Supreme Court of India
STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH THROUGH PRINCIPAL SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF PANCHAYATI RAJ, LUCKNOWversusRAM PRAKASH SINGH
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 555
- Decided
- 22 April 2025
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Bench
- DIPANKAR DATTA
Holding
The disciplinary enquiry was vitiated due to non‑compliance with the 1999 Rules and the failure to furnish the enquiry report, rendering any punishment invalid and precluding any further continuation of the proceedings without a valid extension.
Summary
The State of Uttar Pradesh initiated disciplinary proceedings against Ram Prakash Singh, an Assistant Engineer, alleging embezzlement of Panchayat funds. The enquiry officer prepared a report without examining any witnesses, without furnishing the report or supporting documents to the respondent, and the disciplinary authority imposed a penalty despite these procedural lapses. The respondent challenged the punishment, arguing violations of the U.P. Government Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1999, the principles of natural justice, and the requirement to furnish the enquiry report under Rule 9(4). The Supreme Court held that the enquiry was wholly vitiated, that no order of punishment could be validly made without complying with the statutory procedures, and that the disciplinary authority could not continue proceedings beyond the time fixed by the Tribunal without a valid extension. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed and the respondent was awarded full retiral benefits without any deduction.
Issues considered
- Whether an order of punishment can be validly made when the enquiry lacked witness examination, document proof, and the respondent was not presented the case of the department.
- Whether the disciplinary authority was justified in relying on an enquiry report prepared by an officer who examined only the charge‑sheet and the respondent’s reply without providing the documents to the respondent.
- Whether the failure to furnish the enquiry report vitiated the enquiry.
- Whether disciplinary proceedings could be continued beyond the time stipulated by the Tribunal when the enquiry was not completed within that period.
- Whether the appellant should be granted another opportunity to conclude the enquiry within a time to be fixed by the Court.
Legislation cited
- Constitution (42nd Amendment) Act, 1976s. Article 311
- Evidence Act, 1872
- Government of India Act, 1935
- U.P. Government Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1999s. Rule 7(vii), s. Rule 7(x), s. Rule 9(4)
Headnote
Issue for Consideration Whether, in pursuance of a purported enquiry where there was none to present the case of the department, no witness was examined in support of the charges and no document was formally proved, any order of be made; whether the disciplinary authority was justified in placing reliance on a report of enquiry prepared by the Enquiry Officer who had looked into documents which were not provided to the respondent and had arrived at findings of guilt only on the basis of the charge- sheet, the reply
Subjects
disciplinary proceedingsnatural justiceenquiry reportprejudice testU.P. Government Servants RulesArticle 311due processservice lawpunishment orderextension of time
Judgment
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 275 : 2025 INSC 555
State of Uttar Pradesh through Principal Secretary,
Department of Panchayati Raj, Lucknow
v.
Ram Prakash Singh
(Civil Appeal No. 14724 of 2024)
23 April 2025
[Dipankar Datta* and Prashant Kumar Mishra, JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
Whether, in pursuance of a purported enquiry where there was
none to present the case of the department, no witness was
examined in support of the charges and no document was formally
proved, any order of punishment could validly be made; whether
the disciplinary authority was justified in placing reliance on a
report of enquiry prepared by the Enquiry Officer who had looked
into documents which were not provided to the respondent and
had arrived at findings of guilt only on the basis of the charge-
sheet, the reply thereto of the respondent and such documents;
whether failure or omission or neglect of the disciplinary authority
to furnish the enquiry report had the effect of vitiating the enquiry;
whether the enquiry not having been completed within the time
stipulated by the Tribunal in its order dated 23rd January, 2014, the
disciplinary proceedings could have been continued beyond May,
2014; whether, and if at all, the appellant should be granted one
more opportunity to conclude the enquiry against the respondent
within the time to be stipulated by this Court.
Headnotes†
U.P. Government Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules,
1999 – r.9(4) – Civil Service Regulations – Art. 351-A – According
to the appellant, the respondent had engaged in embezzlement
of panchayat funds – High Court dismissed the writ petition
filed by the appellant challenging the order of the Uttar Pradesh
State Public Services Tribunal (Tribunal) whereby it had set
aside the order of punishment imposing on the respondent a
penalty of Rs.10.25 lakh with 5% reduction in pension for five
years – Whether on facts, the enquiry was conducted by the
Enquiry Officer in disregard of the 1999 Rules – Respondent, if
* Author
276 [2025] 5 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
was punished by the disciplinary authority without due process
being followed in taking disciplinary action against him:
Held: Yes – Impugned order of the High Court does not suffer
from any legal infirmity, upheld – Enquiry was conducted by the
Enquiry Officer in clear disregard of the 1999 Rules relating to
conduct of disciplinary proceedings against the employees of the
appellant – After the first round of litigation before the Tribunal
leading to quashing of the order of dismissal, the Enquiry officer
could not have repeated the same mistake by not calling witnesses
to record their oral statements as well as to prove the documents
generated in course of the preliminary enquiry – Respondent was
thus, punished by the disciplinary authority without due process
being followed in taking disciplinary action against him – Further,
there was blatant disregard by the appellant of not only principles
of natural justice and the judicial command in B. Karunakar’s
case by not furnishing the enquiry report but also by not following
the applicable statutory rule – Therefore, the enquiry was wholly
vitiated – Furthermore, the enquiry not having been completed within
the time stipulated by the Tribunal in its order dtd. 23.01.2014, the
disciplinary proceedings could not have been continued beyond
May, 2014 – Thus, without an extension of time, no order of
punishment could have been validly made – Lastly, the appellant
despite being given an opportunity to proceed in accordance with
law failed to utilise such opportunity – Tribunal and the High Court
were justified in not granting one more opportunity to the appellant
to resume proceedings from the stage invalidity in the proceedings
was detected – Respondent entitled to full retiral benefits from
the date of his superannuation without deduction. [Paras 9, 10,
59, 64, 71, 72]
Disciplinary action for misconduct – Departmental Enquiry –
Non-service of Enquiry report – Right to receive the enquiry
report fundamental safeguard in disciplinary proceedings –
Test of prejudice – What is the effect and impact of non-
furnishing the report of enquiry by the disciplinary authority
to a delinquent employee before he is punished; Does he
have to plead and prove ‘prejudice’; Is it in all or specific
circumstances that the courts would insist on the delinquent
employee to demonstrate ‘prejudice’; Is furnishing of the
report of enquiry merely a procedural step in the disciplinary
proceedings or something more – Law declared in Constitution
Bench judgment in B. Karunakar’s case – Interpretation of –
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 277
State of Uttar Pradesh through Principal Secretary, Department of
Panchayati Raj, Lucknow v. Ram Prakash Singh
Shifting of trend towards the ‘prejudice’ principle; insistence
on the pleading and proof of ‘prejudice’ – Constitution of
India – Article 311. [Paras 37-44, 52]
Departmental Enquiry – Furnishing of enquiry report –
Mandatory – Test of ‘prejudice’:
Held: The requirement of furnishing the report of enquiry, though
procedural, is mandatory and the bogey argument of the employer
to apply the test of ‘prejudice’ when the report of enquiry is not
furnished cannot be of any avail to thwart the challenge of the
delinquent employee – Such test could call for application, if from the
facts and circumstances, it can be established that the delinquent
employee waived his right to have the report furnished – Should
satisfactory explanation be not proffered by the employer for its
failure/omission/neglect to furnish the enquiry report, that ought to be
sufficient for invalidating the proceedings and directing resumption
from the stage of furnishing the report – No proof of prejudice for
breach of a statutory rule or the principles of natural justice and
fair play need be proved, unless there is a waiver, either express
or by conduct, to of the right to receive the report – It is only in
specific and not in all circumstances that proof of ‘prejudice’ ought
to be insisted upon. [Para 52]
Departmental Enquiry – Evidence Act, 1872 – Applicability of –
Infirmity in the process of decision making in the present case:
Held: ‘Materials brought on record by the parties’ (to which
consideration in the enquiry ought to be confined) mean only
such materials can be considered which are brought on record in
a manner known to law – Such materials can then be considered
legal evidence, which can be acted upon – Though the Evidence
Act, 1872 is not strictly applicable to departmental enquiries, which
are not judicial proceedings, nevertheless, the principles flowing
therefrom can be applied in specific cases – Evidence tendered
by witnesses must be recorded in the presence of the delinquent
employee, he should be given opportunity to cross-examine the
witnesses and no document should be relied on by the prosecution
without giving copy thereof to the delinquent – All these basic
principles of fair play have their root in such Act – In the present
case, the documents referred to in the list of documents forming
part of the annexures to the chargesheet, on which the department
seeks to rely in the enquiry, cannot be treated as legal evidence
278 [2025] 5 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
worthy of forming the basis for a finding of guilt if the contents
of such documents are not spoken to by persons competent to
speak about them – A document does not prove itself – In the
enquiry, therefore, the contents of the relied-on documents have
to be proved by examining a witness having knowledge of the
contents of such document and who can depose as regards its
authenticity – In the present case, no such exercise was undertaken
by producing any witness – The enquiry conducted by the Enquiry
Officer in a manner not authorised by law could not have formed
the basis of the order of punishment dated 24.03.2015 imposed
on the respondent. [Paras 14, 18]
Departmental Enquiry – Challenge to order of punishment –
Non-furnishing of the report of enquiry to the employee – ‘Test
of prejudice’ – Applicability – Proper course for the tribunal/
court to adopt:
Held: Whenever a challenge is made to an order of punishment
on, inter alia, the ground that the report of enquiry has not
been furnished, the tribunal/court should require the employer
(Government, public or private) to justify non-furnishing of such
report – If no valid explanation is proffered and the tribunal/court
suspects unfair motives (report has not been furnished as part of
a strategic ploy or to advance an unholy cause or prompted by
extraneous reasons) or carelessness, without much ado and without
insisting for ‘prejudice’ to be demonstrated, the order of punishment
should be set aside and the proceedings directed to resume from
the stage of offering opportunity to the delinquent employee to
respond to the enquiry report – Irrespective of ‘prejudice’ being
demonstrated, no employer or for that matter anyone should be
permitted to gain any benefit by violating the law – In case the
tribunal/court is satisfied that real effort was made by the employer
but such effort remained abortive because the report could not
be furnished to the employee for reason(s) beyond its control, or
some other justification is placed on record, which is acceptable
to the tribunal/court, the test of ‘prejudice’ is open to be applied
but only after ensuring service of a copy of the enquiry report on
the employee – In a case where the employee either expressly or
by his conduct appears to have waived the requirement of having
access to the report, it would be open to the tribunal/court to deal
with the situation as per its discretion – However, the simplicitor
application of the ‘prejudice’ test absent a query to the employer,
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 279
State of Uttar Pradesh through Principal Secretary, Department of
Panchayati Raj, Lucknow v. Ram Prakash Singh
would be in the teeth of the law laid down by the Constitution
Bench in B. Karunakar’s case. [Para 51]
U.P. Government Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules,
1999 – r.9(4) – Departmental Enquiry – Non-furnishing of
the report of enquiry to the respondent-employee – “Test of
prejudice” – Plea of the appellant that the test of ‘prejudice’
ought to be applied in this case since the respondent did
not participate in the enquiry and, therefore, there was no
obligation for the disciplinary authority to furnish such report:
Held: Except that the respondent had not participated in the
second round of enquiry and, hence, the disciplinary authority
was not under obligation to furnish him the enquiry report, there
is no other explanation as to why such report was not furnished to
the respondent – Even assuming that the respondent had without
justification stayed away from the enquiry, the disciplinary authority
could not have considered the report of the Enquiry Officer in
view of what has been held in paragraph 26 in B. Karunakar as
well as Rule 9(4) of the 1999 Rules – Also, since the report of
enquiry has been withheld by the appellant at all three tiers, it is
preposterous that he would be in a position to plead and prove
prejudice – Relying on the law declared in S.K. Sharma which,
had relied on B. Karunakar, the prejudice is self-evident and no
proof of prejudice as such is called for in this case – Adverse
presumption drawn that there was a purpose behind withholding
the report. [Paras 55, 59]
Practice and Procedure – Remittance of case – Requirements
of ‘due process’ not satisfied – Breach of statutory rules –
Whether present case be remitted to disciplinary authority:
Held: No – Remitting would mean reverting to the stage of
production of witnesses on behalf of the department – When
not a single witness could be produced for examination in 2010
and 2014, now witnesses would not be available to support the
charges – Proceedings have certain incidents of 2004-05 as the
origin – Having regard to the lapse of time since then coupled
with the retirement of the respondent from service in 2010 and,
more particularly, when the appellant despite an earlier opportunity
granted by the Tribunal has failed to avail the same by continuing
the enquiry in accordance with law, it would be highly unfair and
unjust to subject the respondent to face the enquiry once again –
280 [2025] 5 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
Gravity of the offence alleged to have been committed is certainly
a vital consideration; however, repeated opportunities cannot be
claimed without there being overwhelming public interest warranting
such opportunity – On facts, second opportunity was not required
to be given – Also, two of the respondent’s colleagues (one of
them a senior officer) who were also proceeded against were
practically let off with no punishment or punishment of stoppage
of increments – No useful purpose will be served by reviving the
disciplinary proceedings and in remitting the case to the appellant.
