TEJRAM PATILversusSTATE OF MAHARASHTRA

                       [2015] 2 S.C.R. 912


A                       TEJRAM PATIL

                               v.
                  STATE OF MAHARASHTRA
B             (Criminal Appeal No. 1330 of 2009)

                      FEBRUARY 26, 2015

                 [DIPAK MISRA AND ADARSH
c                    KUMAR GOEL, JJ.]

       Evidence: Dying declaration relating to circumstances
  resulting in death of any other person - Admissibility of -
  Held: Dying declaration is admissible in relation to the
  cause of death of the person making the statement and as
0
  to circumstances of the transaction which resulted in his
  death - However, if the circumstances of the said
  transaction relate to death of another person, the statement
  cannot be held to be inadmissible when circumstances of
E "his" death are integrally connected to the circumstances
  of death of such other person.

          Dismissing the appeal, the Court

      HELD: 1. Whether statement of deceased-P is
F relevant for determining cause of death of deceased-
  5. The statement is admissible about the cause of
  death or the circumstances of the transaction which
  resulted in the death of deceased-P. Question is what
  happens when two deaths take place in the same
G transaction and circumstances of the transaction
  resulting in one death is closely interconnected with the
  other death. Admittedly, the DD of deceased-P is


H                             912
     TEJRAM PATIL v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA                  913


admissible as to cause of her death as well as the A
circumstances of the transaction which resulted in her
death. Such statement may not by itself be admissible
to determine the cause of death of anyone other than
the person making the statement. However, when the
circumstances of the transaction which resulted in B
death of the person making the statement as well as
death of any other person are part of the same
transaction, the same will be relevant also about the
cause of death of such other person. [Paras 18, 19 and
21] [921-8-F]                                          C

     2. In the instant case, the statement of pouring of
kerosene on deceased-S, intervention of deceased-P in
the process and her receiving burn injuries resulting
in her death are integral part of the same transaction.     D
Thus, the statement which relates to circumstances of
the transaction resulting in her death being admissible,
it can be relied upon to show as to how death of
deceased-S took place. The said statement was also
corroborated by the admission of the accused himself        E
to the extent that the death of deceased-S was by
burning and deceased-P received the burn injuries in
the same incident. The version of the accused that it
was suicide was rightly found to be false. In these         F
circumstances, the death of deceased-S was proved
beyond reasonable doubt to be homicidal death by
burning and by pouring of kerosene and setting her on
fire by the accused. The said statement was duly
recorded by the Magistrate and carried an endorsement       G
by the doctor about her consciousness and fitness to
make a statement. [Paras 26, 27] [928-F-H; 929-A-C]

   Laxman vs. State of Maharashtra (2002) 6 SCC 710;
Sharad Birdhichand Sarda vs. State of Maharashtra (1984) H
914        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2015] 2 S.C.R.


A     4 SCC 116: 1985 (1) SCR 88 - relied on.
         Ratan Gond vs. State of BiharAIR 1959 SC 18:1959
      SCR 1336 - distinguished.

B         Kashinath Tukaram Jadhav vs. State of Maharashtra
      1984 Crl. L.J. 1447; Lukka Ulahannen vs. Travancore-
      Cochin State AIR 1955 Trav-Co 104; Re P. Subbu Thevan
      (2 Weir 750 (B); Nga His Din vs. EmperiorAIR 1936 Rang
      187; Kunwarpa/ Sirigh vs. Emperor AIR 1948 All 170 -
c     referred to.

                       Case Law Reference

       12002) 6 sec 110        relied on.           Para 15

D      1984 Crl. L.J. 1447     referred to.         Para 22

       AIR 1955 Trav-Co 104 referred to.            Para 22

       1959 SCR 1336           distinguished.       Para 23

E      1985 (1) SCR 88         relied on.           Para 24

         CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal
      Appeal No. 1330 of 2009.

