THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER & OTHERSversusS. LALITHA & OTHERS

                 [2025] 4 S.C.R. 1734 : 2025 INSC 565

                The Chief Executive Officer & Others
                                 v.
                        S. Lalitha & Others
                       (Civil Appeal No. 5528 of 2025)
                                  24 April 2025
              [Dipankar Datta* and Rajesh Bindal, JJ.]


                            Issue for Consideration
       Matter pertains to the maintainability of the time-barred application
       of the employee before the tribunal, filed after rejection of a belated
       representation in service dispute.

                                   Headnotes†
       Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985 – ss.20, 21 – Period of
       limitation – Respondent-government employee granted second
       benefit of financial upgradation envisaged under Modified
       Assured Career Progression Scheme-MACP in 2010 and third
       benefit in 2015 – Representation by the respondent before
       the appellant in 2016, seeking grant of the benefit of second
       financial upgradation under ACP Scheme from March, 2009
       and the benefit of the third financial upgradation under the
       MACP from March, 2015 – Rejection of the representation –
       Challenge to – Application allowed by the tribunal, which was
       upheld by the High Court – Correctness:
       Held: Respondent claimed grant of second benefit of financial
       upgradation under ACPS due to her in 2009 as late as in 2016 –
       Respondent did not in the application plead and indicate the specific
       provision in the service rules in terms whereof she sought relief
       from the appellant – In the absence thereof, one has to proceed
       on the premise that she had made the representation on her own
       without the same being provided under any service rules applicable
       to her and it was a non-statutory representation – Period of limitation
       could not have been stretched by the respondent – Representation
       though not provided in the relevant rules governing service could
       yet be necessary and imperative when a legitimate service benefit
       is not conferred on the aggrieved public servant by the employer
       on his own either due to inaction or otherwise, and has to be made

* Author
[2025] 4 S.C.R.                                                               1735

       The Chief Executive Officer & Others v. S. Lalitha & Others


     expeditiously – Except in cases where final orders are passed on
     appeals/revisions/memorials/representations, statutorily provided,
     limitation for filing original application u/s.19, and ss.20, 21, to be
     reckoned keeping in mind date of accrual of the cause of action
     and proximity of the date of the representation, and period of one
     year for filing original application to be counted from the date of
     expiry of six months from date of such representation if no order
     were passed thereon – Cause of action cannot be deferred by
     making highly belated representation and awaiting its outcome –
     Respondent if aggrieved should have availed the remedy before
     the tribunal immediately after her rights were affected – She ought
     not to have waited for so long for ventilating her grievance through
     belated representation – Filing of such belated representation,
     which was rejected in no time, did not have the effect of postponing
     the cause of action and stretching the period of limitation so as to
     render the application as filed within time – Application was time-
     barred and should not have been entertained by the tribunal – High
     Court too erred in law by failing to examine its maintainability – In
     exercise of power u/Art.142, and considering it a very special case,
     no direction to respondent to refund any surplus amount received –
     Constitution of India – Art.142, 15(3), 41. [Paras 23, 24, 33-38]

                               Case Law Cited
     C. Jacob v. Director of Geology and Mining, 2008 INSC 1133 :
     [2008] 14 SCR 634 : (2008) 10 SCC 115; Union of India v. M.K.
     Sarkar, 2009 INSC 1288 : [2009] 16 SCR 249 : (2010) 2 SCC 59;
     Union of India v. N.M. Raut, 2024 INSC 1042 : 2024 SCC OnLine
     SC 3873 – distinguished.
     Union of India & Ors. v. S. Ranjit Samuel & Ors., 2022 INSC 340 :
     2022 SCC OnLine SC 368; Vice Chairman, DDA v. Narendra Kumar
     & Ors., 2022 INSC 276 : [2022] 4 SCR 480 : (2022) 11 SCC 641;
     State of Uttaranchal v. Shiv Charan Singh Bhandari, 2013 INSC
     560 : [2013] 9 SCR 609 : (2013) 12 SCC 179; Union of India v.
     Chaman Rana, 2018 INSC 230 : [2018] 3 SCR 640 : (2018) 5
     SCC 798; State of Orissa v. Laxmi Narayan Das, 2023 INSC 619 :
     [2023] 10 SCR 1049 : (2023) 15 SCC 273; S.S. Rathore v. State
     of Madhya Pradesh, 1989 INSC 268 : [1989] Supp. 1 SCR 43 :
     (1989) 4 SCC 582; D.B. Gohil v. Union of India (2010) 12 SCC
     301; Union of India v. Tarsem Singh, 2008 INSC 930 : [2008] 12
     SCR 104 : (2008) 8 SCC 648 – referred to.
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     B. D. Kadam & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., 2017 SCC OnLine
     Kar 4772 – referred to.

