Holding

A declaration under Section 6 or a notification under Section 4 must be expressly quashed in its entirety for the relief to extend beyond the parties before the court; otherwise the acquisition remains valid.

Summary

The Tamil Nadu Housing Board (TNHB) appealed against orders of the Madras High Court that had directed it to issue No Objection Certificates to purchasers of land that had been acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The land in question had been notified for acquisition under Section 4 and a declaration under Section 6 was later quashed by the Supreme Court in the A.S. Naidu case, but the notification remained intact. The respondents, who bought the land after the award and possession had vested in the State, claimed that the quashing of the declaration nullified the entire acquisition, allowing them to retain possession. The Supreme Court held that unless a declaration under Section 6 or a notification under Section 4 is expressly quashed in its entirety, the relief applies only to the parties before the court and does not invalidate the whole acquisition. Consequently, the respondents could not rely on the earlier judgment to defeat the State’s title, and the High Court orders were set aside. The appeal was allowed and the writ petitions dismissed.

Issues considered

The effect of a Supreme Court order quashing a Section 6 declaration on other parties to the acquisition.
Whether the quashing of a Section 6 declaration automatically nullifies the Section 4 notification and the entire acquisition proceeding.
The standing of purchasers who bought land after the award and possession had vested in the State.
The applicability of limitation period provisions to the issuance of a fresh declaration under the Land Acquisition Act.
The scope of relief when a declaration or notification is not expressly quashed in toto.

Legislation cited

Land Acquisition Act, 1894s. 16, s. 17(2), s. 4, s. 5A, s. 6
Tamil Nadu Land Acquisition Ruless. Rule 3(b)

Subjects

Land acquisitionSection 4 notificationSection 6 declarationQuashing of acquisitionLimitation periodStanding of purchasersCo‑ownershipSupreme Court interpretation

Judgment

(2015] 6 S.C.R. 331 . 1 ' - 1' "'

THE CHAIRMAN & MANAGING DIRECTOR, TNHB & A
ANR.
v.
S. SARASWATHY & ORS.
(Civil Appeal Nos. 736-737 of 2008) B

MAY 11, 2015
[VIKRAMAJIT SEN AND PRAFULLA C. PANT, JJ.]

Land Acquisition Act, 1894 - ss. 4 and 6 - Land c
Acquisition proceedings by State Housing Board- Issuance
of Notification and declaration - Land falling under the said
Survey owned by three persons-VP, AJ and ASN - Said
persons had obtained approved layout plan from the Director
Town Planning for the said Survey, few months before D
issuance of Notification -Award passed by the State - PV,
son of VP received compensation and possession of the land
taken over by the State - However, after three years, PV
sold one of its plot to the respondents - Meanwhile, ASN
had filed writ petitions along _with others and High Court E
quashed the declaration issued u/s. 6 but left the Notification
· issued uls. 4 intact - This Court held that the order of the
High Court in absence of challenge by the State became
final and the acquisition itself is quashed - Second batch of
writ petitions by PV on determination of compensation, F
dismissed by the High Court - No appeal thereagainst as
such acquisition proceedings qua the writ petitioners in the
said batch attained finality- Thereafter, another batch of writ
petitions by respondents, seeking protection of their
possession and enjoyment over the suit land and direction G
to the Housing Board to issue them No Objection Certificate
to ef!able them to put construction on the suit land - Case of
the respondents that order passed in ASN case had the effect
of quashing the acquisiffon proceedings in toto and that ASN H
331
.j
332 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 6 S.C.R.

