SUSHIL KUMAR TIWARIversusHARE RAM SAH & ORS.

                 [2025] 9 S.C.R. 258 : 2025 INSC 1061

                            Sushil Kumar Tiwari
                                     v.
                            Hare Ram Sah & Ors.
                     (Criminal Appeal No. 3813 of 2025)
                               01 September 2025
           [Sanjay Kumar and Satish Chandra Sharma,* JJ.]


                             Issue for Consideration
       Allegation against the respondent nos.1 and 2 that they raped a
       minor girl. It is admitted that they never committed the acts together
       and always acted separately. In light of the controversy involved in
       the instant case, the two question arise for consideration: i) whether
       the High Court fell in a grave error in acquitting the respondent
       nos.1 and 2 by holding that the prosecution failed to discharge its
       evidentiary burden as the evidence led by the prosecution was full
       of inconsistencies and contradictions; ii) whether the High Court
       erred in its finding that the trial was carried out in violation of s.223
       Cr.PC and non-adherence to the same had caused prejudice to the
       respondent nos.1 and 2, thereby leading to miscarriage of justice.

                                    Headnotes†
       Penal Code, 1860 – s.376(2) – Protection of Children from
       Sexual Offences Act, 2012 – ss.4 and 6 – Code of Criminal
       Procedure, 1973 – s.223 – Prosecution case that respondent
       nos.1 and 2 raped a minor girl, though separately – Girl became
       pregnant – Upon questioning, she disclosed names of the
       respondent nos.1 and 2 – Trial Court convicted respondent
       nos.1 and 2 u/s.376(2) of IPC and ss.4 and 6 of POCSO Act,
       2012 – However, the High court held that the prosecution
       did not succeed in proving the case against the respondent
       nos.1 and 2 – The High Court outlined a few specific issues
       in the case i.e. victim’s age, date and time of incident, proof
       of pregnancy and abortion, and delay in lodging the FIR –
       Correctness:
       Held: 1. In the instant case, a fairly consistent and creditworthy
       case of the prosecution has been discarded on what could only be
       termed as misapplication of procedure – No culprit should manage


* Author
[2025] 9 S.C.R.                                                                 259

               Sushil Kumar Tiwari v. Hare Ram Sah & Ors.


     an acquittal on basis of unreasonable doubts – The impugned
     judgment of the High Court is set aside being unsustainable – The
     view taken by the Trial Court was correct and there is no infirmity
     in the same – The judgment of the Trial Court stands restored,
     both on conviction and sentence. [Paras 36, 37, 38]
     2. It cannot be denied that there are slight variations in the age of the
     victim at the relevant point of time, as discernible from the oral and
     documentary evidence – However, it cannot be said that age was
     not proved during the trial – The oral testimonies of PW-3, PW-5 and
     PW6 are consistent inter-se as well as with the Transfer Certificate
     issued by the government school – The age of the victim appears
     to be within the range of 12-13 years at the relevant point of time –
     Also, age was not challenged during the cross-examination of any
     witnesses – As long as the age conclusively appears to be under
     18 years, the special protections carved out in favour of children
     cannot be diluted by insisting upon a rigid determination of the
     age – As regards the issue regarding date and time of the incident,
     the main witness pertaining to the commission of the offence is the
     victim herself, examined as PW-2 – She has expressed the entire
     chain in a consistent manner and her version is also consistent
     with other PWs – She has deposed that the offence took place in
     the days following the festival of Holi and the same is corroborated
     by the medical report dated 01.07.2016, which indicates that she
     was 3-4 months pregnant as on 01.07.2016 – The medical report
     corroborates the time frame stated by the victim – The testimony
     of the victim is fairly consistent and there is no reasonable ground
     to doubt the same – As far as proof of pregnancy and abortion
     is concerned, the medical report dated 01.07.2016 categorically
     indicated that at the time of ultrasound, the victim was 15 weeks
     pregnant – Further, the Trial Court has noted that the letter dated
     28.07.2016 bearing Letter No. 60/BSLSA/AccT/2472 issued by
     the Bihar State Legal Services Authority indicated that the victim’s
     father had sought permission for her abortion – That abortion was
     conducted after the constitution of medical board by the Executive
     Chairman, BSLSA, Patna High Court, a fact which has not been
     disputed – There is ample documentary and oral evidence to
     prove these elements and the High Court has overlooked relevant
     evidence in arriving at its finding – As regards the delay in lodging
     the FIR, the incident came to light only after the ultrasound
     conducted on 01.07.2016 and the FIR was lodged on the very next
     day – Before the discovery of offence, the delay of 3-4 months
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       was a consequence of the intimidation made by the respondent
       nos.1 and 2, which prevented the victim from opening up before
       her parents – So, the victim could be faulted in any manner on
       account of delay. [Paras 17, 19, 20, 21]

       Penal Code, 1860 – s.376(2) – Protection of Children from
       Sexual Offences Act, 2012 – ss.4 and 6 – Code of Criminal
       Procedure, 1973 – s.223 – Trial Court convicted respondent
       nos.1 and 2 u/s.376(2) of IPC and ss.4 and 6 of POCSO Act,
       2012 for raping a minor girl – Respondents never committed
       the acts together and always acted separately – The High
       Court emphasized the non-compliance of s.223 Cr.PC:
       Held: The victim and the respondent nos.1 and 2 were residing
       in the same village, the house of respondent no.2 was situated
       one house away from that of the victim, respondent no.1 was
       running a coaching center adjacent to his house and in the same
       vicinity, and both the respondents threatened the victim of similar
       consequences if she dared to disclose their acts to anyone –
       Evidently, the nature of acts committed by the respondent nos.1
       and 2 herein and subsequent intimidation to keep the victim silent
       were of a similar design – Further, there was a certain proximity of
       time and place as the incidents were committed within a continuous
       time-frame and at different places in the same village – However,
       it is also admitted that they never committed the acts together and
       always acted separately – Therefore, there is no direct evidence
       of commission of offences in the same transaction, however, an
       inference may be drawn – For, even if the conclusion of the High
       Court, that the joint trial was conducted in violation of s.223 Cr.PC,
       is accepted, the respondent nos.1 and 2 would still have to further
       show that the joint trial had caused prejudice to them and had
       occasioned a failure of justice – Mere irregular conduct of a joint or
       separate trial does not vitiate the trial as a whole and the proof of
       failure of justice is sine qua non for holding the trial as invalid – In
       the High Court’s reasoning, there is no finding of actual prejudice
       or failure of justice as a result of the joint trial, as necessitated by
       law – Mere non-compliance of the procedure contemplated u/s.223
       does not ipso facto render the trial as invalid, and the same cannot
       form the basis of returning a finding of prejudice and failure of
       justice – The said conclusion must emanate from the facts of the
       case, after a thorough examination of the facts and evidence on
       record. [Paras 31, 34]
[2025] 9 S.C.R.                                                               261

              Sushil Kumar Tiwari v. Hare Ram Sah & Ors.