                                 List of Acts
     Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985; Central Civil Services (Revised
     Pay) Rules, 2008; Constitution of India.

                              List of Keywords
     Unexplained delay or laches; Modified Assured Career Progression
     Scheme, 2008; Assured Career Progression Scheme, 1999;
     Time-barred application; Service dispute; Central Administrative
     Tribunal; Period of limitation; Second benefit of financial upgradation
     under Modified Assured Career Progression Scheme; Third financial
     upgradation under the MACP; Discretionary writ remedy; Public
     servant; Extraordinary powers; Absence of pleading; Cause of
     action; Deprivation of legitimate benefit; Limitation; Continuous
     wrong; Belated representation.

                             Case Arising From
     CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 5528 of 2025
     From the Judgment and Order dated 08.03.2018 of the High Court
     of Karnataka at Bengaluru in WP No. 9171 of 2018

                          Appearances for Parties
     Advs. for the Appellants:
     Sahil Bhalaik, Tushar Giri, Siddharth Anil Khanna, Ritik Arora,
     Shivam Mishra, Ms. Gulshan Jahan, Murshlin Ansari, Sewa Singh.
     Advs. for the Respondents:
     S N Bhat, Sr. Adv., D P Chaturvedi, Tarun Kumar Thakur, Mrs.
     Parvati Bhat, Abhay Choudhary M, Vivek Ram R, Ms. Anuradha
     Mutatkar.

                Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

                                  Judgment

     Dipankar Datta, J.

1.   Leave granted.
[2025] 4 S.C.R.                                                          1737

         The Chief Executive Officer & Others v. S. Lalitha & Others


2.    The challenge in this appeal is to a short order of the High Court of
      Karnataka at Bengaluru1 dated 8th March, 20182 dismissing a writ
      petition3 that the appellants had presented before it. The appellants
      felt aggrieved by a judgment and order dated 1st August, 2017 of
      the Central Administrative Tribunal, Bengaluru4 whereby it allowed
      an original application5 of the respondent.
3.    Undisputed facts, giving rise to this appeal, in a nutshell are these:
      a.        The respondent joined as TV News and Film Librarian (Library
                & Information Assistant) at Doordarshan Kendra, Bangalore on
                11th March, 1985.
      b.        On 31st May, 2002, the appellant received benefit of financial
                upgradation under the Assured Career Progression6 Scheme,
                1999 for the first time w.e.f. 9th August, 1999.
      c.        Since the ACP Scheme envisaged benefits of financial
                upgradation in the hierarchical scale after 12 and 24 years of
                service, the respondent became entitled to receive benefit of
                financial upgradation under the ACP Scheme for the second
                time w.e.f. 11th March, 2009.
      d.        The Modified Assured Career Progression7 Scheme, 2009 was
                brought into force superseding the ACP Scheme, w.e.f. 19th
                May, 2009.
      e.        The MACP Scheme envisaged placement in the immediate
                next higher grade pay on completion of 10, 20 and 30 years
                of service. It also provided that upgradation granted under the
                ACP Scheme in the past to those grades which now carry the
                same Grade Pay due to the merger of pay scale/upgradation
                of pay recommended by the 6th Pay Commission shall be
                ignored for the purpose of granting upgradation under the
                MACP Scheme.


1    High Court
2    impugned order
3    W.P. No. 9171 of 2018
4    Tribunal
5    O.A. No. 2 of 2017
6    ACP Scheme
7    MACP Scheme
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     f.      The basic difference between the ACP Scheme and the MACP
             Scheme appears to be that while under the former scheme the
             financial upgradation was to the pay scale of the next higher
             promotional post in the service, under the latter scheme, financial
             upgradation was with reference to the next higher grade pay in
             the scale of pay as notified upon implementation of the Central
             Civil Services (Revised Pay) Rules, 2018.
     g.      Since the respondent had not been promoted to a higher post
             till 1st September, 2008, she was granted the second benefit
             envisaged in the MACP Scheme [Pay Band 2 with Grade Pay
             of Rs.4,800/-] vide an order dated 10th August, 2010, w.e.f. 1st
             September, 2008.
     h.      In due course of time, w.e.f. 11th July, 2015, the respondent
             was granted the benefit of third financial upgradation under the
             MACP Scheme [Grade Pay of Rs.5,400/-] vide an order dated
             18th November, 2015.
     i.      The respondent, indubitably, received the benefits of second
             and third financial upgradation under the MACP Scheme without
             raising any demur.
     j.      On 4th October, 2016, the respondent submitted a representation
             to the Director General, Doordarshan, 3 rd appellant (5 th
             respondent in the original application), to grant her benefit of
             second financial upgradation under ACP Scheme with Grade
             Pay of Rs.6,600/- w.e.f. 11th March, 2009 and the benefit of
             the third financial upgradation under the MACP Scheme with
             Grade Pay of Rs.7,600/-, w.e.f. 11th March, 2015.
     k.      Such representation was rejected on 5th November, 2016 by
             the Dy. Director (S.II).
     l.      Challenging rejection of her representation, the respondent
             approached the Tribunal which, as noted above, allowed her
             original application8 vide the judgment and order dated 1st
             August, 2017,9 which later came to be affirmed by the High
             Court vide the impugned order.



