Holding

When a termination contravenes Section 25F, the order is treated as if never passed and the workman is ordinarily entitled to reinstatement with full back wages, and the 240‑day rule under Section 25B(2) brings the appellants within that protection.

Summary

The appellants, workmen of a bank, were terminated for failing to pass tests for permanent absorption. The Labour Court held the terminations violated Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act and were therefore invalid, but it refused reinstatement with full back wages, granting only compensation. The Supreme Court examined whether such terminations, deemed retrenchment, required reinstatement with back wages and whether workmen who had worked at least 240 days in the preceding twelve months but not for a full year fell within Section 25F after the 1964 amendment. Relying on earlier decisions such as Santosh Gupta v. State Bank of Patiala, the Court held that striking down the termination ordinarily mandates reinstatement with full back wages unless special impediments exist, which were absent here. It also held that the amendment to Section 25B makes the 240‑day rule sufficient, bringing Usha Kumari and Madhu Bala within the same relief. Consequently, all appeals were allowed and the workmen were ordered reinstated with full back wages, subject to salary adjustments and exclusion of the intervening period for seniority.

Issues considered

The effect of a termination that violates Section 25F: whether it is void ab initio or merely invalid and inoperative and the appropriate relief
Whether workmen who have worked 240 days in the preceding twelve months but not for a continuous year are covered by Section 25F after the amendment introducing Section 25B(2)
Whether the Labour Court erred in refusing reinstatement with full back wages and granting only compensation

Legislation cited

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947s. 25B, s. 25F, s. 2(eee), s. 2(oo)

Subjects

Industrial Disputes ActSection 25FSection 25BRetrenchmentReinstatementBack wagesContinuous serviceLabour lawSupreme Court

Judgment

789'

A

SURENDRA KUMAR VERMA ETC.

v.
THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL-
CUM-LABOUR COURT, NEW DELHI & ANR.

...•.
•
September 23, 1980

[V. R. KRISHNA IYER, R. S. PATHAK AND 0. CHINNAPPA REDDY JJ.) c
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 2(00), 25F and 25B Scope-Retrench-
ment-When the Court would order reinstatement with full back wages-Work-
man in employment for 240 days during twelve months-If in "conti1111011s ser-
vice" for purposes of section 25F.

Interpretation-Welfare legislation-how interpreted.
D

The respondent Bank terminated the services of the appellants on the
ground that they could not pass the prescribed tests for their permanent absorp-
tion in its service. On reference the Labour Court held that the Bank's action
in terminating their services (except . in the case of two workmen) was in
violation of section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and, therefore, E.
was invalid and inoperative. The Labour Court, however, refused to order
their reinstatement with full back wages on the ground that reinstatement
would have the effect of equating them with workmen who had qualified for
permanent· absorption •by passing the test; instead it directed payment of
compensation of six months' salary in addition to retrenchment compensation.

In Santosh Gu pt~ v. State' Bank of· Patiala it ·was held by this Court that
the discharge of 'the' workman for the reason that she did not pass the test
"which would have enabled her to be confirmed was retrenchment within the
meaning of section 2(oo) and therefore the requirement of section 25F had
to be complied with .. The workman in that case was directed· to be reinst~ted
with full back wages. The workmen claimed that their case being identical
with this case, they should be reinstated with full back wages.
.G
The Bank on the other hand contended that non-complbnce with the
requirements of section 25F did not render the termination of their service
void ab initio but made it invalid and inoperative and that the Court had
full discretion to direct payment of suitable compensation instead of ordering
reinstatement with full back wages.

In respect of two of the seven appellants, however, it was conceded before H'.
the Labour Court that these two employees worked in the Bank for a few
days more than 240 days during the preceding 12 months and' since they had
/90 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1981] 1 S.C.R.

