SUSHIL KUMAR SINGHALversusTHE REGIONAL MANAGER, PUNJAB NATIONAL BANK

                        [2010] 9 S.C.R. 796


A                    SUSHIL KUMAR SINGHAL
                                  v.
     THE REGIONAL MANAGER, PUNJAB NATIONAL BANK
              (Civil Appeal No. 6423 of 2010)
                         AUGUST 10, 2010
B
        [P. SATHASIVAM AND DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, JJ.]

        Service Law:

C      Termination of services of Bank employee on being
  convicted of an offence involving moral turpitude - Appellate
  court releasing him on probation - Consequently, plea of
  employee that he be reinstated in service - HELD: Not tenable
  - Order of a criminal court granting a delinquent the benefit
  of Probation of Offenders Act, has no bearing on the service
0
  conditions of such employee - An employee who stands
  convicted of an offence involving moral turpitude, it is his
  misconduct that leads to his dismissal - In the instant case,
  in view of s. 10(1 )(b)(i) of Banking Regulation Act, the
  delinquent could not be permitted to continue in service -
E Banking Regulation Act, 1949 - s.10(1)(b)(i) - Probation of
  Offenders Act, 1958 - s. 12.

        Banking Regulation Act, 1949:

F       s.10(1)(b)(i) - Discontinuance of service of the employee
    convicted of moral turpitude - Expression 'moral turpitude' -
    Connotation of.

        Probation of Offenders Act, 1958:
                           -
G       s. 12 - Removal of disqualification attaching to conviction
    - Applicability of in the context of an employee convicted of
    moral turpitude and release by appellate court on probation.

        Words and Phrases:

H                                796
SUSHIL KUMAR SINGHAL v. REGIONAL MANAGER, 797
          PUNJAB NATIONAL BANK
    Expression "moral turpitude" - Connotation of             A

    The appellant, a bank employee, was convicted and
sentenced to two years imprisonment u/s 409 IPC.
Consequently, he was dismissed from service. The
appellant raised an industrial dispute under the Industrial   B
Disputes, Act, 1947. Meanwhile, in the criminal appeal, the
appellate court, while maintaining the conviction,
released him on probation under the Probation of
Offenders Act, 1958. However, the Central Government
Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court upheld his               C
dismissal from service. The High Court affirmed the
award.

    In the instant appeal filed by the delinquent, it was
contended for the appellant that the benefit granted by
the appellate court under the Probation of Offenders A'ct,    D
1958 had taken away the "disqualification" by virtue of
s.12 thereof and, therefore, the respondent -Bank ought
to have considered his case for reinstatement.
    Dismissing the appeal, the Court ·
                                                              E
     HELD: 1.1. Order of a criminal court granting a
delinquent employee the benefit of the Probation of
Offenders Act, 1958 does not have any bearing so far as
his service is concerned. The word "disqualification" in
s.12 of the 1958 Act provides that such a person shall not    F
stand disqualified for the purposes of other Acts like the
Representation of the People Act, 1951 etc. [para 27] [809-
G-H; 810-A]          .

     1.2. The conviction in a criminal case is one part and   G
release on probation is another. Therefore, grant of
benefit of the provisions of Probation of Offenders Act,
1958, only enables the delinquent not to undergo the
sentence on showing his good conduct during the period
of probation. In case, after being released, the delinquent   H
    798      SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2010] 9 S.C.R.


