Holding

The appellant was not of unsound mind at the time of the offences and the insanity defence under Section 84 IPC was untenable.

Summary

The appellant, a government servant, was convicted of murdering his wife and son at a picnic spot and sentenced to life imprisonment. He appealed to the Supreme Court claiming exemption under Section 84 of the Indian Penal Code, asserting that he was suffering from mental illness (moderate depression) and that the prosecution's case, based solely on circumstantial evidence, failed to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The Court examined the medical report, which indicated only moderate depression and satisfactory mental condition, and found no evidence that the appellant was of unsound mind at the time of the offences. It held that the entire conduct of the appellant from the commission of the crime to the commencement of the trial showed that the insanity plea was an after‑thought and lacked substance. Consequently, the conviction was upheld and the appeal dismissed.

Issues considered

Whether the appellant can successfully invoke the defence of insanity under Section 84 IPC.
Whether the prosecution proved the murder of the appellant's wife and son beyond reasonable doubt on the basis of circumstantial evidence.
Whether the burden of proof for the insanity defence was discharged by the appellant.

Legislation cited

Indian Evidence Act, 1872s. 105, s. 4
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 302, s. 313, s. 84

Subjects

Insanity defenceSection 84 IPCmental illnessburden of proofcircumstantial evidencemurderlife imprisonmentcriminal law

Judgment

A T.N. LAKSHMAIAH
v.
STATE OF KARNATAKA

OCTOBER 16? 2001

B [M.B. SHAH AND R.P. SETHI? JJ.]

Penal Code, J860 :

Section 84-Plea o.finsanity_;.General exceptions-Scope of-Held, when
aet committed by a person of unsound mind incapable of knowing the nature .
c of the act entire conduct of accused, from committing of offence till commence-
ment of Session Court's proceedings is relevant to ascertain whether plea raised
was genuine, bonafide or after thought-The plea raised in the instant case is
an qfter thought and bereft of any substance.

D Maxims:

Maxim 'Actus nonfacit reum nisi mens sit rea ', meaning and applicabil-
ity o.f.

The appellant was a Government servant living with his wife and
E son. He took them to a picnic spot . He allegedly pushed down his son, who
fell on a rock which was 150 ft. below. Thereafter he tied the saree of his
wife around her neck, tightened the knot and killed her. After committing
the crime, he came back and on the next day confessed to the Police. The
police registered a case u/s. 302 IPC and started investigation. As per his
F disclosure, the dead body of his wife and ~he body of his son who was alive
were recovered. His son was hospitalised, who later-on succumbed to his
injuries.

On completion of investigation the final report was submitted and
the case was committed to the Session. Charges were framed against the
G appellant; thirty witnesses were examined. However, there was no eye
witness to the crime. The appellant denied the charge of taking his wife
and son to the place of occurrence. He stated that he could only remember
that his wife had nagged him to eat meals on 13.1.91 and subsequently he
found himself in the prison in June 1991 and he did not remember any-
H thing in the intervening period. The Trial Court concluded that the appel-
200
T.N. LAKSHMAIAH v. STATE 201
lant was guilty of murder of his wife and son. The appeal was dismissed by A
the High Court Hence this appeal.

It was contended for the appellant that his conduct at or about the
time of occurrence,was of mental illness and the report produced during
the trial probablised his being insane within the meaning of Section 84 IPC B
which entitled his acquittal; and that the prosecution had failed to prove its
case as the prosecution rests only on the circumstantial evidence and the
chain of circumstances was not so complete as to draw the only inference
that the accused was guilty.

To ascertain the mental condition of the appellant, this Court consid- c
ered the medical report of the appellant. The report revealed that he was
suffering from moderate depression; however his mental condition was
stated to be satisfactory.

Dismissing the appeal, the Court D

... HELD : 1. Section 84 IPC provides that nothing is an offence which
is done by a person who at the time of doing it, by reason of unsoundness of
mind is incapable of knowing the nature of the act or what he is doing is
either wrong or contrary to law. The Section is part of Chapter IV of IPC E
and deals with general exceptions. The principle embodied in the Chapter
is based upon the maxim "actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea" i.e. an act is
not criminal unless there is criminal intent Under the Evidence Act, the
onus of proving any of the exceptions in Chapter IV IPC lies on the
accused though the requisite standard of proof is not the same as expected· F
from the prosecution. It is sufficient if the version given by him casts a
doubt on the prosecution case. [204-G; 205-D; E]

State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ahmadulla, Am (1961) SC 998, referred
to.
G
2. For claiming the exception under section 84 of Penal Code, entire
conduct of the accused from the time of commission of offence up to the
time the Sessions proceeding commenced, is relevant for the purpose of
ascertaining as to whether plea raised was genuine, bonafide or after
thought. [205-H; 206-A] H
202 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.
A Sahyabhai Chhaganbhai Thakkar v. State of Gujarat, AIR .(1964) s'c
1563 and Bhikari v. The State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR (1966) SC 1, referred to.