.A not been· in th(' Bank's employment for one year, there was no violation of
section 25F. But this concession was questioned before this Court in appeal
and it was contended that there was non-compliance with the requirements
of section 25F.
Allowing the appeals,
HELD : [per Krishna Iyer and Chinnappa Reddy, JJ. Pathak, l. concurring]

The five retrenched workmen should be reinstat_ed with full back wages .
• When an order terminating the services of a workman is struck down
it is as if that order had never been passed and it must ordinarily lead to
reinstatement of the workman with full backwages. In cases where 1t is
impossible or wholly inequitable vis-a-vis the employer and the worker to
·.C direct reinstatement with full back wages, as for instance, where the industry
has closed down or where the industry is in severe financial straits, for to
order reinstatement in such a case would place an impossible burden on the
employer or whc:re the workman had secured better or an alternative employ-
ment elsewhere and so on, there is a vestige of discretion left in the court
to make appropriate orders. Occasional hardship may be caused to the em-
ployer; but more often than not, far greater hardship is certain to be caused
D to the workman if the relief is denied than to the employer 1f the relief is
granted. [795B-E]
In the instant case there is no special impediment in the way of awarding
the relief of reinstatement with back wages. The apprehension of the Labour
Court that reinstatement with full back wages would put these workmen on
a par with those who weri~ qualified for permanent absorption by passing the
prescribed test and that that would create dissatisfaction amongst the latter
E
is unfounded because firstly these workmen can never be on par with the
others since reinstatement would not qualify them for permanent absorption but
they would continue to be temporary liable to be retrenched. Secondly there
is nothing to show that their reinstatement would cause dissatisfaction to any-
one nor even that it would place an undue burden on the employer. [795F-G]

F
Santosh Gupta v. State Bank of Patiala (1980) Vol. II LU 72, applied,
Hindustan Steel Ltd. v. The Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Orissa & Ors.
j
[1977] I SCR 586, M/s. Avon Services Produotion Agencies (P) Ltd. v. Indua-
trial Tribunal, Haryana and Ors. [1979] I SCC 1, M / s. Swadesamitran Limited,
Madras v. Their Workmen [1960] 3 SCR 144@ 156 and State Bank of India v.
Shri N. Sundara Money [1976] 3 SCR 160 @ 166 referred to. ·
To attempt to discern a distinction between "void ab initio" and "invalid
and inoperative", even if it be possible to discover some razor's edge distinction
would be an unfruitful task because semantic luxuries are misplaced in the
interpretation of 'bread and butter' statutes. Where legislation is designed to
give relief against certain kinds of mischief, th~ Court is not to make inroads
by making etymological excursions. Whatever expre·ssion is used the workman
and the employer primarily are concerned with the consequence of strikini:
down the order of termination of the services of the workman. [794H]
.H The two other appellants were in much the same position as the five others.
The concession made before the Labour Court was apparently based on the
decision of this Court in Sur Enamel & Stamping Works (P) Ltd. v. Thefr
S. K. VERMA v. INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL 791 .

:workmen [1964] 3 SCR 616 which was a case before section 25B was recast A
ihy Act 36 of 1964. The amendment Act 36 of 1964 has brought about a
-change in the law by repealing section 2(eee) (defining continuous service) and
adding section 25B(2)' which now begins with "where a workman is not in
. continuous service ......... for a period of one year". These changes are designed
to provide that a workman who had actually worked under the employer for
not less than 240 days during a period of 12 months shall be deemed to
have been in continuous s~rvice for a period of one year whether or not he B
has in fact been in such continuous service for a period of one year. It is
..enough that he has worked for 240 days in a period of 12 months. [798F-G]
Pathak, /. concurring:
The limited question for examination is whether the appellants should have
been awarded reinstatement with back wages instead of the curtailed relief
granted by the Labour Court. The respondent bank having accepted that c
the termination of the services of the workmen amounted to retrenchment with-
in the meaning of section 2(oo) it is not necessary to invoke the rule laid
down by this Court in Santosh Gupta v. Stair Bank of. Patiala for the inter-
pretation of section 2(00). [799G-E]
·ordinarily a workman who has been retrenched in contravention of the
law is entitled to reinstatement with full back wages and that principle yields D
only where the justice of the case in the light of the particular facts indicates
the desirability of a different relief. It has not been shown in this case why
th.e ordinary rule should not be applied. [799-G-H]
Havfog regard to the simultaneous amendments introduced in the Indus-
trial Disputes Act by Act 36 of 1964 it is no longer necessary for a workman
to show that he has been in employment during a preceding period of twelve
-calendar months in order to qualify within the terms of section 25B. It is E
'Sufficient for the purpose of section 25B(2)(a)(ii) that he has actually worked
for not less than 240 days during the preceding period of 12 calendar months.
(SOCIA-CJ
Sur Enamel and Stamping Works (P) Ltd. v. Their Workmen [1964] 3
:s.C.R. 616, 622-3, held inapplicable. ·