8   O.A.
9   Tribunal’s order
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         The Chief Executive Officer & Others v. S. Lalitha & Others


4.    The Tribunal proceeded to allow the O.A. of the respondent relying
      on a judgment and order of the High Court dated 5th June, 2017 in
      B. D. Kadam & ors. v. Union of India & ors..10
5.    The impugned order recorded its concurrence with the decision in
      B. D. Kadam (supra) and, thus, held that the Tribunal was not in
      error in upholding the respondent’s challenge to the order dated 5th
      November, 2016 rejecting her representation. The High Court also
      noticed that the decision in B.D. Kadam (supra) had been challenged
      before this Court by the Union of India in SLP (Civil) D No. 29605
      of 2017 but no order had been passed. Accordingly, the challenge
      in the writ petition was spurned. Submission advanced on behalf
      of the respondent that the Tribunal’s order had been complied with
      was, however, recorded.
6.    Incidentally, SLP (Civil) D. No. 29605 of 2017 stands dismissed vide
      an order of this Court dated 27th January, 2020.
7.    Up to this stage, it would seem to be an open and shut case. The
      Tribunal having proceeded to allow the O.A. on the basis of B. D.
      Kadam (supra), which it was bound to follow, the Tribunal’s order
      having been complied with by the appellants by granting to the
      respondent the benefit she had claimed, and the SLP (Civil) D. No.
      29605 of 2017 against the decision in B. D. Kadam (supra) having
      been rejected, nothing further would survive for consideration.
      However, certain subsequent developments including decisions of
      this Court have been drawn to our notice by the appellants and it has
      been urged that this Court may examine the issue of the respondent’s
      entitlement in the light of such developments and notwithstanding
      that compliance with the Tribunal’s order has been secured.
8.    After SLP (Civil) D. No. 29605 of 2017 came to be dismissed by
      this Court on 27th January, 2020, a review petition11 was filed before
      the High Court. Vide its order dated 7th March, 2023, the High Court
      rejected the review petition. Challenging such rejection, SLP (Civil)
      D. No. 45401 of 2023 has been filed, whereupon a coordinate Bench
      of this Court on 8th December, 2023 has issued notice in view of the




10   2017 SCC OnLine Kar 4772
11   R.P. No.345 of 2022
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      decisions in Union of India & ors. v. S. Ranjit Samuel & ors.12 and
      Vice Chairman, DDA v. Narendra Kumar & ors.13
9.    The appellants, therefore, contend that the issue is still at large as to
      whether the respondent was entitled to succeed in her claim before
      the Tribunal and the High Court.
10. Since SLP (Civil) D. No. 45401 of 2023 is pending, the same has
    to be decided on its own merits. However, for reasons more than
    one (which we need not express here, lest it has any effect on the
    pending lis), we are really not impressed by the contention advanced
    on behalf of the appellants based on the fact of issuance of notice
    referred to above.
11. Though not cited by the appellants, we have looked into a decision
    of recent origin of a coordinate Bench of this Court in Union of
    India v. N.M. Raut,14 wherein, upon thorough consideration of
    the MACP scheme and the decisions referred to therein, financial
    upgradations granted in favour of the respondents-employees
    were interdicted and the appeals were allowed. However, we have
    noticed a factual dissimilarity which is of some significance. The
    respondents-employees were granted financial upgradations under
    the MACP Scheme despite grant of non-functional upgradation
    after two or four years of service while functioning as Pharmacist
    and Superintendent, respectively, and thus had not stagnated. This
    Court in N.M. Raut (supra) held that such grant of non-functional
    upgradation and thereafter financial upgradation under the MACP
    Scheme would be contrary to the intent and purpose of the MACP
    scheme. This position is evident from what was observed in paragraph
    20, reading as follows:
             “20. In view of the aforesaid position of the MACPS,
             we fail to understand how we can ignore the financial
             upgradation, which was granted upon completion of two
             or four years of service in the posts of Pharmacist or
             Superintendent, as the case may be, for the purpose of
             deciding as to whether or not the Government employee



