STATE OF U.P.versusVEERPAL & ANR.

                       [2022] 1 S.C.R. 1163                            1163


                          STATE OF U.P.                                A
                                 v.
                        VEERPAL & ANR.
                 (Criminal Appeal No. 34 of 2022)
                       FEBRUARY 01, 2022                               B
        [M. R. SHAH AND B. V. NAGARATHNA, JJ.]
       Evidence Act, 1872 – s.32 – Dying declaration – Appreciation
of – Dying declaration recorded by the Magistrate in which
deceased specifically stated that due to feud over demand of money,
                                                                       C
respondents-accused burnt her after pouring kerosene over her –
On facts, no reason to doubt the dying declaration recorded by the
magistrate – Statements in the dying declaration consistent with
medical evidence inasmuch as there were no injuries on the chest
and injuries were found only on the head and backside – Such
injuries on the head and backside could have been possible only if     D
somebody have poured kerosene on the deceased from behind –
Evidentiary value of the dying declaration further enhanced by
certificate by physician who treated the deceased prior to her death
that at the time of making statements she was fully conscious – High
Court erred in acquitting the accused – Penal Code, 1860 – s.302
                                                                       E
r/w. s.34.
     Evidence – Dying declaration – Evidentiary Value- There can
be conviction solely based upon the dying declaration without
corroboration.
      Allowing the appeal, the Court                                   F
      HELD:1. Nothing is on record with regard to any allegation
against the Magistrate/SDM to the effect that he was biased or
interested in recording the dying declaration against the accused.
He was summoned during the course of investigation and during
the course of investigation he recorded the dying declaration and      G
the statement of deceased. Even the High Court as such has not
doubted the credibility of the dying declaration recorded by the
Magistrate/SDM on the ground of malice. The reasoning given
by the High Court to not rely upon the dying declaration recorded

                                                                       H
                               1163
1164            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2022] 1 S.C.R.


 A     by the Magistrate/SDM is not germane and cannot be accepted.
       There is no reason to doubt the dying declaration recorded by
       the Magistrate on 22.12.2011 in which the deceased specifically
       stated that at 11:00 am due to the feud over demanding money,
       respondents – accused have burned her after pouring kerosene
       over her. Therefore, in the statement of dying declaration
 B
       recorded by the Magistrate on 22.12.2011, the respondents –
       original accused are specifically named and it is specifically stated
       that they poured kerosene on her. [Para 10][1172-G-H;
       1173-A-B]
             2. Even considering the medical evidence on record and
 C
       the injuries sustained by the deceased, it is found that there were
       no injuries at all on the chest and injuries were found on the head
       and on the backside. As rightly observed by the Trial Court if
       she had committed suicide by pouring kerosene there would have
       been injuries on the chest as well as injuries would not have been
 D     on the head and on the backside. Such injuries as found on the
       body of the deceased could have been possible only if somebody
       had poured kerosene on her from behind her. The aforesaid aspect
       has not at all been considered by the High Court. [Para 10]
       [1173-E-F]
 E           3. There can be a conviction solely based upon the dying
       declaration without corroboration. [Para 10.1][1174-B]
             4. Although the accused was not specifically named by the
       deceased in her statement recorded under section 161 of the
       Cr.P.C, as the person who set the deceased on fire, he has been
 F     so named in her dying declaration. Even in the statement recorded
       under section 161 of the Cr.PC, the deceased has stated that her
       father--in--law had attacked her with a stick with an intention to
       kill her and as a result, she locked herself in the room and set
       herself ablaze. Therefore, there runs a common thread in the
       statements of the deceased, being that she was attacked by the
 G
       accused -respondent. Further, the statements made by the
       deceased in her dying declaration are consistent with medical
       evidence which reveals that there were burns on all parts of the
       body except chest and sides of the abdomen and back. The burns
       are at such parts as could have resulted when a person, other
 H
                STATE OF U.P. v. VEERPAL & ANR.                        1165