A commits another offence, benefit of the 1958 Act, gets
  terminated and the delinquent can be made liable to
  undergo the sentence. Therefore, in the case of an
  employee who stands convicted of an offence involving
  moral turpitude, it is his misconduct that leads to his
B dismissal. [para 27] [810-B-C]

         1.3. Moral turpitude means anything contrary to
    honesty, modesty or good morals. It means vileness and
    depravity. In fact, the conviction of a person in a crime
C   involving moral turpitude impeaches his credibility as he
    has been found to have indulged in shameful, wicked,
    and base activities. In the instant case, undoubtedly, the
    embezzlement of Rs. 5000/- by the appellant, for which
    he had been convicted, was an offence involving moral
    turpitude. Section 10(1)(b)(i) of the Banking Regulation
D   Act, 1949 provides that the Management shall not permit
    any person convicted of an offence involving moral
    turpitude to continue in employment. The Tribunal
    rejected the appellant's claim for re-instatement and other
    benefits taking note of the fact that he was given an
E   opportunity by the Management to show cause as to why
    he should not be dismissed from service and he
    submitted his reply, as also taking into consideration the
    contents of the Bi-Partite Settlement applicable in the
    case. The High Court considered appellant's grievance
F   elaborately. In this fact-situation, it cannot be said that
    any other view could also be possible. [para 24 and 28)
    [809-B-C; 810-D-F]

       Pawan Kumar vs. State of Haryana & Anr. , AIR 1996 SC
G 3300 Allahabad Bank & Anr. Vs. Deepak Kumar Bhola (1997)
  4 SCC 1; Baleshwar Singh vs. District Magistrate and
  Collector, AIR 1959 All. 71; and Manish Goel vs. Rohini Goel
  AIR 2010 SC 199, relied on

          Black's Law Dictionary (8th Edn., 2004), referred to.
H
  SUSHIL KUMAR SINGHAL v. REGIONAL MANAGER, 799
            PUNJAB NATIONAL BANK
      Harichand vs. Director of School Education 1998 ( 1 )    A
  SCR 143 =(1998) 2 SCC 383, Divisional Personnel Officer,
 Southern Railway & "Anr. Vs. T.R. Chellappan, 1976 ( 1 )
  SCR 783 =AIR 1975 SC 2216; Shankar Dass Vs. Union of
 India & Anr. 1985 (3) SCR 163 = AIR 1985 SC 772; State
 of UP. Vs. Ranjit Singh, 1999 ( 1 ) SCR 786 =AIR 1999 SC      B
 1201; Punjab Water Supply Sewerage Board & Anr. Vs. Raj
 Sajivan & Anr. 2007 (5) SCR 684 = (2007) 9 SCC 86,
 relied on.

      Trikha Ram vs. V.K. Seth & Anr. (1987) Supp. SCC 39;
  Union of India & Ors. Vs. Bakshi Ram, 1990 ( 1 ) SCR 760 =
                                                               c
  (1990) 2 SCC 426; Karam Singh Vs. State of Punjab & Anr.
  1996 ( 1 ) SCR 1030 = (1996)7 SCC 748; Additional Deputy
  Inspector General of Police, Hyderabad vs. P.R.K. Mohan
  (1997) 11 SCC 571; Union of India Vs. Trilochan Patel, AIR
  1985 SC 1612; Swam Singh Vs. State Bank of India & Anr.      D
-(1986) Supp. SCC 566, referred to

                     Case Law Reference:
      1998 (1) SCR 143        relied on           para 10
                                                               E
      1976 (1) SCR 783        relied on           para 11
      1987 Suppl.   sec 39    referred to         para 12
      1990 ( 1 ) SCR 760      referred to         para 12
                                                               F
      1996 (1) SCR 1030       referred to         para 12
      (1997) 11 sec 571       referred to         para 12
      1985 (3) SCR 163        relied on           para 13
      1999 (1) SCR 786        relied on           para 14      G

      AIR 1985 SC 1612        referred to         para 15
      2007 (5) SCR 684        relied on           para 15
      (1986) Supp. SCC 566 referred to            para 19      H
    800      SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2010] 9 S.C.R.


A         AIR 1996 SC 3300        relied on             para 22

          (1997) 4 sec 1          relied on             para 23

          AIR 1959 All. 71        relied on             para 23

          AIR 2010 SC 199         relied on             para 26
B
        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal no.
    6423 of 2010.

