SUBHASH CHANDER & ORS.versusM/S BHARAT PETROLEUM CORPORATION LTD.(BPCL) & ANR.

108                      [2022]REPORTS
               SUPREME COURT    8 S.C.R. 108                  [2022] 8 S.C.R.


A                       SUBHASH CHANDER & ORS.
                                         v.
       M/S BHARAT PETROLEUM CORPORATION LTD.(BPCL) &
                           ANR.
B                         (Civil Appeal No. 7517 of 2012)
                               JANUARY 28, 2022
                [AJAY RASTOGI AND ABHAY S. OKA, JJ.]
             Haryana (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act, 1973 – Burmah
      Shell (Acquisition of Undertakings) Act, 1976 – ss. 3, 5, 7 and 11 –
C
      Transfer of Property Act, 1882 – Suit for possession by the appellant
      – Maintainability of, before the Rent Controller under the 1973 Act
      or the jurisdiction of the civil court – Property owned by the
      predecessor in interest of the appellant, leased out to M/s Burmah
      Shell Company for 20 years – Renewal option for another 20 years
D     was availed – However, before the expiry of the initial lease period,
      the Central Government enacted Burmah Shell (Acquisition of
      Undertakings) Act, 1976 and took over the rights of the lessee and
      transferred the same to the respondent-government company in
      exercise of its power under the Act 1976 – After expiry of lease
      period, notice served on the respondents for terminating the tenancy
E
      and thereafter, suit for possession filed by the appellant against the
      respondent for vacating the suit property – Trial court held that the
      appellants were entitled for the restoration of possession of the suit
      land – In appeal thereagainst, it was held that the civil court has no
      jurisdiction to try the suit and respondents are in possession of the
F     suit property as statutory tenant and can be evicted from the suit
      property only under the provisions of the Act 1973 – High Court
      upheld the same – On appeal, held: By virtue of the statutory
      enactment of Burmah Shell Act, 1976, the pre-existing tenancy rights
      held by Burmah Shell with the appellants vested with the Central
      Government and by virtue of s. 7, the said rights in turn stood vested
G
      in the respondents-government company and they statutorily became
      the tenant of the appellants – Jurisdiction of a civil court is impliedly
      barred from the field covered specifically by the provisions of the
      Act 1973 and that being the complete code determining the rights
      of a tenant/landlord to the exclusion of the other laws – Therefore,
H     no error committed by the High Court in holding that even after the
                                        108
 SUBHASH CHANDER & ORS. v. M/S BHARAT PETROLEUM                         109
         CORPORATION LTD.(BPCL) & ANR.

expiry of the lease term of the lease deed, the respondents became      A
a statutory tenant and jurisdiction of the civil court is impliedly
barred and could be evicted only under the provisions of the Act
1973.
      Dismissing the appeal, the Court
      HELD:1. By virtue of the statutory enactment of Burmah            B
Shell (Acquisition of Undertakings) Act, 1976, the pre-existing
tenancy rights held by Burmah Shell with the appellants stood
transferred and vested with the Central Government and
thereafter by operation of Section 7, the said rights in turn stood
transposed and vested in the Government Company (Bharat                 C
Petroleum Corporation Ltd.) as the Government Company
statutorily became the tenant of the appellants/plaintiffs. [Para
19][117-F-G]
      2. Even if the lease period is determined by forfeiture under
the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, still the tenant continues to       D
be a tenant that is to say that there is no forfeiture in the eyes of
law and the tenant becomes liable to be evicted and the forfeiture
comes into play only if he has incurred a liability to be evicted
under the State Rent Act and not otherwise and further held that
even after the expiry of the period of contractual tenancy, the
tenant can be evicted only in terms of provisions of the State          E
Rent Act which is applicable in reference the subject property in
question. [Para 20][119-C-E]
      3. A perusal of the scheme of the Act 1976 would show that
from the appointed day, right, title and interest of Burmah Shell
with effect to Section 5(1) stood transferred and vested with the       F
Central Government and by virtue of Section 7(2), the vesting of
tenancy rights with the Central Government stood further
transposed and vested in Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. And
that became a statutory tenant by virtue of Section 7(3) of the
Act. To that extent, Section 11 of the Act has an overriding effect
                                                                        G
to the provisions of other laws. That being so, the jurisdiction
indeed of a civil Court is impliedly barred from the field covered
specifically by the provisions of the Haryana (Control of Rent &
Eviction) Act, 1973 and that being the complete code determining
the rights of a tenant/landlord to the exclusion of the other laws,
                                                                        H
110            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2022] 8 S.C.R.