3. There is nothing on record to infer that the accused was of un-
sound mind at or about the time of occurrence and at no point of time his
behaviour was shown to be abnormal. LikeWise there was no recorc{show-
B ing the appellant to be suffering from any mental disease. The plea raised
on the face of it is an after thought and bereft of any substance.
[207-G; 208-B]

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 1210
of 1999.
c
From the Judgment and Order dated 1.12.97 of the Karnataka High Court
Crl. A. No. 437 of 1995.

S. Muralidhar (A.C.) and S. Vallinayagam for the Appellant.

D N.P. Midha for N. Ganpathy, Adv. for the Respondent.

The Judgment of the. Court was delivered by

SETHI, J. Claiming insanity at the time of commission of offence of
murdering his own wife Gayathramma and teen aged son Bhaskar, the appel-
E lant has prayed for setting aside the judgment of the trial court as well as the
High Court by which he has been convicted under Section 302 of the Indian
Penal Code and sentenced to life imprisonment. Without leading evidence in
support of his claim, the appellant urged that there was sufficient material on
record which probabilised the existence of circumstances justifying the benefit
F of the exception as incorporated under Section 84 of the Indian Penal Code.
It is also submitted that the prosecution had failed to establish his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.

In order to appreciate the submissions of the appellant, it is relevant to

G
take note of the prosecution case as alleged and proved against him vide the
judgment impunged in this appeaL The appellant was a Government servant
employed in the Department of Agriculture from the year 1991. He was
-
residing with his wife and son in one of the quarters allotted to him by the
Department. The appellant's deceased son was a student of 7th standard at the
time of occurrence. On 12.1.1991, the appellant applied to avail casual leave
H on 14.1.1991. The accused, along with his wife and son, had left his house on
T.N. LAKSHMAIAH v. STATE [SETHI, J.] 203
11.1.1991 and gone to Thadagavadi. On 16.1.1991, he took his wife and son A
along with him on the pretext of showing them Shivanasamudra, a picnic spot.
where the River Kaveri makes a fall. He purchased half kilogram of apples
from Devegowda (PWll) in a village shop at Malavalli. At about 9 O'clock
in the morning, the appellant with his wife and son got down from the bus at
Satyagola Hand Post where they purchased and consumed tender coconut. All
B
the three thereafter walked on foot towards Shivanasamudra. The accused took
his wife and son to the extreme end to show them Gagana Chukki Falls. He
led them downwards telling that he would show the beauty of the falls from
a very near point. He is alleged to have pushed down Bhaskar from that place
who fell on a rock which was 150 feet below. He thereafter caught hold of his
wife and forcibly tied her hands with a red waste thread and dgragged her to c
a rock, notwithstanding her pleadings and protests. He tied her saree arount the
neck of his wife and killed her by tightening the knot. Despite being a picnic
spot, he had chosen the spot for commission for the offence where no tourist
normally went. He left the place of occurrence at 4.30 in the evening, got a bus
and went towards Malavalli. He was seen reaching his horn at about 7.30 p.m. D
by Sri Kalaiah (PW8). On the next day, the appellat left his house and went
... to Kollegal Rural Police Station in the afternoon where he gave a statement
confessing his crime. On the basis of his statement, a case was registered for
offence punishable under Section 302 IPC. As per his disclosure, made in the
statement, the dead body of the wife was recovered from the place pointed out
by him. The body of the son was seen lying on the rock/gorge where the police
could not reach on the first day. When, on the next day, the body of the child
was recorded, he was alive and brought to the Kollegal Hospital and thereafter
sent for better treatment in NIMHANS at Bangalore, where he breathed his
last on 19.1.1999.

On completion of the investigation, the final report was produced, the
F
case committed to the Sessions and charges framed against the appellant. To
prove their case, the prosecution examined 30 witnesses. It is conceded that
there was no eye-witness to the occurrence. In his statement, recorded under
Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the appellant accepted that he
was residing with his wife and son in the quarters belonging to the Agriculture G
Department. He also admitted the fact of having applied for casual leave. He
admitted to have left his house on the evening on 11.1.1991 with his wife and
son. He denied the charge of having taken his wife and son to Gagana Chukki
Falls and instead stated that he had gone to Talagawadi with his family. He
stated that he only remembered that his wife had nagged him to eat the meals H
204 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.
A on 13.1.1991 but does not remember anything thereafter. He claims to have
seen himself in the prison in June, 1991 and stated that he did not remember
as to what ~ad happene4.\in the 1 intervening period.