than the deceased poured kerosene and set fire. If the deceased        A
had set herself on fire, her chest ought to have been burnt. Medical
evidence is consistent with the dying declaration, thereby allowing
this Court to place reliance on the declarations. [Para 10.2]
[1175-D-G]
      5. The Trial Court has rightly observed as to the weight         B
and reliance that must be placed on the dying declaration of the
deceased. There was no reason for the High Court to disregard
the dying declaration of the deceased. It is noted that the dying
declaration was made by the deceased to Sub--Divisional
Magistrate (SDM) . His statement reveals that the deceased at
                                                                       C
the time of making the statements, was fully conscious and capable
of comprehending the questions put forth by the officer to whom
the declaration was made. The evidentiary value of the dying
declaration is further enhanced by the fact that it was accompanied
by a certificate from the physician who was treating the deceased
prior to her death, stating that the deceased remained fully           D
conscious while making the statement. The Trial Court rightly
placed reliance on the dying declaration having due regard to the
statements made by the physician as to the medical condition of
the deceased while making such declaration. The Trial Court has
also rightly noted that the statements of the SDM and the
                                                                       E
physician, being independent witnesses in the trial, has added
weight to the prosecution case as the same could not be motivated
by malice. [Para 10.2][1175-G-H; 1176-A-C]
      6. Considering the dying declaration recorded by the SDM/
Magistrate on 22.12.2011 the accused can be convicted for which
                                                                       F
they were tried. Hence, the High Court has committed a grave
error in acquitting the accused. The impugned judgment and order
passed by the High Court acquitting the accused for the offences
punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the IPC is
unsustainable and the same deserves to be quashed and set aside.
[Para 11][1176-D-E]                                                    G
      Munnu Raja & Anr. v. State of M.P. (1976) 3 SCC 104
      : [1976] 2 SCR 764 ; Paniben (Smt) v. State of Gujarat,
      (1992) 2 SCC 474 : [1992] 2 SCR 197; State of Uttar

                                                                       H
1166          SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2022] 1 S.C.R.


 A          Pradesh v. Ram Sagar Yadav & Ors. (1985) 1 SCC 552
            : [1985] 2 SCR 621; Ramawati Devi v. State of Bihar,
            (1983) 1 SCC 211 and Kushal Rao v. State of Bombay,
            AIR 1958 SC 22 : [1958] SCR 552 – relied on.
            Ravi Chander & Ors. v. State of Punjab (1998) 9 SCC
 B          303; Harjit Kaur v. State of Punjab (1999) 6 SCC 545;
            Koli Chunilal Savji & Anr. v. State of Gujarat (1999) 9
            SCC 562 : [1999] 3 Suppl. SCR 284; Vikas&Ors.
            v.State of Maharashtra (2008) 2 SCC 516 : [2008]
            1 SCR 933; Laxman v. State of Maharashtra (2002) 6
            SCC 710; Jagbir Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2019)
 C
            8 SCC 779 : [2019] 11 SCR 1137; Amol Singh v. State
            of M.P., (2008) 5 SCC 468 : [2008] 8 SCR 956;
            Kundula Bala Subrahmanyam & Anr. v. State of Andhra
            Pradesh (1993)2SCC684 : [1993] 2 SCR 666 – referred
            to.
 D                          Case Law Reference
       (1998) 9 SCC 303               referred to           Para 5.3
       (1999) 6 SCC 545               referred to           Para 5.3
       [1999] 3 Suppl. SCR 284        referred to           Para 5.3
 E
       [2008] 1 SCR 933               referred to           Para 5.3
       (2002) 6 SCC 710               referred to           Para 5.3
       [2019] 11 SCR 1137             referred to           Para 5.3

 F     [2008] 8 SCR 956               referred to           Para 5.4
       [1993] 2 SCR 666               referred to           Para 5.4
       [1976] 2 SCR 764               relied on             Para 5.4
       [1992] 2 SCR 197               relied on             Para 10.1
 G     [1985] 2 SCR 621               relied on             Para 10.1
       (1983) 1 SCC 211               relied on             Para 10.1
       [1958] SCR 552                 relied on             Para 10.2


 H
                 STATE OF U.P. v. VEERPAL & ANR.                              1167


       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.                   A
34 of 2022.
      From the Judgment and Order dated 30.05.2020 of the High Court
of Judicature at Allahabad in Criminal Appeal No.4658 of 2015.
      Ms. Garima Prashad, AAG, Vishnu Shankar Jain, Advs. for the
Appellant.                                                                    B

