Supreme Court of India
STATE THROUGH CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATIONversusHEMENDHRA REDDY & ANOTHER. ETC.
- Citation
- 2023 INSC 460
- Decided
- 28 April 2023
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Bench
- SURYA KANT
Holding
Section 173(8) of the CrPC permits further investigation after a final report is accepted, and such investigation does not constitute a fresh prosecution or invoke the double‑jeopardy bar.
Summary
The Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) investigated alleged disproportionate assets of D. Dwarakanadha Reddy and others under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, filed a closure report under Section 173(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) in 2008, and the Special Judge accepted it. In 2013 the CBI obtained fresh material and sought to reopen the case under Section 173(8) of the CrPC; the Special Judge permitted further investigation and the CBI filed a charge‑sheet. The Madras High Court quashed the prosecution, holding that a closure report barred any further investigation and that the charge‑sheet was illegal, also raising a procedural defect under the second proviso of Section 17 of the 1988 Act. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that Section 173(8) expressly allows further investigation after a final report is accepted, that such investigation is a continuation, not a fresh trial, and that the double‑jeopardy bar of Article 20(2) does not apply. The Court also ruled that the magistrate need not recall or review the acceptance order and that the High Court’s quashing was erroneous. Consequently, the appeals were allowed, the High Court orders set aside, and the trial was ordered to proceed.
Issues considered
- The High Court’s quashing of the prosecution on the ground that further investigation under Section 173(8) CrPC is barred after a closure report under Section 173(2) has been accepted.
- Whether the acceptance of a final report under Section 173(2) creates a legal bar to any subsequent investigation or charge‑sheet.
- Whether the alleged non‑compliance with the second proviso of Section 17 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, vitiates the charge‑sheet.
- The applicability of the double‑jeopardy principle (Article 20(2) Constitution) to further investigation.
Legislation cited
- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 156(3), s. 169, s. 173(2), s. 173(8), s. 190(1)(c)
- Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 109
- Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988s. 13(1)(e), s. 17(Second proviso)
Subjects
Further investigationSection 173(8) CrPCClosure reportDouble jeopardyPrevention of Corruption ActMagistrate powersCBIDelay in trialCriminal procedure
Judgment
134 [2023]
SUPREME COURT 7 S.C.R. 134
REPORTS [2023] 7 S.C.R.
A STATE THROUGH CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
v.
HEMENDHRA REDDY & ANOTHER. ETC.
(Criminal Appeal Nos. 1300-1302 of 2023)
B APRIL 28, 2023
[SURYA KANT AND J.B. PARDIWALA, JJ.]
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – ss. 169, 173(2), 173(8)
– Further Investigation – Whether the High Court was justified in
quashing the entire prosecution instituted by the CBI against the
C
accused persons for the alleged offences on the ground that the
CBI could not have undertaken further investigation under sub-
section (8) of s.173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and
filed a charge-sheet having once already submitted a final report
under sub-section (2) of the s.173 of the CrPC (closure report) –
D Held: There is no bar against conducting further investigation u/s.
173(8) of the CrPC after the final report submitted u/s. 173(2) of
the CrPC has been accepted – Prior to carrying out a further
investigation u/s. 173(8) of the CrPC, it is not necessary for the
Magistrate to review or recall the order accepting the final report –
Further investigation is merely a continuation of the earlier
E
investigation, hence it cannot be said that the accused are being
subjected to investigation twice over – Moreover, investigation
cannot be put at par with prosecution and punishment so as to fall
within the ambit of Clause (2) of Article 20 of the Constitution –
The principle of double jeopardy would, therefore, not be applicable
F to further investigation – There is nothing in the CrPC to suggest
that the court is obliged to hear the accused while considering an
application for further investigation u/s. 173(8) of the CrPC –
Impugned orders passed by the High Court set aside.
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.173 – Delay in trial on
G account of further investigation – Held: It is settled law that the
criminal offence is considered as a wrong against the State and the
Society even though it has been committed against an individual –
Normally, in serious offences, prosecution is launched by the State
and a Court of law has no power to throw away prosecution solely
on the ground of delay – Mere delay in approaching a Court of law
H
134
STATE THROUGH CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION v. 135
HEMENDHRA REDDY & ANOTHER. ETC.
would not by itself afford a ground for dismissing the case – Though A
it may be a relevant circumstance in reaching a final verdict.
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – ss. 169, 173 – Distinction
between – Section 169 of the CrPC is silent in making report to the
Magistrate, however the Investigating Officer is under an obligation
to submit its report to the Magistrate under Section 173 of the CrPC B
– Though Section 169 of the CrPC does not contemplate making a
report, it contemplates of obtaining a bond with or without sureties
from the accused to appear if and when so required before the
Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence on a police
report and such report is contemplated under Section 173 of the
CrPC. C
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 – Non-compliance to
second proviso to s. 17 – A superior police officer of the rank of
Superintendent of Police or any officer higher in rank is required
to pass an order before an investigation, if any, for offence u/s.
13(1)(e) is commenced – The argument canvassed on behalf of the D
accused persons is that there is no such order of the police officer
not below the rank of Superintendent of Police in the charge-sheet
– Held: In the instant case, this issue was not raised before the
High Court – Even otherwise, this is a question of fact and a matter
of record – If it is the case of the accused that there is no such order E
on record, the same may be pointed out to the trial court in the
course of the trial – It is for the trial court to verify the record, look
into it and take an appropriate call on this issue in accordance with
law.
Maxim – Nullum tempus aut locus occurrit regi – discussed. F
Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: Section 169 of CrPC
1. Section 169 of the CrPC is silent in making report to the
Magistrate, however the Investigating Officer is under an
G
obligation to submit its report to the Magistrate under Section
173 of the CrPC. Thus, though Section 169 of the CrPC does not
contemplate making a report, it contemplates of obtaining a bond
with or without sureties from the accused to appear if and when
so required before the Magistrate empowered to take cognizance
H
136 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 7 S.C.R.
A of the offence on a police report and such report is contemplated
under Section 173 of the CrPC. [Para 39][153-A-B]
What is the meaning of the term “Further Investigation”?
2. In Rama Chaudhary Vs. State of Bihar reported in (2009)
6 SCC 346, this Court held that, “further investigation within the
B meaning of provision of Section 173(8) CrPC is additional; more;
or supplemental. “Further investigation”, therefore, is the
continuation of the earlier investigation and not a fresh investigation
or reinvestigation to be started ab initio wiping out the earlier
investigation altogether.” [Para 48][156-B-C]
C What are the alternatives before a Magistrate when a “Final
Report” is filed?
3. Wherever a final report forwarded by the Investigating
Officer to a Magistrate under Section 173(2)(i) of the CrPC is
placed before him, several situations may arise. The report may
D conclude that an offence appears to have been committed by a
particular person and persons, and in such a case the Magistrate
may either:(1) accept the report and take cognizance of offence
and issue process, (2) may disagree with the report and drop the
proceeding or may take cognizance on the basis of report/material
E submitted by the investigation officer, (3) may direct further
investigation under Section 156(3) and require police to make a
report as per Section 173(8) of the CrPC. (4) may treat the protest
complaint as a complaint, and proceed under Sections 200 and
202 of the CrPC. [Para 49][156-C-F]
F What is the prime consideration for “Further
Investigation”?
4. As observed in Hasanbhai Valibhai Qureshi v. State of
Gujarat and Others reported in (2004) 5 SCC 347, the prime
consideration for further investigation is to arrive at the truth
and do real and substantial justice. The hands of investigating
G
agency for further investigation should not be tied down on the
ground of mere delay. In other words, the mere fact that there
may be further delay in concluding the trial should not stand in
the way of further investigation if that would help the court in
arriving at the truth and do real and substantial and effective
H justice. [Para 50][156-G-H; 157-A]
STATE THROUGH CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION v. 137
HEMENDHRA REDDY & ANOTHER. ETC.
5. A conspectus of the various decisions of the Supreme A
Court rendered in cases where final reports (closure reports)
had already been submitted and accepted makes the position of
law very clear that even after the final report is laid before the
Magistrate and is accepted, it is permissible for the investigating
agency to carry out further investigation in the case. In other
B
words, there is no bar against conducting further investigation
under Section 173(8) of the CrPC after the final report submitted
under Section 173(2) of the CrPC has been accepted. It is also
evident, that prior to carrying out a further investigation under
Section 173(8) of the CrPC, it is not necessary for the Magistrate
to review or recall the order accepting the final report. [Para C
76][171-B-C]
6. The final conclusion can be summarized as: (i) Even after
the final report is laid before the Magistrate and is accepted, it is
permissible for the investigating agency to carry out further
investigation in the case. In other words, there is no bar against D
conducting further investigation under Section 173(8) of the CrPC
after the final report submitted under Section 173(2) of the CrPC
has been accepted; (ii) Prior to carrying out further investigation
under Section 173(8) of the CrPC it is not necessary that the
order accepting the final report should be reviewed, recalled or
quashed; (iv) Further investigation is merely a continuation of E
the earlier investigation, hence it cannot be said that the accused
are being subjected to investigation twice over. Moreover,
investigation cannot be put at par with prosecution and
punishment so as to fall within the ambit of Clause (2) of Article
20 of the Constitution. The principle of double jeopardy would, F
therefore, not be applicable to further investigation; (v) There is
nothing in the CrPC to suggest that the court is obliged to hear
the accused while considering an application for further
investigation under Section 173(8) of the CrPC. [Para 77][171-
D-G]
G
Delay in Trial on account of Further Investigation
7. The general rule of criminal justice is that “a crime never
dies”. The principle is reflected in the well-known maxim nullum
tempus aut locus occurrit regi (lapse of time is no bar to Crown in
proceeding against offenders). It is settled law that the criminal H
138 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 7 S.C.R.
A offence is considered as a wrong against the State and the Society
even though it has been committed against an individual. Normally,
in serious offences, prosecution is launched by the State and a
Court of law has no power to throw away prosecution solely on
the ground of delay. Mere delay in approaching a Court of law
would not by itself afford a ground for dismissing the case. Though
B
it may be a relevant circumstance in reaching a final verdict. [Para
84][181-G-H]
Non-compliance of the Second Proviso to Section 17 of the
1988 Act
C 8. The Second proviso to Section 17 of the 1988 Act directs
that the offence referred to under clause (e) of sub section (1) of
Section 13 of the 1988 Act shall not be investigated without the
order of a police officer not below the rank of a Superintendent of
Police. Thus, from the Second proviso, it is clear that an
investigation into the offence referred to in clause (e) of sub
D section (1) of Section 13 of the 1988 Act even by any police officer
enumerated in clauses (a) to (c) or any Police Officer authorized
in that behalf by the State Government as per the first proviso,
can be undertaken only by an order of the police officer not below
the rank of Superintendent of Police. Thus, the Second proviso
E is in the nature of additional safe guard for the public servant
who are accused of the offence punishable under Section 13(1)(e)
of the 1988 Act against an investigation by a police officer without
the knowledge and consent of superior police officer not below
the rank of Superintendent of Police. A superior police officer of
the rank of Superintendent of Police or any officer higher in rank
F is required to pass an order before an investigation, if any, for
such offence is commenced. It is needless to point-out that, before
directing such investigation, the Superintendent of Police or an
officer superior to him is required to apply his mind to the
information and come to an opinion that the investigation on such
G allegations is necessary. The argument canvassed on behalf of
the accused persons is that there is no such order of the police
officer not below the rank of Superintendent of Police in the
chargesheet. This issue was not even raised before the High
Court. Even otherwise, this is a question of fact and a matter of
record. If it is the case of the accused that there is no such order
H
STATE THROUGH CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION v. 139
HEMENDHRA REDDY & ANOTHER. ETC.
on record, the same may be pointed out to the trial court in the A
course of the trial. It is for the trial court to verify the record,
look into it and take an appropriate call on this issue in accordance
with law. [Para 88][183-F-H; 184-A-D]
Rama Chaudhary Vs. State of Bihar (2009) 6 SCC 346
: [2009] 5 SCR 482; Hasanbhai Valibhai Qureshi v. B
State of Gujarat and Others (2004) 5 SCC 347 : [2004]
3 SCR 762; Ramchandran v. R. Udhayakumar and
Others (2008) 5 SCC 413 : [2008] 8 SCR 439; K.
