SURENDRANversusSTATE OF KERELA

                         [2022] 4 S.C.R. 675                               675


                            SURENDRAN                                      A
                                   v.
                        STATE OF KERELA
                 (Criminal Appeal No. 1080 of 2019)
                            MAY 13, 2022                                   B
          [N. V. RAMANA CJI, A. S. BOPANNA AND
                    HIMA KOHLI. JJ.]
       Evidence Act, 1872: s. 32 – Dying declaration – Admissibility
of – On facts, suicide attempt by the wife soon after marriage due
                                                                           C
to harassment and dowry demands of husband and the family
members – Settlement between the parties, however, harassment
continued and wife committed suicide within two years of marriage
– Conviction of husband, his mother and two brothers u/ss. 304B
and 498A – Appellate court acquitted the brothers but maintained
the conviction of the husband and the mother – However, the High           D
Court acquitted the husband and his mother u/s.304B while upheld
their conviction u/s.498A and sentenced accordingly – Husband’s
case before this Court that since he was acquitted u/s. 304B, thus,
statement of wife could not be relied upon to sustain his conviction
u/s. 498A as it would not fall within the ambit of s. 32(1) – Held:
                                                                           E
U/s. 32, the phrase ‘cases in which the cause of that person’s death
comes into question’ is broader than merely referring only to cases
where there is a charge of murder, suicide or dowry death – s. 32(1)
has been used to admit statements in a case where the charge is of
a different nature or even in a civil action – Second part of the s.
32(1) specifies that such statements are relevant ‘whatever may be         F
the nature of proceeding in which the cause of death comes into
question – Test of admissibility u/s. 32(1) is that ‘the cause of death’
must come into question in the case regardless of the nature of the
case – Purpose for which such evidence is being sought should be
a part of the ‘circumstances of the transaction’ relating to the death
                                                                           G
– Whether the charge relating to death is proved or not is immaterial
with respect to its admissibility – On facts, it is not necessary to
examine whether the statement of the wife can be admitted u/s 32(1)
– Other evidence on record clearly proves the husband’s guilt beyond
reasonable doubt – Furthermore, evidence of the mother of the
deceased was reliable – Thus, the order passed by the High Court           H
                                  675
676            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                       [2022] 4 S.C.R.


A     does not call for interference – Penal Code, 1860 – ss. 304B and
      498A.
            Dismissing the appeal, the Court
            HELD: 1.1 Section 32 of the Evidence Act, 1872 relates to
      the admissibility of statements made by a person who cannot be
B     called as witness. The Section itself specifies the circumstances
      under which such statements become relevant. In the instant
      case, the concern is with one such circumstance, that is, when
      the person who made the statement is dead. [Para 9][681-D-E]
            1.2 To rely on Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act, one of the
C     main conditions laid out in the sub-section is that the issue must
      arise “in cases in which the cause of that person’s death comes
      into question”. [Para 11][682-D]
            1.3 The phrase “cases in which the cause of that person’s
      death comes into question” is broader than merely referring only
D     to cases where there is a charge of murder, suicide, or dowry
      death. There have been instances where Courts have used
      Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act to admit statements in a case
      where the charge is of a different nature or even in a civil action.
      This is abundantly clear from the second part of Section 32(1) of
E     the Evidence Act which specifies that such statements are
      relevant “whatever may be the nature of the proceeding in which
      the cause of his death comes into question”. Illustration (a) to
      Section 32 of the Evidence Act refers to a statement made by a
      deceased in a rape case which may be admitted under the section,
      which was the position in India even prior to the enactment of
F     the Evidence Act. [Para 14][684-B-D]
            1.4 The test for admissibility under the Section 32(1) of the
      Evidence Act, is not that the evidence to be admitted should
      directly relate to a charge pertaining to the death of the individual,
      or that the charge relating to death could not be proved. Rather,
G     the test appears to be that the cause of death must come into
      question in that case, regardless of the nature of the proceeding,
      and that the purpose for which such evidence is being sought to
      be admitted should be a part of the ‘circumstances of the
      transaction’ relating to the death. [Para 17][686-D-F]
H
              SURENDRAN v. STATE OF KERELA                             677