     Evidence – Standard of reasonable doubt:
     Held: One of the foremost principles of appreciation of evidence
     is that natural variations, errors and inconsistencies are not to be
     elevated to the standard of a reasonable doubt or to hold that the
     prosecution has failed – There is nothing like perfect evidence in
     a Court and in fact, perfection is often suggestive of tutoring and
     manufacturing of evidence – The availability of evidence as well
     as the quality of evidence are not open to judgment on any pre-
     determined parameters – For, these aspects not only depend upon
     the quality of investigation but also upon the societal circumstances
     prevalent in the area of crime – They also depend upon the level of
     awareness, not only of the persons involved in the case but also of the
     members of the locality who often appear as witnesses – Therefore,
     the Courts must be alive to the state of affairs on the ground and in
     that backdrop, it must examine whether the inconsistencies and gaps
     have been properly explained or not – If so, such inconsistencies
     and gaps may not affect the case of the prosecution – However, if
     the prosecution fails to explain the inconsistencies in its case, an
     adverse inference may be drawn against it. [Para 22]

     Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.464 – Whether mere
     discovery of an error, irregularity or omission in the framing of
     charge ipso facto render the decision of the Court as invalid:
     Held: Mere discovery of an error, irregularity or omission in the
     framing of charge does not ipso facto render the decision of the
     Court as invalid – In fact, even a case of non-framing of charge is
     not liable to be discarded on that ground alone – In order to vitiate
     the decision, what is necessary is the failure of justice as a result
     of such error or omission or irregularity – Thus, the quintessential
     issue that requires an answer is whether the defect in the framing
     of charge in the instant matter has occasioned a failure of justice
     for the respondent nos.1 and 2. [Para 26]

                               Case Law Cited
     Nasib Singh v. State of Punjab and Another, 2021 INSC 642 :
     [2021] 13 SCR 566 – relied on.
     Krishan Kumar Malik v. State of Haryana [2011] 8 SCR 774 :
     (2011) 7 SCC 130 – held inapplicable.
     Soundarajan v. State (Represented by the Inspector of Police,
     Vigilance Anti-Corruption, Dindigul) [2023] 4 SCR 133 : (2023) 16
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       SCC 141; State of Andhra Pradesh v. Cheemalapati Ganeswara
       Rao and Another [1964] 3 SCR 297 : AIR 1963 SC 1850 –
       referred to.

                                   List of Acts
       Penal Code, 1860; Protection of Children from Sexual Offences
       (POCSO) Act, 2012; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Juvenile
       Justice (Care & Protection) Act, 2015.

                                List of Keywords
       Rape; Minor girl; Framing of charge; Irregularity; Evidence; Standard
       of reasonable doubt; Natural variations; Perfect evidence; Quality
       of evidence; Section 223 of CrPC; Non-compliance of s.223 Cr.PC;
       Victim’s age; Date and time of incident; Proof of pregnancy; Abortion;
       Delay in lodging the FIR.

                               Case Arising From
       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
       3813 of 2025
       From the Judgment and Order dated 26.09.2024 of the High Court
       of Judicature at Patna in CRADB No. 1124 of 2019

                           Appearances for Parties
       Advs. for the Appellant:
       Daksha Kumar, Ms. Tanishq Mehta, Aftab Ali Khan, Ms. Ankita
       Baluni, Deepak Kumar, Ms. Sonakshi Monga.
       Advs. for the Respondents:
       Talib Mustafa, Ms. Raksha Agrawal, Lzafeer Ahmad B. F., Manish
       Kumar, Shashwat Pratyush.

                  Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

                                   Judgment

       Satish Chandra Sharma, J.

1.     Leave granted.
2.     The struggle for sensitivity towards offences against women, children
       and other marginalized groups passes through various phases of
[2025] 9 S.C.R.                                                         263

                   Sushil Kumar Tiwari v. Hare Ram Sah & Ors.


      evolution. Whereas, the end goal is most desirable, the journey is not
      always a pleasant one. At times, the victims find themselves pitched
      against a system full of insensitive stakeholders and at other times,
      the victims find themselves in conflict with the procedural intricacies
      of the laws in place. Despite the importance of procedural sanctity,
      it is always a matter of utter failure for the system as a whole when
      a culprit, that too of a heinous sexual offence, manages to walk free
      by entangling the victim in misapplication of procedural rules, without
      the knowledge of the victim and without any control of the victim.
      The present case presents one such illustration from a place called
      Piro, District Bhojpur, Bihar.
3.    In 2016, a few months after the festival of Holi, the victim - the
      appellant’s daughter – started feeling unwell. Upon finding that her
      health was constantly deteriorating, the appellant’s wife took their
      daughter to her native place in Ballia, Uttar Pradesh for treatment.
      There, she was taken to Zila Mahila Chikitsalaya on 01.07.2016 and
      upon examination, the victim was found to be 3 months pregnant.
      Upon questioning, she disclosed that she was raped by the
      respondents, namely, Hare Ram Sah and Manish Tiwari about 3-4
      months ago, sometime after the festival of Holi. On the strength of
      this disclosure, the appellant lodged a complaint at PS Piro, District
      Bhojpur, Bihar on 02.07.2016, which culminated into FIR/Criminal
      Case No. 209/2016. Investigation commenced and chargesheet was
      filed in the concerned Court.
4.    After trial, Learned Additional District & Sessions Judge-cum-Special
      Judge, POCSO Act, Bhojpur at Ara found the Respondent Nos. 1
      and 2 guilty for the commission of offences under Sections 376(2)
      of Indian Penal Code, 18601, and Sections 4 & 6 of Protection
      of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act, 20122. For the
      commission of the offence under Section 376 IPC, the Respondent
      Nos. 1 and 2 were sentenced to undergo rigorous life imprisonment
      along with a fine of Rs. 50,000/- each. In default of payment of fine,
      additional sentence of imprisonment for one year was imposed. For
      the commission of the offence under Section 6 of POCSO Act, the
      Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 were sentenced to undergo rigorous life


1    Hereinafter referred as “IPC”
2    Hereinafter referred as “POCSO Act”
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       imprisonment along with a fine of Rs. 25,000/- each. In default of
       payment of fine, additional sentence of imprisonment for one year
       was imposed. For the commission of the offence under Section
       4 of POCSO Act, the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 were sentenced
       to undergo rigorous imprisonment of 7 years along with a fine of
       Rs. 10,000/- each. In default of payment of fine, additional sentence
       of imprisonment for three months was imposed. The sentences were
       directed to run concurrently.

