Holding

A demand for money for house construction, when made by the husband or his relatives in connection with the marriage, is a dowry demand, and all four conditions of Section 304‑B IPC are met, warranting conviction under Sections 304‑B and 498‑A.

Summary

The State of Madhya Pradesh appealed the High Court's judgment that set aside the convictions of Jogendra (husband) and Badri Prasad (father‑in‑law) under Sections 304‑B and 498‑A of the IPC for the death of their wife/ daughter‑in‑law Geeta Bai, who immolated herself while five months pregnant. The trial court had convicted them based on testimony that they repeatedly demanded large sums of money for constructing a house, constituting dowry demands, and that the harassment led to her suicide within seven years of marriage. The High Court held that such monetary demands did not amount to dowry and acquitted them of the dowry‑death charge, also acquitting them of abetment to suicide under Section 306. The Supreme Court examined the statutory definition of "dowry" in the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 and held that any demand for property or valuable security in connection with marriage, even for house construction, falls within the ambit of dowry. It affirmed that all four ingredients of Section 304‑B were satisfied and restored the convictions under Sections 304‑B and 498‑A, while leaving the acquittal on Section 306 undisturbed, reducing the life sentence to seven years. The appeal was therefore partly allowed.

Issues considered

The proper interpretation of 'dowry' under Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, especially whether a demand for money to construct a house constitutes dowry.
Whether the four statutory prerequisites for invoking Section 304‑B IPC (dowry death) are satisfied in the present facts.
Whether the prosecution proved abetment to suicide under Section 306 IPC.
Whether the High Court erred in acquitting the respondents on the basis that the monetary demand was not a dowry demand.

Legislation cited

Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961s. 2
Indian Evidence Act, 1872s. 113-B
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 304-B, s. 306, s. 498-A

Subjects

dowry deathSection 304-B IPCSection 498-A IPCDowry Prohibition Actinterpretation of statuteshouse construction demandsuicideabetmentsoon beforeexpansive definition of dowry

Judgment

[2022] 2 S.C.R. 295

STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
v.
JOGENDRA & ANR.
(Criminal Appeal No. 190 of 2012)
JANUARY 11, 2022
[N. V. RAMANA,CJI, A. S. BOPANNA AND
HIMA KOHLI, JJ.]
Penal Code, 1860: s.304-B, 498-A – Dowry death –
Prosecution case was that fed up with the constant dowry demands
made on her by the respondents (husband and father-in-law), which
her family could not satisfy, the victim-deceased committed suicide
by immolating herself at her matrimonial home within seven years
of her marriage – Conviction of respondents for offence under
ss.304B, 498A and 306 – On appeal, held: All the four pre-requisites
for invoking s.304-B were satisfied, namely, that the death of the
victim-deceased took place at her matrimonial home within seven
years of her marriage; that the said death took place in abnormal
circumstances on account of burning and that too when she was
five months pregnant; that she had been subjected to cruelty and
harassment by the respondents soon before her death and such
cruelty/harassment was in connection with demand for dowry –
Taking into account the evidence brought on record by the
prosecution, particularly, the testimony of P.W.-1 (uncle of the
deceased), analysis of the trial Court was correct and respondents
deserved to be convicted under ss.304-B and 498-A – However, the
findings returned by the High Court that has acquitted the
respondents for the offence of abetment to commit suicide under
s.306 is not disturbed as the prosecution could not bring any
conclusive evidence on record to satisfactorily demonstrate that it
was due to the abetment on the part of the respondents that the
deceased had committed suicide by immolating herself.
Dowry prohibition Act, 1961: s.2 – Dowry – The term ‘dowry’
takes within its ambit any kind of property or valuable security –
Demand of money for construction of a house – In the instant
case, the trial Court correctly interpreted the demand for money

295
296 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 2 S.C.R.

A raised by the respondents on the deceased for construction of a
house as falling within the definition of the word “dowry” – The
submission for the respondents that the deceased was also a party
to such a demand as she had on her own asked her mother and
maternal uncle to contribute to the construction of the house, must
be understood in the correct perspective – It cannot be lost sight
B
of that the respondents had been constantly tormenting the
deceased and asking her to approach her family members for
money to build a house and it was only on their persistence and
insistence that she was compelled to ask them to contribute some
amount for constructing a house – High Court fell in an error in
C drawing an inference that since the deceased had herself joined
her husband and father-in-law, and asked her mother or uncle to
contribute money to construct a house, such demand cannot be
treated as a “dowry demand” – On the contrary, the evidence
brought on record was that the deceased was pressurized to make
D such a request for money to her mother and uncle – It was not a
case of complicity but a case of sheer helplessness faced by the
deceased in such adverse circumstances – Penal Code, 1860 –
ss.304-B, 498-A.
Penal Code, 1860: ss.304-B, 498-A – Dowry death–
E Interpretation of a provision of law that will defeat the very intention
of the legislature must be shunned in favour of an interpretation
that will promote the object sought to be achieved through the
legislation meant to uproot a social evil like dowry demand – In this
context the word “Dowry” ought to be ascribed an expansive
meaning so as to encompass any demand made on a woman, whether
F in respect of a property or a valuable security of any nature – When
dealing with cases under s.304-B IPC, a provision legislated to act
as a deterrent in the society and curb the heinous crime of dowry
demands, the shift in the approach of the courts ought to be from
strict to liberal, from constricted to dilated – Any rigid meaning
G would tend to bring to naught, the real object of the provision –
Therefore, a push in the right direction is required to accomplish
the task of eradicating this evil which has become deeply entrenched
in our society – Interpretation of statutes – Dowry prohibition Act,
1961 – s.2.
H
STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH v. JOGENDRA & ANR. 297

