SURENDRA MOHAN ARORAversusHDFC BANK LTD. AND OTHERS

                    (2014] 5 S.C.R. 835


               SURENDRA MOHAN ARORA                               A
                              v.
             HDFC BANK LTD. AND OTHERS
              (Civil Appeal No. 4891 of 2014)
                       APRIL 25, 2014
                                                                  B
               [GYAN SUDHA MISRA AND
             PINAKI CHANDRA GHOSE, JJ.]

     Consumer Protection Regulations, 2005 - Regulation 15
- Power of the National Commission to review order when           C
error apparent on the face of the record - Constitutionality of
Regulation 15 - Held: The Regulations were framed in
accordance with the power conferred on the Commission u/
s. 30A of the Act - Regulation 15(2) states that power to deal
with review applications fies with the Commission - The           D
procedure is to be adopted by the National Commission,
whether the review petition would be decided after hearing the
parties orally or can be disposed of by way of circulation -
Regulations uls.22 of the Act, cannot be said to be ultra vires
the Act - No reason to believe that the National Commission       E
by enacting Regulation 15 exceeded its jurisdiction or the
power vested in it under s. 30A of the Act - Consumer
Protection Act, 1986 - ss. 22 and 30A.

     Review - Held: Unless the power of review is specifically    F
conferred by the statute, there cannot be any inherent power
of review - Consumer Protection Act, 1986.

     Advocates Act, 1961. - s.30 - Proxy counsel -
Entitlement of, to appear before the Courts - Held: Under the
Advocates Act, there is no terminology which defines "proxy       G
counsel - Therefore, specific direction issued by the National
Commission in its Cause List, that no proxy counsel shall be
allowed to make submissions, not bad in law.

                             835
    836      SUPREME COURT REPORTS             [2014] 5 S.C.R.

A        The instant appeal was file.d against 'the judgment
    passed by the High Court dismissing the writ petition filed
    by the appellant, questioning the vires of Regulation 15
    of the Consumer Protection Regulations, 2005 framed
    under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986.
B
       Regulation 15 of the Consumer Protection
  Regulations, 2005 sets out the grounds for review and
  states that unless otherwise ordered by the National
  Commission, an application for review shall be disposed
C of by circulation without oral arguments, as far as
  practicable between the same members who had
  delivered the order sought to be reviewed.

       The appellant contended that Regulation 15 of the
  Consumer Protection Regulations be struck down on the
D ground that the said Regulation was ultra vires Section
  22 of the Consumer Protection Act; and that by
  introducing Regulation 15, the National Commission has
  exceeded its jurisdiction and the power vested in if under
  Section 30A of the Act.
E
       The main grievance of the appellant was that the
  National Commission has provided for disposal of review
  application by circulation without oral arguments; and
  that the salient features of the Act are being rendered
F redundant by way of Regulation 15, by taking away the
  right of being heard and there is no adherence to
  principles of natural justice, thereby mal<ing it ultra vires
  to Section 22 of the said Act.

          Dismissing the appeal, the Court
G
      HELD:1.1. Under Section 22(2) of the Consumer
  Protection Act, 1986, the National Commission has been
  empowered to review an order made by it when there is
  an error apparent on the face of the record. Also sub-
H section (1) of the said Act streamlines the functioning of
 SURENDRA MOHAN ARORA v. HDFC BANK LTD.                   837


the Consumer Redressal Forums and also reduces the               A
number of appeals to the Supreme Court from the orders
of the National Commission. The power of review did not
exist earlier. lf is trite law that unless the power of review
is specifically conferred by the statute, there cannot be
any inherent power of review. [Para 9] [843-C-E]                 B.

      1.2. In the instant case, the "power conferred by
Section 22 of the said Act on the National Commission
is not an inherent power and further the Commission has
the power to review its order when there is an error             C
apparent on the face of the record. The Regulations have
been framed in accordance with the power conferred
under Section 30A on the Commission, thereby effecting
its right to frame Regulations. Therefore, the Regulations
have been framed in accordance with law. Regulation
15(2) states that power to deal with review applications         D
lies with the Commission. The procedure is to be adopted
by the National Commission, whether the review petition
would be decided after hearing the parties orally or can
be disposed of by way of circulation. Therefore, the said
Regulations under Section 22 of the said Act, cannot be          E
said to be ultra vires the said Act. There is no reason to
believe that the National Commission by enacting
Regulation 15 exceeded its jurisdiction or the power
vested in it under Section 30A of the said Act. [Para 1OJ
[843-F-H; 844-A-C]                                               F

     State of Orissa vs. Dr. (Miss) Binapani Dei and Ors
(1967) 2 SCR 625; Maneka Gandhi vs. Union of India (1978)
1 SCC 248: 1978 (2) SCR 621; Sahara India (Firm), Lucknow
vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, Central-I & Anr. (2008) 14       G
SCC 151: 2008 (6) SCR 427 and Automotive Tyre
Manufact.LJrers Association vs. Designated Authority and Ors.
(2011) 2 sec 258: 2011 (1) scR 198 - Cited.