       1.5 In some circumstances, the evidence of a deceased wife      A
with respect to cruelty could be admissible in a trial for a charge
under Section 498A IPC under Section 32(1) of the Evidence
Act. There are, however, certain necessary pre-conditions that
must be met before the evidence is admitted. The first condition
is that her cause of death must come into question in the matter.
                                                                       B
This would include, for instance, matters where along with the
charge under Section 498A IPC, the prosecution has also charged
the accused under Sections 302, 306 or 304B IPC. It must be
noted however that as long as the cause of her death has come
into question, whether the charge relating to death is proved or
not is immaterial with respect to admissibility. The second            C
condition is that the prosecution will have to show that the
evidence that is sought to be admitted with respect to Section
498A IPC must also relate to the circumstances of the transaction
of the death. How far back the evidence can be, and how
connected the evidence is to the cause of death of the deceased
                                                                       D
would necessarily depend on the facts and circumstances of each
case. No specific straitjacket formula or rule can be given with
respect to this. [Paras 20-22][689-F-H; 690-A-B]
      Gananath Pattnaik v. State of Orissa (2002) 2 SCC 619
      : [2002] 1 SCR 845; Inderpal v. State of MP (2001) 10
      SCC 736; Bhairon Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh                E
      (2009) 13 SCC 80 : [2009] 9 SCR 875; Kantilal Martaji
      Pandor v. State of Gujarat (2013) 8 SCC 781 : [2013]
      8 SCR 137 – Partly Overruled.
      1.6 It is not necessary for this Court to undertake the
exercise to determine whether the statement of the deceased            F
can be admitted under Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act. The
appeal can be decided even without considering this aspect, as
the other evidence on record clearly proves the appellant’s guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. [Para 24][690-E]
      1.7 The deceased’s wife was being harassed is clear from         G
the evidence of PW-3 (mother of the deceased). She had
specifically stated in her chief examination that within few days of
their marriage, the appellant brought the deceased back to her
parental home with the threat that if extra dowry was not given,
he would leave her and marry another “beautiful” girl. As a result
                                                                       H
678           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2022] 4 S.C.R.


A     of such harassment, the deceased allegedly attempted suicide
      for the first time by consuming poison. While she was being treated
      in the hospital, a settlement was reached between the parties, to
      which appellant was also a part, wherein it was agreed that no
      further demands for dowry would be made. This agreement was
      exhibited before the trial court. Although the High Court indicated
B
      that the said settlement was not admissible in evidence, the fact
      of its existence has been deposed by PW-9, who is an independent
      witness, as well as by PW-3. Further, it was stated by PW-3 in her
      chief examination that even after the settlement, the appellant
      had continued to ill-treat the deceased. The deceased, due to
C     the ill-treatment faced by her had ultimately committed suicide
      by hanging herself with a saree. [Para 25][690-F-H; 691-A]
             1.8 There are concurrent findings of the courts below
      upholding the reliability of the evidence of PW-3. The submission
      of the appellant that the evidence of PW-3 is unreliable because
D     she is the mother of the deceased, cannot be accepted. The
      evidence tendered by the related or interested witness cannot
      be discarded on that ground alone. However, as a rule of prudence,
      the Court may scrutinize the evidence of such related or interested
      witness more carefully. [Para 26][691-B-C]
             1.9 There is no reason to interfere with the impugned
E     judgment passed by the High Court in confirming the conviction
      of the appellant under Section 498A IPC and sentencing him to
      undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year. [Para 27][691-F]
             Queen v. Bissorunjun Mookerjee (1866) 6 W.R. Cr.
             75; Lalji Dusadh v. King Emperor AIR 1928 Pat 162;
F            Parmanand Ganga Prasad v. Emperor AIR 1940 Nag
             340; Pakala Narayana Swami v. King Emperor AIR
             1939 PC 47; Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of
             Maharashtra (1984) 4 SCC 116 : [1985] 1 SCR 88;
             Ilangovan v. State of T.N. (2020) 10 SCC 533 - referred
             to.
G
                              Case Law Reference
      [2002] 1 SCR 845                 partly overruled       Para 23
      (2001) 10 SCC 736                partly overruled       Para 23

H
               SURENDRAN v. STATE OF KERELA                                  679


[2009] 9 SCR 875                 partly overruled          Para 23           A

[2013] 8 SCR 137                 partly overruled          Para 23

[1985] 1 SCR 88                  referred to               Para 19

(2020) 10 SCC 533                referred to               Para 26           B

      CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
1080 of 2019.