To ascertain as to whether the accused had committed the crime or not,
the trial court formulated eight points for its determination and after appreci-
B ating the evidence, hearing the arguments and taking note of the attending
circumstances, concluded that the appellant was guilty for the commission of
the crime of murders of his wife and son. The appeal filed by him was
dismissed by the High Court vide the order impugned in this appeal.

c Mr.S. Muralidhar, Amicus curiae who appeared for the appellant submit-
ted that the conduct of the accused at or about the time of occurrence, his
having remained a patient of mental illness and the record produced during the
trial probabilised his being insane within the meaning of Section 84 of the
Indian Penal Code which entitled him acquittal. He has further contended that
as the case of the prosecution rests only on the circumstantial evidence, the
D
prosecution has failed to connect the accused with the commission of the crime
as, according to the learned counsel, the chain of circumstances is not so
complete to draw the only inference of the accused being guilty of the offence
...
charged .

.E To allay all apprehensions, this Court vide order dated 15.11.1999 di-
rected the Superintendent of the Central Jail, New Central Prison, Bangalore
to forward the medical report, if any, concerning him for facilitating the court
to ascertain his mental condition. In response, the Senior Superintendent of
Central Prison, Bangalore has submitted the medical report dated 6.12.1999.
F issued by the psychiatrist of the prison Hospital. In the report it is stated thae .
the appellant was examined and diagnosed as suffering from "moderate depres-
sion". He was put on treatment and had shown improvement. At the time of
submission of the report his mental condition was stated to be &atisfactory.

Section 84 of the Indian Penal Code provides that. nothing is an offence
G which is done by a person who, at the time of doing it, by reason of unsound-
ness of mind, is incapable of knowing the nature of the act, or that what he is
doing is either wrong or contrary to law. The section forms part of Chapter IV
dealing with general exceptions. The importance of the chapter was highlighted
by Lord Macaulay before the House of Commons at the time of introduction
H of the Bill as under :
T.N. LAKSHMAIAH v. STATE [SETHI, J.] 205
"This chapter has been framed in order to obviate the necessity of A
repeating in every penal clause a considerable number of limitations.
Some limitations relate only to a single provision, or to a very small
class of provisions... Every such exception evid~ntly ought to be
appended to the rule which it is intended to modify. But there are other
exceptions which are common to all the penal clauses of the Code, or B
to a greater variety of clauses dispersed over many chapters. It would
obviously be inconvenient to repeat these exceptions several times in
every page. We have, therefore, placed them in a separate chapter and,
we have provided that every definition of an offence, every penal
provision, and every illustration of a definition or penal provision,
shall be construed subject to the provisions contained in that chapter".
a I

!

I

The principle embodied in the chapter is based upon the maxim "actus
non facit reum nisi mens sit rea'', i.e., an act is not criminal unless there is
criminal intent.
D
Under the Evidence Act, the onus of proving any of the exception
mentioned in. the Chapter lies on the accused though the requisite standard of
proof is not the same as expected from the prosecution. It is sufficient if an
accused is able to bring his case within the ambit of any of the general
exceptions by the standard of preponderance of probabilities, as a result of E
which he may succeed not because that he proves his case to the hilt but
because of the version given by him casts a doubt on the prosecution case.

In State ofMadhya Pradesh v. Ahmadulla, AIR (1961) SC 998 this Court
held that the burden of proof that the mental condition of the accused was, at
the crucial point of time, such as is described by the Section, lies on the accused
F
who claims the benefit of this exemption vide Section 105 of the Evidence Act
(Illustration a). The settled position of law is that every man is presumed to be
sane and to posses1: a sufficient degree of reason to be responsible for his acts
unless the cbntrary is proved. Mere ipsi dixit of the accused is not enough for
availing of the benefit of the exceptions under chapter IV. G

In a case where the exception under Section 84 of the Indian Penal Code
is claimed, the Court has to consider whether, at the time of commission of the
offence, the accused, by reason of unsoundness of mind, was incapable of
knowing the nature of the act or that he is doing what is either wrong or a
206 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.
A contrary to law. Entire conduct of the accused, from the time of the commission
of the offence upto the time, the Sessions proceedings commenced, is relevant
for the purpose of ascertaining as to whether plea raised was genuine, bonafide
or after-thought. Dealing with the plea of insanity, the scope of Section 84 IPC,
the attending circumstances and the burden ·or proof, this Court in Dahyabhai
:a Chhaganbhai Thakkar v. State of Gujarat, AIR (1964) Sc 1563, held.