A     there is no error in the view expressed by the High Court in the
      impugned judgment holding that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court
      is held to be barred and remedial mechanism for ejectment could
      be possible only under the provisions of the Act 1973. [Para
      21][119-E-H]
B           4. In the given circumstances, no error was committed by
      the High Court in arriving to a conclusion that even after the
      expiry of the lease term of the lease deed, the respondents
      became a statutory tenant and jurisdiction of the Civil Court is
      impliedly barred and could be evicted only under the provisions
      of the Act 1973. [Para 25][120-F]
C
            Depot Superintendent, H.P. Corpn. Ltd. and Another v.
            Kolhapur Agricultural Market Committee, Kolhapur
            (2007) 6 SCC 159 : [2007] 7 SCR 1061; Ram Bharosey
            Lal Gupta (Dead) by LRs and Others v. Hindustan
            Petroleum Corporation Limited and Another (2013) 9
D           SCC 714 : [2013] 6 SCR 323; Bharat Petroleum
            Corporation Limited v. Rama Chandrashekhar Vaidya
            and Another (2014) 1 SCC 657 : [2013] 5 SCR 674; V.
            Dhanapal Chettiar v. Yesodai Ammal (1979) 4 SCC 214
            : [1980] 1 SCR 334; Shyam Lal v. Deepa Dass Chela
E           Ram Chela Garib Dass (2016) 7 SCC 572 : [ 2016] 5
            SCR 893 - referred to.
                            Case Law Reference
      [2007] 7 SCR 1061                referred to             Para 12

F     [2013] 6 SCR 323                 referred to             Para 12
      [2013] 5 SCR 674                 referred to             Para 12
      [1980] 1 SCR 334                 referred to             Para 13
      [2016] 5 SCR 893                 referred to             Para 13
G           CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 7517
      of 2012.
            From the Judgment and Order dated 08.07.2009 of the High Court
      of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh in R.S.A. No.3061 of 2006.

H
 SUBHASH CHANDER & ORS. v. M/S BHARAT PETROLEUM                                    111
         CORPORATION LTD.(BPCL) & ANR.

      Manoj Swarup, Sr. Adv., Ankit Swarup, Neelmani Pant, Ms.                     A
Vidisha Swarup, Rohit Kumar Singh, Advs. for the Appellants.
       V. Giri, Sr. Adv., Parijat Sinha, Ms. Pallak Bhagat, Rudra Dutta,
Ms. Sanyukta Gupta, Devesh Mishra, Ms. Reshmi Rea Sinha, Ms. Akriti
Jain, B. S. Bedi, Dinesh Verma, Krishna Kumar, Ms. Nandani Gupta,
Dr. (Mrs.) Vipin Gupta, Advs. for the Respondents.                                 B
       The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
       RASTOGI, J.
       1. The instant appeal has been preferred by the appellants/plaintiffs
assailing the judgment dated 8th July, 2009, upholding the judgment and
                                                                                   C
decree of the Court of appeal dated 28th March, 2006 holding that the
Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain and try the suit for possession
in reference to the subject property and the appropriate remedy available
with the appellants is to initiate proceedings for eviction of the suit property
under the provisions of the Haryana (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act,
1973 (hereinafter called as “Act 1973”).                                           D
       2. The brief facts of the case manifest from the record are that
the appellants filed a suit on the averment that their predecessor in interest
Sh. Vinod Kumar was owner of the subject plot of land admeasuring
10,000 sq. feet in municipal limits, Kaithal bearing Municipal No.657/10.
Undisputedly, the Act 1973 applies to the suit property in question.               E
       3. The subject property was given on lease by late Vinod Kumar
to M/s Burmah Shell Oil Storage Distributing Company Ltd. for a fixed
period of 20 years at the rate of Rs.35/- per month vide lease dated 4th
June, 1958 with effect from 1st April, 1958. The lease period initially was
for 20 years and clause 10 of the lease contemplated renewal of the                F
lease once for another 20 years. The lease period commenced from 1st
April, 1958 for a period of 20 years expired on 1st April, 1978 and in
terms of clause 10 of the lease deed, one extension was permissible and
that renewal option for another period of 20 years was availed and that
lease period also expired on 1st April, 1998.
                                                                                   G
       4. At this stage, the appellants served a legal notice on the
respondents dated 30th January, 1998 in which although Section 106 of
the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 has not been specifically mentioned,
but in pith and substance the notice was served for terminating tenancy
of the respondents and later filed a civil suit for possession of the subject
land on 7th August, 1998.                                                          H
112             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2022] 8 S.C.R.