[Para 71]
Departmental Enquiry – Fixed time stipulated by tribunal/court
to conclude the proceedings – Extension of time:
Held: It may not always be possible for the disciplinary authority
in each such case where a fixed time has been stipulated by
a tribunal/court to conclude the proceedings to apply and seek
extension of time before expiry of such time although there can
be no gainsaying that applying and obtaining an extension before
expiry is eminently desirable – In exceptional cases, even after
expiry of the stipulated time, such an application can be moved;
and, depending on the cause shown for inability or failure to
conclude the proceedings within the time stipulated and also for
not applying for extension before expiry, the tribunal/court may,
in its discretion, allow or reject the prayer for extension – If the
application is rejected, the proceedings cannot be carried forward
unless a superior court, reversing the order of rejection, permits the
disciplinary authority to so proceed – If the delinquent employee
objects to continuation of proceedings beyond the time stipulated,
the disciplinary authority without proceeding further ought to apply
for extension of time and may not go ahead till such time its prayer
for extension is granted on such application – Proceeding despite
objection and without there being an extension could give rise to
apprehensions of bias – Therefore, applying for extension upon
halting the proceedings awaiting order on the application would
be an advisable course of action to balance the interests of both
the employer and the employee – Even if the delinquent employee
has not objected to continuation of proceedings beyond the time
stipulated by the tribunal/court but before the final order is passed in
the proceedings, the disciplinary authority would be bound to seek
and obtain extension of time – If a tribunal/court stipulates a fixed
time by which an enquiry or proceedings for disciplinary action ought
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 281
State of Uttar Pradesh through Principal Secretary, Department of
Panchayati Raj, Lucknow v. Ram Prakash Singh
to be concluded coupled with a rider that, in default, the enquiry/
proceedings will stand lapsed, the disciplinary authority in such a
case would cease to have the jurisdiction to proceed further unless,
citing genuine grounds, a recall of such default clause is sought
and obtained to proceed further in accordance with law. [Para 62]
Case Law Cited
Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad v. B. Karunakar [1993] Supp.
2 SCR 576 : (1993) 4 SCC 727 – followed.
State Bank of Patiala v. S.K. Sharma [1996] 3 SCR 972 : (1996)
3 SCC 364 – relied on.
Board of Directors Himachal Pradesh Transport Corporation v. HC
Rahi [2008] 3 SCR 97 : (2008) 11 SCC 502; M/s. Bareilly Electricity
Supply Company Limited v. The Workmen and Others (1971) 2
SCC 617; Roop Singh Negi v. Punjab National Bank and Others
[2008] 17 SCR 1476 : (2009) 2 SCC 570; State of Uttar Pradesh
and Others v. Saroj Kumar Sinha [2010] 2 SCR 326 : (2010) 2 SCC
772; Nirmala J. Jhala v. State of Gujarat and Another [2013] 5 SCR
200 : (2013) 4 SCC 301; Haryana Financial Corporation v. Kailash
Chandra Ahuja [2008] 10 SCR 222 : (2008) 9 SCC 31; Union of
India v. Bishamber Das Dogra [2009] 9 SCR 828 : (2009) 13 SCC
102; Sarva U.P. Gramin Bank v. Manoj Kumar Sinha [2010] 2 SCR
512 : (2010) 3 SCC 556; Union of India v. Alok Kumar [2010] 5
SCR 35 : (2010) 5 SCC 349; Punjab National Bank v. K.K. Verma
[2010] 11 SCR 311 : (2010) 13 SCC 494; Union of India v. R.P
Singh [2014] 6 SCR 351 : (2014) 7 SCC 340; SBI v. B.R. Saini
(2018) 11 SCC 83; Union of India and Others v. Dilip Paul [2023]
13 SCR 473 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1423; Dharampal Satyapal
Ltd. v. CCE [2015] 6 SCR 437 : (2015) 8 SCC 519; Swamy Devi
Dayal Hospital & Dental College v. Union of India [2013] 14 SCR
105 : (2014) 13 SCC 506; Vijayakumaran C.P.V. v. Central University
of Kerala [2020] 3 SCR 374 : (2020) 12 SCC 426; Mineral Area
Development Authority of India & Anr. v. Steel Authority of India &
Anr. [2024] 7 SCR 1549 : (2024) 10 SCC 257; Securities Exchange
Board of India v. Mega Corporation Limited [2022] 2 SCR 546 :
(2023) 12 SCC 802; T. Takano v. Securities and Exchange Board
of India and Anr. [2022] 16 SCR 212 : (2022) 8 SCC 162; State of
U.P. v. Sudhir Kumar Singh [2020] 13 SCR 571 : (2021) 19 SCC
706; Gorkha Security Services v. Govt. (NCT of Delhi) [2014] 13
SCR 617 : (2014) 9 SCC 105; Kailash Chander Asthana v. State
282 [2025] 5 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
of U.P. (1988) 3 SCC 600; Union of India v. Mohd. Ramzan Khan
[1990] Supp. 3 SCR 248 : (1991) 1 SCC 588; Union of India v.
E. Bashyan [1988] 3 SCR 209 : (1988) 2 SCC 196; Union of India v.
Tulsiram Patel [1985] Supp. 2 SCR 131 : (1985) 3 SCC 398; Olga
Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation [1985] Supp. 2 SCR 51 :
(1985) 3 SCC 545; A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak [1988] Supp. 1 SCR
1 : (1988) 2 SCC 602; S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan [1981] 1 SCR
746 : (1980) 4 SCC 379; Union of India and Others v. Satyendra
Kumar Sahai and Another (2005) 12 SCC 355; A. Masilamani v.
LIC (2013) 6 SCC 530; Allahabad Bank v. Krishna Narayan Tiwari
[2017] 1 SCR 389 : (2017) 2 SCC 308 – referred to.
Abhishek Prabhakar Awasthy v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd.,
2013 SCC OnLine All 14267 – approved.
List of Acts
U.P. Government Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1999;
Evidence Act, 1872; Government of India Act, 1935; Constitution
(42nd Amendment) Act, 1976.
List of Keywords
U.P. Government Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1999;
Embezzlement of panchayat funds; Disciplinary proceedings;
Enquiry report not furnished/supplied; Non-furnishing of enquiry
report; Documents not supplied; Reliance on enquiry report;
Enquiry vitiated; Disciplinary action; Government of Uttar Pradesh,
Panchayati Raj Section; Uttar Pradesh State Public Services
Tribunal; No witnesses examined; No documents formally proved;
Order of dismissal; Order of punishment; “Irregular” enquiry;
Second round of disciplinary proceedings; Time stipulated to
conclude enquiry; Time period stipulated by the Tribunal expired;
No extension of time prayed; Functus officio; Sanction of Governor;
Article 351-A of the Constitution; Order quashed; Statutory
compliance; Clear disregard of the 1999 Rules relating to conduct
of disciplinary proceedings; Due process not followed; Test of
‘prejudice’; Ratio decidendi of B. Karunakar case; Jurisprudence
on non-furnishing of the report of enquiry; Delinquent employee to
demonstrate ‘prejudice’; Right to raise a fair defence; Fundamental
safeguard in disciplinary proceedings; Integral part of natural
justice; ‘Reasonable opportunity to defend’; Article 141 of the
Constitution; Res ipsa loquitur; Enquiry stands vitiated; Remitting
the case.
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 283
State of Uttar Pradesh through Principal Secretary, Department of
Panchayati Raj, Lucknow v. Ram Prakash Singh
Case Arising From
Civil Appellate Jurisdiction: Civil Appeal No. 14724 of 2024
From the Judgment and Order dated 19.10.2019 of the High Court
of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench in SB No. 28859 of 2019
Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Appellant:
Shaurya Sahay, Aditya Kumar, Ms. Ruchil Raj.
Adv. for the Respondent:
Anil Kumar Mishra.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
Dipankar Datta, J.
The Challenge
1. The challenge in this appeal, by special leave, is to a judgment and
order dated 19th October, 20191 of the High Court of Judicature at
Allahabad.2 It is laid by the State of Uttar Pradesh, the unsuccessful
writ petitioner.3 The impugned order dismissed the writ petition4 of the
appellant, wherein the final order of the Uttar Pradesh State Public
Services Tribunal5 dated 19th November, 2018 was under challenge.
The Tribunal set aside the order of punishment dated 24th March,
2015 imposing a penalty of Rs. 10.25 lakh along with a 5% reduction
in pension for five years on Ram Prakash Singh.6
Factual Matrix
2. The facts of the case are of great significance given the key
arguments advanced by the parties. Hence, we find it appropriate
1 impugned order
2 High Court
3 appellant
4 Writ Petition (S/B) No. 28859/2019
5 Tribunal
6 Respondent
284 [2025] 5 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
to briefly narrate the events having a bearing on our decision before
proceeding to examine the merits of the rival claims. The vital facts,
as culled out from the records, to decide the appeal are as follows:
I. The respondent was serving as an Assistant Engineer in
District Panchayat, Kushinagar in 2004-2005.
II. According to the appellant, the respondent had engaged in
embezzlement of panchayat funds to the tune of Rs. 2.5 crore
in relation to certain drainage and road construction projects.
In cahoots with the incumbent Junior Engineer, Ram Kripal
Singh, the respondent had created sham work records and
siphoned off panchayat funds.
III. Consequently, in December, 2005, the Commissioner,
Gorakhpur Division7 was appointed to make a preliminary
enquiry. He directed the Technical Audit Cell and Divisional
Technical Examiner to determine the existence and extent of
financial irregularities committed by the respondent.
IV. The Technical Audit Cell submitted the financial audit report
dated 16th January, 2006, which found the respondent to have
verified fake records of work created by the said Ram Kripal,
Junior Engineer. Vide another report dated 23rd February
2006, it was opined that there was a loss of Rs. 30.083 lakh
to the exchequer on account of the misconduct committed
by the respondent and others and that the respondent being
responsible for 35% of the said loss, Rs. 10.25 lakh was the
amount recoverable from him.
V. On 12 th April, 2006, the respondent was placed under
suspension in contemplation of disciplinary proceedings.
VI. Respondent was served with a chargesheet dated 24th August,
2006. Five charges were framed against him. The audit reports
dated 16th January, 2006 and 23rd February 2006 constituted
the basis for the charges.
VII. A challenge laid by the respondent to the order of suspension
dated 12 th April, 2006 before the High Court in its writ
jurisdiction resulted in his reinstatement in service on 24th
November, 2006.
7 Enquiry Officer
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 285
State of Uttar Pradesh through Principal Secretary, Department of
Panchayati Raj, Lucknow v. Ram Prakash Singh
VIII. The documents sought to be relied on by the appellant against
the respondent to drive home the charges were not supplied
to the respondent. Respondent, thus, furnished his reply on
2nd January, 2008 denying the charges against him in addition
to praying for a personal hearing.
IX. The enquiry officer submitted his report of enquiry to the
appellant on 18th February, 2008 holding the respondent guilty
of all the charges.
X. Per the respondent, there was no enquiry at all. No witness
was examined in support of the charges and he was not put
on notice. None proved the documents forming part of the
charge-sheet, which were also not supplied to him. Relying
on the charge-sheet, his reply thereto and the enquiry reports
obtained from Technical Audit Cell, the enquiry officer held
him guilty. Even copy of the enquiry report was not furnished.
XI. Respondent reached the age of superannuation on 2nd August,
2010.
XII. Almost after two and half years of submission of the enquiry
report by the Enquiry Officer, the respondent received on 2nd
August, 2010 an order dismissing him from service dated
26th July, 2010 passed by the Principal Secretary to the
Government of Uttar Pradesh, Panchayati Raj Section.
XIII. Apart from being dismissed, a penalty of Rs. 10.52 lakh was
imposed on the respondent.
XIV. Crestfallen with the order of dismissal received by him a couple
of days after the date of superannuation, the respondent
challenged such order by lodging a claim8 before the Tribunal.
The Tribunal, vide judgment and order dated 23rd January,
2014, inter alia, returned findings on perusal of the enquiry
report that no enquiry was conducted by the Enquiry Officer in
accordance with Rule 7(vii) of the U.P. Government Servants
(Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 19999 ordaining that when a
charge is denied by the charged officer, the Enquiry Officer
8 Claim Petition No. 1563/2010
9 1999 Rules
286 [2025] 5 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
shall proceed to call the witnesses proposed in the charge-
sheet and record their oral evidence in presence of the charged
officer who shall then be given opportunity to cross-examine
the witnesses. Holding that the order of dismissal could not
be sustained based on an “irregular” enquiry, the Tribunal
ordered the appellant to initiate enquiry proceedings against
the respondent from the stage of submission of reply within
three weeks from date of receipt of the judgment and conclude
the same within a period of an additional three months.
XV. The three-month period stipulated by the Tribunal for
concluding the enquiry expired in April, 2014.
XVI. In the wake of the decision of the Tribunal, the Enquiry Officer
addressed a letter dated 16th May, 2014 to the respondent
extending to him another opportunity to present any statement
or additional evidence within 15 days of receiving such letter.
XVII. However, according to the appellant, instead of participating,
the respondent refused to join the enquiry and raised frivolous
grounds to derail the same.
XVIII. Through a letter dated 23rd May 2014, the respondent replied
to the letter dated 16th May, 2014 stating that the time period
stipulated by the Tribunal had expired and no extension of
time having been prayed, the proceedings initiated against
him had lapsed. Respondent also contended that since he
had retired in 2010, no proceedings could be continued
against him.
XIX. Vide his letter dated 05th June, 2014, the Enquiry Officer
once again called upon the respondent to file his additional
reply/explanation.
XX. Respondent vide his letter dated 13th June, 2014 reiterated that
the Enquiry Officer had become functus officio and, therefore,
without any extension of time granted by the Tribunal, he had
no authority to proceed.
XXI. Once again, the Enquiry Officer without recording the oral
evidence of any witness and merely on the basis of the charge-
sheet, reply and the documents gathered during preliminary
enquiry submitted a report of enquiry dated 15th September,
2014, holding the respondent guilty of all the charges.