12   2022 INSC 340 : 2022 SCC OnLine SC 368
13   2022 INSC 276 : (2022) 11 SCC 641
14   2024 INSC 1042 : 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3873
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       The Chief Executive Officer & Others v. S. Lalitha & Others


           would be entitled to the next financial benefit under the
           MACPS. To ignore the financial upgradation granted on
           completion of two or four years of service as Pharmacists
           or Superintendents, would be contrary to the intent and
           purpose of the scheme, the language employed as well
           as the examples/illustrations which have been given. …”
12. It is, therefore, apparent that financial upgradations granted under
    the MACP Scheme despite grant of non-functional upgradation to
    the respondents-employees upon completion of two or four years
    of service, as the case may be, was not found by this Court to be
    in accord with the MACP scheme and while, however, not ordering
    recovery from those who had retired and those who were due to
    retire within a year of pronouncement of such judgment, the Court
    clarified that their pension and pay scale be redetermined w.e.f. 1st
    January, 2025. The respondent before us had claimed benefits of
    financial upgradation on completion of 24 years of service with effect
    from the date of grant of financial upgradation to her was due in terms
    of the ACP Scheme, which got delayed and, in the interregnum, the
    MACP Scheme intervened. The reason why this Court held against
    the respondents-employees in N.M. Raut (supra) is, therefore, quite
    distinct, whereas this appeal calls for a different perspective.
13. Be that as it may, non-interference with the order impugned is the
    logical conclusion based on our understanding that issuance of notice
    on SLP (Civil) D. No. 45401 of 2023 is of no relevance and that the
    decision in N.M. Raut (supra) does not operate to the detriment of
    the respondent; however, the reason why we propose not to end
    our judgment here but to say a few more words is because of an
    objection that the appellants had raised in their counter statement as
    regards maintainability of the O.A. According to the appellants, the
    O.A. was time-barred and ought to have been dismissed as such.
14. The respondent had pleaded in paragraph 3 of the O.A. as follows:
           “3. Limitation:
           The Applicant further declares that the application is
           within the limitation period prescribed in Section 21 of
           the Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985 as the Applicant is
           challenging the orders passed by the 5th Respondent at
           Annexure A-11 dated 5.11.2016 against the claim of the
           Applicant.”
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15. Since the O.A. was verified on 21st December, 2016, the respondent
    was confident and, accordingly, declared that it was within the period
    of limitation prescribed in Section 21 of the Administrative Tribunals
    Act, 1985.15
16. Both the Tribunal as well as the High Court did not rule on the objection
    of maintainability though, for the reasons and the observations that
    follow, such objection appears to us to be fairly sound.
17. C. Jacob v. Director of Geology and Mining,16 Union of India
    v. M.K. Sarkar,17 State of Uttaranchal v. Shiv Charan Singh
    Bhandari18 and Union of India v. Chaman Rana19 are decisions
    of this Court on belated approaches with stale grievances in service
    related disputes having a material bearing on this appeal.
18. In C. Jacob (supra), this Court observed that the case before it was
    a typical example of “representation and relief”. The employee kept
    quiet for 18 years after termination of service. A stage was reached
    of no record being available regarding his previous service. In the
    representation which the employee made in 2000, he claimed that he
    should be taken back in service. On rejection of the said representation
    by an order dated 9th April, 2002, he filed a writ petition before the
    jurisdictional high court claiming service benefits, by referring the
    said order of rejection as the cause of action. The learned Judge
    examined the claim, as if it was a live claim made in time, found fault
    with the employer for not producing material to show that termination
    was preceded by due enquiry and declared the termination as illegal.
    But as the employee already reached the age of superannuation, the
    learned Judge granted the employee the relief of pension with effect
    from 18th July, 1982, by deeming that he retired from service on that
    day. This Court expressed its inability to understand how the learned
    Judge could declare a termination in 1982 as illegal in a writ petition
    filed in 2005 as well as how fault could be found with the Department
    of Mines and Geology, for failing to prove that a termination made
    in 1982, was preceded by an enquiry in proceedings initiated after


15   1985 Act
16   2008 INSC 1133 : (2008) 10 SCC 115
17   2009 INSC 1288 : (2010) 2 SCC 59
18   2013 INSC 560 : (2013) 12 SCC 179
19   2018 INSC 230 : (2018) 5 SCC 798
[2025] 4 S.C.R.                                                        1743