Chandrasekhar v. State of Kerala and Others (1998) 5
SCC 223 : [1998] 3 SCR 72; Sri Bhagwan Samardha
Sreepada Vallabha Venkata Vishwanandha Maharaj v. C
State of A.P. and Others (1999) 5 SCC 740 : [1999] 3
SCR 870; Hemant Dhasmana v. Central Bureau of
Investigation and Another (2001) 7 SCC 536 : [2001]
1 Suppl. SCR 646; Union Public Service Commission
v. S. Papaiah and Others (1997) 7 SCC 614 : [1997] 4 D
Suppl. SCR 56; Ram Lal Narang v. State (Delhi
Administration) (1979) 2 SCC 322 : [1979] 2 SCR 923;
State of Andhra Pradesh v. A.S. Peter (2008) 2 SCC
383 : [2007] 13 SCR 517; Nirmal Singh Kahlon v. State
of Punjab and Others (2009) 1 SCC 441 : [2008] 14
SCR 1049; Kari Choudhary v. Mst. Sita Devi and E
Others (2002) 1 SCC 714 : [2001] 5 Suppl. SCR 588;
Official Liquidator v. Dayanand and Others (2008) 10
SCC 1 : [2008] 15 SCR 331; Pooja Pal v. Union of
India and Others (2016) 3 SCC 135 : [2016] 11 SCR
560 – relied on. F
Vinay Tyagi v. Irshad Ali alias Deepak and Others
(2013) 5 SCC 762 : [2012] 13 SCR 1005; Vinubhai
Haribhai Malaviya v. State of Gujarat (2019) 17 SCC
1 : [2019] 15 SCR 936; Luckose Zachariah alias Zak
Nedumchira Luke and Others v. Joseph Joseph and G
Others (2022) SCC Online SC 241; H.N. Rishbud v.
State of Delhi AIR 1955 SC 196 : [1955] SCR 1150;
Kamlapati Trivedi v. State of West Bengal 1980 (2) SCC
91 : [1979] 2 SCR 717; State of Rajasthan v. Aruna
Devi and Others (1995) 1 SCC 1 : [1994] 5 Suppl. SCR
H
140 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 7 S.C.R.
A 274; N.P. Jharia v. State of M.P. (2007) 7 SCC 358 :
[2007] 8 SCR 618; Japani Sahoo v. Chandra Sekhar
Mohanty (2007) 7 SCC 394 : [2007] 8 SCR 582;
Commissioner of Police, Delhi and Another v. Registrar,
Delhi High Court, New Delhi (1996) 6 SCC 323 : [1996]
7 Suppl. SCR 432 – referred to.
B
Divakar Singh v. A. Ramamurthi Naidu AIR 1919 Mad
751; State v. Mehar Singh and Ors. 1974 Crl LJ 970 –
referred to.
King-Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmad, Vol. LXXI
C Indian Appeals, 203 – referred to.
Case Law Reference
[2012] 13 SCR 1005 referred to Para 17 (ii), 33 (i)
[2019] 15 SCR 936 referred to Para 33 (ii)
D [1955] SCR 1150 referred to Para 43
[2009] 5 SCR 482 relied on Para 48
[2004] 3 SCR 762 relied on Para 50
[2008] 8 SCR 439 relied on Para 51
E [1998] 3 SCR 72 relied on Para 51
[1999] 3 SCR 870 relied on Para 53
[2001] 1 Suppl. SCR 646 relied on Para 54
[1997] 4 Suppl. SCR 56 relied on Para 55
F
[1979] 2 SCR 923 relied on Para 57
[2007] 13 SCR 517 relied on Para 58
[2008] 14 SCR 1049 relied on Para 59
[1979] 2 SCR 717 referred to Para 66
G
[1994] 5 Suppl. SCR 274 referred to Para 68
[2007] 8 SCR 618 referred to Para 74
[2001] 5 Suppl. SCR 588 relied on Para 75
[2008] 15 SCR 331 relied on Para 82
H
STATE THROUGH CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION v. 141
HEMENDHRA REDDY & ANOTHER. ETC.
[2007] 8 SCR 582 referred to Para 84 A
[1996] 7 Suppl. SCR 432 referred to Para 86
[2016] 11 SCR 560 relied on Para 87
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
Nos.1300-1302 of 2023. B
From the Judgment and Order dated 15.12.2015 in CRLOP
Nos.11101 and 15873 of 2015 and dated 08.01.2016 in CRLOP No.411
of 2016 of the High Court of Judicature at Madras.
Jayant K. Sud, ASG, Praveena Gautam, Mrs. Suhasini Sen, Mrs.
Saudamini Sharma, Amit Sharma B, Santosh Kumar, P V Yogeswaran, C
Arvind Kumar Sharma, Advs. for the Appellant.
Suresh Babu, C. K. Sasi, Abdulla Naseeh V T, Ms. Meena K
Poulose, Navin Suresh, Advs. for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
D
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
J. B. PARDIWALA, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. Since the issues raised in all the captioned appeals are the E
same those were taken up for hearing analogously and are being disposed
of by this common judgment and order.
3. The principal question of law that falls for the consideration of
this Court in the present litigation is whether the High Court was justified
in quashing the entire prosecution instituted by the CBI against the F
accused persons for the alleged offences on the ground that the CBI
could not have undertaken further investigation under sub section (8) of
Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, ‘the
CrPC’) and filed a chargesheet having once already submitted a final
report under sub section (2) of the Section 173 of the CrPC (closure
report)? In other words, whether the High Court was right in taking the G
view that the Special Court could not have taken cognizance upon the
chargesheet filed by the CBI based on further investigation having once
already filed a closure report in the past and the same having been
accepted by the court concerned at the relevant point of time?
H
142 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 7 S.C.R.
A FACTUAL MATRIX
4. The respondent No. 3 herein D. Dwarakanadha Reddy
(Accused No. 1) joined the services of the Customs Department as a
Preventive Officer in the year 1993.
5. In January, 2003, the respondent No. 3 was promoted as an
B Appraiser in Customs Department.
6. On 30.06.2006, the office of Superintendent of Police (CBI)
was in receipt of the following information:
(i) D. Dwarakanadha Reddy (A-1) was holding the post of
Appraiser, Customs Department since 2004, and his main
C income was his salary.
(ii) His wife D. Sujana Reddy (A-2) has no agricultural land in
her name and does business in the name of M/s Sujana
Engineers.
(iii) That the couple had acquired assets worth Rs. 64, 41, 690.92
D lakh between 01.04.2001 and 31.03.2005, however their
combined income during the said period was Rs. 50, 95,
371.57/-, comprising of salary income of A-1, agricultural
income of A-2, business income of A-2, bank interest, housing
loan from the Andhra Bank, capital gain on sale of property,
E rewards given to A-1 etc.
(iv) During the period between 01.04.2001 and 31.03.2005, they
incurred expenditure of Rs. 12, 74, 347.16/-, leaving them
with the savings of Rs. 38, 21, 024.41/-.
(v) Therefore, their total disproportionate assets were worth
F Rs. 26, 20, 666.51/- as on 31.03.2005.
In such circumstances referred to above, an FIR in RC MA 1
2006 A 0027 was registered by the CBI under Section 13(1)(e) read
with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (for short,
‘the 1988 Act’) along with Section 109 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860
G (for short, ‘the IPC’).
7. On 24.12.2008, the CBI/ACB filed an application before the
Principal Special Judge for CBI Cases, Chennai, with a prayer to close
the proceedings and return the documents for the purpose of regular
departmental action against the accused No. 1 (respondent No. 3). The
application stated inter alia as follows:
H
STATE THROUGH CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION v. 143
HEMENDHRA REDDY & ANOTHER. ETC. [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
“After completion of investigation it has come to light that A
the accused cannot be prosecuted. Hence, Final Report u/s.
173 Cr.PC is being filed which may be accepted.”
8. It was further prayed that the documents seized during the
course of investigation be returned so that the same could be used in the
regular departmental action that may be initiated against the accused B
No. 1.
9. The aforesaid application filed by the CBI was taken up by the
Special Court and the following order dated 29.01.2009 came to be
passed:
“ORDER C
This petition is filed by the Petitioner/Complainant u/s. 173
Cr.PC praying to close the FIR and to retain the documents
collected during the investigation to be used in the Regular
Departmental Action against A1 .
D
1. Heard the learned Public Prosecutor. Perused the FIR,
report and connected records. Reason stated in the report is
convincing. Hence Final Report is accepted and FIR is closed
and permitted to retain the documents collected during the
investigation to be used in the regular Departmental Action
against A1. E
Pronounced by me in the Open Court, this the 29th day of
January 2009.
Principal Spl. Judge for CBI Cases”
10. On 24.02.2012, departmental proceedings were initiated against F
the accused No. 1.
11. It appears from the materials on record that at the end of the
departmental proceedings, the possession of disproportionate assets could
not be established. However, an administrative warning was issued to
the accused No. 1 for the lapse on his part to intimate his department the G
fact of having obtained a loan of Rs. 3, 00, 000/- (Rupees Three Lakh)
from the Andhra Bank jointly along with his wife. An administrative
warning was also issued in regard to not intimating the correct expense
incurred by the accused No. 1 towards the construction of the house.
H
144 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 7 S.C.R.
A 12. On 26.06.2013, the CBI filed the Crl. MP 3833/2013 in RC
MA 1 2006 A0027 under Section 173(8) of the CrPC, seeking to reopen
and undertake further investigation of the case, stating inter alia as
follows:
“…the prosecution had filed final report under Section 173
B Cr.P.C. before this Hon’ble Court on 24.12.2008 with a prayer
to close the FIR as a mistake of fact…”
“… It is humbly submitted that now new evidences emerged to
prove the allegation levelled against the above said accused
persons and to substantiate the charge of possession of the
C disproportionate to the known sources of income of A-1 and
A-2. Hence, it is just and necessary to re-open and further
investigate the above case U/s. 173(8) Cr.P.C. in the interest
of justice.”
13. The Special Court allowed the aforesaid application vide order
dated 28.06.2013, holding inter alia as under:
D
“Heard. According to the prosecution, the prosecution is in
possession of new evidences to substantiate the allegation of
possession of disproportionate assets to the known sources
of income against the accused persons. Hence, it is just and
proper to order for re-opening of the case.”
E
14. On 01.03.2014, the CBI issued a letter/summons No. RC 27/
A/2006/ CBI/ACB/Chennai/0799 to the Deputy Commissioner of
Customs, CIV-Vigilance Customs House, Chennai, requiring the presence
of the respondent No.3 D. Dwarakanadha Reddy in connection with the
investigation in RC 27(A)/06.
F 15. On 13.03.2014, respondent No. 3 filed Crl. O.P. of No. 6371
of 2014 before the Madras High Court seeking quashing of the
proceedings related to the summons dated 1.03.2014. The respondent
No. 3 stated that he had attended the summons and during the
interrogation he was asked to produce documents which were “either
G not in existence or not available with the petitioner or already
available with CBI”.
16. On 21.03.2014, the CBI filed its counter affidavit to the above
referred petition filed by the respondent No. 3, stating specifically that:
“3. It is submitted that in the year 2013 CBI received certain
H information/materials warranting the re-opening of the
STATE THROUGH CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION v. 145
HEMENDHRA REDDY & ANOTHER. ETC. [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
investigation of this closed case. Accordingly Shri G. A
Palaniappan, Inspector of Police, CBI/ACB, Chennai filed a
petition in the Hon’ble Court of Principal Special Judge for
CBI Cases, Chennai seeking the orders of the said court for
re-opening of investigation and the Hon’ble Court of PSJ,
Chennai had issued order dt. 28.06.2.013 ordering the re-
B
opening investigation of this case.”
17. The High Court vide its order dated 11.09.2014 rejected the
Crl. O.P. No. 6371 of 2014, holding inter alia as under:
(i) In the year 2013, the CBI came into possession of certain
fresh materials warranting the re-opening of the investigation C
against the accused persons.
(ii) Under 173(8) of the CrPC, a police officer can carry on
further investigation even after a report under Section
173(2) of the CrPC is submitted, in view of Section 173(8)
of the CrPC and held in Vinay Tyagi v. Irshad Ali alias
D
Deepak and Others reported in (2013) 5 SCC 762, with
the only rider being that the police should seek formal
permission from the Court.
(iii) Acceptance of the final report by the Magistrate does not
debar him from taking cognizance if on further investigation,
fresh material comes to light. E
(iv) In the CBI counter, it is stated that fresh material was
received in the year 2013 which warranted reopening of
the investigation.