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 287
State of Uttar Pradesh through Principal Secretary, Department of
Panchayati Raj, Lucknow v. Ram Prakash Singh
XXII. After receiving the sanction of the Governor under Article
351-A, Civil Service Regulations10 on 05th January, 2015
(which was required because the respondent had retired),
the Joint Secretary to the Government of Uttar Pradesh,
Panchayati Raj Section issued a fresh order of punishment
on 24th March, 2015 reducing the pension of the respondent
by 5% for a period of five years and requiring recovery of
Rs. 10.52 lakh from his retiral benefits.
XXIII. Interestingly, the aforesaid order dated 24th March, 2015
though briefly refers to and summarises the enquiry report, it
is clear on perusal thereof that the Enquiry Officer proceeded
to hold the charges against the respondent established only
on the basis of the allegations in the charge-sheet and the
reply of the respondent. There is absolutely no reference to
statement of any witness being recorded or as to who proved
the documents which, in the opinion of the Enquiry Officer,
did support the case of the department that the respondent
had by his acts of omission/commission indulged in draining
the public exchequer in excess of Rs. 2 crore. Further, the
said order is completely silent as to whether the documents
relied on by the Enquiry Officer were at all made over to the
respondent. Also, the Principal Secretary quashed the earlier
order of punishment dated 26th July, 2010 and closed the
proceedings ordering fresh punishment, but little did he realise
that such order had been quashed earlier by the Tribunal vide
judgment and order dated 23rd January, 2014; hence such
order did not survive for being quashed.
XXIV. Dissatisfied with the order of punishment dated 24th March,
2015, the respondent once again invoked the jurisdiction of
the Tribunal to assail the order of the appellant by lodging a
fresh claim.11 The Tribunal, vide judgment and order dated
12th November, 2018, allowed the claim of the respondent
by setting aside the impugned order dated 24th March, 2015.
The Tribunal noted that, admittedly, copy of the enquiry report
was not supplied to the respondent; hence, the procedure
adopted by the appellant was in the teeth of Rule 9(4) of the
10 CSR
11 Claim Petition No. 471/2016
288 [2025] 5 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
1999 Rules. Further, it found that the enquiry had not been
conducted in terms of the 1999 Rules. Additionally, it was
recorded that the Tribunal on the earlier occasion having
granted three months’ time to conclude the enquiry, submission
of the enquiry report dated 15th September, 2014 and the final
order of punishment dated 24th March, 2015 should have been
preceded by a permission being sought from the Tribunal
which, unfortunately, the appellant did not seek. Reliance
was placed by the Tribunal on the Full Bench decision of
the High Court in Abhishek Prabhakar Awasthy v. New
India Assurance Co. Ltd.12. It was laid down therein that if
the court stipulates a time for concluding the proceedings, it
will not be open to the employer to disregard that stipulation
and an extension of time must be sought. Based on such
reasons, the order of punishment dated 24th March, 2015
under challenge was set aside and the respondent was held
entitled to all service benefits that were stopped in terms
thereof. Compliance was directed to be ensured within a
period of three months.
XXV. Aggrieved by the order of the Tribunal, the appellant moved
the High Court in its writ jurisdiction albeit unsuccessfully.
The High Court, vide the impugned order, dismissed the
appellant’s writ petition and upheld the order of the Tribunal.
Contentions of the Parties
3. Learned counsel for the appellant, seeking quashing of the impugned
order and the order passed by the Tribunal, vigorously contended that:
I. Immense gravity of the offence committed by the respondent
was not appreciated either by the High Court or the Tribunal.
Further, the respondent overtly refused to participate in
the second round of disciplinary proceedings; hence, the
respondent cannot be permitted to take advantage of his
own wrong.
II. This Court in Board of Directors Himachal Pradesh
Transport Corporation v. HC Rahi,13 has held that the
12 2013 SCC OnLine All 14267
13 (2008) 11 SCC 502
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 289
State of Uttar Pradesh through Principal Secretary, Department of
Panchayati Raj, Lucknow v. Ram Prakash Singh
principles of natural justice cannot be viewed in a rigid manner.
The application of these principles depends on the facts and
circumstances of each individual case. To sustain the plea of
violation of principles of natural justice, one must establish
how he has been prejudiced by the violation. In the present
case, Respondent was aware of the disciplinary proceedings,
yet, refused to participate in the same. It can be inferred
from the respondent’s actions that he had waived any right
to natural justice.
III. The Tribunal, vide order dt. 23rd January, 2014, in the first
round of litigation, had overruled the respondent’s contention
that the entirety of the disciplinary proceedings should be
set aside. However, the respondent chose to raise the same
issues in his letters dated 23rd May, 2014 and 13th June, 2014.
IV. The second round of enquiry was not a fresh proceeding;
rather, it was a continuation of the disciplinary proceeding
which was initiated in 2006. Additionally, a fresh enquiry
can be initiated against a retired employee within four
years of his retirement under Regulation 351-A of the CSR.
Respondent retired on 31st July, 2010 and the office order
directing resumption of disciplinary proceedings was passed
on 10th April, 2014, which is well within four years of the
respondent’s retirement. In any event, the Government, vide
office order dated 16th October 2014, granted sanction under
Regulation 351A of the CSR to continue the proceedings.
In arguendo, even if the non-supply of enquiry report is a
violation of principles of natural justice, it could not have
resulted in quashing of the proceedings per the Constitution
Bench decision of this Court in Managing Director, ECIL,
Hyderabad v. B. Karunakar.14 It was held therein that in
the event that there is a non-supply of the enquiry report,
the courts and tribunals shall cause the enquiry report to be
furnished to the employee and he be given an opportunity to
make his case. If after hearing the parties, the court comes
to a conclusion that the non-supply has made no difference
to the findings and punishment meted out to the charged
14 (1993) 4 SCC 727
290 [2025] 5 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
employee, the court should not interfere with the punishment
order. It was also held that the court should not mechanically
set aside a punishment order on the ground of non-supply of
enquiry report to the charged employee.
V. The correct procedure per B. Karunakar (supra) has not been
followed by the High Court and, accordingly, the impugned
order ought to be set aside.
4. Per contra, in support of the impugned order and pressing for dismissal
of the appeal, learned counsel for the respondent assiduously
contended that:
I. The appellant has tried to mislead this Court by painting
the present case as an instance of non-cooperation of the
respondent whereas, in actuality, the present case is a
demonstration of flagrant violation of the rules. Further, the
appellant has supressed from this Court the fact that the
second round of disciplinary proceedings were conducted in
breach of the timeline provided by the Tribunal.
II. Rule 7(v) of the 1999 Rules require the disciplinary authority
to provide to the employee, the chargesheet along with the
copy of all documentary evidence mentioned therein. The
appellant has not been able to prove before the Tribunal and
the High Court as well as before this Court that the documents
sought to be relied on in the enquiry were furnished to him.
III. Moreover, Rule 9(4) of the 1999 Rules mandates that if the
disciplinary authority is of the opinion that punishment is
required to be imposed on the employee, the employee has
to be supplied with the enquiry report and given an opportunity
to make a representation. Admittedly, no copy of the enquiry
report was furnished to the respondent and, therefore, he
had no opportunity to represent thereagainst.
IV. Surprisingly, not only copy of the enquiry report dated 15th
September, 2014 was not furnished to the respondent, even
the copy of such report was neither placed on record before
the Tribunal as well as before this Court.
V. The dictum in B. Karunakar (supra), relied upon, does not
apply to the present facts and circumstances. The appellant
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 291
State of Uttar Pradesh through Principal Secretary, Department of
Panchayati Raj, Lucknow v. Ram Prakash Singh
has violated the principles of natural justice as well as the
1999 Rules,
VI. Finally, the Tribunal and the High Court were bound by
the ruling of the Full bench of the High Court in Abhishek
Prabhakar Awasthy (supra) and, therefore, the proceedings
could not have been carried forward beyond April, 2014
without applying for and obtaining permission to proceed.
Having not concluded the enquiry as per the timeline provided
by the Tribunal, the order of punishment dated is non-est in
law and cannot be given effect. The same was, thus, rightly
interdicted by the Tribunal.
Impugned Order
5. The High Court took notice of the fact that copy of the enquiry report
had not been furnished to the respondent in the second round of
disciplinary proceedings and this action of the appellant is repugnant
to the provisions contained in Rule 9(4) of the Rules. The High Court
held that the Tribunal’s order does not suffer from any infirmity while
holding that the appellant’s order dated 24th March 2015 is illegal on
the ground of non-supply of the enquiry report. The High Court also
noticed the fact that the Tribunal’s order dated 12th November, 2018
directed the appellant to conclude the disciplinary proceedings within
a time-frame and the appellant failed to do so. Prior to the time-frame
expiring, the appellant should have approached the Tribunal seeking
suitable extension. The conclusion of the disciplinary proceedings
beyond the time-frame fixed by the Tribunal is impermissible in law.
That apart, the order of punishment is also unsustainable as the
same was discriminatory. While the co-charged employee Baliram
was let off and not punished, the respondent was punished for the
same act.
6. For the reasons thus assigned, the High Court upheld the order of
the Tribunal.
Issues
7. The present case tasks us to decide the following issues: -
(i) Whether, in pursuance of a purported enquiry where there
was none to present the case of the department, no witness
292 [2025] 5 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
was examined in support of the charges and no document
was formally proved, any order of punishment could validly
be made?
(ii) Whether the disciplinary authority was justified in placing
reliance on a report of enquiry prepared by the Enquiry Officer
who had looked into documents which were not provided to
the respondent and had arrived at findings of guilt only on the
basis of the charge-sheet, the reply thereto of the respondent
and such documents?
(iii) Whether failure or omission or neglect of the disciplinary
authority to furnish the enquiry report had the effect of vitiating
the enquiry?
(iv) Whether the enquiry not having been completed within the
time stipulated by the Tribunal in its order dated 23rd January,
2014, the disciplinary proceedings could have been continued
beyond May, 2014? And
(v) Whether, and if at all, the appellant should be granted one more
opportunity to conclude the enquiry against the respondent
within the time to be stipulated by us?
Analysis
8. The first two issues being related are taken up for consideration
together.
9. There could be no iota of doubt that the enquiry in the present case
was conducted by the Enquiry Officer in clear disregard of the 1999
Rules relating to conduct of disciplinary proceedings against the
employees of the appellant.
10. We are at loss to comprehend as to how, after the first round of
litigation before the Tribunal leading to quashing of the order of
dismissal dated 27th July, 2010, the same mistake could be repeated
by the Enquiry officer by not calling for witnesses to record their
oral statements as well as to prove the documents generated in
course of the preliminary enquiry. The procedure followed is plainly
indefensible and, therefore, we hold that the respondent has been
punished by the disciplinary authority without due process being
followed in taking disciplinary action against him.
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 293
State of Uttar Pradesh through Principal Secretary, Department of
Panchayati Raj, Lucknow v. Ram Prakash Singh
11. Useful reference can be made to certain decisions of this Court to
show the infirmity in the process of decision making which led to the
order of punishment being passed against the respondent.
12. M/s. Bareilly Electricity Supply Company Limited v. The Workmen
and Others15 is a decision arising from an award under the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947. Law has been laid down therein as follows:
“9. … Innumerable statements, letters, balance-sheet,
profit and loss account and other documents called for or
otherwise were filed on behalf of the appellants. It cannot
be denied that the mere filing of any of the aforementioned
documents does not amount to proof of them and unless
these are either admitted by the respondents or proved
they do not become evidence in the case.
***
14. … But the application of principle of natural justice does
not imply that what is not evidence can be acted upon.
On the other hand what it means is that no materials can
be relied upon to establish a contested fact which are not
spoken to by persons who are competent to speak about
them and are subjected to cross-examination by the party
against whom they are sought to be used. When a document
is produced in a Court or a Tribunal the questions that
naturally arise is, is it a genuine document, what are its
contents and are the statements contained therein true.
When the appellant produced the balance-sheet and profit
and loss account of the company, it does not by its mere
production amount to a proof of it or of the truth of the
entries therein. If these entries are challenged the appellant
must prove each of such entries by producing the books
and speaking from the entries made therein. If a letter or
other document is produced to establish some fact which
is relevant to the enquiry the writer must be produced or
his affidavit in respect thereof be filed and opportunity
afforded to the opposite party who challenges this fact. … ”
(emphasis ours)
15 (1971) 2 SCC 617
294 [2025] 5 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
13. In Roop Singh Negi v. Punjab National Bank and Others,16 it
was held that an officer conducting an enquiry has a duty to arrive
at findings in respect of the charges upon taking into consideration
the materials brought on record by the parties. It has also been
held therein that any evidence collected during investigation by an
investigating officer against the accused by itself could not be treated
to be evidence in the disciplinary proceedings.
14. What follows from a conjoint reading of the above two decisions is and
what applies here is that, ‘materials brought on record by the parties’
(to which consideration in the enquiry ought to be confined) mean only
such materials can be considered which are brought on record in a
manner known to law. Such materials can then be considered legal
evidence, which can be acted upon. Though the Indian Evidence Act,
1872 is not strictly applicable to departmental enquiries, which are not
judicial proceedings, nevertheless, the principles flowing therefrom
can be applied in specific cases. Evidence tendered by witnesses
must be recorded in the presence of the delinquent employee, he
should be given opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses and no
document should be relied on by the prosecution without giving copy
thereof to the delinquent - all these basic principles of fair play have
their root in such Act. In such light, the documents referred to in the
list of documents forming part of the annexures to the chargesheet,
on which the department seeks to rely in the enquiry, cannot be
treated as legal evidence worthy of forming the basis for a finding of
guilt if the contents of such documents are not spoken to by persons
competent to speak about them. A document does not prove itself.