Partly allowing the appeal, the Court A
HELD: 1. It is clear that during his extensive cross-
examination, P.W.-1 firmly stuck to his statements that the
harassment of his niece had started within six months of her
wedding with the respondent No.1 who had asked her to fetch a
sum of 20,000/- from her mother and P.W.-1 for construction of B
a house. The said demand was also made by the respondent No.1
on P.W.-1 directly. P.W.-1 stated that the deceased had also informed
him that her father-in-law, respondent No.2 had raised a demand of
50,000/- on her for construction of a house, which she was asked
to convey to him. The said witness was consistent in his deposition
that he used to give money to his deceased niece and her husband C
towards expenses and that both of them had demanded a sum of
50,000/- for construction of a house, which he had declined to
give. P.W.-2 and P.W.-4, both maternal uncles of the deceased,
had the same version to narrate as P.W.-1. [Para 8][305-G-H;
306-A-B] D
2. The most fundamental constituent for attracting the
provisions of Section 304-B IPC is that the death of the woman
must be a dowry death. Four pre-requisites for convicting an
accused for the offence punishable under Section 304-B are as
follows: (i) that the death of a woman must have been caused by E
burns or bodily injury or occurred otherwise than under normal
circumstance; (ii) that such a death must have occurred within a
period of seven years of her marriage; (iii) that the woman must
have been subjected to cruelty or harassment at the hands of her
husband, soon before her death; and (iv) that such a cruelty or
harassment must have been for or related to any demand for F
dowry. [Para 9][306-D-G]
3. Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act defines the word
“dowry” and takes in its ambit any kind of property or valuable
security. The Latin maxim “Ut Res Magis Valeat Quam Pereat”
i.e, a liberal construction should be put up on written instruments, G
so as to uphold them, if possible, and carry into effect, the intention
of the parties, sums it up. Interpretation of a provision of law that
will defeat the very intention of the legislature must be shunned
in favour of an interpretation that will promote the object sought
H
298 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 2 S.C.R.

A to be achieved through the legislation meant to uproot a social
evil like dowry demand. In this context the word “Dowry” ought
to be ascribed an expansive meaning so as to encompass any
demand made on a woman, whether in respect of a property or a
valuable security of any nature. When dealing with cases under
Section 304-B IPC, a provision legislated to act as a deterrent in
B
the society and curb the heinous crime of dowry demands, the
shift in the approach of the courts ought to be from strict to liberal,
from constricted to dilated. Any rigid meaning would tend to bring
to naught, the real object of the provision. Therefore, a push in
the right direction is required to accomplish the task of eradicating
C this evil which has become deeply entrenched in our society.
[Paras 12, 13][308-D; 309-E-G]
4. It cannot be lost sight of that the respondents had been
constantly tormenting the deceased and asking her to approach
her family members for money to build a house and it was only on
D their persistence and insistence that she was compelled to ask
them to contribute some amount for constructing a house. The
Court must be sensitive to the social milieu from which the parties
hail. The fact that the marriage of the deceased and the respondent
No.1 was conducted in a community marriage organization where
some couples would have tied the knot goes to show that the
E parties were financially not so well off. This position is also borne
out from the deposition of P.W.-1 who had stated that he used to
bear the expenses of the couple. Before the marriage of the
deceased also, P.W.-1 had stated that he used to bear her
expenses and that of her mother and brother [his sister and
F nephew] as her father had abandoned them. In this background,
the High Court fell in an error in drawing an inference that since
the deceased had herself joined her husband and father-in-law,
respondents and asked her mother or uncle to contribute money
to construct a house, such demand cannot be treated as a “dowry
demand”. On the contrary, the evidence brought on record shows
G that the deceased was pressurized to make such a request for
money to her mother and uncle. It was not a case of complicity
but a case of sheer helplessness faced by the deceased in such
adverse circumstances. [Para 14][310-B-F]

H
STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH v. JOGENDRA & ANR. 299

5. The evidence brought on record amply demonstrates A
that the harassment of the deceased for money had commenced
within a few months of her marriage and had continued thereafter
on several occasions. On being persistently hounded with the
repeated demands for money made on her which her family could
not fulfil, the hapless deceased who was well into the second
B
trimester of her pregnancy, immolated herself at her matrimonial
home. [Para 18] [314-C-D]
6. The above glaring circumstances when viewed together,
can hardly mitigate the offence of the respondents or take the
case out of the purview of Section 304-B IPC, when all the four C
pre-requisites for invoking the said provision stand satisfied.
Though the High Court found the testimony of P.W.-1 [maternal
uncle of the deceased] to be trustworthy and consistent and no
credible evidence could be produced by the respondents to
demolish the prosecution version, surprisingly, their conviction
under Section 304-B IPC has been set aside and furthermore, D
respondent No. 2 has been acquitted for the offence punishable
under Section 498-A IPC. Taking into account the evidence
brought on record by the prosecution, particularly, the testimony
of P.W.-1, the analysis of the trial Court was correct and the
respondents deserved to be convicted under Sections 304-B and E
498-A IPC. However, the findings returned by the High Court
that has acquitted the respondents for the offence of abetment to
commit suicide under Section 306 IPC, is not disturbed as the
prosecution could not bring any conclusive evidence on record
to satisfactorily demonstrate that it was due to the abetment on
F
the part of the respondents that the deceased had committed
suicide by immolating herself. Accordingly, the judgment of
conviction and sentence passed by the trial Court in respect of
both the respondents under Section 304-B and Section 498-A
IPC, is restored. However, the sentence imposed on them by
the trial Court of RI for life is reduced to RI for seven years, G
which is the minimum sentence prescribed for an offence under
Section 304-B IPC. [Paras 19, 20][314-F-G, H; 315-A-D]

H
300 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 2 S.C.R.