    2. Under the Advocates Act, there is no terminology
which defines "proxy counsel. In a very recent decision          H
    838      SUPREME COURT REPORTS             [2014] 5 S.C.R.


A in *Sanjay Kumar, it was held that any "Arzi", "Farzi", half-
  baked lawyer under the label of "proxy counsel", a
  phrase not traceable under the Advocates Act, 1961 or
  under the Supreme Court Rules, 1966 etc., cannot be
  allowed to abuse and misuse the process of the court
B under a false impression that he has a right to waste
  public time without any authority to appear in the court,
  either from the litigant or from the AOR, as in the instant
  case. Therefore, the specific direction issued by the
  National Commission in its Cause List, that no proxy
c counsel shall be allowed to make submissions, cannot
  be said to be bad in law and without any jurisdiction.
  [Para 11] [844-C-D, F-H; 845-A]

          *Sanjay Kumar v. The State of Bihar & Anr. 5.L.P.
  (Criminal) No.9967 of 2011, order dated January 28, 2014
D - relied on.

       3. The foundation for filing this appeal by the
  appellant is only to curtail the rights of the National
  Commission to adopt the procedure whether the review
E petitions will be decided after granting an opportunity of
  being heard to the petitioner. The order of the High Court
  showed that no such request was made in the application
  before the National Commission for such hearing. In
  these circumstances, the High Court correctly held that
F the writ petition is misconceived and devoid of merit
  without even laying the basic foundation for having
  sought an oral hearing of the review application. There
  is no reason to interfere with the order passed by the
  High Court. [Para 12] [845-B-D]
G                        Case law reference:
          (1967) 2 SCR 625      Cited                Para 8
          1978 (2) SCR 621      Cited                Para 8

H         2008 (6) SCR 427      Cited                Para 8
  SURENDRA MOHAN ARORA v. HDFC BANK LTD.                      839


     2011 (1) SCR 198          Cited                     Para 8     A

    CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
4891 of 2014.

    From the Judgment & Order dated 07 .01.2013 of the High
Court of Delhi at New Delhi in Writ Petition No. 64 of 2013         B

    Nikhil Majithia, Parth Tiwari (for Pragati Neekhra) for the
Appellants.

     The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
                                                                    c
     PINAKI CHANDRA GHOSE, J. 1. Leave granted.

     2. This appeal is directed against the judgment dated
January 7, 2013 passed by the High Court of Delhi in Writ
Petition No. 64 of 2013 dismissing the writ petition filed by the   D
appellant, questioning the vires of Regulation 15 of tt}e
Consumer Protection Regulations, 2005 (hereinafter referred
to as "the Regulations") framed under the Consumer Protection
Act, 1986 (hereinafter referred to as "the said Act").

     3. The facts of the case briefly are as follows :              E

      (3.1) The appellant filed a complaint before the District
  Forum under the said Act. The foundation of the filing of such
  complaint was an allegation made against respondent No. 1 -
  HDFC Bank Ltd. for indulging in unfair trade practice on the      F
  ground of failure to provide professional services to the
. appellant resulting in pre-payment of loan to respondent No.1
  seeking to levy a penalty for pre-payment.

     (3.2) By an order dated August 2, 2007, the District Forum
held in favour of the appellant. Respondent No.1 preferred an       G
appeal ag(\inst the said order before the State Commission
resulting in dismissal by an order dated November 19, 2007.
A revision petition was filed before the National Consumer
Disputes Redressal Commission (hereinafter referred to as
                                                                    H
    840      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2014] 5 S.C.R.


A "the National Commission") which set aside the orders of the
  District Forum and the State Commission vide an order dated
  August 14, 2012 on the basis of the agreements inter se
  between the parties. Being aggrieved, the appellant filed a
  review application before the National Commission resulting in
B dismissal by an order dated September 24, 2012.

       (3.3) Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the said order,
  the appellant filed a writ petition under Article 226 of the
  Constitution of India before the High Court, inter alia, praying
  that Regulation 15 of the Regulations be struck down on the
C ground that the said Regulation being ultra vires of the said Act,
  and further the review application filed by the appellant should
  be re-heard by the National Commission granting an
  oppo1iunity to present the case by making oral arguments.