(v) The Magistrate’s power to order further investigation under
Section 156(3) of the CrPC does not conflict with the power F
of the police to investigate further in light of Section 173(8)
of the CrPC, and therefore the Magistrate can order
reopening of the investigation.
(vi) This can of course only be done when fresh material comes
to the knowledge of the investigating officer which he did G
not have before as in the present case.
(vii) Since the CBI has collected fresh material connected with
the case which were not available earlier, it cannot be said
that the Special Court has acted beyond its jurisdiction in
reopening the investigation. H
146 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 7 S.C.R.
A 18. On 17.12.2014, the CBI filed its detailed chargesheet against
the respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3 respectively alleging inter alia as follows:
(i) That the Respondent No.1, Hemendra Reddy, the brother-
in-law of D. Sujana (A-2) was a farmer at Chenna Reddy
Garu Palli, Chithoor Dist.
B (ii) The Respondent No.3, was found to be in possession of
assets/pecuniary resources in his name and in the names
of his family members D. Sujana and Hemendra Reddy to
the tune of Rs. 61, 11, 989/- as against their known sources
of income of Rs. 59, 90, 135/- during the period between
C 01.01.1998 and 30.06.2005.
19. On 2.06.2015, the respondent No. 2 herein filed Crl. O.P. No.
15873 of 2015 before the Madras High Court, seeking quashing of the
chargesheet.
20. On 27.04.2015, the respondent No. 1 herein filed Crl. O.P.
D No. 11101 of 2015, seeking quashing of the chargesheet.
21. On 14.09.2015, the CBI filed its counter to all the aforesaid
petitions.
22. On 15.12.2015, the High Court allowed the Crl. O.P. No.
11101 of 2015 and Crl. O.P. No. 15873 of 2015 respectively by a common
E order, holding inter alia as follows:
(i) That on receipt of a final report under Section 173 of the
CrPC, the Magistrate has three options – either to accept
the report and close the case, to disagree with the report
and proceed with the case or to order further investigation
F under Section 156(3) of the CrPC.
(ii) That the Magistrate is only empowered to direct “further
investigation” and not to direct a “re-investigation/ de-novo
investigation”.
(iii) In terms of the judgment in Vinay Tyagi(supra)no
G investigation agency is empowered to conduct a fresh, de-
novo or reinvestigation once a report under Section 173(2)
of the CrPC is filed.
(iv) The petition seeking “re-opening”/ “further investigation”
was filed after a lapse of 4 years.
H
STATE THROUGH CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION v. 147
HEMENDHRA REDDY & ANOTHER. ETC. [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
(v) In order to empower the Magistrate to permit further A
investigation, something should have been pending before
the Magistrate, but no matter was pending as the
investigation had already been closed.
(vi) The Special Court thus had no power to grant permission
to conduct a further investigation. B
(vii) The judgment of Vinay Tyagi (supra) had not been brought
to the attention of the High Court at the time of deciding
Crl. O.P. No. 6371 of 2014.
23. It appears that the respondent No. 3 herein also filed Crl. O.P.
No. 411 of 2016, seeking quashing of the chargesheet. The High Court C
vide order dated 08.01.2016 allowed the Crl. O.P. No. 411 of 2016 filed
by D. Dwarakanadha Reddy in terms of the order passed by it dated
15.12.2015, holding that the same principles and reasonings would apply
to the petition filed by the D. Dwarakanadha Reddy too.
24. Thus, the High Court ultimately quashed the entire prosecution, D
essentially on the ground that the Special Court (CBI) had no jurisdiction/
power to grant permission to the CBI to conduct further investigation. In
other words, the High Court took the view that the chargesheet filed
against the accused persons was the outcome of the materials collected
during the course of the further investigation, which by itself was illegal
and, therefore, the criminal proceedings would not be maintainable in E
the eye of law. It appears that the High Court was also cognizant of the
fact that a Co-ordinate Bench had earlier set at rest all the issues vide
order dated 11.09.2014 passed in the Crl. O.P. No. 6371 of 2014.
However, the same was not looked into on the ground that the said order
passed by the Co-ordinate Bench was per incuriam and, therefore, not F
binding to another Co-ordinate Bench.
25. In such circumstances referred to above, the CBI is herein
before this Court with the present appeals.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE CBI
G
26. Mr. Jayant K. Sud, the learned Additional Solicitor General of
India, appearing for the CBI vehemently submitted that the High Court
committed a serious error in passing the impugned orders thereby leading
to a serious miscarriage of justice.
H
148 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 7 S.C.R.
A 27. The learned counsel further submitted that the law is well
settled that further investigation can be undertaken under sub section
(8) of Section 173 of the CrPC even after the closure report is filed and
accepted by the court concerned. He would submit that new material/
evidence surfaced and came in the hands of the CBI on the basis of
which an appropriate application was filed before the Special Court,
B
seeking permission to undertake the further investigation. He further
submitted that the application filed by the CBI was duly considered and
the Special Court permitted the CBI to re-open the case and undertake
further investigation.
28. The learned counsel further submitted that the respondent
C No. 3 (Accused No. 1) had questioned the entire action on the part of
the CBI in seeking to re-open the case and undertake further investigation
before the High Court by filing Crl. O.P. No. 6371 of 2014 and the High
Court by a detailed order had declined to interfere. According to the
learned counsel, the order passed by a Co-ordinate Bench of the High
D Court in Crl. O.P. No. 6371 of 2014 was binding to another Co-ordinate
Bench and same could not have been over-looked or ignored on the
ground that while deciding Crl. O.P. No. 6371 of 2014, the attention of
the High Court was not drawn to the decision of this Court in the case of
Vinit Tyagi (supra). Mr. Sud further submitted that it is not that the
decision of this Court in Vinit Tyagi (supra) was not considered in the
E earlier round of the litigation i.e., while deciding Crl. O.P. No. 6371 of
2014 as is evident from para 5 of the order passed by the High Court
dated 11.09.2014 in Crl. O.P. No. 6371 of 2014.
29. In such circumstances as referred to above, the learned counsel
prays that there being merit in all his appeals, those may be allowed and
F the impugned order be set aside.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE ACCUSED
PERSONS
30. On the other hand, all the appeals have been vehemently
G opposed by the learned counsel appearing for the accused persons,
submitting that no error, much less an error of law could be said to have
been committed by the High Court in passing the impugned orders. The
learned counsel would submit that the acceptance of a closure report by
the Special Court (CBI) would terminate the proceedings finally and the
same would thereafter operate as a legal bar for the investigating agency
H to undertake any further investigation in connection with the alleged
STATE THROUGH CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION v. 149
HEMENDHRA REDDY & ANOTHER. ETC. [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
offence. The learned counsel laid much stress on the fact that for the A
purpose of granting permission to conduct further investigation, something
must be pending before the court concerned in the primary report to
enable to file a supplementary report. In the instant case, according to
the learned counsel, nothing was pending at the time of passing the order
under Section 173(8) of the CrPC. It was pointed out that the FIR was
B
closed and all the evidence collected during the investigation was ordered
to be returned to the CBI for the purpose of departmental proceedings.
In such circumstances, according to the learned counsel, there was no
scope for further investigation and even if further investigation is ordered
then it is as good as re-investigation or fresh investigation or de novo
investigation, which is otherwise not permissible in law. C
31. The learned counsel submitted that further investigation cannot
be ordered at any point of time. It was argued that in the case on hand,
the further investigation was undertaken after a period of four years
from the date of the closure report. If further investigation is permitted
to be undertaken after an indefinite period of time, the same would result D
in delaying the trial thereby violating the Article 21 of the Constitution,
i.e., the right of the accused to have a speedy trial.
32. The learned counsel further submitted that one additional issue
arises in the present litigation relating to non-compliance of the mandatory
requirement under Section 17(Second proviso) of the 1988 Act. E
According to the learned counsel the chargesheet in C.C.No.13 of 2015
on the file of the XIII Additional Special Judge for CBI Cases, Chennai,
was filed by Mr. Syed Bazlullah ASP/CBI/ACB/Chennai. Upon perusal
of the chargesheet which was served on the accused by the Magistrate
under Section 207 of the CrPC, it was noticed that the same does not
include the order passed by an officer not below the Rank of F
Superintendent of Police, as mandatorily required under Section
17(Second proviso) of the 1988 Act, conferring powers to Mr. Syed
Bazlullah to investigate this case in RC MA 1 2006 A 0027 for an offence
under Section 13(1)(e) of the 1988 Act, which thereon got culminated
into the chargesheet in C.C.No.13 of 2015. It was argued that the non- G
compliance of Section 17(Second proviso) of the 1988 Act is an illegality
that vitiates the entire trial.
33. In support of the aforesaid submissions, reliance has been
placed on the following case law:
H
150 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 7 S.C.R.
A (i) Vinay Tyagi v. Irshad Ali alias Deepak and Others
reported in (2013) 5 SCC 762;
(ii) Vinubhai Haribhai Malaviya v. State of Gujarat reported
in (2019) 17 SCC 1; and
(iii) Luckose Zachariah alias Zak Nedumchira Luke and
B Others v. Joseph Joseph and Others reported in (2022)
SCC Online SC 241.
ANALYSIS
34. Section 169 of the CrPC reads as under:
C “169. Release of accused when evidence deficient.—
If, upon an investigation under this Chapter, it appears to the
officer in charge of the police station that there is not sufficient
evidence or reasonable ground of suspicion to justify the
forwarding of the accused to a Magistrate, such officer shall,
D if such person is in custody, release him on his executing a
bond, with or without sureties, as such officer may direct, to
appear, if and when so required, before a Magistrate
empowered to take cognizance of the offence on a police
report, and to try the accused or commit him for trial.”
E 35. The perusal of the aforesaid Section would reveal that the
Investigating Officer is under an obligation to release such person, who
is in custody on executing a bond with or without sureties, if evidence is
not sufficient and/or there are no reasonable grounds of suspicion to
forward such person to the Magistrate.
F 36. The plain reading of Section 169 of the CrPC, therefore,
postulates that when the Investigating Officer reports his action to the
learned Magistrate, it will not be a report, however it will be a report of
his action either by the Investigating Officer or by the Officer in-charge
of the police station.
G 37. Section 173 of the CrPC states about the steps to be taken by
the Investigating Officer after the completion of the investigation. The
Officer in-charge of the police station is required to forward the report
under said Section to the Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of
the offence in prescribed form.
H 38. Section 173 of the CrPC reads thus:
STATE THROUGH CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION v. 151
HEMENDHRA REDDY & ANOTHER. ETC. [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
“173.Report of police officer on completion of investigation.— A
(1) Every investigation under this Chapter shall be completed
without unnecessary delay.
(1A) The investigation in relation to an offence under sections
376, 376A, 376AB, 376B, 376C, 376D, 376DA, 376DB or
376E from the date on which the information was recorded B
by the officer in charge of the police station.
(2)(i) As soon as it is completed, the officer in charge of the
police station shall forward to a Magistrate empowered to
take cognizance of the offence on a police report, a report in
the form prescribed by the State Government, stating— C
(a) the names of the parties;
(b) the nature of the information;
(c) the names of the persons who appear to be acquainted
with the circumstances of the case; D
(d) whether any offence appears to have been committed and,
if so, by whom;
(e) whether the accused has been arrested;
(f) whether he has been released on his bond and, if so, E
whether with or without sureties;
(g) whether he has been forwarded in custody under section
170.
(h) whether the report of medical examination of the woman
has been attached where investigation relates to an offence F
under sections 376, 376A, 376AB, 376B, 376C, 376D, 376DA,
376DB or section 376E of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860).
(ii) The officer shall also communicate, in such manner as
may be prescribed by the State Government, the action taken
by him, to the person, if any, by whom the information relating G
to the commission of the offence was first given.
(3) Where a superior officer of police has been appointed
under section 158, the report shall, in any case in which the
State Government by general or special order so directs, be
submitted through that officer, and he may, pending the orders H
152 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 7 S.C.R.
A of the Magistrate, direct the officer in charge of the police
station to make further investigation.
(4) Whenever it appears from a report forwarded under this
section that the accused has been released on his bond, the
Magistrate shall make such order for the discharge of such
B bond or otherwise as he thinks fit.
(5) When such report is in respect of a case to which section
170 applies, the police officer shall forward to the Magistrate
along with the report—
(a) all documents or relevant extracts thereof on which the
C prosecution proposes to rely other than those already sent to
the Magistrate during investigation;
(b) the statements recorded under section 161 of all the persons
whom the prosecution proposes to examine as its witnesses.