      P. S. Khurana, Vibhuti Sushant Gupta, Narender Kumar Verma,
Advs. for the Respondents.
      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
      M. R. SHAH, J.                                                          C
      1. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment
and order dated 30.05.2020 passed by the Division Bench of the High
Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Criminal Appeal No. 4658 of 2015
by which the High Court has allowed the said appeal preferred by the
respondents herein – original accused and has acquitted the accused for       D
the offences under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the IPC, the
State has preferred the present appeal.
      2. The facts leading to the present appeal in nutshell are as under:-
       2.1 That PW-1 Bengali Babu gave the First Information Report
which was registered as Crime No.1144/11 initially for the offences           E
under Section 326 of the IPC to the effect that on 20.12.2011 at about
2:30 pm, he got a call from Radha – daughter of the deceased that her
mother had got burnt. He immediately reached the hospital and at that
time SDM was taking the deceased’s statement. According to him,
the girl told that her father-in-law and mother-in-law demanded the           F
money and when she refused there was an assault and thereafter they
poured kerosene over her and with a burning matchstick burnt her.
The Investigating Officer started the investigation. He recorded the
statements of the relevant witnesses and collected the necessary
evidence including the medical evidence. After completion of
investigation, Investigating Officer filed the charge-sheet against the       G
accused for the offences under Section 302 read with Section 34 of
the IPC. The learned Trial Court framed the charge against the accused
for the aforesaid offences. The accused denied the charge and pleaded
not guilty. Therefore, they claimed to be tried by the Trial Court for the
aforesaid offences.                                                           H
1168            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2022] 1 S.C.R.


 A            2.2 To prove the charge against the accused, the prosecution
       examined as many as 10 witnesses. PW-5 turned hostile. The prosecution
       also brought on record documentary evidences including two dying
       declarations, one recorded by the police officer and another, recorded by
       the Magistrate/SDM. On appreciation of evidence and considering two
       dying declarations, the learned Trial Court believed the dying declaration
 B
       recorded by the Magistrate on 22.12.2011 and further observed that the
       defence put forth on behalf of the accused that the deceased herself poured
       the kerosene on her is not believable considering the medical evidence on
       record. Thereafter the learned Trial Court convicted the accused for the
       offences under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the IPC and sentenced
 C     the accused to undergo life imprisonment.
              3. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the judgment and order
       of conviction and sentence imposed by the Trial Court, the accused
       preferred the appeal before the High Court being Criminal Appeal
       No.4658/2015. By the impugned judgment and order, the High Court
 D     has acquitted the accused mainly on the ground that there were two
       dying declarations, one recorded on 20.12.2011 and another recorded on
       22.12.2011 and there was a gap of two days between the two dying
       declarations. The High Court instead of relying on the dying declaration
       recorded by SDM/Deputy Commissioner of Agra and by disbelieving
       both the dying declarations has acquitted the accused by observing that
 E     according to the deceased when she was forced to give the money and
       when she refused, the accused tried to assault and she ran away and
       under the pressure she might have poured the kerosene on her.
             4. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment
       and order passed by the High Court, acquitting the accused for the
 F     offences under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the IPC, the State
       has preferred the present appeal.
             5. Ms. Garima Prashad, learned Senior Advocate appearing on
       behalf of the State has vehemently submitted that in the facts and
       circumstances of the case, the High Court has committed a grave error
 G     in acquitting the accused for the serious offences under Section 302
       read with Section 34 of the IPC.
             5.1 It is further submitted by the learned Senior Advocate appearing
       on behalf of the State that in the present case, the High Court ought to
       have relied upon and considered the dying declaration recorded by the
 H     competent magistrate.
                  STATE OF U.P. v. VEERPAL & ANR.                             1169
                         [M. R. SHAH, J.]