CIVIL APPELLATE JuR.ISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos. 632-635
F
dl~Q .
Appeals by Special Leave from the Award dated 1-3-1979 of
·the Central Government Industrial Tribunal cum-Labour Court in
I.D. No. 77 of 1977 and 67, 68 and 72 of 1977 respectively
:published in the Gazettee of India dated 28-4-1979. G

R. K. Garg, N. C. Sikri and A. K. Sikri for the Appellants.
G. B. Pai, 0. C. Mathur and K. l. John for the Respondent
No. 2.
The Judgment of V. R. Krishna Iyer and 0. Chinnappa Reddy. H
JJ. was delivered by Chinnappa Reddy, J. R. S. Pathak, J. gave a
-separate opinion.
792 SUPRIEME COURT REPORTS [1981] 1 S.C.R.

A CHINNAPPA REDDY, J.-The facts of the four appeals before·
us (except the cases of Usha Kumari and Madhu Bala, two out of
the seven appeilants in Civil Appeal No. 633 of 1980) are almost
identical with the facts in. Sm-Mash Gupta v. State Bank of Patiala(l)
decided by this Court on April 29, 1980. Not unnaturally the
appellants claim that they should be given ,the same reliefs as were
B given to the workman in that case, but which have been denied to
them by the Labour Court in the instant cases. The· Labour Court
found, as a fact, that except in the cases of three workmen, S. C.
Goyal, Usha Kumari and Madhu Bala, the termination of the services
of the remaining appellants-workmen was in violation of the provi-
sions of S. 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and therefore
c invalid and inoperative. But, as the termination of their services
was a consequence of their failure to pass the tests prescribed for
permanent absorption into the service of the Bank and as it wa!>
thought their reinstatement would have the effect of equating them
with workmen who had qualified for permanent absorption . by
passing the test, the Labour Court refused .to give the workmen the
D relief of reinstatement in service with full back wages, but, instead;
directed payment of compensation of six months' salary to each of
the-workmen, in addition to the retrenchment compensation. The appel-
lants claim that they should be awarded the relief of reinstatement
with full back wages as was done in the case of Santosh Gupta v.
State Bank of Pati'(Jla (supra) and other earlier cases decided by
E
this Court. On the other hand the learned counsel for the employer
contended that non-compliance with the requirements of S. 25F of
the Industrial Disputes Act did not render the termination of thii:
service of a workman ab initio void but only made it invalid and
inoperative and that the Court, when setting aside· the termination
F of the services of a workman on the ground of failure to comply
with the provisions of S:. 25F, had full discretion not to direct
reinstatement with full back wages, but, instead, to direct the payment
of suitable compensation.. The learned counsel invited our attention
to cases where such discretion had been exercised and to other
cases arising under sections 33 and 33A of the Industrial Disputes Act
where it was held that discharge of workmen during the pendency
of proceedings, without the previous permission in writing of the
authority before which the proceeding was pending was not ab
initio void and that the Labour Court or the Tribunal was not
bound to direct reinstatement merely because it was found that
H there was a violation of S. 33.
(1) 1980 Vol. II LLJ 72.
s. K. VERMA v. INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL (Chinnappa Reddy, !.) 793