F         From the Judgment and Order dated 17.11.2008 of the
      High Court of Judicature at Bombay, Nagpur Bench, Nagpur
      in Criminal Appeal No. 455 of 2003.

          Kishor Lombad, S. Rajappa for the Appellant.

G        Prashant S. Kenjale, Aniruddha Mayee for the
      Respondent.

          The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

         ADARSH KUMAR GOEL J. 1 This appeal has been
H
     TEJRAM PATIL v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA                   915
           [ADARSH KUMAR GOEL J.]

preferred against the judgment and order dated 17th A
November, 2008 passed by the High Court of Judicature
at Bombay, Nagpur Bench, in Criminal Appeal No.455 of
2003, upholding the conviction of the appellant under
Section 302 IPC and sentence of rigorous imprisonment for
life. The appellant has also been directed to pay fine of B
Rs.10,000/-, in default, to suffer RI for six months.

    2. Deceased Savita was married to the appellant about
three years prior to the date of the incident in question, i.e.,
on 28th March, 1999. One son and one daughter were born C
out of the wedlock. They were living in a rented house
owned by PW1 Vimalbai.

     3. According to the prosecution, the deceased was
subjected to cruelty and on the fateful day, the appellant D
returned home in drunken condition and started abusing the
deceased and her mother Prabha Bai who had come on a
visit to her daughter's house. Thereafter, the appellant
poured kerosene on the deceased and set her on fire.
Prabhabai and Vimalbai, PW1, tried to extinguish the fire E
and received burn injuries in the process. They were taken
to Medical College and Hospital, Nagpur. The deceased
made a dying declaration ('DD') (Exhibit 45) before PSI
Sunil Eknadi Wanjari. She succumbed to her injuries at
6.25 A.M. on 29th March, 1999. Prabhabai also made a DD F
(Exhibit 43) before the PSI Bhila Narayan Bachao (PW5),
on the basis of which FIR was lodged at Police Station
lmambada. Rajiv Babarao Raut (PW3), Special Judicial
Magistrate (SJM) also recorded DD of Prabhabai (Exhibit
41) at 9.30 A.M. on 29th March, 1999. The said Magistrate G
also recorded the statement of PW1 Vimalbai (Exhibit 29).
Prabhabai died on 1st April, 1999 at 2.2.0 A.M. with 77%
burn injuries. The dead bodies were subjected to post
mortem.
                                                              H
916      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2015] 2 S.C.R.


A      4. After completion of investigation, the accused was
  sent up for trial. The prosecution examined PW1, Vimalbai,
  the land lady, PW2 Purshottam, father of the deceased,
  PW3 Rajiv Sabarao Raut, SJM, PW 4 PSI Sunil Eknadi
  Wanjari and PW5 PSI Shila Narayan Sachao, apart from
S producing the ODs and other documents. The prosecution
  mainly relied upon DD made by Prabhabai duly recorded
  by the SJM, Rajiv Sabarao Raut, Exhibit 41. As regards,
  the DD of deceased Savita Exhibit 45, the trial Court did
  not place reliance on the same pointing out the infirmities
C that the said DD did not bear signature or thumb mark of
  the deceased. There was no evidence of fitness of the
  deceased to make a statement.

        5. As regards, the DD of Prabhabai, the objection as
D to its admissibility, in so far as it related· to the cause of
  death of the deceased Savita, was overruled. This question
  will be considered in a later part of this order. To complete
  narration of facts, the content of the said declaration may
  be noted, which is as follows :
E
        "I had gone to the house of my daughter Savita
        casually. The incident had taken place at 8.30 p.m.
        The husband of Savita (Tejram) accused returned to
        the house drunk. Tejram picked up quarrel with Savita.
F       Then Tejram poured kerosene on the person of Savita
        and ignited match stick and set her ablaze. I and
        landlady Vimalbai (PW 1) rushed to save Savita.
        However, fire flared up. I tried to catch Savita but got
        burnt. The neighbour took us to the hospital."
G
       The above statement is identical to the statement
  (Exhibit 43) recorded by PW5 PSI Shila Narayan Sachao.
  It may be noted here that the DD Exhibit 41 recorded by
  the Magistrate carried certification of the Doctor about the
H fitness of the declarant to make the statement.
        TEJRAM PATIL v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA                   917
               [ADARSH KUMAR GOEL J.]