A Bachni Devi and Another v. State of Haryana (2011) 4
SCC 427 : [2011] 2 SCR 627; Kulwant Singh and
Others v. State of Punjab (2013) 4 SCC 177 : [2013] 5
SCR 604; Surinder Singh v. State of Haryana (2014) 4
SCC 129 : [2013] 14 SCR 825; Raminder Singh v. State
of Punjab (2014) 12 SCC 582; Kans Raj v. State of
B
Punjab and Other (2000) 5 SCC 207 : [2000] 3 SCR
662; Dinesh v. State of Haryana (2014) 12 SCC 532 :
[2014] 7 SCR 321; Sher Singh @ Partapa v. State of
Haryana (2015) 3 SCC 724 : [2015] 1 SCR 29;
Gurmeet Singh v. State of Punjab (2021) 6 SCC 108;
C Satbir Singh and Another v. State of Haryana (2021) 6
SCC 1 – relied on.
K. Prema S. Rao and Another v. Yadla Srinivasa Rao
and Others (2003) 1 SCC 217 : [2002] 3 Suppl. SCR
339; Saro Rana and Others v. State of Jharkhand 2005
D Crl.L.J. 65; Appasaheb and Another v. State of
Maharashtra (2007) 9 SCC 721 : [2007] 1 SCR 164;
Vipin Jaiswal[a-1] v. State of Andhra Pradesh
represented by Public Prosecutor (2013) 3 SCC 684 :
[2013] 3 SCR 449 – referred to.
E Case law reference
[2002] 3 Suppl. SCR 339 referred to Para 4
[2007] 1 SCR 164 referred to Para 4
[2013] 3 SCR 449 referred to Para 12
F [2011] 2 SCR 627 relied on Para 12
[2013] 5 SCR 604 relied on Para 12
[2013] 14 SCR 825 relied on Para 12
(2014) 12 SCC 582 relied on Para 12
G [2000] 3 SCR 662 relied on Para 16
[2014] 7 SCR 321 relied on Para 16
[2015] 1 SCR 29 relied on Para 16
(2021) 6 SCC 108 relied on Para 17
H (2021) 6 SCC 1 relied on Para 17
STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH v. JOGENDRA & ANR. 301

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. A
190 of 2012.
From the Judgment and Order dated 10.09.2008 of the High Court
of Madhya Pradesh, Jabalpur, Bench at Gwalior in Criminal Appeal No.48
of 2004.
Bharat Singh, AAG, Prashant Singh, Sr. Adv., Pashupathi Nath B
Razdan, Advs. for the Appellant.
Anish Kumar Gupta, Vaibhav Verma, Venugopal Abhay, Ms. Rita
Gupta, Advs. for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by C
HIMA KOHLI, J.
1. The present appeal has been preferred by the State of Madhya
Pradesh, being aggrieved by the judgment dated 10th September, 2008
passed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, whereby the judgment of
conviction and sentence dated 17th December, 2003 imposed by the D
learned Additional Sessions Judge on the original accused No.1, Jogendra
– husband of the deceased, Geeta Bai[respondent No. 1 herein] and the
original accused No.2, Badri Prasad – father-in-law of the deceased
[respondent No. 2 herein] has been set aside under Sections 304-B and
306 of the Indian Penal Code,1 while maintaining the order of conviction
E
imposed on the original accused no. 1 – Jogendra under Section 498-A
IPC and reducing the sentence from three years to the period already
undergone by him, but setting aside the conviction and sentence imposed
on the accused No. 2, Badri Prasad even under Section 498-A IPC.
2. A quick glance of the relevant facts is necessitated. The
F
deceased was 18 years old when she got married to the respondent No.
1 [A1] in a social marriage organisation function2 conducted on 7th May,
1998. Before her marriage, Geeta Bai along with her mother, Kamla Bai
and her brother used to reside with her maternal uncle, Bansi Lal [PW-
1]. In less than four years of her marriage, Geeta Bai committed suicide
at her matrimonial home by pouring kerosene oil and setting herself on G
fire. She was admitted in a burnt condition in the Community Health
Centre, Baroda on 20th April, 2002 and breathed her last on the same

