STATE OF RAJASTHANversusBANWARI LAL AND ANOTHER

                         [2022] 5 S.C.R. 613                               613


                      STATE OF RAJASTHAN                                   A
                                   v.
                 BANWARI LAL AND ANOTHER
                  (Criminal Appeal No. 579 of 2022)
                           APRIL 08, 2022                                  B
         [M. R. SHAH AND B. V. NAGARATHNA, JJ.]
       Appeal by State: Conviction of accused-B by the trial Court
for the offence u/s.307 IPC for having caused serious injuries on
the vital part of the body of the victim/injured – Trial Court sentenced
                                                                           C
accused-B to undergo three years’ rigorous imprisonment – In an
appeal before the High Court, the accused did not challenge the
conviction, but only prayed the Court to reduce the sentence to the
period already undergone by him by submitting that occurrence
took place about 26 years ago; that they were facing trial since
then; and when the occurrence took place, they were young and              D
now they are aged persons – High Court, without any detailed
analysis of the facts of the case, nature of injuries caused, weapon
used, simply reduced the sentence to the period already undergone
(44 days) – Held: The manner in which the High Court dealt with
the appeal and has reduced the sentence, without adverting to the
                                                                           E
relevant facts and without considering the gravity and nature of
offence, is unsustainable – High Court has dealt with the appeal in
a most casual and cavalier manner – The judgment and order passed
by the High Court reducing the sentence is nothing but an instance
of travesty of justice and against all the principles of law on imposing
appropriate punishment/suitable punishment – As per s.307 IPC,             F
whoever does any act with such intention or knowledge, and under
such circumstances that, if he by that act caused death, he would
be guilty of murder, shall be punished with imprisonment of either
description for a term which may extend to ten years and shall also
be liable to fine; and if hurt is caused to any person by such act,
                                                                           G
the offender shall be liable either to imprisonment for life or to
such punishment as mentioned in s.307 IPC – In the instant case,
accused-B could have been sentenced to undergo life imprisonment
and/or at least up to ten years – Trial court sentenced him to undergo
three years rigorous imprisonment – Therefore, as such, trial court
already took a very lenient view while imposing the sentence of            H
                                  613
614            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                        [2022] 5 S.C.R.


A     only three years’ rigorous imprisonment – Therefore, High Court
      ought not to have interfered with the same – Merely because a long
      period lapsed by the time the appeal is decided cannot be a ground
      to award the punishment which is disproportionate and inadequate
      – High Court did not at all advert to the relevant factors while
      imposing appropriate/suitable punishment/sentence – The manner
B
      in which the High Court has dealt with and disposed of the appeal
      is highly deprecated – Penal Code, 1860 – s.307 – Judicial
      deprecation.
            Appeal: Appeal preferred by the State against order of
      probation passed in favour of accused-M – Trial court granted
C     benefit of probation to accused-M, against which the State did not
      prefer any appeal before the High Court and it was the accused
      who preferred appeal, which came to be dismissed – State ought
      not to have preferred the instant appeal against the accused-M,
      when his appeal before the High Court was dismissed and the
D     conviction was confirmed – If the State was aggrieved against
      granting the benefit of probation, in that case, in the first instance,
      the State ought to have preferred an appeal before the High Court.
             Appeal: Delay on part of State in filing appeal – Condonation
      of – Plea by accused that they have resettled in their lives and have
E     not indulged in any criminal activity and therefore, substantial delay
      on part of State in filing appeal should not be condoned – Held:
      Merely on the technical ground of delay and merely on the ground
      that the accused have resettled in their lives and their conduct has
      since been satisfactory and they have not indulged in any criminal
      activity, is no ground not to condone the delay and not to consider
F     the appeal on merits – The delay of 1880 days in preferring appeal
      is condoned.
            Partly allowing the appeal, the Court
            HELD: 1.The approach of the High Court is most cavalier.
G     Therefore, the order of the High Court merits interference by
      this Court. Merely on the technical ground of delay and merely
      on the ground that after the impugned judgment and order, which
      is unsustainable, the accused have resettled in their lives and
      their conduct has since been satisfactory and they have not
      indulged in any criminal activity, is no ground not to condone the
H
     STATE OF RAJASTHAN v. BANWARI LAL AND ANOTHER                     615