       IMPUGNED JUDGMENT
5.     In appeal, the High Court examined the entire evidence on record
       and came to the conclusion that the prosecution did not succeed
       in proving the case against the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2. In doing
       so, the High Court primarily found the following infirmities in the
       prosecution case:
       i.      The date and time of the alleged incident were not proved;
       ii.     The determination of age of the victim was not carried out;
       iii.    No proof of abortion of the victim was placed on record;
       iv.     The charge was not framed properly as it recorded the date as
               02.07.2016, whereas the incident was reported on 01.07.2016
               and offence was committed 3-4 months prior to its reporting;
       v.      The Trial Court committed an error in conducting the joint trial
               of the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2, despite the case not falling
               within the conditions stipulated in Section 223 of the Code of
               Criminal Procedure, 19733 for conducting joint trial. The High
               Court observed that the trial was bad in law, as the Respondent
               Nos. 1 and 2 were accused of committing different offences
               committed at different points of time, and the joinder of trial had
               caused grave prejudice to them and led to miscarriage of justice.
6.     The High Court emphasized that in addition to the procedural infirmities
       that resulted from the non-compliance of Section 223 Cr.P.C., there
       were major inconsistencies in the deposition of prosecution witnesses.
       However, it clarified that the conviction was not set aside solely due
       to procedural lapses. The relevant para reads thus:


3    Hereinafter referred as “Cr.P.C.”
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              Sushil Kumar Tiwari v. Hare Ram Sah & Ors.


           “42. As per the principles laid down by the Hon’ble
           Supreme Court, and the two pronged test satisfies this
           case that the joint trial conducted has prejudiced the
           defence of the accused and has successfully proven to
           cause a miscarriage of justice. In view of the aforesaid
           facts and circumstances of the present case, we are
           of the view that the prosecution has failed to prove the
           case on various grounds. The conviction of the present
           appellants is not being set aside on the mere ground that
           the procedure of Section 223 of the Code has not been
           adhered to but there are numerous laches on the part of
           the prosecution in proving the case beyond reasonable
           doubt. The learned Trial Court has also failed to consider
           the fact that Section 223 was applicable in this matter,
           but the same has not been considered in this case and
           the appellants have been tried jointly, causing prejudice
           to the appellants, despite which, the learned Trial Court
           has recorded the impugned judgment of conviction and
           the order of sentence. As such, the same are required to
           be quashed and set aside.”

     THE CHALLENGE
7.   Taking exception to the impugned judgment, Learned Counsel on
     behalf of the appellant submits that the High Court fell in a grave
     error in concluding that prejudice was caused to the Respondent
     Nos. 1 and 2 due to non-compliance of Section 223 Cr.P.C. He
     submits that the ground qua non-compliance of Section 223 was
     never taken by the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 and the High Court
     examined the same on its own. To buttress the submission, it is
     submitted that even if Section 223 was not complied, it did not
     cause any prejudice to the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 and they
     had sufficient opportunity to participate and defend themselves
     during the trial.
8.   It is further submitted that the age of the victim was established to
     be under 18 years without any doubt, on the strength of the school
     transfer certificate, statement of the victim under Section 164 Cr.P.C.
     and the medical report dated 01.07.2016. It is further submitted
     that there was no reason to doubt the testimony of the victim and
     in a case of this nature, the testimony of the victim could form the
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       sole basis of conviction. It is further submitted that the aspects of
       pregnancy and abortion were duly proved in the case on the basis
       of the medical reports and abortion papers.
9.     It is further submitted that there was no enmity between the victim
       and the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 and thus, there was no motive
       to implicate the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2. It is further submitted
       that even if the High Court had found any procedural irregularity,
       it ought to have remanded the matter back for fresh adjudication
       instead of acquitting the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2. To buttress, it is
       submitted that the impugned decision completely disregarded the
       rights of the victim.
10. Per contra, the respondents advanced submissions in support of
    the impugned decision. On their behalf, it is submitted that the
    investigation was carried out in a completely casual and negligent
    manner and the same cause prejudice to the Respondent Nos.
    1 and 2. The submissions draw attention to the aspects of age
    determination, absence of proof of pregnancy and abortion, lack of
    investigation qua the date, time and place of the incidents, etc. It is
    further submitted that the charges framed by the Trial Court were
    defective and the entire trial was conducted on the basis of defective
    charges, thereby disentitling the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 from a
    fair participation.
11. It is further submitted that the Trial Court conducted a joint trial
    of the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 in utter violation of Section 223
    Cr.P.C. and without fulfilment of the conditions contemplated
    thereunder. It is further submitted that even at the stage of Section
    313 Cr.P.C., the incriminating evidence was not put properly to
    the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 and consequently, the Respondent
    Nos. 1 and 2 were prevented from explaining the evidence against
    them in a proper manner. Further, it is submitted that the version
    of the prosecution witnesses, especially that of the victim, was
    not consistent and the Trial Court committed an error in placing
    reliance upon their testimonies. It is further submitted that the
    defence witnesses presented a valid defence and the same out to
    have been considered.
12. Both the parties have filed written submissions and compilation of
    judgments in support of their case. We have considered the same.
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              Sushil Kumar Tiwari v. Hare Ram Sah & Ors.