1
For short ‘IPC’
2
Samuhik VIvaah Sammelan H
302 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 2 S.C.R.

A day. At that time, she was five months pregnant. On receiving information
from the attending doctor, an FIR was lodged on 23rd April, 2002 [Exhibit
P-13]. On completion of the investigation, the charge-sheet was filed
and the case was committed for trial in the Sessions Court.
3. After examining the evidence produced by the prosecution and
B the defence, the trial Court acquitted Sushila [A-3] – mother-in-law and
Jitender [A-4] – brother-in-law of the deceased, but convicted both the
respondents [A-1 and A-2] [husband and father-in-law of the deceased]
under Sections 304-B, 306 and 498-A IPC and imposed a sentence of
rigorous imprisonment3 for life for the first offence, RI for a period of
seven years with fine for the second offence and RI for three years
C with fine for the third offence. The conviction and sentence imposed on
the respondents was primarily based on the evidence of Bansi Lal [P.W.-
1], Shyam Bihari [P.W.-2] and Amrit Lal [P.W.-4], maternal uncles of
the deceased who stated that the respondents had been demanding money
from the deceased for constructing a house which her family members
D were unable to give. As a result, she was constantly harassed and
subjected to cruelty, finally leading to her committing suicide. Dr. V.K.
Garg [P.W.-8], who had conducted the post-mortem examination [Ex.
P-7] on the dead body of the deceased, had deposed that on examining
the uterus, there was a foetus of five months in a dead condition and, in
his opinion, the death of Geeta Bai had taken place due to burning.
E
4. On the respondents preferring an appeal against the judgment
of conviction dated 17th December, 2003 passed by the Sessions Court,
the High Court gave a clean chit to the respondent No. 2 [A-2], while
setting aside the order of conviction in respect of the respondent No.1
[A-1] under Sections 304B and 306 IPC. However, the conviction of
F the respondent No.1 was sustained under Section 498-A IPC, but the
sentence of RI for three years imposed on him was reduced to the
period already undergone by him. For arriving at such a conclusion, the
High Court was persuaded by the rulings in K. Prema S. Rao and
Another v. Yadla Srinivasa Rao and Others4, Saro Rana and Others
G v. State of Jharkhand 5 and Appasaheb and Another v. State of
Maharashtra6 and held that the demand of money for construction of a

3
For short ‘RI’
4
(2003) 1 SCC 217
5
2005 Crl.L.J. 65 delivered by a Division Bench of the High Court of Jharkhand
6
H (2007) 9 SCC 721
STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH v. JOGENDRA & ANR. 303
[HIMA KOHLI, J.]

house cannot be treated as a demand for dowry. The High Court agreed A
with the submission made by the learned counsel for A-1 and A-2,
respondents herein that the offence under Section 304-B was not
established against them as the demand allegedly made on the deceased
was for money to construct a house, which cannot be treated as a dowry
demand for connecting her death to the said cause. The respondents
B
were also acquitted for the offence under Section 306 IPC as the High
Court was of the opinion that, from a scrutiny of the depositions of P.W.-
1, P.W.-2, P.W.-4 and P.W.-6, there was nothing to sustain the conclusion
that the respondents had abetted the deceased to commit suicide. As for
the offence under Section 498-A relating to cruelty meted out to the
deceased, the High Court acquitted the respondent No. 2, while C
maintaining the conviction order in respect of the respondent No. 1.
Aggrieved by the said judgment, the present appeal has been filed by the
State of Madhya Pradesh.
5. Mr. Prashant Singh, learned Advocate General for the appellant-
State has assailed the impugned judgment and contended that the High D
Court has failed to appreciate the harassment caused to the deceased at
the hands of the respondents who had been constantly demanding money
from her to construct a house and purchase a plot of land; that the High
Court did not consider the testimonies of Bansi Lal [P.W.-1], Shyam
Bihari [P.W.-2], Amrit Lal [P.W.-4] and Rajesh Bhai [P.W.-6], who had
unanimously stated that whenever the deceased used to visit her parental E
home, she would complain that she was being subjected to assault by
the respondents for bringing a sum of 50,000/- [Rupees Fifty thousand]
for constructing a house and that it was due to this harassment caused
by them that the deceased got fed up and was forced to commit suicide.
Learned counsel argued that contribution of money to construct a house, F
as demanded by the respondents from the deceased ought to be treated
as a dowry demand and it is quite apparently a case where the offence
under Section 304-B was made out. It was also submitted that this was
a clear-cut case of abetment to commit suicide and both the respondents
had rightly been convicted for the said offence by the trial Court, which
order has been erroneously overturned in appeal. G

6. For the purpose of deciding the present appeal, it is considered
appropriate to extract below the statement of the uncle of the deceased,
Bansi Lal [PW-1], who has been found to be a reliable witness by both
the Courts below: -
H
304 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 2 S.C.R.

A “2. Whenever Gitabai had used to come then she had used to say
that she is beaten. She had told about beating by father-in-law
and husband. They had used to demand rupees fifty thousand for
construction of house. So they had used to beat her. Since I had
no money so I did not give. I and people of society had also
convinced to son-in-law and father-in-law but they did not agree.
B
Gitabai had also discussed about demand of rupees fifty thousand
with my sister and wife.
3. We had received the information of death of Gitabai by phone
at 11 o’clock of night. We did not give rupees fifty thousand
thereafter Gitabai was beaten consequently her finger was also
C fractured. Her husband has committed beating. Badriprasad had
also expelled to Gitabai and Jogendra from the house. After ouster
from the house, Gitabai and Jogendra had lived near the father of
Badriprasad in Khanpur. Then both of them had come to Kota
from there. They had lived in Kota for 7-8 months. After spending
D of money in Kota, both of them arrived near my sister Kamlabai
in Takarbada. Both of them had stayed in Takarbada for 1-2 days.
Jogendra demanded rupees twenty thousand from my sister in
Takarbada. My sister had told me about it. Rupees twenty thousand
was demanded for purchase of a plot in Kota. The both Gitabai
and Jogendra arrived near me in Sultanpur from Takarbada.
E Jogendra also demanded rupees twenty thousand from me. Rupees
was demanded for purchase of plot to construct the house. Money
was used to demand as dowry. I had not given rupees. Then due
to not giving of money, threatening to my niece Gitabai, he had
carried her to Kota.
F 4. I saw to Gitabai at that time. Then she was pregnant.
Subsequently Badriprasad, Jitendra and Sushila went near
Jogendra and Gitabai in Kota and keeping their luggage forcibly,
they brought the luggage and they also brought to Gitabai and
Jogendra in their house. After three months of carrying from Kota,
G I received the news of death of Gitabai.”
7. Some of the relevant statements made by P.W.-1 during his
cross-examination are also extracted below:
“13. After about 6 months of it, Gitabai had again come to in-laws
house and she had stayed for 6-7 months and when we had used to
H go to take her then in-laws of Gitabai had not used to send her.
STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH v. JOGENDRA & ANR. 305
[HIMA KOHLI, J.]

