THE AGRICULTURAL PRODUCE MARKETING COMMITTEE BANGALOREversusTHE STATE OF KARNATAKA & ORS
- Citation
- 2022 INSC 325
- Decided
- 22 March 2022
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Bench
- M R SHAH
Holding
The acquisition proceedings have not lapsed under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act, and the High Court erred by deciding only one issue without addressing the other matters raised.
Summary
The Agricultural Produce Marketing Committee (APMC) appealed against the Karnataka High Court’s judgment that the land acquisition proceedings for its mega‑market project had lapsed under Section 24(2) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013. The High Court had decided only the lapse issue, ignoring several other questions concerning the validity of the 1894 acquisition notifications, possession, compensation payment, and the effect of interim stays granted by courts. The Supreme Court held that the High Court’s limited adjudication was erroneous, especially in light of its own precedent in Indore Development Authority, which clarifies that a lapse under Section 24(2) occurs only when neither possession nor compensation has been taken for five years, and that interim court orders must be excluded from the period. Moreover, the Court emphasized that a judge must decide all issues raised, as required by Order 14 Rule 2 of the CPC, to avoid remand. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s orders and remitted the matters to the Single Judge to determine all pending issues afresh. The appeals were allowed.
Issues considered
- Whether the acquisition proceedings have lapsed under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act.
- Whether the High Court should have adjudicated on all other issues raised, including validity of notifications under the 1894 Act, possession, and compensation.
- Interpretation of Section 24(2) regarding the effect of interim court orders on the five‑year period.
- Whether the provisions of Order 14 Rule 2 of the CPC require a court to decide all issues before disposing of a case.
Legislation cited
- Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. Order 14 Rule 2
- Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961s. 66
- Land Acquisition Act, 1894s. 11A, s. 16, s. 17, s. 31, s. 34, s. 4(1), s. 6
- Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013s. 24(1)(a), s. 24(1)(b), s. 24(2)
Subjects
Judgment
[2022] 4 S.C.R. 309 309
THE AGRICULTURAL PRODUCE MARKETING COMMITTEE A
BANGALORE
v.
THE STATE OF KARNATAKA & ORS.
(Civil Appeal Nos. 1345-1346 of 2022) B
MARCH 22, 2022
[M. R. SHAH AND B. V. NAGARATHNA, JJ.]
Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land
Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013: s.24(2) – C
Lapse of Proceedings – Award not passed due to interim order – If
there is delay in the passing of the award owing to interim orders
granted by the High Court or even by the civil courts, where suits
may have been filed against acquiring bodies, the land owners
cannot take advantage of the same so as to contend that no award D
was made and consequently there was no payment or deposit of the
compensation and that possession of the acquired land continued
with them – The land owners having availed the benefit of interim
orders granted in their favour in proceedings initiated by them
against the acquisition cannot take benefit under s.24(2) of the
Act, 2013. E
Code Of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Or.14 r. 2 – Adjudication
upon all issues along with Preliminary Issue – The courts should
adjudicate on all the issues and give its findings on all the issues
and not to pronounce the judgment only on one of the issues – The
F
purpose is to avoid the increase of burden on the appellate court
and in many cases if the decision on the issue decided is found to
be erroneous and on other issues there is no adjudication and no
findings recorded by the court, the appellate court will have no
option but to remand the matter for its fresh decision – Therefore, to
avoid such an eventuality, the courts have to adjudicate on all the G
issues raised in a case and render findings and the judgment on all
the issues involved.
H
309
310 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 4 S.C.R.
A Allowing the appeals and remitting the matters to High
Court, the Court
HELD: 1. Despite the fact that a number of issues/grounds
were raised before the High Court on the legality and validity of
the acquisition proceedings, the Single Judge decided only one
B issue, namely, whether the acquisition proceedings have lapsed
by virtue of the 2013 Act. Whereas a number of issues/grounds
were raised and as such the original reliefs sought (acquisition
proceedings under Act 1894) were the main reliefs which were
required to be dealt with and considered, unfortunately, the Single
Judge did not give findings on the other issues/grounds and on
C the reliefs sought and disposed of the writ petitions considering
only one relief/ground, namely, whether the acquisition
proceedings have lapsed by virtue of the 2013 Act. When a number
of submissions were made on the other issues/grounds, the High
Court ought to have considered the other issues and ought to
D have given the findings on other issues also. Because of not
deciding the other issues and deciding the matter only on one
issue and thereafter when the decision on such one issue, is held
to be bad in law the Court has no other alternative but to remand
the matters to the Single Judge for deciding the Writ Petitions
afresh on all other issues. [Para 8.2][322-E-H; 323-A-B]
E
Nusli Neville Wadia v. Ivory Properties & Ors, (2020) 6
SCC 557 : [2019] 15 SCR 795 – relied on.