In the enquiry, therefore, the contents of the relied-on documents
have to be proved by examining a witness having knowledge of
the contents of such document and who can depose as regards its
authenticity. In the present case, no such exercise was undertaken
by producing any witness.
15. We may further refer to the decision of this Court in State of Uttar
Pradesh and Others v. Saroj Kumar Sinha17 where disciplinary
proceedings were drawn up against the respondent, Saroj Kumar
Sinha, under the 1999 Rules itself with which we are concerned.
16 (2009) 2 SCC 570
17 (2010) 2 SCC 772
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 295
State of Uttar Pradesh through Principal Secretary, Department of
Panchayati Raj, Lucknow v. Ram Prakash Singh
Paragraphs 26 to 30 and 33 of the said decision being relevant are
quoted below:
“26. The first inquiry report is vitiated also on the ground that
the inquiry officers failed to fix any date for the appearance
of the respondent to answer the charges. Rule 7(x) clearly
provides as under:
‘7. (x) Where the charged government servant does
not appear on the date fixed in the inquiry or at any
stage of the proceeding in spite of the service of
the notice on him or having knowledge of the date,
the inquiry officer shall proceed with the inquiry ex
parte. In such a case the inquiry officer shall record
the statement of witnesses mentioned in the charge-
sheet in absence of the charged government servant.’
27. A bare perusal of the aforesaid sub-rule shows that
when the respondent had failed to submit the explanation
to the charge-sheet it was incumbent upon the inquiry
officer to fix a date for his appearance in the inquiry. It
is only in a case when the government servant despite
notice of the date fixed failed to appear that the inquiry
officer can proceed with the inquiry ex parte. Even in
such circumstances it is incumbent on the inquiry officer
to record the statement of witnesses mentioned in the
charge-sheet. Since the government servant is absent,
he would clearly lose the benefit of cross-examination
of the witnesses. But nonetheless in order to establish
the charges the Department is required to produce the
necessary evidence before the inquiry officer. This is so
as to avoid the charge that the inquiry officer has acted
as a prosecutor as well as a judge.
28. An inquiry officer acting in a quasi-judicial authority
is in the position of an independent adjudicator. He is
not supposed to be a representative of the department/
disciplinary authority/Government. His function is to
examine the evidence presented by the Department, even
in the absence of the delinquent official to see as to whether
the unrebutted evidence is sufficient to hold that the charges
are proved. In the present case the aforesaid procedure
296 [2025] 5 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
has not been observed. Since no oral evidence has been
examined the documents have not been proved, and could
not have been taken into consideration to conclude that
the charges have been proved against the respondents.
29. Apart from the above, by virtue of Article 311(2) of the
Constitution of India the departmental enquiry had to be
conducted in accordance with the rules of natural justice.
It is a basic requirement of the rules of natural justice
that an employee be given a reasonable opportunity of
being heard in any proceedings which may culminate in
punishment being imposed on the employee.
30. When a departmental enquiry is conducted against
the government servant it cannot be treated as a casual
exercise. The enquiry proceedings also cannot be
conducted with a closed mind. The inquiry officer has
to be wholly unbiased. The rules of natural justice are
required to be observed to ensure not only that justice is
done but is manifestly seen to be done. The object of rules
of natural justice is to ensure that a government servant
is treated fairly in proceedings which may culminate in
imposition of punishment including dismissal/removal
from service.
***
33. As noticed earlier in the present case not only the
respondent has been denied access to documents
sought to be relied upon against him, but he has been
condemned unheard as the inquiry officer failed to fix
any date for conduct of the enquiry. In other words, not
a single witness has been examined in support of the
charges levelled against the respondent. The High Court,
therefore, has rightly observed that the entire proceedings
are vitiated having been conducted in complete violation
of the principles of natural justice and total disregard of
fair play. The respondent never had any opportunity at any
stage of the proceedings to offer an explanation against
the allegations made in the charge-sheet.”
(emphasis ours)
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 297
State of Uttar Pradesh through Principal Secretary, Department of
Panchayati Raj, Lucknow v. Ram Prakash Singh
16. It appears that the appellant is yet to take lessons despite the
admonition in Saroj Kumar Sinha (supra). The same kind of
omissions and commissions that led to setting aside of the order of
punishment imposed being upheld by this Court were repeated in
the present case.
17. Next, the decision in Nirmala J. Jhala v. State of Gujarat and
Another18 deserves consideration where the concept of preliminary
enquiry being distinct from a regular enquiry was noticed and
discussed. Paragraphs 45 and 51 from such decision read as follows:
“42. A Constitution Bench of this Court in Amalendu
Ghosh v. North Eastern Railway, AIR 1960 SC 992, held
that the purpose of holding a preliminary inquiry in respect
of a particular alleged misconduct is only for the purpose
of finding a particular fact and prima facie, to know as to
whether the alleged misconduct has been committed and
on the basis of the findings recorded in preliminary inquiry,
no order of punishment can be passed. It may be used
only to take a view as to whether a regular disciplinary
proceeding against the delinquent is required to be held.
43. Similarly in Champaklal Chimanlal Shah v. Union of
India, AIR 1964 SC 1854, a Constitution Bench of this Court
while taking a similar view held that preliminary inquiry
should not be confused with regular inquiry. The preliminary
inquiry is not governed by the provisions of Article 311(2) of
the Constitution of India. Preliminary inquiry may be held ex
parte, for it is merely for the satisfaction of the Government
though usually for the sake of fairness, an explanation may
be sought from the government servant even at such an
inquiry. But at that stage, he has no right to be heard as
the inquiry is merely for the satisfaction of the Government
as to whether a regular inquiry must be held. …
***
45. In view of the above, it is evident that the evidence
recorded in preliminary inquiry cannot be used in regular
18 (2013) 4 SCC 301
298 [2025] 5 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
inquiry as the delinquent is not associated with it, and
opportunity to cross-examine the persons examined in
such inquiry is not given. Using such evidence would be
violative of the principles of natural justice.”
18. Guided by the law declared in the aforesaid decisions, we can safely
conclude that the enquiry conducted by the Enquiry Officer in a manner
not authorised by law could not have formed the basis of the order
of punishment dated 24th March, 2015 imposed on the respondent.
The first two issues are, therefore, answered in the negative.
19. In view of our answers to the first two issues and the glaring fact
of the report of enquiry not having seen the light of the day, the
third issue may not detain us for long. However, before specifically
answering this issue, we need to deal with the argument of learned
counsel for the appellant that the test of ‘prejudice’ ought to be applied
in this case since the respondent did not participate in the enquiry
and, therefore, there was no obligation for the disciplinary authority
to furnish such report. This argument has necessitated a study of
the law declared in B. Karunakar (supra), in some depth, to assess
how the jurisprudence has developed on the issue of non-furnishing
of the report of enquiry in the light of such decision.
20. Multiple decisions have been rendered by different Benches of this
Court where, considering B. Karunakar (supra), views have been
expressed placing the burden of proof on the delinquent employee to
demonstrate the ‘prejudice’ that he has suffered owing to non-furnishing
of the report of enquiry as a pre-requisite to succeed in his challenge
to the order of punishment on the ground of violation of natural justice,
with which we find ourselves in respectful disagreement. We may
be mistaken; but our reading suggests that the articulation of law in
B. Karunakar (supra) has been subject to varying interpretations,
and in some cases the key ruling has been overlooked so much so
that in the process its core principle stands overshadowed. Though
judicial discipline, propriety and decorum demand that we follow the
precedents bearing in mind the rule of stare decisis, or formulate the
issue(s) on which we disagree and refer the same for consideration
by a larger Bench, we propose not to walk that way since, on other
fronts, the violations/breaches in this case are so obtrusive, as already
found, that the respondent is entitled to grant of relief irrespective of
the legal position on the point, and what we express hereafter on the
effect and impact of non-furnishing of the report of enquiry.
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 299
State of Uttar Pradesh through Principal Secretary, Department of
Panchayati Raj, Lucknow v. Ram Prakash Singh
21. A random search for precedents over the past 20 (twenty) years’
reveals that in umpteen decisions in relation to service law (as
well as non-service law disputes), this Court has consistently
accepted the principle of law enunciated in B. Karunakar (supra)
that non-furnishing of the report of enquiry to the delinquent
employee constitutes violation of his right to raise an effective
defence. However, in the same breath, it has been observed in such
precedents that even if the report is not furnished in any particular
case, the court seized of the matter must make an independent
examination whether non-furnishing of the report has caused any
prejudice to him. The common thread running through all these
decisions is that quashing of the proceedings does not follow as
a ritual if the claim for obtaining relief is that the report of enquiry
has not been furnished; on the contrary, grant of relief in such a
case must be preceded by a satisfaction to be recorded by the
court that non-furnishing of the report did ‘prejudice’ the delinquent
employee amounting to the due process of law not being followed
and thereby causing a failure of justice; and, for such a finding to
be recorded, ‘prejudice’ has to be pleaded and proved. Indeed, an
onerous burden placed on a delinquent employee!
22. In relation to service law disputes, inter alia, the decisions in Haryana
Financial Corporation v. Kailash Chandra Ahuja;19 Union of India
v. Bishamber Das Dogra;20 Sarva U.P. Gramin Bank v. Manoj
Kumar Sinha;21 Union of India v. Alok Kumar;22 Punjab National
Bank v. K.K. Verma,23 Union of India v. R.P Singh24; SBI v. B.R.
Saini;25 and Union of India and Others v. Dilip Paul26 hold the field.
23. This Court has also noticed the decision in B. Karunakar (supra) in
a wide variety of cases raising disputes other than service, largely
focusing on the elucidation of principles of natural justice. Reference
may be made, inter alia, to the decisions in Dharampal Satyapal
19 (2008) 9 SCC 31
20 (2009) 13 SCC 102
21 (2010) 3 SCC 556
22 (2010) 5 SCC 349
23 (2010) 13 SCC 494
24 (2014) 7 SCC 340
25 (2018) 11 SCC 83
26 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1423
300 [2025] 5 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
Ltd. v. CCE,27 Swamy Devi Dayal Hospital & Dental College v.
Union of India,28 Vijayakumaran C.P.V. v. Central University of
Kerala,29 Mineral Area Development Authority of India & Anr.
v. Steel Authority of India & Anr.,30 Securities Exchange Board
of India v. Mega Corporation Limited31, T. Takano v. Securities
and Exchange Board of India and Anr.,32 State of U.P. v. Sudhir
Kumar Singh33 and Gorkha Security Services v. Govt. (NCT of
Delhi).34
24. Lest we be misunderstood, we clarify that our intention is to offer
insights and not to dispute or critique established views. We aim
here to present an alternative perspective on the law declared by
the Constitution Bench in B. Karunakar (supra) analysing the basic
question and the incidental questions that emerged for answers before
it, moving away from the prevailing perspective available in decisions
so far rendered by diverse Benches. As different understandings
have emerged, this endeavour may facilitate further clarification
or reconsideration by a relevant Bench, allowing for potential re-
evaluation in future cases which could ultimately lead to further
development and refinement of the law on the topic.
25. We propose to begin the discussion by referring to the decision in
State Bank of Patiala v. S.K. Sharma35, which was rendered by
a coordinate Bench of this Court close on the heels of the decision
in B. Karunakar (supra). Upon consideration thereof, this Court
in S.K. Sharma (supra) held that while applying the rule of audi
alteram partem (the primary principle of natural justice) the courts/
tribunals must always bear in mind the ultimate and overriding
objective underlying the said rule, viz. to ensure a fair hearing and
to ensure that there is no failure of justice. It was also authoritatively
held that:
27 (2015) 8 SCC 519
28 (2014) 13 SCC 506
29 (2020) 12 SCC 426
30 (2024) 10 SCC 257
31 (2023) 12 SCC 802
32 (2022) 8 SCC 162
33 (2021) 19 SCC 706
34 (2014) 9 SCC 105
35 (1996) 3 SCC 364
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 301
State of Uttar Pradesh through Principal Secretary, Department of
Panchayati Raj, Lucknow v. Ram Prakash Singh
“33. We may summarise the principles emerging from the
above discussion. (These are by no means intended to be
exhaustive and are evolved keeping in view the context of
disciplinary enquiries and orders of punishment imposed
by an employer upon the employee):
(1) An order passed imposing a punishment on an
employee consequent upon a disciplinary/departmental
enquiry in violation of the rules/regulations/statutory
provisions governing such enquiries should not be set aside
automatically. The Court or the Tribunal should enquire
whether (a) the provision violated is of a substantive nature
or (b) whether it is procedural in character.
(2) A substantive provision has normally to be complied
with as explained hereinbefore and the theory of substantial
compliance or the test of prejudice would not be applicable
in such a case.
(3) In the case of violation of a procedural provision, the
position is this: procedural provisions are generally meant
for affording a reasonable and adequate opportunity to
the delinquent officer/employee. They are, generally
speaking, conceived in his interest. Violation of any and
every procedural provision cannot be said to automatically
vitiate the enquiry held or order passed. Except cases
falling under — ‘no notice’, ‘no opportunity’ and ‘no
hearing’ categories, the complaint of violation of procedural
provision should be examined from the point of view of
prejudice, viz., whether such violation has prejudiced
the delinquent officer/employee in defending himself
properly and effectively. If it is found that he has been
so prejudiced, appropriate orders have to be made to
repair and remedy the prejudice including setting aside
the enquiry and/or the order of punishment. If no prejudice
is established to have resulted therefrom, it is obvious,
no interference is called for. In this connection, it may
be remembered that there may be certain procedural
provisions which are of a fundamental character, whose
violation is by itself proof of prejudice. The Court may not
insist on proof of prejudice in such cases. As explained
in the body of the judgment, take a case where there is
302 [2025] 5 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
a provision expressly providing that after the evidence
of the employer/government is over, the employee shall
be given an opportunity to lead defence in his evidence,
and in a given case, the enquiry officer does not give that
opportunity in spite of the delinquent officer/employee
asking for it. The prejudice is self-evident. No proof of
prejudice as such need be called for in such a case.
