof. On this short
ground it must be held that the impugned order is liable to be set ~side as
F being violative of basic principles of the natural justice. But instead of
resting our judgment on this short ground, we have thought it fit to decide
the question of validity of the said Rule on merits as the question raises an
important controversy regarding the correct procedure to be followed by
the High Court while deciding applications invoking contempt jurisdiction
of the High. Court in connection with civil contempts of its orders and as
G the decision on this question will have a direct impact on large number of '
petitions pending in the High Court.

Learned counsel appearing for the appellant-High Court as well as
learned counsel appearing for some of the respondents have contended
H that the aforesaid view of he the High Court is patently erroneous. Respon-
-+·
\
H.C.OF JUDICATUREATALLAHABADv. RK YADAV[S.B MAJMUDAR,J.) 433

dent No. 1 who was the original applicant before the High Court invoking A
its contempt jurisdiction, though served, has not though it fit to appear and
contest these proceedings.

A few relevant facts leading to these proceedings may be nofod at
the outset. On 16th December 1989 an interim order was passed by a
Division Bench of the High Court of Allahabad in Writ Petition No. 23189 B
of 1989 staying termination of services of ad hoc teachers who were

-
petitioners before the High Court. By an order dated 13th May 1993 a
learned Single Judge of the High Court, R.S. Dhavan, J., allowed the said
Writ Petition and issued directions to the respondent-authorities con-
cerned by which it was ordered that ad hoc· teachers at the Kendriya C
Vidyalaya would be replaced only by freshly empanelled recruits and
should not be replaced by transferred teachers and that they would be
entitled to salary for the period mentioned in the aforesaid order. On 18th
October 1993 respondent No. 1 moved an application for taking suitable
action against the concerned respondents in the Writ Petition on the
allegation that they committed contempt of the court by flouting the D
aforesaid final order passed by the learned Judge in the Writ petition. The
original writ petitioners by an application dated 9th November 1993 sub-
mitted that nomination of a learned judge for hearing civil contempt of the
High Court as per impugned Rule 4(a) of the High Court Rules militates
against Article 215 of the Constitution of India. By the judgment under E
appeal the Division Bench of the High Court declared Rule 4( a) of the
High Court Rules as ultra vires Article 215 of the Constitution to the extent

- indicated in the judgment, as noted earlier.

Having given our anxious consideration to the reasoning which
prevailed with the learned judges for coming to the aforesaid conclusion, F
and having heard the learned counsel for the parties before us we find that
the view taken by the learned judges of the High Court in the impugned
judgment cannot be sustained on the scheme of the Constitution and the
relevant provisions of the Contempt' of Courts Act, 1971 (hereinafter
referred to as 'the Act'). G
In the first place we may notice the relevant provisions of the Act.
Section 2(b) defines 'civil contempt' as under :

"2. (b). 'civil contempt' mearis wilful disobedience to any judgment,
decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a court or wilful H
434 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1997] 2 S.C.R.

A breach of an undertaking given to a court."

Section 11 provides that a High Court shall have jurisdiction to inquire into
or try a contempt of itself or of any court subordinate to it, whether the
contempt is alleged to have been committed within or outside the local
limits of its jurisdiction, and whether the person alleged to be guilty of
B contempt is within or outside such limits. Section 23 lays down that the
Supreme Court or, as the case may be, any High Court may make rules,
not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, providing for any matter
relating to its procedure. -
C As per the aforesaid provisions of the Act the High Court can take
suitable action in connection with civil contempt committed by the contem-
nor so far as the contempt is alleged to be in connection with any order
passed by the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction. The contempt
alleged is the contempt of the High Court as such and not necessarily the
contempt of only a particular judge who might have passed the order
D concerned in exercise of the jurisdiction conferred on the High Court as
such. 'High Court' is defined by Section 2( d) of the Act to mean, 'the High
Court for a State or union territory, and includes the court of the Judicial
Commissioner in any Union territory'. The procedure for exercise of
contempt jurisdiction can be laid down by the High Court concerned by
E framing suitable Rules under Section 23 cf the Act.
Now let us have a look at the constitutional scheme in this connec-
tion. The first relevant Article is Article 214 in Chapter V of Part VI of
the Constitution of India dealing with 'High Courts for States'. It states that
there shall be a High Court for each State. Then follows Article 215 which
F has been heavily relied upon in the impugned judgment by the learned
judges of the High Court for voiding the Rule in question. Said Article
reads as under : ·-
"215. High Courts to be courts of record.- Every High Court shall
be a court of record and shall have all the powers of such a court
G including the power to punish for contempt of itself."