2. There has been a trend of land owners filing fresh cases
seeking lapse of acquisition on the basis of Section 24(2) of the
F Act, 2013, although such land owners may have earlier
unsuccessfully filed writ petitions challenging the acquisition
notifications. Such land owners may have had the benefit of interim
orders of stay of further proceedings in the acquisition process
or dispossession resulting in a delay in the making of the award
and payment/deposit of the compensation and consequently in
G taking over possession of the acquired land. There being a delay
in the passing of the award owing to interim orders granted by
the High Court or even by the civil courts, where suits may have
been filed against acquiring bodies, the land owners cannot now
H
THE AGRICULTURAL PRODUCE MARKETING COMMITTEE 311
BANGALORE v. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA & ORS.
take advantage of the same so as to contend that no award has A
been made and consequently there has been no payment or
deposit of the compensation and that possession of the acquired
land continues with them. The land owners having had the benefit
of interim orders granted in their favour in proceedings initiated
by them against the acquisition cannot take benefit under Section
B
24(2) of the Act, 2013. The High Court or the civil courts which
may have granted interim orders in favour of the land owners,
ought to consider the aforesaid aspect before applying Section
24(2) of the Act, 2013 in favour of the land owners. [Para 9][326-
C-G]
Indore Development Authority v. Manoharlal & Ors., C
(2020) 8 SCC 129 : [2020] 3 SCR 1 – followed.
Pune Municipal Corporation v. Harakchand Misirimal
Solanki (2014) 3 SCC 183 : [2014] 1 SCR 783 –
referred to.
D
Case Law Reference
[2020] 3 SCR 1 followed Para 4.7
[2019] 15 SCR 795 relied on Para 8.3
[2014] 1 SCR 783 referred to Para 9
E
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 1345-
1346 of 2022.
From the Judgment and Order dated 13.09.2017 of the High Court
of Karnataka at Bengaluru in W.A. No.1732 of 2014 and Order dated
28.06.2019 in RP No.539 of 2017. F
With
Civil Appeal Nos.1347-1374 of 2022.
V. Giri, Sr. Adv., Dr. Nanda Kishore, T. S. Sabarish, Vishnu
Unnikrishnan, Ms. Ankita Gupta, Ms. Manali Tripathi, Advs. for the G
Appellant.
C. U. Singh, Sr. Adv., V. N. Raghupathy, Md. Apzal Ansari, Pratap
Venugopal, Ms. Surekha Raman, Akhil Abraham Roy, Vijay Valson for
M/s K. J. John and Co., Advs. for the Respondents.
H
312 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 4 S.C.R.
A The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
M. R. SHAH, J.
1. As common question of law and facts arise in this group of
appeals and as such are between the same parties, all these appeals are
decided and disposed of together by this common judgment and order.
B
2. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment
and order in respective writ appeals preferred by the appellant herein –
the Agricultural Produce Marketing Committee, Bangalore (hereinafter
referred to as the “APMC”), by which the Division Bench of the High
Court has dismissed the said writ appeals and confirmed the common
C
judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge passed in
respective writ petitions preferred by the private respondents herein –
original land owners and declared that the acquisitions of the lands in
question has lapsed under Section 24(2) of the Right to Fair Compensation
and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement
D Act, 2013 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act, 2013”), the APMC,
Bangalore has preferred the present appeals.
3. The facts leading to the present appeals in a nutshell are as
under: -
3.1 That the lands in question were acquired in three parts. The
E
first acquisition was in respect of 172 acres 22 guntas of land owned by
respondent No.4 – Jamanlal Bajaj Seva Trust (for short “Trust”). Second
acquisition was in respect of 104 acres 5 guntas of land owned by very
respondent No.4 – Trust and the third acquisition was in respect of 3
acres 34 guntas of land (which is not the subject matter of appeals before
F this Court).
3.2 The relevant facts in respect of first and second acquisitions
are as under: -
In respect of 172 acres 22 guntas (First Acquisition)
G 3.2.1 That a notification was issued under Section 4(1) of the
Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act, 1894”)
on 03.09.1994 in respect of 172 acres 22 guntas of land owned by
respondent No.4 herein – Trust in Srigandadakaval Village,
Yeshwanthpura Hobli, Bengaluru for establishing a mega market by the
appellant – APMC, Bangalore.
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THE AGRICULTURAL PRODUCE MARKETING COMMITTEE 313
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3.2.2 One Rajajinagar House Building Co-operative Society A
challenged the notification issued under Section 4(1), before the High
Court of Karnataka by way of Writ Petition No.28988/1994. It was the
case on behalf of the said society that the land should be acquired for
them and not for APMC. The said writ petition came to be dismissed by
the High Court vide order dated 23.12.1995.
B
3.3.3 Thereafter a notification/declaration under Section 6 of the
Act, 1894 was issued on 10.10.1996 and published on 13.10.1996. A
draft award was prepared in respect of 172 acres 22 guntas of land on
12.08.1998.
3.3.4 On the instructions given by the Land Acquisition Officer, C
the appellant – APMC deposited Rs.9,14,14,873/- on 19.08.1998 towards
approximate cost of the acquisition.
3.3.5 It appears that the aforesaid Rajajinagar House Building
Co-operative Society filed another writ petition being W.P. No.6880/
1997 before the High Court, before the acquisition of 172.50 acres of D
land at Srigandadakaval Village could be completed. The High Court
granted an ex-parte order of stay of acquisition proceedings vide interim
order dated 16.09.1998. Thereafter respondent no.4 – original land owner
filed Writ Petition No.3884/1998 before the High Court, challenging the
acquisition proceedings. Vide interim order dated 08.02.1999, the High
Court ordered stay of dispossession. E
In respect of 104 acres 5 guntas (Second Acquisition)
3.4 That a notification under Section 4(1) read with Section 17(4)
of the Act, 1894, dispensing with the requirement of hearing was issued
on 13.04.1999 in respect of 104 acres 5 guntas of land owned by F
respondent No.4 – Trust in Herohalli Village, Yeshwanthpura Hobli,
Bangalore North Taluk, for establishing a mega market by the appellant
– APMC. A final notification under Section 6(1) read with Section 17(1)
to 17(4) was issued in respect of 100 acres 11 guntas out of 104 acres 5
guntas which had been notified under Section 4(1) on 13.04.1999, leaving
an area of 3 acres 34 guntas out of acquisition. An enquiry under Section G
5A was dispensed with.