To repeat, the test is one of prejudice, i.e., whether the
person has received a fair hearing considering all things.
Now, this very aspect can also be looked at from the point
of view of directory and mandatory provisions, if one is
so inclined. The principle stated under (4) hereinbelow
is only another way of looking at the same aspect as is
dealt with herein and not a different or distinct principle.
(4)(a) In the case of a procedural provision which is not of
a mandatory character, the complaint of violation has to be
examined from the standpoint of substantial compliance.
Be that as it may, the order passed in violation of such a
provision can be set aside only where such violation has
occasioned prejudice to the delinquent employee.
(b) In the case of violation of a procedural provision, which is
of a mandatory character, it has to be ascertained whether
the provision is conceived in the interest of the person
proceeded against or in public interest. If it is found to be
the former, then it must be seen whether the delinquent
officer has waived the said requirement, either expressly
or by his conduct. If he is found to have waived it, then the
order of punishment cannot be set aside on the ground
of the said violation. If, on the other hand, it is found that
the delinquent officer/employee has not waived it or that
the provision could not be waived by him, then the Court
or Tribunal should make appropriate directions (include
the setting aside of the order of punishment), keeping in
mind the approach adopted by the Constitution Bench in
B. Karunakar. The ultimate test is always the same, viz.,
test of prejudice or the test of fair hearing, as it may be
called. … ”
26. Having regard to the statement of law in S.K. Sharma (supra), certain
questions fall for answers, viz. what would be the effect and impact
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 303
State of Uttar Pradesh through Principal Secretary, Department of
Panchayati Raj, Lucknow v. Ram Prakash Singh
of non-furnishing the report of enquiry by the disciplinary authority
to a delinquent employee before he is punished? Does he have to
plead and prove ‘prejudice’? Is it in all or specific circumstances that
the courts would insist on the delinquent employee to demonstrate
‘prejudice’? Is furnishing of the report of enquiry merely a procedural
step in the disciplinary proceedings or something more? We
may proceed to find the answers to these questions referring to
B. Karunakar (supra).
27. Due to an apparent conflict between the decisions in Kailash
Chander Asthana v. State of U.P. 36 and Union of India v.
Mohd. Ramzan Khan37—both delivered by Benches comprising
three Judges—a reference was made to a Constitution Bench for
authoritative resolution. Kailash Chander Asthana (supra) was a
case where the enquiry had been conducted by an Administrative
Tribunal under applicable disciplinary rules. It was held that the
failure to serve a copy of the enquiry report was not material. In
contrast, Mohd. Ramzan Khan (supra) marked a momentous
progress in the jurisprudence on disciplinary proceedings by
holding that a delinquent employee is entitled to receive a copy of
the enquiry report before the disciplinary authority decides on the
charges against them. Observing the divergence in these rulings, a
Bench of co-equal strength referred several cases to a Constitution
Bench through an order dated 5th August, 1991, which was decided
in B. Karunakar (supra). Notably, Mohd. Ramzan Khan (supra)
judgment heralded a watershed moment in disciplinary law,
declaring that withholding the enquiry report before the disciplinary
authority’s decision strikes at the very heart of natural justice. It
firmly entrenched the employee’s right to be heard before a final
decision to punish him is taken.
28. The majority opinion in the Constitution Bench decision of
B. Karunakar (supra) was authored by Hon’ble P.B. Sawant, J. The
questions which this Court considered are as under:
“2. The basic question of law which arises in these matters
is whether the report of the enquiry officer/authority who/
which is appointed by the disciplinary authority to hold an
enquiry into the charges against the delinquent employee,
36 (1988) 3 SCC 600
37 (1991) 1 SCC 588
304 [2025] 5 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
is required to be furnished to the employee to enable him
to make proper representation to the disciplinary authority
before such authority arrives at its own finding with regard to
the guilt or otherwise of the employee and the punishment,
if any, to be awarded to him. This question in turn gives
rise to the following incidental questions:
i. Whether the report should be furnished to the
employee even when the statutory rules laying down
the procedure for holding the disciplinary enquiry are
silent on the subject or are against it?
ii. Whether the report of the enquiry officer is required
to be furnished to the delinquent employee even
when the punishment imposed is other than the major
punishment of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank?
iii. Whether the obligation to furnish the report is only
when the employee asks for the same or whether it
exists even otherwise?
iv. Whether the law laid down in Mohd. Ramzan Khan
case will apply to all establishments — Government
and non-Government, public and private sector
undertakings?
v. What is the effect of the non-furnishing of the report
on the order of punishment and what relief should
be granted to the employee in such cases?
vi. From what date the law requiring furnishing of the
report, should come into operation?
vii. Since the decision in Mohd. Ramzan Khan case
has made the law laid down there prospective in
operation, i.e., applicable to the orders of punishment
passed after November 20, 1990 on which day the
said decision was delivered, this question in turn
also raises another question, viz., what was the law
prevailing prior to November 20, 1990?”
(emphasis ours)
29. At paragraph 18 of the judgment, this Court after examining the
decision in Kailash Chander Asthana (supra), Union of India v.
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 305
State of Uttar Pradesh through Principal Secretary, Department of
Panchayati Raj, Lucknow v. Ram Prakash Singh
E. Bashyan38 and Mohd. Ramzan Khan (supra) found no conflict
between Kailash Chander Asthana (supra) and the two others.
30. In view of the above, ordinarily, the Constitution Bench might not
have proceeded further; however, it found it necessary to do so in
light of the observations recorded in paragraph 19:
“19. In Mohd. Ramzan Khan case the question squarely fell
for consideration before a Bench of three learned Judges
of this Court, viz., that although on account of the Forty-
second Amendment of the Constitution, it was no longer
necessary to issue a notice to the delinquent employee
to show cause against the punishment proposed and,
therefore, to furnish a copy of the enquiry officer’s report
along with the notice to make representation against the
penalty, whether it was still necessary to furnish a copy
of the report to him to enable him to make representation
against the findings recorded against him in the report
before the disciplinary authority took its own decision with
regard to the guilt or otherwise of the employee by taking
into consideration the said report. The Court held that
whenever the enquiry officer is other than the disciplinary
authority and the report of the enquiry officer holds the
employee guilty of all or any of the charges with proposal
for any punishment or not, the delinquent employee is
entitled to a copy of the report to enable him to make a
representation to the disciplinary authority against it and
the non-furnishing of the report amounts to a violation
of the rules of natural justice. However, after taking this
view, the Court directed that the law laid down there shall
have prospective application and the punishment which
is already imposed shall not be open to challenge on
that ground. Unfortunately, the Court by mistake allowed
all the appeals which were before it and thus set aside
the disciplinary action in every case, by failing to notice
that the actions in those cases were prior to the said
decision. This anomaly was noticed at a later stage but
before the final order could be reviewed and rectified, the
present reference was already made, as stated above, by
38 (1988) 2 SCC 196
306 [2025] 5 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
a Bench of three learned Judges. The anomaly has thus
lent another dimension to the question to be resolved in
the present case.”
(emphasis ours)
31. Hon’ble K. Ramaswamy, J. agreed with the view expressed by
Hon’ble P.B. Sawant, J. on all but one of the points. His Lordship
opined that no mistake was made by the Bench in Mohd. Ramzan
Khan (supra) in granting relief to the employees, even though the
judgment said that the rule requiring the enquiry report to be given
to the employee would apply only in future cases. Importantly, both
Hon’ble Sawant and Hon’ble Ramaswamy, JJ. were on the three-
Judge Bench that decided Mohd. Ramzan Khan (supra). This Court
was aware that several appeals were pending, where high courts had
struck down disciplinary actions just because the enquiry report was
not furnished—relying on Mohd. Ramzan Khan (supra), even though
that ruling was meant to apply only to future cases. Because of this
confusion, the Constitution Bench had to clarify the law to properly
address those pending cases where disciplinary action was taken
before the decision in Mohd. Ramzan Khan (supra) was rendered.
The inconsistency mentioned in paragraph 19 of that ruling also
led to several related legal issues [questions (v), (vi), and (vii)] that
needed settlement.
32. Upon a survey of the legal position from the time the Government
of India Act, 193539 was enacted till the 42nd Amendment of the
Constitution of India came into effect, the Constitution Bench had
the occasion to observe as follows:
“24. Since the Government of India Act, 1935 till the Forty-
second Amendment of the Constitution, the Government
servant had always the right to receive the report of
the enquiry officer/authority and to represent against
the findings recorded in it when the enquiry officer/
authority was not the disciplinary authority. This right was
however, exercisable by him at the second stage of the
disciplinary proceedings viz., when he was served with
a notice to show cause against the proposed penalty.
The issuance of the notice to show cause against the
39 GoI Act
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 307
State of Uttar Pradesh through Principal Secretary, Department of
Panchayati Raj, Lucknow v. Ram Prakash Singh
penalty necessarily required the furnishing of a copy of
the enquiry officer’s report since, as held by the Courts,
the right to show cause against the penalty also implied
the right to represent against the findings on the charges.
This was considered to be an essential part of the
‘reasonable opportunity’ incorporated earlier in Section
240(3) of the GOI Act and later in Article 311(2) of the
Constitution as originally enacted. The right to receive
the enquiry officer’s report and to show cause against
the findings in the report was independent of the right
to show cause against the penalty proposed. The two
rights came to be confused with each other because as
the law stood prior to the Forty-second Amendment of
the Constitution, the two rights arose simultaneously only
at the stage when a notice to show cause against the
proposed penalty was issued. If the disciplinary authority
after considering the enquiry officer’s report had dropped
the proceedings or had decided to impose a penalty other
than that of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank, there
was no occasion for issuance of the notice to show cause
against the proposed penalty. In that case, the employee
had neither the right to receive the report and represent
against the finding of guilt nor the right to show cause
against the proposed penalty. The right to receive the
report and to represent against the findings recorded in
it was thus inextricably connected with the acceptance of
the report by the disciplinary authority and the nature of
the penalty proposed. Since the Forty-second Amendment
of the Constitution dispensed with the issuance of the
notice to show cause against the penalty proposed even
if it was dismissal, removal or reduction in rank, some
courts took the view that the Government servant was
deprived of his right to represent against the findings of
guilt as well. The error occurred on account of the failure
to distinguish the two rights which were independent of
each other.
25. While the right to represent against the findings
in the report is part of the reasonable opportunity
available during the first stage of the inquiry viz., before
the disciplinary authority takes into consideration the
308 [2025] 5 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
findings in the report, the right to show cause against the
penalty proposed belongs to the second stage when the
disciplinary authority has considered the findings in the
report and has come to the conclusion with regard to the
guilt of the employee and proposes to award penalty on
the basis of its conclusions. The first right is the right to
prove innocence. The second right is to plead for either
no penalty or a lesser penalty although the conclusion
regarding the guilt is accepted. It is the second right
exercisable at the second stage which was taken away
by the Forty-second Amendment.
26. The reason why the right to receive the report of
the enquiry officer is considered an essential part of
the reasonable opportunity at the first stage and also a
principle of natural justice is that the findings recorded
by the enquiry officer form an important material before
the disciplinary authority which along with the evidence is
taken into consideration by it to come to its conclusions.
It is difficult to say in advance, to what extent the said
findings including the punishment, if any, recommended in
the report would influence the disciplinary authority while
drawing its conclusions. The findings further might have
been recorded without considering the relevant evidence
on record, or by misconstruing it or unsupported by it.
If such a finding is to be one of the documents to be
considered by the disciplinary authority, the principles of
natural justice require that the employee should have afair
opportunity to meet, explain and controvert it before he
is condemned. It is negation of the tenets of justice and
a denial of fair opportunity to the employee to consider
the findings recorded by a third party like the enquiry
officer without giving the employee an opportunity to reply
to it. Although it is true that the disciplinary authority is
supposed to arrive at its own findings on the basis of the
evidence recorded in the enquiry, it is also equally true
that the disciplinary authority takes into consideration the
findings recorded by the enquiry officer alongwith the
evidence on record. In the circumstances, the findings
of the enquiry officer do constitute an important material
before the disciplinary authority which is likely to influence
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 309
State of Uttar Pradesh through Principal Secretary, Department of
Panchayati Raj, Lucknow v. Ram Prakash Singh
its conclusions. If the enquiry officer were only to record
the evidence and forward the same to the disciplinary
authority, that would not constitute any additional material
before the disciplinary authority of which the delinquent
employee has no knowledge. However, when the enquiry
officer goes further and records his findings, as stated
above, which may or may not be based on the evidence
on record or are contrary to the same or in ignorance
of it, such findings are an additional material unknown
to the employee but are taken into consideration by the
disciplinary authority while arriving at its conclusions. Both
the dictates of the reasonable opportunity as well as the
principles of natural justice, therefore, require that before
the disciplinary authority comes to its own conclusions,
the delinquent employee should have an opportunity to
reply to the enquiry officer’s findings. The disciplinary
authority is then required to consider the evidence, the
report of the enquiry officer and the representation of the
employee against it.
27. It will thus be seen that where the enquiry officer
is other than the disciplinary authority, the disciplinary
proceedings break into two stages. The first stage ends
when the disciplinary authority arrives at its conclusions
on the basis of the evidence, enquiry officer’s report and
the delinquent employee’s reply to it. The second stage
begins when the disciplinary authority decides to impose
penalty on the basis of its conclusions. If the disciplinary
authority decides to drop the disciplinary proceedings,
the second stage is not even reached. The employee’s
right to receive the report is thus, a part of the reasonable
opportunity of defending himself in the first stage of the
inquiry. If this right is denied to him, he is in effect denied
the right to defend himself and to prove his innocence in
the disciplinary proceedings.