     DISCUSSION
13. We have carefully considered the contentions advanced by the parties,
    impugned judgment, judgment of the Trial Court and the decisions
    relied upon by the parties. In light of the controversy involved in the
    matter, the following two issues arise for our consideration:
     i.    Whether the High Court fell in a grave error in acquitting the
           Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 by holding that the prosecution failed
           to discharge its evidentiary burden as the evidence led by the
           prosecution was full of inconsistencies and contradictions?
     ii.   Whether the High Court erred in its finding that the trial was
           carried out in violation of Section 223 Cr.P.C. and non-adherence
           to the same had caused prejudice to the Respondent Nos. 1
           and 2, thereby leading to miscarriage of justice?
14. We may first consider the issue regarding inconsistencies and
    contradictions in the prosecution evidence, which would require some
    degree of examination of the evidence on record. At the outset, it
    needs to be noted that the High Court has outlined a few specific
    issues in the case i.e. victim’s age, date and time of the incident,
    proof of pregnancy and abortion, and delay in lodging the FIR.
15. Before appreciation of evidence led on these aspects, we may first
    traverse through the testimony of the victim, examined before the
    Trial Court as PW-2, in order to understand the precise allegations.
    After the discovery of pregnancy, PW-2 deposed that the incident
    took place in 2016, a few days after the festival of Holi. She deposed
    that one afternoon, her mother and father were not at home and
    she was sleeping alone in the house. Respondent No. 2 Manish
    Tiwari entered the house and raped her, and before leaving, he
    threatened her saying that should she tell anyone about it, she would
    be killed. Two or three days after this incident, the victim went near
    Shivala in the evening hours to look for her brother Himanshu. On
    the way, she passed respondent No. 1 Hare Ram Sah’s room and
    inquired if he had seen her brother. The said respondent pointed
    towards an inner room (used as coaching center) and suggested to
    the victim that her brother had gone in that direction. She went to
    check inside the room and found no one there. At the same time,
    Hare Ram Sah came from behind and grabbed her. She deposed
    that he took her inside and raped her. He also threatened her by
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       saying that should she tell anyone about it, she would be killed. The
       victim further deposed that she got scared and told no one about
       it. The story does not end here. She further deposed that after this
       incident, for two-three successive months, the Respondent Nos.
       1 and 2 took turns and raped her multiple times. Thereafter, she
       fell sick and started experiencing stomach pain and vomiting. She
       informed her mother and her mother firstly took her to a doctor in
       Ara. Despite administration of medicines, her health did not improve.
       Thereafter, the victim was taken to her maternal uncle’s house in
       Ballia, Uttar Pradesh, where an ultrasound was conducted and the
       pregnancy was discovered. It is noteworthy that the statement of the
       victim recorded by the police, statement recorded by the concerned
       Magistrate under Section 164 Cr.P.C. and the deposition recorded
       in the Court, are fairly consistent. There appears to be no variance
       insofar as the material aspects of the offence are concerned.
16. As regards the first issue concerning the age of the victim, it is quite
    understandable that for an offence under the POCSO Act, the victim
    must be aged under 18 years. In order to prove so, the prosecution has
    relied upon both oral and documentary evidence. The oral testimony
    of the mother of the victim, examined before the Trial Court as PW-
    3, reveals that the victim was 12 years old at the time of incident.
    Further, the statement of victim under Section 164 Cr.P.C. also bears
    an endorsement regarding her age. The concerned ACJM, examined
    as PW-4, has recorded her age as 13 years. The father of the victim,
    examined as PW-5, has deposed that the victim’s age at the time
    of incident was 12 years. Insofar as the documentary evidence is
    concerned, the Transfer Certificate (Annexure P-10) issued by the
    government school attended by the victim records her date of birth as
    03.10.2004, thereby meaning that during the concerned time-frame
    of the year 2016, the victim was around 12 years old. The medical
    report dated 01.07.2016 (Annexure P-1) is also relevant on this aspect.
    The said medical report pertains to the ultrasound examination of the
    victim and records her age as 15 years.
17. It cannot be denied that there are slight variations in the age of
    the victim at the relevant point of time, as discernible from the oral
    and documentary evidence. However, we do not find ourselves in
    agreement with the High Court that the age was not proved during
    trial. The oral testimonies of PW-3, PW-5 and PW-6 are consistent
    inter-se as well as with the Transfer Certificate issued by the
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              Sushil Kumar Tiwari v. Hare Ram Sah & Ors.


     government school. The age of the victim appears to be within the
     range of 12-13 years at the relevant point of time. The medical
     report records the age as 15 years. However, we cannot lose sight
     of the fact that the age of the victim was not challenged during
     cross-examination of any of the witnesses mentioned above. Their
     testimonies, on the point of age, have largely remained unrebutted,
     thereby meaning that the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 had no claim that
     she was not a minor at the relevant point. We do not mean to say in
     cases involving POCSO Act or Juvenile Justice (Care & Protection)
     Act, 2015, the determination of age is not required. Most certainly,
     the determination of minority is essential to extend the protection of
     these legislations, however, as long as the age conclusively appears
     to be under 18 years, the special protections carved out in favour of
     children cannot be diluted by insisting upon a rigid determination of
     the age, that too when it was not even questioned at the right time.
     In the present case, even if it is believed that the age of the victim
     was not determined to the hilt, the Trial Court had concluded that
     the victim was aged between 12 to 15 years at the relevant point
     of time and thus, was a minor. Thus, it could not be stated that the
     Trial Court had not determined the minority of the victim. It was done
     and, in our opinion, rightly so, on the basis of the unrebutted oral
     and documentary evidence.
18. Interestingly, the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 neither claimed that the
    victim was not a minor at any point of time nor led any evidence to
    that effect. We find that the High Court has erred in raising a doubt
    where none existed, even inter-se the parties to the case. We are
    also of the opinion that once the minority of the victim was beyond
    doubt, the special protection of POCSO Act ought not to have been
    diluted by raising a fictious doubt regarding the precise age of the
    victim. For, the Courts must remain alive to the socio-economic
    circumstances of the victims, especially those who are based in
    remoter regions of the country. In rural regions, discrepancies in
    the educational and identification documents are not unknown and,
    in such circumstances, the Courts must be sensitive to the ground
    realities of the society, so as to ensure that the intent of the law is
    not suppressed and protections created by the legislature reach the
    intended persons in their right spirit.
19. As regards the issue regarding date and time of the incident, the
    High Court has observed that the prosecution had failed to prove
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       the date and time of the offence. In order to examine this aspect,
       we must appreciate the circumstances in which the offence was
       committed and discovered. The main witness pertaining to the
       commission of the offence is the victim herself, examined as PW-2.
       She has expressed the entire chain in a consistent manner and her
       version is also consistent with other PWs. She has deposed that
       the offence took place in the days following the festival of Holi and
       the same is corroborated by the medical report dated 01.07.2016,
       which indicates that she was 3-4 months pregnant as on 01.07.2016.
       The medical report corroborates the time frame stated by the victim.
       Further, as regards the time, the victim has deposed that the first
       incident took place during the afternoon and the second incident
       took place in the evening. Importantly, it is not a case wherein the
       victim reported the offence immediately after its commission. The
       victim was scared to report the incident to anyone as she was
       threatened by the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 and probably, if not
       for the pregnancy and deterioration of health, she would not have
       reported either. Therefore, the inability of the victim, a minor girl,
       to recollect the precise time and date of the offence is completely
       natural. Furthermore, the victim has specified the places used for
       the commission of the alleged offence, including her house and
       coaching center of Respondent No. 1-Hare Ram Sah, and has also
       correctly identified both the respondent Nos. 1 and 2. during trial.
       Therefore, the victim has deposed in a completely natural manner
       and her inability to depose about some facts in precise terms is not
       only natural, but is also inconsequential as the medical report has
       corroborated the time-frame of the offence. The testimony of the
       victim is fairly consistent and there is no reasonable ground to doubt
       the same. Moreover, this deficiency has not caused any prejudice
       to the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2.
20. As regards the proof of pregnancy and abortion, we find that the High
    Court has fell in a grave error by failing to acknowledge the evidence
    on record. The medical report dated 01.07.2016 categorically indicates
    that at the time of ultrasound, the victim was 15 weeks pregnant. In
    the subsequent examination conducted on 02.07.2016 at Ara, the
    victim was again found to be 16 weeks pregnant and in support of
    the same, PW-7 has deposed before the Trial Court. No infirmity has
    been pointed out in the examination of PW-7. The factum of abortion
    has been proved on the basis of the medical documents/Discharge
[2025] 9 S.C.R.                                                       271