       The Chief Executive Officer & Others v. S. Lalitha & Others


      22 years, when the department in which the employee had worked
      was wound up long back in 1983 itself and the new department had
      no records of his service.
19. The facts in M.K. Sarkar (supra) would reveal that more than 22 years
    after his retirement, and after receiving his dues under the Provident
    Fund Scheme, the retiree-respondent had made a representation
    requesting that he may be extended the benefit of the Pension
    Scheme while, at the same time, expressing willingness to refund
    the amount received under the Provident Fund Scheme (by way of
    adjustment against the arrears of pension that would become payable
    to him on acceptance of his request for switch over to the Pension
    Scheme). The said request was not accepted. The retiree-respondent
    therefore approached the Central Administrative Tribunal20 by filing
    an application under Section 19 of the 1985 Act seeking a direction
    to the Railway Administration to permit him to exercise an option to
    switch over to the Pension Scheme. The application was disposed of
    by the CAT by directing a decision to be taken on the representation
    of the retiree-respondent by passing a reasoned order, making it
    clear that it did not examine the claim on merits. The claim of the
    retiree-respondent was rejected by the Chairman, Railway Board
    whereupon a second original application was filed before the CAT.
    CAT allowed this second application and directed the Railways to
    permit the retiree-respondent to opt for the pension scheme and also
    inform him the amount that was required to be refunded in case he
    exercised the option. The relevant high court having jurisdiction was
    unsuccessfully approached by the Railways, whereafter this Court’s
    jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution was invoked. It is
    in the aforenoted facts and circumstances that this Court had the
    occasion to observe in paragraphs 15 and 16 as follows:
           15. When a belated representation in regard to a “stale”
           or “dead” issue/dispute is considered and decided, in
           compliance with a direction by the court/tribunal to do
           so, the date of such decision cannot be considered as
           furnishing a fresh cause of action for reviving the “dead”
           issue or time-barred dispute. The issue of limitation or
           delay and laches should be considered with reference to
           the original cause of action and not with reference to the


20   CAT
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             date on which an order is passed in compliance with a
             court’s direction. Neither a court’s direction to consider a
             representation issued without examining the merits, nor
             a decision given in compliance with such direction, will
             extend the limitation, or erase the delay and laches.
             16. A court or tribunal, before directing “consideration”
             of a claim or representation should examine whether
             the claim or representation is with reference to a “live”
             issue or whether it is with reference to a “dead” or “stale”
             issue. If it is with reference to a “dead” or “stale” issue or
             dispute, the court/tribunal should put an end to the matter
             and should not direct consideration or reconsideration.
             If the court or tribunal deciding to direct “consideration”
             without itself examining the merits, it should make it clear
             that such consideration will be without prejudice to any
             contention relating to limitation or delay and laches. Even
             if the court does not expressly say so, that would be the
             legal position and effect.
20. Shiva Charan Singh Bhandari (supra) and Chaman Rana (supra)
    arose out of belated claims for grant of promotion. In Chaman Rana
    (supra), it was held that a subsequent pronouncement of a judgment
    by this Court could not enthuse a fresh lease of life or furnish a
    fresh cause of action to what was otherwise clearly a dead and stale
    claim. The following passage from Shiv Charan Singh Bhandari
    (supra) was quoted:
             “29. … Not for nothing, has it been said that everything
             may stop but not the time, for all are in a way slaves of
             time. There may not be any provision providing for limitation
             but a grievance relating to promotion cannot be given a
             new lease of life at any point of time.”
      This was followed by the observation that caution has to be exercised
      by the Court with regard to the modus operandi of the representation
      syndrome to revive what are clearly dead and stale claims, as
      discussed in C. Jacob (supra).
21. One of us (Rajesh Bindal, J.), speaking for the coordinate Bench
    in State of Orissa v. Laxmi Narayan Das,21 had the occasion to


21   2023 INSC 619 : (2023) 15 SCC 273
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       The Chief Executive Officer & Others v. S. Lalitha & Others