In Sanitosh Gupta v. State Bank of Patiala, (supra) the facts A
of which case were identical with the facts of the cases before us,
this Court found "that the discharge of ,the workman_ on the ground
that she did not pass the test, which would have enabled her to be
confirmed, was retrenchment within the meaning of S. 2 (oo) and,
therefore, the requirements of S. 25F had to be complied with".
On that finding, the relief which was awarded was : "the order of B
the Presiding Officer Central Government Industrial Tribunal cum
Labour Court, New Delhi, is set aside and the appellant is directed
to be reinstated w1th full back wages".
Earlier, in Hindustan Steel Ltd. v. The Presiding Officer,
Labour Court, Orissa and Ors., (1) a Division Bench of this Court c
consisting of Chandrachud, Goswami and Gupta JJ, on a finding
that there was a contravention of the provisions of S. 25F of the
Industrial Disputes Act, affirmed the award of the Lower Court
directing
. .
reinstatement with full back wages. In another case
I
M/s.
Avon Services Production Agencies (P) Ltd. v. Industrial Tribunal,
Haryana and Ors.,( 2 ) Krishna Iyer and Desai JJ found that there D
was retrenchment without compliance with the prescribed conditions
precedent. Therefore, they said "the retrenchment was invalid and
the relief of reinstatement with full back wages was amply deserved".
In M/s. Swadesamitran Limited, Madr.as v. Their Workmen( 8 )
dealing with an argument that even if the impugned retrenchment E
was justified, reinstatement should not have been ordered, Gajendra-
gadkar, Subba Rao and Das Gupta JJ observed :
"Once it is found that retrenchment is unjustified and
improper it is for the tribunals below to consider to what
relief the retrenched workmen are entitled. Ordinarily, if a
workman has been improperly and illegally retrenched he is F
entitled to clailr! reinstatement. The fact that in the meanwhile
the employer has engaged other workmen would not necessarily
defeat the claim for reinstatement of the retrenched workmen;
nor can the fact thai protract¢ litigation in regard to the dispute
has inevitably meant delay, defeat such a claim for reinstatement.
This Court has consistently held that in the case of wrongful G
dismissal, discharge or retrenchment, a claim for reinstatement
..... cannot be defeated merely because time has lapsed or that the
employer has ~ngaged fresh hands (Vide :The Punjab National
Bank Ltd. v. The All-India Punjab National Bank Employees'
(1) (1977] 1 SCR 586. H
(2) (19791 1 sec i.
(3) [1960] 3 SCR 144 @ 156.
9--645 S. C. India/ 80
794 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1981] 1 S.C.R.

A Federation [1960] 1 SCR 806) : and National Transport and
General Co. Ltd. V. The Workmen (Civil Appeal No. 312 of
1956 decided on January 22, 1957)."

In State Bank of India v. Shri N. Sundara Money,( 1 ) a Division
Bench of this Comt consisting of Chandrachud. Krishna Iyer and
B Gupta JJ held that a certain order of retrenchment was in violation
cif the provisions of S. 25F and was, therefore, invalid and
inoperative. After so holding, they proceeded to consider the
question of the relief to be awarded. They observed :

"What follows ? Had the State Bank known the law and
c acted on it, half-a-month's pay would have concluded the story.
But that did not happeri. And now, some years have passed
and the Bank has to pay, for no service rendered. Even so,
hard cases cannot make bad law. Re-instatement is the
necessary relief that follows. At what point ? In the particular
facts and circumstances of this case, the respondent shall be put
D back where he left off, but his new salary will be what he
would draw were he to be appointed in the same post today
de nova. As for benefits if any, flowing f!rom service he will
be ranked below all permanent employees in that cadre and
will be deemed to be a temporary hand upto now. He will
not be allowed to claim any advantages in the matter of seniority
E or other priority inter se among temporary employees on the
ground that his retrenchment is being declared invalid by
this Court. Not that we are laying down any general proposition
of law, but make this direction in the special circumstances of
the case. As for the respondent's emoluments, he will have
to pursue oth<:r remedies, if any".
F'
We do no! propose to refer to the cases arising under section
33 and 33A of !he Industrial Disputes Act or to cases arising out of
references under se,ctions 10 and 1OA of the Industrial Disputes Act.
Nor do we propos() to ,engage ourselves in the unfruitful task of
answering the question whether the termination of the services of a
G workman in violation of the provisions of S. 25F is void ab initio
or merely invalid and inoperative, even if it is possible to di,sqover
some razor's edge distinction between the Latin 'Void ab ini,tio'
and the Anglo-Saxon ':invalid and inoperative'. Semantic luxuries
are misplaced in the interpretation of 'bread and butter' statutes.
Welfare statutes must, of necessity, receive a broad interpretation.
H Where legislation is designed to -give relief against' certain kinds of
-,-----
(!) [1976] 3 SCR 160 @ 166.
s. K. VERMA v. INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL (Chinnappa Reddy, J.) 79 5