delay and not to consider the appeal on merits. Hence, the             A
delay of 1880 days in preferring the appeal is condoned.
[Para 8][625-F-G]
       2.1 In the matter on hand, it is proved that the victim has
sustained a grievous injury on vital portion of body, i.e, head and
there was a fracture on the skull. Doctor has also opined that the     B
injury was life-threatening and the injury suffered by the injured
was, in the ordinary course of nature, sufficient to cause death.
As per Section 307 IPC, whoever does any act with such intention
or knowledge, and under such circumstances that, if he by that
act caused death, he would be guilty of murder, shall be punished
with imprisonment of either description for a term which may           C
extend to ten years and shall also be liable to fine; and if hurt is
caused to any person by such act, the offender shall be liable
either to imprisonment for life or to such punishment as
mentioned in Section 307 IPC. Thus, in the present case, the
accused could have been sentenced to undergo life imprisonment         D
and/or at least up to ten years. The trial Court sentenced the
accused-B to undergo three years rigorous imprisonment.
Therefore, as such, the trial Court had already taken a very lenient
view while imposing the sentence of only three years’ rigorous
imprisonment. Therefore, the High Court ought not to have
interfered with the same. Though the High Court has not stated         E
anything, from the impugned judgment and order passed by the
High Court, it appears that what weighed with the High Court is
the submission on behalf of the accused that the occurrence took
place on 31.03.1989, i.e., about 26 years ago; that they were facing
trial since last 26 years; and when the occurrence took place,         F
they were young and now they are aged persons. The aforesaid
cannot be the sole consideration while awarding an appropriate
and/or adequate sentence. Even with regard to the submission
on behalf of the accused that there is no minimum sentence under
Section 307 IPC and that the sentence would be up to ten years,
the same is answered by holding that discretion has to be              G
exercised judiciously and the sentence has to be imposed
proportionately and looking to the nature and gravity of the offence
committed and by considering the principles for imposing
sentence. [Para 9][625-H; 626-A-F]
                                                                       H
616            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2022] 5 S.C.R.


A           State of Rajasthan v. Mohan Lal (2018) 18 SCC 535;
            State of Madhya Pradesh v. Udham (2019) 10 SCC 300;
            Satish Kumar Jayanti Lal Dabgar v. State of Gujarat
            (2015) 7 SCC 359 : [2015] 2 SCR 751 – relied on.
             2.2 Merely because a long period has lapsed by the time
B     the appeal is decided cannot be a ground to award the punishment
      which is disproportionate and inadequate. The High Court has
      not at all adverted to the relevant factors which were required to
      be while imposing appropriate/suitable punishment/sentence. The
      High Court has dealt with and disposed of the appeal in a most
      cavalier manner. The High Court has disposed of the appeal by
C
      adopting shortcuts. The manner in which the High Court has dealt
      with and disposed of the appeal is highly deprecated. [Para
      10][626-G-H]
            2.3 In cases, like the present one, the accused did not press
      any challenge to the conviction and prayed for reduction in
D
      sentence and the same is considered and an inadequate and
      inappropriate sentence has been imposed without assigning any
      further reasons and without adverting to the relevant factors
      which are required to be considered while imposing appropriate
      punishment/sentence. Such practice of disposing of criminal
E     appeals by adopting shortcuts is deprecated. Therefore, the
      impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court reducing
      the sentence to the period already undergone (44 days) from three
      years rigorous imprisonment imposed by the learned trial Court
      in respect of accused-B is absolutely unsustainable and the same
      deserves to be quashed and set aside. [Para 10][627-B-D]
F
            3. Now so far as the appeal preferred by the State against
      the accused-M is concerned, even the trial Court granted the
      benefit of probation to the said accused, against which the State
      did not prefer any appeal before the High Court and it was the
      accused who preferred appeal, which came to be dismissed.
G
      Therefore, the State ought not to have preferred the present
      appeal against the accused-M, when his appeal before the High
      Court came to be dismissed and the conviction came to be
      confirmed. If the State was aggrieved against granting the benefit
      of probation, in that case, in the first instance, the State ought to
H
     STATE OF RAJASTHAN v. BANWARI LAL AND ANOTHER                           617