         From the Jughment & Order dated 10.09.2007 of the High
c   Court of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh in C.W.P No. 14014
    of 2007.

       Pardeep Gupta, Suresh Bharti, Laxmibai Leitanthem, K.K.
    Mohan for the Appellant.

D       Yashraj Singh Deora, R.K. Gautam, Mitter & Mitter Co. for
    the Respondent.

          The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

          DR. B. S. CHAUHAN, J. 1. Leave granted.
E
       2. This appeal has been preferred against the Judgment
  and Order dated 10.09.2007 passed by High Court of Punjab
  & Haryana in Civil Writ Petition 14014 of 2007, by which the
  High Court had dismissed the writ petition for quashing the
F award dated 3rd January, 2007, passed by the Central
  Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court-II at
  Chandigarh (hereinafter called as, "Tribunal"), by which the
  Tribunal had upheld the dismissal of the appellant from service
  on the ground of conviction of the appellant in criminal case
G involving moral turpitude.
         3. Facts and circumstances giving rise to the present case
    are that the appellant was appointed as a Peon in the
    respondent-Bank, Kaithal Branch, on 01.12.1971 and stood
    confirmed on the said post vide order dated 28.12.1977. The
H
SUSHIL KUMAR SINGHAL v. REGIONAL MANAGER, 801
PUNJAB NATIONAL BANK [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
appellant was handed over cash of Rs.5000/-, to deposit the          A
same as dues for the Telephone Bill in the Post Office.
However, it was not deposited by the appellant, therefore, the
bank lodged FIR No. 171 under Section 409 of Indian Penal
Code, 1860 (hereinafter called "IPC") against the appellant, on
27 .04.1982, in Police Station, City Kaithal. Appellant was tried    B
for the said offence. After conclusion of trial, the appellant was
convicted by the competent Criminal Court vide Judgment and
Order dated 28.01.1988. The respondent-Bank issued a Show
Cause Notice dated 01.03.1988 to the appellant, proposing
dismissal from service and asked the appellant to show cause         c
within a period of seven days. The appellant submitted the reply
dated 08.03.1988. However, the respondent-Bank dismissed
the appellant from service vide order dated 09.03.1988.
     4. Beihg aggrieved, the appellant raised an industrial
dispute under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and the matter       D
was referred to the Tribunal. In the meanwhile, the appeal filed
by the appellant against the order of conviction was decided
by the appellate Court vide judgment and order dated
29.5.1989. The appellate Court maintained the conviction, but
granted him the benefit of probation under The Probation of          E
Offenders Act, 1958 (hereinafter called as, "Act 1958) and
releasedI the appellant on probation. The Tribunal made the
award dated 03.01.2007, rejecting the claim of the appellant
and holding his dismissal from service to be justified and in
a~c6rdance with law.                                                 F
     5. Being aggrieved, the appellant challenged the said
award of the Tribunal by filing the writ petition No. 14014 of
2007, before the High Court. His petition also stood dismissed
vide impugned Judgment and order dated 10.09.2007. Hence,
this appeal.                                                         G
    6. Sh. Pradeep Gupta, learned counsel appearing for the
appellant, has submitted that once the appellant had been
granted the benefit of the Act, 1958, the respondent-Bank
ought to have considered his case for reinstatement, as the          H
    802       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 (2010) 9 S.C.R.


A   benefit granted by the appellate Court under the provisions of
    Act, 1958, had taken away "disqualification" by virtue of Section
    12 of the Act, 1958. The appeal deseNes to be allowed and
    the Judgment and Order of the High Court as well as the Award
    of the Tribunal are liable to be set aside.
B
       7. Per contra, Sh. Rajesh Kumar, learned counsel
  appearing for the respondent-Bank, has vehemently opposed
  the appeal contending that grant of benefit under the Act, 1958
  takes away only the punishment (sentence) and not the factum
  of conviction, therefore, in case, an employee of the Bank
C stands convicted in an offence involving moral turpitude, it is
  permissible for the respondent-Bank to remove him from
  seNice. Appeal lacks merit and is liable to be dismissed.