mischief, the Court is not to make inroads by making etymological A
excursions. 'Void ab initio'. 'invalid and inoperative' or call it
what you will, the workmen and the employer are primarily
<:oncerned with the consequence of striking down the order of
termination of the services of the workmen. Plain common sense
dictates that the removal of an order terminating the services of
workmen must ordinarily lead to the reins,tatement of the services B
of the workmen. It is as if the order has never been and so it must
-0rdinarily lead to back wages too. But there may be exceptional
circumstances which make it impossible or wholly inequitable
vis-a-vis the employer and workmen to direct reinstatement with
full back wages. For instance, the industry might have closed down
or might be in severe financial doldrums; the workmen concerned c
might have secured better or other employment elsewhere and so on.
In such situations, there is a vestige of discretion left in the Court
to· make appropriate consequential orders. The Court may deny the
relief of reinstatement where reinstatement is impossible because the
industry has closed down. The ·court may deny the relief of award
D
of full back wages where that would place .an impossible burden
on the employer. In such and other exceptional cases the Court
may mould the relief, but. ordinarily the relief to be awarded must
be reinstatement with full back wages. That relief must be
.awarded where no special impediment in the way of awarding the
relief is clearly shown. True, occasional hardship may be caused E
to an employer but we must remember that, more often than not.
.comparatively far greater hardship is certain to be caused to the
workmen if the relief is denied than to the employer if the relief
is granted.
In the cases before us we are unable to see any special
ll:npediment in the way of awarding the relief. The Labour Court F
.appe.ars to have thought that the award of the relief of reinstatement
with full back wages would put these workmen ·on a par with who
had qualified for permanent absorption by passing the prescribed
test and thait would create dissatisfaction amongst the latter. First,
they can never be on par since reinstatement would not qualify them
G
for permanent absorption. They would continue to be temporary,
liable to be retrenched. Second, there is not a shred of evidence
to suggest that their reinstatement would be a cause for dissatisfaction
to anyone. There is no hint in the record that any undue burden
would be placed on the employer if the same relief is granted as
was done in Santosh Gupta v. State Bank of Patiala (supra). H
The cases of Usha Kumari and Madhu Bala were treated by .
the Labour Court as distinct from !he cases of all the other appellants
796 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1981] 1 S.C.R.

.A on the ground 1hat, though they had worked for more than two
hundred and forty days in the preceding twelve months, they had
not been in employment for one year. It appears that Usha Kumari
and Madhu Bala were in the employment of the Bank from May
4, 1974 to January 29, 1975 and had worked for 258 and 266
days respectively during that period. As the period from May 4,
H 1974 to January 29, 1975 was not one year, it was conceded before
the Labour Court that there was no violation of the provisions of
S. 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act. Before us, the concession
was questioned and it was argued that there was non-compliance
with the requirements of s. 25F of the Act. Since the facts were
not disputed, we entertained the argument and heard the counsel
c on the question. The concession was apparently based on the
decision of this Court in Sur Enamel and Stamping Works (P)
Ltd. v. Their Workmen.( 1 ) That decision was rendered before
S. 25B, which defines continuous service for the purposes of
Chapter VA of the Industrial Disputes Act was recast by Act 36
of 1954. The learned counsel for the employer submitted that the
D
&mendment made no substantial difference. Let us take a look at
the statutory provisions. S. 25-F, then and now, provides that no
workman employed in any indust~y who has been in continuous
service for not less than one year under an employer shall be
retrenched by that employer until certain conditions are fulfilled.
E S. 25-B's marginal title is 'Definition of continuous Service'. To
the extent that it is relevant S. 25-B(2) as it i;tow reads is as follows:
"Where a workman is not in continuous service . . . . . . f01:
a period of one year or six months, he shall be deemed to be
in continuous service under an employer ................. .
,J
'i-

