STATE OF M.P.versusMADAN LAL

                        [2015] 7 S.C.R. 998


A                         STATE OF M.P.
                                 v.
                           MADAN LAL

                 (Criminal Appeal No.231of2015)
B
                          JULY01, 2015

         [DIPAK MISRA AND PRAFULLA C. PANT, JJ.]

c      Penal Code, 1860 - s. 376(2)(f) rw s. 511 ands. 354 -
  Rape - Prosecution case that accused raped a seven year
  old girl- Conviction uls. 376(2)(f) rw s. 511 and sentenced to
  rigorous imprisonment for five years - High Court in view of
  compromise between the accused and the parents of the
o victim, converted the offence to one u/s. 354 and confined
  the sentence to the period of custody already undergone -
  On appeal, held: In a case of rape or attempt of rape, there
  cannot be a compromise or settlement as it would be against
  the honour of the victim which matters the most - These are
E crimes against the body of a woman which is her own temple
  - These offences suffocate the breath of life and sully the
  reputation -Adopting a soft approach or a liberal one would
  be a spectacular error - Any kind of liberal approach or
  thought of mediation is completely sans legal permissibility
F - Matter remitted back to the High Court for a fresh decision.

       Judicial Deprecation - Rape cases - Some of the
   appellate judges, contrary to the precedents and against the
   normative mandate of law, assuming a presumptuous role -
G It ruptures the sense of justice and punctures the criminal
  justice dispensation system.
        Partly allowing the appeal, the Court
        HELD: 1.1 Appellate Judges, contrary to the
H                         998
               STATE OF M.P. v. MADAN LAL               999


precedents and against the normative mandate of law, A
assuming a presumptuous role have paved the path of
unbelievable laconicity to deal with criminal appeals
which, ruptures the sense of justice and punctures the
criminal justice dispensation system. [Para 11] [1005-G;
1006-A]                                                  B
     1.2 The Single Judge did not at all referred to the
evidence that was adduced during the trial. The Single
Judge in his judgment has only stated that the
prosecution has examined so many witnesses and filed c
nine documents. Th~ said approach does not satisfy the
requirement of exercise of the appellate jurisdiction. The
Single Judge was influenced by the compromise that
was entered into between the accused and the parents
of the victim as the victim was a minor. The trial judge D
had rejected the said application on the ground that the
offence was not compoundable. [Paras 14, 15] [1008-E-
G; 1009-A-C]
    Amar Singh v. Ba/winder Singh and Others 2003 (1) SCR E
754 : (2003) 2 SCC 518; State of Madhya Pradsesh v. Bhura
Kunjda (2009) 17 SCC 346; K. Anbazhagan v. State of
Kamataka and Others Criminal Appeal No.637 of 2015 -
referred to.
     1.3 In a case of rape or attempt of rape, the F
conception of compromise under no circumstances can
really be thought of. These are crimes against the body
of a woman which is her own temple. There are offences
which suffocate the breath of life and sully the reputation.
And reputation, needless to emphasis, is the richest G
jewel one can conceive of in life. No one would allow it
to be extinguished. When a human frame is defiled, the
"purest treasure", is lost. Dignity of a woman is a part of
her non-perishable and immortal self and no one should H
ever think of paining it in clay. There cannot be a
compromise or settlement as it would be against her
1000        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2015] 7 S.C.R.


 A honour which matters the most. It is sacrosanct.
   Sometimes solace is given that the perpetrator of the
   crime has acceded to enter into wedlock with her which
   is nothing but putting pressure in an adroit manner; and
   the Courts are to remain absolutely away from this
 B subterfuge to adopt a soft approach to the case, for any
   kind of liberal approach has to be put in the compartment
   of spectacular error. Or to put it differently, it would be in
   the realm of a sanctuary of error. It is said so as such an
   attitude reflects lack of sensibility towards the dignity,
 C the elan vital, of a woman. Any kind of liberal approach
   or thought of mediation in this regard is thoroughly and
   completely sans legal permissibility. [Para 16] [1010-A-
       F]
 D     1.4 The matter is remitted to the High Court for a
   reappraisal of the evidence and for a fresh decision. As
   the respondent was in custody at the time of the
   pronouncement of the judgment by the trial court, he
   would be taken into custody forthwith by the
 E Superintendent of Police. [Para 20] [1012-E-G]

       Ashok@ Pappu v. State of M.P. 2005 Cr.L.J.(M.P.) 471;
  Phulki@ Santosh@ Makhan v. State of MP. 2006 Cr.L.J.
  (M.p.) 157; Jeevan v. State of M.P. 2008 Cr.L.J. (M.P.) 1498;
F Shimbhu and Another v. State of Haryana 2013 (14) SCR
  136 : (2014) 13 SCC 318; Shyam Narain v. State (NCT of
  Delhi) 2013 (8) SCR 951 : (2013) 7 SCC 77; Baldev Singh
  v. State of Punjab 2011 (15) SCR 927 : (2011) 13 SCC 705;
  Ravindra v. State of Madhya Pradesh 2015 (2) SCR 860:
G (2015) 4 SCC 491 - referred to.