     6. The stand of the accused in his statement under A
Section 313 was that the deceased Savita committed
suicide by pouring kerosene on herself when the accused
failed to meet her demand to pay her Rs.200/- for domestic
expenses.
                                                           B
     7. The trial Court held the case of the prosecution
proved mainly by relying on ODs Exhibits 41 and 43 made
by deceased Prabhabai. The said ODs were held to be
admissible and genuine.
                                                                c
     8. On appeal, the High Court affirmed the conviction
and sentence of the appellant but on a different basis. The
High Court held the ODs Exhibits 41 and 43 to be
inadmissible for cause of death of Savita as the said
statements were made by deceased Prabhabai and could            o
be relevant only for the cause of death of Prabhabai.
However, the DD Exhibit 45 made by Savita which was not
accepted by the trial Court, was accepted by the High Court.
It was held that since Savita had 100 per cent burn injuries,
there was urgency for PSI Sunil Eknadi Wanjari PW4 to E
record her statement and in such circumstances failure to
obtain medical evidence or to wait for the Magistrate was
not a fetter to the reliability of the said DD.

   9. The High Court held that there are following              F
important aspects of the case:

  "(a) presence of appellant, Prabhabai (mother of
       deceased) as well as Vimal (land lady of deceased)
       on the spot at the time of incident.               G
  (b) Similarly, Savita, Prabhabai, Vimal sustained bum
      injuries and were admitted in the hospital is also not
      disputed.
  (c)    There is absolutely no evidence on record to show H
918      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2015] 2 S.C.R.


A         that Savita was either fed up with her life or was
          frustrated and therefore, wanted to end her life.
      (d) Similarly, there is nothing on record to show that
          Savita had any reason ta end her life."
 B               10.   We have heard learned
                 counsel for the parties.

       11. Learned counsel for the appellant mainly submitted
  that DD Exhibit 45 was rightly discarded by the trial Court
c and has been wrongly relied upon by the High court as the
  sole basis for conviction of the appellant. He further
  submitted that ODs Exhibits 41 and 43 made by Prabhabai
  are not admissible in evidence as rightly held by the High
  Court. He thus, concluded that there was no legal evidence
D in support of conviction of the appellant.

        12. On the other hand, learned counsel for the State
  supported the judgment of the courts below. According to
  him, DD made by deceased Savita as well as ODs made
E by Prabhabai were admissible in evidence and were
  reliable. He further submitted that the incident has been
  admitted by the appellant and his only defence was that the
  deceased Savita committed suicide by pouring kerosene on
  herself which has been found to be false by both the courts
F below. Thus, the circumstantial evidence of the deceased
  being present at the place of occurrence and the death
  being not suicidal rule out the chance of the appellant being
  innocent. The circumstantial evidence itself proves the guilt
  of the appellant.
G
        13. We have given our anxious consideration to the
  rival submissions and perused the evidence on record.

       14. The decision of this appeal will rest on the answers
H to the following two questions : ·
      TEJRAM PATIL v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA                         919
            [ADARSH KUMAR GOEL J.)

