Holding

A dying declaration is admissible despite language or form differences, and information leading to the discovery of a fact, even if obtained in a different case, is admissible under Section 27 of the Evidence Act, making the conviction valid.

Summary

The State of Rajasthan appealed the acquittal of Bhup Singh, who was convicted of murdering his wife, Chawli, based on her dying declaration and ballistic evidence. The High Court had set aside the conviction, holding that the dying declaration was invalid because it was recorded in Hindi rather than the Bagri language spoken by the deceased and not in a question‑answer format, and that the pistol recovered under Section 27 of the Evidence Act was inadmissible as it was discovered during investigation of a different case. The Supreme Court held that a dying declaration remains admissible despite being recorded in a different language or form, provided its substance is reliable. It also clarified that information supplied by an accused leading to the discovery of a fact, even in a separate case, falls within Section 27 and is admissible, and that ballistic expert testimony under CrPC Section 293 is admissible. Consequently, the Court restored the trial court’s conviction and ordered the respondent to be taken into custody.

Issues considered

Whether a dying declaration recorded in a language different from that spoken by the deponent and not in question‑answer form is vitiated.
Whether evidence of a weapon recovered on the basis of an accused's statement in another case is admissible under Section 27 of the Evidence Act, 1872.
Whether ballistic expert opinion is admissible under Section 293 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973.
Whether a conviction can be sustained solely on a dying declaration.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 164, s. 293
Indian Evidence Act, 1872s. 25, s. 26, s. 27, s. 32
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 302

Subjects

dying declarationSection 27 Evidence Actballistic evidencelanguage of recordingmurder convictionappellate reviewcriminal procedure

Judgment

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A STATE OF RAJASTHAN
v.
BHUP RAM

JANUARY 13, 1997

B [DR. A.S. ANAND AND K.T. THOMAS, JJ.)
)o
Crimi11al Law : ·

Crimi11al Procedure Code, 1973 : Sectio11 164.
c Dyi11g declaratio11--Recordi11g of-Mode of-Deceased a11swered ques-
tio11s i11 ·Bagri la11guage while Magistrate recorded it in Hindi-Answers
recorded in na1Tative f onn and 11ot i11 questions and answers fonn--Held :
Dyi11g declaration was 11ot vitiated merely because it was recorded in a
different language-Co11viction could be based upon it-High Coult e1Ted in
D not relying 011 the dying declaration and setting aside conviction recorded by ~
trial coun--fai1ence Ac4 1872, S.32.

Evidence Act, 1872 : Section 27.

Weapon of offence--Recovery of-On basis of statement made by
E accused during investigation in another cas~ditions for applicability
of-Held : such infonnation admissible in evidence-It was immaterial
whether infomzation was supplied in connection with same crime or a dif-
ferent crime.

Pistof-Recovery of-At the instance of acc1tsed-Ballistic expelt opined -t-
F that bullet recovered from body of deceased could have been fired from said
pistol-High Coult overlooked this circumstance-Held : this circumstance
should have been kept in mind while considering legal implication of evidence
relating to recovery of pistol.

Tite respondent-accused was convicted of an offence under Section
G
302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. But, on appeal, the High Court
acquitted the respondent. Hence this appeal.
;-

According to the prosecution, the deceased was first married to the
respondent's brother who died after a brief marital life. Thereafter, the
H deceased was given in marriage to the respondent, but the new alliance was
190
)
STATEv. BHUPRAM 191

-t marred by frequent skirmishes and bickerings between the spouses. The A
deceased was residing in the house of her parents. The estrangement
between the couple reached a point of no return and the respondent wished
to get rid of tbe deceased. So the respondent went to the house of the
deceased on the night of occurrence and shot at the deceased with a pistol.
The deceased was. taken to the hospital and her dying declaration was
recorded by the Judicial Magistrate.
B

·">(
Tiie respondent was arrested in connection with another criminal
case and on the strength of the information elicited from him the police
recovered a pistol. Tiie pistol as well as the bullet recovered from the body
; of the deceased were sent to the ballistic expert ·who opined that the bullet c
could have been fired from the said pistol.