              Sushil Kumar Tiwari v. Hare Ram Sah & Ors.


     Ticket dated 30.07.2016 issued by Sadar Hospital, Ara. Further, the
     Trial Court has noted that the letter dated 28.07.2016 bearing Letter
     No. 60/BSLSA/AccT/2472 issued by the Bihar State Legal Services
     Authority indicated that the victim’s father had sought permission for
     her abortion. The said letter is Annexure P-4 and it aligns with the
     observation of the Trial Court. It is also averred that abortion was
     conducted after the constitution of medical board by the Executive
     Chairman, BSLSA, Patna High Court, a fact which has not been
     disputed. Thus, it appears preposterous to hold that the prosecution
     could not prove the elements of pregnancy and abortion. There is
     ample documentary and oral evidence to prove these elements
     and we feel that the High Court has overlooked relevant evidence
     in arriving at its finding. This fact was duly proved in the common
     course of natural events, but the natural events were overlooked.
21. As regards the delay in lodging the FIR, we feel that the same has
    been appropriately explained. The incident came to light only after
    the ultrasound conducted on 01.07.2016 and the FIR was lodged
    on the very next day. Before the discovery of offence, the delay of
    3-4 months was a consequence of the intimidation made by the
    Respondent Nos. 1 and 2, which prevented the victim from opening
    up before her parents. It is completely natural and understandable.
    We do not find that the victim could be faulted in any manner on
    account of delay.
22. On an examination of the concerns, which formed the basis of the
    impugned decision, we are of the view that undue emphasis has
    been laid on these aspects by the High Court. One of the foremost
    principles of appreciation of evidence is that natural variations,
    errors and inconsistencies are not to be elevated to the standard of
    a reasonable doubt or to hold that the prosecution has failed. There
    is nothing like perfect evidence in a Court and in fact, perfection is
    often suggestive of tutoring and manufacturing of evidence. The
    availability of evidence as well as the quality of evidence are not
    open to judgment on any pre-determined parameters. For, these
    aspects not only depend upon the quality of investigation but also
    upon the societal circumstances prevalent in the area of crime. They
    also depend upon the level of awareness, not only of the persons
    involved in the case but also of the members of the locality who
    often appear as witnesses. Therefore, the Courts must be alive
    to the state of affairs on the ground and in that backdrop, it must
272                                                        [2025] 9 S.C.R.

                          Supreme Court Reports


       examine whether the inconsistencies and gaps have been properly
       explained or not. If so, such inconsistencies and gaps may not
       affect the case of the prosecution. However, if the prosecution fails
       to explain the inconsistencies in its case, an adverse inference may
       be drawn against it.
23. Be that as it may, the present case does not fall in such category,
    as the prosecution witnesses have invariably deposed in support of
    the version put across by the victim. The medical reports and other
    documentary evidence have corroborated the oral statement of the
    victim. Moreover, the oral statement of the victim has remained
    fairly consistent at all levels of the proceeding, including before the
    Magistrate who recorded her statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C.
    and the Trial Court where she was subjected to cross examination.
    The version of the victim has remained completely natural and
    consistent with the chain of circumstances of the case. Despite cross-
    examination, there is nothing to suggest that she is not creditworthy
    as a witness.
24. Having said so, we do agree that better investigation could have been
    conducted in the present matter on certain aspects. For instance,
    the accused persons ought to have been tested for DNA analysis as
    it could have enabled more fool-proofing of the prosecution’s case.
    This argument has been taken by the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2
    in the written submissions and reliance has been placed upon the
    decision of this Court in Krishan Kumar Malik v. State of Haryana4.
    We have carefully considered this aspect and are of the opinion that
    despite this error, the case of the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 cannot
    be advanced as it does not give rise to any reasonable doubt. It is
    so because the factual matrix of the present case is substantially
    distinct from that in Krishan Kumar Malik. In the said case, the
    version of the prosecutrix was found to be doubtful as she had failed
    to disclose the name of the accused in the FIR, despite admitting
    that she knew his name. She had also failed to explain the identity
    of the accused in an accurate manner and in fact, stated that the
    accused was a short-structured person, which was found to be
    contrary to his appearance. The prosecutrix had also concealed and
    falsely presented certain material aspects of the case. Thus, in this
    backdrop, the Court had observed that the prosecution had failed


4   (2011) 7 SCC 130
[2025] 9 S.C.R.                                                          273

              Sushil Kumar Tiwari v. Hare Ram Sah & Ors.