       5.2 It is submitted that as such cogent reasons were given by the      A
Trial Court on appreciation of evidence that the statement before the IO
which was considered to be first dying declaration on 20.12.2011 does
not inspire any confidence. It is submitted that the aforesaid finding
recorded by the learned Trial Court was on appreciation of available
evidence on record more particularly the medical evidence.
                                                                              B
       5.3 It is submitted that the High Court ought to have appreciated
that the dying declaration recorded by a competent Magistrate would
stand on a higher footing than the declaration made to IO under Section
161 of Cr.PC. Reliance is placed upon the decisions of this Court in the
cases of Ravi Chander & Ors. V. State of Punjab (1998) 9 SCC
303 (para 6); Harjit Kaur V. State of Punjab (1999) 6 SCC 545,                C
(para 6); Koli Chunilal Savji & Anr. V. State of Gujarat (1999) 9
SCC 562 (para 8); Vikas & Ors. V. State of Maharashtra (2008) 2
SCC 516 (para 48); Laxman V. State of Maharashtra (2002) 6
SCC 710 and Jagbir Singh V. State (NCT of Delhi) (2019) 8 SCC
779 (para 21).                                                                D
      5.4 It is submitted that in the present case as such the High Court
has specifically observed that both the dying declarations cannot be
believed and it is not safe to rely upon multiple dying declarations of the
deceased. It is submitted that the High Court has observed that it would
not be safe to rely upon multiple dying declarations of the deceased in       E
the absence of any corroborative evidence. It is submitted that the
aforesaid is contrary to the law laid down by this Court in the cases of
Amol Singh V. State of M.P., (2008) 5 SCC 468 (para 13); Kundula
Bala Subrahmanyam & Anr. V. State of Andhra Pradesh (1993) 2
SCC 684 (para 18); Munnu Raja & Anr. V. State of M.P., (1976) 3
SCC 104 (para 6). It is submitted that as held by this Court in the           F
aforesaid decisions there can be conviction on the basis of a dying
declaration of the deceased without there being any corroborative
evidence on record.
       5.5 It is submitted that in the present case, the High Court has
erred in not relying upon the dying declarations more particularly the        G
dying declaration recorded by the Magistrate/SDM without any cogent
reason. It is submitted that as such the High Court has not doubted the
credibility and/or has not observed anything with regard to malice on the
part of the executive magistrate who recorded the statement on
22.12.2011. It is submitted therefore the High Court ought to have upheld     H
1170            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2022] 1 S.C.R.


 A     the conviction relying upon the dying declaration recorded by the
       Magistrate/SDM on 22.12.2011.
              5.6 It is hence submitted that the impugned judgment and order
       passed by the High Court is not sustainable and the impugned judgment
       and order deserves to be quashed and set aside and the judgment and
 B     order passed by the learned Trial Court convicting the accused under
       Section 302 read with Section 34 of the IPC deserves to be upheld/
       restored.
               6. The present appeal is vehemently opposed by Shri P.S. Khurana,
       learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents – original accused.
 C     It is vehemently submitted by learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
       original accused that in the facts and circumstances of the case and in
       view of multiple dying declarations, the High Court has rightly acquitted
       the accused.
             6.1 It is submitted that as rightly observed by the High Court once
 D     the dying declaration was recorded by the police officer on 20.12.2011,
       thereafter there was no reason to record another dying declaration on
       22.12.2011.
              6.2 It is submitted that in the first dying declaration recorded on
       20.12.2011 she stated that out of fear of father-in-law, she committed
 E     suicide and the role assigned to respondent No.1 – father-in-law in her
       first dying declaration dated 20.12.2011 was only of chasing her for
       beating and not for burning, and in the second dying declaration recorded
       by the Magistrate, there was a somersault and the victim – deceased
       implicated all other family members, the High Court has rightly refused
       to rely upon the dying declaration recorded by the Magistrate/SDM on
 F     22.12.2011.
              6.3 It is submitted that on appreciation of evidence, the High Court
       has observed that the deceased was mentally weak. It is submitted that
       therefore in such a state of mind and because of the fear of her
       father-in-law that she will be beaten when she refused to give the money,
 G     she committed suicide by pouring kerosene on herself; no case of murder
       has been made out and therefore, the High Court has rightly acquitted
       the accused for the offences punishable under Section 302 read with
       Section 34 of the IPC.
             7. Making the above submissions, it is prayed to dismiss the present
 H     appeal.
                  STATE OF U.P. v. VEERPAL & ANR.                               1171
                         [M. R. SHAH, J.]