A             5. The preliminary objection was raised by the respondents
      regarding jurisdiction of the Civil Court in entertaining the suit and the
      defence throughout was that the Act 1973 is applicable on the subject
      property and they can be evicted only under the provisions of the Act
      1973. It is not disputed that the subject land admittedly falls within the
      area administered by Municipal Committee, Kaithal and the rented land
B
      is situated within the urban area and covered under the provisions of the
      Act 1973.
             6. That before expiry of the period of lease of 20 years, the Central
      Government enacted Burmah Shell (Acquisition of Undertakings) Act,
      1976 (hereinafter called as “Act 1976”), pursuant to which the leasehold
C     rights were taken over by the respondents/defendants. The option of
      renewal of lease for another period of 20 years was availed by the
      respondents in terms of clause 10 of the lease deed dated 4th June, 1958.
      The case of the appellants was that after lease expired on 1st April,
      1998, the possession of the respondents on the suit property became
D     unauthorised and without consent of the appellants and since the
      respondents failed to vacate the suit property despite a legal notice dated
      30th January, 1998 being served, the appellants since required the suit
      property for their personal bonafide necessity for expanding their business,
      although had earlier filed an application under the Act 1973, as alleged
      on the wrong premise. It was pleaded that at least the provisions of the
E     Act 1973 do not apply to the suit property as it is governed by the special
      Act enacted by the Central Government being Act 1976. In the alternative,
      it was pleaded by the appellants that respondent no.1 had sub-let the suit
      property to respondent no.2 without consent of the appellants and hence
      the appellants are entitled to possession of the suit property and also
F     claimed mesne profits during pendency of the suit at the market rate, in
      addition to three years rent prior to lapse of the renewal period and
      prayed for a decree for possession and recovery of mesne profits.
             7. The respondents filed written statement and it was admitted
      that the suit property had been leased out by late Vinod Kumar to M/s
G     Burmah Shell Oil Storage Distributing Company Ltd. and later by the
      Act 1976, the leasehold rights were transferred to respondent no.1. It
      was also admitted that they exercised their renewal option in terms of
      clause 10 of the lease for a period of 20 years. At the same time, it was
      also averred that on expiry of the lease period, the respondents became
      the statutory tenant of the suit property and the appellants had been
H     receiving rent from the respondents without any demur and further
 SUBHASH CHANDER & ORS. v. M/S BHARAT PETROLEUM                                113
  CORPORATION LTD.(BPCL) & ANR. [AJAY RASTOGI, J.]