         8. We have considered the rival submissions made by the
D learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. The
    facts of the case are not in dispute. The Trial Court has
    convicted the appellant under Section 409.IPC after recording
  . the finding of fact that the appellant had not deposited the
    telephone bill in spite of receiving a sum of Rs. 5000/- for that
E purpose on 26.04.1982 and he deposited the said amount with
    the Bank on 27.07.1982 vide voucher (Exhibit PH). Appellant
    had also taken away the Bicycle of the Bank. The appellate
    Court maintained the conviction, however, it granted the
    appellant the benefit of probation under the Act, 1958.

F       9. The sole question involved in this case is whether the
    benefit granted to the appellant under the provisions of Act,
    1958 makes him entitled to reinstatement in seNice.
          The issue involved herein is no more res integra.
G       In Aitha Chander Rao Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, 1981
    (Suppl.) SCC 17, this Court held:-
          "As the appellant has been released on probation, this may
          not affect his seNice career in view of Section 12 of the
          Probation of offenders Act."
H
SUSHIL KUMAR SINGHAL v. REGIONAL MANAGER, 803
PUNJAB NATIONAL BANK [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]

     10. The said judgment in Aitha Chander Rao (Supra) was         A
not approved by this Court in Harichand Vs. Director of School
Education, (1998) 2 SCC 383, observing that due to the
peculiar circumstances of the case, the benefit of the provisions
of 1958 Act had been given to him and as in that case there
had been no discussion on the words "disqualification, if any       B
attaching to a conviction of an offence under such law", the said
judgment cannot be treated as a binding precedent. This Court
interpreted the provisions of Section 12 of the 1958, Act and
held as under :-

    "In our view, Section 12 of the probation of offenders Act C
    would apply only in respect of a disqualification that goes
    with a conviction under law which provides for the offence
    and its punishment. That is the plain meaning of the words
    "disqualification, if any, attaching to a conviction of an
    offence under such law" therein. Where the law that D
    provides for an offence and its punishment also stipulates
    a disqualification, a person convicted of the offence but"
    released on probation does not by reason of Section 12,
    suffers the disqualification. It cannot be held that by
    reason of Section 12, a conviction for an offence should E
    not be taken into account for the purposes of dismissal
    of the person convicted from government service. n
    (Emphasis added).

      11. In Divisional Personnel Officer, Southern Railway &
                                                                    F
Anr. Vs. T.R. Chel/appan, AIR 1975 SC 2216, this Court
observed that the conviction of an accused, or the finding of
the Court that he is guilty, does not stand washed away because
that is the sine-qua-non for the order of release on probation.
The order of release on probation is merely in substitution of
the sentence to be imposed by the Court. Thus, the factum of        G
guilt on the criminal charge is not swept away merely by passing
the order under the Act, 1958.
     12. In Trikha Ram Vs. V.K. Seth & Anr, (1987) Supp. SCC
39, this Court had held that if a person stands convicted and       H
    804 .   SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2010] 9 S.C.R.


A is given the benefit of the provisions of the 1958, Act, he can
  be removed from service only on the ground that he stood
  convicted. But by virtue of the provisions of Section 12 of the
  1958, Act, his removal cannot be a "disqualification" for the
  purposes provided in other Statutes such as the Representation
B of the People Act, 1950. The same view has been reiterated
  by this Court in Union of India & Ors. Vs. Bakshi Ram, (1990)
  2 SCC 426; Karam Singh Vs. State of Punjab & Anr., (1996)
  7 SCC 748; and Additional Deputy Inspector General of
  Police, 'Hyderabad Vs. P.R.K. Mohan, (1997) 11 SCC 571.