Article 216 deals with 'Constitution of High Court's and lays down that,
'every High Court shall consist of a Chief Justice and such other Judges as
the President may from time to time deem it necessary to appoint'. There-
H fore, the High Court as a court of record would consist of a Chief Justice
H.C.OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABADv. RK YADAV[S.B. MAJMUDAR,J.] 435

and other judges who are appointed to the said court by the President from A
- time to time. A.J;ticle 225 deals with 'Jurisdiction of existing High Courts'

.. meaning thereby which were in existence at the time when the Constitution
of India came into force. High Court of Allahabad is one such High Court.
Therefore, its jurisdiction gets validly traced to Article 225. Said Article
provides as under :
B
"225. Jurisdiction of existing High Courts.- Subject to the provisions
of this Constitution and to the provisions of any law of the ap-
propriate Legislature made by virtue of powers conferred on that
Legislature by this Constitution, the jurisdiction of, and the law
administered in, any existing High Court, and tlie respective C
powers of the judges thereof in relation to the administration of

- Justice in the Court, including any power to make rules of Court
and to regulate the sittings of the Court and of members thereof
sitting alone or in Division Courts, shall be the same as immediately
before the commencement of this Constitution :
D
Provided that any restriction to which the exercise of original
jurisdiction by any of the High Courts with respect to any matter
concerning the revenue or concerning any act ordered or done i11
the collection thereof was subject immediately before the commen-
cement of this Constitution shall no longer apply to the exercise E
of such jurisdiction."

Prior to the advent of the Constitution the then existing High Courts were
having jurisdiction emanating from Section 223 of the Government of India
Act, 1935 which read as under :
F
"223. Subject to the provisions of this Part of this Act, to the
provisions of any order in Council made under this or any other
Act, to the provisions of any order made under the Indian Inde-
pendence Act, 1947, and to the provisions of any Act of the
.- appropriate Legislature enacted by 'virtue of powers conferred on
that legislature by this Act, the jurisdiction of, and the law .ad- G
ministered in, any existing High Court, and the respective powers
of the judges thereof in relation to the administration of justice in
the Court, including any power to make rules of Court and to .
regulate the sittings of the Court and of members thereof sitting
alone or in division courts, shall be the same as immediately before H
436 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997] 2 S.C.R.

A the establishment of the Dominion.

(1) Until otherwise provided by Act of the appropriate Legis-
lature, no High Court shall have any original jurisdiction in any
matter concerning the revenue, or concerning any act ordered or
done in the collection thereof according to the usage and practice
B of the country or law for the time being in force."

As Section 223 of the Government of India Act, 1935 in its turn referred
to the powers of the High Courts as were being exercised by then
immediately before the establishment of the dominion under the said Act
C of 1935, reference to yet earlier Government of India Act of 1915 espe-
cially Section 108 thereof becomes relevant. Section 108 of the Govern-
ment of India Act, 1915 which regulated the administration of justice by
the concerned High Courts prior to the establishment of dominion read
as under:

D "108. (1). Each high court may by its own rules provide, as it thinks
fit, for the exercise, by one or more judges, or by division courts
constituted by two or more judges, of the high court, of the original
and appellate jurisdiction vested in the court.

(2) The chief justice of each high court shall determine what
E judge in each case is to sit alone, and what judges of the court,
whether with or without the chief justice, are to constitute the
several division courts."