28. The position in law can also be looked at from a slightly
different angle. Article 311(2) says that the employee shall
be given a ‘reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect
of the charges against him’. The findings on the charges
given by a third person like the enquiry officer, particularly
310 [2025] 5 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
when they are not borne out by the evidence or are arrived
at by overlooking the evidence or misconstruing it, could
themselves constitute new unwarranted imputations. What
is further, when the proviso to the said Article states that
‘where it is proposed after such inquiry, to impose upon
him any such penalty, such penalty may be imposed on
the basis of the evidence adduced during such inquiry
and it shall not be necessary to give such person any
opportunity of making representation on the penalty
proposed’, it in effect accepts two successive stages of
differing scope. Since the penalty is to be proposed after
the inquiry, which inquiry in effect is to be carried out by
the disciplinary authority (the enquiry officer being only his
delegate appointed to hold the inquiry and to assist him),
the employee’s reply to the enquiry officer’s report and
consideration of such reply by the disciplinary authority
also constitute an integral part of such inquiry. The second
stage follows the inquiry so carried out and it consists
of the issuance of the notice to show cause against the
proposed penalty and of considering the reply to the notice
and deciding upon the penalty. What is dispensed with is
the opportunity of making representation on the penalty
proposed and not of opportunity of making representation
on the report of the enquiry officer. The latter right was
always there. But before the Forty-second Amendment
of the Constitution, the point of time at which it was to
be exercised had stood deferred till the second stage
viz., the stage of considering the penalty. Till that time,
the conclusions that the disciplinary authority might have
arrived at both with regard to the guilt of the employee
and the penalty to be imposed were only tentative. All that
has happened after the Forty-second Amendment of the
Constitution is to advance the point of time at which the
representation of the employee against the enquiry officer’s
report would be considered. Now, the disciplinary authority
has to consider the representation of the employee against
the report before it arrives at its conclusion with regard to
his guilt or innocence of the charges.
(emphasis ours)
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 311
State of Uttar Pradesh through Principal Secretary, Department of
Panchayati Raj, Lucknow v. Ram Prakash Singh
33. Resting on the aforesaid reasoning, the answer to the basic question
(majority view) in B. Karunakar (supra) is found in paragraph 29
reading as follows:
“29. Hence it has to be held that when the enquiry officer
is not the disciplinary authority, the delinquent employee
has a right to receive a copy of the enquiry officer’s report
before the disciplinary authority arrives at its conclusions
with regard to the guilt or innocence of the employee with
regard to the charges levelled against him. That right is
a part of the employee’s right to defend himself against
the charges levelled against him. A denial of the enquiry
officer’s report before the disciplinary authority takes
its decision on the charges, is a denial of reasonable
opportunity to the employee to prove his innocence and
is a breach of the principles of natural justice.”
(emphasis ours)
34. Hon’ble Ramaswamy, J. answered the basic question as follows:
“61. It is now settled law that the proceedings must be
just, fair and reasonable and negation thereof offends
Articles 14 and 21. It is well-settled law that the principles
of natural justice are integral part of Article 14. No decision
prejudicial to a party should be taken without affording an
opportunity or supplying the material which is the basis
for the decision. The enquiry report constitutes fresh
material which has great persuasive force or effect on
the mind of the disciplinary authority. The supply of the
report along with the final order is like a post-mortem
certificate with putrefying odour. The failure to supply
copy thereof to the delinquent would be unfair procedure
offending not only Articles 14, 21 and 311(2) of the
Constitution, but also, the principles of natural justice.
The contention on behalf of the Government/management
that the report is not evidence adduced during such
enquiry envisaged under proviso to Article 311(2) is also
devoid of substance. It is settled law that the Evidence
Act has no application to the enquiry conducted during
the disciplinary proceedings. The evidence adduced is
312 [2025] 5 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
not in strict conformity with the Indian Evidence Act,
though the essential principles of fair play envisaged in
the Evidence Act are applicable. What was meant by
‘evidence’ in the proviso to Article 311(2) is the totality
of the material collected during the enquiry including the
report of the enquiry officer forming part of that material.
Therefore, when reliance is sought to be placed by the
disciplinary authority, on the report of the enquiry officer
for proof of the charge or for imposition of the penalty,
then it is incumbent that the copy thereof should be
supplied before reaching any conclusion either on proof
of the charge or the nature of the penalty to be imposed
on the proved charge or on both.”
(emphasis ours)
35. The answers to the incidental questions are found in paragraph 30.
A brief summary of the same is as follows:
i. Question (i): it was held that even if the disciplinary rules are
silent on providing the enquiry report to the delinquent employee
or prohibit it—the employee still has a right to get the enquiry
report. Denying the report means denying a fair chance to
defend oneself, which violates natural justice. So, any rule that
prevents giving the report is invalid.
ii. Question (ii): If someone other than the disciplinary authority
conducts the enquiry, the report must be shared with the
employee.
iii. Question (iii): The enquiry report must be given whether or not
the employee asks for it. It is his right, and not asking for it
does not mean he has given up that right.
iv. Question (iv): The law laid down in Mohd. Ramzan Khan (supra)
applies to all employees—Government, private, or public sector.
v. Question (v): discussed in the next paragraph.
vi. Question (vi): the requirement to provide the enquiry report
would take effect from November 20, 1990—the date of the
decision in Mohd. Ramzan Khan (supra).
vii. Question (vii): The rule requiring the enquiry report to be given
to the employee was established for the first time in Mohd.
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 313
State of Uttar Pradesh through Principal Secretary, Department of
Panchayati Raj, Lucknow v. Ram Prakash Singh
Ramzan Khan (supra), i.e., 20th November, 1990 and applies
only to disciplinary orders made after that date; orders passed
before it would be governed by the earlier law, which did not
mandate furnishing the report—even if related cases were still
pending in court.
36. The Constitution Bench’s answer to question (v), referring to the
‘prejudice’ principle, reads:
“[v] The next question to be answered is what is the
effect on the order of punishment when the report of
the enquiry officer is not furnished to the employee and
what relief should be granted to him in such cases.
The answer to this question has to be relative to the
punishment awarded. When the employee is dismissed
or removed from service and the enquiry is set aside
because the report is not furnished to him, in some cases
the non-furnishing of the report may have prejudiced
him gravely while in other cases it may have made no
difference to the ultimate punishment awarded to him.
Hence to direct reinstatement of the employee with back-
wages in all cases is to reduce the rules of justice to a
mechanical ritual. The theory of reasonable opportunity
and the principles of natural justice have been evolved
to uphold the rule of law and to assist the individual to
vindicate his just rights. They are not incantations to
be invoked nor rites to be performed on all and sundry
occasions. Whether in fact, prejudice has been caused
to the employee or not on account of the denial to him
of the report, has to be considered on the facts and
circumstances of each case. Where, therefore, even after
the furnishing of the report, no different consequence
would have followed, it would be a perversion of justice
to permit the employee to resume duty and to get all
the consequential benefits. It amounts to rewarding
the dishonest and the guilty and thus to stretching the
concept of justice to illogical and exasperating limits. It
amounts to an ‘unnatural expansion of natural justice’
which in itself is antithetical to justice.”
(emphasis ours)
314 [2025] 5 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
The Constitution Bench further proceeded to hold that:
“31. Hence, in all cases where the enquiry officer’s
report is not furnished to the delinquent employee in
the disciplinary proceedings, the Courts and Tribunals
should cause the copy of the report to be furnished to
the aggrieved employee if he has not already secured
it before coming to the Court/Tribunal and give the
employee an opportunity to show how his or her case
was prejudiced because of the non-supply of the report.
If after hearing the parties, the Court/Tribunal comes to
the conclusion that the non-supply of the report would
have made no difference to the ultimate findings and the
punishment given, the Court/Tribunal should not interfere
with the order of punishment. The Court/Tribunal should
not mechanically set aside the order of punishment
on the ground that the report was not furnished as is
regrettably being done at present. The courts should avoid
resorting to short cuts. Since it is the Courts/Tribunals
which will apply their judicial mind to the question and
give their reasons for setting aside or not setting aside
the order of punishment, (and not any internal appellate
or revisional authority), there would be neither a breach
of the principles of natural justice nor a denial of the
reasonable opportunity. It is only if the Court/Tribunal
finds that the furnishing of the report would have made
a difference to the result in the case that it should set
aside the order of punishment. Where after following the
above procedure, the Court/Tribunal sets aside the order
of punishment, the proper relief that should be granted
is to direct reinstatement of the employee with liberty to
the authority/management to proceed with the enquiry, by
placing the employee under suspension and continuing
the enquiry from the stage of furnishing him with the
report. The question whether the employee would be
entitled to the back-wages and other benefits from the
date of his dismissal to the date of his reinstatement if
ultimately ordered, should invariably be left to be decided
by the authority concerned according to law, after the
culmination of the proceedings and depending on the final
outcome. If the employee succeeds in the fresh enquiry
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 315
State of Uttar Pradesh through Principal Secretary, Department of
Panchayati Raj, Lucknow v. Ram Prakash Singh
and is directed to be reinstated, the authority should be
at liberty to decide according to law how it will treat the
period from the date of dismissal till the reinstatement and
to what benefits, if any and the extent of the benefits, he
will be entitled. The reinstatement made as a result of the
setting aside of the enquiry for failure to furnish the report,
should be treated as a reinstatement for the purpose of
holding the fresh enquiry from the stage of furnishing the
report and no more, where such fresh enquiry is held.
That will also be the correct position in law.”
(emphasis ours)
Ultimately, the Constitution Bench at paragraph 44 observed:
“44. The need to make the law laid down in Mohd. Ramzan
Khan case prospective in operation requires no emphasis.
As pointed out above, in view of the unsettled position of the
law on the subject, the authorities/managements all over
the country had proceeded on the basis that there was no
need to furnish a copy of the report of the enquiry officer
to the delinquent employee and innumerable employees
have been punished without giving them the copies of the
reports. In some of the cases, the orders of punishment
have long since become final while other cases are pending
in courts at different stages. In many of the cases, the
misconduct has been grave and in others the denial on
the part of the management to furnish the report would
ultimately prove to be no more than a technical mistake.
To reopen all the disciplinary proceedings now would
result in grave prejudice to administration which will far
outweigh the benefit to the employees concerned. Both
administrative reality and public interests do not, therefore,
require that the orders of punishment passed prior to the
decision in Mohd. Ramzan Khan case without furnishing
the report of the enquiry officer should be disturbed and
the disciplinary proceedings which gave rise to the said
orders should be reopened on that account. Hence we
hold as above.”
(emphasis ours)
316 [2025] 5 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
37. Plain reading of the questions posed and the answers thereto together
with the underlying reasons highlight the Constitution Bench’s anxiety
to safeguard the delinquent employee’s right to raise a fair defence,
especially in cases where the enquiry is conducted by someone
other than the disciplinary authority. This Court carefully reviewed the
legal framework, including Article 311 of the Constitution—both in its
original form and as amended by the 42nd Amendment, effective from
1st January, 1977. Notwithstanding that the law was in a nebulous
state at one point of time, the decision in B. Karunakar (supra)
brought clarity and settled the law without ambiguity.
38. Thus, the right to receive the enquiry report as a fundamental
safeguard in disciplinary proceedings, where such report holds the
charges against the delinquent employee to be established, was firmly
entrenched by the Constitution Bench in the jurisprudence relating
to proceedings initiated for disciplinary action for misconduct. This
valuable right applies uniformly, regardless of who the employer is
(Government, public or private) and regardless of what the rules
governing the service ordain. Even if the rules are silent or do not
require furnishing of the enquiry report, the same has to be furnished.
Additionally, the report must be furnished to the employee even
without a request, as it forms an integral part of ensuring a fair
and reasonable opportunity to defend against the charges. By not
furnishing the report, an employer cannot scuttle the rights of the
delinquent employee.
39. Reading the passage from S.K. Sharma (supra) highlighted above
bearing in mind the guidance received from the dicta in B. Karunakar
(supra), one can safely conclude that furnishing of a report of enquiry
though is a procedural step, it is of a mandatory character. However,
such a requirement can be waived by the delinquent employee,
expressly or by conduct, but if on facts he is found not to have waived
his right to receive the report, the theory of substantial compliance
or the test of ‘prejudice’ would not be applicable.
40. In the decisions of this Court, referred to at the beginning of the
discussion, it is revealed that some of the Benches of this Court
have not invalidated the employers’ acts of withholding the reports
of enquiry on the ground that the delinquent employees have not
been able to demonstrate how they suffered ‘prejudice’ by reason of
the reports not being furnished, notwithstanding that such decisions
of the employers clearly violated the precedential significance of the
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 317
State of Uttar Pradesh through Principal Secretary, Department of
Panchayati Raj, Lucknow v. Ram Prakash Singh
Constitution Bench decision in B. Karunakar (supra) while answering
question (i).
41. Application of the test of ‘prejudice’, when the requirement is
mandatory in character and where admittedly the report of enquiry
has not been furnished, goes against the very grain of the answer
rendered by the Constitution Bench in B. Karunakar (supra) to the
basic issue that was under consideration before it. It is proposed to
discuss, a little later in this judgment, why the test of ‘prejudice’ may
not be made applicable in respect of disciplinary action, proceedings
wherefor have commenced after the decision in B. Karunakar
(supra) was rendered, appreciating the deleterious effects likely to
befall employees who have been punished without furnishing of the
enquiry reports. We consider it reasonable to think that in every case
of failure/omission/neglect to furnish the report of enquiry, which is an
act of the employer certainly in utter disregard of the ratio decidendi
of the decision in B. Karunakar (supra), calling upon the employer
to justify why the judicial mandate of the Constitution Bench had not
been followed could have eased the situation.