A was co-owner with PVofthe property in the said survey and
was authorize by PV to initiate• all subsequent proceedings
- Writ petitions allowed by the High Court- Said order upheld
by the Division Bench - On appeal, held: Unless the
Declaration uls. 6 or the Notification uls. 4 is not explicitly
B quashed in toto or in its wholeness by the Court, the benefits
of relief granted by the Court would be effective only qua the
parties before it - Those who failed to challenge the
acquisition proceedings, cannot, thereafter, follow those who
challenged the acquisition before the Court at the appropriate
C time and thereafter obtained favourable orders -
Respondents including their vendor, PV, cannot be permitted
to take any advantage of the orders passed by this Court in
ASN's case - This Court in ASN case annulled the
Notification issued u/s. 4 on the premises of limitation which
0
would mean that the rest of the acquisition proceedings was
left untouched by this Court in ASN - Further, respondents
had purchased the suit land after the Award had been passed
and possession of the land had been taken by the State,
E they could not have acquired any rights against the State -
PV did not bring down the acquisition proceedings qua his
land, but on the contrary, by accepting compensation, had
manifested his acceptance of the Award- Thus, once the
land stood vested in the State u/s. 16, PV and his vendees-
F respondents, could not have created and engineered rights
or interests in the property against the State, except the right
of seeking and receiving enhanced compensation -
Furthermore, there is no evidence to support the claim that
ASN as a co-owner or even otherwise, had challenged the
G acquisition proceedings qua the entire Survey on behalf of
himself and PV also - Thus, the order passed by the High
Courts is set aside.
A. Viswanatha Pillai v. The Special Tahsildar for Land
H Acquisition No. IV (1991) 4 SCC 17 and Jalandhar
Improvement Trust v. State of Punjab (2003) 1 SCC 526 -
distinguished.
THE CHAIRMAN & MANAGING DIRECTOR, TNHB & 333
ANR. v. S. SARASWATHY & ORS.

A. S. Naidu. v. State of Tamil Nadu SLP Nos. 11353-55 A
of 1988; Abhey Ram v. Union of India 1997 (3) SCR 931:
(1997) 5 SCC 421; Tamil Nadu Housing Board v. L.
Chandrasekaran (2010) 2 SCC 786; Shyam Nandan Prasad
v. State of Bihar 1993 (1) Suppl. SCR 533: (1993) 4 SCC
255; Delhi Admin. v. Gurdip Singh Uban 1999 (1) Suppl. B
SCR 650: (1999) 7 SCC 44; Delhi Admn. v. Gurdip Singh
Uban 2000 (2) Suppl. SCR 496: (2000) 7 sec 296 -
referred to.
Case Law Reference
c
1997 (3) SCR 931 Referred to. Para 9
(2010) 2 sec 786 Referred to. Para 10
1993 (1) Suppl. SCR 533 Referred to. Para 10
1999 (1) Suppl. SCR 650 Referred to. Para 10
2000 (2) Suppl. SCR 496 Referred to. Para 10 D
(1991) 4 sec 11 Distinguished. Para 16
(2003) 1 sec 526 Distinguished. Para 16
CIVILAPPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos.
736-737 of 2008
E
From the Judgment and Order of the High Court of
Judicature at Madras dated 07.04.2006 and 27.09.2006 in
W.A. No. 613 of 1997 and Review Application No. 118 of
2006 in W.A. No. 613of1997 respectively.
with F
C. A. Nos. 553-554, 555-556, 706-707, 709-710, 712,
739-740, 741-742, 743-744, 745-746, 747-748, 828-829 and
833-834 of 2008
Dhruv Mehta, Subramonium Prasad, AAG, M. Yogesh G
Kanna, A. Santha Kumaran, S. Thananjayan, D. K. Singh,
Pradeep Shukla, Archila Phoolenn, Abhijit Sengupta, ATM
Sampath, V. Balaji, Atul Sharma, P. Narasimhan, B. K. Pal,
Dinesh Kumar Garg, Abhishek Garg, Dhananjay Garg,
Deepak Mishra, P. B. Suresh, Vipin Nair, Udayaditya H
Banerjee, Temple Law Firm, N. Sheba, Sriram J. Thalapathy,
V. Adhimoolam, S. Vined, M. K. Madan for the appearing
Parties.
334 , 11SUPREME.COURT REPORTS [2015) 6 s,c.R.