D (6) If the police officer is of opinion that any part of any
such statement is not relevant to the subject-matter of the
proceedings or that its disclosure to the accused is not
essential in the interests of justice and is inexpedient in the
public interest, he shall indicate that part of the statement
and append a note requesting the Magistrate to exclude that
E part from the copies to be granted to the accused and stating
his reasons for making such request.
(7) Where the police officer investigating the case finds it
convenient so to do, he may furnish to the accused copies of
all or any of the documents referred to in sub-section (5).
F
(8) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to preclude further
investigation in respect of an offence after a report under
sub-section (2) has been forwarded to the Magistrate and,
where upon such investigation, the officer in charge of the
police station obtains further evidence, oral or documentary,
G he shall forward to the Magistrate a further report or reports
regarding such evidence in the form prescribed; and the
provisions of sub-sections (2) to (6) shall, as far as may be,
apply in relation to such report or reports as they apply in
relation to a report forwarded under sub-section (2).”
H (Emphasis supplied)
STATE THROUGH CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION v. 153
HEMENDHRA REDDY & ANOTHER. ETC. [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
39. Thus, Section 169 of the CrPC is silent in making report to the A
Magistrate, however the Investigating Officer is under an obligation to
submit its report to the Magistrate under Section 173 of the CrPC. Thus,
though Section 169 of the CrPC does not contemplate making a report,
it contemplates of obtaining a bond with or without sureties from the
accused to appear if and when so required before the Magistrate
B
empowered to take cognizance of the offence on a police report and
such report is contemplated under Section 173 of the CrPC. Clauses (d)
and (f) of Section 173(2)(i) of the CrPC read as under:
“173(2)(i) xxx xxx
(d) whether any offence appears to have been committed and, C
if so, by whom;
xxx xxx xxx
(f) whether he has been released on his bond and, if so,
whether with or without sureties”.
D
40. Section 173(8) of the CrPC deals with further investigation
and supplementary report. In the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (for
short, ‘the Old Code’), there was no identical provision to that of Section
173(8) of the CrPC. The same is a newly added provision in the CrPC.
It was added on the recommendation of the Law Commission in its 41st
Report that the right of the police to make further investigation should be E
statutorily affirmed.
41. In the Old Code, there was no provision prescribing the
procedure to be followed by the police for fresh investigation, when
fresh facts came to light, upon the submission of the police report and
subsequent to taking cognizance by the Magistrate. There was, also, no F
express provision prohibiting further investigation by the police.
42. The said omission was sought to be supplied for the first time
by a two-Judge Bench of the Madras High Court as early as in 1919 in
Divakar Singh v. A. Ramamurthi Naidu reported in AIR 1919 Mad
751, where it was observed that: G
“ Another contention is put forward that when a report of
investigation has been sent in under Section 173 of the Cr
PC, the police has no further powers of investigation, but
this argument may be briefly met by the remark that the number
of investigations into a crime is not limited by law and that H
154 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 7 S.C.R.
A when one has been completed another may be begun on
further information received.”.
43. After recognition of the right of the police to make repeated
investigations under the Old Code in Divakar’s case, a three-Judge
Bench of this Court in H.N. Rishbud v. State of Delhi reported in AIR
B 1955 SC 196, held that:-
“It does not follow, however, that the invalidity of the
investigation is to be completely ignored by the Court during
trial. When the breach of such a mandatory provision is
brought to the knowledge of the Court at a sufficiently early
C stage, the Court, while not declining cognizance, will have to
take the necessary steps to get the illegality cured and the
defect rectified, by ordering such reinvestigation as the
circumstances of an individual case may call for. Such a course
is not altogether outside the contemplation of the scheme of
the Code as appears from Section 202 under which a
D Magistrate taking cognizance on a complaint can order
investigation by the police. Nor can it be said that the adoption
of such a course is outside the scope of the inherent powers
of the Special Judge, who for purposes of procedure at the
trial is virtually in the position of a Magistrate trying a warrant
E case.”
44. Some High Courts were also of the view that with the
submission of a chargesheet under Section 173, the power of the police
to investigate into an offence comes to an end and the Magistrate’s
cognizance of the offence started. For instance, in State v. Mehar Singh
F and Ors. reported in 1974 Crl LJ 970, a Full Bench of the High Court of
Punjab and Haryana held that the police became functus officio once
the Court took cognizance of an offence on the filing of a chargesheet
by the police and thereafter, further investigation by the police was not
permissible.
G 45. It was, however, observed that in light of the decision in H.N.
Rishbud (supra), it would be open to the Magistrate to ‘suspend
cognizance’ and direct the police to make further investigation into the
case and submit a report.
46. The said inconsistency and incongruity in the judicial decisions
was recognized by the Law Commission in its 41st Report (under Clause
H
STATE THROUGH CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION v. 155
HEMENDHRA REDDY & ANOTHER. ETC. [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
14.23) and it was recommended that the right of the police to make A
further investigation should be statutorily affirmed. Accordingly, in the
CrPC, Section 173(8), came to be introduced, which statutorily
empowered the police to undertake further investigation after submission
of the final report under Section 173(2) of the CrPC. Conspicuously, it
still did not confer such powers on the Magistrate to direct further and/
B
or fresh investigation after submission of the final report by the Police.
47. Section 173(8) of the CrPC may be fragmented or dissected
as under:
(1) Further investigation can be done in respect of an offence
wherein report under Section 173(2) has been forwarded to the C
Magistrate; and
(2) During further investigation, the officer-in-charge has power
(a) to obtain further evidence, oral or documentary,
(b) to forward to the Magistrate, a further report or reports
regarding such evidence in the form prescribed, D
(3) The provisions of sub sections (2) to (6) shall, as far as may
be, apply in relation to such further report or reports.
Sub section (1) of Section 173 of the CrPC provides that every
investigation by the police shall be completed without unnecessary delay
and sub section (2) of Section 173 of the CrPC provides that as soon as E
such investigation is completed, the officer in charge of the police station
shall forward to a Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the
offence on a police report, a report in the form prescribed by the State
Government.
Under sub section (2) of the Section 173 of the CrPC, a police F
report (chargesheet or Challan) is filed by the police after investigation
is complete.
Sub section (8) of Section 173 of the CrPC, states that nothing in
the section shall be deemed to preclude any further investigation in respect
of an offence after a report under sub-section (2) has been forwarded
to the Magistrate. G
Thus, even where chargesheet or Challan has been filed by the
police under sub section (2) of Section 173 of the CrPC, the police can
undertake further investigation in respect of an offence under sub section
(8) of Section 173 of the CrPC. (Reference: Article titled “Different
H
156 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 7 S.C.R.
A Aspects of Section 173(8) of the CrPC” by D. Nageswara Rao, Prl.JCJ,
Manthani.)
What is the meaning of the term “Further Investigation”?
48. In Rama Chaudhary Vs. State of Bihar reported in (2009) 6
SCC 346, this Court held that, “further investigation within the meaning
B of provision of Section 173(8) CrPC is additional; more; or
supplemental. “Further investigation”, therefore, is the continuation
of the earlier investigation and not a fresh investigation or
reinvestigation to be started ab initio wiping out the earlier
investigation altogether.”
C What are the alternatives before a Magistrate when a “Final
Report” is filed?
49. Wherever a final report forwarded by the Investigating Officer
to a Magistrate under Section 173(2)(i) of the CrPC is placed before
him, several situations may arise. The report may conclude that an offence
appears to have been committed by a particular person and persons, and
D
in such a case the Magistrate may either:
(1) accept the report and take cognizance of offence and issue
process,
(2) may disagree with the report and drop the proceeding or may
E take cognizance on the basis of report/material submitted by the
investigation officer,
(3) may direct further investigation under Section 156(3) and
require police to make a report as per Section 173(8) of the CrPC.
(4) may treat the protest complaint as a complaint, and proceed
F under Sections 200 and 202 of the CrPC.
What is the prime consideration for “Further
Investigation”?
50. As observed in Hasanbhai Valibhai Qureshi v. State of
Gujarat and Others reported in (2004) 5 SCC 347, the prime
G
consideration for further investigation is to arrive at the truth and do real
and substantial justice. The hands of investigating agency for further
investigation should not be tied down on the ground of mere delay. In
other words, the mere fact that there may be further delay in concluding
the trial should not stand in the way of further investigation if that would
H
STATE THROUGH CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION v. 157
HEMENDHRA REDDY & ANOTHER. ETC. [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
help the court in arriving at the truth and do real and substantial and A
effective justice.
Difference between “Further Investigation” and “Re-
investigation”
51. There is no doubt that “further investigation” and “re-
investigation” stand altogether on a different footing. In Ramchandran B
v. R. Udhayakumar and Others reported in (2008) 5 SCC 413, this
Court has explained the fine distinction between the two relying on its
earlier decision in K. Chandrasekhar v. State of Kerala and Others
reported in (1998) 5 SCC 223. We quote paras 7 and 8 as under:
“7. At this juncture it would be necessary to take note of C
Section 173 of the Code. From a plain reading of the above
section it is evident that even after completion of investigation
under sub-section (2) of Section 173 of the Code, the police
has right to further investigate under sub-section (8), but not
fresh investigation or reinvestigation. This was highlighted D
by this Court in K. Chandrasekhar v. State of Kerala [(1998)
5 SCC 223 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 1291] . It was, inter alia,
observed as follows : (SCC p. 237, para 24)
“24. The dictionary meaning of ‘further’ (when used as an
adjective) is ‘additional; more; supplemental’. ‘Further’ E
investigation therefore is the continuation of the earlier
investigation and not a fresh investigation or reinvestigation
to be started ab initio wiping out the earlier investigation
altogether. In drawing this conclusion we have also drawn
inspiration from the fact that sub-section (8) clearly envisages
that on completion of further investigation the investigating F
agency has to forward to the Magistrate a ‘further’ report or
reports—and not fresh report or reports—regarding the
‘further’ evidence obtained during such investigation.”
8. In view of the position of law as indicated above, the
directions of the High Court for reinvestigation or fresh G
investigation are clearly indefensible. We, therefore, direct
that instead of fresh investigation there can be further
investigation if required under Section 173(8) of the Code.
The same can be done by CB CID as directed by the High
Court.”
H
158 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 7 S.C.R.
A Position of Law on the subject of “Further Investigation”
52. In King-Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmad, Vol. LXXI Indian
Appeals, 203 the Privy Council delineated the powers of the police to
investigate. It was held thus:
“Just as it is essential that every one accused of a crime should
B have free access to a Court of justice, so that he may be duly
acquitted if found not guilty of the offence with which he is
charged, so it is of the utmost importance that the judiciary
should not interfere with the police in matters which are within
their province and into which the law imposes on them the
C duty of inquiry. In India, as has been shown, there is a statutory
right on the part of the police to investigate the circumstances
of an alleged cognizable crime without requiring any authority
from the judicial authorities, and it would, as their Lordships
think, be an unfortunate result if it should be held possible to
interfere with those statutory rules by an exercise of the
D inherent jurisdiction of the Court. The functions of the
judiciary and the police are complementary, not overlapping,
and the combination of individual liberty with a due
observance of law and order is only to be obtained by leaving
each to exercise its own function, always, of course, subject
E to the right of the Courts to intervene in an appropriate case
when moved under Section 491 of the Criminal Procedure
Code to give directions in the nature of Habeas Corpus.”
53. In Sri Bhagwan Samardha Sreepada Vallabha Venkata
Vishwanandha Maharaj v. State of A.P. and Others reported in (1999)
F 5 SCC 740, it was held in paras 10 and 11:
“10. Power of the police to conduct further investigation, after
laying final report, is recognised under Section 173(8) of the
Code of Criminal Procedure. Even after the court took
cognizance of any offence on the strength of the police report
G first submitted, it is open to the police to conduct further
investigation. This has been so stated by this Court in Ram
Lal Narang v. State (Delhi Admn.) [(1979) 2 SCC 322 : 1979
SCC (Cri) 479 : AIR 1979 SC 1791] . The only rider provided
by the aforesaid decision is that it would be desirable that the
police should inform the court and seek formal permission to
H make further investigation.