      From the Judgment and Order dated 12.09.2018 of the High Court
of Kerala at Ernakulam in Crl. Rev. Pet. No. 1801 of 2006.                   C

      Adolf Mathew, Sanjay Jain, Advs. for the Appellant.

    Harshad V. Hameed, Dileep Poolakkot, Mrs. Ashly Harshad,
Muhammed Siddick, G. Prakash, Advs. for the Respondent.
                                                                             D
      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

      N. V. RAMANA, CJI.

       1. The instant appeal, by way of special leave, is directed against
                                                                             E
judgment dated 12.09.2018 passed by the High Court of Kerala in Criminal
Revision Petition No. 1801 of 2006, whereby the High Court partly
allowed the Revision Petition filed by the appellant-husband (accused
no. 5). By way of the impugned judgment, the High Court has set aside
the concurrent findings of conviction of the courts below and acquitted
the appellant under Section 304B of the Indian Penal Code [for short         F
‘the IPC’] while confirming his conviction under Section 498A of the
IPC. The High Court has further modified the sentence imposed on the
appellant to rigorous imprisonment for one year.

       2. The conspectus of the facts necessary for the disposal of the
appeal are as follows: the appellant married the deceased on 09.04.1995.     G
After the marriage, the deceased resided with the appellant and his family
members at their matrimonial home. It is alleged that the appellant, along
with his family members, started harassing the deceased soon after the
marriage and was demanding additional dowry. Allegedly, the deceased
                                                                             H
680             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2022] 4 S.C.R.


A     attempted suicide by consuming Benzyl Hexa Chloride powder on
      11.02.1996 due to the mental harassment by the accused persons.
      Fortunately, she was able to recover after treatment at the Government
      Hospital, Palakkad. Subsequent to this incident, mediation between the
      parties took place and a settlement was reached between the parties
      whereby the deceased continued to reside at the house of the accused.
B
      Despite the above agreement, it is alleged that the harassment continued
      and the deceased committed suicide by hanging on 21.10.1996, at her
      own home.
            3. The prosecution charged the appellant, his parents and his two
C     brothers under Sections 304B and 498A of the IPC. Pending trial, the
      appellant’s father passed away. The Trial Court, after examining all the
      witnesses and perusing the documents produced by the prosecution and
      defence, convicted the accused persons under Sections 304B and 498A
      of the IPC. Vide judgment dated 12.05.2006, the Appellate Court
      acquitted the appellant’s brothers of both the offences. However, the
D     conviction and sentence against the appellant and his mother was
      confirmed.
             4. Aggrieved, the appellant and his mother filed the Criminal
      Revision Petition before the High Court of Kerala. As already mentioned
      above, vide the impugned judgment, the High Court partly allowed the
E     revision petition and acquitted the appellant and his mother under Section
      304B of the IPC while confirming their conviction under Section 498A
      of the IPC. The High Court, however, reduced the sentence imposed on
      the appellant to rigorous imprisonment for one year, and, that of his mother
      to rigorous imprisonment for one month. The appellant’s mother has not
      filed any appeal before this Court.
F
             5. The main thrust of the submissions made by the learned counsel
      for the appellant are two-fold. First, that the suicide note and other
      statements made by the deceased cannot be relied upon by the Court
      for convicting him under Section 498A of the IPC as they do not fall
      within the scope of Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (for
G
      short ‘the Evidence Act’). Second, that the evidence of PW-3 (mother
      of the deceased) is contradictory and cannot be relied upon to convict
      the appellant. On the strength of the above two arguments, the learned
      counsel for the appellant attempts to persuade this Court that there is no
      credible evidence to convict the appellant under Section 498A of the
H     IPC, and therefore, he should be acquitted of the same.
                SURENDRAN v. STATE OF KERELA                                     681
                     [N. V. RAMANA, CJI.]

