Holding

The Supreme Court held that the employee’s delayed alteration of his date of birth is barred by estoppel and the employer was correct in retaining the originally declared date of birth, rendering the Tribunal’s award of back wages untenable.

Summary

The respondent, a piece‑rated mazdoor, initially declared his date of birth as 27‑12‑1948 when he joined Barsua Iron Ore Mines in 1972, enabling him to meet the statutory minimum age of 18. In 1982 he altered his recorded birth date to 12‑03‑1955 without documentary proof, and only in 1998 submitted a school transfer certificate supporting the later date. The employer’s competent authority, after noting the discrepancy, upheld the original 1948 birth date, leading to the respondent’s superannuation in 2008 based on that date. The Central Government Industrial Tribunal later awarded the respondent back wages on the basis of the 1955 date, a decision upheld by the High Court. The Supreme Court held that the respondent’s delayed change was a calculated attempt to gain advantage, that the principle of estoppel barred the revision, and that the employer was entitled to rely on the original declaration. Consequently, the Tribunal’s award and the High Court judgment were set aside and the appeal was allowed.

Issues considered

Whether the respondent’s later claim of a different date of birth, made after years of service, can be accepted for the purpose of recalculating superannuation benefits.
Whether the principle of estoppel applies to prevent an employee from altering his date of birth after having relied on the original declaration for employment.
Whether the employer’s competent authority was justified in retaining the original date of birth in the absence of documentary proof until 1998.

Legislation cited

Subjects

Service LawSuperannuationDate of birthDiscrepancy in the date of birthPrinciple of estoppelBack wages

Judgment

[2024] 4 S.C.R. 63 : 2024 INSC 264

The General Manager, M/S Barsua Iron Ore Mines
v.
The Vice President United Mines Mazdoor Union and Ors.
(Civil Appeal No. 4686 of 2024)
02 April 2024
[Hima Kohli and Ahsanuddin Amanullah,* JJ.]

Issue for Consideration
Respondent initially declared his date of birth as 27.12.1948.
Later, in descriptive roll, he changed his initially recorded date
of birth i.e. 27.12.1948 to 12.03.1955. Based on his declaration
at the time of initial employment the Competent Authority of the
appellant determined the date of birth of the respondent no.3 as
27.12.1948. The respondent no.3 superannuated from service
based on his initially recorded date of birth [27.12.1948]. Whether
the respondent no.3 is held to have been rightly retired in terms
of his date of birth as 27.12.1948.

Headnotes
Service Law – Superannuation – Discrepancy in date of birth
– The CGIT passed its Award and held that the appellant’s
determination of the respondent no.3’s date of birth based
on the initial Descriptive Roll (27.12.1948) was unjustified
and thus, awarded him 50% back wages from his retirement
in 2008 until his supposed date of superannuation in 2015,
based on the date of birth disclosed in the STC i.e., 12.03.1955
– Propriety:
Held: The disclosure of the originally-given date of birth
(27.12.1948) by the respondent no.3 was a well-thought out plan
hatched by him, at the relevant time – His conduct cannot be
simply brushed aside on a plea that there was an error on the
part of the appellant in recording his date of birth – Examined
thus, the following is evincible: (a) the Competent Authority noticed
discrepancy in the date of birth in the records of the appellant and,
upon due scrutiny, opined that the declaration of date of birth made
by the respondent no.3 at the first point of time, i.e., 27.12.1948,
should be taken as his date of birth, as till 1998 no documentary
proof was given, and; (b) the respondent no.3 would not have

* Author
64 [2024] 4 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

been able to legally come into employment on 27.12.1972, had
he disclosed his date of birth as 12.03.1955 – No fault can be
found with the appellant on this score – It is a just and reasonable
conclusion by the appellant’s Competent Authority – The principles
of estoppel would come into play in the present case – The
respondent no.3, having stated on 27.12.1972, that his date of
birth was 27.12.1948, cannot be permitted to raise the claim of
his date of birth being 12.03.1955, that too on 14.08.1982, i.e.,
almost after a decade (counting from 27.12.1972 to 14.08.1982)
– Even the STC was submitted after the appellant requested
the respondent no.3 for documentary proof on 24.11.1998 – The
respondent no.3 is held to have been rightly retired in terms of
his date of birth reckoned as 27.12.1948 – The further direction
to award 50% back wages to the respondent no.3 from the date
he was retired till the (notional) superannuation on 31.03.2015,
also stands set aside. [Paras 17 and 19]