Witness himself said that their harassment process had started during A
this time. My younger brother had gone to take her for 6-7 times in
this period. I had used to live in Kota. After this when my mother
had died then Gitabai had come and she had also come for one
more programme. When Gitabai had gone to in-laws house after 6
months then after that I had met with her at the time of death of my
B
mother. When my mother had died then Gitabai had come then she
had stayed with my brother for 6 months. When my mother had
died then Jogendra had come with Gitabai on third day and he had
also caused beating before us. He had not got tea so Jogendra had
caused beating. When Gitabai lived with brothers for 6 months then
I had gone there for many times during that period. Accused and C
Sushilabai and Badri had also come there at the time of death of my
mother. I had stayed in the village for 12 days. It is incorrect to say
when Gitabai had stayed in Takarwada at the time of death of
mother then she had not made any complaint of in-laws there. This
fact is correct that first of all Gitabai had complained at the time of
D
death of mother. Jogendra had stayed in our village for 2 days.
xxx xxx xxx
18. When Badriprasad had come at the time of death of mother.
After that, I have not met with Badriprasad till today. Badriprasad
demands rupees fifty thousand for construction of house. Gitabai E
had told me this fact when Gitabai had come after death of mother
then she had told this fact that Badriprasad demands rupees fifty
thousand for construction of house. Sister Kamlabai had told me
this fact. Besides her, any other person did not tell the fact of
demand of rupees fifty thousand. After 7 – 8 months of death of
mother, Kamlabai had told me the fact of rupees fifty thousand. F
Which fact Kamlabai had told me, after 4 - 5 months of that,
Gitabai and Jogendra had come near me for demand of rupees
twenty thousand.”
8. It is clear that during his extensive cross-examination, P.W.-1
firmly stuck to his statements that the harassment of his niece, Geeta G
Bai had started within six months of her wedding with the respondent
No.1 who had asked her to fetch a sum of 20,000/-[Rupees Twenty
thousand] from her mother and P.W.-1 for construction of a house. The
said demand was also made by the respondent No.1 on P.W.-1 directly.
P.W.-1 stated that the deceased had also informed him that her father-
H
306 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 2 S.C.R.

A in-law, respondent No.2 had raised a demand of 50,000/- [Rupees Fifty
thousand] on her for construction of a house, which she was asked to
convey to him. The said witness was consistent in his deposition that he
used to give money to his deceased niece and her husband – respondent
No. 1 towards expenses and that both of them had demanded a sum of
50,000/-[Rupees Fifty thousand] for construction of a house, which he
B
had declined to give. Pertinently, Shyam Bihari [P.W.-2] and Amrit Lal
[P.W.-4], both maternal uncles of the deceased, had the same version to
narrate as P.W.-1. Thus, the prosecution version was that the respondents
used to harass the deceased and that the respondent No. 1 had demanded
a sum of 20,000/-[Rupees Twenty thousand], whereas the respondent
C No. 2 had demanded 50,000/-[Rupees Fifty thousand] from the deceased
for constructing a house and for buying a plot of land. Fed up with the
constant dowry demands made on her by the respondents, which her
family could not satisfy, Geeta Bai had committed suicide by immolating
herself at her matrimonial home within seven years of her marriage.
D 9. The most fundamental constituent for attracting the provisions
of Section 304-B IPC is that the death of the woman must be a dowry
death. The ingredients for making out an offence under Section 304-B
have been reiterated in several rulings of this Court. Four pre-requisites
for convicting an accused for the offence punishable under Section 304-
B are as follows:
E
(i) that the death of a woman must have been caused by burns
or bodily injury or occurred otherwise than under normal
circumstance;
(ii) that such a death must have occurred within a period of
seven years of her marriage;
F
(iii) that the woman must have been subjected to cruelty or
harassment at the hands of her husband, soon before her
death; and
(iv) that such a cruelty or harassment must have been for or
related to any demand for dowry.
G
10. As the word “dowry” has been defined in Section 2 of the
Dowry Prohibition Act, 19617, the said provision gains significance and
is extracted below:

7
H For short ‘the Dowry Act’
STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH v. JOGENDRA & ANR. 307
[HIMA KOHLI, J.]