Thus a conjoint reading of Section 108 of the Government of India Act,
F 1915, Section 223 of the Government of India Act, 1935 and Article 225 of
the Constitution of India makes it clear that every High Court by its own
rules can provides for exercise of its jurisdiction, original or appellate, by
one or more judges or by Division Courts consisting of two or more judges
of the High Courts and it is for the Chief Justice of each High Court to
determine what judge in each case is to sit alone or what judges of the
G court whether with or without the Chief Justice are to constitute several
division courts. In exercise of the aforesaid rule-making power which
inhered in all existing High Courts at the time of the advent of the
. Constitution of India and which was expressly saved by Article 225 of the
Constitution of India, the Full Court of the High Court had framed these
H Rules in 1952. The impugned Rule is one of those Rules. Pursuant to the
H.C. OF JUDICATUREAT ALLAHABAD v. RK YADAV [S.B. MAJMUDAR, J.] 437

said Rule the learned Chief Justice was entitled to nominate a learned A
Single Judge to decide civil contempt cases arising under the Contempt of
Courts Act, 1971. The aforesaid Rule, therefore, clearly falls in line with
the constitutional scheme in connection with the exercise of jurisdiction of
the High Court as seen earlier. Consequently it cannot be said that by
enacting the impugned Rule the High Court on its administrative side had B
encroached upon any forbidden field. The scheme of the aforesaid
provision was examined by this Court in the case of NaJional Sewing Thread
Co. Ltd. Chidambaram v. James Chadwick and Bros. Ltd., AIR (1953) SC
357. In that case a Bench of three learned judges speaking through
Mahajan, J., had to consider the question whether an order by a learned
Single Judge of the High Court under Trade Marks Act, 1940 could be C
appealed against under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent of the Bombay
High Court. It was submitted amongst others that such an appeal would
not lie as Clause 15 of the Letters Patent applicable to Bombay High Court
permitted appeal from the order of a learned Single Judge delivered
pursuant to Section 108, Government of India Act, 1915 which no longer D
survived after the advent of the Constitution ·of India. Repelling the said
contention the following pertinent observations were made in pare 9 of the
Report:

"It was argued that simultaneously with the repeal of S. 108,
Government of India Act 1915 and of the enactment of its E
provisions in S. 223, Government of India Act of 1935 and later
on in Art. 225 of the Constitution of India, there had not been any
corresponding amendment of Cl. 15 of the Letters Patent and the
reference to S. 108 in Cl. 15 of the Letters Patent could not
therefore be taken as relating to these provisions, and that being F
so, the High Court had no power to make rules in 1940 when the
Trade Marks Act was enacted under the repealed secti~_m. and the
decision of Mr. Justice Shah therefore could not be said to have
. been given pursuant to S.108, This objection also in our opinion is
not well founded as it overlooks the fact that the power that was
confe~red on the High Court by S.108 still subsists, and it has not G
been affected in any manner whatever either by the Government
of India Act 1935 or by the new Constitution. On the other hand
it has been kept alive and reaffirmed with great vigour by these
statutes. The High Courts still enjoy the same unfettered power as
they enjoyed under S.108 of the Government of India Act, 1915 of H
438 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1997) 2 S.C.R.

A making rules and providing whether an appeal has to be heard by
one Judge or more Judges or by Division Courts consisting of two
or more Judges of the High Court." ..
Thus enactment of the impugned Rule squarely falls within the administra-
B tive power of the High Court well preserved by the aforesaid provisions.