I
(a) for a~ period of one year, if the workman, during
F
a period of twelve calendar months preceding the date with
reference' to which calculation is to be made, has actually
worked under the employer for not less than ........... .
(i) one hundred and ninety days in the case of
a workman employed below ground in a mine; and
G (ii) two hundred and forty days in any other
case;
(h) ................. .
Explanation ............... .
The provision appears to be plain enough. Section 25 ..p requires that a
H workman should be in continuous service for not less than one year
(1) [l96~ 3 SCR 616 @ 6?2-6i!.3.
s. K. VERMA v. INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL (Chinnappa Reddy, ].) 797

under an employer before that provision applies. White so, present A
S. 25 B(2) steps in and says that even if a workman has not been
in continuous service under an employer for a period of one year,
he shall be deemed to have been in such continuous service for a
period of one year, if he has actually worked under the employer
for 240 days in the preceding period of twelve months. There is
no. stipulation that he should have been in employment or service B
under the employer for a whole period of twelve months. In fact,
the thrust of the provision is that he need not be. That appears
to be the plain meaning without gloss from any source.
Now, S. 25-B was not always so worded. Prior to Act 36 of
1964, it read as follows : -
c
"For the purposes of Section 25-F and 25-F, a workman
who, during a period of twelve calendar months, has actually
worked in an industry for not less than two hundred and forty
days shall be deemed to have completed one year's continuous
service in the industry.
D
Explanation.- "
The differerite between old 25-B and present 25-B is patent The
clause "where a workman is not in continuous service . . . . for a
period of one year" with which present S. 25-B (2) so significantly
begins, was equally significantly absent from old S. 25-B. Of the
same degree of significance was the circumstance that' prior to Act E
36 of 1964 the expression "Continuous Service" was separately
defined by S. 2(eee) as fo1lows:-
" ( eee) 'continuous service' means uninterrupted service,
and includes service which may be interrupted merely on
account of sickness or authorised leave or an accident or F
a strike which ,is not illegal, or lock-out or a cessation of work
which is not due to any fault on the part of tlie workman;"
S. 2(eee) was omitted by the same Act 36 of 1964 which recast
S. 25-B. S. 25-B as it read prior to Act 36 of 1964, in the light
of the then existing S. 2 ( eee), certainly lent itself to the construction G
that a workman had to be in the service of the employer for a period
of one year and should have worked for not ;ess than 240 days
before he could claim to have completed one year's completed
service so as to attract •the provisions of S. 25-F. That precisely
was what was decided by this Court in Sur Enamel and Stamping
Works Ltd. v. Their Workmen (supra). The Court said : H
"On the plain terms of the section (S. 25-F) only a
workman who lrns been in continuous service for aot less than
798 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1981] 1 S.C.R.

A one year under an employer is entitled to its benefit. 'Continuous
Service' is defined ins. 2(eee) as meaning uninterrupted service7
and includes service which may be interrupted merely on
account of sickness or authorised leave .or an accident or a
strike which is not illegal or a lock-out or a cessation of work
which is not due to any fault on the part of the workman ..
B What is meant by "one year of continuous service' has been
defined in s. 25B. Under this section a workman who during
a period of twelve calendar months has actually worked in an
industry for not less 240 days shall be deemed to have completed
service in the industry. . . . . . . . . The
position (therefore) is that during a period of employment for
c less 1than 11 calendar months these two persons worked for
more than 240 days. In our opinion that would not satisfy
the requirement of s. 25B. Before a workman can be
considered to have completed one year of continuous service
in an industry it must be shown first that. he was employed
for a period of not less than 12 calendar months and, next
D
that during those 12 calendar months had worked for not less '
than 240 days .. Where, as in the present case, the workmen
have not at all been employed for a period of 12 calendar
months it becomes unnecessary to examine whether the actual
days of work numbered 240 days or more".
E Act 36 of 1964 has drastically changed the position. S. 2(eee) has
been repealed and S. 25-B(2) now begins with the clause "where a
workman is not in continuous service ...... for a period of one year". .......
These changes brought about by Act 36 of 1964 appear to be clearly
designed to provide that a workman who has actually worked under ..
the employer for not less than 240 days during a period of twelve _....
F months shall .be deem1ed to have been in continuous service · for a
period of one year whether or not he has in fact been in such
continuous service for a period of one year. It is enough that he
has worked for 240 days in a period of 12 months; it is not neces-
sary that he should have been in the service of the employer for one
whole year. So we hold that Usha Kumari and Madhu Bala are in
G the same position as the other appellants.
In the result all the appeals are allowed and the workmen-
appellants are directed to be reinstated with full back wages. We,.
however, super-impose the condition that the salary on reinstatement
of the workmen will be the salary which they were drawing when
H they were retrenched (subject of course to any revision of scales that
might have been made in the meanwhile) and the period from the
date of retrenchment to the date of reinstatement will not be taken
. '
s. K. VERMA v. INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL (Pathak, J.) 799