      8. We have heard the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the           A
respective parties at length.
       9. At the outset, it is required to be noted in the present case,
there are two dying declarations, one recorded by the Police Officer on
20.12.2011 and another recorded by the Magistrate/SDM recorded on
22.12.2011. Even in the impugned judgment and order, the High Court             B
has as such specifically observed that none of the dying declarations
inspire confidence. The High Court has not believed the dying declaration
recorded by the Magistrate/SDM on 22.12.2011 mainly on the ground
that when the dying declaration was already recorded by the Police
Officer on 20.12.2011, there was no reason to record the second dying
declaration. However, it is required to be noted that what was recorded         C
by the Police Officer on 20.12.2011 was the statement under Section
161 Cr.PC. Therefore, it was thought fit to record the dying declaration
of the deceased by the Magistrate and that is why SDM was called to
record the dying declaration of deceased on 22.12.2011. At the cost of
repetition, it is observed that even the High Court has specifically observed   D
that the first statement/dying declaration recorded by the Police on
20.12.2011 does not inspire any confidence. In that view of the matter, it
is required to be considered whether the dying declaration recorded by
the Magistrate on 22.12.2011 is to be believed or not and whether on the
basis of such dying declaration recorded by the Magistrate/SDM, the
accused can be convicted or not.                                                E

       9.1 While considering the aforesaid question/issue a few decisions
of this Court on the credibility of the dying declaration recorded by the
Magistrate are required to be referred to.
       9.1.1 In the case of Laxman (supra) after referring to and               F
considering the earlier decisions on the credibility of the dying declaration
recorded by the Magistrate, it was observed that the Magistrate being a
disinterested witness and a responsible officer and there being no
circumstances or material to suspect that the Magistrate had any animus
against the accused or was in any way interested for fabricating a dying
declaration, question of doubt on the declaration, recorded by the              G
Magistrate does not arise.
       9.1.2 In the case of Jagbir Singh (supra) this Court had an
occasion to consider the law relating to the dying declaration and the
problem of multiple dying declarations in detail. It was observed and
held that merely because there are two/multiple dying declarations, all         H
1172             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2022] 1 S.C.R.


 A     the dying declarations are not to be rejected. It was observed and held
       that when there are multiple dying declarations the case must be decided
       on the facts of each case and the court will not be relieved of its duty to
       carefully examine the entirety of the material on record as also the
       circumstances surrounding the making of the different dying declarations.
       Ultimately, in paragraph 32, this Court concluded as under: -
 B
             “Our conclusion on multiple dying declarations
             32 We would think that on a conspectus of the law as laid down
             by this Court, when there are more than one dying declaration,
             and in the earlier dying declaration, the accused is not sought to
 C           be roped in but in the later dying declaration, a somersault is made
             by the deceased, the case must be decided on the facts of each
             case. The court will not be relieved of its duty to carefully examine
             the entirety of materials as also the circumstances surrounding
             the making of the different dying declarations. If the court finds
             that the incriminatory dying declaration brings out the truthful
 D           position particularly in conjunction with the capacity of the
             deceased to make such declaration, the voluntariness with which
             it was made which involves, no doubt, ruling out tutoring and
             prompting and also the other evidence which support the contents
             of the incriminatory dying declaration, it can be acted upon. Equally,
 E           the circumstances which render the earlier dying declaration,
             worthy or unworthy of acceptance, can be considered.”
             Similar views have been expressed by this Court in the case of
       Ravi Chander & Ors. (supra), Harjit Kaur (supra), Koli Chunilal
       Savji & Anr. (supra) and Vikas & Ors. (supra).
 F             10. Applying the law laid down by this Court in the aforesaid
       decisions to the facts of the case on hand, it is required to be considered
       whether the dying declaration recorded by the Magistrate on 22.12.2011
       is to be believed or not. Nothing is on record with regard to any allegation
       against the Magistrate/SDM to the effect that he was biased or interested
 G     in recording the dying declaration against the accused. He was
       summoned during the course of investigation and during the course of
       investigation he recorded the dying declaration and the statement of
       deceased. Even the High Court as such has not doubted the credibility
       of the dying declaration recorded by the Magistrate/SDM on the ground
       of malice. The reasoning given by the High Court to not rely upon the
 H     dying declaration recorded by the Magistrate/SDM is not germane and
                  STATE OF U.P. v. VEERPAL & ANR.                               1173
                         [M. R. SHAH, J.]