     to prove the identity of the accused therein and DNA test ought to
     have been carried out to obtain scientific evidence of identification.
     However, in the present case, the victim has correctly named and
     identified both the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 right from the beginning
     of the case. In the Trial Court as well, she had correctly identified
     them and no doubt qua identity was raised at that stage. On the point
     of identity, the victim has not even been rebutted at any stage. The
     Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 have not shown any circumstance which
     could enable this Court to raise a question on the identification of
     the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 by the victim. Perhaps, there is none.
     Therefore, merely on account of non-availability of DNA analysis, the
     case of the prosecution cannot be discarded, especially because the
     purpose of identification has been fulfilled on the strength of other
     credible evidence. The reliance placed on Krishan Kumar Malik
     (supra) is, thus, wholly misplaced.
25. Another important aspect that has weighed with the High Court is
    the manner of framing of charge by the Trial Court. On this aspect,
    the High Court has noted thus:
           “25. The Code lays down various provisions with regard
           to the framing of charges against an accused. On perusal
           of charge sheet dated 06.12.2017, it is mentioned that the
           date of occurrence of the incident was on 02.07.2016, but
           the ferdbeyan dated 02.07.2016, states that the daughter of
           the informant was pregnant for three months and few days
           as according to the treatment of the victim which was done
           on 01.07.2016. Further, on perusal of the F.I.R and case
           diary, the statement of the victim which is in para-3 of the
           case diary dated 02.07.2016, she has stated that the first
           incident, where Manish Tiwary (appellant no. 2) raped her
           three to four months back during the time of Holi and after
           a few days, the victim stated that Hare Ram Sah (appellant
           no. 1) raped her while she was searching for her brother.
           It is factually impossible that the incident was reported on
           01.07.2016 and the charge was framed for the occurrence
           of incident dated 02.07.2016, but the ferdbeyan and the
           statement of the victim itself states that the incident had
           occurred three to four months before the F.I.R was filed.
           26. Thus, it is clear to us that the charges framed are not
           in accordance with law and, thus, causing prejudice to the
274                                                          [2025] 9 S.C.R.

                          Supreme Court Reports


           accused persons / appellants as mentioned in the trial court
           record. The framing of charge is the most basic step of
           the process of initiation of a trial in a criminal proceeding.
           Utmost care must be taken while the charges are being
           framed as wrong framing may lead to denial of justice.
           Therefore, one should abstain from wrongful framing and
           joinder of charges as such an inefficiency would vitiate the
           very basic essence of a fair trial.”
26. A perusal of the charge framed by the Trial Court in this matter reveals
    that the charge stated to the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 pertained to
    the commission of offences “on or about the 2nd day of July 2016”. It
    is an admitted position that the date of offence was a few days after
    the festival of Holi and 3-4 months prior to the date of discovery of
    the offence i.e. 01.07.2016. In fact, 2nd July, 2016 was the date of
    registration of FIR and the same has been put to the Respondent
    Nos. 1 and 2 as the date of commission of the offences. We have
    no doubt in observing that the charge stated to the Respondent
    Nos. 1 and 2 was not free from defects. Even if the exact date of
    commission of the offence was not known, the charge ought to have
    stated that the offences was committed before 2nd July 2016 and a
    few days after the festival of Holi, so as to correctly state the time
    frame. The Trial Court clearly fell in error in not doing so. However,
    the consequence of error or defect in charge is to be determined
    in a nuanced manner. Section 464 Cr.P.C. is of instructive value
    in this regard and it provides that no finding, sentence or order of
    any Court shall be deemed invalid merely on account of any error,
    omission or irregularity in the framing of charge, unless the same
    has occasioned any failure of justice. Sub-section (1) of Section 464
    Cr.P.C. reads thus:
           “464. Effect of omission to frame, or absence of, or
           error in, charge.— (1) No finding, sentence or order by
           a Court of competent jurisdiction shall be deemed invalid
           merely on the ground that no charge was framed or on the
           ground of any error, omission or irregularity in the charge
           including any misjoinder of charges, unless, in the opinion
           of the Court of appeal, confirmation or revision, a failure
           of justice has in fact been occasioned thereby.”
       Thus, mere discovery of an error, irregularity or omission in the
       framing of charge does not ipso facto render the decision of the
[2025] 9 S.C.R.                                                      275

              Sushil Kumar Tiwari v. Hare Ram Sah & Ors.


     Court as invalid. In fact, even a case of non-framing of charge is
     not liable to be discarded on that ground alone. In order to vitiate
     the decision, what is necessary is the failure of justice as a result
     of such error or omission or irregularity. Thus, the quintessential
     issue that requires an answer is whether the defect in the framing
     of charge in the instant matter has occasioned a failure of justice
     for the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2. In other words, has it prevented
     the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 from having a fair trial or has denied
     them any opportunity to present a valid defence before the Trial
     Court? We feel not.
27. Ordinarily, in a criminal trial, the stage of charge is sandwiched
    between the stages of investigation and trial. It is the gateway
    to trial and prior to this stage, the stages of registration of FIR,
    filing of chargesheet and arguments on charge occur. During
    all these stages, the accused has a right to be informed, and is
    informed, about the allegations against him and the chargesheet
    finally culminates the entire case of the prosecution and makes it
    clearly known to the accused persons the colour and content of the
    allegations. Thus, on receipt of the chargesheet, the Respondent
    Nos. 1 and 2 were conscious of the allegations. Merely for non-
    statement of the correct date in the formal charge, it could not be
    said that the accused persons have been robbed of a fair trial or
    that failure of justice has been occasioned. Throughout the trial,
    there was no confusion regarding the date or time frame of the
    commission of the offence. Had there been so, the error in charge
    could have been suitably corrected under Section 216 Cr.P.C.
    However, the error in question did not have the effect of misleading
    the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 in any manner during the trial. Section
    215 Cr.P.C., which finds place in the chapter of “Charge” and deals
    with the effect of errors, also provides that no error in the framing
    of charge shall be regarded as material, unless it has the effect of
    misleading the accused and results into failure of justice. In this
    matter, there is no explanation as to how the Respondent Nos.
    1 and 2were misled by the charge or had suffered any failure of
    justice. During their statements under Section 313 Cr.P.C. and
    defence evidence as well, the allegations were fully addressed by
    the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 without any confusion with respect
    to the time-frame of offence. The time frame alleged by the victim
    was well known to the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 and there was no
276                                                         [2025] 9 S.C.R.