     consider the effect that unexplained delay and laches would have
     in availing remedies. The Court in that case was concerned with a
     challenge to finally published record of rights. Taking note of multiple
     precedents in the field on the subject of delay or laches disentitling
     a party to relief, it was held that a writ petition filed 46 (forty-six)
     years after final publication was grossly belated and that no relief
     could have been made available to the respondents/writ petitioners.
22. Although in C. Jacob (supra) and M. K. Sarkar (supra) the law was
    declared keeping in mind that there were directions for consideration
    of the “stale” or “dead” claims by the orders of the high court and the
    CAT, respectively, and thereafter, rejection of the claims gave rise
    to the second round of litigation, here no such order of the Tribunal
    admittedly intervened. There is, thus, a factual dissimilarity; yet,
    nothing much turns on it.
23. In the facts of the present appeal, we find that the respondent
    had received the second benefit of financial upgradation under
    the MACP Scheme in August, 2010 and even the third benefit
    thereunder sometime in November, 2015. She claimed grant of the
    second benefit of financial upgradation under the ACP Scheme,
    due to her in March, 2009, as late as in October, 2016 by making a
    representation. Fortuitously for the respondent, she did not have to
    approach the Tribunal for getting her representation decided, because
    within 32 days of receipt thereof, the Dy. Director (S.II) rejected such
    representation on 5th November, 2016. The due diligence exercised
    by a conscientious officer, [who thought it to be his duty to decide
    the representation but otherwise could well have elected not to
    examine the same because (i) a “stale” or “dead” claim had been
    raised and (ii) the respondent, while in service, had accepted the
    benefits of financial upgradation without raising any demur] cannot
    be taken undue advantage by the respondent by urging that the law
    declared in the aforesaid decisions would not be applicable in her
    case because of factual dissimilarities.
24. The self-imposed restrictions in the exercise of writ jurisdiction under
    Article 226 of the Constitution, which have evolved from judicial
    precedents of this Court, need not be restated here. Suffice to say,
    unexplained delay or laches is considered one of the factors which
    could assume significance in denying relief when the discretionary
    writ remedy is invoked. In an appropriate case, a writ court may
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     refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if the applicant’s negligence
     or omission to assert his right combined with undue delay or laches
     and prejudice to the other party warrants such refusal.
25. However, although limitation laws do not apply to writ jurisdiction,
    in relation to service disputes triable under the 1985 Act the laws
    of limitation traceable in Section 21 read with Section 20 thereof do
    apply. Sections 20 and 21 (to the extent relevant) read as follows:

          “20. Application not to be admitted unless other
          remedies exhausted.— (1) A Tribunal shall not ordinarily
          admit an application unless it is satisfied that the applicant
          had availed of all the remedies available to him under
          the relevant service rules as to redressal of grievances.

          (2) For the purposes of sub-section (1), a person shall be
          deemed to have availed of all the remedies available to
          him under the relevant service rules as to redressal of
          grievances,—

               (a) if a final order has been made by the Government
               or other authority or officer or other person competent
               to pass such order under such rules, rejecting any
               appeal preferred or representation made by such
               person in connection with the grievance; or

               (b) where no final order has been made by the
               Government or other authority or officer or other
               person competent to pass such order with regard to
               the appeal preferred or representation made by such
               person, if a period of six months from the date on
               which such appeal was preferred or representation
               was made has expired.

          (3) For the purposes of sub-sections (1) and (2), any
          remedy available to an applicant by way of submission of
          a memorial to the President or the Governor of a State or
          to any other functionary shall not be deemed to be one
          of the remedies which are available unless the applicant
          had elected to submit such memorial.”
                                                 (emphasis supplied)
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        The Chief Executive Officer & Others v. S. Lalitha & Others


             “21. Limitation.—(1) A Tribunal shall not admit an
             application,—
                    (a) in a case where a final order such as is mentioned
                    in clause (a) of sub-section (2) of Section 20 has
                    been made in connection with the grievance unless
                    the application is made, within one year from the date
                    on which such final order has been made;
                    (b) in a case where an appeal or representation such
                    as is mentioned in clause (b) of sub-section (2) of
                    Section 20 has been made and a period of six months
                    had expired thereafter without such final order having
                    been made, within one year from the date of expiry
                    of the said period of six months.
                    … ”.
26. A Constitution Bench of this Court in S.S. Rathore v. State of
    Madhya Pradesh,22 upon noting Section 20, had the occasion to
    observe as follows:
             15. In several States the Conduct Rules for government
             servants require the administrative remedies to be
             exhausted before the disciplinary orders can be challenged
             in court. …
             16. The Rules relating to disciplinary proceedings do provide
             for an appeal against the orders of punishment imposed on
             public servants. Some Rules provide even a second appeal
             or a revision. The purport of Section 20 of the Administrative
             Tribunals Act is to give effect to the Disciplinary Rules
             and the exhaustion of the remedies available thereunder
             is a condition precedent to maintaining of claims under
             the Administrative Tribunals Act. Administrative Tribunals
             have been set up for government servants of the Centre
             and several States have already set up such Tribunals
             under the Act for the employees of the respective States.
             The law is soon going to get crystallised on the line laid
             down under Section 20 of the Administrative Tribunals Act.
                                                    (emphasis supplied)