High Court declined to act on the dying declaration since the
. deceased answered the questions put to her by the magistrate in Bagri
language whereas-the magistrate recorded It In flindi in a narrative form
instead of in questions and 1mswers form. Tiie High Court also held that D
the evidence relating to the recovery of pistol was outside the scope of
Section 27 of the Evidence Act, 1872 inasmuch as the recovery was elTected
during investigation of another case. Tiie High Court also overlooked the
opinion of the Ballistic expert. Hence this appeal by the State Government.
E
Allowing the appeal, this Court

HELD 1.1. Assuming that the deceased gave her statement in her
own language, the dying declaration would not vitiate merely because it
.__,.- was recorded in a dllTerent language. It is not unusual that courts record
evidence in the language of the court even when witnesses depose in their F
own language. Judicial Officers are used to the practice of translating the
statements from the language of the parties to the langtiage of the court.
Such translation process would not upset either the admissibility of the
statement or its reliability, unless there are other reasons to doubt the
truth of it. [19S·E]
G
1.2. A dying declaration would not go bad merely because the
.... magistrate did not record It In the form of questions and answers. It Is
axiomatic that what matters Is the substance and not the form. Questions
put to the dying man would have been formal and hence the answers given
are material. Criminal courts may evince interest in knowing the contents H
192 SUPREME COURT REPORTS. (1997] 1 S.C.R.

A of what the dying person said and the questions put to him are not very
important normally. That part of the statement which. relates to the
circumstances of the transaction which resulted in his death gets the
sanction of admissibility. Here it is improper to throw such statement
overboard on a pediantic premise that it was not in the form of questions
B and answers. [195-G-H]

Ganpat Mahadeo Mani v. State of Maharashtra, [1993) Supp. 2 SCC
242, relied on.

2.1. The conditions prescribed in Section 27 of the Evidence Act, 1872
C . for unwrappi~g the cover of ban against admissibility of statement or the
accused to the police have been satisfied. They are: (1) J\. fact should hitve
been discovered in consequence of information received from the accused;
(2) He shoUld have been accused of an, offence; (3) He sh_ould have been
in the custody or a police officer when he supplied the information; (4 )
The fact so discovered should have been deposed to by the witness. If those
D conditions are satisfied, that part of the information given by the accused
which led to such discovery gets denuded of the wrapper of prohibition
and it becomes admissible in evidence. It is immaterial whether the infor·
mation was supplied in connection with the same crime or a different
crime. [196-E·F]
E
2.2. In the instant case, the fact discovered by'lhe police is not the
pistol, the weapon of offence, but that the accused had buried the said
pistol and he knew where it was buried. Of course, discovei:y of said fact
became complete only when the pistol was recovered by the police. [196-G]

F Puludwi Kottaya v. Emperor, AIR (1947) PC 67, approved.

Jaffar Husain Dastagir v. State of Maharashtra, AIR (1970) SC 1934;
K. Chimiaswamy Reddy v. State of A.P. & Anr., AIR (1962) SC 1788;
.Earabhadrappa Alias Krislmappa v. State of Kamataka, [1983) 2 SCC 330;
G Ranbir Yadav v. State of Bihar, [1995) 4 SCC 392 and Shamshul Kanwar v.
State of UP., [1995) 4 SCC 430, relied on.

3. The repm-t of the llailistic expert is evidence under Section 293 ot
the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 proves that the bullet and pistOI
(involved in this case) were microscopically examined and the expert
H expressed the opinion that the bullet could have been fired from the said
)
STATE v. BHUP RAM [THOMAS, J.] 193
,:_
'
~ pistol. This circumstance, though overlooked by the High Court, should A
be kept in mind while considering the lrgal implication of the evidence
relating to the recovery of the pistol. [197 -Fl

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
377 of 1996.
B
From the Judgment and Order dated 29-8-95 of the Rajasthan High
~-w Court in D.B. Cr!. A. No. 258 of 1989.

Ms. Alka Agrawal for Aruneshwar Gupta for the Appellant.

Doonger Singh, V.J. Francis and P.I. Jose for the. Respondent. c
. •The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

THOMAS J. Respondent's wife (Mst. Chawli) was shot dead on
20.7.1985 while she was sleeping in her house. Respondent Bhup Singh was
alleged to be the killer. Police, after investigation, upheld the allegation D
and challanned him. Though the Sessions Court convicted him of murder,
the High Court of Rajasthan acquitted him. This appeal has been filed by
special leave by the State of Rajasthan in challenge of the aforesaid
acquittal.

Prosecution case is a very short story : Chawli was first married to
E
respondent's brother who died after a brief marital life. Thereafter, Chawli
was given in marriage to the respondent, but the new alliance was marred
by frequent skirmishes and bickerings between the spouses. Chawli was
residing in the house of her parents. The estrangement between the couple
reached a point of no return and the respondent wished to get rid of her. F
So he went to her house on the night of occurrence and shot at her with a
pistol. When he tried to use the firearm again, Chawli's father who heard
Cl the sound of thdirst shot rushed towards hiin a:nd caught him but the killer
escaped with the pistol.