have preferred an appeal before the High Court. [Para 11]                    A
[627-E-F]
                        Case Law Reference
(2018) 18 SCC 535                 relied on                 Para 4.5
(2019) 10 SCC 300                 relied on                 Para 4.5         B
[2015] 2 SCR 751                  relied on                 Para 4.5
      CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
579 of 2022.
      From the Judgment and Order dated 06.05.2015 of the High Court
                                                                             C
of Judicature for Rajasthan at Jaipur Bench, Jaipur in S.B. Criminal
Appeal No.36 of 1993.
      Vishal Meghwal, Milind Kumar, Advs. for the Appellant.
      Abhishek Gupta, Ms. Rohini Musa, Advs. for the Respondents.
      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by                             D

      M. R. SHAH, J.
      1. Leave granted.
       2. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment
and order dated 06.05.2015 passed by the High Court of Judicature for        E
Rajasthan at Jaipur in S.B. Criminal Appeal No. 36/1993, by which the
High Court has partly allowed the said appeal and while maintaining the
conviction of respondent no.1 herein for the offence under Section 307
IPC, has reduced the sentence from three years rigorous imprisonment
to the period already undergone by him in confinement (44 days), and so      F
far as the accused – Mohan Lal is concerned, the High Court has not
interfered with the order of the trial Court convicting him under Section
324 IPC, and releasing him on probation under Section 360 Cr.P.C., the
State has preferred the present appeal.
       3. That the respondents herein and others were tried by the learned
                                                                             G
trial Court for the offences under Sections 147, 148, 149, 447 & 323 IPC
and also under Section 307 IPC (so far as accused Banwari Lal –
respondent no.1 herein is concerned). Respondent No.1 herein – Banwari
Lal was tried for the offence under Section 307 IPC for having caused
grievous injuries on the skull/middle of the head of the injured person –
Phool Chand. That the injured Phool Chand sustained one lacerated            H
618            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2022] 5 S.C.R.


A     wound of size 10 x 1 cms bone deep extending up to brain membrane in
      the centre of the skull and the bone was emerging out. He also sustained
      other injuries.
             3.1 On appreciation of evidence, the learned trial Court held that
      the prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that the injuries
B     suffered by the injured Phool Chand which were caused by the accused
      – Banwari Lalwere sufficient for causing death, in the ordinary course
      of nature. By observing so, the learned trial Court convicted the
      respondent – Banwari Lal for the offence under Section 307 IPC and
      sentenced him to undergo three years rigorous imprisonment. However,
      so far as the accused Mohan Lal is concerned, the learned trial Court,
C     though convicted him, but granted the benefit of probation.
             3.2 Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the judgment and order
      of conviction and sentence passed by the learned trial Court, the
      respondents – accused Banwari Lal and Mohan Lal, both, preferred an
      appeal before the High Court. Before the High Court, the main
D     submissions were made on behalf of the accused – Banwari Lal, in
      which the respondents did not challenge their conviction but prayed to
      reduce the sentence so far as the accused Banwari Lal is concerned, on
      the grounds that occurrence took place on 31.03.1989, i.e., about 26
      years ago; that they were facing trial since last 26 years; and when the
E     occurrence took place, they were young and now they are old/aged
      persons. It was also submitted on behalf of the accused Banwari Lal
      that as the benefit of probation has been given to the accused Mohan
      Lal, he may also be given the benefit of probation. Thereafter, without
      assigning any further reasons whatsoever and without considering the
      nature or gravity of offence and the serious injuries caused by the accused
F     Banwari Lal on the injured Phool Chand, the High Court has partly allowed
      the said appeal and while maintaining the conviction, has reduced the
      sentence to the period already undergone by him (44 days). The High
      Court has dismissed the appeal in respect of the accused Mohan Lal.
             3.3 Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment
G     and order passed by the High Court, interfering with the sentence imposed
      by the learned trial Court and reducing it to the period already undergone
      (44 days) from three years rigorous imprisonment imposed by the learned
      trial Court insofar as accused Banwari Lal is concerned, as also,
      confirming the order of probation insofar as accused Mohan Lal is
H     concerned, the State has preferred the present appeal.
     STATE OF RAJASTHAN v. BANWARI LAL AND ANOTHER                             619
                     [M. R. SHAH, J.]