"It is ftindamental principle of criminal jurisprudence of that an ac-
cused is presumed to be innocent and, therefore, the burden lies on the
prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
The prosecution, therefore, in a case of homicide shall prove beyond
c reasonable doubt that the accused caused death with the requisite
intention described in S.299 of the Indian Penal Code. This general
burden never shifts and it always rests on the prosecution. But, S.84
of the Indian Penal Code provides that nothing is an offence if the
accused at the time of doing that act, by reason of unsoundness of mind
D was incapable of knowing the nature of his act or what he was doing
was either wrong or contrary to law. This being an exception, under
S.105 of the Evidence Act the burden of proving the existence of
circumstances bringing the case within the said exception lies on the ..
accused, and the court shall presume the absence of such circum-
E stances. Under S.105 of the Evidence Act, read with the definition of
"shall presume" in S.4 thereof, the court shall regard the absence of
such circumstances as proved unless~ after considering the matters
before it, it believes that the said circumstances existed or their exist-
ence was so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circum-
stances of the particular case, to act upon the opposition that they did
F
exist. To put in other words, the accused will have to rebut the
presumption that such circumstances did not exist, by placing material
before the court sufficient to make it consider the existence of the said
circumstances so probable that a prudent man would act upon them.
The accused has to satisfy the standard of a 'prudent man'. If the
G material placed before the court, such as oral and documentary evi-
dence, presumptions, admissions or even the prosecution evidence,
satisfies the test of 'prudent man' the accused will have discharged his
burden. The evidence so placed may not be sufficient to discharge the
burden under S.105 of the Evidence Act, but it may raise a reasonable
H doubt in the mind of a judge as regards one or other of the necessary
T.N. LAKSHMAIAH v. STATE [SETHI, J.] 207
ingredients of the offence itself. It may, for instance, raise a reasonable A ·
doubt in the mind of the judge whether the accused had the requisite
intention laid down in S.299 of the Indian Penal Code. If the judge has
such reasonable doubt, he has to acquit the accused, for in that event
the prosecution will have failed to prove conclusively the guilt of the
accused. There is no conflict between the general burden, which is B
always on the prosecution and which never shifts, and the special
burden that rests on the accused to make out his. defence of insanity."

After referring to various text books and the earlier pronouncements of
this Court, it was further held :
c
"The doctine of burden of proof in the context of the plea of insanity
may be stated in the following propositions: (1) The prosecution must
prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused had committed that
offence with the requisite mens rea; and the burden of proving that
always rests on the prosecution from the beginning to the end of the
trial. (2) There is a rebuttable presumption that the accus~d may not D
insane, when' he committed the crime, in the sense laid down by S.84
of the Indian Penal Code; the accused may rebut it by placing before
the court all the relevant evidence - oral, documentary or circumstan-
tial, but the burden of proof upon him is no higher than that rests upon
a party to civil proceedings. (3) Even if the accused was not able to E
establish conclusively that he was insane at the time he committed the
offence, the evidence placed before the court by the accused or by the
prosecution may raise a reasonable doubt in the mind of the court as
regards one or more of the ingredients of the offence, including mens
rea of the accused and in that case the court would be entitled to acquit
the accused on the ground that the general burden of proof resting on
F
the prosecution was not discharged."

To the same effect is the judgment in Bhikari v. The State of Uttar
Pradesh, AIR (1966) SC 1.

It is admitted that the appellant in this case, has not led any evidence in G
proof of the plea of insanity. There is nothing on the record to infer that the
accused was of unsound mind at or about the time of occurrence. His behaviour
at the time and subsequent to the commission of the crime clearly indicates that
he knew and was capable of knowing the nature of the act done by him. Being
annoyed with the attitude of the deceased, he appears to have taken a conscious H
208 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.
'
A decision of taking them away from the house and committed the crime at a
secluded place. He had all faculties to safely reach home and sleep for the night.
At no point of time his behaviour is shown to be abnormal. The plea, though
not strictly but by implication, appears to have been taken by ~he accused for
the first time when his statement was recorded under Section 313 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure. We have found no record allegedly showing the appel-
B
lant to be suffering .from any mental disease when he is stated to have applied
for bail. The plea raised, on the face of it, is after-thought and bereft of any
substance. The opinion of the doctor obtained after about 8 years also does not
indicate any history of medical disorder of the appellant. .Even at the time of
examination in the year 1999, he was diagnosed of suffering from "moderate
c depression" which is likely to be there in the circumstances where such person
is confined in prison on the charge of the murder of his wife and son. We are
satisfied that the appellant was sane and understood the implications of the act
done by him and in no case was having unsound mind within the meaning of
Section 84 of the Indian Penal Code, at the relevant time.
D We are also not satisfied with the submission of the learned counsel of.
the appellant that the prosecution had failed to prove the complete chain of
circumstances connecting the accused with the commission of the crime. In its
detailed judgment the trial court has referred to proved circumstances which
lead to the only inference of the involvement of the accused in the commission
E of the crime. Similarly, the High Court, in its detailed judgment, has referred
to relevant evidence and the incriminating circumstances. We do not find any
ground to draw any other inference in the present case.

There is no substance in this appeal which is accordingly dismissed.

S.K.S. Appeal dismissed.

...