D       4. Mr. Nikhil Majithia, learned counsel appearing on behalf
  of the appellant, drew our attention to the Statement of Objects
  and Reasons of the said Act which is to provide for better
  protection of interest of consumers and it is towards that
  objective that Section 22 of the said Act was amended by Act .
E No.62 of 2002 with effect from March 15, 2003, conferring the
  power of review on the National Commission, which was not
  available in the original Act. According to him, Regulation 15
  is ultra vires Section 22 of the said Act. It is also his contention
  that by introducing Regulation 15, the National Commission has
F exceeded its jurisdiction and the power vested in it under
  Section 30A of the said Act.

          5. Section 22 of the said Act reads as follows :

          "Section 22. Power of and procedure applicable to
G         the National Commission. - (1) The provisions of
          sections 12, 13 and 14 and the rules made thereunder for
          the disposal of complaints by the District Forum shall, with
          such modifications as may be considered necessary by
          the Commission, be applicable to the disposal of disputes
H         by the National Commission.
  SURENDRA MOHAN ARORA v. HDFC BANK LTD.                     &41
         [PINAKI CHANDRA GHOSE, J.]

    (2) Without prejudice to the provisions contained in sub-       A
    section (1 ), the NatioPlal Commission shall have the power
    to review any order made by it, when there is an error
    apparent on the face of record."

    It is necessary to quote Regulation 15 for our purpose          B
which is as under:

    "Regulation 15. Review.-(1) It shall set out clearly the
    grounds for review.

    (2) Unless otherwise ordered by the National Commission,        c
    an application for review shall be disposed of by circulation
    without oral arguments, as far as practicable between the
    same members who had delivered the order sought to be
    reviewed."

     6. It is needless to mention here that the said Regulations    D
were duly published in the Official Gazette dated May 31, 2005
and were so made in pursuance of the power conferred under
Section 30A of the said Act conferring power on the National
Commission to make such regulations with the prior approval
of the Central Government. According to Mr. Majithia, the           E
Consumer Protection Act has been enacted to protect and
advance the cause of consumers. He further contended that the
Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Act in Clause 2 states
that the Act seeks to promote and protect the rights of
consumers including the right to hear and further to assure that    F
the interest of the consumers will receive due consideration at
appropriate fora. He further submitted that all these fora are
quasi-judicial authorities, therefore, are bound to observe the
principles of natural justice.
                                                                    G
     7. He further pointed out that the amendment of Section
22 is only to empower the National Commission to function
more explicitly and further to streamline the functioning of the
consumer fora. The main grievance of the appellant is that the
National Commission has provided for disposal of review             H
    842       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2014) 5 S.C.R.


A application by circulation without oral arguments. Mr. Majithia
  submitted that the said Act has provided for promotion and
  protection of the rights of the consumers which includes the
  right to be heard. The said Act has also provided that the
  principles of natural justice shall be adhered to by· all quasi-
8 judicial fora which include the National Commission. He
  submitted that the salient features of the Act are sought to be
  rendered redundant by way of Regulation 15, by taking away
  the right of being heard and there is no adherence to principles
  of natural justice, thereby making it ultra vires to Section 22 of
c the said Act. In these circumstances, he submitted that
  Regulation 15 should be struck down.

         8. To fortify his submission, he relied on the decisions of
    this Court in State of Orissa vs. Dr. (Miss) Binapani Dei and
    Ors1 followed in Maneka Gandhi vs. Union of lndia 2 & Anr.,
D   Sahara India (Firm), Lucknow vs. Commissioner of Income
    Tax, Central-I & Anr. 3 and Automotive Tyre Manufacturers
    Association vs. Designated Authority and Ors., 4 and it has
    been contended by_ Mr. Majithia that the courts have
    emphasized on the right of being heard time and again even
E   when an order is passed by an administrative authority and that
    written arguments cannot be a substitute for oral hearing. It is
    also the case of the appellant that the national Commission has
    exercised its power beyond the scope of Section 30A of the
    Act while enacting Regulation 15, which in its present form
F   defeats the objective of the amended Section 22 of the Act as
    the right of making oral arguments is taken away from the
    consumer, making the Regulation inconsistent with the objective
    of the Act. It has also been submitted that the impression given
    by Regulation 15(2) that oral arguments can be made when
G   allowed by the National Commission, is fallacious as it does

    1.   (1967) 2 SCR 625.
    2.   (1978) 1 sec 248.
    3.   (2008) 14 sec 151.
H   4.   (2011) 2 sec 258.
 SURENDRA MOHAN ARORA v. HDFC BANK LTD.                         843
        [PINAKI CHANDRA GHOSE, J.]

