Holding

The Supreme Court held that the selection process, while imperfect, did not breach the constitutional requirements of fairness, bias, or arbitrariness, and that the High Court’s detailed scrutiny was beyond the permissible scope of judicial review.

Summary

The Department of Telecommunications invited tenders for cellular licences in four Indian cities, leading to a two‑stage evaluation and the selection of eight operators. Several rejected bidders challenged the final list before the Delhi High Court, alleging bias (due to a member’s son working for a bidder), arbitrariness, hidden criteria, violation of tender terms, and denial of a hearing. The Supreme Court examined the scope of judicial review, holding that courts may only scrutinise the decision‑making process for illegality, irrationality, procedural impropriety or bias, not the merits of the tender. It found no real likelihood of bias by Mr. B.R. Nair, held that the apex committee was not improperly bypassed, and that the evolution of technical criteria was permissible in a complex, novel technology project. The Court also rejected the claim that the change of a foreign collaborator violated clause 7, and it affirmed that the High Court’s detailed interference was unwarranted. Consequently, the appeals were partly allowed and partly dismissed, directing a fresh consideration of the selections where necessary.

Issues considered

The scope of judicial review in government tendering and contract award processes
Whether the selection of operators was arbitrary or unreasonable under Article 14
Whether the participation of Mr. B.R. Nair amounted to bias or a violation of natural justice
Whether the Apex/High‑Powered Committee was bypassed in the selection process
Whether hidden or post‑tender criteria were validly introduced
Whether the change of foreign collaborator breached the tender conditions
Whether the denial of a hearing to Tata Cellular violated natural justice

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. Section 482
Constitution of Indias. Article 14, s. Article 226, s. Article 299
Indian Telegraph Act, 1885s. Section 3(6)

Subjects

administrative lawjudicial reviewWednesbury unreasonablenessbiasnatural justicegovernment contracttender evaluationcellular licenceArticle 14Article 299procedural improprietyarbitrarinesshidden criteriaforeign collaborator

Judgment

A TATA CELLULAR
v:
UNION OF INDIA

JULY 26, 1994

B [M.N. VENKATACHALIAH CJ., M.M. PUNCHHI AND
S. MOHAN JJ.)

Administrative Law-Judicial Review-Scope of-Merits of the decision
cannot be reviewed-Only process of decision making can be reviewed-
C Grounds for review of administrative action-l"ationality-Meaning of-'Wed-
nesbury resonableness-Modern trend-Government contracts-Can be
reviewed on the ground of violation of Anicle 14 of the Constitution of India--
Terms of invitation to tender not open to review-Limitations of coults in
review of administrative decisions-Constitution of India-Articles 14 and
D 226.

Administrative law-Natural Justice-Bias-meaning of test of likelihood
of bias-When there can be-<Jovemment tende,-Son of one of the person
involved in selection process employed with one of the bidders-The bidder
ultimately selected-Held, in the facts and circumstances of the case selection
E is not vitiated by bias-Doctrine of necessity-Applicability of

Constitution of India-Articles 14 and 299 Government contract-Ar-
bitrariness-Govemment invited tenders for operation of cellular mobile
phone service-Cenain criteria not in the tender introduced to eliminate
F tenders-Held, it does not vitiate award of contract as all criteria could not
have postulated at the beginning itself

Constitution of India-Article 14 and 299-Government con-
tract:-Whether technical i"egularity can be condoned without violation Ar-
ticle 14-Govemment invited tenders for operation of cellular mobile phone
G service-Terms prohibiting change in the proposed foreign collaborator-One
tenderer dropping name of one collaborator out of three-Held, does not
amount to change in collaborator.

Constitution of India-Article 14 and 299-Government con-
H tract:-Govemment inviting tenders for operation of Cellular mobile phone
122
TATA CELLULAR v. U.0.1. 123

service-One tenderer initially selected was later on dropped without assigning A
any reasons therefore or hearing-Held, not hearing the tenders violates
Natural Justice-Administrative Law.

The Department of Telecommunication, Government oflndia invited
tenders from India Companies for grant. of licence for the operation of B
cellular mobile telephone service in Delhi, Bombay, Calcutta and Madras.
The tender process consisted of two stages- (i) technical evaluation and
(ii) financial evaluation. The companies short-listed at the first stage were
to be invited at the second stage.

For the purpose of evaluation of tenders and grant of licence, three C
committees were constituted-(i) Tender Evaluation Committee (TEC) con-
sisting of officials of Department of Telecommunication; (ii) Telecom
Commission consisting of a Chairman and four members; and (iii) selec-
tion Committee or Apex/High Powered Committee. Consisting of the Prin-
cipal Secretary to the Prime Minister and there other secretaries of the D
Government of India.

After the first stage of the tender, 14 companies were short listed and
on 30.7.92, financial tenders were issued. The financial tender contained
seven criteria for selection for which no marks had been earmarked. The
financial bid of the 14 short- listed companies were opened on 17.8.1992 E
i.e., the cut off date for the financial bid. A second Tender Evaluation
Committee examined the bids after devising a marking system for the
criteria indicated in the financial tender. Ultimately names of four
operators were recommended. Bharti Cellular was the first choice for all
the four cities. BPL System and Projects was the second choice for Delhi F
and Bombay and Tata Cellular and Skycell were the second chance for
Calcutta and Madras. On 10.9.1992, the Chairman of the Telecom Com-
mission directed that all the documents alongwith the recommendation of
the Tender Evaluation Committee be sent to the Selection Committee for
making final recommendations to the Government. On 10.9.1992 itself, the
Tender Evaluation Committee's report alongwith the other documents G
were sent to the High Power Committee. However, a D.O. was issued
dissolving the High Power Committee.

On 9.10.1992 the concerned Minister made a noting on the tile that
the selection process may be completed by the Department of Telecom- H
124 SUPREME COURT REPOR'rs (1994] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A munication itself as the High power Committee was taking much time.
Accordingly, a final list of 8 companies was prepared. In this final recom-
mendation, the Chairman noted that Bharti Cellular, Modi Telecom and
Mobile Telecom did not fulfil the condition laid down in clause 2.4.7 of the
financial bid which required that the foreign exchange requirement be met
by the foreign collaborator of the operator company. In the final recom-
B
mendation, Sterling CelluI:ir was rejected because a C.B.I. investigation
was pending against it. Hutchinson Max was rejected on the ground that
it had not complied with the operative and technical conditions of the bid.
Hutchinson Max had sent a letter explaining that the non- compliance was
merely a typographical error and agreeing to comply with all technical,
C commercial and general conditions of the bid. The Minister reviewed the
final recommendation and reversed the decisions regarding exclusion of
Sterling Cellular and one Indian Telecom Ltd. Accordingly, the list of
selected operations was recast on 10.10.1992 and the final list prepared
was as follows :

D Bombay 1. Bharti Cellular
2. B.P.L. Projects and Systems

Delhi 1. Indian Telecom Ltd.
2. Tata Cellular Pvt. Ltd.

E Calcutta 1. Mobile Telecom Ltd.
2. Usha Martin Telecom

Madras 1. Skycell
2. Sterling Cellular Ltd.

F Four Writ Petitions came to be filed by the rejected companies before
the High Court challenging the final list. The writ petitions were disposed
off by the High Court by its judgment and order dated 26.2.1993 with
certain directions to the Government In pursuance .of the Judgment of the
High Court, the final list was recasted on 27.8.1993 and following com-
G panies were selected :

Bombay· 1. Hutchinson Max
2. Bharti Cellular

Delhi 1. B.P.L. Projects and Systems
H 2. Sterling Cellular Ltd.
TATA CELLULAR v. U.O.l. 125

Calcutta 1. India Telecom Ltd. A
2.. Usha Martin Telecom

.) Madras 1. Mobile Telecom Ltd.
2. Skycell

The companies aggrieved by the judgment and order of the High B
Court, approached this Court in appeal. The main arguments advanced
by the appellants before this Court were :

1. The Conditions laid down in clause 2.4,7 of the financial bid was
ignored despite there being a clear noting of the chairman in his final C
recommendations that few companies did not fulfil the conditions of clause
2.4.7. Although Bharti Cellular and mobile Telecom did not fulfil condition
2.4.7, they were selected.

2. One Mrs. Nair, who was the member of the Telecom Commission.
and later on appointed as Member (Service), had partkipated in selection D
proceedings although his son was an employee of BPL Projects and
Systems which was one of the Parties to the bid. Mr. Nair had agreed with
the recommendation of the Technical Evaluation committee to the effect
that names of four firms should be included in the short list condoning
their defeciency. One of the firms in respect of which condonation was E
recommended was B.P.L. Projects and systems itself. The appellants ar·
gued that the selection was vitiated by bias.

3. The apex committee was by-passed and the selection process was
entrusted to a committee which did not follows the norms.

4. Certain hidden criteria, which were not disclosed earlier, were
F
applied not as parameters, but for elimination. These hidden criterias
were:

(a) the foreign collaborator of the bidder must have an experience
of handling on lakh Cellular phones or 80000 cellular phones G
with Global System for Mobile Communication (GSM) License.

(b) if two bidders have the same collaborator in relation to foreign
exchange, that bid will not be consider.

5. For granting license to Bharti Cellular the experience of Talkland H
126 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A or U.K. was considered although Talkland was not a collaborator or Bharti
Cellular.

6. B.P.L. Projects and systems was all~wed to drop the name or Mc.
Caw Cellular communications Inc. USA as 'its foreign collaborator at the
second stage or financial bid, although Mc. Caw was originally proposed as
B a collaborator. This was in violation or clause 7 or Chapter II or the bid
document which prohibited change in collaborator stated in the first stage
bid.

7. B.P.L. System and Projects submitted its application for foreign
collaborator on 22.4.1992 to SIA beyond the cut off date or 31.3.1992.
c -
8. Sterling Cellular was selected despite there being an filed by CBI
against it.

9. Tall\ Cellular was rejected, without assigning any reasons or giving
them opportunity of hearing although it was originally selected for Delhi.
D
10. Hutchison Max was selected although it had not sent the com·
pliance report in respect of operative and financial conditions alongwith its
offer.

On the basis of arguments advanced, this court framed the following
E points for determination :
1. What is the scope of judicial review in matters of the present kind?

2. Whether the selection is vitiated by arbitrariness?

F 3. Whether the contention regarding bias can be upheld?

4. Whether the apex committee has been bypassed?

5. Whether evolving the hidden criteria is valid?

G Disposing of the appeals, this Court

HELD: 1. SCOPE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

1.1. Judicial quest in administrative matters has been to find that
right balance between the administrative discretion to decide matters
H whether contractual or political in nature or issues of social policy; thus
TATA CELLULAR v. U.0.1. 127

they are not essentially justiciable and the need to remedy any unfairness. A
Such an unfairness is set right by judicial review. [158-DJ

Nottinghamshire County Council v. Secretary of State for the Environ-
ment, (1986) AC 240; Judicial Review by Michael Supperstone and Janes
Goudie, (1992) edn., p.16, relied on.
B
1.2. Judicial review is concerned with reviewing not the merits of the
decisions in support of which the application for judicial review is made,
but the decision making process itself. The duty of the court is to confine
itself to the question of legality. Its concerned should be: [159-B)

Whether a decision-making authority c
(a) exceeded its powers

(b) committed an error of law

(c) committed a breach of rules of natural justice D
(d) reached a decisions which no reasonable Tribunal would have
reached, or

(e) abused its powers? [160-E-F)
E
Therefore, it is not for the court to determine whether a particular
policy or particular decisions taken in fulOIIment of that policy is fair. It is
only concerned with the manner in which those decisions have been taken.
The extent of the duty to act fairly will vary from case to case. The grounds
upon which an ad~inistrative action is subject to control by judicial review
can be classified as under: [160-G) F

(a) Illegality : this means the decisions-maker must understand
correctly the law that regulates his decision-making power and
must give effect to it.

(b) Irrationality: the court is entitled to investigate the action of the G
local authority with a view to seeing whether or not they have
taken into account, and conversely, have refused to take into
account or neglected to take into account matter which they
ought to take into account and further to see whether the local
authority has come to a conclusion so unreasonable that no H
128 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A reasonable authority could ever have come to it.

(c) Procedural Impropriety [160-H, 161-A-B]

The above are only broad grounds but it does not rule out addition
of further grounds in the course of time. [161-B)
B
Chief Constable of North wales Police v. Evans, (1992) 3 All E R 141;
R v. panel on Take-overs and Mergers, ex P Gunness Pie, (1990) 1 QB 146;
R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department ex pane Brind, (1991) 1 AC
696; R. v. Askew, (1768) 4 Burr 2168; Judicial Review by Michael Suppers/one
and James Goude, 1992 edn., The Supreme Court Practice 1993 edn., Vol. l
c P. 849, relied on.
13. Two other facets ofirrationality are:-

(a) It is open to the court to review the decision-maker's evaluation
of facts. The Court will not interview where the facts taken as a whole could
D not logically warrant the conclusion of the decision maker. Ir the weight of
facts pointing to one course of action Is overwhelming, then a decision the
other way, cannot be upheld. (163-H, 164-A-B)

Emma Hotels Ltd. v. Secretary of the State of Environment, (1980) 41
p. and CR 255, relied on.
E
(b) A decision would be regarded as unreasonable if it is impartial
and unequal in its operation as between different classes. (164-D)

R v. Barnet Landon Borough Council Ex P. Johnson, (1989) 88 L G R
73, relied on.
F
1.4. The trend points to judicial restraint in administrative action.
The court does not have the expertise to correct the administrative decision.
If a review of the administrative decision is permitted it will be substituting
its own decision, without the necessary expertise which itself may be fallible.

G 1.5. Quashing decisions may impose heavy administrative burden on
the administration and lead to increased and unbudgeted expenditure.
(167-H, 168-A]
Administrative law by Bernard Schwartz, 2nd edn.; Administrative
Law: Rethinking judicial Control of Bureaucracy by Christopher F Edley Jr.
H 1990 edn; Universal Camera Corp. v. N.L. R.B. 340 US 474; Judicial Review
TATA CELLULAR v. U.0.1. 129

i11 Public Law by Clive Lewis, (1992] edn; R v. Monopolies commission, A
Ex.p. Arqyll Plc(C.A) (1986] 1 WLR 736; Associated Provincial Picture
Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbwy Corporation, (1948] 1 KB 223; Fasih Choudhary
v. Director General, Doordarshan,, (1989] l SCC 89; G.B. Mahajan v.Jalgaon
Municipal Council, (1991] 3 SCC 91; Administrative Law by prof. Wade;
F.C.I. v. Kamdhe11u Callie Feed Industries, (1993] 1 SCC 71; Sterli11g Com- B
puters Limited v. Mis. M.N. Publications Limited, (1993] 1 SCC 445 and
U11io11 Of India v. Hi11dustan Developme11t Corporation, (1993] 3 SCC 499,
referred to and relied on. ·

1.6 The Government must have freedom of contract. In other words,
a fairplay in the joints is a necessary concomitant for an administrative C
body functioning in an administrative sphere or quasi-administrative
sphere. However, the decision must not only be tested by the application of
Wednesbury principle of reasonableness but must be free from arbitrari-
ness, not effected by bias of actuated by malafides. (173-H]

1.7 It cannot be denied that the principles of judicial review would D
apply to the exercise of contractual powers by government bodies In order
to prevent arbitrariness or favoritism. However, it must be clearly stated
that there are inherent limitations in the exercise of that power of judicial
review. Government is the guardian of finances of the State. It is expected
to protect the financial interest of the State. The right to refuse the lowest E
or any other tender is always available to the Government. But, the prin-
ciples laid down in Article 14 of the Constitution of India have to be kept
in view while accepting or refusing a tender. There can be no question or
infringement of Article 14 if the Government tries to get the best person or
the best quotation. The right to choose cannot be considered to be an
arbitrary power. Of course, is the said power is exercised for any collateral F
purpose the exercise of that power will be struck down. (158-A-C]

1.8 The terms of invitation to tendor cannot be open to judicial
scrutiny because the invitation to tender is not the realm of contract.
Normally speaking, the decision to accept the tender or award the contract G
is reached by process of negotiations through several tiers. More often
than not, such decisions are made qualitatively by experts. (173-G]

2. WHETHER SELECTION IS ARBITRARY

2.1. The bid proforma of Bharti Cellular, Mobile Telecom, Sterling H
130 SUPREME COURT REPORTS 11994] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A Cellular and Skycell indicates minimum reliance on financial institutions.
It has also made distinction between loans from public financial institu-
tions and banks. In the case of India Telecom while awarding marks care
was taken to exclude the open market projects and foreign exchange from
the evaluation process. As regards skycell, they had projected their opera-
tion in Madras for initial years which would be below profitable levels.
B Therefore, no dividend would have been paid to their foreign collabora-
tions participating in the equality of company. The markings came to be
awarded on the same basis as in the case of all the bidders. The foreign
collaborations of skycell, B.P.L. Systems and Projects, Usha Martin, Bhar-
ti Cellular and Tata Cellular specifically undertook to cover the foreign
c exchange finding by equity and loans. '[175-H, 176-A·D]

2.2. International roaming has been correctly taken into considera-
tion. The roaming can be easily extended internationally and is already
being done in part of Europe. Since the systems are compatible, all that is
D required is an agreement between the operators for revenue ~haring etc.
(176-D, 177-F)
23. The argument that paragraph 2.4.7. namely, the financial projec-
tion of the proposed cellular mobile service and the 7th criterion having
been left out of consideration cannot be accepted. (177-G)

E 3. BIAS-OF MR NAIR

3.1. The rule of bias is founded on the well known maxim Nemo Judex
non causa sua; no persons can be a judge in· his omi cause. Firstly an
adjudicator must not have any direct financial, or proprietory interest in
the outcome of the proceedings. Secondly, he must be reasonably
F suspected, or show a real likelihood of bias. (178-C-D)

Black's Law Dictionary, 6th edn; De Smith's Constitutional and Ad-
n1inistrative law New edn., relied on and referred to.

G 3.2 Whenever a decision maker becomes personally involved with one
of the parties there arises the suspicion that a determination may be
reached exclusively on the merits of the case. The most obvious group of
cases calling for scrutiny are those in which one of the parties has close
ties of kinship with the decision maker. (179-D-F)

H 3.3 It is not necessary to establish bias but it is sufficient to in·
TAT/\ CELLULAR , .. U.0.1. 131

validate the selection process if it could be sho"·n that there ·was rt:asonable A
likelihood of bias. The likelihood of bias may arise on account of
proprietory interest or on account of personal reasons, such as, hostility
to one party or personal friendship or family relationship "'ith the other.
Where reasonable likelihood of !Jias is alleged on the ground of relation-
ship, the question would always be as to how close is the degree of B
relationship is. It has to be seen whether it is so great as to give rise to
reasonable apprehension of bias on the part of the authority making the
selection. Vague suspicion of whimsical, capricious and unreasonable
people should not be made a standard to regulate the court's action.
Flimsy, elusive, morbid suspicions should not be permitted to form a
ground of decision. [185-E-F, 187-CJ C
Natural Justice (Principles and Practical Application) [1979] edu by
Geoffrey A Flick; R v. Cambome Justices Ex parte Pearce, [1954) 2 All ER
850; Metropolitan Properties Co. (F.G.C.)Ltd., v. Lennon and others, [1968]
3 All E.R. 304; R v. Liverpool City Justices, Ex parte Topping, [1983) 1 All ER
490; University College ofSwansea v. Cornelius, (1988) I.C.R. 735; Manak Lal D
v. Dr. Prem Chand, [1955] SCR 575; !. Mahapatra & Co., v. State of Orissa,
(1985] 1 SCR 322; Ashok Kumar Yadav v. State of Haryana, [1985) 4 SCC
417; Ranjit 7hakur v. Union of India, [1988) 1 SCR 512, Public Utilities
Commission of District of Columbia v. Pollack, 343 US 451; lntemational
Airport Authority of India v. K. D. Bali, [1988] 2 SCC 360 and Union Carbide E
Corporation v. Union of India, [1991) 4 SCC 584, referred to and relied on.

3.4 Mr. Nair's son was only one of the officers in B.P.L. Systems and
projects, which has about 5500 employees in 27 offices all over India. There
were 89 officers of his rank. [190-C)
F
3.5. Mr. B.R. Nair was not the decision-maker at all. He was one of
the recommending authorities. As Director General of Communications as
well as Telecom Authority his involvement in the approval and selection of
tender was indispensable. In these circumstances the doctrine of necessity
is applicable. Therefore Mr. B.R. Nair's involvement did not vitiate the
selection on the ground of bias. [190-D-F, 191·D] G

Charan la/ Sahu v. Union of India, [1990) 1 SCC 613, relied on.

4. BYPASSING OF APEX COMMITTEE

4.1. The note prepared by the Adviser (Operations) dated 8.9.1992 H
132 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A had been sent to the High Power Committee for its consideration and final
recommendation. However, a D.O. came to be issued dissolving the Apex
Committee. Therefore, it is not correct to contend that the Apex Commit·
tee had been bypassed. (194-F, 195-C, 196-H]

5. ENTRY OF HIDDEN CRITERIA
B
5.1 In a technical matter like this where the Government of India is
embarking. upon new communication scheme with advance technology all
the criteria cannot be postulated in the beginning itself. Where the com·
mittee of experts thought certain criteria have to be evolved in order to
C subserve the interest of the scheme it is not necessary to have all of them
set out in the beginning itself. (199-H, 200-A]

5.2 T~lkland never figured as a collaborator for Bharti Cellular and
therefore Bharti Cellular's claim based on Talkland is incorrect.
Talkland's experience has to be excluded. The claim of Bharti Cellnlar
D should be reconsidered an a factual basis as on 20th January 1992, after
excluding the experience of Talkland and it should be examined as to
whether still Bharti Cellular could fulfil. The requisite qualification, name·
ly, 80000 GSM lines and whether its collaborators SFR France and
EMTEL Mauritius bad that experience. [204-B-D]
E
6.1 As a matter of general proposition it cannot be held that an
authority inviting tenders is bound to give effect to every term mentioned
in the notice in meticulous detail, and is not entitled to waive even a
technical irregularity of little or no significance. The reqnirements in a
tender notice can be classified into two categories-those which lay down
F the essential conditions of eligibility and the others which are merely
ancialliary or subsidiary with the main object to be achieved by the
cor.dition. In the first case the authority issning the tender may be required
to enforce them rigidly; in the other cases it must be open to the authority
to deviate from and not to insist npon the strict literal compliance of the
G condition in appropriate cases. [207-E-F]

G.J. Fema11des v. State of Kamataka, [1990] 2 SCC 488 and Poddar
Steel Corporation v. Ganesh Engineering Works, [1991] 3 SCC 273, relied
on.

H 6.2 Clause 7 of Chapter II forbids only change. On 17.8.92 when BPL
TATA CELLULAR v. U.0.1. 133

Systems and Projects submitted its second stage of financial, Mc. Caw A
Cellular Communications Inc. USA had been dropped out as foreign col·
laborator from its list of three foreign collaborators. This does not amount
to a change in foreign collaborator. The original two still remained. There
is no change in joint venture. This does not violate clause 7 of Chapter II.
[205·E·G]
B
7. BPL Systems and Projects did submit its application for foreign
collaboration on 31.3.1992 to the Reserve Bank oflndia. When that applica-
tion was returned on 20th April 1992 it came to be sent to SIA on 22.4.92.
Therefore, BPL Systems and Projects cannot be faulted for submitting its
application for foreign collaborator on 22.4.1992 to SIA beyond the cut off
date of31.3.1992. (208-D-E) C
8. On the date of selection there was no adverse report against Ster·
ling Computers. It was only after 10th of June, 1993 an FIR was filed by the
CBI. On the date of consideration by the Technical Evaluation Committee
its position was even better. If therefore, this aspect had been borne in mind D
it is not for the court to reweigh the claims and come to one conclusion or
another. (213-G-H, 214-A)

9. From the letter dated 27.8.1993 sent to Tata Cellular cancelling
the tender in its favour, the reason for its omission cannot be fathomed.
Tata Cellular was originally selected for Delhi. By implementation of the E
Judgment of the High Court it was left out. Before doing so, Tata Cellular
ought to have been heard. Therefore, there is a clear violation of the
principle of nature Justice. The claim of Tata Cellular will have to be
reconsidered. (215-A-B)

10. Although there was no reference to operating conditions of Finan· F
cial conditions in the Compliance statement of Hutchinson Max, on 11.9.92,
that is, prior to the last date of filing tender document for the second stage,
Hutchinson Max wrote a letter to the Minister of State for Communication
about the inadvertant error due to a typographical/clerical mistake in not
referring to operating conditions and financial conditions. The proper G
compliance statement come to be filed later. This mistake of Hutchinson
Max is in relation to peripheral or collateral matter. There has been every
intention to comply with the terms of the bid. For an accidental omission
it cannot be punished. [210·D·G, 211-G)

Moffett, Hodgkins and Clarke Company v. City of Rochester, 178 US H
134 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A Supreme Court Reports 1108; referred to.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos. 4947-50
of 1994.

From the Judgment and Order dated 26.2.93 of the Delhi High Court
B in C.W. Nos. 4030-32/92, 4302/91 & 163 of 1993.
Soli J. Sorabjee, M.H. Baig,· Ashok Sen, Harish N. Salve, Gulam
Vahanvati, Mrs. P.S. Shroff, Ms. Ritu Bhalla, Mrs. Nilina Chaterjee, Ms.
Smitha Inna, S.S. Shroff, for Suresh A. Shroff & Co., Shirish Kumar Misra,
N.D.B. Raju, Shalendra Swaroop, Mrs. Kum Kum Sen, Mrs. Anjali Verma
C for Khaitan & Co., R.J. Gagrat, U.A. Rana and Anand Parasad for Gagrat
& Co. for the Appellants.

F.S. Nariman for the Respondent in B.P.L. Sanyo Systems & Project
Ltd.

D P. Chidambram for the Respondent in Usha Martin & BPL Sanyo.

D.P. Gupta, Solicitor General, A.B. Divan, K. Para:saran, K.K.
Venugopal, G.Ramaswamy, N.N. Goswamy, Ravinder Narain, Ashok
Sagar, Sumeet kachwah, Ms. Punita Singh, D.N. Mishra for JB.D.& Co.,
V.N. Koura, Ashok Grover, M.G. Ramachandran, S.Fazl, Nagesh Rao,
E P.H. Parekh, Sanjeev Puri, Sanjeev Malhotra, N.Ganapathy, Hemani Shar-
ma, Mrs. Anil Katiyar and T.V. Ratanam for the Respondents. in Mobile
Telecom Service.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

F MOHAN, J. Leave granted.

All these appeals can be dealt with under a common. judgment since
one and same issue requires to be decided. The brief facts are as under :

The Department of Telecommunications, Government of India, in-
G viled tenders from Indian Companies with a view to license the operation
of Cellular Mobile Telephone Service' in four metropolitan cities of India,
namely, Delhi, Bombay, Calcutta and Madras. Cellular mobile telephone
means a telecommunication system \vhich allows two ways telecommunicaR
tion between a mobile or stationary telephone to another mobile or sta-
H tionary unit at a location. It may be within or outside the city including
TATACELLULAR v. U.0.1.(MOHAN,J.] 135

subscriber-cum-dialing and international subscriber-cum-dialing calls. The A
last date for submission of tender was 31.3.92. The tender process was in
two stages. First stage involved technical evaluation and the second in-
volved financial evaluation. Those who were short-listed at the first stage
were invited for the second stage.

30 bidders participated initially at the first stage. The first tender B
Evaluation Committee was constituted consisting of senior officers of the
Department of Telecommunication.

A Telecom Commission was constituted on 6.4.89 comprising of a
Chairman and four full-time Members :
c
1. Member (Production)

2. Member (Service)

3. Member (Technology)
D
4. Member (Finance)

It short-listed 16 companies, 12 of which were eligible without any
defect. However, in the case of 4 the Committee recommended condona-
tion of certain defects. Those four were :
E
1. BPL Systems and Projects Limited

2. Mobile Telecommunication Limited

3. Mobile Telecom Services
F
4. Indian Telecom Limited

Between 19th of May, 1992 and 27 of May, 1992 the recommenda-
tions were submitted to the Telecom Commission. the matter came up for
discussion among the members of the Commission. On 27.5.92 the Telecom G
Commission accepted the recommendations of the Technical Evaluation
Committee. The Chairman recommended that the short-list of bidders, the
·recommendations ·of the Tender Evaluation Committee and the proposal
for financial bids be placed before the selection Committee at the earliest.

It requires to be noted, at this stage, that a Selection Committee also H
136 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A described as Apex/High-powered Committee comprising ol the Principal
Secretary to the Prime Minister and three other Secretaries to the Govern-
ment of India had been set up by the Minister for final evaluation of the
bid.

Mr. B.R. Nair, a Member (Budget) of Telecom Commission came to
B be appointed as Member (Services) on 29.5.92. It appears the Selection
Committee met a number of times and discussed the matter with the
Minister. He submitted an interim report on 16th July, 1992. During this
time the Committee not only de novo exercised but also modified the
short-list prepared by the Technical Evaluation Committee and approved
c 14 companies. The Selection Committee also met the representatives of
equipment manufacturers for the selection of the licensees. On 20th July,
1992, the revised financial bid and the short-list approved by the Telecom
Commission were put up before the· Minister for approval. On 24.7.92,
further meetings of the Selection Committee were held and the financial
D bid document was revised. On 28.7.92, the Selection Committee submitted
its final report. Two bidders, namely, M/s. Ashok Leyland Ltd. and Mis.
Varn Organics Ltd. were dropped from out of the short-list of 16 bidders.
On 29.7.92, Mr. Nair was appointed as Director General of Telecom-
munications. He was authorised to exercise all powers of Telecom
Authority under Section 3 of the Telegraph Act. The Minister approved
E the issue of financial bids with modification to the short-listed companies
as recommencied by the Selection Committee on 29.7.92. The approval took
place on 30.7.92.

On 30.7.92, the financial tenders were issued. It contained seven
criteria which had been approved by the. Selection Committee. However,
F
no marks were earmarked for any of the criteria. 17.8.92 was the cut-off
date for financial bid document. On this date the bids received from 14
companies were opened and read out to the bidders, who were present.
As per the conditions, the quoted rental ceiling and the cities for which
the bids were made, was read out.
G
Another Departmental Tender Evaluation Committee consisting of
senior officers examined the financial bids of the 14 short-listed companies.
It adopted some parameter and devised the marking system which was not
done by the Selection Committee. On 2.9.92 the second Tender Evaluation
H Committee submitted its recommendations. However, the matter was
TATACELLULAR v. U.0.1.[MOHAN,J.] 137

referred back to it for a fresh gradation on the basis of 21. 75 per cent A
interest rate in respect of 13 per cent rate which it had earlier adopted.
On 7.9.92 the recommendations were re-submitted. The Adviser (Opera-
tion) recommended only 4 operators based on the evaluation and fmancial
bids. Bharti Cellular was recommended as a first choice for all the four
cities. BPL as the second choice for botb Delhi and Bombay, Tata Cellular B
and Skycell as second choice for Calcutta and Madras. This was done
since in his view no other bidder qualified· for licence. On 10.9.92 the
Chairman of the Tender Evaluation Committee directed that all the docu-
ments and recommendations be sent to the Selection Committee for its
consideration and for making final recommendations to the Government.
When the file was put up to the Minister on 9.10.92 he made three C
important notings:

1. In view of the time taken by the High powered Committee the
selection process be completed by Dot internally;

2. Only one party may be granted licence for one city; and D

3. The actual selection of the licensee should be made primarily on
the consideration of rentals and the marks obtained in respect of foreign
exchange inflow and outflow criterion and experience of the licensee.
E
On 9.10.92, in accordance with this note, a list of 8 short- listed
companies was prepared. The reasons for rejection of the 6 companies
were recorded. The Chairman, in his final recommendation, made on
9.10.92 noted that Bharti Cellular, Modi Telecom· and Mobile Telecom did
not fulfill the conditions provided in clause 2.4.7 of Chapter II of the
financial bid which requires that foreign exchange requirement be met by F
foreign collaborator. With regard to rejection of 6 bidders Sterling Cellular
was rejected because some investigation against them was pending because
some investigation against them was pending before the C.B.I. However,
the Minister reversed that decision as to the exclusion of.Sterling Cellular
and Indian Telecom limited from the list. of finally approved bidders and G
directed that the same be considered.

On 10.10.92, the list was recast. Sterling Cellular was provisionally
selected for the city of Madras. On 12.10.92, the selected bidders were
notified of their provisional selection subject to the acceptance of rentals
and other terms as might be advised. H
138 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1994] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A It is under these circumstances, four writ petitions were preferred
bearing C.W.P. Nos. 403Q, 4031, 4032 and 163 of 1992. The petitioners
were:

1. India Telecomp (Petitioner in C.W.P. No. 4030 of 1992)

B 2. Adino Telecom Limited (Petitioner in C.W.P. No. 4031 of 1992)

3. Kanazia Digital System (Petitioner in C.W.P. No. 4032 of 1992)

4. Hutchison Max Telecom Private Limited (Petitioner in C.W.P. No.
163/92)
c
It Was urged before the High Court of Delhi that the decision of the
Government in selecting eight parties, two for each of the cities, was bad
on the following grounds:

(i) bias
D
(ii) invoking certain hidden criteria

(iii) irrelevant considerations

(iv) by-passing the Selection Committee
E
(v) selecting otherwise underqualified parties.

(vi) marketing system which was evaluated by the second Technical
Evaluation Committee for grading various bidders.

F So manipulated thereby a criterion was evolved which was tailor-
made to knock out the petitioners before the High Court or resulting in
knocking out of the petitioner in the case of India Telecomp Limited and
Adino Telecom Limited. Hutchison Max Telecom Private Limited urged
that it wa~ that highest in the gradation. Its bid was not considered for a
G technical and flimsy reason; in that, the compliance statement required to
be furnished with the bids was not complete. Kanazia Digital System
contended that its technical bid was left out on certain wrong premise.

Lengthy arguments were advanced before the High Court. On a
consideration of those arguments the writ petitions of Adino Telecom and
H Kanazia Digital System were dismissed. C.W.P. 4030 of 1992 filed by India
TATACELLULAR v. U.0.1.(MOHAN.J.) 139

Telecomp was allowed. A ma11dam11s was issued to consider afresh the A
grant of licence to the petitioner therein, after evaluating marks for the
rental on the basis the figures of deposits from subscribers given for Delhi
and Bombay were accumulated. Similarly, C.W.P. 163 of 1992 in which the
petitioner was Mis Hutchison Max Telecom Private Limited, was allowed.
A direction was issued to reconsider the case of the petitioner, on the basis B
the compliance filed by it, as it was in order. To that extent, the order,
granting licence to 8 parties (2 for each of the cities) was set aside. This
judgment was pronounced on 26.2.93.

After the judgment of the Delhi Court, the matter was reconsidered
in the light of the said judgment. A revised list of Provisionally selected C
bidders was prepared on 27.8.93. That is as follows :

Position as on 12.10.92 Position as on 27.8.93

Bombay Bombay D
Bharti Cellular Hutchison Max
BPL Projects & Systems Bharti Cellular

Delhi Delhi
India Telecomp Ltd. BPL Projects & Systems
Tata Cellular Pvt. Ltd. Sterling Celluler Ltd. E

Calculla Calculla
Mobile Telecom Ltd. India Telecomp Ltd.
Usha Matin Telecom Usha Martin Telecom
F
Madras Madras
Skycell Mobile Telecom Ltd.
Sterling Cellular Ltd. Skycell

It could be seen from the above that Tata Cellular which was
originally selected for Delhi has been left out. Therefore, it has preferred G
SLP (Civil) Nos. 14191-94 of 1993.

Mis. Hutchison Max Private Limited has apprehended that if the
judgment of the Delhi High Court is not accepted it is likely to be displaced
from the provisional selection list for Delhi. H
140 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994) SUPP. 2 S.C.R. •
A Indian Telecom Private Limited preferred SLP (C) No. 17809/93.
India Telecomp preferred SLP (C) No. 14266 of 1993.

Mr. Soli J. Sorabjee, learned counsel for the appellant, Tata Cellular,
argues that this is a two staged tender. In the first stage, the evaruation had
to be made on the basis of technical and commercial considerations. The
B bidders short-listed at the first stage would then compete in the second
stage, namely, ttie financial bid. Chapter II contains general conditions
framed into the bid. In paragraph 2.4.7 the financial projection of the
proposed cellular mobile service was prescribed. The notes mentioned
three criteria:
c
(i) Entire foreign exchange requirement shall be met by the foreign
collaborator.

(ii) Minimum reliance of Indian public financial institutions will be
D preferred.

(iii) Debt equity ratio should not be more than 2:1.

It is borne out by records that out of the seven criteria in evaluating
the financial bid, six parameters alone were taken into consideration. For
E rental parameter the evaluation committee took into account the equity
rental ceiling, security deposits installation and other charges indicated in
the bid which were the same in the case of all the bidders. This was done
in order to arrive at an equated or effective figure of monthly rental for
each bidder. It is not open to the Committee to totally ignore this criterion
F when the Chairman's note dated 9.10.92 specifically states that the com-
panies would be asked to comply with the conditions of financial bid in
clause 2.4.7 of Chapter II while granting licences.

When this is the position, strangely, the appellant is informed as
G follows:

"Ministry of Communication
(Telecom Commission)
_,
New Delhi-110001

H No./92-TM Dated : 27.8.93
TATACELLULAR V. u.o.i.[MOHAN,J.J 141

To A
Kind attenion :

Subject : Tender No. 44-21/91-MMC(FIN) for franchise for cel-
lular mobile telephone service for Bombay, Delhi, Calcutta and
Madras. B
Sir,

Kindly refer letter of even No. dated 12.10.92 informing you
that you have provisionally selected for franchise for providing
cellular mobile telephones service at on a non- exclusive basis. C

2. The matter has been reconsidered in the light of the judgment
delivered by the High Court of Delhi in this case. M/s. have now
been provisionally selected for franchise for providing cellular
mobile telephone service at in place of on a non- exclusive basis.
The other franchise selected for is M/s. with M/s. of as their foreign D
partner.

3. The details of the rental, deposits and other terms fixed for the .
franchise wilt be intimated to you shortly.

4. Kindly get necessary formalities completed by 30.9.93. E
Your faithfully'

{S.K. Garg)
DOG (TM)" . F

The second ground of attack is bias. In that, Mr. B.R. Nair, Member
of Production in the Telecom Commission, who was appointed as Member
(Service) on 29th May, 1992, participated. From the Advisor the file went
to Member {Service). The note of Mr. Nair is dated 21st May, 1992. He
agreed with the recommendation of T.E.C. that four firms which had some G
deficiencies should be included in the short-list. They were B.P.L. Systems
and Projects, Mobile Telecom, Mobile Communications and Indian Cel-
lular Therefore, B.P.L. was approved by Mr. Nair. Admittedly, Mr. Nair's
son is employed. in B.P.L. Systems and Projects.

The _High Court in dealing with the allegations of bias made against H
142 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994) SUP!'. 2 S.C.R.

A Mr. Nair held :

"Nexus of father and son in the chain of decision making
process is too remote to be of any consequence. It is quite inter-
esting to note that of the four companies which were having some
deficiencies in their tender documents in the first stage and were
B recommended for consideration by the first TEC, three companies
including BPL made it to the final list of eight. Plea of bias is not
alleged in the selection of other two companies. In the circumstan-
ces it is not possible for us to hold any allegation of bias made
against Nair."
c The High Court concluded :

"We do not think in a case like this the mere fact that Nair was
part of the machinery to fact that Nair was part of the machinery
to make selection was enough to show that there could be
D reasonable suspicion or real likelihood of bias in favour of BPL.

This finding is wrong, Mr. Nair's participation from the beginning
would constitute bias. In support of this submission, the learned counsel
relies on Manak Lal v. Dr. Prem Chand, [1957] and particularly the passage
occurring at page 587, Mahapatra v. State of Orissa, (1985] 1 SCR 322 at
E page 334 and Ashok Kumar Yadav v. State of Haryana, [1985) 4 SCC 417
at paragraph 16 at pages 440 and 441.

The English decisions on this aspect which will support the conten-
tion are :

F Metropolitan v. Lennon and others, (1986) 3 AER 304 at 310.

In law, there is no degree of bias.

Even otherwise in the implementation of the Judgment of the High
Court of Delhi, if this appellant is to be eliminated, it ought to have been
G afforded an opportunity,. Had that been done it would have pointed out
several factors, namely, the omission to consider relevant material, namely,
parameter seven, .the prejudice cause by the award of marks after the bids
were opened. The Dot was obliged to disclose the maximum marks for each i,
criterion at the threshold of the financial bid in the interest of transparency
H and to ensure a non-arbitrary selection.
TATA CELLULAR v. U.0.1. (MOHAN, J.] 143

In the case of most of the bidders the foreign exchange is not met by A
the foreign collaborator. In the case of India Telecomp the debt equity
ratio is 1:1. Their total project cost is stated to be Rs. 101 crores. This
means Rs. 50.50 crores represent equity and the other Rs.50.50 crores
represent external commercial borrowing. In this case, the entire foreign
exchange is not met by the foreign collaborator. Therefore, there is a B
breach of the fundamental condition of the bid. This would constitute a
disqualification which is a bar at the threshold. Had this Condition been
strictly applied Bharti Cellular, Modi Telecom, Mobile communications,
Hutchison Max, Skycell Communication would have been eliminated.
Likewise, Sterling Cellular also did not fulfil this Condition.
c
It was a mandatory condition that a foreign collaborator indicated at
the first stage of tender, could not be changed thereafter. Inter alia, on the
strength of credentials of foreign collaborators the bid is considered. If a
change is allowed it would amount to technical violation of the bid. Yet in
the case of BPL one of its foreign collaborators, namely, McCaw Cellular D
withdrew from the collaboration. Inspite of this, the breach was dis-
regarded. The bidder had to furnish proof that he had obtained the
approval of foreign collaboration or filed application before the competent
authority. BPL had not even filed an application before the competent
authority yet its tender was considered and approved. On the very same E
ground, while Ashok Leyland had been disqualified, equally, it should have
been applied to BPL.

Sterling Cellular had been rejected at various stages of consideration
on the ground that there was criminal complaint/investigation pending F
against it. The Minister had also agreed but reversed that. decision on the
last day and directed its consideration for inclusion in Madras on the
purported ground that Madras was the least popular of the stations and
that if any delay is caused due to complications on account of CBI
investigation would have the least adverse effect for lack of competition. G
The High Court noted that no material had been brought on record to
show that there was any complaint against Sterling Cellular. But, factually,
to the knowledge of the DOT, a criminal case stood registered against
Sterling Cellular in June, 1993, before making the final selection. The DOT,
instead of rejecting Sterling Cellular on that ground, upgraded it. from
Madras to Delhi in disregard of the decision of the Minister. H
144 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994J SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A Any foreign collaboration has to be approved by an inter- ministerial
committee called FIPB. No proposal for foreign collaboration could be
evaluated by the TEC without receiving the approval from the FIPB. Even
under the tender documents the bidders were required to show that they
had applied for such approval.

B Having regard to all these, the selection is vitiated by arbitrariness
or unfairness.

Mr. Harish Salve, learned counsel, appearing for India Telecomp
attacks the selection as arbitrary on the following three grounds :

c 1. By-passing the Apex Committee and entrusting to a Committee
which did not follow the norms.

2. Certain hidden criteria which were not disclosed earlier, were
applied not as parameters, but for elimination.
D 3.' There are five glaring errors in the selection. One such is, in the
case of Sterling Cellular. It supports its bid on the strength of the foreign
exchange that may be obtained from foreign tourists. This is something
incomprehensible.

E Elaborating these points it is urged that after short-listing, in the
selection committee did not select at all. The counter affidavit filed on
behalf of the Government of India does not mention that there was a delay
by Apex Committee, as held by the High Court. On the contrary, the facts
disclose there was no delay whatever.

F Two hidden criteria were postulated. (i) Persons having less than one
Iakh experience will not be considered. (ii) If two bidders have the same
collaborator in relation to foreign exchange that bid will not be con-
sidered. These criteria were evolved after 18th August, 1992. When one
looks at the conditions of tender, paragraph 2.2.1 talks of subscriber's
G capacity. That does not mentio:i about the nature of ex'Jlerience. Equally,
paragraph 2.4.5 makes no mention about one foreign collaborator for each
bidder. In the case of Bharti Cellular it was having only eighty one thousand
lines. The criterion of 80 thousand GSM was prescribed only to favour
Bharti Cellular.

H · If no change of foreign collaborator 1s allowed at the stage of
TATA CELLULAR v. U.O. I. [MOHAN,J.) 145

financial assessment after the technical committee has passed its bid, in the A
case to permit such a change to BPL, is clearly arbitrary.

Indian Telecom was excluded because it has the same foreign col-
laborator, namely Telecom Malayasia. However, in the case of Bharti
Cellular, that test was not applied. Its collaborator is Talkland Vodaphone.
The same Vodaphone has been the collaborator with Mobile Telecom. B
This would amount to adopting double standards.

As against BPL the attack is as under :

1. BPL did not apply to SIA/FIPB but to Reserve Bank of India C
(RBI).

2. The foreign collaborator was changed in the middle, as submitted
above, inasmuch as McCaw Cellular withdrew. The joint venture is gone
when McCaw was given up.
D
3. Mr. Nair was biased in favour of BPL .
•
4: Total marks awarded are five. The idea is indigenous equipment
whereas what has been done by BPL is to quote higher custom duty.

In so far as Sterling Cellular is preferred for Delhi that again is E
arbitrary. There is a C.B.l. Inquiry pending against it. Secondly, the foreign
exchange is sought to be procured by international roaming and it is
awarded 10 marks out of 10.

Mr. Ashok Sen, learned counsel, appearing for the Indian Telecom
submits, firstly, the limits of judicial review in the matter of this kind will F
have to be examined. Such limits could be gathered from Sterling Com-
puters Limited v. M. & N. Publications Limited, (1993) ·1 Scale 36 and Union
of India v. Hindustan Development Cotporation, (1993) 3 SCC 499 which
lay down the methods reaching conclusion.

Generally speaking in entering into contracts, the public authority is G
not like a private person. The question to be asked is have the guidelines
been laid down, if so laid down, have they been observed? In this case,
Indian Telecom was originally allotted Delhi. By reason of reconsideration
pursuant to the judgment of the High Court of Delhi, it has now been
allotted Calcutta. The is wrong. H
146 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1994] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A ln clause 7 of the General Conditions it is stipulated that there can
be no change of foreign collaborator. In clause 13, a certificate requires to
be produced. In number of cases no such certificate has been produced,
Paragraph 2.4.5 of Chapter II of General Conditions lays down one of the
parameter is the experience of foreign operating partner. In. the case of
Bharti Cellular, SFR Finance Company has no experience. Talkland's sole
B function is service. Therefore, its experience should not have been added.
In paragraph 1.4 the nature of services is listed. These are not the services
offered by Talkland. Hutchison Max did not produce any certificate;
likewise Bharti Cellular.

C The argument on behalf of Ashok Leyland, petitioner in Transferred
Case No. 49 of 1993 is that it was an eligible bidder but has never
communicated the reason as to why it came to be rejected. On 29.9.92, the
Committee records that reasons must be given. Yet no reasons are fur-
nished to the petitioner. Even though the Tender Evaluation Committee
D held that petitioner to be qualified yet its bid had been reje~ted without
communicating any reason whatever. Jn Mahabir Auto Stores v. Indian Oil
Corporation, (1990] 3 SCC 752 at paragraph 18 at page 763 this Court has
held that there is an obligation to communicate the reasons.

Mr. Kaura, learned counsel appearing for the Bharti-Cellular, in
E opposing the arguments advanced on behalf of the appellants, submits that
service operation should not be read in a narrow sense. In telephone
industry there could be operation as well as service. while defining the
Service, relying on paragraph 2.1 is wrong because services are defined in
paragraph 1.4 whereas paragraph 2.1 refers only to obligations of licensee.

F · ' Besides, the services are also essential, they should be regarded as a
part of operation.

Mr. G. Ramaswami, learned counsel, appearing for skycell states that
his client has been awarded Madras City. It is submitted that in the absence
G of ma/a fides the individual marking system should not have been interfered
with as far as foreign exchange is concerned. In the case of his client
regarding the foreign exchange sourcing, inflow is more than the outflow.

Mr. Anil B. Divan Learned counsel, appearing for Mobile Telecom
Services submits that thought this respondent supports the judgment of the
H High Court, in so far as it is allowed the writ petition filed by Hutchison
TATA CELLULAR 1·. U.0.1. jMOHAN. J.] 147

Max, the Same ought to be reconsidered. The bid of Hutchison Max was A
rejected since it had filed an incomplete compliance report. The High
court has chosen to accept the bid of Hutchison Max on four grounds :

L The approach of the Department was hypertechnical.

2. Compliance statement is akin to verification in a pleading. It B
cannot be placed on a higher pedestal than verification.

3. The Department ought to have allowed rectification since it was
purely a mistake unintentionally made.

4. Inasmuch as the Department had allowed a favourable treatment
c
in the case of Indian Telecom Private Limited and Tata Cellular the same
treatment ought to have been accorded to hutchison Max as well. These
findings are attacked on the following grounds :

The tender documents both technical and commercial bid as well as D
the financial bid clearly lay down the manner of compliance. Clause as of
the technical bid states, in the even cf the compliance report not be
enclosed with the offer, the offer shall not be considered. Equally, in
relation to financial bid, Chapter I states that any offer received after the
due date and time shall be rejected. the various other clauses also postulate
a strict compliance. If, therefore, the bid is incomplete the offer ought to
E
have been rejected. Hence, there is no question of the Department of
Telecommunication condoning the defect. If the view of the High Court is
to prevail it would amount to allowing a post-tender modification on a
select basis, that is, on the basis whether the mistake was intentional or
unintentional. Where the Department has chosen to reject, the High Court F
cannot sit in judgment. To state it is like verification of pleading is to
overlook that the pleadings are governed by the Code of Civil Procedure
which permits amendments of pleadings as well as the verification. That is
not the case here. The comparison with Indian Telecom and Tata Cellular
is also incorrect. In the case of Indian Telecom there is an unconditional G
compliance. Only in the covering letter a view has been expressed about
the economic viability of the services and bidders' preference. Hence, it
cannot be contended that the bid was conditional, in any manner. Similarly,
Tata cellular was not accompanied in this regard.

The allegation against this respondent that the foreign exchange H
148 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1994) SUPP. 2 S.C.R,

A requirement has not been met is incorrect. The documents filed by the
respondent clearly show that there is a surplus of approximately three crore
rupees, available from the foreign collaborator, in the first year. The
allegation of India Telecomp that the bidder was responding on the basis
of one party per City and the proposal for licence for a period of 20 to
25 years is factually incorrect Equally, to state that this respondent quoted
B a lower customs duty and thereby got higher marks is incorrect The
financial bid of the respondent shows that this had taken customs duty at
95 per cent for the first year when the backlog of the' equipment is to be
imported. For the subsequent years, the projection was made on a reduced
customs duty in view of the announced policy of the Government to reduce
customs duty and to bring them in line with international levels.
c
The argument that there is a common collaborator of Bharti Cellular
and Mobile Telecom Services proceeds on the footing that Bharti cellular
is collaborating with Talkland. That Talkland has a service privately in
agreement with Vodaphone group. Thus Vodaphone is the common
D foreign collaborator of Bharti Cellular and Mobile Telecom. This is not
correct Mobile Telecom has its foreign partner for the purpose of setting
up a leading cellular network cooperator of U.K Namely, Vodaphone.
Vodaphone as network operator is the owner of Vodaphone Cellular
network. It is responsible for the setting up of the network in U.K where
cellular network operator can also be a service provider. Vodaphone has
E been issued a licence as a cellular network operator under Section 7 of the
U.K Telecommunications Act of 1984. It is known as a public telecom-
munication operator. Vodaphone has about 30 service providers in U.K
including Talkland. It has no equity in Talkland. There are no common
Iilirectors on the boards of two companies. Vodaphone is the foreign
F collaborator of Mobile Telecom. It has no collaboration agreement with
Bharti Cellular. In regard to Bharti cellular it has only a collaboration
agreement with Talkland which is a mere service provider.

Arguing on behalf of Sterling Cellular Mr. K Parasaran, learned
G counsel submits that the technical competency and capacity to execute the
contract by this respondent with its joint venture partner is not in doubt
Sterling Cellular was short-listed by Technical Evaluation Committee itself.
It was amongst the 12 tenders short-listed in the first list The joint venture
collaborator of Sterling, namely Cellular Communication is a reputed
international company having large scale operation in U.S.A. As regards
H the foreign exchange inflow and outflow it is submitted that Sterling
TATACELLULAR v. U.O.l.[MOHAN,J.) 149

Cellular has projected its stand that the foreign exchange inflow will be A
from foreign tourists and business travellers visiting the city of Delhi. The
expression "international roaming" has been used in relation to such foreign
tourists and business travellers. Internationally, cellular phones are used by
two categories of persons, (1) subscribers residing in the city who would
use the phone on a permanent basis, {2) the tourists and business travellers
visiting the city who would use the phone on a temporary basis. Inasmuch B
as the foreign tourists and foreign business travellers make the payment in
foreign currency it will be a source of foreign exchange. What is required
under the tender -;ondition is the projection of foreign exchange inflow and
outflow relating to the cellular phone contract. This means inflow in foreign
exchange as a result of the operation of cellular phone system. Hence, the C
earning from tourists and business travellers is a very relevant considera-
tion. Like this respondent, Hutchison Max selected for the Bombay City
al.so projected for the foreign exchange opening by the us~ of cellular
phone by tourists and business travellers. The argument that the foreign
tourists and business travellers are not likely to use cellular telephone is
not correct since the calls made through the cellular telephones are not D
only cheaper but also available as a 24 hours companion. That, of course,
is a greater facility. In the note made by the Minister it has been mentioned
that the respondent has undertaken to be bound by conditions contained
in the tender documents to the effect that the entire foreign exchange
requirement shall be met by the foreign collaborator. In fact, the foreign
collaborator has also confirmed this. E

As regards the allegation of CBI inquire, it is submitted that the
learned Judges of the High Court perused the note of the Chairman
Telecom Commission. It was only after this the Court held that there were
no strictures against holding company of S.C.L by the name Sterling F
Computers Limited, in M&N Publicatio11 Limited v. M. T.N.L., Giid others
{1992) 4 D.L.T. 24. It was further held that it appears to have been
punished for no sin of it. There was no CBI inquiry on the date of the
above judgment. It was after the judgment dated 10th July, 1993, the FIR
was filed which has been allowed to be proceeded with by way of directions
in petition under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code. This Court G
in Erusian Equipment & Chemicals Ltd. v. State of West Bengal & Anr.,
[1975] 2 SCR 674 has laid down that pending investigation black listing
cannot be permitted. The. said ratio will apply to this case.

Mr. K.K. Venugopal, learned counsel appearing for Hutchison Max H
150 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A submits that this responde~t was rejected by the committee. That was
questioned in the Writ Petition. The High Court directed reconsideration
of its bid. With regard to compliance statement it was stated that the
company agrees to fully comply with all paragraphs of Chapter II of the
General· Conditions and Chapter V; Tariffs of Document No.44-21/91-
MMC(FIN) without any deviation and reservation. No doubt, there is a
B failure, in the first instance, to state about compliance with Chapters II and
IV. This is an accidental omission. It amounts to a clerical error as laid
down in Moffet Hodgkins v. City of Rochester, (178 U.S. 1108). If it is a
mistake in relation to non-essential or collateral matter it could always be
condoned. The Privy Council in Mohammad Ejaz Hussain v. Mohammad
C Iftikhar Husain, AIR (1932) PC 78 has held that it is always a matter of
form and not of substance. Other argument is advanced that there is a
defect in the compliance statement.

The alternate submission is, the question of error does not arise since
the compliance statement was filed on 11.9.92 while the contract came to
D be awarded only on 12.10.92. In such a case the question would be what is
the scope of judicial review? The Court could interfere in the following
three categories of cases :

1. Quasi-judicial

E 2. Administrative, for example, price fixing

3. Award of contracts

Here, the matter is technical in relation to award of contract. Judicial
review does not mean the court should take over the contracting powers.
F
The parameters for interference in such matter would be :

(i) Mala fide

G (ii) Bias

(iii) ".'-rbitrariness to the extent of perversity.

If none of these is present, the court should not interfere. It must be
left to the authorities. The contrary arguments advanced on behalf of the
H appellants against this respondent are not tenable.
TATACELLULAR v. U.0.1.[MOHAN,J.] 151

Mr. F.S. Nariman, learned counsel appearing for BPL in the · A
foremost argues by way of preliminary submissions that three questions will
arise at the threshold.

(a) The scope and ambit of judicial review with regard to decisions
bona fide arrived at in tender cases (pre contract). B

(b) The applicability of judicial review in these cases.

(c) The interference under Article 136 of the Constitution where the
power of judicial review has been exercised by the High Court under
Article 226. c
It is submitted that the reasonableness in administrative law means
to distinguish between proper use or improper use of power. The test is
not the court's own standard of reasonableness. This Court has reiterated
this proposition in A.B. Mahajan v. Jalgaon Municipal Council, [1991] 3 D
SCC 91 (in paragraphs 43-46). There is a possibility of fallibility inherent
in all factp findings. To insist upon a strict. complianci;; with each and every
tender document is not the law. This Court upheld that waiver of technical,
literal compliance of the tender conditions in Poddar Steel Corporation v.
Ganesh Engineering Works, (1991] 3 SCC 273. In the present case, the short- E
listing, at the first stage, the allotment of cities at the second stage and the
selection of franchisees qua cities at the third stage were after evaluating
the financial bid by a collectivity of persons at different level. Therefore,
possibility of elimination of arbitrariness is conceived in the system itself.
Further, the High Court has analysed properly and come to the proper
F
conclusion. That being so, this Court \vill not interfere by exercising its
powers under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. The argument about
hidden criteria would not affect or benefit this respondent directly or
indirectly. Even otherwise, the hidden criteria cannot be impugned. There
is no mention of any particular criterion on the basis of which the selection
was to be made. At the second stage what was required to be kept in mind G
were the parameters mentioned in paragraph 2.4 ..The criteria for selection
to each of the four cities had to be provided inter alia because the tenderers
did not tender for one city alone but for more than one. The.allegation of
bias on the part of Mr. Nair is without substance. It is submitted, Whenever
disqualification on the ground of personal involvement is alleged: H
152 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A (i) the person involved (for example related) must be the decision-
maker;

(ii) there must be sufficient nexus between the decision-maker and
the party complaining in order to justify the real likelihood of bias.

B After a d_ecision is reached the standard of proof of bias is higher as
laid down in Vassiliades v. VasEiliades and another, AIR (1945) PC 38. This
decision has been referred to by this Court in Rajit 17iakur v. Union of
India, [1987] 4 SCC 611. The learned counsel after referring to the relevant
case law submits that cases of. bias and ostensible bias had to be regarded
in the light of their own circumstances. In this case Mr. Subhash Nair is
c only one of the officers in B.P.L., which has over 5500 employees and 89
officers of his rank in 27 offices all over India. Mr. Nair was not the
decision-maker at all. He was one of the recommending authorities. His
involvement in the approval and selection of the tender was indispensable.
He was originally the Member (Services) on 29.5.92. Thereafter he became
D Director General, Telecommunications by a Notification issued on 28.7.92
by the President of India. As such, he was to exercise all powers of
Telegraph Authority under General 3(6) of the Act. Therefore, the High
Court was right in applying the doctrine of necessity. This doctrine has
come up for discussion in Charan Lal Sahu v. Union of India, [1990] 1 SCC
613.
E
Whatever it may be, Indian Telecom cannot take the point of bias.
It took the chance and benefit of being short-listed despite the knowledge
of Mr. Nair's involvement. Equally, Tata Cellular did not raise the allega-
tion of bias in the High Court. In fact, it opposed the plea of bias.

F No doubt, this respondent dropped Mccaw as a foreign collaborator.
That does not amount to change where one out of two or three col-
laborators is dropped. This foreign collaborator was required as Condition
No. 7 only in financial bid documents not in tender documents. This
respondent submitted financial bid on 17.8.92 showing only two of the
G collaborators. Mccaw was not shown as that was already dropped out.
Therefore, the High Court rightly held that Mccaw was not taken into
consideration in awarding marks for foreign partners' experience. The
object of the first stage was not to allot the franchise but to short-list the
parties.

H The learned Solicitor General produced the copies of the relevant
TATA CELLULAR v. U.0.1.(MOHAN,J.) 153

documents in the file and took us though the same. It is submitted, after A
outlining the process of evaluation in the second stage six parameters were
adopted by the Committee consisting of Telecom experts who are none
other than the senior officers of the Department of Telecommunications.
The parameters are as follows :

1. Quoted rental ceiling B

2. Prnject financing plan

3. Foreign Exchange inflow and outflow

4. Project's plan for cellular equipment within the country including C
the tie-up with the proposed Indian manufacturers.

5. Experience of foreign operating partner and

6. Financial strength of parameters/partner companies.
D
These parameters were assigned marks. The evaluation report in-
cluding the ranking arrived at by the tender evaluation committee was then
put up to the Telecom Commission for further consideration and selection.
Due to technical considerations not more than two bidders per city could
be accommodated. Paragraph 14 of the bid conditions provided that each E
bidder must further a declaration in a specified form to the bid documents.
The declaration given by Hutchison Max was complete. However, its bid
had to be rejected on merits in spite of securing high marks.

Mis. India Telecomp secured the second place for Calcutta. In
asmuch as they had the same foreign partner as Usha Martin which F
secured a higher place than India Telecomp, it was rejected and the choice
went to the next bidder in the marking list. After the above considerations
were taken into account, the remaining companies were selected which led
to the writ petition. Pursuant to the High Court direction& the matter was
reconsidered and selections have been made as was done earlier.
G
The principal objection of the Union of India is that the High Court
was not justified in scrutinising the tendering process in such detail. The
minute examination is unwarranted because the· High Court cannot con-
stitute itself the selecting authority. However, no appeal is preferred, as
otherwise, it would have further delayed the introduction of very valuable H
154 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A communication facility in this country. Beyond that, it has no particular
interest as to who is selected. However, it becomes necessary to answer the
allegations made about the actual selection and whether there was any bias
on the part of the selection committee. The selection process was dictated
by the exigencies of the situation.

B
It is a question, as to what one could settle for, in the given circumstances.
The Government was embarking upon a totally new technology project, for
the first time. At that stage, it was impossible to predict what kind of
response will there be. Therefore, it is impossible to predicate the cut-off
limits which could be set or which conditions have to be relaxed or
c softened. The allegation of bias, it is held, must be a case of reasonable
possibility or likelihood of bias. In this case, there is no such reasonable
likelihood. Mr. B.R. Nair was not influenced directly, or, in any other
manner, subtle or otherwise. He did not, in fact, participate in any of the
significant or crucial stages in the selection process. Even otherwise, the
D relationship is not such as to give a reasonable apprehension of bias. In
support of this argument reliance is placed on Manak Lal (Supra) and
Ashok Kukar Yadav v. State of Haryana, (1Q85] 4' SCC 417 al 441, (para-
graph 16). As regards the paraliieter·i~-~~lation to project financing it was
kept in view by taking into account the estimated number of subscribers,
installation charges, monthly rental, any other charges etc. They were
E included in the competition. The other parameters of the bidders were
treated on the same footing as regards this parameter is concerned. Con·
cerning rental, it was specifically averred in the counter before the High
Court that the other charges had also been included calculating quoted
rental.
F
It is not correct to contend that Talkland's experience is not relevant.
In the United Kingdom the operation of Mobile Cellular System is handled
by the network corporator and a proper service provider, acting together.
The licensee is required to perform the combined functions of a network
G operator as well as service provider. The duties and functions of a licensee
are not limited to making available to services as defined. In fact, the
principal obligation of the licensee is expressed generally in paragraph
2.1.1. A reading of the other clauses makes it clear that it is incumbent
upon the licensee to provide service. Therefore, the experiences of a
H network operator and the service provider are both important and relevant.
TATACELLULAR v. U.0.1.[MOHAN,J.] 155

In the case of Bharti Cellular the attack is that the cut-off came to A
be reduced to 80, 000 subscribers to accommodate it. Bharti Cellular
mentioned in its tender, as on 31.12.91 The name of S.F.R. France which
had 80,000 subscribers. By 31.12.91, it would have got increased to more
than one lakh. In August 1992, when the bids were submitted S.F.R.'s line
of experience could reasonably be expected to be more than one lakh. B
S.F.R. France had a G.S.M. Licence. Having regard to these facts, it would
not be an unreasonable estimate, for the experts, to conclude that Bharti
Cellular was having experience of over one lakh lines.

It is alleged that the debt/equity ratio of Skycell has not been proper·
ly taken. Skycell ratio was 1.5 and was correctly assigned 3 marks. C
Tata Cellular alleges that Bharti Cellular, Mobile Telecom, Sterling
and Skycell have breached note (ii) under Para 2.4. which provides that
minimum reliance on Indian Public Financial Institutions will be preferred.
The bid proforma made distinction between loans from Public Financial
Institutions and Banks. The criticism of Tata confuses this requirement D
with loan from Banks. the criterion, it is submitted, was correctly applied.

In the evaluation of process open market purchase was left out of
consideration.
E
Since Skycell bid for Madras Showed that they had projected their
operations in Madras for initial years, would be below profitable levels. In
such a case, no dividend would have to be paid to the foreign collaborators.
Accordingly, it was concluded that the foreign exchange inflow position
was better.
F
International roaming is a relevant consideration. From the tender
document it will be clear that it provides for facility of roaming to visitors.
Roaming facility for a tourist is available in the G.S.M. system. Even if this
conditions had been relaxed in favour of certain bidders, there is nothing
wrong. Reliance is placed on G.J. Fernandez v. State of Karnataka, [1992] G
2 sec 488, paragraph 18.

With regard to the foreign collaborator of B.P.L. there was no
change. French Telecom is one of the foremost in the world in this
technology. It remained as foreign collaborator of B.P.L. Dropping out of
McCaw did not violate the bid conditions which were really aimed at H
156 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1994] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A preventing a new and, therefore, unknown collaborator being introduced
at the financial bid stage. The second Technical. Evaluation Committee did
not see this as a violation, In any event, where the judgment of the High
Court had been given effect to and a proper evaluation has been done. no
interference is warranted.

B Mr. Soli J. Sorabjee, learned counsel, in his reply, would submit that
as regards the scope of judicial review the American cases cited by Mr.
K.K.Venugopal would not apply. As laid down in State of U.P., v.Maharaja
Dharamander Prasad Singh, [1989) 1 SCR 176 at 202 judicial review is
confined to decision- making process. This being an administrative action
c the scope of judicial review could be gathered from Council of Civil Service
Union v. Minister for the Civil Service, (1985) 1 Appeal Cases 374. In
Secretary of State for Education and Science v. Tameside Metropolitan
Borough Council, (1977) Appeal Cases 1014 the law has been stated as to
when subjective satisfaction could be interfered with under judicial review.
This Court also had occasion to deal with similar contracts and stated the
D law relating to judicial review in Sterling Computers Limited v. Mis M & N
Publications Limited, (1993] 1 SCC 445 at 455 and 458, paragraph 19. Then
again, in Union of India v. Hindustan Development Corporation, [1993) 3
sec 499.
E The point against Hutchison Max is, the defect in its tender, came
to be pointed out, requiring it to comply with the same. In view of the
defect Hutchison Max came to be excluded.

Mr. Nair's participation from the beginning would constitute bias in
law.
F
Mr. Ashok Sen, in his reply would stated that in the case of
Hutchison Max the mistake was committed in the offer with regard to
compliance statement. The principle of bias, as laid down in The King v.
Essex Justices (Sizer and others) Ex parte Perkins, (1927] 2 K.B. 475, would
G apply. Similar passage occurs in be Smith's Constitutional and Administra-
tive Law (Fourth Edition) page 268.

Mr. Barish Salve, in reply, would urge that the hidden criteria were
evolved in relation to common foreign collaborator. This shows that there
was lack of candour on the part of the Union. It is mentioned that Talkland
H and take into consideration. It is not so, as seen from the file. The
TATA CELLULAR v. U.0.1. [MOHAN,J.) 157

conditions were tailor-made to suit Bharti Cellular and BPL. A
Mr. K.K. Venugopal would urge that the rule relating to judicial
review would not be applied here because it is one of selection by an
administrative process.

Having regard to the above arguments we proposed to deal with the B
matter from the following five aspects:

1. The scope of judicial review in matters of this Kind.

2. Whether the selection is vitiated by arbitrariness? :- (a) regarding
.financial projection and (b) regarding rental. C

3. Bias of Mr. Nair - whether affected the selection?

4. Whether the Apex Commitiee has been bypassed? 5. Evolving of
hidden criteria - whether valid?
D
point I - Scope of Judicial Review :

A tender is an offer. It is something which invites and is communi-.
cated to notify acceptance. Broadly stated, the following are the requisites
of a valid tender :
E
1. It must be unconditional

2. Must be made at 'the proper place

3. Must conform to the terms of obligation
F
4. Must be made at the proper time

5. Must be made in the proper form

6. The person by whom the tender is made must be able and willing
to perform his obligations. G
7. There must be reasonable opportunity for inspection

8. Tender must be made to the proper person

9. It. must be of full amount. H
158 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A It cannot be r!enied that the principles of judicial revic'w would apply
to the exercise of contractual powers by Government bodies in order to
prevent arbitrariness or favouritism. However, it must be clearly stated that
there are inherent limitations in exercise of. that power of judicial review.
Govemment is the guardian of tlv finances of the State. It is expected to
protect the financial interest of the State. The right to refuse the lowest or
1
B
any other tender is always available to the government. But, the principles j
laid down in Article 14 of the Constitution have to be kept in view while
accepting or refusing a tender. There can be no question of infrigement of
Article 14 if the Government tries to get the best person or the best
quotation. The right to choose cannot be considered to be an arbitrary
c power. Of course, if the said power is exercised for any collateral purpose
the exercise of that power will be struck down.

Judicial quest in administrative matters has been to find that right
balance between the administrative discretion to decide matters whether
contractual or political in nature or issues of social policy; thus they are.
D not essentially justiciable and the need to remedy any unfairness. Such an
unfairness is set right by judicial review.

Lord Scarman in Nottinghamshire county Council v. Secretary of State
for the Environment, [1986] AC 240 at 251 proclaimed :
E
. '"Judicial review' is a great weapon in the hands of the judges;
but the judges must observe the constitutional limits set by our
parliamentary system upon the exercise .of this beneficent power."

Commenting upon this Michael Supperstone and James Goudie in
F their work on "Judicial Review" (1992 Edition) at page 16 say: ·

"If anyone were prompted to dismiss this sage warning as a mere
obiter dictum from the most radical member of the higher judiciary
of recent times, and therefore to be treated as an idiosyncratic
aberration, it he .as received the endorsement of the Jaw Lords
G generally. The words of Lord Scarman were echoed by Lord
Bridge of Harwich; speaking on behalf of the Board when reversing
an interventionist decision of the New Zealand Court of Appeal
in Butcher v. Petrocoip, exploration Ltd. 18 March 1991."

H Observance of judicial restraint is currently the mood in England.
TATA CELLULAR v. U.O. l. [MOHAN.].] 159

The judicial power of revie\V is exercised to rein in any unbridled executive A
functioning. The restraint has tv.·o contemporary manifestations. One is the
ambit of judicial intervention; the order covers the scope of the court's
ability to quash an administrative decision on its merits. These restrains
bear the hallmarks of judicial control over administrative action.

Judicial review is concerned with reviewing not the merits of the B
decision in support of which the application for judicial review is made,
but the decision-making process itself.

In Chief Constable of the North Wales Police v. Evans, (1992] 3 All
ER 141 at 154 Lord Brightman said:
c
"Judicial review, as the words imply, is nuL an appeal from a
decision, but a review of the manner in which the decision was
made.

Judicial Review is concerned, not with the decision, with the D
decision-making process. Unless that restriction on the power of
the court is observed, the court will, in may view, under the guise
of preventing the abuse of power, be itself guilty of usurping power.

In the same case Lord Hailsham commented on the purpose of
the remedy by way of judicial review under RSC Ord 53 in the E
following terms;

This remdey, vastly increased in the extent, and rendered, over
a long period in recent years, of infinitely more convenien't access
than that provided by the old prerogative writs and actions for a
declaration, is intended to protect the individual against the abuse F
of power by a wide range of authorities, judicial quasi-judicial, and,
as would originally have bee!' though when I first practised at the
Bar, administrative. It is not intended to take away from those
authorities the powers and discretions properly vested in them by
' law and to substitute the courts as the bodies making the decisions.
It is intended to see that the relevant authorities are their powers
G

in a proper manner. (p. 1160)

R v. Panel take-overs and Mergers, exp Datafin pie, Sir John
Donaldson MR commented : 'an application for judicial review is
not an appeal'. In lonrlw pie v. Secretary of State for Trade and H
160 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1994J SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A Industry, Lord Keith said; 'Judicial review is a protection and not
a weapon. It is thus different from an appeal. When hearing an
'appeal the Court is concerned with the merits of the decision under
appeal. In Re Amin, Lord Fraser observed that :

'Judicial review is concerned not with the meriits of a decision
B but with the manner in which the decision was made ..... Judicial
review is entirely different from an ordinary appeal. It is made
effective by the court quashing an administrative decision without
substituting its own decision, and is to be contrasted with an appeal
where the appellate tribunal substitutes is own decision on the
c merits for that of the administrative officer.'

In R v. Penal on Take overs and Mergers, exp Gunness pie, (1990j
1 QB, 146 Lord Donaldson MR. referred to the Judicial review jurisdiction
as being supervisory or 'longstop' jurisdiction. Unless tha.t restriction on
the power of the courts is observed, the court· will, under the guise of
D preventing the abuse of power, be itself guilty of usurping power.

The duty of the court i~ to confine itself to the question of legality.
Its concern should be :

1. Whether a decision-making authority exceeded its powers?
E
2. committed an error of law

3. committed a breach of the rules of natural justice

4. reached a decision which no reasonable tribunal would have
F reached or

5. abused its powers.

Therefore, it is not for the court to determine whether a particular '
G policy or particular decision taken in the fulfillment of that policy is fair.
It is only concerned with the manner in which those decisions have been
taken. The extent of the duty to act fairly will vary from case to case. shortly
put, the grounds upon which an administrative action is subject to control
by 'judicial review can be classified as under :

H (i) Illegality: This means the decision-maker must understand car-
TATA CELLULAR 1·. U.0.1.[MOHAN,J.] 161

rectly the law that regulates his decision-making power and must give effect A
to it.

(ii) Irrationality, namely, Wednesbury unreasonableness.

(iii) Procedural impropriety.
B
The il'bove are only the broad grounds but it does not rule out
additional of further grounds in courts of time. As a matter of fact, in R v.
SecretOI)' of Srate for tile Home Departmem ex parte Bri11d, (1991) 1 AC 696
Lord Diplock refers specifically to one development, namely, the possible
recognition of the principle of proportional,ity. In all these cases the test to
be adopted is that the court should, "consider whether something has gone c
\VTOng of nature and degree which requires its intervention".

What is this charming principle of Wednesbury unreasonableness? Is
it is a magical formula? In R v. Askew, (1768] 4 2168, Lord Mansfield
considered the question whether 111a11da11111s should be granted against the D
College of Physicians. He expressed the relevant principles in two eloquent
sentences. They gained greater value two centuries later :

"It is true, that the judgment and discretion of determining upon
this skill, ability, learning and sufficiency to exercise and practise
this profession is trusted to the College of Physician: and this Court E
will not take it from them, nor interrupt them in the due and proper
exercise of it. But their conduct in the exercise of this trust thus
committed to them ought to be fair, can did and unprejudiced; not
arbitrary, capiricious, or biassed; much less, warped by resentment,
or personal dislike. 11
F
To quote again, Michael Supperstone and James Goudie; in their
work 'judicial Review (1992 Edition) it is observed at pages 119 to 121 as
under:

"The assertion of a claim to examine the reasonableness been done
by a public authority inevitably led to differences of judicial opinion G
as to the circumstances in which the court should intervene. These
difference of opinion were resolved in two landmark cases which
confined the circumstances for intervention to narrO\V limits. In
K!Use v. loh11so11 a specially constituted divisional court had to
consider the validity of a byelaw made by a local authority. In the H
'162 SUPRH!E COURT REPORTS 11994] SUPP, 2 S,C,R,

A leading judgment of Lord Russell of Killowen CJ the approach to
be adopted by the court was set out Such byelaws ought to be
'benevolently' interpreted, and credit ought to be given to those
who ha''< to administer them that they would be reasonably ad-
ministered, they could be held in\'alid if unreasonable: where for
instance bvelaws were found to be partial and unequal in their
B operation as between different classes, if they were manifestly
unjust, if they disclosed bad faith, or if they inrnh'ed such oppres-
sive or gratuitous interference \Vith the rights of citizens as could
find no justification in the minds of reasonable men, Lord Russell
emphasised that a byelaws is not unreasonable just because par-
c ticular judges might think it went further than was prudent or
necessary or convenient.

In 1947 the Court of Appeal confirmed a similar approach for
the review of executive discretion generally in Associated Provincial
Picture Houses Ltd v, Wednesbwy Corpn, This case wa:; concerned
D 'with a complaint by the owners of a cinema in Wednesbury, that it
was unreasonable of the local authority to licence performances
on Sunday only subject to a condition that 'no children under the
age of 15 years shall be admitted to any entertainment whether
accompanied by an adult or not', In an extempore judgment, Lord
E 'Greene M,R, drew attention to the fact that the word
'unreasonable' had often been used in a sense which com-
prehended d.ifferent grounds of review, (At page 229, where it was
said that the dismissal of a teacher for' having red hair (cited by
Wanington LJ in Short v, Poole Corpn,, (1926] Ch 66, 91 as an
example of a 'frivolous and foolish reason') was, in another 'ense,
F
taking into consideration extraneous matters, and might be so
unreasonable that it could almost be described a being done in
.bad faith; see also R v, Tower Hamlets London Borough council,
exp Chetllik Developments Ltd,, (1988] AC 858 at page 873,Chapter
4, p 73, supra, He summarised the principles as follows :
G
"The Court is entitled to investigate the action of the local
authority with a view to seeing whether or not they have taken into
account matter which they ought not to have taken into account,
or, conversely, have refused to take into account 01 neglected to
H take into account matter which they ought to take into account
TATA CELLULAR "· U.0.1. [~!0llAN. J.] 163
'
()nee that question is ans\vcre<l in fa\'OUr of the local authority, it A
may still be possible to say that, although the local authority had
kept \vithin the four corners of the matters \vhich they ought to
consider, they have nc\'crthelcss come .to a conclusion so un-
reasonable that no reasonable authority could ever ha,·e come to
it. In such a case~ again, I think the court can interfere. The po\ver
B
of the court to interfere of the court to interfere in each case is
not as an appellate authority to override a decision of the local
allthority, but as a judicial authority which is concerned, as con-
c~rned only, to see whether the local authority has contravened
the law by acting in excess of the power which Parliament has
confided in them." , c
This summary by Lord Greene has been applied in countless
subsequent cases.

The modern statement of the principle is found in a passage
in the speech of lord Diplock in Council of Civil Se1Vice Unions v. D
Minister for the Civil Sen. ice:
1

"By "irrationality" I mean that can now be succinctly referred
to as "Wednesbury unreasonableness" Associated Provincial Picture
Houses v. Wednesbwy Corpn., [1948) 1 KB 233. It applies to a E
decision which is so outrageous in its defiance of logic or of
accepted moral standards that no sensible person who had applied
his mind to the question to be decided could have arrived at."

At this stage, The Supreme Court Practice 1993 Volume 1 Pages
849-850, may be quoted : F

"4. Wednesbury principle - A decision of a Public authority will be
liable to be quashed or otherwise dealt with by an appropriate
order in judicial review proceedings where the Court concludes
that the decision is such that no authority properly directing itself G
on the relevant law and acting reasonably could have reached it
(Associated Provincial Picture Houses Limited v. Wednesbury Cor-
poration, [1948) 1 K.B. 223; [1947) 2 All E.R. 680, per Lord Green
M.R.)

Two other facts of irrationality may be 1nentioned. H
164 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994LSUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A (1) It is open to the court to review the decision-maker's evaluation
of the facts. The court will intervene where the facts taken as a whole could
not logically warrant the conclusion of the decision-maker. If the weight of
facts pointing to one course of action is overwhelming, then a decision the
other way, cannot be upheld. Thus, in Emma Hotels Ltd. v. Secreta1y of the
State of Environment, [1980[ 41 P & CR 255, the Secretary of State referred
B to a number of factors which led him to the conclusibn that a non-resident's
bar in a hotel was operated in such a way that the bar was not in incident
of the hotel use for planning purposes, but constituted a separate use. The
Divisional Court analysed the factors which led the Secretary of State to
that conclusion and, having done so, set it aside. Donaldson LJ said that
C he could not see on what basis the Secretary of State had reached his
conclusion.

(2) A decision would be regarded as unreasonable if it is impartial
and unequal in its operation as between different classes. On this basis in
R v. Barnet London Borough Council, exp Johnson, [1989[ 88 LGR 73 the
D condition imposed by a local authority prohibiting participation by those
affiliated with political parties at events to be hekl in the authority's parks
was struck down.

Bernard Schwartz in Administrative Law Second Edition page 584
E has this to say :

nlf the scope of review is too broad, agencies are turned into
little more than media for the transmission of cases to the courts.
That would destroy the values of agencies created lo secure the
benefit of special knowledge acquired through continuous ad-
F ministration in complicated fields. At the same time, the scope of
judicial inquiry must not be so restricted that it prevents full inquiry
into the question of legality. If that question cannot be properly
explored by the judge, the right to review becomes meaningless.
·"It makes judicial review of administrative orders a hopeless for-
mality for the litigant. .... .It reduces the judicial process in such
G cases to a mere feint."

Two overriding considerations have combined to narrow the
scope of review. The first is that of deference to the administrative
expert. In Chief Justice Neely's words, "I have very few illusions
H about my own limitations as a judge and from those limitations I
'
I
TATA CELLULAR v. U.O. I. (MOHAN,J.] 165

-
generalize to the inherent limitations of all appellate courts review- A
ing rate cases. It must be remembered that this Court sees ap-
proximately 1, 262 cases a year with five judges. I am not an
accountant,electrical engineer, financier, banker, stock broker, or
systems management analyst. It is the height of folly to expect
judges intelligently to review a 5,000 page record addressing the B
intricacies of public utility operation." It is not the function of a
judge to act as a super board, or with the zeal of a pedantic
schoolmaster substituting its judgment for that of the ad-
ministrator.

The result is a theory of review that limits the extent to which the C
discretion of the expert may be scrutinized by the nonexpe(! judge.
The alternative is for the court to overrule the agency on technical
matters where all the advantages of expertise lie with the agencies.
If a Court were to review fully the decision of a body such a state
board of medical examiners "it would find itself wandering amid
the mazes of therapeutics of boggling at the mysteries of the D
pharmacopoeia." Such a situation as a state court expressed it many
years ago "is not a case of the blind leading the blind but of one
who has always been deaf and blind insisting that he can see and
hear better than one who has always had his eyesight and hearing
and has always used them to. the utmost advantage in ascertaining E
the truth in regard to the matter in question."

The second consideration leading to narrow review that of calen-
dar pressure. In practical terms it may be the more important
consideration. More than any theory of limited review it is the
pressure of the judicial calendar combined with the elephantine F
bulk of the record in so many review proceedings which leads to
perfunctory affirmance of the vest majority of agency decision."

A modern comprehensive statement about judicial review by Lord
Denning is very apposite; it is perhaps worthwhile noting that he stresses G
the supervisory nature of the jurisdiction :

"Parliament often entrusts the decision of a matter to a specified
person or body, without providing for any appeal. It may be a judicial
decision, or a quasi-judicial decision, or an administrative decision. Some-
times Parliament says it decision is to be final. At other times it says nothing H
166 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1994] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A about it. In all these cases the courts will not themselves take the place of
the body to whom Parliament has entrusted t.he decision. The courts will
not themselves embark on a rehearing of the matter: See Healey v. Minister
of Health, (1955] 1 QB 221. But nevertheless, the courts will, if called upon
act in a supervisory capacity. They will see that the decision-making body
acts fairly: see in re H.K. (an Infant), [1967] 2 QB 617, at 630 and Reg. v.
B Gaming Board for Great Britain; Ex parte Benaim and Khaida, (1970] 2 QB
417. The courts will ensure that the body acts in accordance with the law.
If a question arises on the interpretation of words, the courts will decide
it by declaring what is the correct interpretation: see Punton v. Minister of
Pensions and National Insurance, [1963] 1 W.L.R. 186. And if the decision-
c making body has gone wrong in its interpretation they can set its order
aside: see Aslibridge Investments Ltd. v. Minister of House and Local
Govemment, [1965] 1 W.L.R. 1320. (I know of some expressions to the
contrary but they are not correct. If the decision-making body is influenced
by considerations which ought not to influence it; or fails to take into
D account matters which it ought to take into account, the court will interfere:
See Padfield v. Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, [1968] A.C. 997.
If the decision-making body comes to its decision on no evidence or comes
to an unreasonable finding - so unreasonable that a reasonable person
would not have come to it - then again the courts will interfere: see
Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corporation, [1948]
E 1 KB. 223. If the decision-making body goes outside its powers or mis-
contrues the extent of its powers, then, too the courts can interfere: see
Anisminic Ltd. v. Foreign Compensation Commission, [1969] 2 A.C. 147.
And, of course, if the body acts in bad faith or for an ulterior object, which
is not authorised by law, its decision object, which is not authorised by law,
its decision will be set aside: see Sydeney Municipal Council v. Campbell,
F
[1925] A.C. 228. In exercising these powers, the courts will take into
account any reason which the body may given for its decisions. If it gives
no reasons - in a case when it may reasonably be expected to do so, the
courts may infer that it has no good reason for reaching its conclusion, and
act according: see Padjield's case (A.C. 997, 1007 @ 1061)."
G
We may usefully refer to Administrative Law Rethinking Judicial
Control of Bureaucracy by Christopher F. Edley, JR (1990) Edn.) At page
96 it is stated thus :

H A great deal of administrative law boils down to the scope of
TATACELLULAR v. U.0.1.(MOHAN,J.) 167

review problem; defining what degree of deference a court will A
accord an agency's findings, conclusions, and choices, including
choice of procedures. It is misleading to speak of a "doctrine", or
"the law", of scope of review. It is instead just a big problem, that
is addressed piecemeal by a large collection of doctrines. Kenneth
Culp Davis has offered a condensed summary of the subject :
B
"Courts usually substitute (their own) judgment on the kind of
questions of law that are within their special competence, but on
other question they limit themselves to deciding reasonableness;
they do not clarify the meaning of reasonableness but retain full
discretion in each case to stretch it in either direction."
c
In U11iversa/ Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 US 474 at 488-89, Justice
Frankfurter stated :

"A formula for judicial review of administrative action may afford
grounds for certitude but cannot assure certainty of application.
Some scope for judicial discretion in applying the formula can be D
avoided only by falsifying the actual process of judging or by using
the formula as an instrument of futile casuistry. It cannot be too
often repeated that judges are not automata. The ultimate reliance
for the fair operation of any standard is a judiciary of high com-
petence and character and the constant play of an informed E
professional acritique upon its work. Since the precise way in which
courts interfere with agency findings cannot be imprisoned within
any form of words, new formulas attempting to rephrase the old
are not likely to be more helpful than the old. there are no
talismanic words that can avoid the process of judgment. The
difficulty is that we cannot escape, in relation to this problem the F
use of underfined defining terms."

An innovative approach is made by Clive Lewis as to why the courts
should be slow in quashing administrative (in his Judicial· Remedies in
Public Law 1992 Edition at pages 294-95). The illuminating passage reads G
as under:

"The courts now recognise that the impact on the administra-
tion is relevant in the exercise of their remedial jurisdiction. Quash-
ing decisions may impose heavy administrative burdens on the
administration, divert resources towards re- opening decisions, and H
168 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A lead to increased ad unbudgeted expenditure. Earlier cases took
the robust line that the law had to be observed, and the decision
invalidated whatever the administrative inconvenience caused. The
courts nowadays recognise that such an approach is not always
appropriate and may not be in the wider public interest. The effect
on the administrative process is relevant to the court' remedial
B
discretion and any prove decisive. This is particularly the case when
the challenge is procedural rather then substantive, or if the courts
can be certain that the administrator would not reach a different
decision even if the original decision were quashed. Judges may
differ in the importance they attach to the disruption that quashing
c a decision will cause. They may also be influenced by the extent
to which the illegality arises from the conduct of the administrative
body itself, and their view of that conduct.

The current approach is best exemplified by R. v. Monopolies
011d Mergers Commission, et p. Argyll Group, [1986] 1 W.L.R. 763."
D
Sir John Donaldson M.R. in R. v. Monopolies Commission, Ex p.
Argyll Pie., (C.A.) [1986] 1 WLR 736 at 774, observed thus :

"We are sitting as a public law court concerned to review an
administrative decision, albeit one which has to be reached by the
E
application of judicial or quasi-judicial principles. We have to
approach our duties with a proper awareness of the need:; of public
administration. I cannot catalogue then-all, but, in the present
context, would draw attention to a few which are relevant.

F Good public administration is concerned with substance rather
than form .

......... Good public administration is concerned with speed of
decision, particular in the final field.
G .......... Good public administration requires a proper con-
sideration of the public interest. In this context, the Secretary of
State is the guardian of the public interest.

.......... Good public administration requires a proper considera-
H tion of the legitimate interests of individual citizens, however rich
TATA CELLULAR v. U.0.1. [MOHAN, J.) 169

and powerful they may be and whether they are natural or judicial A
persons. But in judging the relevance of an interest, however
legimiate, regard has to be had to the purpose of the administrative
process concerned .

........ Lastly, good public administration requires decisiveness
and finality, unless there dare compelling reasons to the contrary." B

We may 11ow look at some of the pronouncements of this Court
including the authorities cited by Mr. Ashok Sen.

Fasih Chaudhary v. Director General, Doordarshan, [1989] 1 SCC 89 C
was a case in which the Court was concerned with the award of a contract
for show of sponsored TV serial. At page 92 in paragraphs 5 and 6 it was
held thus:

"It is well settled that there should be fair play in action in a
situation like the present one, as was observed by this Court in D
Ram & Shyam Co. v. State of Haryana, [19S5] 3 SCC 267, 268-69.
It is also well settled that the authorities like the Doordarshan
should act fairly and their action should be legitimate and fair and
transaction should be without any aversion, malice or affection.
Nothing should be done which gives the impression of favouritism E
or nepotism. See the observations of this Court inHaji T.M. Hassan
Rawther v. Kera/a Financial Corpn., [1988] l SCC 166, 173 para 14.

While, as mentioned hereinbefore, fairplay in action in matters
like the present one is an essential requirement, similarly, however,
'free play in the joints', is also .a necessary concomitant for an F
administrative body functioning in an administrative sphere or
quasi-administrative sphere as the present one. Judged from that
standpoint of view, though all the proposals might not have been
considered strictly in accordance with order of preceqence, it
appears that these were considered fairly, reasonably, objectively G
and without any malice or ill-will." ·

In G.B. Mahajan v. Jalgaon Municipal Council, [1991] 3 SCC 91 the
concept of reasonableness in administrative law came to be dealt with
elaborately by one of us, Venkatachaliah, J. (as he then was). In paragraphs
37 to 46 the Court observed thus : H
170 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1994] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A "It was urged that the basic concept of the manner of the
development of the real estate and disposal of occupancy right
were visited by unreasonableness. It is a truism, doctrinally, that
powers must be exercised reasonably. But as Prof. Wade points
out :

B "The doctrine that powers must be exercised reasonably has to
be reconciled with the no less important doctrine that the court
must not usurp· the discretion of the public authority which Parlia,
ment appointed to take the decision. Within the bounds of legal
reasonableness is the area in which the deciding authority has
c genuinely free discretion. If it passes those bounds, it acts ultra
vires. The court must therefore resist the temptation to draw the
bounds too tightly, merely according to its own opinion. It must
strive to apply an objective standard which leaves to the deciding
authority the full range of choices which the legislature is presumed
to have intended. Decisions which are extravagant or capricious
D cannot be legitimate. But if the decision is within the confines of
reasonableness, it is no part of the court's function to look further
into its merits. 'With the question whether a particular policy is
wise or foolish the court is not concerned; it can only interfere if
to pursue it is beyond the powers of the authority' ...... "
E
In the arguments there is some general misapprehension of the
scope of the "reasonableness" test in administrative law. By whose
standards of reasonableness that a matter is to be decided? Some
phrases which pass from one branch of law to another - as did the
expressions 'void' and 'voidable' from private law areas to public
F law situations - carry over with them meanings that may be inap-
posite in the changed context. Some such thing has happened to
the word 11 reasonable 11, "reasonableness 11 etc. In Tiller v. Atlantic
Coast Line Rail Road Company justice frankfurter said :

"A phrase begins life as a literary expression; its felicity leads
G to its lazy repetition; and repetition soon establishes it as a legal
formula, undiscriminatingly used to express different and some-
times contradictory ideas. 11

Different contexts in which the operation of 11 reasonableness 11
H es test of validity operates must be kept distinguished. For instance
TATA CELLULAR v. U.O. I. [MOHAN, J.] 171

as the arguments in the present case invoke, the administrative law A
test of 'reasonableness' as the touchstone of validity of the im-
pugned resolutions is different from the test of the 'reasonable
man' familiar to the law of torts, whom English law figuratively
identifies as the "man on the Clapham omnibus". In the latter case
the standards of the 'reasonable man', to the extent a reasonable
man' is court's creation, is in a manner of saying, a mere transferred
B
epithet Lord Radcliffe observed : (All ER p.160)

"By this time, it might seem that the parties themselves have
become so far disembodied spirits that their actual persons should
be allowed to rest in peace. In there place there rises the figure C
of the fair and reasonable man. And the spokesman of the fair and
reasonable man, who represents after all no more than the
anthropomorphic conception of justice, is, and must be, "the court
itself....... 11

See Davis Contractors Ltd. v. Fareham U.D.C., (1956] 2 All ER D
145, 160.

Yet another area of reasonableness which must be distin-
guished is the constitutional standards of 'reasonableness; of the
restrictions on the fundamental rights of which the court of judicial E
review is the arbiter. ·

The administrative law test of reasonableness is not by the
standards of the "reasonable man" of the torts law. Prof. Wade
says:
F
'This is not therefore the standard of 'the man on the Clapham
omnibus' . It is the standard indicated by a true construction of
the Act which distinguishes between what the statutory authority
may or may not be authorised to do. It distinguishes between
proper use and improper abuse of power. It is often expressed by G
saying that the decision is unlawful if it is one to which no
reasonable authority could have come. This is the essence of what
is now commonly called 'Wednesbury unreasonableness' after the
new famous case in what Lord Greene, M.R. expounded it."

Referring to the doctrine of unreasonableness, Prof. Wade says in H
172 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1994) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A Administration Law (supra):

"The point to not is that a thing is not unreasonable in the legal
sense merely because the Court thinks it is unwise."

In F.C.l. v. Kamdhenu Cattle Feed Industries, (1993] 1 SCC 71 at 76
B it was observed thus :

"In contractual sphere as in all other State actions, the State and
all ·its instrumentalities have to conform to Article 14 of the
Constitution of which non-arbitrariness is a significant facet. There
is no unfettered discretion in public law : A public authority
c possesses powers only to use them for public good. This imposes
the duty to act fairly and to adopt a procedure which is 'fairplay
in action'."

In Sterling Computers limited v. M/s. M & N Publications Limited,
D [1993] 1 sec 445 at page 455 this Court observed thus :

"........ .In contracts having commercial element, some more dis-
cretion has to be conceded to the authorities so that they may enter
into contracts with persons, keeping an eye on the augmentation
of the revenue. But even in such matters they have to follow the
E norms recognised by courts while dealing with public property. It
is not possible for courts to question and adjudicate every decision
taken by an authority, because many of the Government Under-
takings which in due course have acquired the monopolist position
in matters of sale and purchase of products and with so many
F ventures in hand, they can come out with a plea that it is not always
possible to act like a quasi-judicial authority while awarding con-
tracts. Under some special circumstances a discretion has to be
conceded to the authorities who have to enter into contract giving
them liberty to assess the overall situation for purpose of taking a
decision as to whom the contact be awarded and at what terms. It
G the decisions have been taken in bona fide manner although not
strictly following the norms laid down by the courts, such decisions
are upheld on the principle laid down by Justice Holmes, that
courts while judging the constitutional validity of executive
decisions .must grant certain measure of freedom of "play in the
H joints11 to the executive.'1
TATA CELLULAR i·. U.O. l. (MOHAN,J.J 173

In Union of flldia v. Hindustan Development Corporation, (1993] 3 A
SCC 499 at 515 this Court held thus:

"........... the Government had the right to either accept or reject
the lowest offer but that of course, if done on a policy, should be
on some rational and reasonable grounds. In Entsian Equipnzent
and Chemicals Ltd. v. State of WB. this Court obs :rred as under: B

"When the Government is trading with the public, 'the
democratic form of Government demands equality and absence of
arbitrariness and discrimination in such transactions'. The activities
of the Government have a public element and, therefore, there
should be fairness and equality. The State need not enter into any
c
contract with anyone but if it does so, it must do so fairly without
discrimination and without unfair procedure."

The principles deducible from the above are :
D
(1) The modern trend points to judicial restraint in administrative
action.

(2) The Court does no sit as a court of appeal but merely reviews
the manner in which the decision was made.
E
(3) The Court does not have the expertise to correct the administra-
tive decision. If a review of the administrative decision is permitted it will
be substituting its own decision, without the necessary expertise which itself
may be fallible.
F
(4) The terms of the invitation to tender cannot be open to judicial
scrutiny because the invitation to tender is in the realm of contract.
Normally speaking, the decision to accept the tender or award the contract
is reached by process of negotiations through several tiers. More often than
not, such decisions are made qualitatively by experts.
G
(5) The Government must have freedom of contract. In other words,
a fairplay in the joints is a necessary concomitant for an administrative body
functioning in an administrative sphere or quasi-administrative sphere.
However, the decision must not only be tested by the application of
Wednesbury principle of reasonableness (including its other facts pointed H
174 SUPREME COURT REPORTS j l~94j SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A out ahC1\'C) hut must be frt.:e arbitrariness not alfcctcd by bias or acluated
hy 111ala fidcs.

(6) Qu;i,hing decision.I m;iy impose heow administrntiYe burden on
the administration and lead to increased and unbudgeted expenditure.

B Based on these principles \\'C \viii examine the facts of this case ~.incc
they con1mend to us as the correct principles.

Point /1.10. 2 : U1u:ther the selection is ritiated by arbitaraliness '!:

Mr. Soli J. Sorabjee, leorned counsel appearing for Tata Cellular
C argued that there. ar~ clear instances of arbitrariness.

Criterion No. 2.4.7 has been totally ignored ;ind excluded. This has
been so admitted. No marks have been awarded on this scope under this
criterion.

D Note II of the same General conditions 2.4. 7 says minimum reliance
on Indian Public financial institutions will be prefened. This requirement
has been breached by Bharti Cellular, Mobile Telecom, Sterling Cellular
and Skycell Communication. They have borrowed fI 0m commercial banks
4.87 per cent, 43.48 per cent and 34.41 per cent respectively. This criterion
E carries 8 marks. In spite of the borrowing they have been awarded 6, 8 (full
marks), 5 and 7 respectively. The company, Tata Cellular, which had not
borrowed at all from the commercial banks, has been awarded only 4
marks. It requires io be noted that borrowing from commercial banks was
prohibited by Reserve Bank of India.

F Then again, one of the prescribed criterion is 2.4.6 which carries 12
marks, namely, the financial strength of the partner company. The annual
turnover from Tata Cellular, from Indian parameter was 12, 000 crores
and annual turnover of their foreign parameters was 51,000 crores yet what
has been awarded is only 9 marks. As against this Huchison Max has only
G an annual turnover of 75 crores and rupees 6,600 crores of foreign
parameter yet it has been awarded 12 marks. Equally, Sterling Cellular was
turnover according to its bid document was 77 crores; the foreign
parameter·is unknown, it has also been awarded 9 marks.

The cut-off date for financial bid document was fixed as 17.8.92. To
H examine and evaluate the same a committee was set up. The committee
TATA CELLULAR 1·. U.O. l. [MOHAN, J.] 175

adopted some paramclcrs and devised a marking system. It is under : A

Paramclcr Total Marks

Rental 50

Project Financing 8 B
Foreign Exchange innow/outllow 10

Purchase plan for Cellular
equipment within the country
including lie-ups with the proposed c
Indian manufacturers 5

Experience 15

Financial strength 12
D
Note : No marks were allotted for the seventh criterion of financial
projections of Cellular Mobile Service.

The report of the Tender Evaluation Committee on this aspect states
as under :
E
"One of the parameters is about the financial projection. The
Committee discussed about the reliability of financial projections
made by the bidders and came to the conclusion that it is not
possible for them to verify the reliability of the projections which
are based on individual postulations about the number of sub-
scribers, traffic, tariff, financial structure etc. For this purpose we F
have to go by the cl.ate furnished by the bidders at its face value.
In any case the financial data, having relevance to evaluation of
the tender have well been covered under various parameters."

Annexure I to the Report of the said Committee shows the manner G
the parameters and their weightage were given to each criterion. The
debt/equity ratio is 1.5 for city of Bombay. It has been rightly assigned 3
marks.

The bid proforma of Bharti Cellular, Mobile Telecom, Sterling Cel-
lular and Skycell indicates minimum reliance on financial institutions. It has H
176 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994[ SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A also made distinction between loans from public financial institutions and
banks. Therefore, there is a confusion on the part of Tata Cellular about
this requirement with loans from the banks.

Records reveal that in the case of India Telecomp while awarding
marks care was taken to exclude the open market projects and foreign
B exchange from the evaluation process.

As regards Skycell they had projected their operation in Madras for
initial years which would be below profitable levels. Therefore, no dividend
would have been paid to their foreign collaborators participating in the
C equity of company. The foreign exchange inflow position in their case was
considered to be better. The markings came to be awarded on the same
basis as in the case of all the bidders. The foreign collaborators of Skycell,
B.P.L. Systems and Projects, Usha Martin, l:lharti Cellular and Tata Cel-
lular specifically undertook to cover the foreign exchange funding by equity
and loans. International roaming has been correctly taken into considera-
D tion. As submitted by the learned Solicitor General roaming is defined in
paragraph 1.3.1.2 of N.l.T. as follows :

"Roaming: This feature shall enable a subscriber to communicate
in a cellular system other than its home registered one."

E Paragraph 1.3.1.18 talks of home location registered.

Paragraph 1.3.1.19 deals with Visitor Location Register (VLR} which
says as follows :

"Visitor location register (VLR) : shall be able to store the
F
following information. Their functions shall also include data
retrieval, date collection, update of data entry, once PLMNs are
established.

The IMS!
G
The mobile Station lriternational ISON number

The Mobile Station Roaming number, if allocated at location
updating.

H The temporary Mobile Station Identity\ if applicable
TATA CELLULAR v. U.O. l. [MOHAN,J.] 177

the location area where the mobile station has been A
registered.

supplementary service parameters.

any other information needed for management of mobile
station." B

All these paragraphs will clearly establish that the system provides
for facility of roaming to visitors. International roaming in G.S.M. is
well-accepted technique.

GSM is defined as a Global System for Mobile communications. The C
GSM specifications are highly standarized. This means that the systems
that are designed as per GSM specifications will be compatible with each
other and, therefore, can be easily connected together from day one.

Roaming in GSM Cellular mobile systems means that a subscriber D
belonging to one operator can use his telephone to receive and make calls
while he is in the area of another operator automatically. When a sub-
scriber goes into the area of another operator, who bas a roaming agree-
ment with his another operator, the details of the subscriber available in
the HLR (Home Location Register) of the home MSC (Mobile Switching
Centre) are obtained by the visitor MSC and placed in the VLR (Visitor E
Location Register). The subscriber can originate and receive calls without
feeling any difference. The roaming can be easily extended internationally
and is already being done in parts of Europe. Since the systems are
compatible, all that is required_ is an agreement between the operators for
revenue sharing etc. F
Thus, we find the argument that paragraph 2.4.7, namely, the finan·
cial projection of the proposed Cellular Mobile Cellular and the 7th
criterion having been left out of consideration cannot be accepted.

Point No. 3 Bias of Mr. Nair· Whether affects the selection? G
In Black's Law Dictionary Sixth Edition at page 162 bias defined as
under:

"Inclination; bent; prepossession; a pre·conceived op1n1on; a
predisposition to decide a cause or an issue in a certain way, which does H
178 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994j SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A not leave the mind perfectly open conviction. To incline to one side.
Condition of mind, which sways judgment and renders judge unable to
exercise his functions impartially in particular case. As used in la\v regard-
ing disqualification of judge, refers to mental attitude or disposition of the
judge toward a party to the litigation, and not to any views that he may
entertain regarding the subject matter involved. State ex rel. Mitchell v. Sage
B
Stores Co., 157 Kan. 622, 143 p.2d 652, 655.

The rule of bias is founded on the well-known maxim Nemo judex
non cause sua: ·no person can be a judge in his own cause.
'
C De Smith's Constitutional and Administrative Law New Edition at
page 583 states as follows :

"First, an adjudicator must not have any direct financial or
proprietary interest in the outcome of the proceedings. Secondly,
he must not be reasonably suspected, or show a real likelihood,
D of bias."

Jn the instant case, the first aspect of the matter does not arise. As
regards the second, the law is as stated by De Smith's Constitutional and
Administrative Law New Edition at page 584-85 :
E "If an adjudicator is likely to be biased he is also disqualified
from acting. Likelihood of bias may arise from a number of causes:
membership of an organisation or autb,ority that is a party to the
proceedings; partisanship expressed in extra-judicial pronounce-
ments; the fact of appearing as a witness for a party to the
F proceedings; personal animosity or friendship towards a party;
family relationship with a party; professional or commercial
relationship with a party; and so on. The categories of situations
potentially giving rise to a likelihood of bias are not closed."

"............. How should the test of disqualification for likelihood
G of bias be formulated? .... A more common formulation of the test
is: Would a member of the public, looking at the situation as a
whole, reasonably suspect that a member of the adjudicating body
would be biased? Another common formulation is: Is there in fact
a real likelihood of bias? There is no need, on either formulation,
H , to prove actual bias; indeed, the courts may refuse to entertain
TATA CELLULAR v. U.O. L[MOHAN,J.] 179

submissions designed to establish the actual bias of a member of A
an independent tribunal, on the ground that such an inquiry would
be unseemly. In practice the test of 'reasonable suspicion' and 'real
likelihood' of bias will generally lead to the same result. Seldom
indeed will one find a situation in which reasonable persons ade-
quately apprised of the facts will reasonably suspect bias but a
B
court reviewing the facts will hold that there was no real likelihood
of bias. Neither formulation is concerned wholly with appearances
or wholly with objective reality. In ninety-nine cases out of a
hundred it is enough for the court to ask itself whether a reasonable
person viewing the facts would think that there was substantial
possibility of bias." c
Geoffrey A Flick in his work on Natural Justice (Principles and
Practical Application) 1979 Edition at 118-120 states :
-·
"PERSONAL INVOLVEMENT
D
Whenever a decision-maker becomes personally involved with
one of the parties there aries the suspicion that a determination
may not be reached exclusively on the merits of the case as
discussed at the hearing. Unlike allegations of bias by reason of
the pecuniary interest of the decision-maker however, allegations E
of bias founded upon a personal involvement will only result in
disqualification where there is a real likelihood that a hearing will
not be fair: de Smith at 232-37; David @ 12.02.

The most obvious group of cases calling for scrutiny are th9se
in which one of the parties has close ties of kinship with the F
decisjon-maker. A chairman of county commissioners, therefore,
cannot hear a petition to build a new road which was intended to
pass over land belonging to his brother-in-law; nor can a member
of a zoning commission determine his wife's application for a
change in zoning from residential to business: Low v. Town of G
Madison, 60 A 2d 774 (Conn 1948). In the last cited case the court
was concerned with both the family sentiment that was present and
with the opportunity for the wife to have what in reality a private
hearing before the board with her husband acting as advocate: see
778. But not all family relationships will disqualify and, by way of
contrast, on the circumstances of one particular case it was said H
180 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1994] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A that a board of adjustment c.ould decided an application by a
company for permission to deveJ.op a free parking area despite the
fact that an employee of the company was the wife of one board
member and the fact that a third or fourth cousin of another board
member was the president of the company: Moody v. City of
University Park, 278 SW 2d 912 (Dt Civ App Tex 1955).
B

Disqualification on the basis of personal involvement is not, of
course, limited to the above two situations but may n:sult whenever
there is a sufficient nexus between the decisionrnaker and a party
c to justify the appearance that this nexus may influence the decision
reached: of R v. Altrincham Justices, Ex parte Pennington, (1975)
QB 549. Street CT has state.cl the law in this respect in yet another
New South Wales decision: Ex Parle Burnett, Re Wurth (1955) 72
WN (NSW) 457. The last cited case involved a former officer of
D the Department of Education who later sat as a member of the
Public Service Board inquiring into alleged false and scandalous
allegations made by a teacher against various persons, including
the officer in question, and during the course of his judgment street
CT observed:
E Where bias arises not from {pecuniary) interest, the officer
must have so conducted himself that a high probability arises of a
bias inconsistent with the fair performance of his duties, with the
result that a substantial distrust of the result must exist in the minds
of reasonable persons.
F
Put in other words, the issue is not merely whether justice has in
fact has been done, but whether it has manifestly and undoubtedly
been seen to be done. It may, therefore, be improper for the clerk
of the court to act as a solicitor for a party. Similarly, it may be
unwise for a headmaster to sit in judgment upon a case involving
G a former pupil who had been adversely criticised in a detailed staff
report signed by the headmaster some three months previously
even where the existence of the report has been forgotten: R v.
Abingdon Justices, Ex Porte Cousins, {1964) 108 Sol. J. 840."

H The leading cases on bias may now be seen.
TATACELLUIAR v. U.0.1.[MOHAN,J.] 181

In R v. Combome Justices, Ex parte Pearce, (1954) 2 All ER 850 at A
855 it was held :

"In R v. Essex JJ. Ex P.' Perkine (9) Avory, J.,, said (1927) 2 K.B.
488:

"We have here to determine, however, or not there might B
appear to be a reasonable likelihood of his being biased."

And SWIFr, J., said (ibid., 490):

"It is essential that justice should be so administered as to satisfy
reasonable persons that the tribunal is impartial and unbiased. As C
LORD HEWART, CJ., said inR v. Sussex!!. Ex.p. McCaTthy (6)
(1924] 1 K.B. 259) : 'Nothing is to be done which crates even a
suspicion that there has been an improper interference with the
course of justice.'· might a reasonable man suppose that there had
here been such an interference with the course of justice?" D
In R. v. Salford Assessment Committee, Ex p. Ogden (10)
SLESSER, L. J. (1937] 2 All E.R. 103 and ,LUXMOORE, J. (ibid.,
108) applied the "reasonable likelihood" test, while GREENE, L.J.
(ibid., 107) dissented only on the inference to be drawn from the
facts. In Cottle v. Cottle ( 11) SIR BOYD MERRIMAN, P. (1939] 2 E
All E.R. 541) asked himself the question whether the party com-
plaining.

".... might -reasonably have formed the impression that Mr:
Browing (the Chairman of the bench) could not give this case in F
unbiased hearing. 11

BUCKNIL, J., said (ibid) :

"The test which we have to apply is whether or not a reasonable
man, in all the circumstances, might suppose that there was an G
improper interference with the course of justice ..."

In the judgment of this court the right test is that prescribed
by BLACKBURN, J. (L.R. 1 Q.B. 233)in R v. Rand (I), namely,
that to disqualify a person from acting in a judicial or quasi-judicial
capacity on the ground of interest (other than pecuniary or H
182 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A proprietary) in the subject- matter of the· proceedings a real
likelihood of bias must be shown. This court is, further, of opinion
that a real likelihood of bias must be made to appear not only from
the materials in fact ascertained by the party complaining, but from
such further facts as he might readily have ascertained and easily
verified in the course of his inquires. In the present case, for
B
example, the facts relied on in the applicant's statement under
R.S.C. Ord. 59, r. 3 (2), of the grounds of his application might
create a more sinister impression that the full facts as found by
this court, all or most of which would have been availalJ!e to the
applicant had he pursued his inquiries on learned that Mr. Thomas
c was a member of the Cornwall County Council and none of these
further facts was disputed at the hearing of this motion. The
frequency with which allegations of bias have come before the
courts in recent times seems to indicate that the reminder of
LORD HEWART, C.J., in R v. Sussex JI. Exp. McCarthy, (6)
[1924] 1 K.B. 259) that it is.
D
"Of fundamental importance that justice should not only be
done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done."

In Metropolitan Properties Co. (F.G.C.), Ltd. v. Lannon and Others,
E [1968] 3 All E.R. 304 at 310 it was held thus:

".............. in considering whether there was a real likelihood of
bias, the court does not look at the mind of the justice himself or
at the mind of the chairman of the tribunal, or whoever it may be,
F who sits in a judicial capacity. It does not look to see if there was
a real likelihood that he would, or did, in fact favour one side at
the expense of the other. The court looks at the impression which
would be given to other people. Even if he was impartial as could
be, nevertheless, if right-minded persons would thank that, in the
circumstances, there was a real likelihood of bias on his part, than
G he should not sit. And if he does sit, his decision cannot stand: See
R v. Huggins (8); R v. Sunderland justices (9), per Vaughan Wil-
liams, L. J. Nevertheless, there must appear to be a real likelihood
of bias. Suimis or conjecture is not enough: see R v. Combome
Justices, Ex P. Pearce (10); R v. Nailsworth Justices, Ex~P. Birds
H (11). There must be circumstances from which a reaso;;able man
TATACELLULAR v. U.0.1.[MOHAN,J.) 183

would think it likely or probable that the justice or chairman, as A
the case may be, would, or did, favour one side unfairly at the
expense of the other. The court will not enquire whether he did,
in fact, favour one side unfairly. Suffice it that reasonable people
might think he did. The reason is plain enough. Justice must be
rooted in confidence; and confidence is destroyed when right-
B
minded people go away thinking : "The judge was biased" ·

In R v. Liverpool City Justices, ex parte Tooping [1983) 1 All ER 490
at 494 it was observed :

"In the past there has also been a conflict of view as to the way C
in which that test should be applied. Must there appear to be a
real likelihood of bias? Or is it enough if there appears to be a
reasonable suspicion of bias? (For a discussion on the cases, see
de Smith's Judicial Review of Administrative Action (4th edn. 1980)
pp 262- 264 and H W R wade, Administrative Law (5th edn, 1982)
pp 430- 432.) We accept the view of Cross Li, expressed in D
Hannam v. Bradford City Council, (1970) 2 All ER 690 at 700,
(1970) 1 WLR 937 at 949, that there is really little if any difference
between the two tests:

'If a reasonable person who has no knowledge 'of the matter
beyond knowledge of the relationship which subsists between some E
members of the tribunal and one of the parties would think that
there might well be bias, then there is in his opinion a real
likelihood of bias. Of course, someone else with inside knowledge
of the character of the members in question might say: "Although
things don's look very well, in fact there is no real likelihood of
bias." But that would be beside the point, because the question is
F
not whether the tribunal will in fact be biased, but whether a
reasonable man with no inside knowledge might well think that it
might be biased.'

We conclude that the test to be applied can conveniently be G
expressed by slightly adapting in words of Lord Widgery CJ in a
test which he laid down in R. v. Uxbridge Justices, ex p. Burbridge
(1972)'Times, 21 June and referred to by him in R v. Mclean, ex
p. Aikens [1974) 139 JP 261 at 266: would a reasonable and
fair-minded person sitting in court and knowing all the relevant
facts have a reasonable suspicion that fair trial for the applicant H
184 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A was not possible?"

In University College of Swansea v. Cornelius, [1988] I.C.R. 735 at 73~
holds :

"Cases of bias and ostensible bias had to be regarded in the light
B of their own circumstances. The circumstances of this case could
have no relevance to other cases.' 1

The Indian Law can be gathered from the following rulings:

In Manak Lal v. Dr. Prem Chand, [1955) SCR 575 at 581 it was held
C thus:

"But where pecunciary interest is not attributed but instead a
bias is suggested, it often becomes necessary to consider whether
there is a reasonable ground for assuming the possibility of a bias
and whether it is likely to produce in the minds of the litigant or
D the public at large a reasonable doubt about the fairness of the
administration of justice. It would always be a question of fact to
be decided in each case. 11 The principlen, says Halsbury, "nemo
debet esse judex: in causa propria sua precludes a justice, who is
interest in the subject-matter of a dispute, from acting as a justice
E therein". In our opinion, there is and can be no doubt about the
validity of this principle and we are prepared to assume that this
principle applies not only to the justices as mentioned by Halsbury
but to all tribunals and bodies which are given jurisdiction to
determine judicially the rights of parties."

F In J. Mahapatra & Co. v. State of Orissa, [1985) 1 SCR 322 at 334 it
was observed thus :

"It is no answer to say that an author-member is only one of
the members of the Assessment Sub-Committee and that the
ultimate decision rests with the State Government which may reject
G any book out of the list of approved books. A similar argument
was rejected by this court in Kraipak's case. The State Government
would normally be guided by the list approved by the Assessment
Sub-Committee. Further, to say that such author-member is only
one of the members of the Assessment Sub-Committee is to
H overlook the fact that the author-member can subtly influence the
TATA CELLULAR"· U.O. l. iMOHAN.J.] 185

minds of the other members against selecting books by other A
authors in preference to his own. It can also be that books by some
.. of the other members may also have been submitted for selection
and there can be between them in quid pro quo or, in other words,
you see that my book is selected and in return I will do the same
for you. In either case, when a book of an author-member comes
B
up for consideration, the other members would feel themselves
embarassed in frankly discussing it merits. Such author-member
may also be a person holding a high official position whom the
other members may not want to displease. It can be that the other
members may not be influenced by the fact that the book which
they are considering for approval was written by one of their C
members. Whether they were so influenced or not is, however, a
matter impossible to determine. It is not, therefore, the actual bias
in favour or the author-member that is material but the possibility
of such bias. All these considerations require that an author-mem-
ber should not be a member of any such committee or sub-com- D
mittee.'

inAshok Kumar Yadav v. State of Haryana, [1985] 4 SCC 417 at 441
this Court emphasised the reasonable likelihood of bias thus :

'This Co1¥t emphasised that it was not necessary to established E
bias but it was sufficient to invalidate the selection process if it
could be shown that there was reasonable likelihood of bias. The
likelihood of bias may arise on account of proprietary interest or
on account of personal reasons, such as, hostility to one party or
personal friendship or family relationship with the other. Where
reasonable likelihood of bias is alleged on the ground of relation- F
ship, the question would always be as to how close is the degree
of relationship so great as to give rise to reasonable apprehension
of bias on the part of the authority making the selection. "

In Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India, (1988] 1 SCR 512 at 520 the law G
was stated by one of us, Venkatachaliah, J. (as he then was) as under : -

"As to the tests of the likelihood of bias what is relevaot is the
reasonableness of the apprehension in that regard in the mind of
the party. The proper approach for the judge is not to took at his
. own mind and ask himself, however, honestly; "Am I biased? "but H
186 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A to look at the mind of the party before him."

Reference was made therein to a dictum laid down by Justice
Frankfurter in Public Utilities Commission of the District of Columbia v.
Pollack, 343 US 451 at 466 which is reproduced as under :

B "The judicial process demands that a judge move within the
frame work of relevant legal rules and the court covenanted modes
of thought for ascertaining them. He must think dispassionately
and submerge private feeling on every aspect of a case. There is
a good deal of shallow talk that the judicial robe does not change
c the man within it. It does. The fact is that on the whole judges do
lay aside private views in discharging their judicial functions. This
is achieved through training, professional habits, self-discipline and
that fortunate alchemy by which men are loyal to the obligation
with which they are interested. But it is also true that reason cannot
control the subconscious influence of feelings or which it is un-
D aware. When there is ground for believing that such unconscious
feelings may operate in the ultimate judgment or may not unfairly
lead others to believe they are operating, judges rescue themselves.
They do no sit in judgment... .................. '

E In International Airports Authority of India v. KD. Bali, [1988) 2 SCC
360 at 367 this Court observed thus :

"Several points were taken in support of the application for
revocation. It was sought to be urged that the petitioner had lost
confidence in the sole arbitrator and was apprehensive that the
F arbitrator was biased against the petitioner. It is necessary to
reiterate before proceeding further what are the parameter by
which an appointed arbitrator on the application of a party can be
removed. It is well settled that there must be purity in the ad-
ministration of quasi-justice as are involved in the adjudicatory
G process before the arbitratrs. It is well said that once the arbitrator
enters in an arbitration, the arbitrator must not be guilty of any
act which can possibly be construed as indicative of partiality or
unfairness. It is not a question of the effect which misconduct on
his part had in fact upon the result of the proceeding, but of what
H effect it might possibly have produced. It is not enough to show
TATAtELLULAR v. U.O. l. [MOHAN.J.J 187

that, even if there was misconduct on his part, the award \Vas A
unaffected by it, and was reality just; arbitrator must not do
anything which is not io itself fair and impartial. See Russel on
Arbitration, 18th Edition, page 378 and observations of Justice
Edition, page 378 and observations of Justice Boyd in Re Brien
and Brien. Lord O'Brien in King (De Vosci) v. Justice of Queen's B
Country observed as follows :

'By bias I understand a real likelihood of an operative
prejudice, whether conscious or unconscious. There must in may
opinion be reasonable evidenee to satisfy us that there was a real
likelihood of bias. I do not think that their vague suspicions of C
whimsical. capricious and unreasonable people should be made a
standard to regulate our action here. It might be a different matter
of suspicion rested on reasonable grounds - was reasonably
generated - but certainly mere flimsy, elusive, morbid suspicions
·. should not be permitted to form a ground of decision. D
(Emphasis supplied)'

In Union Carbide Corporation v. Union of India, [1991) 4 SCC 584 at
667 this Court observed thus:
E
"But the effects and consequences of non-compliance may alter
with situational variations and particularities, illustrating a 'flexible
use of discretionary remedies to meet novel legal situations'. "One
motive' says Prof. Wade 'for holding administrative acts to be
voidable where accordiog to priociple they are void may be a desire
to. extend the discretionary powers of the Court". As observed by F
Lord Reid in Wiseman v. Borneman natural justice should
degenerate into a set of hard and fast rules. There should be a
circumstantial flexibility.'

In the light of this let us fmd out whether bias has been established? G
The Report of the Tender Evaluation Committee was made on
16.5.92. In that Committee Mr. B.R. Nair was a party. As seen above, the
offer of the four companies did not fully satisfy the criteria. Their cases
were recommended to be considered for condonation. The four companies
are: H
188 SUPREME COURT REPORTS 11994] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A L BPL Systems and Projects

2. Mobile Communication India private Limited

3. Mobile Telecom Service limited and

B 4. Indian Telecom private Limited.

Mr. B.R. Nair, Member (Production) made the following note :

"I agree with the recommendations of the Evaluation Commit:
tee that the four firms must be in paragraph 3 of Page 1JN should
C be included in the short-list. Thus, there would 14 companies in
the short-list instead of 16 recommended by adviser (O).'

On 8th of September, 19921 Mr. Nair, as Member of the Committee,
agreed to a noting that only three companies, Bharti Cellular, BPL Systems
and Projects and Skycell qualified for selection. After further discussion, 8
D companies came to selected and the note was accordingly put up on
9.10.92. This recommendation is agreed to by Mr. Nair.

According to Mr. Harish Salve, the very presence of Mr. Nair itself
will amount to bias.

E In the case, as noted above, the crucial test is whether there was a
reai likelihood of bias. As to how Mr. R. Satish Kumar, the son of Mr. B.R.
Nair, came to be appointed in BPL Systems and Projects is explained in
the additional affidavit filed on behalf of BPL Systems & Projects Ltd.
Respondent No. 10, by Mr. S. Sunder Rao, Corporate Personnel Manager
F of BPL Group of Companies, including respondent No. 10 company. The
relevant portion is extracted as under :

"With regard to the selection and appointment of Shri R. Salish
Kumar I state as follows :

G That the respondent No. 10 company desired to employ certain
manager and executives as follows :

(i) Sr. Manager, (Push Button Telephone) for New Delhi,
Bangalore and Bombay.

H (ii) Manager (Communications) for Madras, Calcutta and Ban-
TATA CELLULAR v. U.O. I. [MOHAN, J.) 189

galore. A

-. (iii) Territory Manager (Sales) for Delhi, Hyderabad and
Madras.

(iv) Sales Executives for Delhi, Madras, Kanpur Chandigarh,
Baroda, Kochhi, Calcutta, Bhopal, Poona and Coimbatore. B
These posts were advertised for in several newspapers as fol-
lows:

(i) The Times of India, Delhi and Bombay Editions.
c
(ii) The Hindustan Times, Delhi Edition.

(iii) Statesman, Calcutta Edition.

(iv) The Hindu, All India Edition.
D
(v) Deccan Herald, Bangalore.

These advertisement appeared between 26th August, 1991 and
29th August, 1991. The eligibility conditions for the candidates was
specified and with regard to the post of Territory Manager (Sales)
it was mentioned that the candidates should be an Electronics/ E
Electrical Engineer with 5/6 years experience of office automation
products, Computer, Telecom equipments, etc .......... .

In response to advertisement Shri R. Salish Kumar applied for
the post of Territory Manager (Sales) vide his letter dated 28th
August, 1991 enclosing thereby his bio-data........ F
As per practice of the Respondent Company the bio-data of
all the applicants were scruitinised by the Personnel Department
and thereafter by the Asst. General Manager Qf the Respondent
Company. Thereafter the short:listed candidates were called for G
interview on various dates. Shri Salish Kumar was called for an
interview on 6th September, 1991. Two other candidates were also
interviewed for this post. Shri Salish Kumar was interviewed by
the Senior Officer of the company inclnding myself. At the con-
clusion of the interview as per· practice, an internal assessment
form was filled by the interviewers. ......... H
190 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A On the basis of the said interview Shri Satish Kumar was
selected and a letter dated 21st October, 1991 was addressed to
~
him offering him the said post. Shri Satish Kumar was required to
report for duty on or before 2nd December 1991 at Bangalore.
Shri Satish Kumar however requested for some time to enable him
to handover the charge in his previous company and this was
B agreed to by the company. Shri Satish Kumar accordingly joined
respondent No. 10 on 6th January, 1992.........

I state and submit that Shri Satish Kumar was selected by
respondent No. 10 company in the normal course and the selection
c was purely on merit."

It is to be seen that Mr. Satish Nair is only one of the officers in BPL
Systems and Projects, which has over 5500 employees in 27 offices all over
India. There are 89 officers of his rank.

D Mr. B.R. Nair was not a decision-maker at all. He was one of the
recommending authorities. As Director General of Communication·as well
as Telecom Authority his involvement in the approval an.d selectiol) of
tender was indispensable. He came to be appointed as member (Services)
on 29.5.92. By virtue of the Notification dated 28.7.92 Mr. B.R. Nair
became the Director General of Telecommunication. As such, he could
E
exercise all the powers under Section 3(6) of the Indian Telegraphs Act of
1885. Such a Telecom Authority has the right to grant cellular operating
licences to the successful party and also reject any bids without assigning
any reason. Registration fees, security deposit and other financial charges
shall be fixed by the licensor in consultation with the Telecom Authority.
F This is what is stated in the financial bid. Therefore, Mr. B.R. Nair could
not dissociate himself from the decision-making process. It is under these
circumstances the High Court rightly applied the doctrine of necessity. This
Court in Charan Lal Sahu v. Union of India, [1990] 1 SCC 613 at 694 dealt
with this doctrine which is stated as follows :
G "The questio;, whether there is scope for the Union of India
being responsible or liable as joint tort-feasor is a difficult and
different question. But even assuming that it was possible that the
Central Government might be liable in a case of this nature, the
learned Attorney General was right in contending that it was
H proper that the Central Government should be able and authorised
r
TATA CELLULAR v. U.0. I. [MOHAN, J.] 191

to represent the victims. In such a situation, there will be no scope A
of the violation of the principles of natural justice. The doctrine
of necessity would be applicable in a situation of this nature. The
doctrine has been elaborated, in Halsbury's Laws or England, 4th
edn., page 89, paragraph 73, where it was reiterated that even if
all the members of the tribunal competent to determine a .matter
B
were subject to disqualification, they might be authorised and
obliged to hear that matter by virtue of the operation of the
common law doctrine of necessity. An adjudicator who is subject
to disqualification on the ground of bias or interest in the matter
which he has to decide may in certain circumstances be required
to adjudicate if there is no other person who is competent or C
authorised to be adjudicator of if a quorum cannot be formed
without him or if no other competent tribunal can be constituted."

Therefore, we are unable to accept the contentions of Mr. Soli J
Sorabjee and Mr. Harish Salve.
D
We hold Mr. B.R. Nair's involvement did not vitiate the selection on
the ground of bias. Since we have reached this conclusion we are not going
to the other question argued by Mr. F.S. Narirnan whether India Telecomp
or Tata Cellular could urged this point relating to bias.
E
Point No. 4 : Whether the Apex Committee has been bypassed?:

After finding that only three companies qualified for selection on
8.9.92 the following note was made by Mr. G.T. Naryanan, Adviser (Opera,
lions) :
F
"The financial bid which was approved by the apex committee
was given to the shortlisted bidders and these were received and
ppened on 17.8.1992. these were evaluated by the Tender Evalua-
tion Committee (TEC). The evaluation report is placed below. The
financial evaluation was done based upon the weightages of the G
various parameters namely, rental, financing, foreign exchange
inflow/outflow, financial strength, experience and purchase plants.
The rental was given the maximum weightage. The various
guidelines made for giving the marks are at Annexure I (page 11,
Flag 'A'). H
192 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1994) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A So far as the rental and other allied parameters are concerned,
there are wide variations of rent, deposit, registration/connection
fee. In some cases rent is zero. It was considered by the TEC that
these are to be equated to one parameter as 'equated rental' and
the method adopted was loading the basic rental and other charges
B like deposit, interest rate @ 13% per annum. Based upon these
assumptions, the gradation for various bidders for each city is at
page 9 of the main report.

.The Chairman and Member of the Telecom Commission were
consulted in this regard. It was felt that the rate of interest adopted
c by the TEC was low, and the maximum lending rate of the State
B~nk of India as on 1.8.1992 viz. 21.75% is more appropriate to
adopt both for refundable and non-refundable deposits and non-
returnable charges. For the non-refundable charges the monthly
amortised value over 5 years at the lending rate uiz. 21.75% should
D be used for loading the rental, to get at the equivalent rental value
which represents the actual monthly burden on the subscribers.,
As per this guideline the TEC gave the fresh calculations on
7.9.1992 and a new gradation list was prepared which is placed at
Flag 'B'.
E
After examining the TEC report the following points have come to
light -

(i) M/s. Hutchison Max India Ltd. in their bid document
(Annexure 1>) have not given proper and full compliance. The
F TEC has observed "Compliance to Chapter III (Operative Condi-
tions) and Chapter IV (Financial Conditions) has not been indi-
cated by the bidder". Thus, it clearly shows that they have not
complied with these important conditions which from the very basis
of the financial bid It is evident that the bidder has serious
reservations about financial conditions and operative conditions
G
and if granted a licence, there is a possibility of litigation.

(ii) Since we require good operators with experience the min-
imum of 10 marks out of 15 for this parameter is considered a
must and those bidders who have scored less than 10 for this
H parameter should be disqualified. This represents an experience
TATA CELLULAR v. U.O. I. [MOHAN,J.] 193

of handling of 1 lakh cellular phones or 80,000 with a GSM licence. A

(iii) In accordance with the policy of the Govt .. for encouraging
foreign exchange investment only those who do foresee the inflow
of foreign exchange should be considered. For this parameter the
TEC had allocated 5 marks to those bids which were foreign
exchange neutral. Those getting more than 5 indicate a net foreign B
exchange. inflow. Thus, 5 marks or above for this parameter is
considered essential and those getting below 5 marks deserves to
be disqualified.

So with the points listed above taken into account, the following
companies qualify citiwise as per the gradation -
c
Delhi Bombay

1. Bharati Cellular 1. Bharati Cellular
2. BPL Systems & Projects Ud. 2. BPL Systems & 'Projects Ltd.
D
3. Sterling Cellular 3. Sterling Cellular
4. Tata Cellular 4. Tata Cellular

Calcutta Madras

1. Bharati Cellular 1. Bharati Cellular E
2. Sterling Cellular 2. Sterling Cellular
3. Tata Cellular 3. Tata Cellular
(on an exclusive basis) (on an exclusive basis)

While making the final selection, it should be borne in mind
that sterling Cellular has got a problem which is explained in the F
notes of DDG(Vig.) placed below. Sterling Computer which is
mentioned in the notes of DDG(Vig.) flag C has a tie up with
Sterling Cellular from the list of approved operators.

Summarizing, the following operators are recommended for giving G
the cellular licence -

FE
Name of the Equated Exper- Over
Inflow/ Collaborator
Company rental ience all
Outflow
1 2 3 4 5 6
H
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A Bombay
SRF France
1. Bharnti Cellular 37.3 7 15 78.3
France
2. BPL Systems & 33.2 6 14 76.2
Telecom
Projects Ltd.
Delhi
SRF France
1. Bharti Cellular 41.0 8 15 83.0
B France
2. BPL Systems & 33.8 6 14 76.8
Telecom
Projects Ltd.
Madras
38.5 8 15 80.0 SRF France
1. Bharti Cellular
24.6 10 15 71.6 Bell South
2. Skycell
c Calclltta
.

27.1 8 15 69.1 SRF France
1. Bharti Cellular

There is no other bider who qualifies for giving the licence.
Even though Tata Cellular fulfils all the conditions but in bid·
D document they have based their calculations on single
operator concept. However, we may, if approved by Telecom
Commission and High Power Committee make a counter
offer to operate on a non-exclusive basis.
•.
After the operators are selected, tariff fixation and other licens-
E ing terms can be negotiated by the Telecom authorities.

A separate note is being prepared for sending to the High
Power Committee based upon the observations that are likely to
be made on this note.

F For approval, please.

sd/-8.9.92
(G.T. NARAYAN)
Adviser (Operations)
G
·Member (Services)
Member (Productions)
Member (Finance)
Chainnan (TC.)

H The proposal on pre-page with all the relevant calculation
TATA CELLULAR v. U.O.l.[MOHAN.J.] 195

sheets and TEC report, copy of the F.B. document, may please be A
sent to the high power committee nominated by NOS (C) for its
consideration and for making final recommendations to the Gm1.
Re. selection of the licencees.

sd/-
10.9.92 B

Adv. (0) - Out of Stn.
DOG (TM)

A brief note, copies of TEC report, financial tender document have
been sent to the High Power Committee. The Note was shown to Member c
(S) before dispatch. (Emphasis supplied)

sd/-
10.9.92
D
Adv. (0)

sd/-
(G.T. Narayan)
14.9.92"
E
On 10. 9.92 the Chairman (TC) made the following note :

"In pursuances of the orders of the MOS(C}, a Committee
consisting of Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister, in his
capacity as chairman, foreign Jnvi'stment Promotion Board,
Secretary Finance, Secretary Electronics and Chairman Telecom F
Commission was appointed to make recommendations regarding
selection of the franchisees to provide Cellular Mobile Telephone
Service in the four metro cities. This committee examined the bids
received against the tenders floated on the basis of Tender Evalua-
tion Committee report and made recommendations to MOS(C)
regarding short-listing of the bidders and the financial bids docu- G
ment. The financial bids from the short-listed bidders have now
been received and examined in the Department. The recommen-
dations of the Evaluation Committee are being· forwarded to the
members of the High Court Level Committee appointed by MOS
(C} for examination and making recommendations to the Govern- H
196 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994} SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A ment regarding final selection of the franchisees.

I spoke to Principal Secretary to the Hon'ble Prime Minister
with the request to expedite the process. He indicated that the
Committee earlier appointed by MOS(C) stands dissolved and a
fresh Committee will have to be nominated for considering the
B financial bids etc. He also indicated that he proposes to put up
the case to the Hon'ble Prime Minister for his clearance. It is,
therefore, proposed to issue a letter to the members of the High
Level Committee as per draft placed below. The same may please
be seen by MOS (C) for approval before issue.
c · In the draft letter it has been indicated that the same Com-
mittee will also examine the bids received for provision of the
Paging Service in 27 cities_- first for short- listing and finalising the
financial bids and the later for selection of the franchisees. The
documents relating to short- listing of Paging Service bidders have
D also been sent separately to the members of the Committee.

sd/-
SEPT 10, 1992
(H.P. WAGLE)
CHAIRMAN (TC)
E
MOS(C)
11.9.92
D.O. tO Prin. Sec. with copies
to F.S./Elec. Sec. may issue
F sci/·
14/9

P.S.
D.O. issued, pl.
G sd/-14/9

DDG (TM)"

However, the D.O. came to be issued in accordance with the note of
10.9.92 dissolving the apex committee. Therefore, it is not correct to
H contend; as urged by Mr. Harish Salve, that the apex committee had been
TATACELLULAR v. U.0.1.[MOHAN,J.] 197

bypassed. The learned Solicitor General is right in his submission. A
Point No.5: Entry of Hidden Criteria - Whether valid?

In the original tender document, paragraph 2.2.1 in relation to the
Subscriber's Capacity states as follows :
B
"Subscriber Capacity: 1000 with modular expansion upto min. 40,000
subscribers."

In Section II of General Condition Clause 1 (d} states :

"Copy of the agreement between the Indian and the foreign partner, C
if any foreign partner is proposed."

Chapter II of General Conditions in paragraph 2.4.5 states :
11
Experience of the Foreign operating partner; 11

On 8.9.92 Mr. G.T. Narayan, Adviser (Operations) in his note in the
D
file inter alia stated as follows :

"Since we require good operators with experience the minimum
of 10 marks out of 15 for this parameter is considered a must and
those bidders who have scored less than 10 for this parameter E
should be disqualified. This represents an experience of handing
of 1 lakh cellular phones or 80,000 with a GSM license."

These hidden criteria came to be evolved in the following context :

The Apex Committee indicated the parameters in which it stated that F
"...... the committee decided to consider foreign companies who have ex-
perience of operating a cellular system of at least five years and who have
developed a reasonable sized network (25,000 subscribers)."

Inter a/ia it stated in the report of the Selection Committee for the
Cellular Mobile Telephone Service Tender : G
"15. The Committee, therefore, drew up the following
criteria: -

(i) The experience of the bidding company. Since none of the
Indian companies have any experience of operating a cellular H
198 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1994] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A service, this would necessary apply to the foreign collaborator. Also
smce GSM technology is only now beginning to come into com-
mercial operation, the Committee decided to consider foreign
Companies who have experience of operating a cellular system of
at least 5years and who have developed a reasonable sized network
(25,000 - 25,000 subscribers)."
B
On 2.9.92 the Tender Evaluation Committee made the recommenda-
tions. Upon these recommendations Bharti Cellular got three cities, Delhi,
Bombay and Madras. Even then BPL Systems and Projects did not feature.
Therefore, it was directed that an additional output of gradation of dif-
C. ferent bidders for the four cities by adopting inter a/ia the highest lending
rate of State Bank of India for 5 years for lending of monthly rental with
simple interest on deposits. As per this revised gradation Bharti Cellular
got Delhi, Calcutta and Madras. However, it was eliminated from Bombay.

On 8.9.92, the criterion of one lakh lines was introduced. It was
D suggested by Mr. G.T. Narayan, Adviser (Operations) that those who have
secured less than 10 marks for this parameter should be disqualified. this
is in relation to the experience of handing of one lakh cellular phones or
80,000 with GSM line. It is submitted that criterion of experience of 1 lakh
lines helped elimination of Usha Martin in Bombay and created place for
E BPL Systems and Projects.

The criterion of experience was introduced as a ground of dis-
qualification. If the criterion of experience. of one lakh lines is a principal
condition to qualify for consideration for Bombay and Delhi was intro-
duced uniformly then Bharti Cellular could be disqualified. Thus, a relaxa-
F tion of 80,000 with the GSM line was introduced. It is important to note
the person who evolved this criterion did not consider Talkland as Bharti
Cellular' s collaborator.

As noted above, the learned Solicitor General would submit that as
G on 31.12.91 Bharti Cellular had experience of 81,085 lines of SFR France
and 1,982 lines EMTEL making a total of 83,067 lines. Added to this,
Talkland had an experience of 1,70,000 subscribers. The reference to the
marks awarded for comparative evaluation in this context is irrelevant.
Besides, even assuming that in comparative evaluation the holding of the
licence may be given some weight; cannot be made the governing factor in
H determinin~ the experience of a bidder for the purpose of its eligibility.
TATACELLULAR v. U.0.1.[MOHAN,J.) 199

As a result of 8.9 .92 recommendations, Bharti cellular got all the four · A
cities. BPL System and Projects got two out of four cities. Only Skycell got
Madras. No fourth party got any city. Having realised that this decision will
patently be unacceptable a relaxation was made on 9.10.92 one day before
the final decision whether those with less than one lakh lines experience
could be considered for Calcutta and Madras. Even, on 9.10.92, Bharti B
Cellular was evaluated vis-a-vis SRF France and EMTEL Mauritius. There
was no mention of Talkland. On 10.10.92, Bharti Cellular was again evalua-
tion vis-a-vis its collaborators SFR France and EMTEL Mauritius. In the
affidavit filed in the High Court the Government urged that" one lakh lines
carrying 10 points was considered equivalent to 80,000 lines with GSM
licence. This, however, had no impact on Bbarti Cellular. Bharti Cellular's C
collaborators included Talkland which is one of the highest sendce
provides United Kingdoms."

The learned Solicitor General submits that the evaluation in the case
of Bharti Cellular was correct and in any event, including Talkland, Bharti D
cellular was properly considered. The parameter of experience had three
comvonents :

1. The number of subscribers
2. The number of countries
3. GSM experience. E
It is true that during evaluation it was noted that any bidder with less
10 marks out of 15 for experience ..yould stand disqualified. The cut-off of
one lakh lines was in the context of minii;num experience of 10 marks.
Bharti Cellular had a collaborator other then talkland, namely, SFR
France. It was mentioned in Bharti Cellular's bid in its tender on 31.12.91 F
that the number of SFR France was over 80,000. By 31st December, 1992
it was estimated to be 1, 10,000 In August 1992 when the bids were
submitted SFR France line experience could reasonably be expected to be
above one lakh lines. In addition, SFR had a GSM Licence. In view of all,
it would not be a unreasonable-estimate on the part of experts to consider G
Bharti Cellular as having one lakh having lines' experience.

We are not in a position to accept the contentions of Mr. Harish
Salve that these criteria were evolved as tailor-made to suit some other
bidders and knock off others. In a technical matter like this where the
Government of Indi.a is embarking upon new communication scheme with H
200 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1994) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A advance technology all the criteria cannot be postulated in the beginning
itself. Where the Committee of Experts thought certain criteria have to be
evolved in. order to subserve the interest of the scheme it is not necessary
to have all of them set out in the beginning itself. However, the important
question remains after the evolution of the criteria whether they have been
uniformly and properly applied, as urged by Mr. Ashok Sen.
B
A careful perusal of the tiles shows that the Advisor (Operations)
selected Bharti Cellular for franchise, with it foreign collaborators SFR
France; EMTEL Mauritius. The same was approved by the Chairman in
his final proposal which was ultimately approved on 10th October, 1992.
C Thus, it is clear that at no point of time Talkland ever figured as Bharti
Cellular's collaborator. SFR France, the foreign collaborator of Bharti
Cellular had GSM Paris area Sept. 23, 1992. As on 31.12.91 it had 81,085
subscribers with no GSM experience. The number of subscribers was es-
timated to go upto 1,10,000 by 31st December, 1992. On the date of
D submission of the bid it was expected to cross the one lakh mark. The other
collaborator EMTEL Mauritius had only an experience of 1,982 lines. In
order to make Bharti Cellular qualify Talkland is also included as a foreign
collaborator. This is factually wrong, as noted above, because at no point
of time Talkland was thought of as foreign collaborator for Bharti Cellular.
Even then, as seen from the file, Talkland is providing marketing, sales,
E customer care, billing services to both Vodaphone and Celine! under
contracts with both of them. This evident from the material produced
before us. It states. :

"Talkland's sole foundation is to distribute radiotelephone ser-
F vices. Unlike SFR in France it neither sets up nor manages networ/r.s.
In the UK these two activities have been separated by the 1984
Telecommunications Act. While two operators develop and
manage the networks some 20 marketing companies known as
"service providers" deal with the end-user, undertaking m.arketing
•
after-sales service and billing. This original mode of organization
G has proved beneficial and has helped to promote .the rapid
development of radiotelephone in the UK. At the beginning of
1992 there were already some 1.2 million subscribers. This cor-
responds to a penetration. This corresponds to a penetration rate
of more than 2% of the population, against around 0.7% in France
H Talkland, with a market share of about 13%, is one of the foremost
TATACELLULAR v. U.0.1.[MOHAN,J.] 201

service providers it has 165,000 subscribers and reports anol!al A
sales of some FRF 1.4 billion." (Emphasis supplied)

In. Annexure VII experience of foreign collaborators Item 10 is
.Bharti Cellular. The number of subscribers that is put against it is 2,53,067.
This figure could be reached only by including Talkland. It is necessary to
point out that what is required is either experience of handling one lakh B
cellular phones or 80,000 with the GSM lines. Both the learned Solicitor
General and Mr. Kaura would argue that service is relevant. But the nature
of service that is contemplated here as per the tender document is found
in Section Ill of Commercial Conditions at para 1.4. That reads as under:

"'Services refer to the scope of the services defined to be within
c
the licence in para 4 Section IV."

Therefore, one has to obviously refer to Para 4 of Section IV which
sets out the following :
D
"In the first instance the system should be capable of providing
the following services :

- Tele-services

lnfom1ation types services E
Speech Telephone Emergency calls

Data Message handling system
300 bps access
F
Short text Communication of short
Alphanumeric messages .

Graphics Grp. 3 Facsimile

· Bearer services G
Data transmission in Asynchronous duplex circuit mode with
PSTN

300 bps (V 21)
1200 bps (V 22) H
202 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1994) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A Data transmission in Sychronous duplex circuit mode with PSTN

1200 bps
2400 bps

Mobile. access in the Asynchronous mode to the packet as-
B sembler/disassembler of packet switching network

300 bps
1200 bps

c Mobile access in the synchronuos mode to the packet switching
network

2400 bps
4800 bps

D - Supplementary Services

In the first instance the following supplementary services may
be provided :

• Calling Number Identification Presentation
E • Calling Number Identification Restriction
• Connected Number Identification Presentation
• Connected Number Identification Restriction
• Malicious Call Identification
• Call Forwarding U ncoitditional
F • Call Forwarding on Mobile Subscriber Busy
• Call Forwarding on No Reply
• Call forwarding on Mobile Subscriber Not Reachable
• Call Transfer
• Mobile Access Hunting
• Call :Waiting
G • Call Hold
* Completion of Call to Busy Subscriber
• Three Party Service
• Conference Calling
• Closed User Group
H • Advice of Charge
TATA CELLULAR 1·. U.O. l. [MOHAN, 1.J 203

* Freephone Service A
• Reverse Charging (Called or Calling MS)
' Barring of all Out going Calls
' Barring of Outgoing International Call except
those directed to the Home PLMN Country.
• Barring of all Incoming Calls
B
• Barring of Incoming Calls when Roaming outside
the Home PLMN Country."

The reliance placed by Mr. Kaura and learned Solicitor General on
paragraph 2.1.1. of Section III of Commercial conditions to include services
is not correct because that speaks of the obligations of the licensee. That C
is obvious as seen under :

"2.1 Obligations of the Licensee :

2.1.1 The Licensee shall operate and provide and the SER- ·
VICES. He will be solely responsible for the installation, network- D
ing, operation, treatment of the complaints, issue of bills to his
subscribers, collection of his component of the revenue, claims,
damages arising out of this operation."

In the judgment under appeal the High Court has observed :
E
"Thus, one lakh lines carrying 10 marks was considered
equivalent to 80,000 lines with GSM Lines. Even otherwise the
respondents say that this had no impact in the case of Bharti as
jts collaborators included Talkland who was on of the .largest
service providers in U .K. Experience of providing service was an F
Important consideration and experience of Talkland in computing
Bharti's foreign collaborators was correctly included in the com-
putations and, thus, its experience exceeded 2.51 Iakh lines. The
respondents say that Bharti was treated on this basis and not on
the basis of 80,000 lines. In support of this argument Mr. Gupta, G
learned Solicitor General, submitted that all services were to be
provided by the licensee, and though Talkland had no operating
experience it was having service experience for rendering service
to subscribers which was an important factor. A subscriber is more
concerned with the service than as to how the Cellular Telephone
operates. The service would be of any type like billing, correction H
204 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A of de~ects in hand sets, shifting of phones, etc. The operation said
service though go hand in hand we do not find anything wrong in
taking into account the experience of Talkland which has been
done by the respondents."

We are unable to support this finding as it clearly ignores that
B Talkland never figure as a collaborator for Bharti Cellular. Further, ignor-
ing the disjunctive clause, two qualifications were sought to be subsumed
to give an undue advantage to Bharti Cellular. Besides, the nature of
service is as set out in Para 4 of Section IV as stated in Condition 1.4 of
Section Ill. Thus, we .hold, {borrowing the words of Donaldson L.J. Emma
Hotels Ltd. v. Secretary of the State for Environment, [1980[ 41 P & CR 255"
C we could not see on what basis the Committee had reached its conclusion".

If, after excluding the experience of Talkland, whether still Bharti
Cellular could fulfil the requisite qualification, namely, 80,000 GMS lines
and whether SFR France with EMTEL Mauritius had that experience are
D matters which require to the factually analysed. The Committee may decide
this factual aspect as on the date on which the offer was made i.e. 20th
Jaouary, 1992. If the finding is.rendered in favour of Bharti Cellular it will
qualify.

The other "hidden criteria" alleged is about the same foreign col-
E laborator. The Chairman, Telecom Commission, in relation to these
criteria noted 'the element of competition will get vitiated if the two JV s
with a common foreign partner were to be selected to provide the service
at the same location.'

Concerning this criterion the attack against BPL System and
F Projects, its foreign collaborator came to be changed iii the middle aod yet
iii violation of the conditions laid down in Chapter 11, clause 7 of the
General Conditions. Originally, there were the following three foreign
collaborators:

1. Fraoce Telecom Mobile International Fraoce
G
2. McCaw Cellular Commns. Inc. USA

3. LCC Inc. USA

At the second stage of financial bid, the name of the third partner
H has come to be omitted. This is the argument of Mr. Soli J. Sorabjee aod
TATA CELLULAR v. U.0.1.[MOHAN,J.] 205

Mr. Harish Salve. The dropping of McCaw resulted iii a change of the A
joint venture which was not permissible. This is answered by Mr. F.S.
Nariman, as noted above, that .the deficiencies in tender conditions could
be condoned. This argument is supported by reference to GJ. Fernandez
v. State of Kamataka, [1990] 2 SCC 488 and Poddar Steel Corporation v.
Ganesh Engineering Works, [1991] 3 sec 273. The condition relating to B
change does not include the dropping out one condition of 2 or 3 col-
laborators. Further, this condition is not found in the tender documents
but only financial bid documents.

BPL Systems and Projects submitted its financial bid on 17.8.92. In
that bid McCaw was never shown. Inasmuch as the financial bid was C
received by BPL Systems and Projects only on 31.7.92 Condition No. 7 was
inapplicable or impossible of compliance because the dropping was before
Condition No. 7 was brought to the notice of BPL Systems and Projects.
Where, therefore, the financial bid came to be submitted on 17.8.92 no
question of alternation would ever arise. After all the object of the first
stage was only to short-list and not to allot the franchise. Therefore, there D.
is nothing wrong in the same.

In the financial bid clause 7 of Chapter II reads as follows :

"No change can be made in the Indian or foreign partners E
already indicated in the first stage bid.'

It is common case beiween the parties that originally the foreign
collaborators of BPL Systems and Projects were three, as mentioned above.

So this is the position at the first stage, on 16.5.92, when the evalua- F
tion took place. Clause 7 of Chapter II, quote above, forbids only change.

(Emphasis supplied)

On 17.8.92, when it submitted bid,. McCaw had been dropped out. G
It does not amount to a change of foreign collaborator. Still, the original_
two remained. There is no change in joint venture. This does not violate
Clause 7 of Chapter II. (Emphasis supplied)

Mr. F.S. Nariman has rightly placed reliance on the abovesaid two
rulings relevant passages are quoted as under : H
206 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1994] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A In GJ. Fernandes v. State of Kamataka, (1990] 2 SCC 488 at pages
499 to 501, in paragraphs 13 to 15 this Court inter alia observed :

"....... In the first place, although, as we have explained above,
para V cannot but be read with para I and that the supply of some
of the documents referred to in para V is indispensable to assess
B
whether the application fulfils the pre- qualifying requirements set
out in para I, it will be too extreme to hold that the omission to
supply every small detail referred to in VI would affect the
eligibility under para I and disqualify the tenderer. The question
how far the delayed supply, or omission to supply, any one or more
c of the details referred to therein will affect any of the pre-qualifying
conditions is a matter which it is for the KPC to assess. We have
seen that the documents having a direct bearing on para I viz.
rngarding output of concrete and brick work had been supplied
in time. The delay was only in supply the details regarding "hollow
cement blocks" and to what extent this lacuna affected the condi-
D
tions in para I was for the KPC to assess.

Secondly, whatever may be the interpretation that a court may
place on the NIT, the way in which the tender documents issued
by it has been understood and implemented by the KPC is ex-
E . plained in its "note", makes it clear that the KPC took the view
that para I alone incorporated the "minimum pre-qualify-
ingieligibility conditions " and the data called for under para V was
in the nature "general requirements". It further clarifies that while
tenders will be issued ordy to those who comply with the pre-
F qualifying conditions, any deficiency in the general requirements
will not disqualify the applicant from receiving tender documents
and that data regarding these requirements could be supplied later.
Right or wrong, this was the way they had understood the standard
stipulations and on the basis of which it had processed the applica-
tions for contracts all along. The minutes show that they did not
G deviate or want to deviate from this established procedure in
regard to this contract. They ordy decided, in view of the conten-
tions raised by the appellant that para V should also be tre.ated as
part of the pre-qualifying conditions, that they would make it
specific and dear in their future N!Ts that only the fulfillment of
H pre-qualifying conditions would be mandatory. If a party has been
TATA CELLULAR v. U.0.1. [MOHAN, J.] '2IJ7

consistently and bona fide interpreting the standards prescribed A
by it in a particular manner, we do not think this Court should
interfere though it may be inclined to read or construe the condi-
tions differently. We are, therefore, of opinion that the High Court
was right in declining to interfere.

Thir4ly, the conditions and stipulations in a tender notice like B
this ha~e two types of consequences. The first is that the party
issuing the. tender has the right to punctiliously and rigidly enforce
them. Thus, if a party does not strictly comply with the require-
ments of 11ara III, V or VI of the NIT, it is open to the KPC to
decline to considei'i the party for the contract and if a party comes C
to court saying that the KPC should be stopped from doing so, the
court will decline relief. The second consequence, indicated by this
Court in earlier decisions, is not that the KPC cannot deviate from
these guidelines in all in any station but that any deviation, if made,
should not result in arbitrariness or discrimination.'
D
In Poddar Steel Corporation v. Ganesh Engineering Works, (1991] 3
SCC 273 at page 276, in paragraph 6, this Court observed :

"....... As a matter of general proposition it cannot be held that
an authority inviting tenders is bound to give effect to every term E
mentioned in the notice in meticulous detail, and' is not entitled to
waive even a technical irregularity of little or no significance. The
requirements in a tender notice can be classified into two
categories - those which lay down the essential conditions of
eligibility and the others which are merely ancillary or subsidiary
with the main/object to be achieved by the conditions. In the first F
case the authority issuing the tender may be required to enforce
them rigidly. In the other cases it must be open to the authority to
deviate from and not to insist upon the strict literal compliance of
the conditions in appropriate cases."
G
The High Court observed thus :

"We also do not find any error on the part of the respondents
in treating the financial bid of BPL in order if at the stage BPL
dropped one of its three foreign collaborators (Which were named
by it at the technical bid stage) as otherwise financial bid satisfied H
208 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1994] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A all the criteria and dropping of one of the collaborators made no
difference."

It further observed :

"We, therefore, find that stand of the petitioner .that any undue
B preference had been given to some of the companies cannot be
upheld. We ~ven otherwise do not find that deviation or relaxation
in .the stand~rds prescribed has resulted in any arbitrariness or
discrimination. (See in this connection G.J. Fernandez v. State of
Karnataka, (1990] 2 SCC 488. We do not think it is necessary for
C us to go into each and every deficiency as us to go into each and
every deficiency as alleged by the petitioner we find that the action
ofthe respondents had been bona fide. Motivation is providing of
best possible service to the consumers.''

We are in agreement with this finding.
D
Yet another attack that is made against BPL Systems and Projects is
tha,t it submitted its application for foreign collaborator on 22.4.92 to SIA
beyond the cut-off date of 31.3.92. It should not loom large because there
was a confusion as to who was competent authority to receive the applica-
E tion. As a matter of fact BPL Systems and Projects did submit its applica-
tion (or foreign collaboration on 31.3.92 to the Reserve Bank of India.
When that application was returned on 20th April, 1992 it came to be sent
to SIA on 22.4.92. We do not think BPL Systems and Projects could be
faulted on this score. Equally, the argument that the memorandum and
articles do not mean cellular business does not merit acceptance at our
F hand. In fact, the High Court has correctly construed the main object,
namely, to .design, develop, fabricate, manufacture, assemble, exporting
from and importing into India by self or otherwise dealing and act as
consultants and render services in connection with all kinds of telecom-
munication equipments as including cellular telephones.
G Now we go on to Huchison Max. It came to be rejected by the TEC,
Relevant note dated 9.. 10.92 Inter alia reads as follows :

: "Huchison Max : Non-compliance of operative and Financial
Conditions laid down in Chapter III at the time of opening of
H Financial Bids. They have accepted these conditions, through a
TATACELLULAR v. U.0.1.[MOHAN,J.] 209

letter, explaining their earlier non-compliance as typographical A
error."

Section II, General Conditions, para 3 states as under :

"3 Compliance :
B
Point to point compliance report in respect of Technical, Com-
mercial and views on Financial conditions must be submitted.
Deviation, if any, must be separately highlighted. In case com-
pliance report is not enclosed with the offer, the offer shall not be
considered. u
c
The proforma of the compliance statement is in the following form :

''This company hereby agrees to fully comply with all Te.chni-
cal, Commercial and General Conditions of Tender document No.
44-24/91-MMC including amendments/clarifications issued by the D
Department of Telecom without any deviations and reservations.

This company also hereby agrees to fully comply with all
paragraphs of Chapter II General Conditions, Chapter III :
Operating Conditions, Chapter IV: Financial Conditions and
Chapter V : Tariffs of document number 44-24/91 MMC(FINAN- E
CIAL) without any deviations and reservations,

Signature of the authorised signatory of the bidder/operating
company

for and on behalf of----------------------- F
The compliance statement, as submitted by (Name of the company)"
Huchison Max Telecom is as under :

'Compliance Statement
G
This company hereby agrees to fully comply with all Technical,
Commercial and General conditions of Tender document No.
44-24/91-MMC including amendments/clarifications issued by the
Department of Telecom without any deviations and reservations.

This company also hereby agrees to fully comply with an· H
210 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1994] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A paragraphs of Chapter II: General Conditions and Chapter V:
Tariffs of Document number 44-24/91-MMC(FINANCIAL)
without any deviations and reservations.

Signature of the authorised signatory of the bidder/operating
company.
B
For and on .behalf of HUTCHISON MAX TELECOM
PRIVATE LIMITED

Sd/-

c (ASHWANI WINDLASS)
DIRECTOR'".

In all the four separate tender documents similar compliance state-
ments were filed.
D Therefore, obviously, there is no reference to either Chapter III:
Operating Conditions or Chapter IV: Financial Conditions. It has already
been noted that for the second stage the last date for filing tender docu-
ment was 17.8.92. On 11.9.92, Hutchison Max wrote a letter to the Minister
for State for Communication about the inadvertant error due to a typo-
E graphical/clerical mistake in not referring to Chapter Ill or Chapter IV. It
is relevant to note that in the concluding paragraph of that letter it is stated:

"We reiterate and reconfirm OUF unequivocal compliance
without any reservations and deviations with the said tender con-
ditions: Accordingly, enclosed herewith is a corrected Compliance
F Statement duly signed by the authorised signatory of the Company
which may kindly be taken on regard."

The proper Compliance Statement came to be filed later. Since it
had not filed a proper Compliance Statement it had come to be excluded
G (which knowledge was gained by it) it made representations to the Chair-
man, Telecom Commission and the Prime Minister. According to Mr. K.K.
Venugopal it is an accidental omission amounting to a clerical error. In
support of this he cites Mofett Hodgkins & Clarke Company v. City of
Rochester, 178 US Supreme Court Reports 1108. The Headnote reads:

H "A mistake in the proposals by a bidder for a contract with a
TATA CELLULAR v. U.0.1.[MOHAN,J.J 211

city, which is promptly declared by an agent of the bidder as soon A
as it is discovered and before the city has done anything to alter
its condition, will not bind the the bidder by reason of a provision
in the city charter that in a bid shall not be withdrawn or canceled
until the board shall have let the contract."

At page 1115 it reads: B

'The compliant is not endeavoring 'to withdraw or cancel a bid or
bond.' the bill proceeds upon the theory that the bid upon which
the defendants acted was not the complainant's bid; that the
complainant was no more responsible for it than if it had been the
result of agraphia or the mistake of a acopyist or printer. In other
words, that the proposal read at the meeting of the board was one
which the complainant never inten.ded to make, and that the minds
of the parties never met upon a contract based thereon. If the
defendants are correct in their contention there is absolutely no
redress for a bidder for public work, no matter how aggravated or D
palpable his blunder. The moment his proposal is opened by the
executive board he is held as in a grasp of steel. There is no remedy,
no escape. If, through an error of his clerk, he has agreed to do
work worth #1,000,000 for #10, he must be held to the strict letter
of his contract, while equity stands by with folded hands and sees
him driven into bankruptcy. The defendants ' position admits of E
no compromise, no exception, no middle ground. (82 Fed. Rep.
256)"

The alternate submission is the question of even clerical error does
not arise here because one month before acceptance Hutchison Max had
sent the compliance form. Where the matter is purely technical the court F
should not exercise the power of judicial review. We find great force in this
submission. We are clearly of the opinion that the mistake is in relation to
a non-essential matter that is in relation to peripheral or collateral matter.
There has been every intention to comply with the terms of the bid. For
an accidental omission it cannot be punished. We concur with the High G
Court.

Regarding Sterling Cellular the note dated 9.10.92 inter alia states as
under:

"This J.V. has the Indian partner M/s. Sterling Computers Ltd. H
212 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1994] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A which is under investigation by CBI, in respect of their dealings
with MTNL for publication of directions. Delhi H.C. has in recent
judgment passed strictures on the deal. The Joint Venture has,
·therefore, been excluded from consideration. CBI report is, how-
ever, yet to be received and formal blacklisting proposal in respect
of the first has not been initiated so far. Exclusion has therefore
B to be justified."

Note dated 10.10.92 reads as follows:

"MOS (C) further discussed the case with me today, when M(s)
was present.
c
'He indicated that after examining the reasons for elimination
of the six short-listed parties from consideration for selection, he
is of the opinion that Mis. Sterling Cellular need not be excluded
outright, since CBI report has not yet been received. The company
D ~ay be considered for selection and included in the select list on
a provisional basis, if found eligible otherwise ..Similarly, Mis
indian Telecom Ltd. (partner OIC Australia) need not be
eliminated just because they have desired exclusive license. We
may offer them the license on a non-exclusive basis, if they are
found eligible. It is upto them to convey acceptance to the offer.
E Exclusion of other four companies can stand for reasons indicated.

I have examined the case again. I recommend that if Mis.
Sterling Cellular is to be selected on a ·provisional basis, the
·company may be allotted Madras for following reasons:
F (a) Foreign exchange investment profile submitted by the com-
pany indicates that there will be a heavy F.E. outflow over 3 years
if the company were to be allotted Bombay or Delhi.

(b) Madras is the least popular of the stations along with
Calcutta. Rentals quoted are high as pointed in our earlier note.
G
Mis. Usha Martin will help bring down the rentals in Calcutta.
Allotment of Mis. Sterling to Madras will achieve the same pur-
pose.

(c) Any delay in allotment of license to Mis Sterling on account
H of the CB.I. investigations will have the least adverse effect in
TATA CELLULAR v. U.0.1.[MOHAN,J.] 213

Madras for lack of competition to other licensee. A

M(S) may kindly examine the again in the light of the observa-
tions of MOS(C) and ·rework out the select list. The case may be
put up for approval of MOS(C).

Then it came to be selected on the approval of the Minister. B

The High Court in upholding the selection observed thus:

"The case of Sterling Cellular, however, appears to us to be
rather strange. There were no strictures against the holding of this
company by the name Sterling Computers Ltd. in M/s. M. & N C
Publications Limited v. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Limited and
Others, (1992) 4 DLT 24 by this Court and the strictures were only
against MTNL and United India Periodicals Pvt. Ltd. (UPI) and
United Database (India Pvt. Ltd. (UDI). M/s. Sterling Computers
Ltd. had got associated with UP!/UDI in getting a supplementary D
agreement for publication of telephone directories for the cities of
Bombay & Delhi. This Supplementary agreement was struck down.
The Supreme Court in appeal Sierling Computers Limited v. M/s.
M & N Publications Limited and others, JT (1993) 1S.C.187 against
that judgment also did not appear to have made any strictures.
There was nothing on the record of the respondents to suggest E
that any CBI enquiry was pending against this company. There was
no FIR and no preliminary report adverse to the company and we
feel the ghost of CBI has been unnecessarily brought into play.
The company appears to have been punished for no sin of its.
However, since the company has not complained we will leave the
matter at that.11 F

It is submitted hy Mr. Parasaran that as on the date of the judgment
no inquiry was pending. It was only after 10th of June, 1993 an FIR was
filed by CBI when the High Court of Madras was approached for quashing
the FIR under Section 482 Cr. P.C. An order by consent was passed. CBI G
was allowed to proceed with the investigation and complete the same
within one year. It was also ordered that there would be no arrest or
harassment. Therefore, as on the date of selection there was no adverse
report against Sterling Computers.

On the date of consideration by the Technical Evaluation Committee H
214 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A its position was even better. If, therefore, this aspect had been borne in
mind it is not for us to reweigh the claims and come to one conclusion or
another. So much for selections.

A letter dated 27.8.93 by Departmet of Communications, Telecom
Commissi.on was addressed to the appellants as follows :
B
"Department of Telecommunications
{Telecom Commission)
New Delhi-110001

No. 842-2/92-TM Dated : 27th August, 1993
c
To:

Sub.: Tender No.44-21/91-MMC(FIN) for franchise for
cellular mobile telephone service for Bombay Delhi,
E Calcutta and Madras.

Kindly refer this office letter of even No. dated 2.10.92 inform-
ing your that M/s. Tata Cellular Ltd. were provisionally selected
for franchise for providing cellular mobile telephone service at
Delhi on a non-exclusive basis.
F
That matter has been reconsidered in the light of the judgment
delivered by the High Court of Delhi in this case and a revised list
of provisionally selected bidders in the cities of Bombay, Delhi,
Calcutta and Madras has been prepared. The revised list does not
include mobile telephone service in any of the four cities. the
G
earlier letter of even No. dated 12.10.92 may therefore be treated
as cancelled.

sd/-
{S.K.GARG) 27.08.93
H DDG {TM-'
TATACELLUL~ v. U.0.1.(MOHAN,J.) 215

From this letter we are not able to fathom the reason for omission. A
As seen above, Tata Cellular was originally selected for Delhi. By im-
plementation of the judgment of the High Court it has been left out. Before
doing so, as rightly urged by Mr. Soli, J. Sorabjee, this appellant ought to
have been heard. Therefore, there is a clear violation of the principle of
natural justice. On an overall view we find it has two distinctive quaJifica-
B
tions. In that :

1. It has not borrowed from any commercial bank.

2. It has an annual turnover from Indian Parameters of Rs. 12,000
crores and the annual turnover of the foreign parameters, Rs. 51,000 C
crores. Comparatively speaking, the other companies do not possess such
high credentials yet it has been awarded low marks with regard to the
· reliance on Indian public financial institutions and the financial strength of
the parameters/partner companies.

· .These qualifications could have been validly urged had it been heard. D
Then, we do not know what decision could have been arrived at.

Indian Telecomp had been omitted for the following reasons as
indicated in note dated 9.10.92 :

"India Telecom (Partner Telecom Malaysia): E
Limited experience. Telecom Malaysia already selected as
partner of Mis. Usha Martin ICC Calcutta."

We cannot find fault with this reasoning since there can be only one
foreign collaborator. It cannot have Telecom Malaysia as its collaborator
F
since Usha Martin has the same foreign collaborator.

In the case of Ashok Leyland, the noting, as seen above, is as under:

"In both cases of _(i) M/s. Ashok Leyland and (ii) Mis. Varn <;J
Organic Chemicals Ltd. - a joint venture company has not been ·
formed as stipulated in the tender, and there is no indication of
the enquity structure or the extent of participation of the foreign
collaborators."

We cannot interfere with the discretion of the Committee. H
216 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1994] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A In thJ above two cases, we are obliged to interfere on the ground of
arbitrariness. and violation of the principle of natural justice confining
ourselves to the doctrine of judicial restraint, however, by the application
of permissible parameters to set right rite decision-making process (Em-
phasis supplied)
B We make it clear that we are not disturbing the other selections since
the power of judicial review is not an appeal from the decision. We cannot
substitute. our decision since we do not have the necessary expertise to
review.

C Lastly, quashing may involve heavy administrative burden and lead
to delay, increased and unbudgeted expenditure; more so, in a vital field
like telecommunication.

In view of the foregoing, we thus reach the conclusion that Bharti
Cellular could not claim the experience to Talkland. This conclusion has
D come to be arrived at on the basis of the parameters we have set out in
relation to the scope of judicial review. We may reiterate that it is not our
intention to substitute our opinion to that of the experts. Apart from the
fact that the Court is hardly equipped to do so, it would not be desirable
either .. Where the selection or rejection is arbitrary, certainly this Court
E would interfere.

· In the result, we hold that Bharti Cellular's claim based on Talkland's
experience is incorrect. Talkland's experience will have to be excluded. The
matter will have to be reconsidered on a factual basis as on 20th January, ·
1992, in the light of what we have observed. The claim of Tata Cellular will
F have to be reconsidered in the light of the above observations. Accordingly,
civil appeals arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 14191-94 of 1993 will stand
allowed. Civil Appeals arising out ofSLP{C) No. 14266 of 1993, SLP{C)
No. 17809 of 1993 and T.C. (C) No. 49 or 1993 will stand dismissed with
no order as to costs.

B.K.M. Appeals disposed of.