        6. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent-            A
State submits that there are three concurrent finding of facts by the
Courts below which do not merit any interference by this Court in exercise
of its jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. Learned
counsel for the State also submits that there is sufficient evidence on
record to make out a clear case for convicting the appellant under Section
                                                                                 B
498A of the IPC.
       7. Heard the learned counsel for the appellant and the respondent-
State at length.
       8. Before we proceed, it is expedient to advert to the submissions
of the learned counsel for the appellant particularly that in the present        C
case, the appellant was acquitted under Section 304B of the IPC by the
High Court in revision and therefore, the statements of the deceased
could not have been relied upon by the High Court to sustain his conviction
under Section 498A of the IPC as it would not fall within the ambit of
Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act.
                                                                                 D
       9. In this context, it is appropriate to refer to certain provisions of
Section 32 of the Evidence Act. Section 32 relates to the admissibility of
statements made by a person who cannot be called as witness. The
Section itself specifies the circumstances under which such statements
become relevant. In the present case, we are concerned with one such
circumstance, that is, when the person who made the statement is dead.           E
The learned counsel for the appellant has focused predominantly on
Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act in an attempt to exclude the evidence
of the deceased by suggesting that it does not fall within the scope of the
abovesaid sub-section and therefore, is inadmissible. The relevant portion
of Section 32 of the Evidence Act is extracted below:                            F
       32. Cases in which statement of relevant fact by person
       who is dead or cannot be found, etc., is relevant. –
       Statements, written or verbal, or relevant facts, made by a person
       who is dead, or who cannot be found, or who has become incapable
       of giving evidence, or whose attendance cannot be procured,               G
       without an amount of delay or expense which under the
       circumstances of the case appears to the Court unreasonable,
       are themselves relevant facts in the following cases:
       (1) When it relates to cause of death. - When the statement is
       made by a person as to the cause of his death, or as to any of the        H
682            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2022] 4 S.C.R.


A           circumstances of the transaction which resulted in his death, in
            cases in which the cause of that person’s death comes into
            question.
            Such statements are relevant whether the person who made them
            was or was not, at the time when they were made, under
B           expectation of death, and whatever may be the nature of the
            proceeding in which the cause of his death comes into
            question.
                                  xxx   xxx xxx
            10. Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act is famously referred to as
C     the “dying declaration” section, although the phrase itself does not find
      mention under the Evidence Act. The Courts have had occasion to
      consider the scope and ambit of Section 32, particularly Section 32(1) of
      the Evidence Act on various occasions.
             11. To rely on Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act, one of the main
D     conditions laid out in the sub-section is that the issue must arise “in
      cases in which the cause of that person’s death comes into question”.
      The submission of the learned counsel for the appellant is that, in the
      present case, with the acquittal of the appellant by the High Court under
      Section 304B of the IPC, and the absence of any appeal challenging the
E     same, the present case pertains to only Section 498A of the IPC.
      Therefore, the present case does not fall within the scope of the
      aforementioned sub-section as it is no longer a case in which the cause
      of the deceased’s death comes into question. As such, Section 32(1) of
      the Evidence Act cannot be relied upon by the Court to admit the
      statements of the deceased to convict him under Section 498A of the
F     IPC.
            12. Learned counsel for the appellant has primarily relied upon
      the judgment of this Court in Gananath Pattnaik v. State of Orissa,
      (2002) 2 SCC 619, wherein the Court had observed as under:
            “10. Another circumstance of cruelty is with respect to taking
G
            away of the child from the deceased. To arrive at such a
            conclusion, the trial court has referred to the statement of PW 5,
            who is the sister of the deceased. In her deposition recorded in
            the court on 4-5-1990 PW 5 had stated:

H
               SURENDRAN v. STATE OF KERELA                                   683
                    [N. V. RAMANA, CJI.]