A The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J. 1. The Appellant, Tamil
Nadu Housing Board, is taking exception to the Judgment
dated 07.04.2006 passed by the High Court in the Writ
B Appeal Nos. 603 to 615 of 1997 and the Judgment dated
27.09.2006 passed in the Review Application Nos. 108 to
120 of 2006 in the Writ Appeal Nos. 603 to 615 of 1997,
whereby the High Court had directed the Appellant
Government/State to issue No Objection Certificates to the
C contesting Respondents before us.

2. The Government of Tamil Nadu initiated land
acquisition proceedings on behalf of the Tamil Nadu Housing
Board to acquire 513.-52 acres of land including the land in
D question, in and around Chennai, under the Land Acquisition
Act, 1894 (hereinafter 'the Act') for the purpose of Ambattur
Neighborhood Housing Scheme. Notification under Section
4 of the Act was issued on 23.10.1975 and published on
12.11.1975, followed by the Declaration under Section 6 of
E the Act issued and published on 09.11.1978 and 10.11.1978
respectively. The land in question in the present Appeals, in
all 1 acre and 10 cents, owned originally by V. Perumal, forms
part of Survey Nos. 271/1 and 271/5 of the village Mogappair.
The total area of the land falling under the said Survey No.
F 271 is 4 acres and 10 cents: the said 1 acre and 10 cents
owned by V. Perumal and another 3 acres owned by A. J.
Ponnial and A. S. Naidu. The aforementioned three persons
had obtained an approved layout plan from the Director of
Town Planning on 07.03.1975 with respect to the said Survey
G No. 271.

3. When the Notifications for acquisition came to be
passed, two batches of writ petitions were filed before the
High Court; the first batch consisted of W.P. No. 7625 of
H 1982 filed by P. Velu, son of V. Perumal, while the second
>· T.HE1CH.All1RMAN & MANAGINGIDfREOiFOR,'if-NHB & ·335
ANR. v. S. SARASWATHY & ORS. [VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J.]

batch included W.P. Nos. 7499 and 8328 of 1983 filed by A. A
S. Naidu. The former batch assailed the Constitutional validity
of Sections 11 (1) and 23(1) of the Act and contended that
the compensation determined as on the date of publication
of a notification under Section 4 of the Act was inequitable
and arbitrary. The second batch laid an assault to the B
Notifications published under the Act in their entirety. It should
· be noted immediately that the statute has subsequently been
amended to mandate that an Award has to be passed within
two/three years, thereby substantially addressing the
grievance of compensation being a pittance owing to it being C
calculated after several years of the Notification.

4. In the batch matter concerning A. S. Naidu, the
parties fought a strenuous battle which resulted in a lengthy
discourse and an elaborate order of the High Court. The writ D
petitioners therein averred that the remarks, which were
offered by the requisitioning body, i.e. the Housing Board,
upon furnishing to it the Objections of the landowners, had
not been communicated to the latter. Such remarks along
with the Objections of the landowners formed the basis for E
enquiry under Section 5A of the Act; ergo, knowledge of those
remarks or contentions of the requisitioning body were crucial
for the landowners to sustain their objections. This contention
of the writ petitioners that Rule 3(b) of the Tamil Nadu Land F
Acquisition Rules has been infracted because of non-
furnishing of the said remarks to the landowners found favour
with the High Court. The High Court reasoned that the
furnishing of the remarks to the landowners was not just
another formality or discretionary procedure to be waived of G
at the whims of the Authorities; and their non-communication
had the effect of "setting at naught the very purpose of the
E!nquiry". Another contributory factor buttressing the case of
the writ petitioners was that the Declaration under Section 6
was not in conformity with the proviso of Section 6(1) of the H
336 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 6 S.C.R.