42. Be that as it may, the question that troubles us is this: does the law
laid down while answering incidental questions have the effect of
overriding or prevailing over or modifying the law declared on the main
issue by the Constitution Bench? Questions (v), (vi) and (vii) framed
by the Constitution Bench in B. Karunakar (supra), to our mind, were
necessitated because of the error/anomaly that was noticed in the
ultimate direction in Mohd. Ramzan Khan (supra). As we read and
understand the law laid down in B. Karunakar (supra), the answers to
questions (v), (vi) and (vii) were intended to have limited application,
that is, to matters which were already pending before this Court or
before the high courts as on date the Constitution Bench rendered
its decision, where the challenge was laid to punishment orders
passed, both prior to and post November 20, 1990, i.e., the day
when Mohd. Rizwan Khan (supra) was decided. And the answer to
question (i), which was to apply prospectively, was intended to guide
decisions in future cases making it imperative that the employer has
to furnish such report to the delinquent employee, no matter who the
employer is, what the rules say or whether the delinquent employee
asks for it. Whatever be the legal (non)requirement or the factual
position, the report has to be furnished. That is the law. The report
has to be furnished because it is an integral part of natural justice
318 [2025] 5 S.C.R.
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and consideration of the report behind the back of the delinquent
employee would effectively deprive him of the protective shield of
‘reasonable opportunity to defend’ the charges. We are anchored in
our conviction that any other interpretation of the Constitution Bench
decision would result in diluting the law declared therein.
43. Interpretation of B. Karunakar (supra), particularly bearing in mind
the shifting trend towards the ‘prejudice’ principle and the insistence
on the pleading and proof of ‘prejudice’, may have unintended
consequences for delinquent employees which have not been
visualized hitherto, therefore, having the potential of rendering the
law laid down by the Constitution Bench a dead letter.
44. To recapitulate, B. Karunakar (supra) has unequivocally held
that non-furnishing of the enquiry report would deprive the
employee of the opportunity and disable him to demonstrate
before the disciplinary authority the perversity in such report by
filing a representation. The object that is sought to be achieved by
furnishing of the enquiry report is this. If the report were furnished,
the delinquent employee could persuade the disciplinary authority
to hold that either he is innocent and/or that he does not deserve
any punishment, or may be let off with a minor punishment.
Providing a delinquent employee with an opportunity to respond
to the enquiry report is, thus, a crucial procedural step that must
precede disciplinary action. Failure to do so, such as imposing
punishment without furnishing the report, could severely handicap
the employee’s ability to effectively question or challenge the
decision in an appeal/appropriate proceedings, as he would be
unaware of the materials against him. In such a case, at best,
nothing more than a plain and simple plea can be urged that non-
furnishing of the enquiry report has deprived him of reasonable
opportunity to counter the findings of guilt without, however, he being
able to demonstrate prejudice. It is axiomatic that without reading
the enquiry report, there cannot be an effective and meaningful
challenge to the findings contained therein.
45. That apart, the right to receive the report of enquiry being available
prior to a final decision being taken in the disciplinary proceedings
cannot be postponed by any arbitrary act of the employer in not
following the law, which can be or should be validated by the court,
and what was intended to be a pre-decisional opportunity cannot
be made to partake the character of a post-decisional opportunity.
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State of Uttar Pradesh through Principal Secretary, Department of
Panchayati Raj, Lucknow v. Ram Prakash Singh
46. Imagine a scenario where the employer seeking to get rid of an
inconvenient employee succeeds in its endeavour and dismisses
him following an enquiry, flawed in itself, by relying on the report
of enquiry without furnishing copy of the same to him. In such an
eventuality, the dismissed employee while approaching a tribunal/
court for redress has to do so without having access to the materials
considered in the report. This is best exemplified by the present
case where the report of enquiry has neither been furnished to the
respondent nor placed on record before all the adjudicatory fora.
In the absence of such access, can the delinquent employee be
expected to demonstrate prejudice suffered by him? We are not
sure how the burden can be discharged by the employee in such
a case. This lack of access to the report would severely hamper
the ability of the employee to demonstrate ‘prejudice’ and to build
a strong case for succeeding in his challenge to the order of
punishment. Besides, the lengthy legal process could be agonizing,
and especially without any earning, may not only lead to financial
strain and diminished resolve but could eventually end up with the
employee abandoning the challenge. Drawing from experience, we
understand how employers take advantage and employ methods
to drag on proceedings for years and thereby ensure that through
the process of ‘wear and tear’, the employee (if he has been either
dismissed or removed from service) loses steam and, inevitably,
lacking interest in the challenge effectively gets thrown out of the
legal arena by forces beyond his control.
47. These are vital considerations which, in our considered opinion,
need to engage the mind of every court while deciding to apply
the test of ‘prejudice’. In a battle between the mighty lion and the
weak lamb when the former is in an overpowering position, should
the courts lean in its favour and put the weak to the sword for not
having demonstrated ‘prejudice’ when a brazen violation of the law
declared by the Constitution Bench is brought to its notice? Why
should the mighty not be made answerable as to why the report of
enquiry has not been furnished and to bear whatever consequences
that are bound to follow its failure, omission or neglect in this behalf?
In a society governed by the rule of law and when the preambular
promise is to secure equality and justice for all, the weak lamb is
certainly entitled in law to demand that the ratio decidendi of B.
Karunakar (supra) be followed to the ‘T’. We regret, reliance placed
in some of the decisions primarily on certain English decisions on
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whether ‘opportunity would have served any purpose’, may not be
appropriate for acceptance in our service jurisprudence.
48. Looked at from a different angle, it is unheard of and simply
unacceptable to us that employers could brazenly disregard the
law declared by the Constitution Bench and/or act in derogation
of statutory rules, yet, argue that no prejudice was caused to the
dismissed employee by reason of not giving him access to the enquiry
report. If the answer to question (v) given in B. Karunakar (supra)
is to be regarded as the final word, we are left to wonder whether
it would have at all been necessary for the Constitution Bench to
elaborately discuss the law on the subject, stress on the importance
and need for the enquiry report to be furnished to the delinquent
employee and to introduce a new regime with prospective effect. If
the test of ‘prejudice’ were to be given primordial importance, the
Constitution Bench could have, on the contrary, simply observed that
post 20th November, 1990 [the date on which Mohd. Ramzan Khan
(supra) was decided], if in case report of enquiry in a particular case
were not furnished to the delinquent employee and upon the matter
reaching the tribunal/court for adjudication at a subsequent stage,
the employer is under no obligation to explain why the report has
not been furnished and its action of taking disciplinary action has to
be judged and could be interdicted only in the event the employee,
on the touchstone of ‘prejudice’, were to succeed in proving that he
had been denied reasonable opportunity to defend. The Constitution
Bench’s careful consideration of question (i), viz. the need to furnish
the enquiry report to a delinquent employee before disciplinary
action is taken being an integral part of natural justice, the answer
thereto would be rendered redundant if such an approach by the
employers is permitted. Allowing employers to circumvent the law
declared by the Constitution Bench and dilution of such declared law
regarding the necessity, nay imperative, to furnish the enquiry report
by interpretative exercises subsequently undertaken by Benches of
lesser strength without bearing in mind other Constitution Bench
decisions (we propose to refer to them briefly, immediately after
this discussion) on the effect of breach of natural justice principles
and the consequences that could visit an employee whose service
is terminated if the report were not furnished in the first place is an
unfortunate development which undermines the rule of law.
49. Just as Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution constitute a
triumvirate of rights of citizens conceived as charters on equality,
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State of Uttar Pradesh through Principal Secretary, Department of
Panchayati Raj, Lucknow v. Ram Prakash Singh
freedom and liberty, the trio of decisions of Constitution Benches
of this Court in Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel,40 Olga Tellis v.
Bombay Municipal Corporation41 and A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak42
form the bedrock of natural justice principles being regarded as part
of Article 14 of the Constitution and obviating the need to demonstrate
‘prejudice’ if a challenge were laid on the ground of breach of Article
14. In Tulsiram Patel (supra), it was held that violation of a principle
of natural justice is violation of Article 14. The dictum of the three-
Judge Bench in S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan43 that non-observance of
natural justice is itself prejudice to any man and proof of prejudice,
independently of proof of denial of natural justice is unnecessary,
was approved by the Constitution Bench in Olga Tellis (supra). No
prejudice need be proved for enforcing the Fundamental Rights is
the emphatic assertion in A.R. Antulay (supra).
50. These Constitution Bench decisions have stood the test of time.
Without being overruled in any subsequent decision, the law continues
to bind all Benches of lesser strength. Equally, it cannot be gainsaid
that with the march of time and the progress made in the years since
then, nuanced or refined approaches to applying natural justice
principles may be necessary and appropriate in specific cases. There
can be no quarrel with this approach. However, we find it difficult
for us to be guided by the decisions insisting on application of the
‘prejudice’ principle in the wake of the aforesaid Constitution Bench
decisions. Accepting such decisions of lesser strength would signal
re-imposition of the legal regime pre-Mohd. Ramzan Khan (supra)
when the employer was under no obligation to furnish the enquiry
report. We are afraid, this could encourage mischievous employers
to drain out its terminated employee by ensuring that copy of the
enquiry report is not furnished.
51. Thus said, what is the way for reconciling the law laid down in the
precedents discussed so far? Attempting to clear the confusion
arising out of different understandings of the ratio decidendi of the
decision in B. Karunakar (supra), we proceed to focus on the proper
course for the tribunal/court to adopt when the issue reaches it for
40 (1985) 3 SCC 398
41 (1985) 3 SCC 545
42 (1988) 2 SCC 602
43 (1980) 4 SCC 379
322 [2025] 5 S.C.R.
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adjudication. In our opinion, whenever a challenge is mounted to
an order of punishment on, inter alia, the ground that the report of
enquiry has not been furnished, the tribunal/court should require the
employer (Government, public or private) to justify non-furnishing of
such report. This is a course, which again experience has shown, is
seldom followed. If no valid explanation is proffered and the tribunal/
court suspects unfair motives (report has not been furnished as part
of a strategic ploy or to advance an unholy cause or prompted by
extraneous reasons) or carelessness, without much ado and without
insisting for ‘prejudice’ to be demonstrated, the order of punishment
should be set aside and the proceedings directed to resume from the
stage of offering opportunity to the delinquent employee to respond
to the enquiry report. Irrespective of ‘prejudice’ being demonstrated,
no employer or for that matter anyone should be permitted to steal
a march and gain any benefit by violating the law. In case the
tribunal/court is satisfied that real effort was made by the employer
but such effort remained abortive because the report could not
be furnished to the employee for reason(s) beyond its control, or
some other justification is placed on record, which is acceptable to
the tribunal/court, the test of ‘prejudice’ is open to be applied but
only after ensuring service of a copy of the enquiry report on the
employee. In a case where the employee either expressly or by his
conduct appears to have waived the requirement of having access
to the report, it would be open to the tribunal/court to deal with the
situation as per its discretion. However, the simplicitor application
of the ‘prejudice’ test absent a query to the employer, as indicated
above, in our opinion, would be in the teeth of the law laid down in
B. Karunakar (supra).
52. We now sum up our understanding of the law declared in B.
Karunakar (supra) and answer the four questions delineated in
paragraph 26 (supra) compositely. Reading the declaration of law
by the Constitution Bench regarding the imperative need to furnish
the report of enquiry to the delinquent employee even when: (i) the
relevant statutory rules are silent or against it, (ii) the punishment to
be imposed is other than the punishment referred to in clause (2) of
Article 311 of the Constitution, (iii) the employee does not ask for it,
and (iv) the burden is cast on a private employer too, and the law
requiring furnishing of the report being made to operate prospectively
from the date the decision in Mohd. Ramzan Khan (supra) was
rendered, thereby reinforcing the legal position that prevailed after
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State of Uttar Pradesh through Principal Secretary, Department of
Panchayati Raj, Lucknow v. Ram Prakash Singh
the GoI Act was enacted but became unsettled later, there can be
no two opinions that on and from 20th November, 1990 [i.e., when
Mohd. Ramzan Khan (supra) was decided] it is the mandatory
requirement of law that the report of enquiry has to be furnished to
the delinquent employee. Taking a cue from S. K. Sharma (supra),
we are inclined to the view that the requirement of furnishing the
report of enquiry, though procedural, is of a mandatory character and
the bogey argument of the employer to apply the test of ‘prejudice’
when the report of enquiry is not furnished cannot be of any avail
to thwart the challenge of the delinquent employee. Such test could
call for application, if from the facts and circumstances, it can be
established that the delinquent employee waived his right to have
the report furnished. Should satisfactory explanation be not proffered
by the employer for its failure/omission/neglect to furnish the enquiry
report, that ought to be sufficient for invalidating the proceedings and
directing resumption from the stage of furnishing the report. No proof
of prejudice for breach of a statutory rule or the principles of natural
justice and fair play need be proved, unless there is a waiver, either
express or by conduct, to of the right to receive the report. And, it is
only in specific and not in all circumstances that proof of ‘prejudice’
ought to be insisted upon.
53. While concluding our discussion, we repeat what has been observed
earlier. This discourse is intended, not to doubt existing points of
view, but to contribute to the understanding of the law. To prevent
misunderstandings and to provide clarity, we wish to make it clear
that it would be open for all courts, bound by Article 141 of the
Constitution, to decide matters coming up before them on the relevant
topic in accordance with what they perceive is the law declared in
B. Karunakar (supra).
54. Turning to the facts of the present appeal, we have noted how the
appellant has conducted itself in proceeding against the respondent.