“2. Definition of ‘dowry’ - In this Act, “dowry” means any A
property or valuable security given or agreed to be given either
directly or indirectly –
(a) by one party to a marriage to the other party to the marriage;
or
(b) by the parents of either party to a marriage by any other B
person, to either party to the marriage or to any other person;
at or before or any time after the marriage in connection with the
marriage of the said parties, but does not include dower or mahr
in the case of persons to whom the Muslim Personal law (Shariat)
applies. C

Explanation I.—xxx xxx xxx8
Explanation II.— The expression “valuable security” has the
same meaning as in section 30 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of
1860).” D
11. In a three Judge Bench decision of this Court in Rajinder
Singh v. State of Punjab9, Section 2 of the Dowry Act has been split
into six distinct parts for a better understanding of the said provision,
which are as follows:
“8. A perusal of Section 2 shows that this definition can be broken E
into six distinct parts:
(1) Dowry must first consist of any property or valuable
security— the word “any” is a word of width and
would, therefore, include within it property and
valuable security of any kind whatsoever. F
(2) Such property or security can be given or even agreed to
be given. The actual giving of such property or security is,
therefore, not necessary.
(3) Such property or security can be given or agreed to be
given either directly or indirectly. G

(4) Such giving or agreeing to give can again be not only by
one party to a marriage to the other but also by the parents

8
Omitted by Act 63 of 1984 (w.e.f. 2.10.1985)
9
(2015) 6 SCC 477 H
308 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 2 S.C.R.

A of either party or by any other person to either party to the
marriage or to any other person. It will be noticed that this
clause again widens the reach of the Act insofar as those
guilty of committing the offence of giving or receiving dowry
is concerned.
B (5) Such giving or agreeing to give can be at any time. It can
be at, before, or at any time after the marriage. Thus, it can
be many years after a marriage is solemnised.
(6) Such giving or receiving must be in connection with the
marriage of the parties. Obviously, the expression “in
C connection with” would in the context of the social evil
sought to be tackled by the Dowry Prohibition Act mean
“in relation with” or “relating to”.”
12. In the light of the above provision that defines the word “dowry”
and takes in its ambit any kind of property or valuable security, in our
D opinion, the High Court fell into an error by holding that the demand of
money for construction of a house cannot be treated as a dowry demand.
In Appasaheb’s case [supra] referred to in the impugned judgment, this
Court had held that a demand for money from the parents of the deceased
woman to purchase manure would not fall within the purview of “dowry”,
thereby strictly interpreting the definition of dowry. This view has,
E however, not been subscribed to in Rajinder Singh’s case [supra]
wherein it has been held that the said decision as also the one in the case
of Vipin Jaiswal[a-1] v. State of Andhra Pradesh represented by
Public Prosecutor10, do not state the law correctly. Noting that the
aforesaid decisions were distinct from four other decisions of this Court,
F viz., Bachni Devi and Another v. State of Haryana11, Kulwant Singh
and Others v. State of Punjab12, Surinder Singh v. State of Haryana13,
and Raminder Singh v. State of Punjab14, the Court opined that keeping
in mind the fact that Section 304-B was inserted in the IPC to combat
the social evil of dowry demand that has reached alarming proportions,
it cannot be argued that in case of an ambiguity in the language used in
G the provision, the same ought to be construed strictly as that would amount

10
(2013) 3 SCC 684
11
(2011) 4 SCC 427
12
(2013) 4 SCC 177
13
(2014) 4 SCC 129
14
H (2014) 12 SCC 582
STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH v. JOGENDRA & ANR. 309
[HIMA KOHLI, J.]

to defeating the very object of the provision. In other words, the Court A
leaned in favour of assigning an expansive meaning to the expression
“dowry” and held thus :-
“20. Given that the statute with which we are dealing must be
given a fair, pragmatic, and common sense interpretation so as to
fulfil the object sought to be achieved by Parliament, we feel that B
the judgment in Appasaheb case [Appasaheb v. State of
Maharashtra, (2007) 9 SCC 721(2007) 9 SCC 721 : (2007) 3
SCC (Cri) 468] followed by the judgment of Vipin Jaiswal [Vipin
Jaiswal v. State of A.P., (2013) 3 SCC 684 : (2013) 2 SCC (Cri)
15] do not state the law correctly. We, therefore, declare that
any money or property or valuable security demanded by C
any of the persons mentioned in Section 2 of the Dowry
Prohibition Act, at or before or at any time after the marriage
which is reasonably connected to the death of a married
woman, would necessarily be in connection with or in
relation to the marriage unless, the facts of a given case D
clearly and unequivocally point otherwise.”
[emphasis added]
13. The Latin maxim “Ut Res Magis Valeat Quam Pereat” i.e, a
liberal construction should be put up on written instruments, so as to
uphold them, if possible, and carry into effect, the intention of the parties, E
sums it up. Interpretation of a provision of law that will defeat the very
intention of the legislature must be shunned in favour of an interpretation
that will promote the object sought to be achieved through the legislation
meant to uproot a social evil like dowry demand. In this context the
word “Dowry” ought to be ascribed an expansive meaning so as to F
encompass any demand made on a woman, whether in respect of a
property or a valuable security of any nature. When dealing with cases
under Section 304-B IPC, a provision legislated to act as a deterrent in
the society and curb the heinous crime of dowry demands, the shift in
the approach of the courts ought to be from strict to liberal, from
constricted to dilated. Any rigid meaning would tend to bring to naught, G
the real object of the provision. Therefore, a push in the right direction is
required to accomplish the task of eradicating this evil which has become
deeply entrenched in our society.
14. In the facts of the instant case, we are of the opinion that the
trial Court has correctly interpreted the demand for money raised by the H
310 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 2 S.C.R.