A Act, which prescribes that where land is being acquired for
the benefits of a Local Authority, a part of the compensation
payable for the acquisition shall have to be borne from the
fund controlled or managed by the concerned Local Authority.
Since the Tamil Nadu State Housing Board, i.e. the
B beneficiary of the subject acquisition proceedings, was held
by the High Court to be such a Local Authority and the
Declaration under Section 6 specifically provided that the
entire compensation was to be paid.out of public revenue
without any portion from the fund maintained by the Housing
C Board, it was plain that the Declaration under Section 6 of
the Act was not in accordance with the proviso of Section
6(1) of the Act. on-these two counts thus, the Writ Petition
of A. S. Naidu along with some of the other parties was partly
D allowed by the High Court by granting the relief of quashing
of the said Declaration vide Order dated 08.01.1988. The
Court, however, left the Notification issued under Section 4
of the Act intact, and it declined relief to those writ petitioners,
who acquired ownership of the land under acquisition after
E the issuance of the Notification under Section 4 of the Act.

5. A. S. Naidu, thereafter, approached this Court in
SLP Nos. 11353-55 of 1988 (A. S. Naidu. v. State of Tamil
Nadu), challenging the Judgment dated 08.01.1988, to the
F extent the High Court refused to interfere with the Notification
issued under Section 4 of the Act. However, the State
accepted the decision of the High Court and initiated fresh
enquiry proceedings including rehearing of the objections
preferred under Section 5A. When the matter reached this
G Court, it opined that the three year limitation period to publish
a fresh Declaration under Section 6 of the Act, as amended
by the Act 68of1984, had already lapsed, especially in view
of non-assailment of the Judgment dated 08.01.1988 by the
State, and held it to have attained finality. In this backdrop,
H this Court observed vide Order dated 21.08.1990 that:
s:THE CHAIRMAN & MANAGING DIR,~CJOR; TNHB & 337
ANR. v. S. SARASWATHY & ORS. [VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J.]

"4. On the date the declaration was made there were A
hardly two days left for completion of three years and
afterthe High Court order on 8-1-1988, the period has
already lapsed but no declaration has been published
and the same can no longer be made on the basi~ of
preliminary notification at present. In the absence of B
challenge by the State, the order of the High Court
against it has become final.

5. We are of the view that in these circumstances it
would no more be available to the State to make the C
requisite declaration under Section 6 of the Act. The
acquisition itself is quashed but we make it clear that it
is _open to the State Government in case it is satisfied
that acquisition is necessary in public interest, it is free
to exercise its power of eminent domain and make a D
fresh preliminary notification. The special leave petitions
are disposed of accordingly."

6. Meanwhile certain developments occurred, having
crucial bearing on the present matter. The State passed E
Award No. 9 of 1983 on 20.06.1983 with respect to 22.91
acres of land, which included the suit land as well as the
land of A. S. Naidu. Pursuant to that Award, P. Velu, son of
V. Perumal, received the compensation of Rs. 26615 and
the possession of the land was taken without opposition, by F
the State on 01.07.1983. Despite the acquisition of the suit
land having been completed in all respects thereto, P. Velu
illegally divided the suit land into twelve plots and sold them
in the year 1987 to the contesting Respondents before us
vide registered Sale Deeds, after over three years of vesting G
of land into the State. The Respondents are educated, some
of them are even Advocates and would be expected to have
made a title search. Subsequent to the passing of the
Judgment dated 08.01.1988 by the High Court and the Order H
dated 21.08.1990 by this Court, the second batch of Writ
338 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2015] 6 S.C.R.

A Petition of P. Velu proved futile and eventually came to be
rejected by the High Court on 22.07.1994, both on the
grounds of merits and delay. At this juncture, it merits a
mentioning that the batch of writ petitions including that of P.
Velu was principally concerned with the issue of fair
B determination of compensation at market value of the
property on the date of passing of the Award, instead of
taking the date of issuance of notification under Section 4 of
the Act as the pivotal point. No appeal arose from the
dismissal of these writ petitions, thus rendering finality to
C the acquisition proceedings qua the writ petitioners in that
batch.