     (i) Reliability of DD Exhibit 45 recorded by PSI Sunil A
     Eknadi Wanjari PW 4 made by deceased Savita;

     (ii)Admissibility and reliability of ODs made by
     Prabhabai recorded by SJM, Rajiv Babarao Rauf
     Exhibit 41) and PSI Bhila Narayan Bachao (Exhibit 43). B

     15. As regards the reliability of DD Exhibit 45, we find
merit in the contention of learned counsel for the appellant.
We are of the view that the trial Court was justified in
discarding the said piece of evidence. Undoubtedly, as              c
held by the High Court relying on judgment of this Court in
Laxman vs. State of Maharashtra1 that even in absence
of certification by the Doctor as to fitness of mind of the
declarant and even if the DD is recorded by the Police
 Officer, the same can be relied upon. However, the Court           D
must be satisfied that the deceased was in a fit mental
condition to make the DD and that the statement was
faithfully recorded and was otherwise reliable. In the
present case, it is difficult to record such satisfaction. There
is no material for the Court being satisfied that the deceased      E
was in fit condition to make the declaration. The deceased
was in the hospital at the time of her alleged statement but
no effort was made by the PSI to ascertain her medical
condition or to certify that he had satisfied himself about
the fitness of the declarant. The DD does not bear the              F
signature or thumb mark of the deceased. The deceased
had sustained 100 per cent burns and succumbed to her
injuries on 29'h March, 1999 at 6.25 a.m. as already noted.
The view taken by the High Court that in the peculiarity of
facts, authenticity of DD could be accepted, in our opinion,        G
is not sound.

     16. Coming now to the second question of admissibility

1 c2002) 6 sec 11 o                                                 H
920             SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2015] 2 S.C.R.


A     and reliability of ODs Exhibits 41 and 43 it will be necessary
      to refer to the text of Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act,
      which is as follows :

          "32 Cases in which statement of relevant fact by person
B         who is dead or cannot be found, etc ., is relevant. -
          Statements, written or verbal, of relevant facts made by
          a person who is dead, or who cannot be found, or who
          has become incapable of giving evidence, or whose
          attendance cannot be procured without an amount of
C         delay or expense which, under the circumstances of the
          case, appears to the Court unreasonable, are
          themselves relevant facts in the following cases:-

          (1)   when it relates to cause of death. -When the
o         statement is made by a person as to the cause of his
          death, or as to any of the circumstances of the
          transaction which resulted in his death, in cases in
          which the cause of that person's death comes into
          question.
 E
          Such statements are relevant whether the person who
          made them was or was not, at the time when they were
          made, under expectation of death, and whatever may
          be the nature of the proceeding in which the cause of
 F        his death comes into question."

                                                  (emphasis added)

           17. A bare perusal of the section shows :

G        (i) statement should be of a person who is dead/cannot
             be found/has become incapable of giving evidence
             etc;

         (ii)    It should relate to the relevant facts; and
H        (iii)    It should relate to cause of 'his death' or
     TEJRAM PATIL v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA                        921
           [ADARSH KUMAR GOEL J.]

      circumstances of the transaction which resulted in 'his A
      death', in cases in which the cause of that person's
      death comes into question.

      18. In the present case, we are concerned with Point
(iii) as we are concerned with the question whether B
statement of Prabhabai is relevant for determining cause
of death of Savita. In other words, when charge is of murder
of Savita, whether cause of death of Prabhabai which is
integral part of the incident can also be held to be in
question.                                                    C

      19. On a plain reading, the statement is admissible
about the cause of death or the circumstances of the
transaction which resulted in the death of the person making
the statement. Question is what appens when two deaths D
have taken place in 'the same transaction and
circumstances of the transaction resulting in one death is
closely interconnected with the other death. Admittedly,
the DD of Prabhabai is admissible as to cause of her death
as well as the circumstances of the transaction which E
resulted in her death. Such statement may not by itself be
admissible to determine the cause of death of anyone other
than the person making the statement. However, when the
circumstances of the transaction which resulted in death of
the person making the statement as well as death of any F
other person are part of the same transaction, the same
will be relevant also about the cause of death of such other
person.

     20. Expressions "Relevant" and "facts in issue" are G
defined in the Evidence Act as follows:

    "Relevant" - One fact is said to be relevant to another
    when the one is connected with the other in any of the
    ways referred to in the provisions of this Act relating to    H
922          SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2015] 2 S.C.R.


A          the relevancy of facts.