However the learned judges were persuaded to declare the im-
pugned Rule as ultra vires on the ground that it conflicted with Article 215
of the Constitution of India. It is difficult to appreciate the said line of
reasoning which appealed to the learned judges. All that Article 215 states
C is that every High Court shall be a court of record meaning thereby all the
original record of the court will be preserved by the said court and it shall
have all the powers of such a superior court of record including the power
to punish for contempt of itself. It has to be kept in view that as a superior
court of record the high Court is entitled to preserve its original record in
D perpetuity. It is also now well settled that even apart from the aforesaid
attribute of a superior court of record the High Court as such has two-fold
powers. Being a court of record the High Court (i) has power to determine
the question about its own jurisdiction; and (ii) has inherent power to
punish for its contempt summarily. The aforesaid twin incidents of a court
of record are well established by a catena of decisions of this Court. We
E may usefully refer to one of them. A majority of the Constitution Bench of
nine learned Judges of this Court in the case of Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar
and Others v .. State of Maharashtra and Another, AIR (1967) SC 1 speaking
through Gajend~agadkar, CJ., has made the following pertinent observa-
tions in para 60 of the Report :
F
"There is yet another aspect of this matter to which it is
necessary to refer. The High Court is a superior Court of Record
and under Art. 215 shall all powers of such a Court of record
including the power to punish contempt of itself. One distinguish-
ing characteristic such superior Courts is that they are entitled to
G consider questions of their jurisdiction raised before them. This
question fell to be considered by this Court in Special Reference
No. 1of1964, 1965-1 SCR 413 at p. 499. .In that case, it was urged
before this Court that in granting bail to Keshav Singh, the High
Court had exceeded its jurisdiction and as such the order was a
H nullity. Rejecting this argument this Court observed that in the case
-+
\

H.C OF JUDICATIJREAT ALLAHABAD v. RK. YADA V (S.B. MAJMUDAR, J.) 439

of a superior Court of Record, it is for the Court to consider A
whether any matter falls within its jurisdiction or not. Unlike a

- Court of limited jurisdiction, the superior Court is entitled to
determine for itself questions about its own jurisdiction. That is
why this Court did not accede to the proposition that in passing
the order for interim bail, the High Court can be said to have B
exceeded its jurisdiction with the result that the order in question
was null and void. In support of this view, this Court cited a passage
- from Halsbury's Laws of England where it is observed that

'prima facie, no matter is deemed to be beyond the jurisdiction
of a superior Court unless it is expressly shown to be so, while C
nothing is within the jurisdiction of an inferior court unless it is
expressly shown on the face of the proceedings that the particular
matter is within the cognizance of the particular Court.'

If the decision of a superior Court on a question of its jurisdiction D
is erroneous, it can, of course, be corrected by appeal or revision
as may be permissible under the law; but until the adjudication by
a superior Court on such a point is set aside by adopting the
appropriate course, it would not be open to be corrected by the
exercise of-the writ jurisdiction of this Court."
E
In the light of the aforesaid parameters of the powers of the High
Courts as a superior court of record it is difficult to appreciate how the
Full Court of the Allahabad High Court by framing the impugned Rule
had enacted a provision which fell foul on the touchstone of Article 215 of
the Constitution. High Court as an institution has the seisin of the relevant p
record pertaining to all the cases tried before it. Re~ord cannot be said to
be in the custody of the author of the order giving rise to contempt
proceedings. The cases may be pending or might have been disposed of.·
Civil contempt might be alleged in connection with interim orders in
pending matters and can also be alleged in connection with final orders in
matters which are already disposed of. The record of such matters would G
be available in the High Court. All that the impugned Rule has done is to
entitle the Chief Justice to assign the work of· hearing civil contempt
matters to one of the judges. Such an exercise, an seen above, is perfectly
legal and valid in the light of the constitutional scheme. The civil contempt
alleged is the contempt of the High Court as such and not the contempt H
440 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997] 2 S.C.R.

A of the author of the order being the judge concerned. who might have
passed the said order, whether interim or final. When civil contempt by
way of breach of such an order is alleged it is the institution of the High
Court as such which is said to have been contemptuously dealt with by the
concerned contemnor. For upholding the majesty of the institution as such,
-
therefore, the High Court as a court of record can look into the grievance
B
centering round the alleged breach of its order and. it is this power to
punish the contemnor that flows from Article 215 of the Constitution of
India as well as from the relevant provisions of the Act. But how this
grievance of the aggrieved party is to be processed and examined pertains
to the realm of distribution of work and jurisdiction of the High Court
-
c amongst different Division Benches and that exercise is permissible to the
Chief Justice of the High Court as per the rules framed by the High Court
on its administrative side. That exercise has nothing to do with Article 215.
Article 215 saves the inherent powers of the High Court as a court of
record to suitably punish the contemnor who is alleged to have committed
D civil contempt of its order. Order might have been passed by any of the
learned judges exercising the jurisdiction of the High Court as per the work
assigned to them under the Rules by the orders of the Chief justice, but
once such an order is passed by a learned Single Judge or a Division Bench
of two or more judges the order becomes the order of the High Court.
Breach of such an order which gives rise to contempt proceedings also
E pertains to the contempt of the High Court as an institution. At that stage
Article 215 does not operate, but it is only Article 225 read with the Rules
framed by the High Court on administrative side and the power inhering
in the Chief Justice, of assigning work to the appropriate Bench of judge
or judges, under Section 108 of the Government of India Act, 1915 read
F with Section 223 of the Government of India Act, 1935 which would have