7. In 1996, the contesting Respondents before us,
who are the vendees of P. Velu, filed another batch of writ
D petitions seeking protection of their possession and
enjoyment over the suit land, and direction to the respondents
therein to issue them No Objection Certificates to enable
them to put up constructions on the suit land. There is no
denial and rebuttal by them that they had bought the suit
E land from P. Velu after the Award had been passed.
Nonetheless, they put forth their case before the High Court
premised entirely on the cornerstone of the Order dated
21.08.1990 passed by this Court in A. S. Naidu, which they
F contended had the effect of quashing the acquisition
proceedings in toto. They further maintained thatA. S. Naidu,
allegedly a co-owner with P. Velu of the land property in
Survey No. 271, was authorized by P. Velu to take all the
necessary steps to get approvals for the planned layout as
G well as to initiate subsequent proceedings in order to protect
their common interest in the Survey No. 271. The Single
Judge of the High Court vide common Judgment dated
19.02.1997 allowed the Writ Petitions of the Respondents,
believing that this Court had quashed the acquisition
H proceedings in totality; and it also followed some earlier order
IT"HE:CHAIRMAN & MANAGING DIRECTOR:'TNHB & 339'.
ANR. v. S. SARASWATHY & ORS. [VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J.]

of the High Court. The Division Bench while dismissing the A
Appeals preferred by the Appellant vide common impugned
Judgment dated 07.04.2006 was of the opinion that the
original owner of the suit land and the vendor of the
Respondents was A. S. Naidu. When this factual error was
brought to i_ts notice in the Review Applications, the Division B
Bench then reiterated the observations of the Single Judge
that this Court had quashed the entire acquisition
proceedings as far back in 1990, and since no proceedings
had been initiated thereafter, the question of who the original
owner was made no material difference. It thus affirmed the C
order and direction of the Single Judge and dismissed the
Review Applications vide common impugned Judgment
dated 27.09.2006.

8. The Respondents contend that even if the benefits D
of the Order dated 21.08.1990 passed by this Court in A. S.
Naidu is confined only to the parties to those proceedings
before this Court, they may nevertheless submit that
acquisition in respect of the entire Survey No. 271 had been
challenged by AS. Naidu, for himself and also on behalf of E
P. Velu and the view taken by this Court should enure to
their benefit.

9. We will first consider what implication the Order
dated 21.08.1990 passed by this Court has on the case in F
hand. The High Court was of the opinion thatthe Order dated
21.08.1990 had an all-encompassing import and it annulled
the entire acquisition proceedings. In that respect, we can
gainfully extract from the Order passed by a three-Judge
Bench of this Court in Abhey Ram v. Union of India, (1997) G
s sec 421:
"10. The question then arises is whether the quashing
of the declaration by the Division Bench in respect of
the other matters would enure the benefit to the H
340 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015) 6 S.C.R.

A appellants also. Though, prima facie, the argument of
the learned counsel is attractive, on deeper
consideration, it is difficult to give acceptance to the
contention of Mr Sachar. When the Division Bench
expressly limited the controversy to the quashing of
B the declaration qua the writ petitioners before the
Bench, necessary consequences would be that the
declaration published under Section 6 should stand
upheld.

c 11. It is seen that before the Division Bench judgment
was rendered, the petition of the appellants stood
dismissed and the appellants had filed the special leave
petition in this Court. If it were a case entirely relating
to Section 6 declaration as has been quashed by the
D High Court, necessarily that would enure the benefit to
others also, though they did not file any petition, except
to those whose lands were taken possession of and
were vested in the State under Sections 16 and 17(2)
of the Act free from all encumbrances. But it is seen
E that the Division Bench confined the controversy to the
quashing of the declaration under Section 6 in respect
of the persons qua the writ petitioners before the
Division Bench. Therefore, the benefit of the quashing
of the declaration under Section 6 by the Division Bench
F
does not enure to the appellants.