not consider the fact that the Act has given the prerogative to         A
the consumer and not to the National Commission. Moreover,
this would also lead to inequality as some consumers are given
the right of being heard in open court and some are deprived
of the same at the discretion of the National Commission.
Another submission of the learned counsel is that in the light          B
of the principle that justice must not only be done but also be
seen to have been done; Section 22 is rendered redundant on
account of Regulation 15 as tl:ie-same is contrary to the
principle of audi alteram partem which is- undisputedly followed
by judicial and quasi-judicial bodies alike.                            c
     9. We have perused Section 22 of the said Act. Under
Section 22(2), the National Commission has been empowered
to review an order made by it when there is an error apparent
on the face of the record. We have also noticed sub-section
(1) of the said Act. It is a fact that this provision streamlines       D
the functioning of the consumer Redressal forums and also
reduces the number of appeals to the Supreme Court from the
orders of the National Commission. The power of review did
not exist earlier. It is trite law that unless the power of review is
specifically conferred by the statute, there cannot be any              E
inherent power of review.

      10. In the instant case, the power conferred by Section 22
of the said Act on the Nation.al Commission is not an inherent
power and further the Commission has the power to review its            F
order when there is an error apparent on the face of the record.
We do not find any dispute that the Regulations have been
framed in accordance with the power conferred under Section
30A on the Commission, thereby effecting its right to frame
Regulations. Therefore, the Regulations have been framed in             G
accordance with law. We have minutely gone through
Regulation 15(2) and found that power to deal with review
applications lies with the Commission. The procedure is to be
adopted by the National Commission, whether the review
petition would be decided after hearing the parties orally or can
                                                                        H
    844      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     [2014] 5 S.C.R.

A be disposed of by way of circulation. Therefore, we do not find
  that any mischief has been done by framing the said
  Regulations. In our opinion, the said Regulations under Section
  22 of the said Act, cannot be said to be ultra vires the said
  Act. Accordingly, we do not find any substance in the arguments
B put up before us by Mr. Majithia. There is no reason to believe
  that the National Commission by enacting Regulation 15
  exceeded its jurisdiction or the power vested in it under Section
  30A of the said Act, as has been tried to be contended by Mr.
  Majithia.
c        11. The other grievance of Mr. Majithia is that the National
    Commission in its Cause List specifically issued a notice that
    no proxy counsel shall be allowed to make submissions.
    According to him, such a direction is bad in law and is without
    any jurisdiction. According 'to him, such direction is also arbitrary
o- and illegal as it prevents a qualified lawyer enrolled on the rolls
    of a State Bar Council from presenting his case before the
    National Commission. He further submitted that it is also in
    violation of Article 19(1 )(g) of the Constitution, being the
    fundamental right to practice. He further stated that under
E Section 30 of the Advocates Act, 1961, an Advocate, after
  , having been enrolled, has a right to appear before the courts
    or any other authority and, therefore, it is curtailment of the right
    of an Advocate. We find that under the Advocates Act, there is
    no terminology which defines "proxy counsel". We have found
F in a very recent decision of this Court in S.L.P. (Criminal)
    No.9967 of 2011 (Sanjay Kumar v. The State of Bihar & Anr.),
    a three-Judge Bench of this Court in its order dated January
    28, 2014 has held as follows:

                 "In such a chaotic situation, any "Arzi", "Farzi", half-
G
          baked lawyer under the label of "proxy counsel", a phrase
          not traceable under the Advocates Act, 1961 or under the
          Supreme Court Rules, 1966 etc., cannot be allowed to
          abuse and misuse the process of the court under a false
          impression that he has a right to waste public time without
H
 SURENDRA MOHAN ARORA v. HDFC BANK LTD.                         845
        [PINAKI CHANDRA GHOSE, J.)

    any authority to appear in the court, either from the litigant     A
    or from the AOR, as in the instant case ..... "

     Therefore, we do not find any substance in the submission
of Mr. Majithia with regard to "proxy counsel". We also do not
find that the decisions cited by Mr. Majithia before us can
                                                                       B
extend any help in the facts and circumstances of this case. ·

      12. The foundation, as it appears to us for filing this appeal
by the appellant, is only to curtail the rights of the National
Commission to adopt the procedure whether the review
petitions will be decided after granting an opportunity of being       c
heard to the petitioner. From the order of the High Court, we
find that no such request was made in the application before
the National Commission for such hearing. In these
circumstances, the High Court correctly held that the writ petition
is misconceived and devoid of merit without even laying the            D
basic foundation for having sought an oral hearing of the review
application. We do not find any reason to interfere with the
order passed by the High C.ourt. Accordingly, we uphold and
affirm the said order and dismiss this appeal.

                                                   Appeal dismissed.
                                                                       E
Bibhuti Bhushan Bose