           "Facts in issue" -The expression "facts in issue"
           means and includes-any fact from which, either by
           itself or in connection with other facts, the existence,
B          nonexistence, nature or extent of any right, liability, or
           disability asserted or denied in any suit or proceeding,
           necessarily follows.

           Section 6 is as follows :
c          "6. Relevancy of facts forming part of same
           transaction - Facts which, though not in issue, are so
           connected with a fact in issue as to form part of the
           same transaction, are relevant, whether they occurred
           at the same time and place or at different times and
D
           places.

                               Illustrations
                                 xxxxxxx"

E      21. Thus, when a dying declaration relating to
  circumstances of the transaction which resulted in death of
  a person making the declaration are integral part of
  circumstances resulting in death of any other person, such
  dying declaration has relevance for death of such other
F person also.
       22. We may now refer to the decisions dealing with the
  said legal issue. In Kashinath Tukaram Jadhav vs. State
  of Maharashtra2, a Division Bench of the Bombay High
G Court held the same view relying upon the judgment of
  Travancore-Cochin High Court, in Lukka Ulahannen vs.
  Travancore Cochin State (AIR 1955 Trav-Co 104) as
  follows :

H     2 1984 c~. LJ. 1447
     TEJRAM PATIL v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA                      923
           [ADARSH KUMAR GOEL J.]

    ''The view that the statement of one dead person is not A
    a relevant fact with respect to the question about the
    death of another person or with respect to the causing
    of hurt to a third is too narrow to be accepted. To
    exclude from the evidence statements made by a
    deceased person as to incidents which occurred during B
    the course of the transaction which resulted in his death
    statements other than those relating to the cause of his
    death, would be to import a limitation to the words used
    in the section which their natural meaning does not
    warrant. When a limitation like that is intended, the C
    Legislature specially provides for it."

    In doing so, the High Court also relied upon an early
Madras Judgment in Re P. Subbu Thevan [2 Weir 750 (B)]
and Judgment of Rangoon High Court in Nga His Din vs. D
Emperor(AIR 1936 Rang 187) but dissented from the view
taken by the Allahabad High Court in Kunwarpa/ Singh vs.
Emperor (AIR 1948 All 170) . The Bombay High Court in
that case dealt with death of two persons in the same
transaction. The person making the DD was stabbed while E
saving the other person who was stabbed. Such DD was
held to be admissible for both the deaths. The DD and
discussion of the Court in the said judgment are as follows

                                                                F
    "27. The relevant parl of the dying declaration of Tatya
    read:

      "On Sunday, the 30'" July, 1978, at about 1.00 p.m.
   myself and Shri Khanna were standing near the flour G
   mill, in Tagore Nagar, Group No. 7. One Kashya Jadhav
   came there and called us. He asked whether we were
   searching him for assaulting. Immediately thereafter,
   he took out one open knife and stabbed Khanna on his
   chest twice. When I tried to save Khanna, Kashya H
924       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2015] 2 S.C.R.


A        stabbed me on my chest.

        28. A reading of the declaration shows that it would
        become unintelligible and present a distorted picture if
        the narration regarding stabbing of Khanna is excluded
B       therefrom. Why did Kashya stab Tatya? It is because
        Tatya ran to the rescue of Khanna who was being
        stabbed Kashya. Be excluding the narration regarding
        Khanna, the declaration may give an impression that
        Kashya came to the spot and straightway lunged
c       towards Tatya and stabbed him - which is not what the
        declarants states. Right from the moment Kashya
        arrived at the crossing of the roads where Nana and
        Khanna· were standing till the stabbing of Nana formed
        an .unbroken chain of events constituting one
D       transaction. Hence, the narration of Nana regarding
        the manner in which Kashya stabbed Khanna would
        also fall within the meaning of the phrase "any of the
        circumstances of the transaction" contained in sub-
        section (1) of S.32 of the Evidence Act. An errant bus-
E       drived ploughing his bus into a crowd of waiting
        commuters; a rogue pachyaderm running amock from
        captivity trampling the onlookers; a racist spraying
        bullets on the foci of his hatred - will not the last of the
        survivors of the rampage be able to describe how
F
        others met their deaths before the avalanche hit him?