averred that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain and try the      A
suit as the same is specifically barred by the provisions of the Act 1973.
       8. It was further stated that there was a relationship of landlord
and tenant between the parties and the suit land is a rented land as
defined under Section 2(h) of the Act 1973 and the disputes between
landlord and tenant are to be adjudicated in accordance with the provisions    B
of the Act 1973 and the respondents being in possession as a statutory
tenant of the suit property, cannot be evicted except in accordance with
the provisions of Section 13 of the Act 1973 and that apart the appellants
had earlier filed a petition for ejectment against the respondents before
the Rent Controller on the ground of subletting and personal necessity
and that has been dismissed by the Rent Controller by order dated 3rd          C
May, 1986. An appeal against the same also came to be dismissed by
the appellate authority by order dated 18th March, 1987.
       9. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, the learned trial
Court by a judgment and decree dated 13th March, 2002 held that the
respondents are in unauthorised possession over the suit property w.e.f.       D
1st April, 1998 after notice dated 30th January, 1998 under Section 106 of
the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 has been served for vacating the suit
property holding the appellants entitled for restoration of possession of
the suit land in question.
       10. On appeal being preferred by the respondents, the Court of          E
Appeal set aside the judgment and decree of the trial Court dated 13th
March, 2002 by the judgment dated 28th March, 2006 and held that the
Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain and try the suit and the
respondents are in possession of the suit property as statutory tenant
and can be evicted from the suit property only under the provisions of
the Act 1973. The said order came to be challenged by the appellants/          F
plaintiffs in second appeal before the High Court and that came to be
dismissed by the impugned judgment dated 8th July, 2009, being the subject
matter of challenge in appeal before us.
       11. The dispute between the parties pertains to as to whether the
jurisdiction of the Civil Court is barred and the petition for possession      G
filed by the appellants/plaintiffs will lie before the Rent Controller under
the Act 1973.
      12. Counsel for the appellants, Shri Manoj Swarup, Senior
Advocate, submits that before the term of initial lease period of 20 years
came to be expired on 1st April, 1978, the Central Government came             H
114             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2022] 8 S.C.R.


A     with a special legislation, namely, the Burmah Shell (Acquisition of
      Undertakings) Act, 1976 and the High Court has failed to consider the
      effect of Section 11 of the Act 1976 which has an overriding effect and
      that excludes all other laws inconsistent with the provisions of the Act
      1976, including the Act 1973 and further submits that the finding which
      has been recorded of the respondents being a statutory tenant under the
B
      Act 1973 is in contravention of Section 5(2) of the Act 1976 and in the
      absence of any fresh lease being executed by the parties only one renewal
      as per the lease deed originally executed dated 4th June, 1958, was
      permissible in law and that being availed and the term had expired on 1 st
      April, 1998, no further extension was permissible in law and the
C     respondents became trespassers after expiry of the lease period and the
      only remedy available with the appellants was to file a suit for possession
      of the suit property and in support of his submissions placed reliance on
      the judgments of this Court in Depot Superintendent, H.P. Corpn. Ltd.
      and Another v. Kolhapur Agricultural Market Committee, Kolhapur 1,
      Ram Bharosey Lal Gupta(Dead) by LRs and Others v. Hindustan
D
      Petroleum Corporation Limited and Another2, Bharat Petroleum
      Corporation Limited v. Rama Chandrashekhar Vaidya and Another 3.
             13. Per contra, counsel for the respondents, Shri V. Giri, Senior
      Advocate, while supporting the findings recorded under the impugned
      judgment conceded that only one term of extension of lease of 20 years
E     was permissible and that indeed was availed and stood expired on 1 st
      April, 1998, but further submits that the respondents became statutory
      tenant thereafter under the Act 1973 and they could be evicted only by
      invoking Section 13 of the Act 1973 which undisputedly is applicable to
      the subject property and thus in the given circumstances the Civil Court
F     at least has no jurisdiction to try the suit. That being the finding recorded
      by the first appellate Court and confirmed by the High Court on dismissal
      of second appeal preferred at the instance of the appellants under the
      impugned judgment being supported by the judgment of the Constitution
      Bench of this Court in V. Dhanapal Chettiar v. Yesodai Ammal4 followed
      in Shyam Lal v. Deepa Dass Chela Ram Chela Garib Dass 5, what is
G     being urged by learned counsel for the appellants is without substance
      1
        (2007) 6 SCC 159
      2
        (2013) 9 SCC 714
      3
        (2014) 1 SCC 657
      4
        (1979) 4 SCC 214
H     5
        (2016) 7 SCC 572
 SUBHASH CHANDER & ORS. v. M/S BHARAT PETROLEUM                                  115
  CORPORATION LTD.(BPCL) & ANR. [AJAY RASTOGI, J.]