STATE THROUGH CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION v. 159
HEMENDHRA REDDY & ANOTHER. ETC. [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
11. In such a situation the power of the court to direct the A
police to conduct further investigation cannot have any
inhibition. There is nothing in Section 173(8) to suggest that
the court is obliged to hear the accused before any such
direction is made. Casting of any such obligation on the court
would only result in encumbering the court with the burden
B
of searching for all the potential accused to be afforded with
the opportunity of being heard. As the law does not require it,
we would not burden the Magistrate with such an obligation.”
54. In Hemant Dhasmana v. Central Bureau of Investigation
and Another reported in (2001) 7 SCC 536, it was held:
C
“15. When the report is filed under the sub-section the
Magistrate (in this case the Special Judge) has to deal with it
by bestowing his judicial consideration. If the report is to the
effect that the allegations in the original complaint were found
true in the investigation, or that some other accused and/or
some other offences were also detected, the court has to decide D
whether cognizance of the offences should be taken or not
on the strength of that report. We do not think that it is
necessary for us to vex our mind, in this case, regarding that
aspect when the report points to the offences committed by
some persons. But when the report is against the allegations E
contained in the complaint and concluded that no offence
has been committed by any person, it is open to the court to
accept the report after hearing the complainant at whose
behest the investigation had commenced. If the court feels on
a perusal of such a report that the alleged offences have in
fact been committed by some persons the court has the power F
to ignore the contrary conclusions made by the investigating
officer in the final report. Then it is open to the court to
independently apply its mind to the facts emerging therefrom
and it can even take cognizance of the offences which appear
to it to have been committed, in exercise of its power under G
Section 190(1)(b) of the Code. The third option is the one
adumbrated in Section 173(8) of the Code. …
16. Although the said sub-section does not, in specific terms,
mention about the powers of the court to order further
investigation, the power of the police to conduct further H
160 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 7 S.C.R.
A investigation envisaged therein can be triggered into motion
at the instance of the court. When any such order is passed
by a court which has the jurisdiction to do so, it would not be
a proper exercise of revisional powers to interfere therewith
because the further investigation would only be for the ends
of justice. …”
B
55. In Union Public Service Commission v. S. Papaiah and
Others reported in (1997) 7 SCC 614, it was held in Para 13:
“The Magistrate could, thus in exercise of the powers under
Section 173(8) CrPC direct the CBI to “further investigate”
C the case and collect further evidence keeping in view the
objections raised by the appellant to the investigation and
the “new” report to be submitted by the investigating officer
would be governed by sub-sections (2) to (6) of Section 173
CrPC.”.
56. This Court in Hasanbhai (supra) held thus:
D
“12. Sub-section (8) of Section 173 of the Code permits further
investigation, and even dehors any direction from the court
as such, it is open to the police to conduct proper investigation,
even after the court took cognisance of any offence on the
strength of a police report earlier submitted. All the more so,
E if as in this case, the Head of the Police Department also was
not satisfied of the propriety or the manner and nature of
investigation already conducted.
13. In Ram Lal Narang v. State (Delhi Admn.) [(1979) 2 SCC
322 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 479 : AIR 1979 SC 1791] it was observed
F by this Court that further investigation is not altogether ruled
out merely because cognisance has been taken by the court.
When defective investigation comes to light during course of
trial, it may be cured by further investigation, if circumstances
so permitted. It would ordinarily be desirable and all the more
G so in this case, that the police should inform the court and
seek formal permission to make further investigation when
fresh facts come to light instead of being silent over the matter
keeping in view only the need for an early trial since an
effective trial for real or actual offences found during course
of proper investigation is as much relevant, desirable and
H necessary as an expeditious disposal of the matter by the
STATE THROUGH CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION v. 161
HEMENDHRA REDDY & ANOTHER. ETC. [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
courts. In view of the aforesaid position in law, if there is A
necessity for further investigation, the same can certainly be
done as prescribed by law. The mere fact that there may be
further delay in concluding the trial should not stand in the
way of further investigation if that would help the court in
arriving at the truth and do real and substantial as well as
B
effective justice. ”
57. In Ram Lal Narang v. State (Delhi Administration) reported
in (1979) 2 SCC 322, this Court held thus:
“21. As observed by us earlier, there was no provision in the
CrPC, 1898 which, expressly or by necessary implication, C
barred the right of the police to further investigate after
cognizance of the case had been taken by the Magistrate.
Neither Section 173 nor Section 190 lead us to hold that the
power of the police to further investigate was exhausted by
the Magistrate taking cognizance of the offence. Practice,
convenience and preponderance of authority, permitted D
repeated investigations on discovery of fresh facts. In our
view, notwithstanding that a Magistrate had taken cognizance
of the offence upon a police report submitted under Section
173 of the 1898 Code, the right of the police to further
investigate was not exhausted and the police could exercise E
such right as often as necessary when fresh information came
to light. Where the police desired to make a further
investigation, the police could express their regard and respect
for the court by seeking its formal permission to make further
investigation.”
F
58. In State of Andhra Pradesh v. A.S. Peter reported in (2008)
2 SCC 383, this Court held thus:
“9. Indisputably, the law does not mandate taking of prior
permission from the Magistrate for further investigation.
Carrying out of a further investigation even after filing of
G
the charge-sheet is a statutory right of the police. A distinction
also exists between further investigation and reinvestigation.
Whereas reinvestigation without prior permission is
necessarily forbidden, further investigation is not.”
59. In Nirmal Singh Kahlon v. State of Punjab and Others
reported in (2009) 1 SCC 441, this Court held as follows: H
162 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 7 S.C.R.
A “68. An order of further investigation in terms of Section
173(8) of the Code by the State in exercise of its jurisdiction
under Section 36 thereof stands on a different footing. The
power of the investigating officer to make further
investigation in exercise of its statutory jurisdiction under
Section 173(8) of the Code and at the instance of the State
B
having regard to Section 36 thereof read with Section 3 of
the Police Act, 1861 should be considered in different contexts.
Section 173(8) of the Code is an enabling provision. Only
when cognizance of an offence is taken, the learned
Magistrate may have some say. But, the restriction imposed
C by judicial legislation is merely for the purpose of upholding
the independence and impartiality of the judiciary. It is one
thing to say that the court will have supervisory jurisdiction
to ensure a fair investigation, as has been observed by a Bench
of this Court in Sakiri Vasu v. State of U.P. [(2008) 2 SCC
409 : (2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 440] , correctness whereof is open
D
to question, but it is another thing to say that the investigating
officer will have no jurisdiction whatsoever to make any
further investigation without the express permission of the
Magistrate.”
60. In Vinay Tyagi (supra), it was held that “further
E investigation” in terms of Section 173(8) of the CrPC can be made in
a situation where the investigating officer obtains further oral or
documentary evidence after the final report has been filed before the
Court. The report on such further investigation under Section 173(8) of
the CrPC can be termed as a supplementary report.
F 61. In Vinay Tyagi (supra), it was held that:
“40.2. A Magistrate has the power to direct “further
investigation” after filing of a police report in terms of Section
173(6) of the Code.
G Xxx xxx xxx
40.4. Neither the scheme of the Code nor any specific
provision therein bars exercise of such jurisdiction by the
Magistrate. The language of Section 173(2) cannot be
construed so restrictively as to deprive the Magistrate of such
powers particularly in face of the provisions of Section 156(3)
H
STATE THROUGH CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION v. 163
HEMENDHRA REDDY & ANOTHER. ETC. [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
and the language of Section 173(8) itself. In fact, such power A
would have to be read into the language of Section 173(8).
40.5. The Code is a procedural document, thus, it must receive
a construction which would advance the cause of justice and
legislative object sought to be achieved. It does not stand to
reason that the legislature provided power of further B
investigation to the police even after filing a report, but
intended to curtail the power of the court to the extent that
even where the facts of the case and the ends of justice
demand, the court can still not direct the investigating agency
to conduct further investigation which it could do on its own.
C
40.6. It has been a procedure of propriety that the police has
to seek permission of the court to continue “further
investigation” and file supplementary charge-sheet. …”
62. In Vinubhai (supra); a three-Judge Bench of this Court has
endeavoured to lay at rest the controversy enveloping the evasive issue D
of further investigation directed by the Magistrate. This Court, speaking
through Justice R.F. Nariman, has laid down at Para 38 that:
“ To say that a fair and just investigation would lead to the
conclusion that the police retain the power, subject, of course,
to the Magistrate’s nod under Section 173(8) to further
E
investigate an offence till charges are framed, but that the
supervisory jurisdiction of the Magistrate suddenly ceases
midway through the pre-trial proceedings, would amount to a
travesty of justice, as certain cases may cry out for further
investigation so that an innocent person is not wrongly
arraigned as an accused or that a prima facie guilty person F
is not so left out. There is no warrant for such a narrow and
restrictive view of the powers of the Magistrate, particularly
when such powers are traceable to Section 156(3) read with
Section 156(1), Section 2(h) and Section 173(8) CrPC, as
has been noticed hereinabove, and would be available at all
G
stages of the progress of a criminal case before the trial
actually commences. It would also be in the interest of justice
that this power be exercised suo motu by the Magistrate
himself, depending on the facts of each case. Whether further
investigation should or should not be ordered is within the
H
164 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 7 S.C.R.
A discretion of the learned Magistrate who will exercise such
discretion on the facts of each case and in accordance with
law.” It was also clarified that, “The “investigation” spoken of
in Section 156(3) would embrace the entire process, which
begins with the collection of evidence and continues until
charges are framed by the Court, at which stage the trial can
B
be said to have begun.”.
63. Thus, this Court, in conclusion, observed that, “when Section
156(3) states that a Magistrate empowered under Section 190 may
order “such an investigation”, such Magistrate may also order
further investigation under Section 173(8), regard being had to the
C definition of “investigation” contained in Section 2(h).”
64. Thus, in view of the law laid down by this Court in the various
decisions cited hereinabove, it is well settled that sub section (8) of Section
173 of the CrPC permits further investigation, and even dehors any
direction from the court, it is open to the police to conduct proper
D investigation, even after the court takes cognizance of any offence on
the strength of a police report earlier submitted.
65. However, the question before this Court is whether sub section
(8) of Section 173 of the CrPC permits further investigation after the
Magistrate has accepted a final report (closure report) under sub section
E (2) of Section 173 of the CrPC. The contention raised on behalf of the
accused persons is that acceptance of a closure report would terminate
the proceedings finally so as to bar the investigating agency from carrying
out any further investigation in connection with the offence.
66. The learned counsel appearing for the accused persons
F submitted that an order accepting the closure report under Section
190(1)(c) of the CrPC is a judicial order and not an administrative order.
Relying on the decision of this Court in Kamlapati Trivedi v. State of
West Bengal reported in 1980 (2) SCC 91, it was submitted that when a
final report of the police is submitted to the Magistrate and the Magistrate
passes an order (a) agreeing with the report of the police and filing
G proceedings; or (b) not agreeing with the police report and holding that
the evidence is sufficient to justify the forwarding of the accused to the
Magistrate and takes cognizance of the offence complained of, such
order is a judicial order.
67. We are at one with the aforesaid submission canvassed on
H behalf of the accused persons. However, this is not going to make any
STATE THROUGH CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION v. 165
HEMENDHRA REDDY & ANOTHER. ETC. [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
difference. What is necessary to be examined is as to whether an order A
passed under Section 190(1) of the CrPC accepting a final report being
a judicial order would bar further investigation by the police or the CBI
as in the present case, in exercise of the statutory powers under chapter
XII of the CrPC?
68. In State of Rajasthan v. Aruna Devi and Others reported in B
(1995) 1 SCC 1, a complaint was filed in the Court of Munsif and Judicial
Magistrate, First Class, Bilara, against the respondents under various
sections of the IPC. The gravamen of the allegation was that the
respondents had, in pursuance of a conspiracy, transferred some land on
the strength of a special power of attorney bearing forged signature.
The Magistrate, after perusal of the complaint, directed an investigation C
to be made as contemplated by Section 156(3) of the CrPC. A case was
registered thereafter, by the police and a final report was submitted on
18.07.1981 stating that complaint was false. The report came to be
accepted by the Magistrate on 23.09.1981. It, however, so happened
that the Superintendent of Police had independently ordered further D
investigation on 24.09.1981 and a challan came to be filed by police
against the respondents, inter alia, under Sections 420 and 467 of the
IPC. The Magistrate took cognizance on 25.06.1984. A challenge was
made to this act of the Magistrate before Sessions Judge, Jodhpur, who
dismissed the revision. On further approach to the High Court, the revision
was allowed and the order of cognizance was set aside. The State came E
in appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution.