A respondents on the deceased for construction of a house as falling within
the definition of the word “dowry”. The submission made by learned
counsel for the respondents that the deceased was also a party to such
a demand as she had on her own asked her mother and maternal uncle
to contribute to the construction of the house, must be understood in the
correct perspective. It cannot be lost sight of that the respondents had
B
been constantly tormenting the deceased and asking her to approach
her family members for money to build a house and it was only on their
persistence and insistence that she was compelled to ask them to
contribute some amount for constructing a house. The Court must be
sensitive to the social milieu from which the parties hail. The fact that
C the marriage of the deceased and the respondent No.1 was conducted
in a community marriage organization where some couples would have
tied the knot goes to show that the parties were financially not so well
off. This position is also borne out from the deposition of P.W.-1 who
had stated that he used to bear the expenses of the couple. Before the
marriage of the deceased also, P.W.-1 had stated that he used to bear
D
her expenses and that of her mother and brother [his sister and nephew]
as her father had abandoned them. In this background, the High Court
fell in an error in drawing an inference that since the deceased had
herself joined her husband and father-in-law, respondents herein and
asked her mother or uncle to contribute money to construct a house,
E such demand cannot be treated as a “dowry demand”. On the contrary,
the evidence brought on record shows that the deceased was pressurized
to make such a request for money to her mother and uncle. It was not a
case of complicity but a case of sheer helplessness faced by the deceased
in such adverse circumstances.
F 15. Now, coming to the second point urged by learned counsel for
the State that the High Court has overlooked the fact that Geeta Bai had
been subjected to cruelty/harassment at the hands of the respondents
soon before her death, which submission is strictly contested by learned
counsel for the respondents, we may note that the meaning of the
expression “soon before her death” has been discussed threadbare in
G several judgments. In Surinder Singh (supra), while relying on the
provisions of Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act, 187215 and
Section 304-B IPC, where the words “soon before her death” find
mention, the following pertinent observations have been made: -

15
H For short ‘the Evidence Act’
STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH v. JOGENDRA & ANR. 311
[HIMA KOHLI, J.]

“17. Thus, the words “soon before” appear in Section 113- A
B of the Evidence Act, 1872 and also in Section 304-B IPC.
For the presumptions contemplated under these sections
to spring into action, it is necessary to show that the cruelty
or harassment was caused soon before the death. The
interpretation of the words “soon before” is, therefore,
B
important. The question is how “soon before”? This would
obviously depend on the facts and circumstances of each case.
The cruelty or harassment differs from case to case. It relates to
the mindset of people which varies from person to person. Cruelty
can be mental or it can be physical. Mental cruelty is also of different
shades. It can be verbal or emotional like insulting or ridiculing or C
humiliating a woman. It can be giving threats of injury to her or her
near and dear ones. It can be depriving her of economic resources
or essential amenities of life. It can be putting restraints on her
movements. It can be not allowing her to talk to the outside world.
The list is illustrative and not exhaustive. Physical cruelty could be
actual beating or causing pain and harm to the person of a woman. D
Every such instance of cruelty and related harassment has a
different impact on the mind of a woman. Some instances may be
so grave as to have a lasting impact on a woman. Some instances
which degrade her dignity may remain etched in her memory for a
long time. Therefore, “soon before” is a relative term. In E
matters of emotions we cannot have fixed formulae. The
time-lag may differ from case to case. This must be kept in
mind while examining each case of dowry death.
18. In this connection we may refer to the judgment of this
Court in Kans Raj v. State of Punjab [(2000) 5 SCC 207 : 2000
F
SCC (Cri) 935] where this Court considered the term “soon
before”. The relevant observations are as under: (SCC pp. 222-
23, para 15)
“15. … ‘Soon before’ is a relative term which is
required to be considered under specific
circumstances of each case and no straitjacket formula G
can be laid down by fixing any time-limit. This
expression is pregnant with the idea of proximity test.
The term ‘soon before’ is not synonymous with the
term ‘immediately before’ and is opposite of the
expression ‘soon after’ as used and understood in H
312 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 2 S.C.R.

A Section 114, Illustration (a) of the Evidence Act. These
words would imply that the interval should not be too long
between the time of making the statement and the death. It
contemplates the reasonable time which, as earlier noticed,
has to be understood and determined under the peculiar
circumstances of each case. In relation to dowry deaths,
B
the circumstances showing the existence of cruelty
or harassment to the deceased are not restricted to a
particular instance but normally refer to a course of
conduct. Such conduct may be spread over a period
of time. If the cruelty or harassment or demand for
C dowry is shown to have persisted, it shall be deemed
to be ‘soon before death’ if any other intervening
circumstance showing the non-existence of such
treatment is not brought on record, before such
alleged treatment and the date of death. It does not,
however, mean that such time can be stretched to any period.
D
Proximate and live link between the effect of cruelty based
on dowry demand and the consequential death is required
to be proved by the prosecution. The demand of dowry,
cruelty or harassment based upon such demand and the date
of death should not be too remote in time which, under the
E circumstances, be treated as having become stale enough.”
Thus, there must be a nexus between the demand of dowry,
cruelty or harassment, based upon such demand and the
date of death. The test of proximity will have to be applied.
But, it is not a rigid test. It depends on the facts and
F circumstances of each case and calls for a pragmatic and
sensitive approach of the court within the confines of law.
[emphasis added]
16. In Rajinder Singh [supra], falling back on the rulings in Kans
Raj v. State of Punjab and Others16, Dinesh v. State of Haryana17
G and Sher Singh @ Partapa v. State of Haryana 18, it has been
emphasized that “soon before” is not synonymous to “immediately
before” and the following observations have been made: -
16
(2000) 5 SCC 207
17
(2014) 12 SCC 532
H 18
(2015) 3 SCC 724
STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH v. JOGENDRA & ANR. 313
[HIMA KOHLI, J.]