               “Whenever I had gone to my sister, all the times she           A
         was complaining that she is not well treated by her husband
         and in-laws for non-fulfilment of balance dowry amount of a
         scooter and a two-in-one.”
      and added:
                “On 3-6-1987 for the last time I had been to the house        B
         of the deceased i.e. to her separate residence. Sworna, Snigdha,
         Sima Apa, Baby Apa accompanied me to her house on that
         day. At that time the deceased complained before us as usual
         and added to that she said that she is being assaulted by the
         accused nowadays. She further complained before us that the          C
         accused is taking away the child from her, and that her mother-
         in-law has come and some conspiracy is going against her (the
         deceased). She further told that ‘mate au banchei
         debenahin’.”
      Such a statement appears to have been taken on record                   D
      with the aid of Section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act at a
      time when the appellant was being tried for the offence under
      Section 304-B and such statement was admissible under
      clause (1) of the said section as it related to the cause of
      death of the deceased and the circumstances of the
      transaction which resulted in her death. Such a statement               E
      is not admissible in evidence for the offence punishable
      under Section 498-A of the Penal Code, 1860 and has to be
      termed as being only a hearsay evidence. Section 32 is an
      exception to the hearsay rule and deals with the statements or
      declarations by a person, since dead, relating to the cause of his      F
      or her death or the circumstances leading to such death. If a
      statement which otherwise is covered by the hearsay rule does
      not fall within the exceptions of Section 32 of the Evidence Act,
      the same cannot be relied upon for finding the guilt of the accused.”
                                                  (Emphasis supplied)         G
       13. Although not cited by the learned counsel, the proposition put
forth by him appears to be supported by three other judgments of this
Court in Inderpal v. State of MP, (2001) 10 SCC 736, Bhairon Singh
v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2009) 13 SCC 80 and Kantilal Martaji
Pandor v. State of Gujarat, (2013) 8 SCC 781. All of these judgments
                                                                              H
684            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2022] 4 S.C.R.


A     also appear to follow the same line of reasoning as followed by this
      Court in Gananath Pattnaik case (supra), i.e., that once the Court has
      acquitted an accused of the charge relating to the death of an individual,
      the evidence of the deceased would not be admissible to prove the charge
      under Section 498A of the IPC simpliciter as then the case would no
      longer relate to the death of the deceased.
B
             14. It may bear mentioning that the phrase “cases in which the
      cause of that person’s death comes into question” is broader than
      merely referring only to cases where there is a charge of murder, suicide,
      or dowry death. There have been instances where Courts have used
      Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act to admit statements in a case where
C     the charge is of a different nature or even in a civil action. This is
      abundantly clear from the second part of Section 32(1) of the Evidence
      Act which specifies that such statements are relevant “whatever may
      be the nature of the proceeding in which the cause of his death
      comes into question”. Illustration (a) to Section 32 of the Evidence Act
D     refers to a statement made by a deceased in a rape case which may be
      admitted under the section, which was the position in India even prior to
      the enactment of the Evidence Act, as held by the Court in the case of
      Queen v. Bissorunjun Mookerjee, (1866) 6 W.R. Cr. 75.
             15. In Lalji Dusadh v. King-Emperor, AIR 1928 Pat 162, the
E     Patna High Court upheld the admissibility of statements made by the
      deceased in a case concerning charges under Sections 302, 392 and 397
      of the IPC. In that case, the deceased victim was robbed and killed as a
      part of the same transaction. The submission of the learned counsel for
      the accused in that case, inter alia, was that the dying declaration of the
      deceased could not be admitted under Section 32(1) of the Evidence
F     Act with respect to the charges under Section 392 and 397 of the IPC.
      Negativing this contention, the High Court observed as follows:
            “A further legal point is taken with regard to the dying declarations.
            It is contended that so far as the charges for the offences under
G           sections 392 and 397 are concerned the dying declarations are
            not admissible under section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act
            inasmuch as the cause of the deceased’s death does not come in
            question in the trial of those charges. It is contended that on this
            point the Indian law is the same as the English law and that a
            dying declaration as to the cause of the death is only admissible
H           when the causing of the death is the subject of the charge. I
               SURENDRAN v. STATE OF KERELA                                   685
                    [N. V. RAMANA, CJI.]

      cannot agree with this view. The words of section 32 are                A
      very wide and it is not necessary that the charge should be
      one of homicide. The evidence as to the cause of death was
      relevant to the charge of robbery and consequently the
      cause of death that is to say the assault committed by the
      appellant came in question in the trial. Before the Indian
                                                                              B
      Evidence Act was enacted it was held in Queen v. Bissorunjun
      Mookerjee [(1866) 6 W.R. (Cr.) 75.] that there was no necessity
      in India for following the very narrow rule of English law and that
      a dying declaration could be used as evidence in a charge of rape.
      One of the illustrations to section 32 of the present Indian Evidence
      Act expressly provides for such evidence where the charge is not        C
      culpable homicide but rape.”
                                                  (Emphasis supplied)
       16. Further, in a proceeding with multiple charges, where one
directly relates to the death of a declarant and the other does not, the
Court has admitted the evidence of the declarant even if the prosecution      D
failed to prove the charge relating to death. For instance, in Parmanand
Ganga Prasad v. Emperor, AIR 1940 Nag 340, the High Court of
Nagpur held as follows:
      “7. …The prosecution story as narrated by us shows that
      throughout the enquiry the cause of death of Munde was material.        E
      That being so, the mere fact that a charge of murder failed
      and was not brought home to the accused would not make
      the statement inadmissible for the purposes of other
      offences which were committed in the course of the same
      transaction and with which the accused were charged.                    F
      8. We may also observe that in all cases regarding admissibility of
      a particular piece of evidence the material time when the
      admissibility has got to be decided is the time when the Court
      received the evidence and not the eventual result. In this case
      when the statements were filed by the prosecution and proved in         G
      the case it could under no circumstances be argued that the cause
      of death of the deceased was not in question. The cause of death
      of Munde was in question as there was also a charge under S.
      302, and this charge was joined with other charges in the case
      under Section 239(d) as forming part of the same transaction. So,
                                                                              H
686            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2022] 4 S.C.R.