3.4.1 That one Vishwaneedam Trust filed Writ Petition No.708/
2000 before the High Court challenging the said acquisition. The High
Court granted stay of dispossession in respect of 35 acres out of the 100
acres 5 guntas situated in Herohalli Village. H
314 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 4 S.C.R.
A 3.4.2 Respondent No.4 – Trust – original land owner filed Writ
Petition No.37140/2000 challenging the notifications dated 13.04.1999
and 26.10.1999 in respect of the lands at Herohalli Village.
3.4.3 According to the appellant, possession was taken and handed
over to the APMC by the Land Acquisition Officer vide an Official
B Memorandum of Possession dated 06.10.2000 in respect of 65 acres 19
guntas of the lands at Herohalli Village.
3.4.4 That an award was made by the State Land Acquisition
Officer (SLAO) on 22.05.2002, referring to a Government order dated
26.03.2002, in respect of 100 acres 11 guntas covered by Section 6
C notification dated 26.10.1999. The award provided for payment of
compensation to respondent No.4 – Trust after excluding 34 acres 14
guntas of acquired land treating the same as Phut Kharab belonging to
the Government and further excluding 35 acres in respect of the writ
petition filed Vishwaneedam trust in which an order of stay of
dispossession had been passed by the High Court. The said compensation
D was accepted by respondent No.4 under protest. Respondent No.4 –
Trust – original land owner filed a Land Acquisition Case No.1/2003
seeking enhancement of compensation which seems to be pending.
3.5 Thus, Writ Petition No.3884/1998 filed by respondent No.4 –
original land owner was in respect of 172 acres 22 guntas of land. Writ
E Petition Nos.37140-37146/2000 was in respect of 100 acres of land and
Writ Petition No.708/2000 was filed by Vishwaneedam Trust in respect
of second acquisition (part).
3.6 A common statement of objections was filed by the appellant
– APMC to all the writ petitions.
F
3.7 That the APMC filed IA No.01/2007 in W.P. No.37140/2000,
to permit APMC to hand over 9 acres of land out of 65 acres 11 guntas
to the Bangalore Development Authority (BDA) and 4 acres to the
Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board (BWSSB). That vide
order dated 21.03.2007, the learned Single Judge allowed the said IA
G No.01/2007 and granted permission to the APMC as prayed.
3.8 At this stage, it is required to be noted that in respect to the
lands in question and other lands owned by respondent No.4 – Trust,
proceedings were pending before the Land Reforms Tribunal, Bangalore
N. Taluk. At this stage, it is required to be noted that it was the specific
H case on behalf of the State and the APMC that unless the proceedings
THE AGRICULTURAL PRODUCE MARKETING COMMITTEE 315
BANGALORE v. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA & ORS. [M. R. SHAH, J.]
under the Karnataka Land Reforms Act (KLR Act) are disposed of, the A
compensation is not required to be deposited as, if ultimately it is held
that the land acquired is excess vacant land under the provisions of
KLR Act, in that case, the said land would vest with the State Government
and therefore, no compensation would be payable. Therefore, since the
Government was not proceeding with making of awards or offering
B
compensation on the ground that proceedings were pending before the
Land Reforms Tribunal, by the same order dated 21.03.2007 the learned
Single Judge directed the Tribunal to dispose of application No.LRF 2099/
74-75 under Section 66 of the KLR Act, within three months.
3.9 The order passed by the learned Single Judge dated 21.03.2007
granting permission to the APMC to hand over 9 acres of land to BDA C
and 4 acres of land to BWSSB was challenged before the Division Bench
of the High Court by way of Writ Appeal No.1011/2007. The Division
Bench of the High Court stayed the order of the learned Single Judge.
The said appeal along with some companion appeals came to be disposed
of by the Division Bench vide order dated 28.06.2012, directing learned D
Single Judge to decide all the connected writ petitions finally and continued
the interim stay granted by the Division Bench until the final disposal of
all the petitions.
3.10 Thereafter APMC filed IA No.03/2008 seeking permission
to build a wall around 65 acres of land, which came to be allowed vide E
order dated 12.02.2009. It is reported that thereafter APMC has completed
the fencing work.
Proceedings before the Land Reforms Tribunal
3.11 That the Land Reforms Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as
“the Tribunal”) passed an order dated 12.01.2010 in the proceedings F
under the KLR Act holding that 213 acres 20 guntas of respondent No.4
– Trust’s land was excess land under the said Act.
3.11.1 The order passed by the Tribunal was challenged before
the High Court in Writ Petition No.4311/2010. The High Court vide order
dated 24.03.2014 remitted the proceedings to the Tribunal with directions G
for a fresh consideration.