C        13. In Shankar Dass Vs. Union of India & Anr., AIR 1985
    SC 772, this Court has held that the order of dismissal from
    service, consequent upon a conviction, is not a disqualification
    within the meaning of Section 12 of the 1958, Act. The court
    held as under :-
D
        "There are Statutes which provide that the persons, who
        are convicted for certain offences, shall incur certain
        disqualific_ation; for example, Chapter Ill of _the
        Representation of Peoples Act, 1951 entitles
        'disqualification' for Membership of Parliament and State
E
        Legislatures, and Chapter IV entitles 'disqualification' for
        voting, contains the provisions which disqualify persons
        convicted of certain charges from being the Members of
        Legislatures or from voting at election to the legislature.
        That is the sense in which the word 'disqualification' is
F       used in Section 12 of the Probation of Offenders
        Act.. ..... Therefore, it is not possible to accept the
        reasoning of the High Court that Section 12 of the 1958
        Act takes away the effect of conviction for the purpose of
        service also."
G
        14. In State of U.P. Vs. Ranjft Singh, AIR 1999 SC 1201,
  this Court has held that the High Court, while deciding a criminal
  case and giving the benefit of the U.P. First Offenders
  Probation Act, 1958, or similar enactment, has no competence
H to issue any direction that the accused shall not suffer any civil
SUSHIL KUMAR SINGHAL v. REGIONAL MANAGER, 805
PUNJAB NATIONAL BANK [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
consequences. The Court has held as under:                             A
    "We also fail to understand, how the High Court, while
    deciding a criminal case, can direct that the accused must
    be deemed to have been in continuous service without
    break, and, therefore, he should be paid his full pay and
                                                                       B
    dearness allowance during the period of his suspension.
    This direction and observation is wholly without
    jurisdiction .... "

    15. In Union of India Vs. Trilochan Patel, AIR 1985 SC
1612, some part of the Judgment in T.R. Chellappan (supra)             C
was overruled by the Constitution Bench of this Court. But the
observations cited hereinbefore were not overruled.

     16. In Punjab Water Supply Sewerage Board & Anr. Vs.
Ram Sajivan & Anr., (2007) 9 SCC 86, this Court explained
that the Judgment in Aitha Chander Rao (supra) did not lay             D
down any law as no reason has been assigned in support of
the order. Thus, the same remained merely an order purported
to have been passed under Article 142 of the Constitution of
India. This Court allowed the disciplinary authority to initiate the
disciplinary proceedings in accordance with law and pass an            E
appropriate order, in spite of the fact that in the said case, the
court, after recording the convictior had granted benefits of the
provisions of the Act, 1958 to the employee.

     17. In view of the above, the law on the issue can be
                                                                       F
summarized to the effect that the conviction of an employee in
an offence permits the disciplinary authority to initiate
disciplinary proceedings against the employee or to take
appropriate steps for his dismissal/removal only on the basis
of his conviction. The word 'Disqualification' contained in            G
Section 12 of the Act, 1958 refers to a disqualification provided
in other Statutes, as explained by this Court in the above
referred cases, and the employee cannot claim a right to
continue in service merely on the ground that he had been given
the benefit of probation under the Act, 1958.
                                                                       H
    806      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2010] 9 S.C.R

A        18. Sh. Gupta, learned counsel forthe appellant has placed
    very heavy reliance on the Judgment of this Court in Shankar
    Dass (supra) and submitted that this Court has held otherwise
    in that case. We have gone through the entire judgment and
    found that there is a complete fallacy in the submissions made
B   by Sh. Gupta in this regard. In fact, in that case, this Court came
    to the conclusion that in spite of the fact that the benefit of the
    provisions of Act, 1958 had been granted by the Criminal Court,
    disciplinary proceedings could be initiated against the
    employee. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case
C   involved therein, the Court asked the Management to
    reconsider the issue of quantum of punishment. This Court had
    taken note of the observations made by the Criminal Court
    while granting the benefit of the Act, 1958, which are as under


0         "Misfortune dogged the accused for about a year. ..... and
          it seems that it was under the force of adverse
          circumstances that he held back the money in question.
          Shankar Dass is a middle-aged man and it is obvious that
          it was under compelling circumstances that he could not
E         deposit the money in question in time. He is not a previous
          convict."