cannot be accepted. We see no reason to doubt the dying declaration             A
recorded by the Magistrate on 22.12.2011 in which the deceased
specifically stated that at 11:00 am due to the feud over demanding money,
respondents – accused have burned her after pouring kerosene over
her. Therefore, in the statement of dying declaration recorded by the
Magistrate on 22.12.2011, the respondents – original accused are
                                                                                B
specifically named and it is specifically stated that they poured kerosene
on her. At this stage, it is required to be noted that in so far as the
statement recorded by the IO on 20.12.2011, it was recorded that the
father-in- law demanded money and started beating her with a stick, she
ran away and she locked the door from inside and out of anger she
poured the kerosene available in the room and set herself on blaze is           C
concerned, considering the medical evidence on record the said statement/
dying declaration recorded by the Police Officer on 20.12.2011 does not
inspire any confidence. Medical evidence does not support the version
stated in the said dying declaration. It is to be noted that even according
to the accused, the father-in-law took her to hospital. If statement of
                                                                                D
deceased in first dying declaration that she locked the door from inside
and out of anger she poured kerosene is accepted, in that case it is not
explained by the accused as to how she was taken to the hospital, as
nothing is on record that the door was broken/opened by the father-in-law
– accused and thereafter she was taken to hospital. Even considering
the medical evidence on record and the injuries sustained by the deceased,      E
it is found that there were no injuries at all on the chest and injuries were
found on the head and on the backside. As rightly observed by the Trial
Court if she had committed suicide by pouring kerosene there would
have been injuries on the chest as well as injuries would not have been
on the head and on the backside. In our view, such injuries as found on
                                                                                F
the body of the deceased could have been possible only if somebody had
poured kerosene on her from behind her. The aforesaid aspect has not
at all been considered by the High Court.
       10.1 Now, on the aspect, whether in absence of any corroborative
evidence, there can be a conviction relying upon the dying declaration
only is concerned, the decision of this Court in the case of Munnu Raja         G
& Anr. (supra) and the subsequent decision in the case of Paniben
(Smt) V. State of Gujarat, (1992) 2 SCC 474 are required to be referred
to. In the aforesaid decisions, it is specifically observed and held that
there is neither a rule of law nor of prudence to the effect that a dying
declaration cannot be acted upon without a corroboration. It is observed        H
1174             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2022] 1 S.C.R.


 A     and held that if the Court is satisfied that the dying declaration is true
       and voluntary it can base its conviction on it, without corroboration. Similar
       view has also been expressed in the cases of State of Uttar Pradesh
       V. Ram Sagar Yadav & Ors. (1985) 1 SCC 552 and Ramawati Devi
       V. State of Bihar, (1983) 1 SCC 211. Therefore, there can be a
       conviction solely based upon the dying declaration without corroboration.
 B
              10.2 Kushal Rao V. State of Bombay, AIR 1958 SC 22:1958
       SCR 552 is a watershed judgment on the law on the evidentiary value
       of dying declarations. This Court laid down the following principles as to
       the circumstances under which a dying declaration may be accepted,
       without corroboration: -
 C
              “16. On a review of the relevant provisions of the Evidence Act
              and of the decided cases in the different High Courts in India and
              in this Court, we have come to the conclusion, in agreement with
              the opinion of the Full Bench of the Madras High Court, aforesaid,
              (1) that it cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law that a
 D            dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction unless
              it is corroborated; (2) that each case must be determined on its
              own facts keeping in view the circumstances in which the dying
              declaration was made; (3) that it cannot be laid down as a general
              proposition that a dying declaration is a weaker kind of evidence
              than other pieces of evidence; (4) that a dying declaration stands
 E
              on the same footing as another piece of evidence and has to be
              judged in the light of surrounding circumstances and with reference
              to the principles governing the weighing of evidence; (5) that a
              dying declaration which has been recorded by a competent
              Magistrate in the proper manner, that is to say, in the form of
 F            questions and answers, and, as far as practicable, in the words of
              the maker of the declaration, stands on a much higher footing
              than a dying declaration which depends upon oral testimony which
              may suffer from all the infirmities of human memory and human
              character, and (6) that in order to test the reliability of a dying
              declaration, the court has to keep in view, the circumstances like
 G
              the opportunity of the dying man for observation, for example,
              whether there was sufficient light if the crime was committed at
              night; whether the capacity of the man to remember the facts
              stated, had not been impaired at the time he was making the
              statement, by circumstances beyond his control; that the statement
 H            has been consistent throughout if he had several opportunities of
                  STATE OF U.P. v. VEERPAL & ANR.                             1175
                         [M. R. SHAH, J.]