12. It is true that a Bench of this Court has considered
the effect of such a quashing in Delhi Development
Authority v. Sudan Singh (1997) 5 SCC 430. But,
G unfortunately, in that case the operative part of the
judgment referred to earlier has not been brought to
the notice of this Court. Therefore, the ratio therein has
no application to the facts in this case. It is also true
that in Yusufbhai Noormohmed Nendoliya v. State of
H
Gujarat (1991) 4 SCC 531 this Court had also observed
-ITHE CHAIRMAN & MANAGING DIREC"VOR:•TNHB & .341
ANR. v. S. SARASWATHY & ORS. [VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J.]

that it would enure the benefit to those petitioners. In A
view of the fact that the notification under Section 4(1)
is a composite one and equally tj'le declaration under
Section 6 is also a composite one, unless the
declaration under Section 6 is quashed in toto, it does
not operate as if the entire declaration requires to be B
quashed. It is seen that the appellants had not filed
any objections to the notice issued under Section 5-
A." (Emphasis supplied)

. 10. WealsohavetheadvantageofaJudgmentdated C
29.01.2010 passed by a Coordinate Bench of this Court in
Civil Appeal Nos. 3148-49 of 2002, titled as Tamil Nadu
Housing Board v. L. Chandrasekaran (2010) 2 SCC 786.
Chandrasekaran was also seized of the acquisition
proceedings we are dealing with, although involving the issue D
of release of land under Section 48 of the Act, but in respect
of different survey numbers. The respondents therein
pressed several grounds but finally rested their claim on the
basis of the Order dated 21.08.1990 passed by this Court in
the case of A.S. Naidu. One of the issues before this Court E
was to decide whether the Order passed by this Court in A.
S. Naidu had the effect of nullifying the acquisition in its
fullness. This Court observed in Chandrasekaran that it
was not possible to return a finding that while disposing of F
the special leave petitions preferred by A.S. Naidu this Court
had quashed the entire acquisition proceedings. This Court
underscored that A.S. Naidu did not even make a prayer
before the High Court for quashing the preliminary
Notification issued under Section 4 of the Act, and it G
observed: " ... in the absence of a specific prayer having been
made in that regard, neither the High Court nor this Court
could have quashed the entire acquisition." The Court then
took into account the cases of Shyam Nandan Prasad v.
State of Bihar (1993) 4 SCC 255, Abhey Ram, Delhi Ad min. H
342•· " ·SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2015] 6 S.C.R.

A v. Gurdip Singh Uban (1999) 7 SCC 44 and Delhi Admn. v.
Gurdip Singh Uban (2000) 7 SCC 296 and reiterated the
established and consistent view of this ·court that quashing
of acquisition proceedings at the instance of one or two
landowners does not have the effect of nullifying the entire
B acquisition. Since the observations contained in
Chandrasekaran are apposite for our purposes, we think it
advantageous to extract the following paragraphs therefrom:

15. The first issue which requires consideration is
c whether the order passed by this Court in AS. Naidu
case has the effect of nullifying the acquisition in its
entirety. In this context, it is apposite to mention that
neither the appellant Board nor have the respondents
placed before the Court copies of the writ petitions in
D which the acquisition proceedings were challenged,
order(s) passed by the High Court and the special leave
petitions which were disposed of by this Court on 21-
8-1990 and without going through those documents, it
is not possible to record a finding that while disposing
E of the special leave petitions preferred by A.S. Naidu
and others, this Court had quashed the entire
acquisition proceedings. So far as A.S. Naidu is
concerned, he did not even make a prayer before the
High Court for quashing the preliminary notification
F
issued under Section 4(1) of the Act.

16. This is evident from the prayer made by him in Writ
Petition No. 7499of1983, which reads as under:

G "For the reasons stated in the accompanying affidavit,
it is most respectfully prayed that this Hon'ble Court
may be pleased to issue a writ of certiorari or any other
proceeding or any other appropriate writ or direction or
order in the nature of a writ to call for the records of the
H first respondent relating to GOMs No. 1502, Housing
·i
.;-rfiE"cHAIRMAN & MANAGiN"c3 DiRECfb'R,ITNHB & 343
ANR. v. S. SARASWATHY.& ORS. [VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J.)

and Urban Development Department dated 7-11-1978 A
published in the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette
Extraordinary dated 10-11-1978 in Part II Section 2 on
pp.- 22 to/ 26 and .quash. the said notification issued
under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894
irisofar as it relates to the land in the petitioners' layout B
approved by the Director. of Town Planning in .LPDM/
DTP/2175 dated 7-3-1975 in Survey Nos: 254, 257, 258,
'260,:268 and 271 in Mogapperi Village, No. 81, Block
V,' Saidapet Taluk, Chingleput District and render
justice." '· · c
!