Case Law Cited
Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. v. Shib Kumar Dushad [2000]
Suppl. 4 SCR 336 : (2000) 8 SCC 696; Union of India
v C Rama Swamy [1997] 3 SCR 760 : (1997) 4 SCC
647 – relied on.
Karnataka Rural Infrastructure Development Limited v.
T P Nataraja [2021] 7 SCR 634 : (2021) 12 SCC 27;
Home Department v. R Kirubakaran [1993] Suppl. 2
SCR 376 : (1994) Supp (1) SCC 155; State of Madhya
Pradesh v. Premlal Shrivas [2011] 11 SCR 444 : (2011)
9 SCC 664; Life Insurance Corporation of India v. R
Basavaraju (2016) 15 SCC 781; Bharat Coking Coal
Limited v. Shyam Kishore Singh (2020) 3 SCC 411 –
referred to.

List of Keywords
Service Law; Superannuation; Date of birth; Discrepancy in the
date of birth; Principle of estoppel; Back wages.

Case Arising From
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 4686 of 2024
From the Judgment and Order dated 04.02.2021 of the High Court
of Orissa at Cuttack in WP(C) No. 9424 of 2019
[2024] 4 S.C.R. 65

The General Manager, M/S Barsua Iron Ore Mines v.
The Vice President United Mines Mazdoor Union and Ors.

Appearances for Parties
Ranjit Kumar, Sr. Adv., Sunil Kumar Jain, Ms. Rashika Swarup, Advs.
for the Appellant.
Ms. Deepanwita Priyanka, Satyalipsu Ray, Ritesh Patil, Advs. for
the Respondents.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment
Ahsanuddin Amanullah, J.
1. Heard Mr. Ranjit Kumar, learned senior counsel for the appellant and
Ms. Deepanwita Priyanka, learned counsel for the respondent no.3.
2. Leave granted.
3. The present appeal arises out of the final judgment dated 04.02.2021
(hereinafter referred to as the “impugned judgment”), passed by a
Division Bench of the High Court of Orissa at Cuttack (hereinafter
referred to as the “High Court”) in Writ Petition (Civil) No.9424 of
2019, whereby the petition filed by the appellant was dismissed and
the Award dated 24.01.2018 passed by the Central Government
Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Bhubaneswar (hereinafter
referred to as the “CGIT”) in ID Case No.33 of 2003, was upheld.
BRIEF FACTS:
4. The respondent no.3 was employed as a Piece Rated Mazdoor at
Barsua Iron Ore Mines under Rourkela Steel Plant, a unit of Hindustan
Steel Limited (hereinafter referred to as “HSL”), which later merged
into Steel Authority of India Limited (hereinafter referred to as “SAIL”).
The respondent no.3 was offered employment on a casual basis vide
letter dated 14.04.1972 as a Piece Rated Mazdoor. On 27.12.1972,
he submitted the prescribed form of descriptive roll declaring his age
as 24 years but did not provide a specific date or any documentary
proof of date of birth. Based on his oral declaration, his date of
birth was recorded as 27.12.1948 and this date was accepted and
signed on by the respondent no.3 leading to his employment. Vide
Offer of Appointment dated 22.06.1981, the respondent no.3, initially
employed as a casual labourer, was regularized under the appellant
and worked as a Piece Rated Mazdoor in mining operations for SAIL
following the merger of HSL into SAIL.
66 [2024] 4 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

5. It appears that on 14.08.1982, the respondent no.3 submitted the
prescribed form of Descriptive Roll, wherein he changed his initially
recorded date of birth i.e. 27.12.1948 to 12.03.1955, again without
providing any documentary proof. Vide Office Order dated 20.12.1982,
such date of birth, as disclosed by the respondent no.3, was entered
in the records of the appellant who effected the change without any
scrutiny.
6. On 24.11.1998, the respondent no.3 was requested to submit
documentary proof in support of his date of birth, in response to
which he submitted a School Transfer Certificate (hereinafter referred
to as the “STC”) dated 12.01.1972, which made him 17 years and 1
month old at the time when he was offered employment on casual
basis on 14.04.1972.
7. On 29.11.2001, based on his declaration at the time of initial
employment the Competent Authority of the appellant determined
the date of birth of the respondent no.3 as 27.12.1948, which made
him come within the statutory employment age limit and above the
minimum age i.e., 18 years, required for such employment.
8. On 09.10.2003, a dispute regarding the respondent no.3’s date of birth was
referred by the “appropriate Government”1 to the CGIT for adjudication.