A           at the stage at which these statements were put up by the
            prosecution before the Court as admissible, it could not be
            argued that they were not admissible and a document once
            admitted in evidence remains admissible for all purposes
            in the case. The subsequent result of the case, viz., failure
            of the charge of murder should not make any difference
B
            whatsoever to the admissibility of the document. Just as their
            Lordships of the Privy Council in AIR 1938 PC 130 [Babulal v.
            Emperor, (1938) 25 AIR PC 130 : 174 IC 1 : 65 IA 158 : 32 SLR
            476 : 39 Cr LJ 452 : ILR (1938) 2 Cal 295 (PC).] stated that the
            relevant point of time in the proceedings at which the condition as
C           to sameness of transaction must be fulfilled is the time of
            accusation and not that of the eventual result we think we would
            be justified in stating the same with respect to the admissibility of
            a document…”
                                                         (Emphasis supplied)
D            17. From the above pronouncements, and the wordings of Section
      32(1) of the Evidence Act, it appears that the test for admissibility under
      the said section is not that the evidence to be admitted should directly
      relate to a charge pertaining to the death of the individual, or that the
      charge relating to death could not be proved. Rather, the test appears to
E     be that the cause of death must come into question in that case, regardless
      of the nature of the proceeding, and that the purpose for which such
      evidence is being sought to be admitted should be a part of the
      ‘circumstances of the transaction’ relating to the death.
              18. The phrase ‘circumstances of the transaction’, as occurring
F     in the section, has been interpreted by the Privy Council in the judgment
      that is considered the locus classicus on admissibility of evidence under
      Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act, Pakala Narayana Swami v. King-
      Emperor, AIR 1939 PC 47. In that case, the Privy Council was dealing
      with a case of murder wherein one of the main pieces of evidence against
      the accused was the statement made by the deceased to his wife. The
G     defence argued that such evidence had to be excluded due to the hearsay
      rule. However, the said evidence was admitted under Section 32(1) of
      the Evidence Act and the accused was convicted. In appeal, one of the
      questions the Privy Council had to answer related to whether the
      deceased’s statement was properly admitted or not. In that context, the
H     Privy Council observed as under:
         SURENDRAN v. STATE OF KERELA                                  687
              [N. V. RAMANA, CJI.]

“A variety of questions has been mooted in the Indian courts as to     A
the effect of this section. It has been suggested that the statement
must be made after the transaction has taken place, that the person
making it must be at any rate near death, that the “circumstances”
can only include the acts done when and where the death was
caused. Their Lordships are of opinion that the natural meaning
                                                                       B
of the words used does not convey any of these limitations. The
statement may be made before the cause of death has arisen, or
before the deceased has any reason to anticipate being killed.
The circumstances must be circumstances of the
transaction : general expressions indicating fear or
suspicion whether of a particular individual or otherwise              C
and not directly releated to the occasion of the death will
not be admissible. But statements made by the deceased
that he was proceeding to the spot where he was in fact
killed, or as to his reasons for so proceeding, or that he
was going to meet a particular person, or that he had been
                                                                       D
invited by such person to meet him would each of them be
circumstances of the transaction, and would be so whether
the person was unknown, or was not the person accused. Such a
statement might indeed be exculpatory of the person accused.
“Circumstances of the transaction” is a phrase no doubt
that conveys some limitations. It is not as broad as the               E
analogous use in “circumstantial evidence” which includes
evidence of all relevant facts. It is on the other hand
narrower than “res gestae.” Circumstances must have some
proximate relation to the actual occurrence : though, as for
instance in a case of prolonged poisoning, they may be
                                                                       F
related to dates at a considerable distance from the date of
the actual fatal dose.
It will be observed that “the circumstances” are of the transaction
which resulted in the death of the declarant. It is not necessary
that there should be a known transaction other than that the death
of the declarant has ultimately been caused, for the condition of      G
the admissibility of the evidence is that “the cause of [the
declarant’s] death comes into question.” In the present case the
cause of the deceased’s death comes into question. The transaction
is one in which the deceased was murdered on March 21 or 22 :
and his body was found in a trunk proved to be bought on behalf        H
688            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2022] 4 S.C.R.