I From the above reproduced prayer clause, it is crystal
J
clear that the only relief sought by Shri AS. Naidu was
for quashing the notification issued under Section 6
insofar it related to the land falling in Survey Nos. 254, D
.c257, 258, 260, 268 and 271 in Mogapperi Village, No.
· 81; Block V, Saidapet Talukand in the absence of a
spe'cific prayer having been made in that regard, neither
the High Court nor this Court could have quashed the
entire acquisition; This appears to be the 'r'eason why E
· the Division Bench of the _High. Court, while disposing
of Writ Appeals Nos. 676-of 19"97 arid 8-9 of 1998
.• ' . . "4- ~ ~

observed that quashing of acquisition by this Court was
· only in relation to the land of the petitioner of that case·
F
and, at this belated stage, we are not inclined to declare
'that order dated 21-8-1990 passed by this Court had
the effect of nullifying the entire acquisition and that
. too by ignoring that.the appellant Board has ·already
· utilised portion of the acquired land for housing and G
other purposes. Any such inferential conclusion will
have disastrous
. . . consequences inasmuch as .it will .
result' .
'

·in uprooting those .who may have settled in, the .flats or
' \

houses constructed by the appellant Board or who may
have
.. ,
built their
.. .
houses'
on' the allotted
' .
plots or · H
undertaken other activities.
344 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 6 S.C.R.

A 17. We may also usefully refer to the judgments of this
Court in Shyam Nandan Prasad v. State of Bihar, Abhey
Ram v. Union of India (para 11), DelhiAdmn. v. Gurdip
Singh Uban (paras 8, 9 and 11) and Delhi Admn. v.
Gurdip Singh Uban, in which it has been consistently
B held that quashing of acquisition proceedings at the
instance of one or two landowners does not have the
effect of nullifying the entire acquisition. Moreover, in
the absence of challenge by L. Chandrasekaran to the
order passed by the Division Bench of the High Court
c in Writ Appeal No. 9of1998, his legal representatives
do not have the locus to contend that the order dated
21-8-1990 passed by this Court in SLPs (C) Nos. 11353-
55 of 1988 had the effect of nullifying the entire
acquisition.
D
11. We are respectfully in accord with the observations
of Coordinate Benches that unless the Declaration under
Section 6 or the Notification under Section 4 of the Act is not
explicitly quashed in toto or in its wholeness by the Court,
E the benefits of relief granted by the Court would be effective
only qua the parties before it. As already adumbrated above,
at the time the Appeal of A. S. Naidu came to be decided,
the three year limitation period to publish a declaration under
F Section 6 of the Act had already expired, making it impossible
for the Government to complete a ftesh process culminating
in another declaration; and it was for this reason that the
acquisition was quashed by the Court.

12. It has been repeatedly reiterated by this Court
G that those who have missed the boat in challenging the
acquisition proceedings, who sat idle and have let the grass
grow under their feet cannot, thereafter, be permitted to jump
on the bandwagon of others who entered the portals of the
H Court at the appropriate time and thereafter obtained
favourable orders. Significantly, in Chandrasekaran the
;-THE CHA·IRMAN & MANAGING'DIRECTOR\'TNHB & '3"45
ANR. v. S. SARASWATHY & ORS. [VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J.]

Court was alive to the reality of utilization of large chunks of A
land by the State for housing scheme; and in this scenario, it
was obviously and rightly reluctant and facially hesitant to
quash the acquisition proceedings in toto, knowing that that
would result in grave consequences to society. In this
analysis, the Respondents including their vendor, P. Velu, B
cannot be permitted to take any advantage of the Orders
passed by this Court in A. S. Naidu.