1 Section 2(a) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 reads as below:
'(a) “appropriate Government” means,—
(i) in relation to any Industrial Disputes concerning any industry carried on by or under the
authority of the Central Government or by a railway company or concerning any such controlled
industry as may be specified in this behalf by the Central Government or in relation to an Industrial
Dispute concerning a Dock Labour Board established under Section 5-A of the Dock Workers
(Regulation of Employment) Act, 1948 (9 of 1948), or the Industrial Finance Corporation of India
Limited formed and registered under the Companies Act, 1956, or the Employees’ State Insurance
Corporation established under Section 3 of the Employees’ State Insurance Act, 1948 (34 of 1948),
or the Board of Trustees constituted under Section 3-A of the Coal Mines Provident Fund and
Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1948 (46 of 1948), or the Central Board of Trustees and the State
Boards of Trustees constituted under Section 5-A and Section 5-B, respectively, of the Employees’
Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 (19 of 1952), or the Life Insurance
Corporation of India established under Section 3 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956 (31
of 1956), or the Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Limited registered under the Companies Act,
1956 (1 of 1956) or the Deposit Insurance and Credit Guarantee Corporation established under
Section 3 of the Deposit Insurance and Credit Guarantee Corporation Act, 1961 (47 of 1961), or the
Central Warehousing Corporation established under Section 3 of the Warehousing Corporations
Act, 1962 (58 of 1962), or the Unit Trust of India established under Section 3 of the Unit Trust of
India Act, 1963 (52 of 1963), or the Food Corporation of India established under Section 3, or a
Board of Management established for two or more contiguous States under Section 16 of the Food
Corporations Act, 1964 (37 of 1964), or the Airports Authority of India constituted under Section 3
of the Airports Authority of India Act, 1994 (55 of 1994), or a Regional Rural Bank established under
Section 3 of the Regional Rural Banks Act, 1976 (21 of 1976), or the Export Credit and Guarantee
Corporation Limited or the Industrial Reconstruction Corporation of India Limited, or the Banking
[2024] 4 S.C.R. 67

The General Manager, M/S Barsua Iron Ore Mines v.
The Vice President United Mines Mazdoor Union and Ors.

9. In the meanwhile, on 31.12.2008, the respondent no.3 superannuated
from service, having attained the age of 60 years, based on his
initially recorded date of birth [27.12.1948].
10. On 24.01.2018, the CGIT passed its Award and held that the
appellant’s determination of the respondent no.3’s date of birth based
on the initial Descriptive Roll was unjustified and thus, awarded him
50% back wages from his retirement in 2008 until his supposed date
of superannuation in 2015, based on the date of birth disclosed in
the STC i.e., 12.03.1955. The appellant filed a Writ Petition before
the High Court of Orissa at Cuttack on 19.05.2019 challenging the
Award passed by the CGIT on 24.01.2018. The order of the High
Court dismissing the same on 04.02.2021, is impugned in the present
appeal.
SUBMISSIONS BY THE APPELLANT:
11. Learned Senior counsel for the appellant submitted that the conduct
of the respondent no.3 clearly dis-entitled him to any relief as he
could not have been allowed to resile from his initially declared date
of birth, that too after 9 years of his initial declaration, on 27.12.1972.
It was submitted that the said declaration by the respondent no.3
himself on 27.12.1972, cannot be said to be an inadvertent error
or omission for the reason that had the so-called correct date of
birth, according to the respondent no.3, i.e., 12.03.1955 been
declared, then at the relevant point of time, he would have been
only 17 years and 1 month old and could not have been given the
employment he had sought, since the minimum age required was
18 years. Thus, it was submitted that it was clear that he had tried
to take employment relying on his date of birth as 27.12.1948,