       The Court also took further note of his other problems as
    under:-

F         "The appellant was a victim of adverse circumstances; his
          son died in February, 1962, which was followed by another
          misfortune; his wife fell down from an upper storey and was
          seriously injured; it was then the turn of his daughter who
          fell seriously ill and that illness lasted for eight months."
G        In the aforesaid facts and circumstances, this Court asked
    the Management to consider whether some other lesser
    punishment commensurate to the misconduct could be
    awarded. In fact the punishment of dismissal was found to be
    disproportionate to the delinquency committed by the appellant
H
SUSHIL KUMAR SINGHAL v. REGIONAL MANAGER, 807
PUNJAB NATIONAL BANK [DR. S.S. CHAUHAN, J.] ,
therein. Had this Court intended to say that once benefit of the    A
Act, 1958 is extended to a delinquent, his conviction also stands
washed off, the court could have directed the Management to
re-instate the employee rather than asking to impose a lesser
punishment. Thus, the submission so advanced by Shri Gupta
is preposterous.                                            '       B

     19. This Court reconsidered the said case i.e. Shankar
Dass (supra) in Swam Singh Vs. State Bank of India & Anr.,
(1986) Supp. SCC 566, and held that the provisions of Article
311 (2) of the Constitution of India conferred the power on the
Government to dismiss a person on the ground of conduct             C
which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge. It is thus,
clear that it was open to the respondent-Bank to initiate the
disciplinary proceedings and impose the punishment in view
of the provisions of The Banking Regulation Act, 1949
(hereinafter called as, "Act 1949").                                D

     20. Section 10(1)(b)(i) of the Act, 1949, reads as under:
     "No banking company -

     (a)                                                            E
     (b)  Shall employ or continue the employment of any
     person -

     (i)   who is, or at any time has been, adjudicated
     insolvent, or has suspended payment or has compounded          F
     with his creditors, or who is, or has been, convicted by a
     criminal court of an offence involving moral turpitude."
     (emphasis supplied)            · ·
                            ,.                     H'·



    The aforesaid provision makes it clear that the
Management is under an obligation to discontinue the services       G
of an employee who is or has been convicted by a Criminal
Court for an offence involving moral turpitude.
     21. Moral Turpitude means [Per Black's Law Dictionary
(8th Edn.,2004)] :-
                                                                    H
    808       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2010) 9 S.C.R.


A         "Conduct that is contrary to justice, honesty, or morality. In
          the area of legal ethics, offenses involving moral turpitude
          such as fraud or breach of trust. Also termed moral
          depravity.

          Moral turpitude means, in general, shameful wickedness-
B         so extreme a departure from ordinary standards of honest,
          good morals, justice, or ethics as to be shocking to the
          moral sense of the community. It has also been defined
          as an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private
          and social duties which one person owes to another, or
c         to society in general, contrary to the accepted and
          customary rule of right and duty between people."

        22. In Pawan Kumar Vs. State of Haryana & Anr., AIR
    1996 SC 3300, this Court has observed as under:-
D         '"Moral turpitude' is an expression which is used in legal
          as also societal parlance to describe conduct which is
          inherently base, vile, depraved or having any· connection
          showing depravity."