3.11.2 On remand the Tribunal passed a fresh order dated
22.09.2015 and declared that 265 acres 24 guntas of land held by
respondent No.4 – Trust was excess land. That the order passed by the
Tribunal dated 22.09.2015 was challenged before the High Court and H
316 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 4 S.C.R.
A the High Court vide order dated 02.05.2017 set aside the order passed
by the Tribunal dated 22.09.2015 and once again remitted the matter to
the Tribunal.
3.11.3 That the Tribunal passed a fresh order dated 28.11.2017
and declared that 354 acres 10 guntas was excess land. The order passed
B by the Tribunal dated 28.11.2017 was again the subject matter before
the High Court by way of Writ Petition No.55344/2017. By judgment
and order dated 30.06.2021, the learned Single Judge has quashed and
set aside the Tribunal’s order dated 28.11.2017. It is reported that against
the judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge of the High
Court dated 30.06.2021 passed in Writ Petition No.55344/2017, the State
C has preferred a writ appeal being W.A. No.1089/21, which is reported
to be pending before the Division Bench of the High Court.
3.12 That all the aforesaid writ petitions being W.P. No.3884/
1998 (in respect of 172 acres of land), W.P. Nos. 37140-37146/2000 (in
respect of 100 acres of land) and others writ petitions being W.P. No.708/
D 2000 and 19579-19585/2001, were clubbed together. During the pendency
of the aforesaid writ petitions the Act, 2013 came into force. Therefore,
the writ petitioners submitted an application dated 24.02.2014 seeking to
invoke the benefit of the Act, 2013 and urged that the benefit of provisions
of the said Act would be available to it.
E 3.13 That the learned Single Judge framed the following points
for consideration: -
a. Whether the disposal of these petitioners should be deferred
pending adjudication and determination by the Land Tribunal,
Bangalore North Taluk of the excess holdings or otherwise
F under the provisions of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act,
1961 of the very lands which are the subject matter herein.
b. Whether the possession of a portion of the lands in question
having said to have been given to APMC can be said to be
valid and in accordance with law.
G
c. Whether the invocation of Section 17 of the LA Act in the
acquisition of a portion of the lands for the same purpose
was justified.
d. Whether the acquiring authority could keeping abeyance
the mandate to pay or deposit the compensation amount
H
THE AGRICULTURAL PRODUCE MARKETING COMMITTEE 317
BANGALORE v. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA & ORS. [M. R. SHAH, J.]
pending disposal of the proceedings before the Land Tribunal A
in respect of the lands.
e. Whether the acquisition proceedings have lapsed by virtue
of the 2013 Act.
3.14 That though some observations were made on the proceedings
B
under the Act, 1894, thereafter, without further finally deciding any other
point framed for consideration, as reproduced hereinabove, the learned
Single Judge has allowed the writ petitions by holding that respective
acquisitions have lapsed under Section 24(2) of the Act, 2013.
3.15 Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the common judgment
and order passed by the learned Single Judge dated 24.06.2014 holding C
that respective acquisitions have lapsed under Section 24(2) of the Act,
2013, the APMC preferred writ appeals before the High Court. By the
impugned common judgment and order, the Division Bench of the High
Court has dismissed the said appeals confirming the judgment and order
passed by the learned Single Judge declaring that the acquisition have D
lapsed under Section 24(2) of the Act, 2013.
3.16 Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned common
judgment and order passed by the Division Bench of the High Court in
respective Writ Appeal No.1732/2014 and others along with accompanied
appeals, the APMC, Bangalore, has preferred the present appeals. E
4. Shri V. Giri, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of
the appellant – APMC has vehemently contended that in the facts and
circumstances of the case the High Court has erred in holding that the
acquisitions in respect of the lands in question have lapsed under Section
24(2) of the Act, 2013. F
4.1 It is further contended that in respect of acquisition of 172 acres
land no award was declared in view of the stay granted by the High Court
in various proceedings. It is submitted that therefore sub-section (2) of
Section 24 of the Act, 2013 shall not be applicable. It is submitted that
therefore the High Court has erred in declaring that the acquisitions have G
lapsed under sub-section (2) of Section 24 of the Act, 2013.
4.2 It is further submitted that so far as the acquisition in respect
of 100 acres of land situated at Herohalli Village is concerned, the award
in respect of 65 acres of land was declared and the possession was also
taken over. Further, the amount of compensation was deposited and the
H
318 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 4 S.C.R.
A respondent – original land owner withdrew Rs.2.37 crores, therefore it
cannot be said that the acquisition has lapsed under sub-section (2) of
Section 24 of the Act, 2013.
4.3 It is urged that the High Court has not properly appreciated
the fact that in respect of acquisition of 172 acres and in respect of
B remaining 35 acres out of the 100 acres of land, the awards could not be
declared in view of the stay orders granted by the High Court in various
proceedings. Therefore, for the purpose of Section 24(1)(a) of the Act,
2013, being made applicable, the period during which the stay orders
were in operation have to be excluded.