Service Commission established, under Section 3 of the Banking Service Commission Act, 1975,
or an air transport service, or a banking or an insurance company, a mine, an oilfield, a Cantonment
Board, or a major port, any company in which not less than fifty-one per cent of the paid-up share
capital is held by the Central Government, or any corporation, not being a corporation referred to
in this clause, established by or under any law made by Parliament, or the Central public sector
undertaking, subsidiary companies set up by the principal undertaking and autonomous bodies
owned or controlled by the Central Government, the Central Government, and
(ii) in relation to any other industrial dispute, including the State public sector undertaking, subsidiary
companies set up by the principal undertaking and autonomous bodies owned or controlled by the
State Government, the State Government:
Provided that in case of a dispute between a contractor and the contract labour employed through
the contractor in any industrial establishment where such dispute first arose, the appropriate
Government shall be the Central Government or the State Government, as the case may be, which
has control over such industrial establishment.’
68 [2024] 4 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

from which he cannot be allowed to backtrack. It was canvassed
that the same would amount to taking double advantage; one at
the initial stage on the basis of the date of birth as 27.12.1948
and later in service on a different date of birth i.e., 12.03.1955.
It was contended that the CGIT reaching the conclusion, that
the management could not have determined the date of birth of
the respondent no.3 based on the initial Descriptive Roll being
unjustified, was totally without any basis and arbitrary and thus,
awarding him 50% back wages, is totally misplaced and needs
interference by this Court. It was urged that the High Court also
failed to take notice of basic factual aspects and more importantly,
the conduct of the respondent no.3 and the time-gap of 9 years
after which he suddenly woke up and made a representation for
change of his date of birth.
SUBMISSIONS OF RESPONDENT NO.3:
12. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent no.3 submitted that
at the time of filling up the Descriptive Roll, the same was based on
an oral declaration and apparently the authority, which was noting
down the date of birth, had committed an error.
13. It was further submitted that the STC dated 12.01.1972 clearly
indicates that his date of birth was 12.03.1955, which required
corrections in the records of the appellant and thus the CGIT and
the High Court have not committed any error warranting interference
by this Court.
14. It was submitted that the respondent no.3 was unaware of the date
of birth being recorded as 27.12.1948 and only when he came to
know of the same, he had taken steps and the CGIT rightly granted
relief to him.
15. Learned counsel submitted that the respondent no.3 cannot be
made to suffer for the fault of the appellant itself and more so when
later, in its own records it had correctly recorded his date of birth as
12.03.1955, in the year 1982.
ANALYSIS, CONCLUSION AND REASONING:
16. Having considered the matter in its entirety and the submissions
made, this Court is of the opinion that the Award of the CGIT as well
as the impugned judgment rendered by the High Court cannot be
[2024] 4 S.C.R. 69

The General Manager, M/S Barsua Iron Ore Mines v.
The Vice President United Mines Mazdoor Union and Ors.

sustained. It is not in dispute that while submitting the Descriptive
Roll, the respondent no.3 had himself declared his age as 24 years
without any documentary proof and since the date of submission
of such Descriptive Roll was 27.12.1972, his date of birth was
recorded by the appellant as 27.12.1948. This position continued for
almost a decade viz. till 1982, when the respondent no.3 submitted
a declaration, on the merger of HSL with SAIL, wherein his date of
birth was disclosed as 12.03.1955, though even at such time, again,
no documentary proof was furnished by him. The respondent no.3
submitted the so-called proof, which was the STC dated 12.01.1972,
only after the issuance of letter dated 24.11.1998, whereby he was
required to submit documentary proof of his date of birth. Pausing
here, the Court would note that by reckoning his date of birth as
12.03.1955, the respondent no.3 would be much below the age of
18 years at the time of initial employment, which was the minimum
requirement in law. Thus, it is clear that had the respondent no.3
declared his so-called correct date of birth, obviously he would not
have been given the employment.
17. From this point of view, it is clear that the disclosure of the originally-
given date of birth by the respondent no.3 was a well-thought out
plan hatched by him, at the relevant time. His conduct cannot be
simply brushed aside on a plea that there was an error on the part
of the appellant in recording his date of birth. Another doubt cast
on the conduct of the respondent no.3 is him not acting on time,
which raises a question about the bonafides of his claim of having
been born on 12.03.1955. In fact, even after giving a declaration
on 14.08.1982, on the merger of HSL with SAIL, the copy of the
STC was never provided to the appellant, which was done only in
response to the letter dated 24.11.1998, requiring him to submit
documentary proof of his date of birth. Examined thus, the following
is evincible: (a) the Competent Authority noticed discrepancy in the
date of birth in the records of the appellant and, upon due scrutiny,
opined that the declaration of date of birth made by the respondent
no.3 at the first point of time, i.e., 27.12.1948, should be taken as
his date of birth, as till 1998 no documentary proof was given, and;
(b) the respondent no.3 would not have been able to legally come
into employment on 27.12.1972, had he disclosed his date of birth as
12.03.1955. No fault can be found with the appellant on this score.
It is a just and reasonable conclusion by the appellant’s Competent
70 [2024] 4 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