Res ipsa loquitur. We have noted earlier that the report of enquiry
dated 15th September, 2014 has never seen the light of the day.
55. Relying on the law declared in S.K. Sharma (supra) which, in turn,
relied on B. Karunakar (supra), we hold that prejudice is self-evident
and no proof of prejudice as such is called for in this case.
56. Assuming that ‘prejudice’ has to be additionally shown, such question
at least does not arise here because we are also disabled from
looking into the said report. Much of what has been argued by
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learned counsel for the appellant pales into insignificance by reason
of the neglect of the appellant to even place on record before us the
report of enquiry. We draw adverse presumption and hold that there
is a purpose behind withholding the report. The report, if produced,
would have supported the contention of the respondent and hence,
conveniently, it has not been produced before any fora.
57. It would also be beneficial at this juncture to read the rules and
regulations which govern the respondent’s employment with the
appellant. Rule 9 of the 1999 Rules ordains that:
9. Action on Enquiry Report –
(1) ***
(2) ***
(3) ***
(4) If the disciplinary authority having regard to its
findings on all or any of charges is of the opinion that
any penalty specified in Rule 3 should be imposed on the
charged Government servant, he shall give a copy of the
enquiry report and his findings recorded under sub-rule
(2) to the charged Government servant and require him
to submit his representation if he so desires, within a
reasonable specified time. The disciplinary authority shall,
having regard to all the relevant records relating to the
enquiry and representation of the charged Government
servant, if any, and subject to the provisions of Rule 16
of these rules, pass a reasoned order imposing one or
more penalties mentioned in Rule 3 of these rules and
communicate the same to the charged Government
servant.
(emphasis ours)
58. It is clear, on a bare reading of Rule 9, that the procedure contemplated
therein corresponds to the procedure that was ordinarily followed in
conducting disciplinary proceedings prior to amendment of Article
311 by the Constitution (42nd Amendment) Act, 1976. As held in
paragraph 27 of B. Karunakar (supra), where the enquiry officer
is other than the disciplinary authority, the disciplinary proceedings
break into two stages. The first stage ends when the disciplinary
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State of Uttar Pradesh through Principal Secretary, Department of
Panchayati Raj, Lucknow v. Ram Prakash Singh
authority arrives at its conclusions on the basis of the evidence,
enquiry officer’s report and the delinquent employee’s reply to it
with regard to his alleged guilt. The second stage begins when the
disciplinary authority decides to impose penalty on the basis of its
conclusions reached at the first stage. If the disciplinary authority
decides to drop the disciplinary proceedings, the second stage is
not even reached. The employee’s right to receive the report is,
thus, a part of the reasonable opportunity of defending himself in
the first stage of the enquiry. If this right is denied to him, he is in
effect denied the right to defend himself and to prove his innocence
in the disciplinary proceedings.
59. In the present case, except that the respondent had not participated
in the second round of enquiry and, hence, the disciplinary authority
was not under obligation to furnish him the enquiry report, no other
worthy explanation is forthcoming as to why such report was not
furnished to the respondent. Assuming arguendo that the respondent
had without justification stayed away from the enquiry, the disciplinary
authority could not have considered the report of the Enquiry Officer
in view of what has been held in paragraph 26 of B. Karunakar
(supra) as well as Rule 9(4) of the 1999 Rules. Also, since the report
of enquiry has been withheld by the appellant at all three tiers, it
is preposterous that he would be in a position to plead and prove
prejudice. No such question does arise here.
60. We, thus, hold while answering the third issue that there has been
blatant disregard by the appellant of not only principles of natural
justice and the judicial command in B. Karunakar (supra) by not
furnishing the enquiry report but also by not following the applicable
statutory rule. The enquiry, therefore, stands wholly vitiated.
61. The fourth issue requires us to consider Abhishek Prabhakar
Awasthi (supra), a decision of the Full Bench of the High Court.
Being a Full Bench decision, obviously the Tribunal as well as the
Division Bench of the High Court was bound thereby. The Full Bench
rendered such decision upon considering, inter alia, the decision of
this Court in Union of India and Others v. Satyendra Kumar Sahai
and Another.44 We may only notice the answers to the questions
referred to the Full Bench, reading as follows:
44 (2005) 12 SCC 355
326 [2025] 5 S.C.R.
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“(A) Question No. (a): We hold that if an enquiry is not
concluded within the time which has been fixed by the
Court, it is open to the employer to seek an extension of
time by making an appropriate application to the Court
setting out the reasons for the delay in the conclusion of
the enquiry. In such an event, it is for the Court to consider
whether time should be extended, based on the facts and
circumstances of the case. However, where there is a
stipulation of time by the Court, it will not be open to the
employer to disregard that stipulation and an extension
of time must be sought;
(B) Question No. (b): The judgment of the Supreme Court in
the case of Suresh Chandra (supra) as well as the judgment
of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Satyendra
Kumar Sahai (supra) clearly indicate that a mere delay
on the part of the employer in concluding a disciplinary
enquiry will not ipso facto nullify the entire proceedings
in every case. The Court which has fixed a stipulation of
time has jurisdiction to extend the time and it is open to
the Court, while exercising that jurisdiction, to consider
whether the delay has been satisfactorily explained.
The Court can suitably extend time for conclusion of the
enquiry either in a proceeding instituted by the employee
challenging the enquiry on the ground that it was not
completed within the stipulated period or even upon an
independent application moved by the employer. The
Court has the inherent jurisdiction to grant an extension
of time, the original stipulation of time having been fixed
by the Court itself. Such an extension of time has to be
considered in the interests of justice balancing both the
need for expeditious conclusion of the enquiry in the
interests of fairness and an honest administration. In an
appropriate case, it would be open to the Court to extend
time suo motu in order to ensure that a serious charge of
misconduct does not go unpunished leading to a serious
detriment to the public interest. The Court has sufficient
powers to grant an extension of time both before and after
the period stipulated by the Court has come to an end”.
62. While affirming the aforesaid view of the Full Bench, we would
like to provide clarification on certain points not touched by such
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State of Uttar Pradesh through Principal Secretary, Department of
Panchayati Raj, Lucknow v. Ram Prakash Singh
bench. First, in view of unseen institutional hurdles that can slow
down swift action, it may not always be possible for the disciplinary
authority in each such case where a fixed time has been stipulated
by a tribunal/court to conclude the proceedings to apply and seek
extension of time before expiry of such time although there can
be no gainsaying that applying and obtaining an extension before
expiry is eminently desirable. In exceptional cases, even after
expiry of the stipulated time, such an application can be moved;
and, depending on the cause shown for inability or failure to
conclude the proceedings within the time stipulated and also for
not applying for extension before expiry, the tribunal/court may,
in its discretion, allow or reject the prayer for extension. If the
application is rejected, the proceedings cannot be carried forward
unless a superior court, reversing the order of rejection, permits
the disciplinary authority to so proceed. Secondly, if the delinquent
employee objects to continuation of proceedings beyond the time
stipulated, the disciplinary authority without proceeding further ought
to apply for extension of time and may not go ahead till such time
its prayer for extension is granted on such application. Proceeding
despite objection and without there being an extension could give
rise to apprehensions of bias. Therefore, applying for extension
upon halting the proceedings awaiting order on the application
would be an advisable course of action to balance the interests of
both the employer and the employee. Thirdly, even if the delinquent
employee has not objected to continuation of proceedings beyond
the time stipulated by the tribunal/court but before the final order
is passed in the proceedings, the disciplinary authority would be
bound to seek and obtain extension of time. This is for the simple
reason that the sanctity of the orders of tribunals/courts cannot be
disrespected by errant parties. The dignity of the judicial process
would be seriously eroded and there would be nothing left of the
rule of law if orders of tribunals/courts, validly made, are disobeyed
and the disobedience is encouraged by being indulgent. Finally,
we hasten to add that if a tribunal/court stipulates a fixed time
by which an enquiry or proceedings for disciplinary action ought
to be concluded coupled with a rider that, in default, the enquiry/
proceedings will stand lapsed, the disciplinary authority in such a
case would cease to have the jurisdiction to proceed further unless,
of course, citing genuine grounds, a recall of such default clause
is sought and obtained to proceed further in accordance with law.
328 [2025] 5 S.C.R.
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63. We also hold that continuation of disciplinary proceedings beyond the
time stipulated by a tribunal/court could invite interdiction if no bona
fide attempt is shown to have been made to seek an extension of
time. However, much would depend on the facts of each case and
it may not be possible to lay down a common formula applicable
to each case. In an exceptional case, the tribunal/court would have
the discretion to overlook the laxity and make such direction as it
deems fit in the circumstances.
64. The answer to the fourth issue, in view of our discussion, has to be
in favour of the respondent and against the appellant. Without an
extension of time, no order of punishment could have been validly
made and the grievance of the respondent in this behalf is absolutely
legitimate.
65. What survives for decision is now the fifth and final issue.
66. It is clear as day-light that the appellant despite being given an
opportunity to proceed in accordance with law failed to utilise such
opportunity. The respondent has experienced 75 (seventy-five)
summers, and is now in the winter years of his life.
67. There are two decisions of this Court, from which guidance could
be had.
68. In A. Masilamani v. LIC,45 this Court held:
“16. It is a settled legal proposition, that once the court
sets aside an order of punishment, on the ground that
the enquiry was not properly conducted, the court cannot
reinstate the employee. It must remit the case concerned to
the disciplinary authority for it to conduct the enquiry from
the point that it stood vitiated, and conclude the same.”
69. The decision of this Court in Allahabad Bank v. Krishna Narayan
Tiwari46 also throws light on the approach to be adopted but in a
more nuanced manner than what was held in A. Masilamani (supra).
Paragraph 8 of the decision reads as follows:
“8. There is no quarrel with the proposition that in cases
where the High Court finds the enquiry to be deficient, either
45 (2013) 6 SCC 530
46 (2017) 2 SCC 308
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State of Uttar Pradesh through Principal Secretary, Department of
Panchayati Raj, Lucknow v. Ram Prakash Singh
procedurally or otherwise, the proper course always is to
remand the matter back to the authority concerned to redo
the same afresh. That course could have been followed
even in the present case. The matter could be remanded
back to the disciplinary authority or to the enquiry officer
for a proper enquiry and a fresh report and order. But that
course may not have been the only course open in a given
situation. There may be situations where because of a long
time-lag or such other supervening circumstances the writ
court considers it unfair, harsh or otherwise unnecessary
to direct a fresh enquiry or fresh order by the competent
authority. That is precisely what the High Court has done
in the case at hand.”
(emphasis ours)
70. Respondent, undoubtedly, was denied a reasonable opportunity to
defend himself in the enquiry by the appellant, as ordained by the
1999 Rules. The manner in which the disciplinary proceedings were
conducted and continued against the respondent did not satisfy the
requirements of ‘due process’. The flaws creeping in such proceedings
have rendered the same wholly illegal. The routine course of action
in a case, such as the present, where an order of punishment is set
aside on grounds of breach of statutory rules and the charged officer
is not acquitted on merits, is to remit the case to the disciplinary
authority and direct resumption from the stage the proceedings is
found to stand vitiated.
71. This, in this case, would mean reverting to the stage of production
of witnesses on behalf of the department. When not a single witness
could be produced for examination in 2010 and 2014, we do not
think that witnesses would now be available to support the charges.
Even otherwise, these proceedings have certain incidents of 2004-05
as the origin. Having regard to the lapse of time since then coupled
with the retirement of the respondent from service in 2010 and,
more particularly, when the appellant despite an earlier opportunity
granted by the Tribunal has failed to avail the same by continuing the
enquiry in accordance with law, it would be highly unfair and unjust
to subject the respondent to face the enquiry once again. Gravity
of the offence alleged to have been committed is certainly a vital
consideration; however, repeated opportunities cannot be claimed
without there being overwhelming public interest warranting such
330 [2025] 5 S.C.R.
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opportunity. No doubt, the respondent was charged with involvement
in a financial scam but a line has to be drawn. Or else, it could be
an unending affair till such time based on a legal and valid report of
enquiry, the disciplinary authority passes an appropriate order. On
facts, we are satisfied that second opportunity was not required to
be given. Also, we have noticed from the materials on record that
two of the respondent’s colleagues (one of them a senior officer)
who were also proceeded against have been practically let off with
no punishment or punishment of stoppage of increments. Thus, we
are satisfied that no useful purpose will be served by reviving the
disciplinary proceedings and in remitting the case to the appellant. On
the contrary, the issue must be given a quietus because the Tribunal
or the High Court did not commit any illegality. We hold that the
Tribunal and the High Court were correct and justified in not granting
one more opportunity to the appellant to resume proceedings from
the stage invalidity in the proceedings was detected. The impugned
order of the High Court, not suffering from any legal infirmity, does
not warrant any interference and deserves to be upheld.
Conclusion
72. For the foregoing reasons, we find no merit in this appeal. The same
is, accordingly, dismissed. Interim order stands vacated.
73. The respondent shall be entitled to full retiral benefits from the date
of his superannuation without any sum being deducted. However,
provisional pension received by him may be adjusted with the arrears.
Let the pensionary benefits be computed and the balance sum of
pension together with other retiral benefits be released in favour
of the respondent as early as possible, but positively within three
months from date of receipt of a copy of this judgment and order.
In default, the sum payable to the respondent shall carry interest
@ 6% per annum and the High Court too shall be free to carry the
contempt proceedings forward.
74. Parties shall, however, bear their own costs.
Result of the case: Appeal dismissed.
†
Headnotes prepared by: Divya Pandey
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