C 4.4 Now so far as the observations made by the High Court that
the appellant was not ready to deposit the amount of compensation, it is
submitted that the High Court ought to have appreciated that as such
there was a very valid reason and/or justification for the APMC not to
deposit the entire amount of compensation. It is submitted that with respect
to the very land in question the proceedings under the KLR Act were
D pending before the Land Reforms Tribunal and the Tribunal had to take
a call and/or decision that the respondent-Trust is holding any excess
vacant land or not and therefore, it was thought fit to wait till the outcome
of the proceedings under the Land Reforms Act. It is submitted that the
aforesaid reason cannot be ascribed against the appellant on the ground
E that the appellant was not ready to deposit/pay the compensation.
4.5 It is further submitted that even the High Court has materially
erred in holding that possession in respect of 65 acres of land was illegal
which was taken by invoking urgency clause and not complying with the
deposit of 80% of compensation as required under Section 17 of the
F Act, 1894.
4.6 It is further submitted that as such in the impugned judgment
and order the High Court has not at all quashed and set aside the
notifications under Section 4 and 6 of the Act, 1894 in respect of 172
acres and 100 acres of lands, respectively. It is submitted that after
G some discussion on the proceedings under the Act, 1894, the High Court
has straightway considered the applicability of the Act, 2013 and has
held that the acquisitions in respect of both the lands have lapsed under
sub-section (2) of Section 24 of the Act, 2013.
4.7 Relying upon the decision of the Constitution Bench of this
Court reported in the case of Indore Development Authority Vs.
H
THE AGRICULTURAL PRODUCE MARKETING COMMITTEE 319
BANGALORE v. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA & ORS. [M. R. SHAH, J.]
Manoharlal & Ors., (2020) 8 SCC 129, it is submitted that the impugned A
judgment and order passed by the High Court holding that the acquisitions
have lapsed under sub-section (2) of Section 24 of the Act, 2013, is not
sustainable.
4.8 A number of submissions are sought to be made by Shri V.
Giri, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant – B
APMC on repeal of the Act, 1894 in view of the enactment of the Act,
2013 and the effect of the Act, 2013 on the acquisitions under the Act,
1894. However, for the reasons stated hereinbelow and as the High
Court has not at all considered any of the submissions/issues on the
validity of the notifications issued under Section 4 and 6 and the High
Court having considered and dealt with the applicability of sub-section C
(2) of Section 24 of the Act, 2013 and having held that the acquisitions
have lapsed under sub-section (2) of Section 24 of the Act, 2013, we
propose to remand the matter to the High Court to decide the other
issues raised afresh, in accordance with law and on merits. Therefore,
we have not dealt with any of the submissions made by Shri V. Giri, D
learned Senior Advocate and even Shri C.U. Singh, learned Senior
Advocate appearing on behalf of the respondent – Trust on merits on
other issues. Hence, we have restricted the consideration of the present
appeals to the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court
declaring that the acquisitions have lapsed under sub-section (2) of Section
24 of the Act, 2013. E
5. Shri V.N. Raghupathy, learned counsel appearing on behalf of
the State has supported the appellant – APMC. He has stated that the
Writ Appeal No.1089/21 challenging the judgment and order passed by
the learned Single Judge quashing and setting aside the order passed by
the Tribunal, is pending before the Division Bench of the High Court. F
Therefore, it is prayed that if this honourable Court proposes, to remand
the matter to the learned Single Judge, in that case, the aforesaid appeal
be directed to be heard first by the Division Bench of the High Court.
6. All these appeals are vehemently opposed by Shri C.U. Singh,
learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the respondent – Trust G
– original land owner. It is submitted that in the present case respondent
– Trust is undertaking various activities and running the ashram in
furtherance of the object of the Trust. It is submitted that respondent –
Trust is not an ordinary individual land owner. That the Trust was
established in the year 1960. It is submitted that the lands in question H
320 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 4 S.C.R.
A was purchased in the year 1960 and the same is being used to carry out
Gandhian activities and in furtherance of the object of the Trust.
6.1 It is submitted that in the present case the High Court has
rightly observed that the State Government/APMC have no intention of
paying any compensation for the acquisition of the subject lands and
B accordingly, chose to abandon the acquisition of the lands or to allow the
same deliberately to lapse.
6.2 Shri Singh, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of
respondent – Trust has also made elaborate submissions on the legality
and validity of the notifications under section 4 and 6 of Act, 1894 in
C respect of the acquisitions of 172 acres and 100 acres lands, respectively.
However, by the impugned judgment and order the High Court has not
declared and set aside the notifications under Section 4 and 6 of the Act,
1894 and has held and declared that the acquisitions have lapsed under
sub-section (2) of Section 24 of the Act, 2013 and the High Court has
not at all decided the other issues which were placed before it. We
D propose not to deal with any of the submissions on other issues on which
there is no decision by the High Court and we confine the present appeals
to the decision of the High Court declaring and holding that the acquisitions
have lapsed under sub-section (2) of Section 24 of the Act, 2013 and for
the other issues we propose to remand the matter to the High Court.
E 6.3 Now so far as the impugned judgment and order passed by
the High Court holding and declaring that the acquisitions have lapsed
under sub-section (2) of Section 24 of the Act, 2013, Shri Singh learned
Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of respondent – Trust has fairly
conceded that in view of the subsequent decision of this Court in the
F case of Indore Development Authority (supra), the view taken by
the High Court that the acquisitions have lapsed under sub-section (2) of
Section 24 of the Act, 2013 is unsustainable. However, he has submitted
that the learned Single Judge and even the learned Division Bench of
the High Court were right in holding so, considering the law prevailing at
that time when the learned Single Judge decided the matters. It is
G submitted that the learned Single Judge followed the law prevailing at
the relevant time and the learned Single Judge decided the matters
accordingly. It is submitted that therefore no fault can be found with the
view taken by the learned Single Judge.