E        23. The aforesaid judgment in Pawan Kumar (supra) has
    been considered by this Court again in Allahabad Bank & Anr.
    Vs. Deepak Kumar Bhola, (1997) 4 SCC 1; and placed
    reliance on Baleshwar Singh Vs. District Magistrate and
    Collector, AIR 1959 All. 71, wherein it has been held as under:-
F         "The expression 'moral turpitude' is not defined anywhere.
          But it means anything done contrary to justice, honesty,
          modesty or good morals. It implies depravity and
          wickedness of character or disposition of the person
          charged with the particular conduct. Every false statement
G         made by a person may not be moral turpitude, but it would
          be so if it discloses vileness or depravity in the doing of
          any private and social duty which a person owes to his
          fellow men or to the society in general. If therefore the
          individual charged with a certain conduct owes a duty,
H         either to another individual or to the society in general, to
SUSHIL KUMAR SINGHAL v. REGIONAL MANAGER, 809
PUNJAB NATIONAL BANK [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
    act in a specific manner or not to so act and he still acts        A
    contrary to it and does so knowingly, his conduct must be
    held to be due to vileness and depravity. It will be contrary
    to accepted customary rule and duty between man and
    man."
                                                                       B
    24. In view of the above, it is evident that moral turpitude
means anything contrary to honesty, modesty or good morals.
It means vileness and depravity. In fact, the conviction of a
person in a crime involving moral turpitude impeaches his
credibility as he has been found to have indulged in .shameful,
wicked, and base activities.                                           C

     25. Undoubtedly, the embezzlement of Rs.5000/- by the
appellant, for which he had been convicted, was an offence
involving moral turpitude. The Statutory provisions of the Act,
1949, provide that the Management shall not permit any person          o
convicted for an offence involving moral turpitude to continue
in employment.
     26. In Manish Goel Vs. Rohini Goel, AIR 2010 SC 1099,
this Court after placing reliance on large number of its earlier
judgments held as under:-                                              E

     "No Court has competence to issue a direction contrary
     to law nor the Court can direct an authority to act in
     contravention of the statutory provisions. The courts are
     meant to enforce the rule of law and not to pass the orders       F
     or directions which are contrary to what has been injuncted
     bylaw."           ·

Thus, in such a fact-situation, it is not permissible for this Court
to issue any direction as had been issued in the case of
Shankar Dass (supra).                                                  G

  · 27. In view of the above, we reach the conclusion that once
a Criminal Court grants a delinquent employee the benefit of
Act, 1958, its order does not have any bearing so far as the
service of such employee is concerned. The word
                                                                       H
    810     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2010] 9 S.C.R.


A "disqualification" in Section 12 of the Act, 1958 provides that
  such a person shall not stand disqualified for the purposes of
  other Acts like the Representation of the People Act, 1950 etc.
       The conviction in a criminal case is one part of the case
  and release on probation is another. Therefore, grant of benefit
8
  of the provisions of Act, 1958, only enables the delinquent not
  to undergo the sentence on showing his good conduct during
  the period of probation. In case, after being released, the
  delinquent commits another offence, benefit of Act, 1958 gets
  terminated and the delinquent can be made liable to undergo
C the sentence. Therefore, in case of an employee who stands
  convicted for an offence involving moral turpitude, it is his
  misconduct that leads to his dismissal.
       28. Undoubtedly, the appellant was convicted by the
0 Criminal  Court for having committed the offence under Section
  409 IPC and was awarded two years' sentence. The appellate
  court granted him the benefit of Act, 1958. The Tribunal rejected
  his claim for re-instatement and other benefits taking note of
  the fact that appellant was given an opportunity by the
E Management to show cause as to why he should not be
  dismissed from service. The appellant submitted his reply to
  the said show cause notice. The Management passed the order
  of dismissal in view of the provisions of the Act, 1949. The
  Tribunal also took into consideration the contents of the Bi-
F Partite Settlement applicable in the case and rejected the
  appellant's claim. The High Court considered appellant's
  grievance elaborately as is evident from the impugned
  judgment. We could not persuade ourselves, in the aforesaid
  fact-situation, that any other view could also be possible.
G       29. In view of the above, we find no force in the appeal
    and it is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.

    R.P.                                       Appeal dismissed.