into account for the purpose of reckoning seniority of the workmen A
among temporary employees. The respondent is free to deal with
its employees, who are temporary, according to the law. There will
be no order regarding costs.

PATHAK/ J.-I entirely agree with my learned brother Chinnappa
Reddy in the order proposed by him. B

The appeals raise strictly limited questions. The appeals by
Usha Kumari and Madhubala~involve the question whether they can
be regarded as being in continuous service for a period of one year
· within the meaning of s. 25B(2), Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and
if so, to what relief would they be entitled. Jhe remaining appeals
c
, require the court to examine whether the appellants should have
.,-. been awarded reinstatement with back wages instead of the curtailed
relief granted by the Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court. That
is the entire scope of these appeals. No question arises before us
whether the termination of the services of the appellants amounts D
to "retrenchment" within the meaning of s. 2 ( oo) of the Act. The
respondent Bank of India has apparently accepted the finding of
the Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court that the termination
amounts to retrenchment. It has not preferred any appeal. I
mention this only because I should not be taken to have agreed
with the interpretation of s. 2(oo) rendered in Santosh Gupta v. E
State Bank of Patiala( 1 ).

Proceeding on the footing mentioned above, my learned brother
Chinnappa Reddy has, I say with respect, rightly concluded that on
the facts and circumstances before us the appe.Jlants should be
reinstated with full back wages subject to the proviso !hat the salary F
on reinstatement will be the salary drawn by the respective appellants
on the date of their retrenchment, qualified by the impact of any
revisional scale meanwhile, and subject to the further proviso that
· the period intervening between the date of retrenchment and the
date of reinstatement will be omitted from account in the determi-
nation of the seniority of these appellants among temporary employees. G
Ordinarily, a workman who has been retrenched in contravention of
the law is entitled to reinstatement with full back wages and that
principle yields only where the justice of the case in the light of
the particular facts indicates the desirabmty of a different relief.
It has not been shown to us on behalf of the respondent why the
H
ordinary rule should not be applied.
(j) 1980 Vol. JI LLJ. 72.

.41
800 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1981] 1 S.C.R.

A On the other question decided by my learned brother I have
no hesitation in agreeing that having regard ~o the simultaneous
amendments introduced in· the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 by
Act No. 36 of 1964-the deletion of s. 2(eee) and the substitution of
the present s. 25B for the original section-it is no longer necessary
for a workman to show that he has been in employment during a
B preceding period of twelve calendar months in order to qualify
within the terms of s. 25B, It is sufficiemt for the purposes of
s. 25B(2)(a) (ii) that he has actually worked for not less than
240 days during the preceding period of 12 calendar months. The
law declared by this Court in Sur Enamel and Stamping Works (P)
Ltd. v. Their Workmen(!) does not apply to situations governed -
c by the subsequently sutJstituted s. 25B of the Act. -
With these observations. I concur wi,th the order proposed by -y,
my learned brother.

P.B.R. . Appeals allowed.

(1) [1964] 3 S.C.R. 616, 622-3.