7. We have heard the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
H respective parties at length.
THE AGRICULTURAL PRODUCE MARKETING COMMITTEE 321
BANGALORE v. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA & ORS. [M. R. SHAH, J.]
8. At the outset it is required to be noted that the proceedings A
before the learned Single Judge of the High Court by way of writ petition
No. 3884 of 1998 was with respect to 172 acres 22 guntas of land acquired.
In the writ petition No. 3884 of 1998, the original land owners prayed for
the following reliefs: -
(i) Declare that the entire acquisition proceedings commencing B
with the issue of a preliminary notification gazette on
3.9.1994 marked as Annexure-A in the writ petition have
lapsed on account of the award not having been made within
a period of two years in terms of Section 11A of the Land
Acquisition Act.
C
(ii) Issue a writ of certiorari or any other writ, order or direction
to quash Annexure-A, the preliminary notification LAQ (2)
SR/32/94-95 DATED 2.9.1994 PUBLISHE DIN TH
Karnataka Gazette dated 3.9.1994 and Annexure the final
notification No. RDD 21 LAQ 96 dated 10.10.1996
published in the Karnataka Gazette dated 31. l 0.1996. D
By way of amendment the original writ petitioners – original land
owners also prayed to declare that the acquisition proceedings are deemed
to have lapsed in view of the provisions of the Right to Fair Compensation
and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement
Act, 2013. E
8.1 Writ petition Nos. 37140-37146 of 2000 filed by the original
writ petitioners – original land owners was with respect to 100 acres of
acquired land. In the said writ petitions original writ petitioners prayed
for the following reliefs: -
F
(i) Issue a Writ of certiorari or any other writ or order, quashing
the impugned notification at Annexure-B dated 13.04.1999
gazetted on 17.04.1999 in LAC(2) SR 2/99-2000 issued by
the second respondent and also the notification at Annexure-
C dated 26.10.1999 gazetted on 18.11.1999 in No.
Kam.E.68.AQ8-99 issued by the first respondent. G
OR
(ii) In the alternative direct the respondents to pay compensation
to the petitioner in terms of the proceedings of the meeting
dated 29.04.1999 Vide Annexure-D
H
322 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 4 S.C.R.
A By way of amendment the original writ petitioners also prayed to
declare the acquisition proceedings having been lapsed under the
provisions of the Act, 2013.
8.2 That the learned Single Judge framed the following common
points for consideration: -
B a. Whether the disposal of these petitioners should be deferred
pending adjudication and determination by the Land Tribunal,
Bangalore North Taluk of the excess holdings or otherwise
under the provisions of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act,
1961 of the very lands which are the subject matter herein.
C b. Whether the possession of a portion of the lands in question
having said to have been given to APMC can be said to be
valid and in accordance with law.
c. Whether the invocation of Section 17 of the LA Act in the
acquisition of a portion of the lands for the same purpose
D was justified.
d. Whether the acquiring authority could keeping abeyance
the mandate to pay or deposit the compensation amount
pending disposal of the proceedings before the Land Tribunal
in respect of the lands.
E e. Whether the acquisition proceedings have lapsed by virtue
of the 2013 Act.
Despite the fact that a number of issues/grounds were raised
before the High Court on the legality and validity of the acquisition
proceedings, the learned Single Judge decided only one issue, namely,
F whether the acquisition proceedings have lapsed by virtue of the 2013
Act. Whereas a number of issues/grounds were raised and as such the
original reliefs sought (acquisition proceedings under Act 1894) were
the main reliefs which were required to be dealt with and considered,
unfortunately, the learned Single Judge did not give findings on the other
issues/grounds and on the reliefs sought and as observed hereinabove,
G disposed of the writ petitions considering only one relief/ground, namely,
whether the acquisition proceedings have lapsed by virtue of the 2013
Act. When a number of submissions were made on the other issues/
grounds, we are of the opinion that the High Court ought to have
considered the other issues and ought to have given the findings on other
H issues also. Because of not deciding the other issues and deciding the
THE AGRICULTURAL PRODUCE MARKETING COMMITTEE 323
BANGALORE v. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA & ORS. [M. R. SHAH, J.]
matter only on one issue and thereafter when the decision on such one A
issue, is held to be bad in law for the reasons stated hereinbelow, this
Court has no other alternative but to remand the matters to the learned
Single Judge for deciding the Writ Petitions afresh on all other issues.
8.3 By way of analogy we observe that while considering Order
14 Rule 2 (as amended w.e.f. 01.02.1977), this Court in the case of B
Nusli Neville Wadia Vs. Ivory Properties & Ors, (2020) 6 SCC
557, has observed and held that after the amendment w.e.f. 01.02.1977,
though Order 14 Rule 2(2) enables the court to decide the issue of law
as a preliminary issue in case the same relates to (i) jurisdiction of court
or (ii) a bar to suit created by any law for the time being in force, a
C
departure has been made in amended provision whereby now it mandates
the court to pronounce judgment on all issues notwithstanding that a
case may be disposed of on a preliminary issue. It is further observed
that intendment behind this departure is to avoid remand in an appealable
case for deciding other issues.