Chawli told everybody present in the house that she was shot at by G
her husband Bhup Singh. She was taken to the hospital and the doctor who
-i· attended on her thought it necessary to inform a judicial magistrate that
her dying declaration could be recorded. Pursuant to it PW5 - Bhagwan
Singh who was judicial magistrate of first class, Alwar, went to the hospital
and recorded her dying declaration .. At 2.30 P.M. she breathed her last. H
{

194 · SUPREMECOURTREPORTS [1997) 1 S.C.R.

A Police registered the case on the basis of a statement recorded from Bhajan
Lal, a neighbour. On 22.7.1985, respondent was arrested in connection with
another criminal case and on the strength of the information elicited from
him the police recovered Article 4 - pistol.

The bullet recovered from the body of Chawli as well as Article 4 -
B pistol were sent to the ballistic expert. In his report, the said expert
affirmed the possibility of the bullet having been fired from the said pistol.

· During trial chawli's father (Ram Ratan - PWl) her sister (Ramesh-
wari - PW2) and Bhajan Lal - PW3 who gave the first information state-
C men! have been declared hostile as they all supported the respondent. His
version was that somebody else had shot her dead and respondent was
falsely implicated. Chawli's mother Smt. Mangli was examined by the
respondent as defence witqess No. 2 to support his plea. However. the trial
court, after rejecting the evidence of PWl, PW2 and PW3 and also PW2,
placed full reliance on ihe dying declaration proved by PW5 - judicial
D magistrate and also on the evidence pertaining to the recovery of Article
4 - pistol and convicted the respondent and sentenced him to imprisonment
for life.

The Division Bench of the High Court of Rajasthan, which heard the
E appeal filed by the respondent, declined to act 0n the dying declaration.
The High Court held that the evidence relating to recovery of pistol was
outside the scope of Section 27 of the Evidence Act inasmuch as the
recovery was effected during investigation of another case. As nothing else
remained for the prosecution to embark upon, the Division Bench ac-
quitted the respondent. -t-
F
If the dying declaration recorded by PW5 judicial magistrate is
reliable, there is no legal hurdle in basing a conviction on it even without
any supporting material.

The statement in Ex. P-8 dying declaration is unmistakbly clear that
G her husband Bhup Singh shot her with a pistol. But learned Judges of the
High ~ourt highlighted two features in Ex. P-8 dying declaration as infir-
mities, .vitiating its evidentiary value. First is, deceased answered the ques- ~
tions put to her by the magistrate in Bagri language whereas PW5 recorded
it in Hindi in a narrative form. According to the Division Bench the
H magistrate should have recorded the ~ying declaration in the form of
)

STATE v. BHUP RAMlTHOMAS, J.] 19)

.....;., questions and answers.·Second is, PWS magistate had not ascertained from A
the doctor whether deceased was in a position to give a conscious dying
declaration.

Dr. Naresh Kumar (PW7) who attended the deceased first when she
was brought to the hospital with bullet injury has given evidence that he
sent a requisition to the magistrate as he felt that a dying declaration from B
Chawli could be recorded. PWS - judicial magistrate has deposed that he
recorded ~n Hindi what the deceased told him. The doctor and the judicial
magistrate have said in one accord that deceased was conscious when the
statement was made. In the above situation there was no justification for
the High Court to assume that the deceased would not have been conscious c
when she gave the statement to the judicial magistrate. Similarly, it was a
wrong assumption that deceased would not have spoken in Hindi because
PWS has stated in his evidence positively that deceased gave her answers
in HindL Even otherwise, it is too much to think that judicial magistrate
would have recorded differently from what the deceased had said to him:
D
Assuming that the deceased gave her statement in her own language,
the dying declaration would not vitiate merely because it was recorded in
a different language. We bear in mind that it is not unusual that courts
record evidence in the language of the court even when witnesses depose
in their own language. Judicial officers are used to the practice of translat- E
ing the statements from the language of the parties to the language of the
court. Such translation process would not upset 'either the admissibility of
the statement or its reliability, unless t):iere are other reasons to doubt the
truth of it.
F
Nor would dying declaration go bad merely because the magistrate did
not record it in the form of questions and answers. It is axiomatic that what
matters is the substance and not the form. Questions put to the dying man
would have been formal and hence the answers given are material Criminal
courts may evince interest in knowing the contents of what the dying person
said and the questions put to him are not very important normally. That part G
of the statement which relates to the circumstances of the transaction which
, .. resulted in his death gets the sanction of admissibility. Here it is improper to
throw such statement overboard on a pediantic premise that it was not
recorded in the form of questions and answers. (Vide Ganpat Mahadeo Mani
v. State of Mahatashtra, [1993] Suppl. 2 SCC 242.) H
196 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1997) 1 S.C.R.