       3.4 There is a huge delay of 1880 days in preferring the appeal         A
and therefore a separate criminal miscellaneous application is filed by
the State, praying to condone the delay.
       4. Shri Vishal Meghwal, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of
the State has vehemently submitted that in the facts and circumstances
of the case, the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court          B
reducing the sentence to the period already undergone (44 days) from
three years’ rigorous imprisonment imposed by the learned trial Court is
unsustainable.
       4.1 It is vehemently submitted that as such there are no specific
reasons assigned by the High Court while reducing the sentence imposed         C
by the trial Court.
      4.2 It is contended that while reducing the sentence the High
Court has not at all dealt with and/or considered the mitigating and
aggravating circumstances, which are relevant for the purpose of imposing
an appropriate punishment/sentence.                                            D

       4.3 It is submitted that the High Court has not at all considered
the gravity of the offence and the serious injuries sustained by the victim/
injured Phool Chand.
       4.4 It is further submitted that when the judicial discretion was       E
exercised by the learned trial Court sentencing the accused to undergo
three years’ rigorous imprisonment (Banwari Lal) for the offence under
Section 307 IPC, the same ought not to have been interfered with by the
High Court, more particularly, when the appeal challenging the conviction
was not pressed.
                                                                               F
       4.5 Making the above submissions and relying upon the decisions
of this Court in the cases of State of Rajasthan v. Mohan Lal, reported
in (2018) 18 SCC 535; State of Madhya Pradesh v. Udham, reported
in (2019) 10 SCC 300; and Satish Kumar Jayanti Lal Dabgar v.
State of Gujarat, reported in (2015) 7 SCC 359, it is prayed to allow
the present appeal, quash and set aside the impugned judgment and order        G
passed by the High Court and restore the judgment of the learned trial
Court.
     5. The present appeal is vehemently opposed by Shri Abhishek
Gupta, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the respondents.
                                                                               H
620            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2022] 5 S.C.R.


A            5.1 Shri Abhishek Gupta, learned counsel appearing on behalf of
      the accused has vehemently submitted that there is a huge delay of 1880
      days in preferring the appeal against the impugned judgment and order
      passed by the High Court. That the accused have resettled in their lives
      and their conduct has since been satisfactory and after the impugned
      judgment is passed, they have not indulged in any criminal activity and
B
      the occurrence is of the year 1989, to revive the proceedings would be
      extremely harsh and unjustified. Therefore, it is prayed not to condone
      the huge delay of 1880 days in preferring the appeal.
             5.2 On merits, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the accused
      has vehemently submitted that while reducing the sentence the High
C     Court has considered the submissions on behalf of the accused Banwari
      Lal that the occurrence took place about 26 years ago and that the
      accused were facing trial since last 26 years and that when the
      occurrence took place in the year 1989, the accused were young and
      now they are aged persons. It is submitted that the aforesaid can be said
D     to be relevant considerations while reducing the sentence to the period
      already undergone (44 days).
            5.3 Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the accused has further
      submitted that insofar as granting the benefit of probation to the accused
      Mohan Lal is concerned, the same was granted by the learned trial
E     Court against which the State did not prefer any appeal before the High
      Court. It is therefore submitted that when the High Court by the
      impugned judgment and order has dismissed the appeal preferred by the
      accused Mohan Lal, it is not open for the State to now challenge the
      order granting benefit of probation to the accused Mohan Lal, when the
      same was not challenged by the State before the High Court.
F
            5.4 Making the above submissions, it is prayed to reject the
      application for condonation of delay as well as the appeal even on merits.
             6. We have heard learned counsel for the respective parties at
      length.
G             At the outset, it is required to be noted that the accused Banwari
      Lal was convicted by the learned trial Court for the offence under Section
      307 IPC for having caused serious injuries on the vital part of the body
      of the victim/injured Phool Chand. That the injured Phool Chand sustained
      one lacerated wound of size 10 x 1 cms bone deep extending up to brain
      membrane in the centre of the skull and the bone was protruding.
H
     STATE OF RAJASTHAN v. BANWARI LAL AND ANOTHER                             621
                     [M. R. SHAH, J.]