      making a dying declaration apart from the official record of it;        A
      and that the statement had been made at the earliest opportunity
      and was not the result of tutoring by interested parties.”
       The relevant facts of the said case are that the deceased therein
had given three successive dying declarations within a span of two hours,
which were, to a certain degree contradictory to each other. However,         B
one of the aspects that remained common and was narrated by the
deceased in all three dying declarations was that he was attacked by
two persons, namely Kushal Rao and Tukaram with swords and spears.
This Court, relying on the common thread running through all dying
declarations, which was consistent with medical evidence revealing
punctured and incised wounds on various parts of the body, held that the      C
said declarations could be relied upon in convicting the accused who had
been named in all three dying declarations.
       Co-relating the said facts to the facts of the instant case, we have
noted that although the accused was not specifically named by the
deceased in her statement recorded under section 161 of the Cr.PC, as         D
the person who set the deceased on fire, he has been so named in her
dying declaration. Even in the statement recorded under section 161 of
the Cr.PC, the deceased has stated that her father- in-law had attacked
her with a stick with an intention to kill her and as a result, she locked
herself in the room and set herself ablaze. Therefore, we find that there     E
runs a common thread in the statements of the deceased, being that she
was attacked by the accused-respondent herein. Further, we also find
that the statements made by the deceased in her dying declaration are
consistent with medical evidence which reveals that there were burns
on all parts of the body except chest and sides of the abdomen and back.
The burns are at such parts as could have resulted when a person, other       F
than the deceased poured kerosene and set fire. As already noted, if the
deceased had set herself on fire, her chest ought to have been burnt. In
light of the aforesaid discussion and the decision in Kushal Rao (supra),
we find that the medical evidence is consistent with the dying declaration,
thereby allowing this Court to place reliance on the declarations.            G
      The Trial Court has rightly observed as to the weight and reliance
that must be placed on the dying declaration of the deceased. There
was no reason for the High Court to disregard the dying declaration of
the deceased. It is noted that the dying declaration was made by the
deceased to Sub-Divisional Magistrate (SDM) Bal Kishan Agarwal, who           H
1176              SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2022] 1 S.C.R.


 A     was also examined as a prosecution witness (PW-6) before the Trial
       Court. His statement reveals that the deceased at the time of making
       the statements, was fully conscious and capable of comprehending the
       questions put forth by the officer to whom the declaration was made.
       The evidentiary value of the dying declaration is further enhanced by
       the fact that it was accompanied by a certificate from the physician who
 B
       was treating the deceased prior to her death, stating that the deceased
       remained fully conscious while making the statement. The Trial Court
       rightly placed reliance on the dying declaration having due regard to the
       statements made by the physician as to the medical condition of the
       deceased while making such declaration. The Trial Court has also rightly
 C     noted that the statements of the SDM and the physician, being independent
       witnesses in the trial, has added weight to the prosecution case as the
       same could not be motivated by malice.
             11. Therefore, considering the dying declaration recorded by the
       SDM/Magistrate on 22.12.2011 the accused can be convicted for which
 D     they were tried. Hence in our view, the High Court has committed a
       grave error in acquitting the accused. The impugned judgment and order
       passed by the High Court acquitting the accused for the offences
       punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the IPC is
       unsustainable and the same deserves to be quashed and set aside.
 E            12. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, the
       present appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment and order acquitting
       the accused for the offences punishable under Section 302 read with
       Section 34 of the IPC is hereby quashed and set aside. The judgment
       and order passed by the learned Trial Court convicting the accused for
       the offences punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the
 F
       IPC is hereby restored. Respondent Nos. 1 & 2 – original accused are
       held guilty for the offences punishable under Section 302 read with Section
       34 of the IPC and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life and a fine
       of Rs.10,000/- each as awarded by the learned Trial Court. Accused to
       surrender before concerned court or jail authority to undergo life sentence
 G     forthwith. The present appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent.


       Bibhuti Bhushan Bose                                         Appeal allowed.
       (Assisted by : Shubhanshu Das, LCRA)


 H