A We find Ext. P-8 dying declaration as a clear and unarnbiguou~
statement. The infirmities pointed out by the High Court are too tenuous
to knock off such a very valuable and sturdy item of substantive evidence.

The High Court sidestepped the evidence regarding recovery of
B pistol and the statement of the accused which led to it on the mere ground
that the pistol was recovered in connection with another case. That other
case was registered on 9.7.1985 as Crime 116 of 1985 against the respon-
dent and he was arrested on 22.7.1985 in connection therewith. PW12 -
SHO of Raising Nagar Police Station has deposed in this case that when
respondent was questioned he toid him that the pistol was wrapped in a
C bag and was buried near his house. When respondent was taken to that
place he disinterred Article 4 - pistol and handed it over to the police.

It is clear from the above evidence that PW12 discovered the fact
that respondent had buried Article 4 - pistol. His statement to the police
D that he had buried the pistol in the ground near his house, therefore, gets
extricated from the ban contained in Section 25 & 26 of the Evidence Act
as it became admissible under Section 27. The conditions prescribed in
Section 27 for unwrapping the cover of ban against admissibility of state-
ment of the accused to the police have been satisfied. They are : (1) A fact
should have been discovered in consequence of information received from
E the accused; (2) He should have been accused of an offence; (3) He should
have been in the custody of a police officer when he supplied the informa·
tion; (4) The fact so discovered should have been deposed to by the
witness. If those conditions are satisfied, that part of the information given
by the accused which led to such discovery gets denuded of the wrapper
p of prohibition and it becomes admissible in evidence. It is immaterial
whether the information was supplied in connection with the same crime
·or a different crime. Here the fact discovered by the police is not Article
4 - pistol, but that the accused had buried the said pistol and he knew
where it was buried. Of course, discovery of said fact became complete
only when the pistol was recovered by the police.
G
In this context, we think it appropriate to quote the celebrated words
of Sir John Beaumont in Pulukuri Kottaya v. Emperor, AIR (1947) PC 67 : -,..

H "In their Lordships' view it is fallacious to treat the 'fact discovered'
)

·I STATEv.BHUPRAM[THOMAS,J.j 197

within the section as equivalent to the object produced; the fact A
discovered embraces the place from which the object is produced
and the knowledge of the accused as to this and the information
given must relate distinctly to, this fact.:.. Information supplied by
a person in custody that "I will produce a knife concealed in the
roof of my hol!,se" does not lead to the discovery of a knife; knives B
were discovered many years ago. It leads to the discovery of the fact
that a knife is concealed in the house of the informant to ·his
knowledge, and if the knife is proved to have been u,;ed in the
commission of the offence, the fact discovered is very relevant."

(emphasis supplied) C

The ratio therein has become locus classicus and even the lapse of half a
ccn_tury after its pronouncement has not eroded its forensic worth. We ~ay
point out that this court has approvingly referred to the said ratio in a
number of decision, (e.g. !after Husain Dasiagi,r v. The State of Maharashtra, D
AIR (1970) SC 1934; K Chi1111aswamy Reddy v. State of A11dhra Pradesh &
Anr., AIR {1962) SC 1788; Earabhadrappa alias Krish11appa v. State of
Kamataka, (1983] 2 SCC 330; Ranbir Yadav v. State of Bihar, (1995] 4 SCC
392 and Shamshul Kanwar v. State of U.P., (1995) 4 SCC 430.)
E
Ext. P-14 is the report dated 8.4.86, submitted by Dr. P.S. Manocha,
(Assistant Director of State Forensic Science Laboratory, Rajasthan). The
said report which is evidence under Section 293 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure proves that the bullet and pistol (involved in this case) were
microscopically examined and the expert expressed the opinion that the F
bullet could have been fired from the said pistol. This is yet another
circumstance which though overlooked by the High Court, we bear in mind
while considering the legal implication of the evidence relating to the
recovery of Article 4 - pistol.

For the aforesaid reasons we are of the firm view that the High Court G
was clearly wrong in marginalising the evidence of PW 12 that respondent
told him about concealment of Article 4 - pistol which is clearly admissible
under section 27 of the Evidence Act.

As the High Court committed serious error 1s discarding the H
198 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997) 1 S.C.R.

A aforesaid two very valuable items of evidence, we are constrained to ,._
interfere with the order of acquittal. We, therefore, upset the impugned
judgment and restore the conviction and sentence passed on the respon-
dent by the trial court. We direct the Sessions Judge, Sri Ganganagar, to
take immediate steps to put the respondent in jail for undergoing the
B sentence.
vss

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