Thereafter, having found the accused Banwari Lal guilty, the learned           A
trial Court sentenced him to undergo three years’ rigorous imprisonment.
In an appeal before the High Court, the accused did not challenge the
conviction, but only prayed the Court to reduce the sentence to the period
already undergone by him by submitting that occurrence took place on
31.03.1989, i.e., about 26 years ago; that they were facing trial since last
                                                                               B
26 years; and when the occurrence took place, they were young and
now they are aged persons. The High Court, without any detailed analysis
of the facts of the case, nature of injuries caused, weapon used, has
simply reduced the sentence to the period already undergone (44 days).
Relevant part of the impugned judgment reads as under:
      “I have heard learned counsel for the parties and carefully perused      C
      the relevant material on record.
      Looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, I do not think
      it just and proper to interfere in the impugned judgment and order
      passed by the trial court qua appeal filed by appellant Mohan Lal
      is concerned.                                                            D

      So far as the appeal filed by accused appellant Banwari Lal is
      concerned, keeping in mind the arguments of learned counsel for
      the appellants that accused appellant Banwari Lal is facing the
      trial for the last 26 years; he has remained in custody for 44 days
      during trial; he is not the previously convicted person, in my view,     E
      ends of justice would be met if the sentence awarded to the
      appellant Banwari is reduced to the period already undergone by
      him in confinement, as indicated herein-above. Hence, this appeal
      is disposed of with the following directions:
          i) The appeal filed by the appellant Banwari is partly allowed;      F
          ii) His conviction is maintained. His sentence is reduced and
          he is released for the period already undergone by him in
          confinement, as indicated above.
          iii) The sentence of the accused appellant Banwari Lal was
                                                                               G
          suspended and he is on bail. He need not to surrender and his
          bail bonds stand cancelled.
          iv) So far as appeal filed by accused Mohan Lal is concerned,
          since he has already been given the benefit of probation, I do
          not find any force in his appeal and consequently, the appeal,
                                                                               H
622             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2022] 5 S.C.R.


A               qua accused Mohan Lal, is dismissed after confirming the
                judgment and order passed by the trial court.
            Impugned judgment stands modified, as indicated hereinabove.”
             6.1 The manner in which the High Court has dealt with the appeal
      and has reduced the sentence, without adverting to the relevant facts
B     and without considering the gravity and nature of offence, is unsustainable.
      The High Court has dealt with the appeal in a most casual and cavalier
      manner. The judgment and order passed by the High Court reducing the
      sentence is nothing but an instance of travesty of justice and against all
      the principles of law laid down by this Court in a catena of decisions on
C     imposing appropriate punishment/suitable punishment.
            7. At this stage, few decisions of this Court on principles for
      sentencing and tests for awarding an appropriate sentence in a given
      case are required to be referred to and considered.
            i) In the case of Mohan Lal (supra), the High Court modified the
D     judgment and order passed by the learned trial Court and sentenced the
      accused to the period already undergone by him, which was only six
      days and absolutely no reasons, much less valid reasons, were assigned
      by the High Court. While setting aside the order passed by the High
      Court, this Court has observed in paragraphs 9 to 13 as under:
E           “9. The High Court simply brushed aside the aforementioned
            material facts and sentenced the accused to the period already
            undergone by him, which is only 6 days in this case. In our view,
            the trial court and the High Court have taken a lenient view by
            convicting the accused for offences under Sections 325 and 323
F           IPC. Absolutely no reasons, much less valid reasons, are assigned
            by the High Court to impose the meagre sentence of 6 days. Such
            imposition of sentence by the High Court shocks the judicial
            conscience of this Court.
            10. Currently, India does not have structured sentencing guidelines
G           that have been issued either by the legislature or the judiciary.
            However, the courts have framed certain guidelines in the matter
            of imposition of sentence. A Judge has wide discretion in awarding
            the sentence within the statutory limits. Since in many offences
            only the maximum punishment is prescribed and for some offences
            the minimum punishment is prescribed, each Judge exercises his
H
STATE OF RAJASTHAN v. BANWARI LAL AND ANOTHER                              623
                [M. R. SHAH, J.]

discretion accordingly. There cannot, therefore, be any uniformity.        A
However, this Court has repeatedly held that the courts will have
to take into account certain principles while exercising their
discretion in sentencing, such as proportionality, deterrence and
rehabilitation. In a proportionality analysis, it is necessary to assess
the seriousness of an offence in order to determine the
                                                                           B
commensurate punishment for the offender. The seriousness of
an offence depends, apart from other things, also upon its
harmfulness.
11. This Court in Soman v. State of Kerala [Soman v. State of
Kerala, (2013) 11 SCC 382 : (2012) 4 SCC (Cri) 1] observed
thus: (SCC p. 393, para 27)                                                C

   “27.1. Courts ought to base sentencing decisions on various
   different rationales — most prominent amongst which would
   be proportionality and deterrence.
   27.2. The question of consequences of criminal action can be            D
   relevant from both a proportionality and deterrence standpoint.
   27.3. Insofar as proportionality is concerned, the sentence must
   be commensurate with the seriousness or gravity of the
   offence.
   27.4. One of the factors relevant for judging seriousness of            E
   the offence is the consequences resulting from it.
   27.5. Unintended consequences/harm may still be properly
   attributed to the offender if they were reasonably foreseeable.
   In case of illicit and underground manufacture of liquor, the
   chances of toxicity are so high that not only its manufacturer          F
   but the distributor and the retail vendor would know its likely
   risks to the consumer. Hence, even though any harm to the
   consumer might not be directly intended, some aggravated
   culpability must attach if the consumer suffers some grievous
   hurt or dies as result of consuming the spurious liquor.”
                                                                           G
12. The same is the verdict of this Court in Alister Anthony
Pareira v. State of Maharashtra [Alister Anthony Pareira v.
State of Maharashtra, (2012) 2 SCC 648 : (2012) 1 SCC (Civ)
848 : (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 953] wherein it is observed thus: (SCC
p. 674, para 84)
                                                                           H
624            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2022] 5 S.C.R.


A              “84. Sentencing is an important task in the matters of crime.
               One of the prime objectives of the criminal law is imposition of
               appropriate, adequate, just and proportionate sentence
               commensurate with the nature and gravity of crime and the
               manner in which the crime is done. There is no straitjacket
               formula for sentencing an accused on proof of crime. The
B
               courts have evolved certain principles: the twin objective of
               the sentencing policy is deterrence and correction. What
               sentence would meet the ends of justice depends on the facts
               and circumstances of each case and the court must keep in
               mind the gravity of the crime, motive for the crime, nature of
C              the offence and all other attendant circumstances.”
            13. From the aforementioned observations, it is clear that the
            principle governing the imposition of punishment will depend upon
            the facts and circumstances of each case. However, the sentence
            should be appropriate, adequate, just, proportionate and
D           commensurate with the nature and gravity of the crime and the
            manner in which the crime is committed. The gravity of the crime,
            motive for the crime, nature of the crime and all other attending
            circumstances have to be borne in mind while imposing the
            sentence. The court cannot afford to be casual while imposing
            the sentence, inasmuch as both the crime and the criminal are
E           equally important in the sentencing process. The courts must see
            that the public does not lose confidence in the judicial system.
            Imposing inadequate sentences will do more harm to the justice
            system and may lead to a state where the victim loses confidence
            in the judicial system and resorts to private vengeance.”
F           ii) In the case of Udham (supra), in paragraphs 11 to 13, it is
      observed and held as under:
            “11. We are of the opinion that a large number of cases are being
            filed before this Court, due to insufficient or wrong sentencing
            undertaken by the courts below. We have time and again cautioned
G           against the cavalier manner in which sentencing is dealt in certain
            cases. There is no gainsaying that the aspect of sentencing should
            not be taken for granted, as this part of Criminal Justice System
            has determinative impact on the society. In light of the same, we
            are of the opinion that we need to provide further clarity on the
H           same.
     STATE OF RAJASTHAN v. BANWARI LAL AND ANOTHER                             625
                     [M. R. SHAH, J.]

      12. Sentencing for crimes has to be analysed on the touchstone           A
      of three tests viz. crime test, criminal test and comparative
      proportionality test. Crime test involves factors like extent of
      planning, choice of weapon, modus of crime, disposal modus (if
      any), role of the accused, anti-social or abhorrent character of
      the crime, state of victim. Criminal test involves assessment of
                                                                               B
      factors such as age of the criminal, gender of the criminal,
      economic conditions or social background of the criminal,
      motivation for crime, availability of defence, state of mind,
      instigation by the deceased or any one from the deceased group,
      adequately represented in the trial, disagreement by a Judge in
      the appeal process, repentance, possibility of reformation, prior        C
      criminal record (not to take pending cases) and any other relevant
      factor (not an exhaustive list).
      13. Additionally, we may note that under the crime test,
      seriousness needs to be ascertained. The seriousness of the crime
      may be ascertained by (i) bodily integrity of the victim; (ii) loss of   D
      material support or amenity; (iii) extent of humiliation; and (iv)
      privacy breach.”
     In the said decision, this Court again cautioned against the cavalier
manner in which sentencing is dealt with in certain cases.
       iii) In the case of Satish Kumar Jayanti Lal Dabgar (supra),            E
this Court has observed and held that the purpose and justification behind
sentencing is not only retribution, incapacitation, rehabilitation but
deterrence as well.
       8. Applying the law laid down by this Court on principles for
sentencing, to the facts of the case on hand, we are of the opinion that       F
the approach of the High Court is most cavalier. Therefore, the order of
the High Court merits interference by this Court. Merely on the technical
ground of delay and merely on the ground that after the impugned
judgment and order, which is unsustainable, the accused have resettled
in their lives and their conduct has since been satisfactory and they have     G
not indulged in any criminal activity, is no ground not to condone the
delay and not to consider the appeal on merits. Hence, the delay of 1880
days in preferring the appeal is condoned.
      9. In the matter on hand, it is proved that the victim Phool Chand
has sustained a grievous injury on vital portion of body, i.e, head and
                                                                               H
626             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2022] 5 S.C.R.


A     there was a fracture on the skull. Doctor has also opined that the injury
      was life-threatening and the injury suffered by the injured Phool Chand
      was, in the ordinary course of nature, sufficient to cause death. As per
      Section 307 IPC, whoever does any act with such intention or knowledge,
      and under such circumstances that, if he by that act caused death, he
      would be guilty of murder, shall be punished with imprisonment of either
B
      description for a term which may extend to ten years and shall also be
      liable to fine; and if hurt is caused to any person by such act, the offender
      shall be liable either to imprisonment for life or to such punishment as
      mentioned in Section 307 IPC. Thus, in the present case, the accused
      could have been sentenced to undergo life imprisonment and/or at least
C     up to ten years. The learned trial Court sentenced the accused Banwari
      Lal to undergo three years rigorous imprisonment. Therefore, as such,
      the learned trial Court had already taken a very lenient view while
      imposing the sentence of only three years’ rigorous imprisonment.
      Therefore, the High Court ought not to have interfered with the same.
      Though the High Court has not stated anything, from the impugned
D
      judgment and order passed by the High Court, it appears that what
      weighed with the High Court is the submission on behalf of the accused
      that the occurrence of the incident took place on 31.03.1989, i.e., about
      26 years ago; that they were facing trial since last 26 years; and when
      the occurrence took place, they were young and now they are aged
E     persons. The aforesaid cannot be the sole consideration while awarding
      an appropriate and/or adequate sentence. Even with regard to the
      submission on behalf of the accused that there is no minimum sentence
      under Section 307 IPC and that the sentence would be up to ten years,
      the same is answered by holding that discretion has to be exercised
      judiciously and the sentence has to be imposed proportionately and looking
F
      to the nature and gravity of the offence committed and by considering
      the principles for imposing sentence, referred to hereinabove.
            10. Merely because a long period has lapsed by the time the appeal
      is decided cannot be a ground to award the punishment which is
      disproportionate and inadequate. The High Court has not at all adverted
G     to the relevant factors which were required to be while imposing
      appropriate/suitable punishment/sentence. As observed hereinabove, the
      High Court has dealt with and disposed of the appeal in a most cavalier
      manner. The High Court has disposed of the appeal by adopting shortcuts.
      The manner in which the High Court has dealt with and disposed of the
H     appeal is highly deprecated. We have come across a number of judgments
     STATE OF RAJASTHAN v. BANWARI LAL AND ANOTHER                            627
                     [M. R. SHAH, J.]

of different High Courts and it is found that in many cases the criminal      A
appeals are disposed of in a cursory manner and by adopting truncated
methods. In some cases, the convictions under Section 302 IPC are
converted to Section 304 Part I or Section 304 Part II IPC without
assigning any adequate reasons and solely recording submissions on behalf
of the accused that their conviction may be altered to Section 304 Part I
                                                                              B
or 304 Part II IPC. In cases, like the present one, the accused did not
press any challenge to the conviction and prayed for reduction in sentence
and the same is considered and an inadequate and inappropriate sentence
has been imposed without assigning any further reasons and without
adverting to the relevant factors which are required to be considered
while imposing appropriate punishment/sentence. We deprecate such             C
practice of disposing of criminal appeals by adopting shortcuts. Therefore,
the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court reducing
the sentence to the period already undergone (44 days) from three years
rigorous imprisonment imposed by the learned trial Court in respect of
accused Banwari Lal is absolutely unsustainable and the same deserves         D
to be quashed and set aside.
       11. Now so far as the appeal preferred by the State against the
accused Mohan Lal is concerned, it is required to be noted that even the
learned trial Court granted the benefit of probation to the said accused,
against which the State did not prefer any appeal before the High Court
                                                                              E
and it was the accused who preferred appeal, which came to be dismissed.
Therefore, the State ought not to have preferred the present appeal
against the accused Mohan Lal, when his appeal before the High Court
came to be dismissed and the conviction came to be confirmed. If the
State was aggrieved against granting the benefit of probation, in that
case, in the first instance, the State ought to have preferred an appeal      F
before the High Court.
       12. In view of the aforesaid discussion and for the reasons stated
above, the present appeal is allowed insofar as the accused Banwari Lal
is concerned. The impugned judgment and order passed by the High
Court interfering with the order of sentence imposed by the learned trial     G
Court and sentencing the accused Banwari Lal to undergo the sentence
to the period already undergone by him (44 days) from three years’
rigorous imprisonment imposed by the learned trial Court under Section
307 IPC is hereby quashed and set aside. The judgment and order passed
by the learned trial Court sentencing the accused Banwari Lal to undergo
                                                                              H
628              SUPREME COURT REPORTS                        [2022] 5 S.C.R.


A     three years’ rigorous imprisonment under Section 307 IPC is hereby
      restored. The accused Banwari Lal is directed to surrender before the
      appropriate jail authority/concerned Court, within a period of four weeks
      from today, to undergo the remaining sentence.
          Insofar as the appeal preferred by the State against the accused
B     Mohan Lal is concerned, the same is hereby dismissed.


      Devika Gujral                                               Partly allowed.



C




D




E




F




G




H