D
8.4 Therefore, the courts should adjudicate on all the issues and
give its findings on all the issues and not to pronounce the judgment only
on one of the issues. As such it is the duty cast upon the courts to
adjudicate on all the issues and pronounce the judgment on all the issues
rather than adopting a shortcut approach and pronouncing the judgment
on only one issue. By such a practice, it would increase the burden on E
the appellate court and in many cases if the decision on the issue decided
is found to be erroneous and on other issues there is no adjudication and
no findings recorded by the court, the appellate court will have no option
but to remand the matter for its fresh decision. Therefore, to avoid such
an eventuality, the courts have to adjudicate on all the issues raised in a
F
case and render findings and the judgment on all the issues involved.
9. Now, so far as the impugned common judgment and order
passed by the High Court declaring that the acquisition proceedings have
lapsed under sub-section (2) of Section 24 of the Act, 2013, is concerned,
the same is unsustainable in view of the decision of the Constitution
G
bench of this Court in the case of Indore Development Authority
(supra). This Court has concluded in paragraph 365 and 366 as under: -
“365. Resultantly, the decision rendered in Pune Municipal
Corpn. [Pune Municipal Corpn. v. Harakchand Misirimal
Solanki, (2014) 3 SCC 183 : (2014) 2 SCC (Civ) 274] is hereby
H
324 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 4 S.C.R.
A overruled and all other decisions in which Pune Municipal
Corpn. [Pune Municipal Corpn. v. Harakchand Misirimal
Solanki, (2014) 3 SCC 183 : (2014) 2 SCC (Civ) 274] has been
followed, are also overruled. The decision in Sree Balaji Nagar
Residential Assn. [Sree Balaji Nagar Residential Assn. v. State
of T.N., (2015) 3 SCC 353 : (2015) 2 SCC (Civ) 298] cannot be
B
said to be laying down good law, is overruled and other decisions
following the same are also overruled. In Indore Development
Authority v. Shailendra [Indore Development Authority v.
Shailendra, (2018) 3 SCC 412 : (2018) 2 SCC (Civ) 426] , the
aspect with respect to the proviso to Section 24(2) and whether
C “or” has to be read as “nor” or as “and” was not placed for
consideration. Therefore, that decision too cannot prevail, in the
light of the discussion in the present judgment.
366. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we answer the questions
as under:
D 366.1. Under the provisions of Section 24(1)(a) in case the award
is not made as on 1-1-2014, the date of commencement of the
2013 Act, there is no lapse of proceedings. Compensation has to
be determined under the provisions of the 2013 Act.
366.2. In case the award has been passed within the window
E period of five years excluding the period covered by an interim
order of the court, then proceedings shall continue as provided
under Section 24(1)(b) of the 2013 Act under the 1894 Act as if it
has not been repealed.
366.3. The word “or” used in Section 24(2) between possession
F and compensation has to be read as “nor” or as “and”. The deemed
lapse of land acquisition proceedings under Section 24(2) of the
2013 Act takes place where due to inaction of authorities for five
years or more prior to commencement of the said Act, the
possession of land has not been taken nor compensation has been
G paid. In other words, in case possession has been taken,
compensation has not been paid then there is no lapse. Similarly,
if compensation has been paid, possession has not been taken
then there is no lapse.
366.4. The expression “paid” in the main part of Section 24(2) of
the 2013 Act does not include a deposit of compensation in court.
H
THE AGRICULTURAL PRODUCE MARKETING COMMITTEE 325
BANGALORE v. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA & ORS. [M. R. SHAH, J.]
The consequence of non-deposit is provided in the proviso to A
Section 24(2) in case it has not been deposited with respect to
majority of landholdings then all beneficiaries (landowners) as on
the date of notification for land acquisition under Section 4 of the
1894 Act shall be entitled to compensation in accordance with the
provisions of the 2013 Act. In case the obligation under Section
B
31 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 has not been fulfilled, interest
under Section 34 of the said Act can be granted. Non-deposit of
compensation (in court) does not result in the lapse of land
acquisition proceedings. In case of non-deposit with respect to
the majority of holdings for five years or more, compensation under
the 2013 Act has to be paid to the “landowners” as on the date of C
notification for land acquisition under Section 4 of the 1894 Act.
366.5. In case a person has been tendered the compensation as
provided under Section 31(1) of the 1894 Act, it is not open to him
to claim that acquisition has lapsed under Section 24(2) due to
non-payment or non-deposit of compensation in court. The D
obligation to pay is complete by tendering the amount under Section
31(1). The landowners who had refused to accept compensation
or who sought reference for higher compensation, cannot claim
that the acquisition proceedings had lapsed under Section 24(2)
of the 2013 Act.
E
366.6. The proviso to Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act is to be treated
as part of Section 24(2), not part of Section 24(1)(b).
366.7. The mode of taking possession under the 1894 Act and as
contemplated under Section 24(2) is by drawing of inquest report/
memorandum. Once award has been passed on taking possession F
under Section 16 of the 1894 Act, the land vests in State there is
no divesting provided under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act, as
once possession has been taken there is no lapse under Section
24(2).