and the finding with regard to the jurisdiction being supported by the           A
settled principles of law needs no further indulgence of this Court.
       14. It may be relevant to note that in the interregnum period, title
deed of the subject property in question was mortgaged with the Punjab
National Bank creating security interest and after the account of the
appellants became NPA, proceedings under the SARFAESI Act, 2002                  B
were initiated against the appellants and public notice (symbolic) was
issued by the secured creditor (Punjab National Bank) for securing
possession of the subject property on 14th August, 2018. Pursuant thereto,
a letter was sent from the office of Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd.
on 12th October, 2018 for withdrawal of the possession notice (symbolic)
dated 14th August, 2018 but what steps have been taken inter se is not           C
on record. However, this Court is not concerned with this controversy in
the instant proceedings, but since the documents have been placed on
record, the same are being noticed only for completion of the facts.
       15. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and with their
assistance perused the material available on record.                             D
       16. It is not disputed that the appellants are the owners of the suit
property which is a plot admeasuring 10,000 square feet situated within
the municipal limits of Kaithal. Their predecessor in interest, late Vinod
Kumar son of Tilaj Raj had leased out the subject plot to M/s Burmah
Shell Oil Storage Distributing Company Ltd. for a period of 20 years             E
pursuant to lease deed dated 4th June, 1958 and before the expiry of the
lease period, the Central Government came out with a legislation, namely,
Burmah Shell (Acquisition of Undertakings) Act, 1976 and took over the
rights of the lessee and transferred the same to M/s Bharat Petroleum
Corporation Ltd. in exercise of its power under Section 5(2) read with
                                                                                 F
Section 7(3) of the Act 1976.
       17. It is also not disputed that the subject land is situated within
the municipal limits of Kaithal and is governed by the Act 1973 and the
term “tenant” defined under Section 2(h) includes “rented land” in
question. At the same time, in terms of Section 3 of the Act 1976, on the
                                                                                 G
appointed day the right, title and interest of Burmah Shell in relation to its
undertaking in India stood transferred and vested in the Central
Government and by a legal fiction the Central Government stepped into
the shoes of Burmah Shell and became the lessee in the lease deed
dated 4nd June, 1958 and in terms of Section 5(2) read with Section 7(3)
of the Act 1976, the statutory rights stood conferred on the respondents         H
116             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2022] 8 S.C.R.


A     in terms of clause 10 of lease deed/agreement for another term of 20
      years on the same terms and conditions as were operating and/or existing
      on the date of enactment of the said Act 1976. As such, upon vesting by
      virtue of the provisions of the Act 1976, the respondents became the
      lessee in respect of the subject land in terms of the provisions of the Act
      which has an overriding effect by virtue of Section 11 of the Act 1976.
B
             18. Sections 3, 5, 7 and 11 of the Act 1976, relevant for the purpose,
      are reproduced hereunder:
            “3. Transfer and vesting in the Central Government of the
            undertakings of Burmah Shell in India. - On the appointed
C           day, the right, title and interest of Burmah Shell, in relation to its
            undertakings in India, shall stand transferred to, and shall vest in,
            the Central Government.
            5. Central Government to be lessor or tenant under certain
            circumstances. - (1) Where any property is held in India by
D           Burmah Shell under any lease or under any right of tenancy, the
            Central Government shall, on and from the appointed day, be
            deemed to have become the lessee or tenant, as the case may be,
            in respect of such property as if the lease or tenancy in relation to
            such property had been granted to the Central Government, and
            thereupon all the rights under such lease or tenancy shall be deemed
E           to have been transferred to, and vested in, the Central
            Government.
            (2) On the expiry of the term of any lease or tenancy referred to
            in sub-section (1), such lease or tenancy shall, if so desired by the
            Central Government, be renewed on the same terms and
F           conditions on which the lease or tenancy was held by Burmah
            Shell immediately before the appointed day.
            7. Power of Central Government to direct vesting of the
            undertakings of the Burmah Shell in a Government
            company. - (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in sections 3,
G           4 and 5, the Central Government may, if it is satisfied that a
            Government company is willing to comply, or has complied, with
            such terms and conditions as that Government may think fit to
            impose, direct by notification, that the right, title and interest and
            the liabilities of Burmah Shell in relation to any of its undertakings
            in India shall, instead of continuing to vest in the Central
H
 SUBHASH CHANDER & ORS. v. M/S BHARAT PETROLEUM                                117
  CORPORATION LTD.(BPCL) & ANR. [AJAY RASTOGI, J.]

      Government, vest in the Government company either on the date            A
      of the notification or on such earlier or later date (not being a date
      earlier than the appointed day) as may be specified in the
      notification.
      (2) Where the right, title and interest and the liabilities of Burmah
      Shell in relation to its undertakings in India vest in a Government      B
      company under sub-section (1), the Government company shall,
      on and from the date of such vesting, be deemed to have become
      the owner, tenant or lessee, as the case may be, in relation to such
      undertakings, and all the rights and liabilities of the Central
      Government in relation to such undertakings shall, on and from
      the date of such vesting, be deemed to have become the rights            C
      and liabilities, respectively, of the Government company.
      (3) The provisions of sub- section (2) of section 5 shall apply to a
      lease or tenancy, which vests in a Government company, as they
      apply to a lease or tenancy vested in the Central Government,
      and reference therein to the” Central Government” shall be               D
      construed as a reference to the Government company.
      11. Effect of Act on other laws. The provisions of this Act shall
      have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith
      contained in any other law for the time being in force or in any
      instrument having effect by virtue of any law other than this Act        E
      or in any decree or order of any court, tribunal or other authority.”
                                                     [Emphasis Supplied]
        19. By virtue of the statutory enactment of Act 1976, the pre-
existing tenancy rights held by Burmah Shell with the appellants stood         F
transferred and vested with the Central Government and thereafter by
operation of Section 7, the said rights in turn stood transposed and vested
in the Government Company (Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd.) as
the Government Company statutorily became the tenant of the appellants/
plaintiffs. The Constitution Bench of this Court in V. Dhanapal Chettiar
(supra)had an occasion to examine the controversy as to whether in             G
order to get a decree/order of eviction against the tenant in the State
Rent Control Act, it is necessary to give a notice under Section 106 of
the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 and taking note of various State
enactments of the Act 1973, L.N. Untwalia, J., speaking for the Bench,
observed in para 18 as under:
                                                                               H
118      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2022] 8 S.C.R.


A     “Lastly our attention was drawn to the decision of this Court
      in Firm Sardarilal Vishwanath v. Pritam Singh [(1978) 4 SCC
      1. The lease in that case had come to an end by efflux of time. A
      tenant continued in possession and became a so-called statutory
      tenant. The argument put forward before this Court that a fresh
      notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was
B
      necessary was rejected on the ground: (SCC p. 10, para 18)
         “Having examined the matter on authority and precedent it
         must be frankly confessed that no other conclusion is possible
         on the first principle. Lease of urban immovable property
         represents a contract between the lessor and the lessee. If the
C        contract is to be put to an end it has to be terminated by a
         notice to quit as envisaged under Section 106 of the Transfer
         of Property Act. But it is equally clear as provided by Section
         111 of the Transfer of Property Act that the lease of immovable
         property determines by various modes therein prescribed. Now,
D        if the lease of immovable property determines in any one of
         the modes prescribed under Section 111, the contract of lease
         comes to an end, and the landlord can exercise his right of re-
         entry. The right of re-entry is further restricted and fettered by
         the provisions of the Rent Restriction Act. Nonetheless the
         contract of lease had expired and the tenant lessee continues
E        in possession under the protective wing of the Rent Restriction
         Act until the lessee loses protection. But there is no question
         of terminating the contract because the contract comes to an
         end once the lease determines in any one of the modes
         prescribed under Section 111. There is, therefore, no question
F        of giving a notice to quit to such a lessee who continued in
         possession after the determination of the lease i.e. after the
         contract came to an end under the protection of the Rent
         Restriction Act. If the contract once came to an end there
         was no question of terminating the contract over again by a
         fresh notice.”
G
      If we were to agree with the view that determination of lease in
      accordance with the Transfer of Property Act is a condition
      precedent to the starting of a proceeding under the State Rent
      Act for eviction of the tenant, we could have said so with respect
      that the view expressed in the above passage is quite correct
H
 SUBHASH CHANDER & ORS. v. M/S BHARAT PETROLEUM                                119
  CORPORATION LTD.(BPCL) & ANR. [AJAY RASTOGI, J.]

      because there was no question of determination of the lease again        A
      once it was determined by efflux of time. But on the first
      assumption we have taken a different view of the matter and
      have come to the conclusion that determination of a lease in
      accordance with the Transfer of Property Act is unnecessary
      and a mere surplusage because the landlord cannot get eviction
                                                                               B
      of the tenant even after such determination. The tenant continues
      to be so even thereafter. That being so, making out a case under
      the Rent Act for eviction of the tenant by itself is sufficient and it
      is not obligatory to found the proceeding on the basis of the
      determination of the lease by issue of notice in accordance with
      Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act.”                            C
                                                     [Emphasis Supplied]
       20. It has been held that even if the lease period is determined by
forfeiture under the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, still the tenant
continues to be a tenant that is to say that there is no forfeiture in the     D
eyes of law and the tenant becomes liable to be evicted and the forfeiture
comes into play only if he has incurred a liability to be evicted under the
State Rent Act and not otherwise and further held that even after the
expiry of the period of contractual tenancy, the tenant can be evicted
only in terms of provisions of the State Rent Act which is applicable in
reference the subject property in question.                                    E

       21. A perusal of the scheme of the Act 1976 would show that
from the appointed day, right, title and interest of Burmah Shell with
effect to Section 5(1) stood transferred and vested with the Central
Government and by virtue of Section 7(2), the vesting of tenancy rights
with the Central Government stood further transposed and vested in             F
Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. and that became a statutory tenant
by virtue of Section 7(3) of the Act. To that extent, Section 11 of the Act
has an overriding effect to the provisions of other laws. That being so,
the jurisdiction indeed of a civil Court is impliedly barred from the field
covered specifically by the provisions of the Act 1973 and that being the      G
complete code determining the rights of a tenant/landlord to the exclusion
of the other laws, we find no error in the view expressed by the High
Court in the impugned judgment holding that the jurisdiction of the Civil
Court is held to be barred and remedial mechanism for ejectment could
be possible only under the provisions of the Act 1973.
                                                                               H
120             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2022] 8 S.C.R.


A            22. The judgments on which the counsel for the appellants has
      placed reliance are of no assistance. In Depot Superintendent, H.P.
      Corpn. Ltd. and Another(supra),the question arose for consideration
      as to whether the company was entitled for second renewal invoking
      the provisions of the Act 1976. It was declined by this Court holding that
      there is no option for further renewal which can be claimed independently
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      under the Act 1976.
             23. In Ram Bharosey Lal Gupta(Dead) by LRs and Others(supra),
      the substantial question of law was as to whether under clause 3(d) of
      the lease deed executed between the parties, (the lessor) was under a
      legal obligation to renew the lease term for a further period of 20 years
C     and it was not the case where the lease has been determined or the
      renewal of lease term has either been availed or expired. In the given
      situation, certain observations have been made by this Court in para 28
      of the judgment that may not be of any assistance in the given facts and
      circumstances.
D           24. The counsel further placed reliance on Bharat Petroleum
      Corporation Limited (supra). The question under consideration was as
      to whether if one term of lease has been extended under the lease deed,
      whether automatic renewal of lease is permissible by virtue of Section
      5(2) of the Act 1976 and it has been held by this Court that only one
E     extension was permissible in terms of the conditions of lease deed and
      Section 5(2) of the Act 1976 will not be available for a further renewal.
             25. In the given circumstances, we are of the considered view
      that no error was committed by the High Court in arriving to a conclusion
      that even after the expiry of the lease term of the lease deed, the
F     respondents became a statutory tenant and jurisdiction of the Civil Court
      is impliedly barred and could be evicted only under the provisions of the
      Act 1973.
             26. The appeal is devoid of merit and accordingly dismissed.
             27. Pending application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of.
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      Nidhi Jain                                                  Appeal dismissed.
      (Assisted by : Tamana, LCRA)




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