“24. We endorse what has been said by these two decisions. A
Days or months are not what is to be seen. What must be
borne in mind is that the word “soon” does not mean
“immediate”. A fair and pragmatic construction keeping in mind
the great social evil that has led to the enactment of Section 304-
B would make it clear that the expression is a relative expression.
B
Time-lags may differ from case to case. All that is necessary
is that the demand for dowry should not be stale but should
be the continuing cause for the death of the married woman
under Section 304-B.”
[emphasis added]
C
17. In the above context, we may usefully refer to a recent decision
of a three Judge Bench of this Court in Gurmeet Singh v. State of
Punjab19 that has restated the detailed guidelines that have been laid
down in Satbir Singh and Another v. State of Haryana 20, both authored
by Chief Justice N.V. Ramana, relating to trial under Section 304-B IPC
where the law on Section 304-B IPC and Section 113-B of the Evidence D
Act has been pithily summarized in the following words:
“38.1. Section 304-B IPC must be interpreted keeping in mind
the legislative intent to curb the social evil of bride burning and
dowry demand.
E
38.2. The prosecution must at first establish the existence
of the necessary ingredients for constituting an offence
under Section 304-B IPC. Once these ingredients are
satisfied, the rebuttable presumption of causality, provided
under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act operates against
the accused. F
38.3. The phrase “soon before” as appearing in Section 304-B
IPC cannot be construed to mean “immediately before”. The
prosecution must establish existence of “proximate and live link”
between the dowry death and cruelty or harassment for dowry
demand by the husband or his relatives. G
38.4. Section 304-B IPC does not take a pigeonhole approach in
categorising death as homicidal or suicidal or accidental. The reason

19
(2021) 6 SCC 108
20
(2021) 6 SCC 1 H
314 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 2 S.C.R.

A for such non-categorisation is due to the fact that death occurring
“otherwise than under normal circumstances” can, in cases,
be homicidal or suicidal or accidental.”
[emphasis added]
18. In the instant case, it is not in dispute that the marriage between
B the deceased and the respondent No. 1 – accused had taken place on
7th May, 1998 and the deceased was brought in a severely burnt condition
from her matrimonial home to the Health Care Centre at Baroda on 20 th
April, 2002 and she had expired on the very same day. It is also not in
dispute that the death had occurred on account of the deceased dowsing
C kerosene oil and setting herself on fire. The evidence brought on record
amply demonstrates that the harassment of the deceased for money had
commenced within a few months of her marriage and had continued
thereafter on several occasions. This fact is borne out from the deposition
of PW-1, which shows that on not being able to fulfil the demand for
50,000/- [Rupees Fifty thousand] made by the respondent No. 2 [father-
D in-law], he had thrown out the deceased and the respondent No.1 from
the matrimonial home. They had then shifted to Kota and resided there.
Thereafter, respondent No.2 had brought the couple back to Baroda and
had again started demanding money from the deceased. Then the
deceased and the respondent No. 1 moved to Tankarwada. This time, it
E was respondent No. 1 who had demanded a sum of 20,000/- [Rupees
Twenty thousand] from the deceased and her uncle for constructing a
house. On being persistently hounded with the repeated demands for
money made on her which her family could not fulfil, the hapless deceased
who was well into the second trimester of her pregnancy, immolated
herself at her matrimonial home.
F
19. The above glairing circumstances when viewed together, can
hardly mitigate the offence of the respondents or take the case out of
the purview of Section 304-B IPC, when all the four pre-requisites for
invoking the said provision stand satisfied, namely, that the death of Geeta
Bai took place at her matrimonial home within seven years of her
G marriage; that the said death took place in abnormal circumstances on
account of burning and that too when she was five months pregnant;
that she had been subjected to cruelty and harassment by the respondents
soon before her death and such cruelty/harassment was in connection
with demand for dowry. Though the High Court found the testimony of
H P.W.-1 [maternal uncle of the deceased] to be trustworthy and consistent
STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH v. JOGENDRA & ANR. 315
[HIMA KOHLI, J.]

and no credible evidence could be produced by the respondents to A
demolish the prosecution version, surprisingly, their conviction under
Section 304-B IPC has been set aside and furthermore, respondent No.
2 has been acquitted for the offence punishable under Section 498-A
IPC.
20. Taking into account the evidence brought on record by the B
prosecution, particularly, the testimony of P.W.-1, this Court has no
hesitation in holding that the analysis of the trial Court was correct and
the respondents deserved to be convicted under Sections 304-B and
498-A IPC. However, we do not propose to disturb the findings returned
by the High Court that has acquitted the respondents for the offence of
abetment to commit suicide under Section 306 IPC, as the prosecution C
could not bring any conclusive evidence on record to satisfactorily
demonstrate that it was due to the abetment on the part of the respondents
that the deceased had committed suicide by immolating herself.
Accordingly, the judgment of conviction and sentence passed by the trial
Court in respect of both the respondents under Section 304-B and Section D
498-A IPC, is restored. However, the sentence imposed on them by the
trial Court of RI for life is reduced to RI for seven years, which is the
minimum sentence prescribed for an offence under Section 304-B IPC.
21. In view of the foregoing discussion, the present appeal is partly
allowed. The respondents shall surrender before the trial Court within E
four weeks to undergo the remaining period of their sentence. The appeal
is allowed in the above terms.

Devika Gujral Appeal partly allowed.
F

G

H