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       occasion for any confusion on that count, let aside any failure of
       justice. The decision relied upon by the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2,
       rendered by this Court in Soundarajan v. State (Represented by
       the Inspector of Police, Vigilance Anti-Corruption, Dindigul)5,
       is of no consequence in the present matter. Ironically, in the said
       decision, the contention regarding failure of justice due to defective
       framing of charge was turned down by the Court. Despite finding
       that non-statement of correct date in the charge had rendered
       the charge as defective, the Court went on to hold that it had not
       occasioned any failure of justice.
28. Nevertheless, we consider it a fit matter to call upon the Trial Courts
    to be vigilant and cautious in framing of charges. The prosecutors
    representing the State are also duty bound to render suitable
    assistance during the trial and to remain vigilant in identifying the
    errors in statement of charges. For, timely intervention is always
    better in a trial and the criminal procedure provides ample provisions
    for rectifying the mistakes in framing of charges during the trial
    itself. The identification of such mistakes at appellate stages, which
    could have easily been spotted and corrected during the trial, does
    not only affect the finality of cases but also affects the credibility
    of the criminal justice system as a whole. The Trial Court does
    the job of raising the building from the scratch, brick by brick. In
    the performance of this onerous task, some mistakes are quite
    natural. While finding defects in the building, the Appellate Court
    must carefully weigh the mistakes and analyze their consequence
    on the outcome of the trial. We may suffice to observe that not
    every mistake is fatal.
29. As an extension of the same discussion, we must also refer to
    the next ground of contention i.e. non-compliance of Section 223
    Cr.P.C. The High Court has observed that the joinder of trial of both
    the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 was impermissible and consequently,
    the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 have been prejudiced before the Trial
    Court. Ordinarily, distinct offences committed by different persons are
    to be tried separately. The principle becomes clear from a reading of
    Section 218 Cr.P.C. However, from Sections 219 to 223 of Cr.P.C.,
    various situations are envisaged wherein multiple offences committed


5   (2023) 16 SCC 141
[2025] 9 S.C.R.                                                         277

              Sushil Kumar Tiwari v. Hare Ram Sah & Ors.


     by the same person could be tried together or different offences
     committed by different persons could be tried together. Whereas,
     a joint trial of different offences committed by the same person is
     contingent upon the fulfilment of the conditions envisaged in Sections
     219 to 221; a joint trial of different offences committed by different
     persons is solely governed by Section 223. In the present case, we
     are concerned with the second scenario.
30. Section 223 lays down various conditions wherein different persons
    who have committed different offences could be charged and tried
    jointly. Amongst other things, it provides that the persons alleged of
    committing different offences, but as a part of the same transaction,
    could be charged and tried jointly. It is contended that the offences
    alleged upon the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 pertained to two completely
    independent acts and thus, they could not be considered to have
    formed part of the same transaction. It has also been contended that
    there was no allegation qua commission of any offence jointly by the
    Respondent Nos. 1 and 2. It is stated that the incidents took place
    at different points of time and there was no unity between them. The
    High Court has accepted this factual position. The statement of the
    victim reveals that allegations pertain to two specific instances of rape
    along with a general allegation that for 2-3 months, the Respondent
    Nos. 1 and 2 continued to rape her. However, we cannot lose sight
    of the fact that there is no direct allegation that the offences were
    committed together by the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 and on a
    plain view of the matter, it is not a case wherein the principles of
    common intention under Section 34 of IPC or conspiracy would be
    attracted. The only question is whether the offences committed by
    the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 formed part of the same transaction,
    so as to attract clause (d) of Section 223 Cr.P.C., which permits
    joint trial of persons accused of different offences committed in the
    course of the same transaction.
31. In criminal law, the question whether certain acts and omissions
    form part of the same transaction often troubles the Courts. There
    is no definition of “same transaction” in the Code and more often
    than not, this determination is contingent upon the peculiar facts
    and circumstances of the case. To make it judicially determinable,
    we have often applied the three tests of “unity of purpose and
    design”, “proximity of time or place” and “continuity of action”.
    Reference may be drawn to the decision of this Court in State
278                                                            [2025] 9 S.C.R.

                           Supreme Court Reports


       of Andhra Pradesh Vs. Cheemalapati Ganeswara Rao and
       another6. Let us have a look at some admitted facts. The victim
       and the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 were residing in the same
       village, the house of respondent No. 2-Manish Tiwari was situated
       one house away from that of the victim, respondent No. 2-Manish
       had taken the victim’s father to hospital a few days prior to the
       incident, respondent No. 1-Hare Ram Sah was running a coaching
       center adjacent to his house and in the same vicinity, and both the
       respondents threatened the victim of similar consequences if she
       dared to disclose their acts to anyone. Evidently, the nature of acts
       committed by the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 herein and subsequent
       intimidation to keep the victim silent were of a similar design. Further,
       there was a certain proximity of time and place as the incidents
       were committed within a continuous time-frame and at different
       places in the same village. However, it is also admitted that they
       never committed the acts together and always acted separately.
       Therefore, there is no direct evidence of commission of offences
       in the same transaction, however, an inference may be drawn. Be
       that as it may, we need not render a finding on this aspect and
       we are not inclined to disturb the factual finding of the High Court.
       For, even if the conclusion of the High Court, that the joint trial
       was conducted in violation of Section 223 Cr.P.C., is accepted,
       the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 would still have to further show that
       the joint trial had caused prejudice to them and had occasioned
       a failure of justice. Mere irregular conduct of a joint or separate
       trial does not vitiate the trial as a whole and the proof of failure of
       justice is sine qua non for holding the trial as invalid.
32. The legal position on Section 223 could not be termed as res integra,
    especially in light of the pronouncement in Nasib Singh v. State
    of Punjab and another7, also relied upon by the High Court. The
    relevant extract of the decision reads thus:
            “51. From the decisions of this Court on joint trial and
            separate trials, the following principles can be formulated:
            51.1 Section 218 provides that separate trials shall be
            conducted for distinct offences alleged to be committed


6   AIR 1963 SC 1850
7   2021 INSC 642
[2025] 9 S.C.R.                                                           279

              Sushil Kumar Tiwari v. Hare Ram Sah & Ors.