69. This Court observed in paras 3 and 4 respectively as under:
3. A perusal of the impugned judgment of the High Court
shows that it took the view that the Magistrate had no F
jurisdiction to take cognizance after the final report submitted
by police had been once accepted. Shri Gupta, appearing
for the appellant, contends that this view is erroneous in law
inasmuch as Section 173(8) of the Code permits further
investigation in respect of an offence after a report under
sub-section (2) has been submitted. Sub-section (8) also G
visualises forwarding of another report to the Magistrate.
Further investigation had thus legal sanction and if after such
further investigation a report is submitted that an offence was
committed, it would be open to the Magistrate to take
cognizance of the same on his being satisfied in this regard. H
166 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 7 S.C.R.
A 4. Shri Francis for the respondents, however, contends that
the order of the Magistrate taking cognizance pursuant to
filing of further report amounted to entertaining second
complaint which is not permissible in law. To substantiate the
legal submission, we have been first referred to Pramatha
Nath Taluqdar v. Saroj Ranjan Sarkar [1962 Supp (2) SCR
B
297 : AIR 1962 SC 876 : (1962) 1 Cri LJ 770] , in which a
three-Judge Bench of this Court dealt with this aspect. A
perusal of the judgment of the majority shows that it took the
view that dismissal of a complaint under Section 203 of the
Code is no bar to the entertainment of a second complaint on
C the same facts; but the same could be done only in exceptional
circumstances some of which have been illustrated in the
judgment. Further observation in this regard is that a fresh
complaint can be entertained, inter alia, when fresh evidence
comes forward. In the present case, this is precisely what had
happened, as on further investigation being made, fresh
D
materials came to light which led to the filing of further report
stating that a case had been made out.
The aforesaid decision of this Court has been rightly referred to
and relied upon by the High Court in its first order dated 11.09.2014.
E 70. This Court in K. Chandrasekhar (supra) was considering a
case, where on the complaint of a Police Inspector, a case was registered
by the Kerala Police against the appellants therein for the offences
punishable under Sections 3 and 4 respectively of the Official Secrets
Act, 1923 read with Section 34 IPC on the allegation that in collusion
with some Indians and foreigners they had committed acts prejudicial to
F the safety and sovereignty of India. During the investigation, certain
other persons (appellants in accompanying appeals) were arrested.
Thereafter, a DIG of Police, who was the head of the team conducting
the investigation, recommended the case for being investigated by the
CBI. Pursuant to such recommendation, the Government of Kerala by a
G notification dated 02.12.1994 accorded its consent under Section 6 of
the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 (for short, ‘the Act’)
for further investigation of the case by the CBI. Accordingly, the CBI
took up the investigation. After completion of the investigation, on
16.04.1996, the CBI filed its report in the final form under Section 173(2)
of the CrPC, stating that the charges were not proved and were false.
H
STATE THROUGH CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION v. 167
HEMENDHRA REDDY & ANOTHER. ETC. [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
Accepting the report, the Magistrate discharged the accused-appellants. A
Thereafter, on 27.6.1996, the Government of Kerala issued a notification
withdrawing the consent earlier given to the CBI to investigate the said
case. The object of the said notification was to enable a reinvestigation
of the case by a team of State Police Officers. By a mandatory
notification dated 08.07.1996, the words “reinvestigation of the case”
B
were substituted by the words “further investigation of the case”. The
State Government notification dated 27.6.1996 (as amended) was upheld
by the High Court. This Court held that, from a plain reading of Section
173 of the CrPC, it is evident that even after submission of police report
under sub section (2) on completion of investigation, the police has a
right of “further” investigation under sub section (8), but not “fresh C
investigation” or “reinvestigation”. The dictionary meaning of “further”
(when used as an adjective) is “additional; more; supplemental”. “Further”
investigation, therefore, is the continuation of the earlier investigation
and not a fresh investigation or reinvestigation to be started ab initio
wiping out the earlier investigation altogether. The Court drew inspiration
D
from the fact that sub section (8) clearly envisages that on completion of
further investigation, the investigating agency has to forward to the
Magistrate a “further” report or reports - and not fresh report or reports
- regarding the “further” evidence obtained during such investigation.
The Court held that once it is accepted that an investigation undertaken
by CBI pursuant to a consent granted under Section 6 of the Act is to be E
completed, notwithstanding withdrawal of the consent, and that “further
investigation” is a continuation of such investigation which culminates in
a further police report under Section 173(8), it necessarily means that
withdrawal of consent in the said case would not entitle the State Police
to further investigate into the case. However, the Court further observed
F
thus: “To put it differently, if any further investigation is to be made,
it is the CBI alone which can do so, for it was entrusted to investigate
into the case by the State Government.” (Emphasis supplied). Thus,
what was held by the Court was that after submission of report under
Section 173(2) Cr.P.C. reinvestigation or fresh investigation is not
permissible. However, it has been expressly observed that if any further G
investigation is to be made, it is the CBI alone which can do so. In other
words, further investigation could be carried out, but that the same could
be done by the CBI alone as it was entrusted to investigate into the case
by the State Government and had carried out the investigation and
submitted final report in connection therewith.
H
168 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 7 S.C.R.
A 71. In S. Papaiah (supra) on a complaint made by the UPSC,
investigation had been carried out by the CBI and final report was
submitted under Section 173 of the CrPC before the Metropolitan
Magistrate, before whom the first information report had been lodged,
seeking closure of the case. The CBI in spite of the request made to it
by the UPSC did not inform about the filing of the final report seeking
B
closure of the case to the UPSC. The report was returned by the learned
Metropolitan Magistrate as notice had not been issued to the complainant
by the CBI though the CBI had asserted that it had informed the UPSC
regarding the filing of the closure report. The final report was resubmitted
by the CBI to the Court of the Metropolitan Magistrate along with a
C copy of the notice sent by the CBI to the UPSC. It appears that the
report was again returned by the Metropolitan Magistrate seeking proof
of service of notice on the de facto complainant. While the proceedings
of submission of the final report were pending, the UPSC addressed a
letter to the Director of CBI pointing out that the investigation had not
been carried out properly and that the filing of the closure report was not
D
justified. While the UPSC was awaiting further communication from
the CBI in that behalf, the CBI resubmitted the closure report and the
learned Metropolitan Magistrate accepted the final report submitted by
the CBI and closed the file without any opportunity being provided to the
UPSC to have its say. Upon receipt of communication of the order of
E the court accepting the closure report, the UPSC filed a petition before
the learned Metropolitan Magistrate submitting that the complaint had
not been properly investigated and that it had no notice about the
acceptance of the final report. The Court rejected the petition of the
UPSC observing that it had accepted the final report filed by the CBI on
16.03.1995, since the UPSC had not filed its objections to the acceptance
F
of the final report and as such, it could not complain. The Court also
opined that since an order accepting final report was a judicial order and
not an administrative order, therefore, it had no power to review such an
order passed by it “rightly or wrongly” and that the UPSC could file a
revision petition seeking appropriate orders against the acceptance of
G the final report from the revisional court. The revision petition filed by
the UPSC was dismissed by the revisional court. In appeal before this
Court, it was held thus:
“13. The appellant brought the contents of communication
dated 23.01.1995 to the notice of the learned Metropolitan
H Magistrate through its Miscellaneous Petition No. 2040 of
STATE THROUGH CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION v. 169
HEMENDHRA REDDY & ANOTHER. ETC. [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
1995 seeking ‘reinvestigation’ but the learned Magistrate, A
rejected the petition vide order dated 4.11.1995, observing
that ‘rightly or wrongly that court had passed an order and it
had no power to review the earlier order.’ Here, again the
learned Magistrate fell into an error. He was not required to
‘review’ his order. He could have ordered ‘further
B
investigation’ into the case. It appears that the learned
Metropolitan Magistrate overlooked the provisions of Section
173(8) which have been enacted to take care of such like
situations also.”
(Emphasis supplied)
C
72. After referring to the provisions of Section 173(8) of the CrPC,
the Court observed that the Magistrate could, thus, in exercise of the
powers under Section 173(8) of the CrPC, direct the CBI to “further
investigate” the case and collect further evidence keeping in view the
objections raised by the UPSC to the investigation and the “new” report
to be submitted by the Investigating Officer would be governed by sub- D
sections (2) to (6) of Section 173 of the CrPC. The Court held that the
learned Magistrate failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in him by
law and his order dated 04.11.1995 cannot be sustained.
73. In the light of the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court, it
appears that though the order passed by the learned Magistrate accepting E
a final report under Section 173 is a judicial order, there is no requirement
for recalling, reviewing or quashing the said order for carrying out further
investigation under Section 173(8) of the CrPC. As held by this Court in
the said decision, the provisions of Section 173(8) of the CrPC have
been enacted to take care of such like situations also. F
74. In N.P. Jharia v. State of M.P. reported in (2007) 7 SCC
358, proceedings had been initiated against the appellant therein in
connection with possession of pecuniary resources disproportionate to
his known sources of income. After investigation the Special Police
Establishment (SPE) submitted a “final report” on 01.03.1990 informing G
the court that no offence was made out against the appellant. The final
report was accepted by the Special Judge on 17.04.1990. But on
01.07.1992, the SPE submitted an application before the Special Judge,
seeking permission for further investigation. The Special Judge permitted
further investigation. Thereafter, the sanction for prosecution was
obtained from the State Government on 01.03.1995. The chargesheet H
170 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 7 S.C.R.
A was filed in the court on 24.07.1995. On behalf of the appellant, it was
urged that once the final report was submitted there is no scope for
further investigation. The Court held that so far as further investigation
was concerned in the background of Section 173(8) of the CrPC the
plea was clearly untenable.
B 75. In Kari Choudhary v. Mst. Sita Deviand Others reported
in (2002) 1 SCC 714, FIR No. 135 was registered on the basis of a
complaint lodged by Sita Devi and investigation was commenced
thereafter. During investigation, the police found that the murder of the
victim, Sugnia Devi was committed pursuant to a conspiracy hatched by
her mother-in-law Sita Devi and her daughters-in-law besides the others.
C So, the police sent a report to the court on 30.11.1998 stating that the
allegations in FIR No. 135 were false. The police continued with the
investigation after informing the court that they had registered another
FIR as FIR No. 208 of 1998. This Court, inter alia, held thus:
“11. Learned counsel adopted an alternative contention that
D once the proceedings initiated under FIR No. 135 ended in a
final report the police had no authority to register a second
FIR and number it as FIR No. 208. Of course the legal position
is that there cannot be two FIRs against the same accused in
respect of the same case. But when there are rival versions in
E respect of the same episode, they would normally take the
shape of two different FIRs and investigation would be carried
on under both of them by the same investigating agency. Even
that apart, the report submitted to the court styling it as FIR
No. 208 of 1998 need be considered as an information
submitted to the court regarding the new discovery made by
F the police during the investigation that persons not named in
FIR No. 135 are the real culprits. To quash the proceedings
merely on the ground that final report had been laid in FIR
No. 135 is, to say the least, too technical. The ultimate object
of every investigation is to find out whether the offences
G alleged have been committed and, if so, who have committed
it.
12. Even otherwise, the investigating agency is not precluded
from further investigation in respect of an offence in spite of
forwarding a report under sub-section (2) of section 173 of a
H
STATE THROUGH CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION v. 171
HEMENDHRA REDDY & ANOTHER. ETC. [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
previous occasion. This is clear from Section 173(8) of the A
Code.”
(Emphasis supplied)
76. Thus, a conspectus of the aforesaid decisions of this Court
rendered in cases where final reports (closure reports) had already been
submitted and accepted makes the position of law very clear that even B
after the final report is laid before the Magistrate and is accepted, it is
permissible for the investigating agency to carry out further investigation
in the case. In other words, there is no bar against conducting further
investigation under Section 173(8) of the CrPC after the final report
submitted under Section 173(2) of the CrPC has been accepted. It is C
also evident, that prior to carrying out a further investigation under Section
173(8) of the CrPC, it is not necessary for the Magistrate to review or
recall the order accepting the final report.
77. We may summarise our final conclusion as under:
(i) Even after the final report is laid before the Magistrate and is D
accepted, it is permissible for the investigating agency to carry
out further investigation in the case. In other words, there is no
bar against conducting further investigation under Section 173(8)
of the CrPC after the final report submitted under Section 173(2)
of the CrPC has been accepted. E
(ii) Prior to carrying out further investigation under Section 173(8)
of the CrPC it is not necessary that the order accepting the final
report should be reviewed, recalled or quashed.