22   1989 INSC 268 : (1989) 4 SCC 582
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27. As noted in S.S. Rathore (supra) and as is still the present position,
    service rules (rules relating to conduct, discipline and appeal, leave,
    pension, etc.) governing public servants do have provisions providing
    for first appeals, second appeals (not ordinarily), revisions against
    original/appellate orders, or memorials (not ordinarily). In rare cases,
    such rules may also provide for representations against actions which
    affect the public servants and are perceived by them to be not in
    accordance with law. In any event, even though service rules may not
    provide for a representation, there could be cases (to be discussed
    hereafter) where omission or failure to consider and dispose of a
    representation could give rise to a claim to move the CAT.
28. We may, at this juncture, clear the position that the CAT does have,
    in exceptional cases, the power to entertain an original application
    under Section 19 of the 1985 Act even if the applicant before it has
    not exhausted the remedies available to him under the service rules
    applicable to him as to redressal of grievances. If any authority on
    the point is required, one may profitably refer to the decision in D.B.
    Gohil v. Union of India.23
29. Coming back to Section 20, the purport of the opening words of
    sub-section (2) read with sub-section (1) thereof, which we have
    highlighted above, leaves no manner of doubt that the word “remedies”
    referred to therein, used as a noun, mean the “remedies” that are
    statutorily available as to redressal of grievances under the relevant
    service rules. However, in a case where the service rules do not
    provide any scope for representation to be made, the aggrieved
    public servant without making an unprovided for representation, i.e.,
    a non-statutory representation, and without waiting for its disposal,
    may approach the CAT directly challenging the order/action that has
    prejudicially affected his right and left him aggrieved; and, if any
    objection as to non-exhaustion of remedy before the departmental
    authorities is raised before the CAT by the authorities, the same can
    well be countered by urging that the service rules do not provide
    any statutory remedy by way of a representation to the departmental
    authorities against the order/action under challenge.
30. There could, however, be innumerable cases where formal orders
    may not exist affecting the rights of public servants covered by the


23   (2010) 12 SCC 301
[2025] 4 S.C.R.                                                      1749

       The Chief Executive Officer & Others v. S. Lalitha & Others


     1985 Act but affectation of their rights could arise out of silence or
     inaction of the employer to confer an otherwise legitimate benefit.
     What is the recourse available in such a case? In such cases, it is
     eminently desirable that steps be first taken by the public servant
     to invite the attention of the employer to such affectation of rights
     for the same to be addressed by the employer. Suppose, a public
     servant is due for promotion or is due for a pay raise or claims
     entitlement to any service benefit which, according to him, is due but
     the employer has remained silent or inactive in not giving the public
     servant what is due to him. In such cases, the only way of espousing
     one’s grievance is through a representation bringing to the notice of
     the employer that grant of the service benefit, though due, has not
     been considered and that the grievance be redressed. If the grievance
     is not redressed despite receiving the representation and despite
     expiry of the period mentioned in sub-section (2) of Section 20 of
     the 1985 Act, in such cases, the CAT cannot throw out an original
     application by holding that the remedy by way of a representation is
     not provided in the service rules. However, the public servant has to
     be cautious and take care not to wait indefinitely for espousing his
     grievance from the date affectation of his right begins. If he does
     wait indefinitely, he does so at his own peril.
31. Or, take a case where there is no employer-employee relationship yet,
    viz., the case of an aspirant for public employment who participates
    in the selection process but turns out to be unsuccessful. Should he
    have any grievance in relation to the process and seeks to challenge
    the same, he may do so immediately before accrual of third party
    rights; or, he may first represent and if there be no response or any
    response which does not address his grievance, he may apply before
    the CAT under Section 19 of the 1985 Act within the prescribed period
    of limitation. However, if there is delay and third party rights accrue,
    the delay has to be explained and condonation sought.
32. Reading Section 20 as we have interpreted it above with the guiding
    light provided by S.S. Rathore (supra) and M.K. Sarkar (supra), we
    need to consider whether the O.A. filed by the respondent before
    the Tribunal was within time or not.
33. The respondent did not in the O.A. plead and indicate the specific
    provision in the service rules in terms whereof she sought relief from
    the 3rd appellant by filing the representation dated 4th October, 2016.
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     In the absence of such pleading, one has to proceed on the premise
     that she had made the representation on her own without the same
     being provided under any service rules applicable to her and, in that
     sense, it was a non-statutory representation. The period of limitation
     could not have been stretched by the respondent by asserting that
     rejection of her non-statutory representation resulted in accrual of
     the cause of action for moving the Tribunal.
34. To summarise the legal position, what assumes cruciality in cases,
    such as these, is whether the representation that has been made
    and rejected, whereafter the jurisdiction of the CAT is invoked, is
    statutorily provided in the service rules governing the applicant-public
    servant. Bare reading of the opening words of Section 20 of the
    1985 Act with sub-section (1), which requires exhaustion of other
    available remedies as a general precondition for entertaining original
    applications under Section 19, refers to remedies that are available
    under the relevant service rules as to redressal of grievances against
    final orders. If the relevant service rules do not provide for making of
    a representation against final orders, by reason of absence of such
    a provision, the remedy of the aggrieved applicant-public servant
    would lie directly before the CAT in challenging the order/action of
    the authorities adverse or prejudicial to his interest; and, in such a
    case, an original application ought not to be rejected mechanically on
    the ground that all “remedies” have not been exhausted. However,
    it cannot be gainsaid that if the relevant service rules do provide for
    making of a representation, the remedy made available has to be
    exhausted unless an exceptional case is set up. Provision made in
    the service rules, if at all, for making of a statutory representation,
    timing of such representation and whether the representation raises
    a “stale” or “dead” claim – all these are relevant for deciding the
    question of limitation under the 1985 Act. The opening words of
    Section 20 read with sub-section (2) thereof would, however, call for
    a nuanced approach. As observed earlier, a representation though
    not provided in the relevant rules governing service could yet be
    necessary and imperative when a legitimate service benefit is not
    conferred on the aggrieved applicant-public servant by the employer
    on his own either due to inaction or otherwise. In such a case, the
    representation inviting attention to what the aggrieved applicant-
    public servant perceives is deprivation of a legitimate benefit has
    to be made expeditiously and before accrual of third-party rights,
[2025] 4 S.C.R.                                                      1751