--
its full play. Consequently if under the impugned Rule the task of consider-
ing the grievances of the aggrieved party in connection with civil contempts
of High Court's orders is assigned to one of the judges of the High Court
it cannot be said that thereby the impugned Rule has in any manner ...
affected the status of the High Court as a court of record. It has to be kept
G in view that. when civil contempt is alleged in connection with breach of
any order of the High Court, whether final or interim, while deciding the
said question the learned judge to whom this work is assigned is entitled
to look into the relevant record which obviously is available in the High
Court and thereby the learned judge is not depriving any other judge of
H the said record. So far as matters which are finally disposed of are
H.C. OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD v. R.K YADAV (S.B. MAJMUDAR, J.] 441

concerned, such an eventuality can never arise but even in pending matters A
where breach of interim orders is alleged, when contempt proceedings in

-
connection with such orders are placed for examination and scrutiny before
the learned Judge to whom the work is assigned by the Chief Justice under
the Rules, it is difficult to appreciate how it can be said that the record of
the case in any way gets adversely affected or disturbed. It is the question B
of internal arrangement and transmission of record from court to court as
per the exigencies and necessities of the case. Under these circumstances
it is impossible to hold that the impugned Rule is in any way ultra vires
Article 215 of the Constitution of India.

It is also difficult to appreciate how the learned judges of the High C
Court in the impugned judgment could assume that record contemplated
by Article 215 of the Constitution of India is the record available only to
the concerned judges dealing with the matter in which. the order, non-com-
pliance of which is alleged, was passed.

Let us now see whether the working of the impugned Rule can affect D
the jurisdiction of the High Court as superior court of record and whether
it can ever conflict in its operation with Article 215 of the Constitution of
India. Complaint about civil contempt in connection with non-compliance
of orde1 of High Court can give rise to the following situations :
E
(i) Violation of interim order of the High Court passed in matters which
are pending for finai disposal.

In such a case if the Bench which passed the order is not hearing the
case, the record of the case would be lying in the court office. It can
conveniently be called for by the learned judge who is assigned the F
work of hearing civil contempt cases. In such an eventuality no
question of the record of the case being in any way withdrawn from
the scrutiny of the Bench which passed the order would ever arise.

- (ii) Violation of interim order of the High Court in a pendiug matter
which is actually part heard before a Bench of the High Court.
G

In such a case by a process of mutual adjustment record of the case,
if necessary, can be called for by the Bench of the court hearing
contempt matters. That can be done with the permission of the Bench
before whom the main matter is being heard as a part heard matter. H
442 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997) 2 S.C.R. +
A In such a case the hearing of the part heard matter may be suitably
adjourned if it is felt that the contempt matter should be heard earlier.

B
If for any reason such record is not made available to the court
dealing with contempt matter and it becomes necessary to scrutinize
the same before deciding the contempt petition, then the contempt
matter would have to be suitably adjourned awaiting arrival of the
record from the court of the leaned judge or judges that might be
-
hearing the main case.

(iii) If contempt alleged is of any final order of the High Court in a
disposed of matter, the record of the case can be conveniently called
C for from the record room without disturbing working of any other
court.

In none of the aforesaid eventualities it can ever be suggested that hearing
of civil contempt case by a Bench of the High Court other than the one
D which had passed the order, non-compliance of which is in issue, would at
all affect the jurisdiction of the High Court at a superior court Of record.
Hence there would arise no occasion for the supposed conflict between the
working of the impugned Rule and Article 215 of the Constitution.

Reliance placed on Order XXXIX Rule 2A of Code of Civil Proce-
E dure, 1908 ('CPC' for short) by the learned judges in the impugned
judgment is also uncalled for. The said Rule on its express language
enables the presiding judge of the Court that passed injunction order to
entertain complaint regarding breach of his order. In such a case the
presiding judge of the court or his successor-in-office is enabled to enter-
F tain such a complaint. The aforesaid Rule is mainly pressed in service
before subordinate courts which at most of the centers consist of sole
presiding judges of the courts. In such cases where the subordinate courts
working at these centers consists of only one presiding judge the applica-
tions .under Order XXXIX Rule 2A, CPC will have to be filed in the very
same court and would go to the same judge or his successor-in-office. Such -
G is not the case with the High Court functioning as a superior court of
record under Article 215 of the Constitution of India. As noted earlier the
High Court consists of a Chief Justice and such other judges as the
President may from time to time deem it necessary to appoint as laid down
by Article 216 of the Constitution of India. Consequently plurality of judges
H appointed to the High Court collectively constitute the High Court. Hence
H.C.OPJUDICATIJREAT ALLAHABADv. RK YADAV[S.B. MAJMUDAR,J.) 443

analogy of Order XXXIX Rule 2A, CPC cannot be pressed in service while . A
judging the validity of the impugned Rule on the touchstone of Article 215
of the Constituti.on of India.

It is of course true that the learned judges in the impugned judgment
have referred to the observations earlier made by the then Chief Justice of
the High Court Hon'ble B.P. Jeevan Reddy, J., about the practical difficul- B
ties which might arise in the working of the said Rule and to the constitu-
tion of committee of two learned judges to suggest amendments of the
Rules. But these events have nothing to do with the moot question whether
the Rule as framed flies in the face of Article 215 of the Constitution of
11\dia or not. It may be that the Rule may require suitable modification C
from the administrative point of view but that has to be left to the Full
Court of the High Court on its administrative side. In fact a committee of
twci learned judges was appointed for that very purpose, but could not
finalise its report for reason beyond its control. Be that as it may, which
rule would be better suited for administration of justice in the High Court D
is a matter which could have been legitimately examined by the Full Court
of the High Court on its administrative side by appointing suitable com-
mittee of learned judges for recommending appropriate modifications in
the Rules. Such an administrative function which could be legitimately
performed by the Full Court of the High Court could not be taken over by
the High Court on its judicial side as it would still remain in the domain E
of a policy decision to be taken by the High Court on its administrative
side. The learned judges in the impugned judgment appear to have felt that
question of civil contempt could be better examined by the same learned
judges who might have passed the order breach of which is alleged by the·
aggrieved party and Rules of some of the High Courts like the High Court F
of Andhra Pradesh might have appeared to the learned judges to be more
suitable, but still the said consideration would remain in the domain of
administrative policy decision of the High Court.

It is also to be kept in view that while exercising original jurisdiction
under Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 in connection with civil contempt of G
its own orders the High Court is not exercising any review jurisdiction
wherein statutorily the proceedings may have to be placed for decision of
the same judge or judges if they are available. Contempt jurisdiction is an
independent jurisdiction of original nature whether emanating from the
Contempt of Courts Act or under Article 215 of the Constitution of India. H
444 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997) 2 S.C.R.
+
.A How such original jurisdiction can be exercised is a matter which can
legitimately be governed by relevant Rules framed by the High Court on
its administrative side by exercising its rule-making power under Section
23 of the Act or under its general rule-making power flowing from the
relevant provisions of the constitutional scheme as seen earlier. Conse-
B quently is cannot be said that the impugned Rule is violative of Article 215
of the Cons.titution of India as held by the Judgment under appeal.

In the result the appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment and
order of the High Court, dated 6th November 1996 are quashed and set
aside. Clause (a) of Rule 4 of Chapter XXXV-E of the Rules of the High
C Court of Judicature at Allahabad is held to be valid and legal and not
inconsistent with Article 215 of the Constitution of India. In the facts and
circumstances of the case there shall be no order as to costs.

P.T.D. Appeal allowed.

-