(iv) Further investigation is merely a continuation of the earlier
investigation, hence it cannot be said that the accused are being F
subjected to investigation twice over. Moreover, investigation
cannot be put at par with prosecution and punishment so as to fall
within the ambit of Clause (2) of Article 20 of the Constitution.
The principle of double jeopardy would, therefore, not be applicable
to further investigation.
G
(v) There is nothing in the CrPC to suggest that the court is obliged
to hear the accused while considering an application for further
investigation under Section 173(8) of the CrPC.
ONE DISTURBING PART OF THE PRESENT
LITIGATION H
172 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 7 S.C.R.
A 78. While recording the facts in the earlier part of our judgment,
we have made reference of the order passed by a Co-ordinate Bench of
the High Court dated 11.09.2014 in Crl. O.P. No. 6371 of 2014. All legal
issues which we have discussed in the present judgment were looked
into by the High Court and by a reasoned order, the High Court took the
view that it was permissible for the CBI to undertake further investigation
B
and the objections raised on behalf of the accused were not sustainable
in law. We quote some of the relevant observations made by the High
Court in its order dated 11.09.2014:
“5. In my opinion, on the facts and circumstances of the instant
case, the above said decisions are of no help to the petitioner.
C In the aforesaid decisions, the well settled principle is restated
that Section 173(8) of Cr.P.C enables an officer in charge of
a Police Station/CBI to carry on further investigation even
after a report under Section 173(2) of Cr.P.C is submitted to
the court. The power to further investigation, after filing of
D final report in court and even after the Magistrate has taken
cognizance, is available to the Police in view of the Section
173(8) of Cr.P.C. Further investigation, therefore, is the
continuation of the earlier investigation and not a fresh
investigation or reinvestigation to be started ab initio wiping
out the earlier investigation altogether. This is well settled in
E the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court reported in 2013-
5-SCC-762 (Tyagi Vs. Irshad Ali). The only rider is provided
is that it would be desirable that the Police should inform the
Court and seek formal permission to make further
investigation as observed in Bhagwan Samardha Sreepada
F Vallabha Venkata Vishwadaha Maharaj Vs. State of AP (AIR-
1999-SC-2332).
6. Although sub section (8) of Section 173 of Cr.P.C does not,
in specific terms, mention about the powers of the court to
order further investigation, the power of the police to conduct
G further investigation envisaged therein can be triggered into
motion at the instance of the court. Therefore, acceptance of
final report by Magistrate does not debar him from taking
cognizance of the offence if no further investigation fresh
materials come to light. In such a situation, the power of the
court to direct the police to conduct further investigation
H
STATE THROUGH CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION v. 173
HEMENDHRA REDDY & ANOTHER. ETC. [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
cannot have any inhibition. There is nothing in Section 173(8) A
of Cr.P.C to suggest that the court is obliged to hear the
accused before any such direction is made.
7. In the instant case, in the counter filed by the Respondent/
CBI, it is specifically stated that in the year 2013, CBI received
certain information/materials warranting reopening of the B
investigation. Accordingly, the Inspector of Police, CBI/ ACB
has filed a petition in Crl. M.P.No.3833/2013 in respect of
the same First Information Report, stating that the prosecution
is in possession of new evidence to substantiate the allegation
of possession of disproportionate assets to the known sources
of income against the accused persons. The said petition has C
been allowed by the learned Principal Special Judge for CBI
Cases, permitting further investigation.
8. In so far as the power of the Magistrate to direct further
investigation is concerned, I may point out her that the power
of the Magistrate under Section 156(3) of the code to direct D
further investigation is clearly an independent power and
does not stand in conflict with the power of the Police Officer.
The power conferred upon the Magistrate under Section
156(3) of the code can be exercised by the Magistrate even
after submission of a report by the Investigating Officer, which E
would mean that it would be open to the Magistrate not to
accept the conclusion of the Investigating Officer and direct
further investigation. This provision does not, in any way,
affect the power of the Investigating Officer to further
investigate the case even after submission of the report as
provided in sub section (8) of Section 173 of the Code. F
Therefore, considering all these provisions, in my view, the
Magistrate can order reopening of the investigation even after
acceptance of the final report “making closure report”.
9. In the instant case, the learned Principal Special Judge
for CBI Cases has passed the impugned order on the petition G
filed by the Investigating Officer, Inspector, CBI/ACB. It is
now clear that sub section (8) of section 173 of Cr.P.C gives
power to the Investigating Officer to reopen the investigation
in the case in which final report had been submitted earlier
and after completing the investigation fresh report has to be H
174 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 7 S.C.R.
A submitted before the learned Special Judge under sub section
(2) of Section 173 of the Code. Of course, this can be done
only on such fresh materials which did not come to the
knowledge of the Investigating Officer, while he was
conducting the investigation and in my view, exactly the same
situation prevailed in this case.
B
11. The same view has also been taken in the decision of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Rajasthan Vs. Aruna Devi
and others (1995-SCC-Crl-1) wherein it was held that
acceptance of final report by Magistrate does not debar him
from taking cognizance of the offence if on further
C investigation fresh materials come to light.
12. Mr. N. Chandrasekaran, the learned Special Public
Prosecutor has contended that there is no legal bar to the
reopening of the investigation of any case in which closure
report has been submitted if there are sufficient, cogent fresh
D materials to proceed against the accused persons. I find all
force in his submissions. Having considered the rival
contentions of both the parties, I am of the opinion that in
view of the facts that the Inspector CBI/ACB has collected
some fresh materials connected with this case, which were
E not available to the Investigating Officer earlier, it cannot be
said that the learned Principal Special Judge for CBI cases
had acted beyond its jurisdiction by ordering reopening of
the investigation of the case.
13. For the reasons stated above, I find full force in the
F contentions raised by the learned Special Public Prosecutor
for CBI Cases. I, therefore, do not find any illegality in the
impugned order which warrants any interference by this
court.”
(Emphasis supplied)
G 79. It goes without saying that the aforesaid judgment delivered
by the learned Single Judge of the High Court was very much binding to
a Co-ordinate Bench when the Crl. O.P. Nos. 15873 and 11101 of 2015
respectively and Crl. O.P. No. 411 of 2016 were heard and decided.
These are the matters, which were filed by the accused persons seeking
discharge from the criminal proceedings. We may reproduce some of
H
STATE THROUGH CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION v. 175
HEMENDHRA REDDY & ANOTHER. ETC. [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
the observations made by the Co-ordinate Bench of the High Court in A
the impugned order assailed before us:
“9. The legal point involved in the present criminal original
petitions is as to whether the concerned Magistrate is having
power of granting fresh investigation, especially after getting
closure report and consequently accepting the same. B
10. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, with regard to power of a
Magistrate under section 173(8) of the code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973, has made a threadbare discussion in the
decision reported in AIR 2015 SC 3566 (Chandra Babu alias
Moses V. State through the Inspector of Police and others). C
After making elaborate discussion, the Hon’ble Supreme
Court has culled out the powers of Magistrate under the said
Section like thus:
“Now, when the report forwarded by the officer in charge of
a police station to the Magistrate under sub-section (2)(i) of D
Section 173 comes up for consideration by the Magistrate,
one of two different situations may arise. The report may
conclude that an offence appears to have been committed by
a particular person or persons and in such a case, the
Magistrate may do one of three things: (1) he may accept the
report and take cognizance of the offence and issue process, E
or (2) he may disagree with the report and drop the
proceeding, or (3) he may direct further investigation under
sub-section (3) of section 156 and require the police to make
a further report. The report may on the other hand state that,
in the opinion of the police, no offence appears to have been F
committed and where such a report has been made, the
Magistrate again has an option to adopt one of three courses:
(1) he may accept the report and drop the proceeding, or (2)
he may disagree with the report and taking the view that there
is sufficient ground for proceeding further, take cognizance
of the offence and issue process, or (3) he may direct further G
investigation to be made by the police under sub-section (3)
of section 156”
11. From a cursory reading of the observations made by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court, it is discernible that after getting a
H
176 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 7 S.C.R.
A final report under section 173(2) of the said code, the
concerned Magistrate is having power, either to take
cognizance or to direct the investigating agency to conduct
further investigation as per section 173(8) of the said code.
12. Even a mere reading of Section 173 of the Code and its
B sub-clauses, would get to show that after getting a final report,
the concerned Magistrate is having unfettered right of
granting further investigation as envisaged in sub-clause(s)
of Section 173 of the said code.
13. But, the legal position involves in the present petitions is
C otherwise. The legal point is as to whether after closure of
final report, as well as First Information Report, whether the
concerned Magistrate is having power to grant permission
either to conduct further investigation/re-investigation/de-
novo investigation.
D 14. At this juncture, it would be condign to look into the real
dictionary meaning of “further investigation”. The dictionary
meaning of ‘further’ (when used as an adjective) is additional;
more; supplemental’. ‘Further’ Investigation therefore is the
continuation of the earlier investigation and not a fresh
investigation or reinvestigation to be started ab initio wiping
E out the earlier investigation altogether. Therefore, it is pellucid
that for granting permission to conduct ‘further investigation’
an investigation must be pending or to put it in short, some
proceeding must be pending before the concerned court. It is
also a settled principle of law that after filing a final report
F under sub-clause (2) of Section 173 of the said code, while
matter is pending, the investigating officer can collect some
more materials so as to strengthen the accusation made against
the concerned accused.
15. As adverted to earlier, in the instant case, the main
G contention of the petitioners is that already investigation has
been done against the accused 1 and 2 and a closure report
has been filed before
the Principal Special Judge for CBI Cases, Chennai and the
same has been accepted and consequently, First Information
Report has been dosed. Under the said circumstances, to
H
STATE THROUGH CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION v. 177
HEMENDHRA REDDY & ANOTHER. ETC. [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
grant permission either to conduct ‘further investigation’ or A
‘reinvestigation’ does not arise.
Xxx xxx xxx
20. After lapse of four years from passing the order mentioned
suprain the year 2013, the respondent, as petitioner, has filed
Crl.M.P.No.3833 of 2013, on the file of the Principals Special B
Court for CBI Cases, Chennai, herein, it is prayed to permit
the petitioner therein to re-open and further investigation the
above case.
Xxx xxx xxx
C
23. The learned Special Public Prosecutor has advanced his
entire argument only on the basis of the order passed in
Criminal Original Petition No.6371 of 2014. In fact, at the
time of passing the order in Crl.O.P.No.6371 of 2014, the
decision mentioned supra has not been brought to the
knowledge of this court. Under the said circumstances, this D
court has erroneously ratified the permission granted by the
Principal Special Judge for CBI cases, Chennai. Therefore,
on the basis of the order passed, in Crl.O.P.No.6371 of 2014
by this court, we cannot come to a conclusion that the order
passed by the Principal Special Judge for CBI Case, Chennai, E
is valid in law. Further, it has already been pointed out that
the said order has been passed even without power. Since the
said order is totally alien to law, the subsequent proceedings
are also bad in law.
24. The present petitions have been filed praying to quash F
the final report filed in Calendar Case No.13 of 2015. Since
the permission granted to the respondent for conducting re-
investigation or further investigation by the Principal Special
Judge for CBI Cases, Chennai is totally illegal and since the
subsequent proceedings are also entirely bad in law, it is
needless to say that the final report filed thereon is also both G
factually and legally not sustainable. Under the said
circumstances, the legal point raised on the side of the
petitioner is really having subsisting force. On that score alone,
these petitions are liable to be allowed.”
(Emphasis supplied) H
178 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 7 S.C.R.
A 80. Thus, one Co-ordinate Bench of the High Court, virtually sat
in appeal over the judgment of another Co-ordinate Bench and took a
contrary view. The learned Single Judge says in his impugned order that
the High Court in its earlier order dated 11.09.2014 referred to above
omitted to consider the decision of this Court in the case of Vinay Tyagi
(supra) and therefore, per incuriam whereas, the decision of this Court
B
in the case of Vinay Tyagi (supra) was very much looked into and has
been referred to in the order dated 11.09.2014. Thus, two contrary views
have been taken by different judges of equal strength of the High Court
on the same subject and litigation.
81. We would like to extend a word of caution over here. While it
C is open to a learned Judge to differ with a view of a Co-ordinate Bench
the sequitur is to make a reference to a larger Bench on papers being
placed before the learned Chief Justice. The learned Judge cannot simply
say “with due respect, I do not agree to the ratio...” or “the decision is
per incuriam as a binding judgment of the Supreme Court has not been
D considered….” and proceed to take a contrary view as done in the
impugned order. Such an approach would result in conflicting opinions
of Co-ordinate Benches, resulting in judicial chaos and is, thus,
improper. This is something atrocious and unacceptable.
82. We may remind the High Court of the observations made by
E this Court in Official Liquidator v. Dayanand and Others reported in
(2008) 10 SCC 1. In this decision, this Court has emphasised the
adherence to basics of judicial discipline and the need for predictability
and a certainty in law. In that context, certain earlier judgments have
been referred to as to whether one Bench of the Court not following the
view of another Co-ordinate Bench has been commented upon as under:
F
“78. There have been several instances of different Benches
of the High Courts not following the judgments/orders of
coordinate and even larger Benches. In some cases, the High
Courts have gone to the extent of ignoring the law laid down
by this Court without any tangible reason. Likewise, there
G have been instances in which smaller Benches of this Court
have either ignored or bypassed the ratio of the judgments of
the larger Benches including the Constitution Benches. These
cases are illustrative of non-adherence to the rule of judicial
discipline which is sine qua non for sustaining the system.
H In Mahadeolal Kanodia v. Administrator General of W.B. [AIR
STATE THROUGH CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION v. 179
HEMENDHRA REDDY & ANOTHER. ETC. [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
1960 SC 936 : (1960) 3 SCR 578] this Court observed : (AIR A
p. 941, para 19)
“19. … If one thing is more necessary in law than any other
thing, it is the quality of certainty. That quality would totally
disappear if Judges of coordinate jurisdiction in a High Court
start overruling one another’s decisions. If one Division Bench B
of a High Court is unable to distinguish a previous decision
of another Division Bench, and holding the view that the
earlier decision is wrong, itself gives effect to that view the
result would be utter confusion. The position would be equally
bad where a Judge sitting singly in the High Court is of opinion
that the previous decision of another Single Judge on a C
question of law is wrong and gives effect to that view instead
of referring the matter to a larger Bench. In such a case
lawyers would not know how to advise their clients and all
courts subordinate to the High Court would find themselves
in an embarrassing position of having to choose between D
dissentient judgments of their own High Court.”
(emphasis added)
79. In Lala Shri Bhagwan v. Ram Chand [AIR 1965 SC 1767]
Gajendragadkar, C.J. observed : (AIR p. 1773, para 18)
E
“18. … It is hardly necessary to emphasise that considerations
of judicial propriety and decorum require that if a learned
Single Judge hearing a matter is inclined to take the view
that the earlier decisions of the High Court, whether of a
Division Bench or of a Single Judge, need to be reconsidered,
he should not embark upon that enquiry sitting as a Single F
Judge, but should refer the matter to a Division Bench or, in
a proper case, place the relevant papers before the Chief
Justice to enable him to constitute a larger Bench to examine
the question. That is the proper and traditional way to deal
with such matters and it is founded on healthy principles of G
judicial decorum and propriety. It is to be regretted that the
learned Single Judge departed from this traditional way in
the present case and chose to examine the question himself.”
Xxx xxx xxx
H
180 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 7 S.C.R.
A 82. In Vijay Laxmi Sadho (Dr.) v. Jagdish [(2001) 2 SCC 247]
this Court considered whether the learned Single Judge of
the Madhya Pradesh High Court could ignore the judgment
of a coordinate Bench on the same issue and held : (SCC p.
256, para 33)
B “33. As the learned Single Judge was not in agreement with
the view expressed in Devilal case [Devilal v. Kinkar Narmada
Prasad, Election Petition No. 9 of 1980 (MP)] it would have
been proper, to maintain judicial discipline, to refer the matter
to a larger Bench rather than to take a different view. We
note it with regret and distress that the said course was not
C followed. It is well settled that if a Bench of coordinate
jurisdiction disagrees with another Bench of coordinate
jurisdiction whether on the basis of ‘different arguments’ or
otherwise, on a question of law, it is appropriate that the matter
be referred to a larger Bench for resolution of the issue rather
D than to leave two conflicting judgments to operate, creating
confusion. It is not proper to sacrifice certainty of law. Judicial
decorum, no less than legal propriety forms the basis of
judicial procedure and it must be respected at all costs.”
Xxx xxx xxx
E 90. We are distressed to note that despite several
pronouncements on the subject, there is substantial increase
in the number of cases involving violation of the basics of
judicial discipline. The learned Single Judges and Benches
of the High Courts refuse to follow and accept the verdict
and law laid down by coordinate and even larger Benches by
F citing minor difference in the facts as the ground for doing
so. Therefore, it has become necessary to reiterate that
disrespect to the constitutional ethos and breach of discipline
have grave impact on the credibility of judicial institution
and encourages chance litigation. It must be remembered that
predictability and certainty is an important hallmark of judicial
G
jurisprudence developed in this country in the last six decades
and increase in the frequency of conflicting judgments of the
superior judiciary will do incalculable harm to the system
inasmuch as the courts at the grass roots will not be able to
decide as to which of the judgments lay down the correct law
H and which one should be followed.
STATE THROUGH CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION v. 181
HEMENDHRA REDDY & ANOTHER. ETC. [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
91. We may add that in our constitutional set-up every citizen A
is under a duty to abide by the Constitution and respect its
ideals and institutions. Those who have been entrusted with
the task of administering the system and operating various
constituents of the State and who take oath to act in accordance
with the Constitution and uphold the same, have to set an
B
example by exhibiting total commitment to the constitutional
ideals. This principle is required to be observed with greater
rigour by the members of judicial fraternity who have been
bestowed with the power to adjudicate upon important
constitutional and legal issues and protect and preserve rights
of the individuals and society as a whole. Discipline is sine C
qua non for effective and efficient functioning of the judicial
system. If the courts command others to act in accordance
with the provisions of the Constitution and rule of law, it is
not possible to countenance violation of the constitutional
principle by those who are required to lay down the law.”
D
(Emphasis supplied)
We need to add nothing more in this context.
DELAY IN TRIAL ON ACCOUNT OF FURTHER
INVESTIGATION
E
83. It was vehemently submitted on behalf of the accused that
further investigation if permitted after such a long lapse of time, would
result in delay in trial. For years to come, the sword of Damocles should
not be kept hanging on the neck of the accused persons. In such
circumstances, it was argued before us that keeping in mind that this
litigation is now almost more than a decade old, it will not be in fitness of F
things to put the accused persons to trial.
84. In the aforesaid context, we may only say that the general
rule of criminal justice is that “a crime never dies”. The principle is
reflected in the well-known maxim nullum tempus aut locus occurrit
regi (lapse of time is no bar to Crown in proceeding against offenders). G
It is settled law that the criminal offence is considered as a wrong against
the State and the Society even though it has been committed against an
individual. Normally, in serious offences, prosecution is launched by the
State and a Court of law has no power to throw away prosecution solely
on the ground of delay. Mere delay in approaching a Court of law would
H
182 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 7 S.C.R.
A not by itself afford a ground for dismissing the case. Though it may be a
relevant circumstance in reaching a final verdict. (See: Japani Sahoo
v. Chandra Sekhar Mohanty reported in (2007) 7 SCC 394.)
85. The following observations in Hasanbhai (supra), have been
made by this Court in reference to further investigation:
B “13. ….if there is necessity for further investigation, the same
can certainly be done as prescribed by law. The mere fact
that there may be further delay in concluding the trial should
not stand in the way of further investigation if that would
help the court in arriving at the truth and do real and
C substantial as well as effective justice. …”
86. Thus, the assurance of a fair trial is to be the first imperative
in the dispensation of justice. [Reference: Commissioner of Police,
Delhi and Another v. Registrar, Delhi High Court, New Delhi reported
in(1996) 6 SCC 323]. The need for fair investigation has also been
D emphasized in Vinay Tyagi (supra) where it was observed as under:
“48. What ultimately is the aim or significance of the
expression “fair and proper investigation” in criminal
jurisprudence? It has a twin purpose: Firstly, the investigation
must be unbiased, honest, just and in accordance with law;
E secondly, the entire emphasis on a fair investigation has to
be to bring out the truth of the case before the court of
competent jurisdiction. ….”
87. Reference may also be placed on the decision in Pooja Pal v.
Union of Indiaand Others reported in (2016) 3 SCC 135, where the
F fundamental rights enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution of India
were discussed in the context of ”speedy trial” juxtaposed to ”fair
trial” in the following manner:
“83. A “speedy trial”, albeit the essence of the fundamental
right to life entrenched in Article 21 of the Constitution of
India has a companion in concept in “fair trial”, both being
G
inalienable constituents of an adjudicative process, to
culminate in a judicial decision by a court of law as the final
arbiter. There is indeed a qualitative difference between right
to speedy trial and fair trial so much so that denial of the
former by itself would not be prejudicial to the accused, when
H pitted against the imperative of fair trial. As fundamentally,
STATE THROUGH CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION v. 183
HEMENDHRA REDDY & ANOTHER. ETC. [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
justice not only has to be done but also must appear to have A
been done, the residuary jurisdiction of a court to direct
further investigation or reinvestigation by any impartial
agency, probe by the State Police notwithstanding, has to be
essentially invoked if the statutory agency already in charge
of the investigation appears to have been ineffective or is
B
presumed or inferred to be not being able to discharge its
functions fairly, meaningfully and fructuously. As the cause
of justice has to reign supreme, a court of law cannot reduce
itself to be a resigned and a helpless spectator and with the
foreseen consequences apparently unjust, in the face of a
faulty investigation, meekly complete the formalities to record C
a foregone conclusion. Justice then would become a casualty.
Though a court’s satisfaction of want of proper, fair, impartial
and effective investigation eroding its credence and reliability
is the precondition for a direction for further investigation or
reinvestigation, submission of the charge-sheet ipso facto or
D
the pendency of the trial can by no means be a prohibitive
impediment. The contextual facts and the attendant
circumstances have to be singularly evaluated and analysed
to decide the needfulness of further investigation or
reinvestigation to unravel the truth and mete out justice to
the parties. The prime concern and the endeavour of the court E
of law is to secure justice on the basis of true facts which
ought to be unearthed through a committed, resolved and a
competent investigating agency.”.
(Emphasis supplied)
NON-COMPLIANCE OF THE SECOND PROVISO TO F
SECTION 17 OF THE 1988 ACT
88. The Second proviso to Section 17 of the 1988 Act directs that
the offence referred to under clause (e) of sub section (1) of Section 13
of the 1988 Act shall not be investigated without the order of a police
officer not below the rank of a Superintendent of Police. Thus, from the G
Second proviso, it is clear that an investigation into the offence referred
to in clause (e) of sub section (1) of Section 13 of the 1988 Act even by
any police officer enumerated in clauses (a) to (c) or any Police Officer
authorized in that behalf by the State Government as per the first proviso,
can be undertaken only by an order of the police officer not below the H
184 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 7 S.C.R.
A rank of Superintendent of Police. Thus, the Second proviso is in the
nature of additional safe guard for the public servant who are accused
of the offence punishable under Section 13(1)(e) of the 1988 Act against
an investigation by a police officer without the knowledge and consent
of superior police officer not below the rank of Superintendent of Police.
A superior police officer of the rank of Superintendent of Police or any
B
officer higher in rank is required to pass an order before an investigation,
if any, for such offence is commenced. It is needless to point-out that,
before directing such investigation, the Superintendent of Police or an
officer superior to him is required to apply his mind to the information
and come to an opinion that the investigation on such allegations is
C necessary. The argument canvassed on behalf of the accused persons
is that there is no such order of the police officer not below the rank of
Superintendent of Police in the chargesheet. We do not propose to go
into this issue in the present litigation. This issue was not even raised
before the High Court. Even otherwise, this is a question of fact and a
matter of record. If it is the case of the accused that there is no such
D
order on record, the same may be pointed out to the trial court in the
course of the trial. It is for the trial court to verify the record, look into it
and take an appropriate call on this issue in accordance with law.
89. In view of the aforesaid discussion, all the appeals filed by the
CBI succeed and are hereby allowed.
E
90. The impugned orders passed by the High Court are hereby
set aside.
91. The Special Court shall now proceed further with the trial of
the accused persons in accordance with law.
F 92. Pending applications if any shall stand disposed of.
Ankit Gyan Appeals allowed.
(Assisted by : Mahendra Yadav, LCRA)
G
H
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