Authority. Moreover, reckoning his date of birth as 27.12.1948, the
respondent no.3 has been permitted to work for 36 years, which
by itself is a sufficient period of employment. Hence, on this count
too, we are unable to show any indulgence to the respondent no.3.
18. Undoubtedly, a decision on the issue of date of birth is as important
for the employer as it is for the employee. Reference in this regard
can be made to Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. v Shib Kumar Dushad,
(2000) 8 SCC 696. As expressed in Union of India v C Rama
Swamy, (1997) 4 SCC 647, “… the court also ought not to grant any
relief even if it is shown that the date of birth, as originally recorded,
was incorrect because the candidate concerned had represented a
different date of birth to be taken into consideration obviously with
a view that that would be to his advantage. …”.
19. Moreover, the principles of estoppel would come into play in the
present case. The respondent no.3, having stated on 27.12.1972,
that his date of birth was 27.12.1948, cannot be permitted to raise the
claim of his date of birth being 12.03.1955, that too on 14.08.1982,
i.e., almost after a decade (counting from 27.12.1972 to 14.08.1982).
Even the STC was submitted after the appellant requested the
respondent no.3 for documentary proof on 24.11.1998.
20. Although, we have examined the matter from the lens of fraud as
well, in view of our discussions hereinabove, the said aspect does
not merit deeper probe. We leave it at that. For the present, it would
suffice to refer to a pronouncement of recent vintage by this Court
in Karnataka Rural Infrastructure Development Limited v T P
Nataraja, (2021) 12 SCC 27, where earlier precedents in Home
Department v R Kirubakaran, 1994 Supp (1) SCC 155; State
of Madhya Pradesh v Premlal Shrivas, (2011) 9 SCC 664; Life
Insurance Corporation of India v R Basavaraju, (2016) 15 SCC
781 and Bharat Coking Coal Limited v Shyam Kishore Singh,
(2020) 3 SCC 411 were considered. Although this Court in T P
Nataraja (supra) was looking at the facts therein, in the context of
the Karnataka State Servants (Determination of Age) Act, 1974, the
principle of law laid down would equally apply insofar as change of
date of birth in service records is concerned, with which we concur:
“11. Considering the aforesaid decisions of this Court the
law on change of date of birth can be summarised as under:
[2024] 4 S.C.R. 71

The General Manager, M/S Barsua Iron Ore Mines v.
The Vice President United Mines Mazdoor Union and Ors.

(i) application for change of date of birth can only be
as per the relevant provisions/regulations applicable;
(ii) even if there is cogent evidence, the same cannot
be claimed as a matter of right;
(iii) application can be rejected on the ground of delay
and laches also more particularly when it is made at
the fag-end of service and/or when the employee is
about to retire on attaining the age of superannuation.”
21. In view of the aforesaid, this Court finds that the much-delayed
disclosure of the date of birth as 12.03.1955 by the respondent
no.3, coupled with his initial declaration and the admitted position
that based on such initial declaration, he had received employment,
as otherwise based on 12.03.1955, he could not have been legally
appointed due to being under-age, there is no manner of doubt that
the respondent no.3, irrespective of his real date of birth, for the
purpose of employment under the appellant, cannot be allowed the
purported rectification/correction of date of birth to 12.03.1955. He
would have to, necessarily, be content with his service and benefits
accounted taking his date of birth as 27.12.1948.
22. For reasons aforesaid, the appeal stands allowed. The Award of the
CGIT dated 24.01.2018 and the impugned judgment stand set aside.
The respondent no.3 is held to have been rightly retired in terms
of his date of birth reckoned as 27.12.1948. Needless to state that
the further direction to award 50% back wages to the respondent
no.3 from the date he was retired till the (notional) superannuation
on 31.03.2015, also stands set aside.
23. There shall be no order as to costs. Pending applications [IA
Nos.51644/2021 and 54844/2021] are closed upon ceasing to subsist
for consideration. The amount deposited by the appellant with the
interest accrued thereon be released by the Registry in its favour.

Headnotes prepared by: Ankit Gyan Result of the case:
Appeal allowed.