13. There could be cases however, where the
acquisition proceedings are deracinated, annulled and C
quashed in toto. Such grounds could include, to wit: absence
of public purpose; non publication of the substance of the
notification under Section 4 as required, denuding the rights
of the landowners; complete lack of consideration of the
objections by the authorities, thus obscuring the public D
purpose; fraudulent or mala fide or colourable exercise of
the power of eminent domain· behind the smokescreen of
public purpose; inherent defect or illegality in the issuance
of the notification under Section 4; acquiring of land for a
private company by illegally bypassing the extant statutory E
procedure etc.

14. Even if we assume that the Order passed by this
Court swept away the entire acquisition proceedings, the
claim of the Respondents is still unsustainable. In the F
Judgment dated 08.01.1988 passed by the High Court in
the case of A. S. Naidu, it has been clarified that "only those
persons, who are the owners on the date of Section 4(1)
Notification alone can question the validity of the
acquisition ... when the property was already notified for G
acquisition, if the petitioners had come to purchase the
property, they cannot have any right to agitate with regard to
procedural violation." There is thus no confusion that the
relief of quashing of the Declaration under Section 6 of the H
Act was expressly limited to some while being plainly denied
·345 ii ... tSUPREME COURT REPORTS ·[2015) 6 S.C.R.

A to others, signifying thereby, that the Declaration under
Section 6 was left untouched in the other cases. In A. S.
Naidu, this Court annulled the Notification issued under
Section 4 on the premises of limitation. This would mean
thatthe rest of the acquisition proceedings was left untouched
B by this Court in A. S. Naidu.

15. The second factor, detaching the case of the
contesting Respondents even farther, is that since the
Respondents had purchased the suit land after the Award
C had been passed and possession of the land had been taken
by the State, they could not have acquired any rights against
the State. P. Velu did not bring down the acquisition
proceedings qua his land, but on the contrary, by accepting
compensation, had manifested his acceptance of the Award.
D In these circumstances, once the land stood vested in the
State under Section 16 of the Act, P. Velu and his vendees,
namely the Respondents, could not have created and
engineered rights or interests in the property against the
State, except the right of seeking and receiving enhanced
E compensation. We are mindful that the Land Acquisition Act,
1894 as applicable to the State of Tamil Nadu does not
specifically preclude the land owners from entering into sale
transactions during an ongoing acquisition proceeding. But
F as long as the acquisition proceedings are not invalidated,
any agreement creating or altering or extinguishing rights
with respect to the land under acquisition will not be effective
or efficacious against the State.

16. As we have noted above, the additional case of
G the Respondents is that A. S. Naidu, as a co-owner or even
otherwise, had challenged the acquisition proceedings qua
the entire Survey No. 271 on behalf of himself and P. Velu
also. We are sorry to record that we have found not a grain
H of evidence supporting their specious claim. The cases of
A. Viswanatha Pillai v. The Special Tahsildar for Land
:<THE C!"IAIRtJIAN &".MANAGING·DIRECTOR,TNHB & 1347
ANR. v. S. SARASWATHY & ORS. [VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J.]

Acquisition No. IV · (1991) 4 SCC 17 and Jalandhar A
Improvement Trust v. State of Punjab (2003) 1 SCC 526
relied upon by them in this context, where reliefs were granted
to the co-owners, are distinguishable from the facts obtaining
in the instant case. The Respondents or even P. Velu cannot
assert to be co-owner with A. S. Naidu merely because they B
happened to own plots in the larger or main Survey No. 271
in the backdrop 'of that Survey having' been fractured into
smaller Survey numbers, or even because an approved
layout plan had been granted of the larger Survey number.
Nor do we think that owning a plot in the same survey number C
ipso facto authorises A.S. Naidu to litigate on behalf of P.
Velu also. The writ petition of A. S. Naidu is also conspicuous
in that it does not lay any claim to represent P. Velu. '!;
. ·-
! :

17. We are unable, for the manifold reasons stated D
above, to uphold the impugned corginon Judgments. The ; :

same are set aside accordingly. Civil Appeals stand allowed.
The Writ Petitions are held to be devoid of any merit and are
dismissed. Parties to bear their respective costs.
E
Nidhl Jain Appeal allowed.

F
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