A           of the accused. The statement made by the deceased on March
            20 or 21 that he was setting out to the place where the accused
            lived, and to meet a person, the wife of the accused, who lived in
            the accused’s house, appears clearly to be a statement as to some
            of the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in his death.
            The statement was rightly admitted.”
B
                                                        (Emphasis supplied)
            19. This principle of law has been upheld by this Court on various
      occasions. In Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra,
      (1984) 4 SCC 116, this Court summarized the principles of Section
C     32(1) of the Evidence Act, including relating to “circumstances of the
      transaction”:
            “21. Thus, from a review of the authorities mentioned above and
            the clear language of Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act, the
            following propositions emerge:
D           (1) Section 32 is an exception to the rule of hearsay and makes
            admissible the statement of a person who dies, whether the death
            is a homicide or a suicide, provided the statement relates to the
            cause of death, or exhibits circumstances leading to the death. In
            this respect, as indicated above, the Indian Evidence Act, in view
E           of the peculiar conditions of our society and the diverse nature
            and character of our people, has thought it necessary to widen
            the sphere of Section 32 to avoid injustice.
            (2) The test of proximity cannot be too literally construed
            and practically reduced to a cut-and-dried formula of
F           universal application so as to be confined in a straitjacket.
            Distance of time would depend or vary with the
            circumstances of each case. For instance, where death is a
            logical culmination of a continuous drama long in process
            and is, as it were, a finale of the story, the statement
            regarding each step directly connected with the end of the
G           drama would be admissible because the entire statement
            would have to be read as an organic whole and not torn
            from the context. Sometimes statements relevant to or
            furnishing an immediate motive may also be admissible as
            being a part of the transaction of death. It is manifest that
            all these statements come to light only after the death of
H
               SURENDRAN v. STATE OF KERELA                                 689
                    [N. V. RAMANA, CJI.]

      the deceased who speaks from death. For instance, where               A
      the death takes place within a very short time of the marriage
      or the distance of time is not spread over more than 3-4
      months the statement may be admissible under Section 32.
      (3) The second part of clause (1) of Section 32 is yet another
      exception to the rule that in criminal law the evidence of a person   B
      who was not being subjected to or given an opportunity of being
      cross-examined by the accused, would be valueless because the
      place of cross-examination is taken by the solemnity and sanctity
      of oath for the simple reason that a person on the verge of death
      is not likely to make a false statement unless there is strong
      evidence to show that the statement was secured either by             C
      prompting or tutoring.
      (4) It may be important to note that Section 32 does not speak of
      homicide alone but includes suicide also, hence all the
      circumstances which may be relevant to prove a case of homicide
      would be equally relevant to prove a case of suicide.                 D

      (5) Where the main evidence consists of statements and
      letters written by the deceased which are directly connected
      with or related to her death and which reveal a tell-tale
      story, the said statement would clearly fall within the four
      corners of Section 32 and, therefore, admissible. The                 E
      distance of time alone in such cases would not make the
      statement irrelevant.”
                                                  (emphasis supplied)
       20. A reading of the above pronouncements makes it clear that, in    F
some circumstances, the evidence of a deceased wife with respect to
cruelty could be admissible in a trial for a charge under Section 498A of
the IPC under Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act. There are, however,
certain necessary pre-conditions that must be met before the evidence
is admitted.
                                                                            G
       21. The first condition is that her cause of death must come into
question in the matter. This would include, for instance, matters where
along with the charge under Section 498A of the IPC, the prosecution
has also charged the accused under Sections 302, 306 or 304B of the
IPC. It must be noted however that as long as the cause of her death
                                                                            H
690            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2022] 4 S.C.R.