      23. In Ratan Gond vs. State of Bihar two young girls
  Baisakhi and Aghani, aged 9 years and 5 years respectively
  were killed. They had gone to the jungle at a short distance
G from their village. Their mother Jatri had also gone to the
  jungle. When Jatri came back she found Aghani alone in
  the house. Aghani gave a statement to her mother about
  Baisakhi and since she died, the question was whether her

H . 3AIR 1959 SC 18 = 1959 SCR 1336
      TEJRAM PATIL v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA                       925
            [ADARSH KUMAR GOEL J.)

statement was admissible about the cause of death of A
          •
Baisakhi. It may be mentioned that Baisakhi had not
returned to her house and her dead body was found on the
next day. The question before the Court was whether the
statement of Aghani was admissible about the cause of
death of Baisakhi, the Court held :                      B
     "In the case before us, the statements made by Aghani
     do not relate to the cause of her death or to any of the
     circumstances relating to her death; on the contrary, the
     statements relate to the death of her sister. We are,        c
     therefore, of the opinion that the statements do not
     come within Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act and,
     indeed, Mr. Dhebar appearing on behalf of the State,
     has conceded that Section 32(1) does not apply to the
     statements of Aghani."                                       o
     It is clear from the above judgment that it was not a
case where the transaction in which the person making the
statement and the other deceased died was the same as
in the present case.                                              E
    24. The matter was again considered in Sharad
Birdhichand Sarda vs. State of Maharashtra4. It was
observed:

     "10. . ..... ..... Coming now to the question of F
     interpretation of Section 32(1) of The Evidence Act, this
     Court in the case of Ratan Gond v. State of Bihar (1959
     SCR 1336: AIR 1959 SC 18: 1959 Cri LJ 108), S.K.
     Das, J. made the following observations:
                                                                  G
          The only relevant clause of Section 32 which may
     be said to have any bearing is clause (1) which relates
     to statements made by a person as to the cause of his

4 (1984) 4 sec 11s                                                H
926    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2015] 2 S.C.R.


A     death or as to any of the circumstances of the
      transaction which resulted in his death. In the case
      before us, the statements made by Aghani do not relate
      to the cause of her death or to any of the circumstances
      relating to her death; on the contrary, the statements
B     relate to the death of her sister.

           In the Law of Evidence by Woodroffe & Ameer Ali,
      (Vol. II) the authors have collected all the cases at one
      place and indicated their conclusions thus:
c
           To sum up, the test of the relevancy of a statement
      under Section 32(1), is not what the final finding in the
      case is but whether the cause of the death of the
      person making the statement comes into question in
o     the case. The expression "any of the circumstances of
      the transaction which resulted in his death" is wider in
      scope than the expression "the cause of his death"; in
      other words, clause (1) of Section 32 refers to two kinds
      of statements: (1) statement made by a person as to
E     the cause of his death, and (2) the statement made by
      a person as to any of the circumstances of the
      transaction which resulted in his death.

           The words 'resulted in his death' do not mean
F     'caused his death'. Thus it is well settled that
      declarations are admissible only insofar as they point
      directly to the fact constituting the res gestae of the
      homicide; that is to say; to the act of killing and to the
      circumstances immediately attendant thereon, like
G     threats and difficulties, acts, declarations and incidents,
      which constitute or accompany and explain the fact or
      transaction in issue. They are admissible for or against
      either party; as forming parts of the res gestae ....... "

H         11. The leading decision on this question, which
  TEJRAM PATIL v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA                      927
         [ADARSH KUMAR GOEL J.]

has been endorsed by this Court, is the case of Pekala       A
Narayana Swami v. Emperor (AIR 1939 PC 47: 66 IA
66 : 180 IC 1) where Lord Atkin has laid down the
following tests:

        It has been suggested that the statement must be B
  made after the transaction has taken place, that the
  person making it must be at any rate near death, that
  the 'circumstances' can only include the acts done when
  and where the death was caused. Their Lordships are
  of opinion that the natural meaning of the words used C
  does not convey any of these limitations. The statement
  may be made before the cause of death has arisen, or
  before the deceased has any reason to anticipate being
  killed. The circumstances must be circumstances of the
 .transaction: general expressions indicating fear or D
  suspicion whether of a particular individual or otherwise
· and not directly related to the occasion of the death will
  not be admissible ......... "Circumstances of the
  transaction" is a phrase no doubt that conveys some
  limitations. It is not as broad as the analogous use in E
  "circumstantial evidence" which includes evidence of all
  relevant facts. It is on the other hand narrower than "res
  gestae". Circumstances must have some proximate
  relation to the actual occurrence: ........... .
                                                             F
      It will be observed that "the circumstances" are of
  the transaction which resulted in the death of the
· declarant.

     These principles were followed and fully endorsed G
by a decision of this Court in Shiv Kumar v. State of
Uttar Pradesh (Cri. Appeal No.55 of 1966, decided on
July 29, 1966) where the following observations were
made:
                                                       H
928      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    (2015] 2 S.C.R.


A            It is clear that if the statement of the deceased is
        to be admissible under this section it must be a
        statement relating to the circumstances of the
        transaction resulting in his death. The statement may
        be made before the cause of death has arisen, or
B       before the deceased has any reason to anticipate being
        killed, . . . . . ... A necessary condition of admissibility
        under the section is that the circumstance must have
        some proximate relation                  to the actual
        occurrence........... The phrase "circumstances of the
c       transaction" is a phrase that no doubt conveys some
        limitations. It is not as broad as the analogous use in
        "circumstantial evidence" which includes evidence of all
        relevant facts. It is on the other hand nanuwer than "res
        gestae" (See Pakala Narayana Swami v. Emperor)."
D
        25. It is thus clear that the DD is admissible not only in
  relation to the cause of death of the person making the
  statement and as to circumstances of the transaction which
  resulted in his death, if the circumstances of the said
E transaction relate to death of another person, the statement
  cannot be held to be inadmissible when circumstances of
  "his" death are integrally connected to the circumstances
  of death of such other person.

F      26. In the present case, the statement of pouring of
  kerosene on Savita, intervention of Prabhabai in the process
  and her receiving burn injuries resulting in her death are
  integral part of the same transaction. Thus, the statement
  which relates to circumstances of the transaction resulting
G in her death being admissible, it can be relied upon to show
  as to how death of Savita took place. The said statement
  is also corroborated by the admission of the accused
  himself to the extent that ti1e death of Savita was by burning
H and the deceased Prabhabai received the burn injuries in
      TEJRAM PATIL v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA                      929
            [ADARSH KUMAR GOEL J.]

 the same incident. Though, the version of the accused that A
 it was suicide, the same has been rightly found to be false.

      27. In these circumstances, the death of Savita is
 proved beyond reasonable doubt to be homicidal death by
 burning and by pouring of kerosene and setting her on fire B
 by the accused. This stands established by the statement
 of Prabhabai and the attendant circumstances. The said
 statement was duly recorded by the Magistrate and carries
 an endorsement by the doctor about her consciousness and
 fitness to make a statement. There is no reason for not C
 accepting the authenticity of the version given in the said
 DD.

     28. Accordingly, we hold that the DD made by
 Prabhabai was admissible as to the circumstances of the D
 transaction which included the circumstance of pouring of
 kerosene and lighting of fire by the accused resulting in
 death of the deceased.

       29. As a result of the above discussion, we hold that E
  the case of the prosecution against the appellant is proved
  beyond reasonable doubt. No interference is called for with
· his conviction and sentence.

     The appeal is accordingly dismissed.
                                                                 F
 Devika Gujrat                              Appeal dismissed.