366.8. The provisions of Section 24(2) providing for a deemed G
lapse of proceedings are applicable in case authorities have failed
due to their inaction to take possession and pay compensation for
five years or more before the 2013 Act came into force, in a
proceeding for land acquisition pending with the authority concerned
as on 1-1-2014. The period of subsistence of interim orders passed
by court has to be excluded in the computation of five years. H
326 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 4 S.C.R.
A 366.9. Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act does not give rise to new
cause of action to question the legality of concluded proceedings
of land acquisition. Section 24 applies to a proceeding pending on
the date of enforcement of the 2013 Act i.e. 1-1-2014. It does not
revive stale and time-barred claims and does not reopen concluded
proceedings nor allow landowners to question the legality of mode
B
of taking possession to reopen proceedings or mode of deposit of
compensation in the treasury instead of court to invalidate
acquisition.”
We wish to emphasise that this Court has opined that all judgments
rendered on the basis of Pune Municipal Corporation Vs. Harakchand
C Misirimal Solanki [(2014) 3 SCC 183] are overruled in view of the
interpretation made to Section 24(2) of the Act, 2013, in Indore
Development Authority (supra). There has been a trend of land owners
filing fresh cases seeking lapse of acquisition on the basis of Section
24(2) of the Act, 2013, although such land owners may have earlier
D unsuccessfully filed writ petitions challenging the acquisition notifications.
Such land owners may have had the benefit of interim orders of stay of
further proceedings in the acquisition process or dispossession resulting
in a delay in the making of the award and payment/deposit of the
compensation and consequently in taking over possession of the acquired
land. There being a delay in the passing of the award owing to interim
E orders granted by the High Court or even by the civil courts, where suits
may have been filed against acquiring bodies, the land owners cannot
now take advantage of the same so as to contend that no award has
been made and consequently there has been no payment or deposit of
the compensation and that possession of the acquired land continues
F with them. The land owners having had the benefit of interim orders
granted in their favour in proceedings initiated by them against the
acquisition cannot take benefit under Section 24(2) of the Act, 2013.
The High Court or the civil courts which may have granted interim orders
in favour of the land owners, ought to consider the aforesaid aspect
before applying Section 24(2) of the Act, 2013 in favour of the land
G owners.
10. Applying the law laid down by this Court in the case of Indore
Development Authority (supra) to the facts of the case on hand, the
view taken by the High Court while declaring the acquisition proceedings
have lapsed under sub-section (2) of section 24 of the Act, 2013, is
H
THE AGRICULTURAL PRODUCE MARKETING COMMITTEE 327
BANGALORE v. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA & ORS. [M. R. SHAH, J.]
unsustainable and is just contrary to the law laid down by this Court in A
the case Indore Development Authority (supra). Even the same is
also not disputed by Shri C. U. Singh, learned Senior Advocate appearing
on behalf of the original writ petitioners – original land owners. Therefore,
the common judgment and order passed by the High Court allowing the
writ petitions and declaring that the acquisition proceedings with respect
B
to the lands in question have lapsed under sub-section (2) of section 24
of the Act, 2013 cannot stand and the same deserve to be quashed and
set aside.
11. As observed hereinabove, though a number of other issues
were raised on the legality of the acquisition proceedings under the Act,
1894 and though other points for consideration were raised/framed by C
the High Court reproduced hereinabove, since none of the issues are
adjudicated by the High Court on merits, we have no other alternative
but to remand the matter to the learned Single Judge for deciding the
writ petitions afresh and to adjudicate on all the other issues, other than
the lapse of acquisitions under sub-section (2) of section 24 of the Act, D
2013. At the cost of repetition, we observe that the High Court ought to
have adjudicated on all the issues raised and ought not to have decided
and disposed of the writ petitions, adjudicating only on one issue which
has been found to be erroneous. The Division Bench has also not applied
its mind to this aspect of the matter and has simply dismissed the appeals
filed by the appellant herein. E
12. In view of the above discussion and for the reasons stated
above, all these appeals are allowed. The impugned common judgment
and order passed by the Division Bench of the High Court as well as the
common judgment and order passed by the High Court in writ petition(s)
No. 3884/1998 and Nos. 37140-37146/2000 are hereby quashed and set F
aside. The matters are remitted back to the learned Single Judge to
decide and dispose of the aforesaid writ petitions afresh and in accordance
with law and on their own merits. The learned Single Judge to adjudicate
all other issues which were framed reproduced hereinabove and
pronounce the judgment on all the points framed for consideration. The G
aforesaid exercise shall be completed within a period of twelve months
from the date of receipt of the present order.
It is made clear that we have not expressed anything on the merits
of these cases, in favour of either of the parties on other issues and it is
ultimately for the learned Single Judge to deal with and consider the H
328 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 4 S.C.R.
A same in accordance with law and on their own merits. It is also made
clear that on remand the learned Single Judge to adjudicate and pronounce
the judgment on all other issues except the issue with respect to the
lapse of the acquisition proceedings by virtue of the Act, 2013. All the
appeals are allowed accordingly.
B We also observe and direct that Writ Appeal No.1089 of 2021 be
heard first and to be decided and disposed of on or before 31.12.2022.
There shall be no order as to costs.
Devika Gujral Appeals allowed.
(Assisted by : Mahendra Yadav, LCRA)
C
D
E
F
G
H
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