        The Chief Executive Officer & Others v. S. Lalitha & Others


      if any. Such a representation could be made even after accrual of
      third-party rights, but within a reasonable time of the same coming
      to the notice of the aggrieved applicant-public servant. What would
      constitute reasonable time would necessarily depend on the facts
      of each particular case and decided accordingly.
35. We hold that except in cases where final orders are passed on
    appeals/revisions/memorials/representations which are statutorily
    provided, limitation for the purpose of filing an original application
    under Section 19 of the 1985 Act, in view of the above-referred
    decisions and Sections 21 and 20 thereof, has to be reckoned
    keeping in mind the date of accrual of the cause of action and the
    proximity of the date of the representation, and the period of one
    year for filing an original application has to be counted from the
    date of expiry of six months from date of such a representation if
    no order were passed thereon. Needless to observe, the cause of
    action cannot be deferred by making a highly belated representation
    and awaiting its outcome. We also make it clear that different
    considerations would arise in a case of a continuous wrong, which
    has to be decided in the light of the decision of this Court in Union
    of India v. Tarsem Singh.24
36. On such premise as explained above, the respondent should have,
    if she felt aggrieved by the action of the appellants of granting her
    benefits of financial upgradation under the MACP Scheme instead of
    the ACP Scheme, availed the remedy before the Tribunal immediately
    after her rights were affected. She ought not to have waited for so long
    for ventilating her grievance through a belated representation. Filing
    of such belated representation, which was rejected in no time, did
    not have the effect of postponing the cause of action and stretching
    the period of limitation so as to render the O.A. as filed within time.
37. Both fora, i.e., the Tribunal as well as the High Court, did not rule
    on the objection of maintainability of the O.A. despite such objection
    being sound. The reasons that we have assigned would lead to the
    irresistible conclusion that the O.A. was time-barred and should not
    have been entertained by the Tribunal. The High Court too erred
    in law by failing to entertain the challenge to the Tribunal’s order
    on the specious ground that the decision in B.D. Kadam (supra)


24   2008 INSC 930 : (2008) 8 SCC 648
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     covered the issue without, however, examining whether the O.A.
     was maintainable.
38. Having ruled thus, we cannot ignore a vital fact. The respondent has
    retired in 2018. The Tribunal’s order has been implemented and she
    has received certain financial benefits. During the winter years of her
    life, financial support will become essential to ensure that she can
    live a life of dignity and purpose, exercising her right to a fulfilling
    existence. Regard being had to the same and bearing in mind the
    provision contained in Article 15(3) of the Constitution enabling
    the State to make special provisions inter alia for women and that
    Article 41 thereof provides guidance for the policy of the State to be
    aimed at providing assistance in cases of inter alia old age, we, in
    due exercise of our power under Article 142 of the Constitution of
    India and considering this case as a very special case, refrain from
    directing the respondent to refund any surplus amount received by
    her over and above her entitlement.
39. The appeal, accordingly, stands disposed of without interfering with
    the impugned order.

     Result of the case: Appeal disposed of.




     †
         Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain