Supreme Court of India
TARA CHAND AND ANR.versusRAM PRASAD
- Citation
- 1990 INSC 184
- Decided
- 3 May 1990
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Bench
- K N SAIKIA
Holding
Tenancy rights are heritable; the heirs of a deceased tenant step into the tenant's shoes and are entitled to the protection of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, and the amendment act does not divest their vested rights.
Summary
Anandi Bai held a shop in Jaipur under an 11‑month lease that was terminated by a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, but she continued in possession and paid rent, becoming a statutory tenant. She died in September 1966 and her heirs (the appellants) were sued for ejectment by the landlord, who argued that the heirs had no right to occupy the premises. The trial court dismissed the suit, holding that Anandi Bai was a holding‑over tenant, but the Rajasthan High Court reversed, saying the heirs were not entitled to the benefits of the amended definition of "tenant" because they had not carried on the business with her. The Supreme Court held that under the Hindu Succession Act the heirs inherit the lease‑hold interest and are entitled to the protection of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, and that the 1976 amendment does not divest their vested rights. It affirmed that tenancy rights are heritable even after termination and that a statutory tenant retains an estate or interest in the premises. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeal, restored the trial court’s decree and dismissed the landlord’s suit. The decision underscores that heirs of a deceased tenant step into the shoes of the tenant and enjoy statutory protection against eviction.
Issues considered
- Whether tenancy rights under the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act are heritable and can be claimed by the heirs of a deceased statutory tenant.
- Whether the 1976 Amendment Act's definition of "tenant" requiring heirs to have carried on the business with the deceased tenant applies to the present case.
- Whether the landlord can evict the heirs under the grounds enumerated in Section 13(1) of the Act.
- Whether a tenant who continues in possession after termination retains an estate or interest in the premises.
Legislation cited
Subjects
heritable tenancystatutory tenantevictionsuccessionRajasthan Premises Actlandlord-tenant lawleasehold rightsholding over
Judgment
TARA CHAND AND ANR.
A
v.
RAM PRASAD
~-
MAY 3, 1990
[K.N. SAIKIA AND K. RAMASWAMY, JJ.] B
Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1950:Sec-
tion 13( ])-Tenancy rights-Whether heritable-Heirs of tenant-
Whether entitled to enjoy protection of Act.
Smt. Anandi Bai wife of Appellant No. 1 and mother of Appellant
No. 2 had a lease of suit shop in Jaipur for a period of 11 months c
beginning May 1, 1964 wherein she was carrying on small kiraua
business. The Respondent-landlord terminated the lease by a notice
issued under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act at the end of
the term of the lease. However Anandi Bai continued to remain in
possession and the landlord went on accepting the rent even after the D
termination of her tenancy and thus she became a statutory tenant. She
died sometime in September 1966. Respondent-landlord initiated action
for ejectment of her heirs-the appellants herein from the demised shop
on the ground that on the death of Anandi Bai the appellants have no
right to continue in occupation of the premises. The trial court dismis-
sed the suit on the finding that Anandi Hai paid and the respondent E
accepted the rent after the determination of the lease, so she was hold-
ing over. The first appellate court confirmed the decree of the trial
court though on different grounds. Second appeal by the plaintiff-
landlord was allowed by the High Court holding that since the heirs of
the tenant had not carried on the business with Anandi Bai during her
life time as family business they were not entitled to the benefits of the F
definition of 'tenant' as amended by Section 3(ii) of the Rajasthan Pre-
mises (Control) of Rent and Eviction) Amendment Act, 14 of 1976 and
accordingly reversing thd decrees of the conrts below, the suit for eject-
ment of the appellaitts from the demised shop was decreed.
Allowing the appeal by special leave against the Judgment and G
Decree of the High Court preferred by the heirs of the tenant Anandi
Bai, this Court,
HELD: Under Hindn Succession Act the heirs of the deceased
~1
tenant are entitled to succeed, not only to his/her· business but
also to his /her tenancy rights under the Rent Act which protects the H
7
8 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1990] 3 S.C.R.
heirs from ejectment except in accordance with that Act. Therefore,
A despite the termination of the tenancy, the tenancy rights are heritable
and the heirs of the tenant are entitled to enjoy the protection of the
Act. [ISA-BJ
Admittedly Smt. Anandi Bai was. inducted into possession of the
B demised property under a contract of tenancy which was determined by
issuance of a notice under Section 106 of Transfer of Property Act.
Even thereafter she continued to remain in possession as statutory ten-
ant under the Act. The finding of the Trial Court as affirmed by the
•
First Appellate Court is that the respondent landlord after termination
of tenancy received the rent from her and thereby she became tenant
c holding over till the date of her death. [18F-G]
...
The appellants by virtue of intestate succession under Hindu
Succession Act, being Class I heirs, succeeded to the heritable interest
in the lease hold right of the demised premises held by Smt. Anandi Bai.
They, thereby, stepped into the shoes of the tenant. They continued to
D remain in possession as on the date of the suit as statutory tenants.
Thereby, they are entitled to the protection of their continuance as a
statutory tenant under the Act. [19B-C]
J.C. Chaterjee v. Sri Kishan, [1973] 1 SCR850; Damadilal & Ors.
v. Parashram & Ors., [1976] Suppl. SCR645;Anand Niwas (Pvt.) Ltd.
E v. Anandji Kalyanji Pedhi & Ors., [1964] 4 SCR 892; Smt. Gian Devi
Anand v. Jeevan Kumar & Ors., [1985] Suppl. SCR l; V. Dhanpal
Chattiar v. Yesodai Ammal, [1980] 1 SCR 334"' and Bhavarlal
Labhchand v. Kanaivalal Nathalal Intawala, [1986] 1 SCC 571,
referred to.
F CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICITON: Civil Appeal No. 5052
of 1985.
'
From the Judgment and Order dated 5.7.1989 of the Rajasthan
High Court in Regular Civil Second Appeal No. 240 of 1978.
G B.D. Sharma for the Appellants.
D. Bhandari for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
H K. RAMASWAMY, J. 1. The appellants had leave under
TARA CHAND v. RAM PRASAD [RAMASWAMY, J.l 9
Article 136 to appeal against the judgment and decree of the High
A
Court of Rajasthan at Jaipur Bench in Second Appeal No. 240 of 1978
dated July 5, 1985 reversing the decrees of the Courts below and
decreeing the suit for ejectment of the appellants from the demised
shop in Jaipur. The facts lie in a short compass: that Smt. Anandi, wife
of the first appellant and the mother of the second appellant, Nand
Kishore had lease of the demised premises for 11 months from May l, B
1964 on payment of monthly rent of Rs.18 which expired on March 31,
1965. The respondent landlord terminated the lease by a notice under
section 106 of Transfer of Property Act but she remained in possession
and enjoyment of the shop carrying on small kirana business. She died
in September, 1966. The demised premises are governed by the Ra-
j as than Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 (Act 26 of
1950 for short the 'Act'). Section 13( 1) thereof, postulates c
that "notwithstanding anything contained in any law or a contract, no
court shall pass any decree or make any order in favour of the land-
lord, whether in execution of a decree or otherwise evicting the tenant
so long as he is ready and willing to pay rent thereof to the full extent
allowable by the Act" unless the landlord proves to the satisfaction of D
the court any one of the grounds enumerated in Clauses 'a' to 'k'
thereof. The action for ejectment was initiated by the respondent on
the premise that on the death of the tenant, the appellants have no
right to continue in occupation of the demised premises. The findings
recorded by all the courts are that Smt. Anandi was the tenant. The
'f appellants during her life time, had not carried on the business with E
her till date of her death. The Trial Couri dismissed the suit on the
ground that Smt. Anandi paid and the respondent accepted the rent
after determination of the lease. So she was a tenant holding over.
During the pendency of the appeal, the Act was amended through
Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Ordinance 26 of
1975 which was replaced by Act 14 of 1976 (for short the 'Amendment F
Act'). Therein the definition of '.Tenant' was amended by Section 3(ii)
of the Amendment Act introducing to Section 3 Clause (vii}, thus:
"(vii) "tenant" means-
(a) The person by whom or on whose account or behalf G
rent is, or, but for a contract express or implied, would
be payable for any premises to his landlord including
the person who is continuing in its possession after the
termination of his tenancy otherwise than by a decree
for eviction passed under the provisions of this Act;
~ H
10 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1990) 3 S.C.R.
(b) In the event of death of the person as is referred to in
A
sub-clause (a), his surviving spouse, son, daughter and
other heir in accordance with the personal law applic-
able to him who had been, in the case of premises
leased out for residential purposes, ordinarily residing
and in the case of premises leased out for commercial
B or business purposes, ordinarily carrying on business
with him in such premises as member of his family upto
his death."
Consequently, the appellants amended the written statement
adding therein paragraphs Nos. 16 and 17 contending that they have
been jointly carrying on the business in the demised premises along-
c with Smt. Anandi Bai, therefore, they are entitled to the continuance
of the tenancy. The amendment was allowed by the Appellate Court
and it called for a finding from the Trial Court in that regard. After
giving an opportunity to both the parties to adduce evidence afresh the
Court recorded the finding in the negative. On its receipt and consid-
D eration thereof the appellate court affirmed the finding but confirmed
the decree of the Trial Court on other grounds. The High Court held
that,as the appellants had not carried on the business with the tenant
during her life time as family business they were not entitled to the
benefit of the amended definiti0~ of the tenant. Accordingly decreed
the suit.
E
(2) The contention of the learned counsel for the appellants is
that the lease hold right is an heritable estate and on death of the
tenant in September, 1966, the succession thereto was opened and the
appellants, being Class I heirs under the Hindu Succession Act, 1956
·inherited by intestate succession the lease hold estate in the tenancy
F rights held by Smt. Anandi. The said right received express recogni-
tion under the Amendment Act which is not in derogation to the
personal law. The High Court, thereby, committed manifest error of
law. Shri Dalveer Bhandari, learned counsel for the respondent, on
thorough preparation of the case, has vehimently resisted the conten-
tion. He also circulated written arguments. According to him preced-
G ing the Amendment Act the commercial or business tenancy was not
heritable as held in J.C. Chaterjee v. Sri Kishan. (1973) 1 SCR 850 bv
the High Courts of Rajasthan, Punjab and Haryana and Delhi. For the
first llme the right to succession has been created under the Amend-
ment Act. The finding recorded by all the courts is that during the life
time and till the date of death of the tenant, Smt. Anandi, the appel-
H !ants did not carry on business with her as family business in the
TARA CHAND v. RAM PRASAD [RAMASWAMY, J.] 11
demised premises. On determination of tenancy the appellants became
A
trespassers. Thereby the appellants became disentitled to remain in
)· possession of the demised premises. It is seen that Section 13( 1) of the
'·· Act engrafts n.on obstenti clause, namely, "notwithstanding anything
contained in any law or contract no court shall pass any decree of
evict10n against-the tenant so long as the tenant is ready and willing to
pay ·rent therefor to the full extent allowable by the Act" unless one B
or other ground or grounds specified in Clauses 'a' to 'k' of sub-section
( 1) of Section 13 are established. Admittedly, the settled legal position
-__,.· preceding theamendment act, prevailing in the State ofRajasthan was
that the lease hold rights of the tenanted premises for commercial or
business purposes governed by the Act is not heritable. It is a personal
right to the tenant. A reading of the amendment to the definition of
'tenant' in Section 3 Sub-Clause (vii)(b) makes the legislative intent
c
manifest that from the date of the Amendment Act came into force, on
the death of the tenant, his surviving spouse, son, daughter and other
-~· helf, in accordance with personal law as applicable to him, who had
been, in the case of the premises leased out for residential purposes,
ordinarily residing and, in the case of premises leased out for commer- D
cial or business purposes, ordinarily had been carrying on business
with him/her in such premises as members of his/her family upto his/
her death. Therefore, under the amended definition of tenant, if one
seeks to make avail of the benefit of statutory tenancy under the Act,
he must establish to the satisfaction of the court that the surviving
'< spouse, son or daughter and other heir, in case ofresidential purposes, E
he/she/they-ordinarily had been residing in the premises along with
the tenant and continued to do so till date of death of the tenant.
Similarly, in respect of premises leased out for commercial or business
purposes it must be established that the surviving spouse or son or
daughter and the heir as the case may be ordinarily had been carrying
on the business during the life time of the tenant as memebrs of the F
family in the demised premises and continued to do the business till
date of the death of the tenant. In other words to avail of the statutory
right under section 3( viii)(b) there must continue to subsist the unity of
action and continuity of membership of the family between the
deceased tenant and the spouse etc. The break in either of the links
snaps off the right denuding the continuity of the statutory tenancy. G
(3) Every tenancy is founded, initially, upon a contract. The
contractual tenant has an estate or property in the lease·hold interest
of the tenancy and his heritability is an incidence of the tenancy.
Despite termination of the tenancy this Court ecologised the resultant
consequences in Damadilal & Ors. v. Parashram & Ors., [1976] Suppl.
12 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1990) 3 S.C.R.
A SCR 645 in which three Judges Bench held that:
"It cannot be assumed, however, that with the determina-
tion of the tenancy the estate must necessarily disappear
and the statute can only preserve his status of irremovabi-
lity and not the estate he had in the premises in his
B occupation.''
The facts in that case were that the tenancy of business premises
was governed by the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act,
1961. The contracted tenancy was determined and a suit for eviction
from a shop was laid in the Civil Coµrt against the tenant. During its
C pendency he died and his legal representatives were sought to come on
record which was resist~d. The word 'tenant' had been defined under-
section 2(1) of that Act, thus:
"a person by whom or on whose account or behalf the rent
of any accommodation is, or, but for a contract express or
0 implied would be payable for any accommodation and in-
cludes any person occupying the accommodation as a sub-
tenant and also any person continuing in possession after
the termination of his tenancy whether before or after the
commencement of this Act; but shall not include any
person against whom any order or decree for eviction has
E been made".
fhe definition is the same as in the present case on hand under
Clause (a) of Sec. 3(vii) of the Rajasthan Act. It was contended that
the tenancy came to a terminus with its determination by issuance of
notice under section 106 of Transfer of Property Act and the legal
F representatives do not succeed to the estate of the deceased tenant
so as to prosecute the proceedings. While repelling that contention,
noticing the definition referred to above, Gupta, J. speakng for the
court held that:
"The definition makes a person continuing in possession
G after the determination of his tenancy a tenant unless a
decree or order for eviction has been made against him,
thus putting him on par with a person whose contractual
• tenancy still subsists. T:,e incidents of such tenancy and a
contractual· tenancy must, therefore, be the same unless
any provision of the Act conveY.ed a contrary intentior •.
H That under this Act such a tenant retains an interest in the
TARA CHAND v. RAM PRASAD [RAMASWAMY, J.l 13
premises, anct not merely a personal right of occupation, A
will also appear from section 14 which contains provisions
restricting the tenant's power of subletting ......
There is nothing to suggest that this section does not apply
to all tenants as defined in Section 2(i). A contractual
tenant has an estate or interest in premises from which he B
carves out what he gives lo the sub-tenant. Section 14 read
with section 2(i) makes it clear that the so-called statutory
tenant has the right to sub-let in common with a contractual
tenant and this is because he also has an interest in the
premises occupied by him."
Accordingly it was held that they succeeded as legal representa-
c
tives to the lease-hold interest of the commercial premises.
( 4) How to resolve the controversy between the ratio therein and
that of ma1ority contra view taken in Anand Niwas (Pvt.) Ltd. v.
Anandji Kalyanji Pedhi & Ors., [1964) 4 SCR 892 and Jagdish Chander D
Chaterjee & Ors. v. Sri Kishan & Anr., (supra), the later case on which
heavy reliance was placed by Mr. Dalveer Bhandari that arose directly
under the Rajasthan Rent Control Act, referred to the Constitution
Bench in Smt. Gian Devi Anand v. Jeevan Kumar & Ors., [1985)
Suppl. SCR 1. The facts therein were that the definition of tenant
under .the unamended Delhi Rent Control Act, similar to Section E
3(vii)(a) of the Act was in vogue in the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958.
The premises in question therein was commercial premises. The
-
definition of tenant was amended with retrospective effect. The con-
tention raised was thai the amenctect Act accords heritability to resi-
dential tenancy while omitting the benefit to commercial or business
tenancy. The legal representatives of the deceased tenant, did not F
acquire heritable interest in the commercial tenancy under that Act.
A.N. Sen, J. speaking for the Constitution Bench surveyed the case
law in extenso and upheld the view in Damadilal's case. It was held at
'
p. 24 to 25 thus:
"For an appreciation of the question it is necessary to un- G
derstand the kind of protection that is sought to be
afforded to a tenant under the Rent Acts and his status
after the termination of the contractual tenancy under the
Rent Acts. It is not in dispute that so long as the con-
tractual tenancy remains subsisting, the contractual
tenancy creates heritable rights; and, on the death of a H
14 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1990] 3 S.C.R.
contractual tenant, the heirs and legal representatives step
A
into the position of the contractual tenant, and in the same
way on. the death of a landlord the heirs and legal re-
presentatives of a landlord become entitled to all the rights
and privileges of the contractual tenancy and also come
under all the obligations under the contractual tenancy.
B The Rent Acts seek to preserve social harmony and pro-
mote social justice by sa.feguarding the in.terests of the
tenants mainly and at the same time protecting the legiti-
mate interests of the landlords. Though the purpose of the
various Rent Acts appear to be the same, namely, to pro-
mote social justice by affording protection to tenants
c
against undue harassment and exploitation by landlords,
providing at the same time for adequate safeguards of the
~
..
legitimate interests of the landlords, the Rent Acts un-
doubtedly lean more in favour of the tenants, for whose
benefit the Rent Acts are essentially passed. It may also
be noted that various amendments have been introduced to
D the various Rent Acts from time to time as and when situa-
tion so required for the purpose of mitigating the hardship
of tenants ..... Though provisions of all the Rent Controt
Legislation is that a contractual tenant on the termination
of the contractual tenancy is by virtue of the provisions of
the Rent Acts not liable to be evicted as a matter of course
E under the ordinary law of the land and he is entitled to
remain in possession even after determination of the con-
tractual tenancy and no order or decree for eviction will be
passed against a tenant unless any ground which entitles
F
the landlord to get an order or decree for possession
specified in the Act is established. In other words, the
common feature of every Rent Control Act is that if affords
--
protection to every tenant against eviction despite termina-
tion of tenancy except on grounds recognised by the Act
and no order or decree for eviction shall be passed against
the tenant unless any such ground is established to the
satisfaction of the Court ....... ,
G
(5) The seven Judges Bench of this Court reported in V.
Dhanpal Chattiar v. Yesodai Ammal. [1980 l 1 SCR 334 while consider-
ing the effect of termination of the tenancy under Section 106 of
Transfer of Property Act vis-a-vis right of the tenant under T .N. Build-
ings (Lease & Rent) Control Act, 1960 held that' various State Rent
H Control Acts make serious encroachment in the field of freedom of
TARA CHAND '· RAM PRASAD [RAMASWAMY, J.] 15
contract. It does not permit the landlord to snap his relationship with
A
the tenant merely by his act of serving a notice to quit on him. In spite
~ of the notice, the law says that he continues to be a tenant and he does
r so en joying all the rights of a lessee and at the same time is deem~d to
be under all the liabilities such as payment of rent etc., in accord-
ance with law. Similarly while considering the language of Section
10(1) of the A.P. Building (Lease, Rent and Eviction Control) Act, B
1960 similar to Section 13(1) of the Act, whether the statutory lease is
to be terminated by issuance of notice under Section 106 of the Trans-
fer of Property Act, it was further held at p. 352 B that "even a special
provision is provided by way of abundant precaution only that without
this a tenant continuing in p9ssession after the termination of the
contractual tenancy and until an eviction order is passed against him,
continues on the same terms and conditions as before and he cannot be c
evicted unless a ground is made out for his eviction according to the
-~ State Rent Act". In Gian Devi Anand's case the Constitution Bench
- - further held at p. 32 F that:
"The termination of the contractual tenancy in view of the D
definition of tenant in the Act does not bring about any
change in the status and legal position of the tenant, unless
there are contrary provisions in the Act; and the tenant
nowithstanding the termination of tenancy does enjoy an
estate or interest in the tenanted premises. This interest or
estate which the tenant under the Act, despite termination E
t of the contractual tenancy, continues to enjoy creates a
heritable interest in the absence of any provision to the
contrary ..... .
at p. 33E to Git was held that:
F
As the ~talus and rights of a contractual tenant even after
determination of his tenancy when the tenant is at times
described as the statutory tenant, are fully protected by the
Act and the heirs of such tenants become entitled by virtue
of the provisions of the Act to inherit the status and posi-
tion of the Statutory tenant on his death, the Legislature G
which has created this right has thought it fit u"i the case· of
residential premises to limit the rights of the heirs in the
manner and to the extent provided in Section 2(1) (iii). It
appears that the Legislature has not thought it fit to put
any such restrictions with regard to tenants in respect of
commercial premises in this Act." H
16 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1990] 3 S.C.R.
at p. 35D to G, it was observed that:
A
So long as the contractual tenancy of a tenant who carries -I!'
on the business continues, there can be no question of the
heirs of the deceased tenant not only inheriting the tenancy
but also inheriting the business and they are entitled to run
B and enjoy the same. We have earlier held that mere termi-
nation of the c?ntractual tenancy does not bring about any
change in the status of the tenant and the tenant by virtue
of the definition of the 'Tenant' in the Act and the other
Rent Acts continue to enjoy the same status and position
unless there be any provisions in the Rent Acts which indi-
cate to the contrary. The mere fact that in the Act no
c provision has been maqe with regard to the heirs of tenants
in respect of commercial tenancies on the death of the
tenant after termination of the tenancy, as has been done in
the case of heirs of the tenants of residential premises, does
not indicate that the legislature intended that the heirs of
D the tenants of commercial premises will cease to enjoy the
protection afforded to the tenant under the Act .. , ...
at p. 36 B to 37 A it was concluded that:
We are of the opinion that in case of commercial premises
E governed by the Delhi Act, the Legislature has not thought '1.
it fit in the light of the situation at Delhi to place any kind of
restriction on the ordinary law of innentance with regard to
succession. It may also be borne in mind that in case of
commercial premises the heirs of the deceased tenant not · (
only succeed to the tenancy rights in the premises but they
F succeed to the business as a whole. It might have been open
to the Legislature to limit or restrict the right of inheritance
with regard to the tenancy as the Legislature had done in r A..
the case of the tenancies with regard to the residential
houses but it would not have been open to the Legislature
to alter under the Rent Act, the Law of Succession regard-
G ing the business which is a valuable heritable right and
which must necessarily devolve on all the heirs in accord-
ance with law. The absence of any provision restricting the
heritability of the commercial tenancies notwithstanding ,_ .
the determination of the contractual tenancies will devolve
on the heirs in accordance with law and the heirs who step
H into the position of the deceased tenant will continue to
TARA CHAND 'v. RAM PRASAD [RAMASWAMY, J.) 17
enjoy the protection afforded by the Act and they can only
be evicted in accordance with the provisions of the A<:t. A
There is another· significant consideration which, in our
opinion, lends support to the view that we are taking.
Commercial premises are let out not only to individuals
bu.t aiso to Companies,. Corporation or anybody with
juristic personality, question of the death of the tenant will B
not arise. Despite the termination of the tenancy, the
Company or the Corporation or such juristic personalities,
'· however, will go on enjoying the protection afforded to the
tenant under the Act. It can hardly be conceived that the
Legislature would intend to deny to one class of tenants,
namely, individuals the protection which will be en j<?y.ed by
. the other class, namely, the Corporations and Companies c
and other bodies with juristic personality under the Act. If
it be held that commercial tenancies after the termination
of the contractual tenancy of the tenant are not heritable
on the death of the tenant and the heirs of the tenant are
not entitled to enjoy the protection under the Act, an D
irreparable mischief which the Legislature would never
have intended is likely to be caused."
(6) On the facts of the case it wa• held that the tenant who continues
lo r~mai!l_in possession even after the termination of the contractual
(
tenancy till a decree for eviction against him is passed, continues to E
have an estate or interest in the tenanted premises and tenancy rights
in respect of commercial premises are heritable. There is no provision
in the Act regulating the rights of its heirs to inherits the tenancy rights
of the tenanted commercial or business premises. The tenancy rights
devolved on the heirs under the ordinary law of succession. Accord-
ingly it was held that the tenancy rights of Wasti Ram devolved on all F
the heirs of Wasti Ram on his death. The ratio with equal force applies
to the facts of this case.
The unamended definition of tenant under section 3(vii) of the
Act reads thus:
G
"tenant" means the person by whom the rent is, 6r but
for a contract express or implied would be, payable for any
premises and includes any person holding or occupying the
premises as a sub-tenant, or any person continuing in
possession after the termination of a tenancy in his favour-
otherwise than under the provisions of the Act." H
18 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1990] 3 S.C.R.
This definition is mutatis mutandis same as the one defined under
A Madhya Pradesh Act and also the Delhi Rent Act. Equally it would be
the same under the amended clause 'a' of section 3(vii) with slight
elongation. Under Hindu Succession Act the heirs of the deceased
tenant are entitled to succeed, not only to his business, but also to his
tenancy rights under the Rent Act which protects the heirs from eject-
B ment e:i:cept in accordance with that Act. Therefore, despite the termi-
nation of the tenancy, the tenancy rights are heritable and the heirs of
the tenant are entitled to enjoy the protection of the Act.
(7) The ratio in Bhavarlal Labhchand Shah v. Kanaiya/al
Nathalal Intawala, [1986] 1SCC571 does not help the respondent. The
facts therein was that the tenant by testimentary disposition "will"
C bequeathed his occupancy rights in the tenanted property in favour of
the stranger legatee. The question was whether such a legatee is en-
titled to the benefit of continuance of tenancy under Bombay Rents,
Hotel and Lodging House Rules Control Act. 1947. It was held that
since the bequest was infavour of the third party, the testator thereby,
D cannot confer rights under the provisions the Rent Act on the stranger
who was not a member of the family. The march of law culminated in
Gian Devi Anand's case knocked of the bottom of A.C. Chaterjee's
ratio. Similarly the foundation in Sita Ram v. Govind, [1969] Weekly
Law Notes p. 108; Balkesh and another v. Shanti Devi and others,
repoted in 1972 Rent Control Tribunal p. 285 and Mohan Lalv. Jaipur
E Hosiery Mills Pvt. Ltd. reported in 1974 Rent Control Journal p. 240
has been shaken and no longer remam to oe good law.
(8) Admittedly Smt. Anandi was inducted into possession of the
demised property under a contract of tenancy which was determined
by issuance of notice under Section 106 of Transfer of Property Act.
r•
F Even thereafter she continued to remain in possession as statutory
tenant under the Act. The finding of Trial Court as affirmed by the
first appellate court is that the respondent landlord after termination
of tenancy received the rent from her and thereby she became tenant
holding over till date of her death.
G Smt. Anandi enjoyed the status as a statutory tenant of the pre-
mises even after the determination of the tenancy. Notwithstanding
the termination of the contractual tenancy the jural relationship of the
landlord and tenant between the respondent and Smt. Anandi under
the Act was not snapped off. The heritable propetly or interest in the
lease hold right in the tenancy continued to subsist in the tenant
H Anandi.
TARA CHAND v. RAM PRASAD [RAMASWAMY. J.I 19
Un her death, the rights to succession to an estate of the A
deceased owner vested immediately on his/her than nearest heirs and
cannot be held in abeyance except when a nearer heir is then in the
womb: The vested right can not be divested except by a retrospective
valid law. The appellants by virtue of intestate succession under Hindu
Succession Act, being Class I heirs, succeeded to the heritable interest
B
in the lease hold right of a demised premises held by Smt. Anandi.
They, thereby, stepped into the shoes of the tenant. They continued to
remain in possession as on the date of the suit as statutory tenants.
"'· Thereby, they are entitled to the protection of their continuance as a
statutory tenant under the Act. The succession having been opened to
the appellants and succeeded in September, 1966 to the estate of the
tenant without any hiatus and restriction on the heritable interest in c
the lease-hold right held by the tenant Smt. Anandi, the Amendment
Act being admittedly prospective in operation, does not apply to the
facts of the case and does not have the effect of divesting their vested
rights in the lease-hold held by the tenant. They are entitled to enjoy
the tenancy rights without any restrictions or hedge put by the Amend-
ment Act. We, thereby, hold that the Amending Act does not apply to D
the facts of this case. But the appellants succeeded to the heritable
interest in the lease-hold right in the demised premises governed by
the Act subject to th.e rights and limitations prescribed under the Act
and also subject to the rights in favour of the respondent created under
·section 13( 1) (a) to (k) and other provisions of the Act.
E
I
(9) Accoramgly, we have no hesitation to hold that the appel-
lants are entitled to remain in possession of the demised shop in
question till the appellants are duly evicted in accordance with the
provisions of the Act as amended from time to time. The appeal is
accordingly allowed and the decree and judgment of the High Court is
reversed and that of the Trial Court is restored. The suit, accordingly, F
stands dismissed but in the circumstances, each party is directed to
bear their own costs throughout.
R.N.J. Appeal dismissed .
•
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