           by a person. Sections 219 - 221 provide exceptions to this
           general rule. If a person falls under these exceptions, then
           a joint trial for the offences which a person is charged with
           may be conducted. Similarly, under Section 223, a joint trial
           may be held for persons charged with different offences
           if any of the clauses in the provision are separately or on
           a combination satisfied;
           51.2 While applying the principles enunciated in Sections
           218 - 223 on conducting joint and separate trials, the trial
           court should apply a two-pronged test, namely, (i) whether
           conducting a joint/separate trial will prejudice the defence
           of the accused; and/or (ii) whether conducting a joint/
           separate trial would cause judicial delay.
           51.3 The possibility of conducting a joint trial will have to
           be determined at the beginning of the trial and not after
           the trial based on the result of the trial. The Appellate
           Court may determine the validity of the argument that
           there ought to have been a separate/joint trial only based
           on whether the trial had prejudiced the right of accused
           or the prosecutrix;
           51.4 Since the provisions which engraft an exception use
           the phrase ‘may’ with reference to conducting a joint trial,
           a separate trial is usually not contrary to law even if a
           joint trial could be conducted, unless proven to cause a
           miscarriage of justice; and
           51.5 A conviction or acquittal of the accused cannot
           be set aside on the mere ground that there was a
           possibility of a joint or a separate trial. To set aside
           the order of conviction or acquittal, it must be proved
           that the rights of the parties were prejudiced because
           of the joint or separate trial, as the case may be.”
                                                  (emphasis supplied)

33. On a reading of the provision as well as the exposition reproduced
    above, it is discernible that when a ground of non-joinder or misjoinder
    of charges/trial is taken before an Appellate Court, the test to be
    applied is whether such non-joinder or misjoinder has resulted into
280                                                         [2025] 9 S.C.R.

                          Supreme Court Reports


       a failure or miscarriage of justice and has prejudiced the accused.
       It is not enough for the Appellate Court to merely hold that the Trial
       Court ought to have tried certain persons jointly or separately in the
       facts and circumstances of the case. That is where the High Court
       has clearly fell in error in the present case.
34. In its appellate capacity, the High Court was required to address two
    aspects – first, whether the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 ought to have
    been tried separately and second, whether the misjoinder of trials
    had caused prejudice to the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 and resulted
    in failure of justice. We are afraid, the High Court restricted itself to
    the first aspect and did not deal with the second aspect in the manner
    required by law. On the first aspect, as already expressed above,
    we refrain from disturbing the factual finding rendered by the High
    Court that the offences were not committed in the same transaction.
    We feel that both views appear to be possible on that aspect and
    therefore, we do not consider it necessary to disturb the finding. On
    the second aspect, which is more important, the observation of the
    High Court reads thus:
            “33. Considering the above provision of the Code, the
            present case of the appellants is nowhere applicable for
            joint trial and learned trial Court has convicted both the
            accused persons through a joint trial. For a joint trial to
            be conducted for two persons committing an offence at
            different place and at different time, the trial Court shall
            mention this on record or an application should be moved
            for conducting a joint trial, and the learned Trial Court
            shall apply a judicial mind while considering the matter,
            and the Judicial Officer while performing the duties shall
            make sure that the procedure prescribed in the Code is
            followed and no prejudice be caused to any person. But,
            in the present case, on perusal of the entire record, no
            such application or mention of conducting joint trial has
            been brought on record. This causes a great prejudice
            on the accused persons as the victim herself states
            in para-30 of her deposition that both the appellants
            raped her at different time at different places and they
            never raped her together …”
                                                  (emphasis supplied)
[2025] 9 S.C.R.                                                        281

              Sushil Kumar Tiwari v. Hare Ram Sah & Ors.


35. It could be seen that the sole basis of the High Court’s reasoning
    in arriving at a finding of prejudice in the impugned decision is that
    a joint trial was not permissible. The finding is unsustainable and in
    fact, there is no finding of actual prejudice or failure of justice as a
    result of the joint trial, as necessitated by law. As noted above, the
    High Court ought to have analyzed the facts of the case to return a
    finding of actual prejudice. Mere non-compliance of the procedure
    contemplated under Section 223 does not ipso facto render the
    trial as invalid, and the same cannot form the basis of returning a
    finding of prejudice and failure of justice. The said conclusion must
    emanate from the facts of the case, after a thorough examination
    of the facts and evidence on record. It is not a case wherein the
    joint trial precluded the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 from presenting a
    valid defence. It is also not a case wherein separate evidence of the
    prosecution witnesses could have made any difference to the end
    result. There is no explanation as to how separate trials could have
    made any difference to the outcome of the case, except causing
    harassment to the victim by compelling her to face her offenders
    twice in the witness box for explaining the same version. Thus, we
    are of the considered view that the joint trial of the Respondent Nos.
    1 and 2 did not cause any prejudice to them and no case for failure
    of justice, on account of the said irregularity, appears to be made out.
36. Before closing, we deem it fit to observe that noticeably, the principle
    of beyond reasonable doubt has been misunderstood to mean any
    and every doubt in the case of the prosecution. Often, we come
    across cases wherein loose acquittals are recorded on the basis of
    minor inconsistencies, contradictions and deficiencies, by elevating
    them to the standard of reasonable doubts. A reasonable doubt
    is one that renders the version of the prosecution as improbable,
    and leads the Court to believe in the existence and probability of
    an alternate version of the facts. It is a serious doubt which must
    be backed by reason. The underlying foundation of the principle of
    beyond reasonable doubt is that no innocent should face punishment
    for a crime that he has not done. But a flipside of the same, of
    which we are conscious, is that at times, owing to a mis-application
    of this principle, actual culprits manage to find their way out of the
    clutches of law. Such misapplication of this principle, resulting into
    culprits walking free by taking benefit of doubt, is equally dangerous
    for the society. Every instance of acquittal of an actual culprit revolt
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       against the sense of security of the society and acts as a blot on
       the criminal justice system. Therefore, not only should no innocent
       face punishment for something that he has not done, but equally,
       no culprit should manage an acquittal on the basis of unreasonable
       doubts and misapplication of procedure.
37. In the present case, a fairly consistent and creditworthy case of the
    prosecution has been discarded on what could only be termed as
    misapplication of procedure. It takes us back to the first principle
    that procedure is not supposed to control justice.
38. In view of the foregoing discussion, we are of the considered view that
    the impugned judgment is liable to be set aside being unsustainable.
    The view taken by the Trial Court was correct and we find no infirmity
    in the same. The judgment of the Trial Court stands restored, both
    on conviction and sentence.
39. The Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 shall surrender before the trial court
    within a period of two weeks from today. In case the Respondent
    Nos. 1 and 2 do not surrender within the stipulated time, the trial
    court shall take appropriate recourse to take them into custody for
    serving the remaining part of sentence. Registry is directed to suitably
    communicate this judgment to ensure due compliance.
40. The captioned appeal stands disposed of in the aforesaid terms.
    Interim application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of.

       Result of the case: Appeal disposed of.




       †
           Headnotes prepared by: Ankit Gyan