A     has come into question, whether the charge relating to death is proved
      or not is immaterial with respect to admissibility.
              22. The second condition is that the prosecution will have to show
      that the evidence that is sought to be admitted with respect to Section
      498A of the IPC must also relate to the circumstances of the transaction
B     of the death. How far back the evidence can be, and how connected the
      evidence is to the cause of death of the deceased would necessarily
      depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. No specific
      straitjacket formula or rule can be given with respect to this.
             23. To the above extent therefore, the judgments of this Court in
C     Gananath Pattnaik (supra), Inderpal (supra), Bhairon Singh (supra)
      and Kantilal Martaji Pandor (supra), wherein it has been held that the
      evidence of the deceased cannot be admitted under Section 32(1) of the
      Evidence Act to prove the charge under Section 498A of the IPC only
      because the accused stands acquitted of the charge relating to the death
      of the deceased, may not be correct. These judgments stand overruled
D     to that limited extent.
             24. Coming to the present case, we are of the opinion that it is not
      necessary for this Court to undertake the exercise to determine whether
      the statement of the deceased can be admitted under Section 32(1) of
      the Evidence Act. As the learned counsel for the State rightly points out,
E     this appeal can be decided even without considering this aspect, as the
      other evidence on record clearly proves the appellant’s guilt beyond
      reasonable doubt.
             25. The fact that the deceased’s wife was being harassed is clear
      from the evidence of PW-3 (mother of the deceased). She had specifically
F     stated in her chief-examination that within few days of their marriage,
      the appellant brought the deceased back to her parental home with the
      threat that if extra dowry was not given, he would leave her and marry
      another “beautiful” girl. As a result of such harassment, the deceased
      allegedly attempted suicide for the first time by consuming poison. While
G     she was being treated in the hospital, a settlement was reached between
      the parties, to which appellant was also a part, wherein it was agreed
      that no further demands for dowry would be made. This agreement was
      exhibited before the Trial Court as Ext P-3. Although the High Court
      indicated that the said settlement was not admissible in evidence, the
      fact of its existence has been deposed by PW-9, who is an independent
H     witness, as well as by PW-3. Further, it was stated by PW-3 in her
                  SURENDRAN v. STATE OF KERELA                                  691
                       [N. V. RAMANA, CJI.]

chief-examination that even after the settlement, the appellant had             A
continued to ill-treat the deceased. The deceased, due to the ill-treatment
faced by her had ultimately committed suicide by hanging herself with a
saree.
       26. The learned counsel for the appellant, despite his best efforts,
could not persuade this Court that the evidence of PW-3 was unreliable.         B
There are three concurrent findings of the Courts below upholding the
reliability of the evidence of PW-3. The submission of the learned counsel
for the appellant that the evidence of PW-3 is unreliable because she is
the mother of the deceased, cannot be countenanced. It is a settled
principle of law that the evidence tendered by the related or interested
witness cannot be discarded on that ground alone. However, as a rule of         C
prudence, the Court may scrutinize the evidence of such related or
interested witness more carefully. This Court in Ilangovan v. State of
T.N., (2020) 10 SCC 533 has held as follows:
       “7. With respect to the first submission of the counsel for the
       appellant, regarding the testimonies of related witnesses, it            D
       is settled law that the testimony of a related or an interested
       witness can be taken into consideration, with the additional
       burden on the Court in such cases to carefully scrutinise
       such evidence (see Sudhakar v. State, (2018) 5 SCC 435).
       As such, the mere submission of the counsel for the appellant,           E
       that the testimonies of the witnesses in the case should be
       disregarded because they were related, without bringing to the
       attention of the Court any reason to disbelieve the same, cannot
       be countenanced.”
       27. In view of the above, we see no reason to interfere with the         F
impugned judgment passed by the High Court in confirming the conviction
of the appellant under Section 498A of the IPC and sentencing him to
undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year.
       28. The appeal is, accordingly, dismissed. The appellant is on bail.
His bail bonds stand cancelled and he is directed to surrender within a         G
period of one week from today before the concerned authorities to serve
out the remaining period of sentence.

Nidhi Jain                                                  Appeal dismissed.
(Assisted by : Shashwat Jain, LCRA)
                                                                                H