                        Case Law Reference

        2005 Cr.L.J.(M.P.) 471   Referred to.        Para 10
 H
              STATE OF M.P. v. MADANLAL                     1001


 2006 Cr.L.J. (M.P.) 157    Referred to.         Para 10       A

 2008 Cr.L.J. (M.P.) 1498 Referred to.           Para 10

 2003 (1) SCR 754            Referred to.        Para 12

 (2009) 11 sec 346           Referred to.        Para 12       B

 2013 (14) SCR 136           Referred to.        Para 15
          ~

 2013 (8) SCR 951            Referred to.        Para 16

 2011 (15) SCR 927           Referred to.        Para 17       c
 2015 (2) SCR 860           Referred to.         Para 17

    CRIMINALAPPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
No. 231 of2015                                      D
    From the Judgment and Order dated 01.02.2010 in CRA
No. 808/2009 of the High Court of M. P. at Gwalior.

    G.D. Singh,Apoorv Kurup, Shreya DubeyfortheAppellant.
                                                               E
    Asha Jain Madan (A.G.) for the Respondent.

    The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

      DIPAK MISRA, J. 1. In this appeal, by special leave, the
                                                                F
State of M.P. calls in question the legal acceptability of the
judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge of
the High Court of M.P. in Criminal Appeal No. 808 of 2009
whereby he has set aside the conviction under Section 376(2)(f)
read with Section 511 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and the G
sentence imposed on that score, that is, rigorous imprisonment
of five years by the learned Sessions Judge, Guna in ST No.
134/2009 and convicted the respondent-accused herein under
Section 354 of the IPC and restricted the sentence to the
period already undergone which is slightly more than one year. H
1002        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    (2015] 7 S.C.R.


 A          2. The factual narration for disposal of the present appeal
      lies in a narrow compass. The respondent as accused was
      sent up for trial for the offence punishable under Section
      376(2)(f) IPC before the learned Sessions Judge. The case
      of the prosecution before the Court below was that on
 B    27.12.2008, the victim, aged about 7 years, PW1, was
      proceeding towards Haar from her home and on the way the
      accused, Madan Lal, met her and came to knowtbat she was
     going in search of her mother who had gone to graze the goats.
     The accused told her that her mother had gone towards the
 C    river and accordingly took her near the river Parvati, removed
     her undergarment and made her sit on his lap, and at that time
     the prosecutrix shouted. As the prosecution story proceeds,
     he discharged on her private parts as well as on the stomach
D    and washed the same. Upon hearing the cry of the prosecutrix,
     her mother, Ramnali Bai, PW2, reached the spot, and then
     accused took to his heels. The prosecutrix narrated the entire
     incident to her mother which led to lodging of an FIR by the
     mother of the prosecutrix. On the basis of the FIR lodged,
E    criminal law was set in motion, and thereafter the investigating
     agency examined number of witnesses, seized the clothes of
     the respondent-accused, sent certain articles for examination
     to the forensic laboratory and even~ually after completing the
     examination, laid the chargesheet before the concerned court,
 F   which in turn, committed the matter to the Court of Session.

      3. The accused abjured his guilt and pleaded false
  implication. The learned trial Judge, regard being had to the
  material brought on record, framed the charge under Section
G 376(2)(f) read with Section 511 of IPC. The prosecution, in
  order to bring home the charge leveled against the accused
  examined the prosecutrix, PW1, Ramnali Bai, PW2, Dr. Smt.
  Sharda Bhola, PW3, Head Constable Babu Singh, PW4,ASI
  B.R.S. Raghuwanshi, PW5, and Dr. Milind Bhagat, PW6, and
H also got marked nine documents as exhibits. The defence
               STATE OF M.P. v. MADANLAL                       1003
                   [DIPAK MISRA, J.]

chose not to adduce any evidence.                                  A

     4. The learned trial Judge on the basis of the material
brought on record came to hold that the prosecution had been
able to establish the charge against the accused and
accordingly found him guilty and sentenced him as has been         s
stated hereinbefore.

      5. The said judgment of conviction and order of sentence
was in assail before the High Court; and it was contended by
the learned counsel for the appellant therein that the trial court c
had failed to appreciate the evidence in proper perspective
and had not considered the' material contradictions in the
testimony of prosecution witnesses and, therefore, the
judgment of conviction and sentence, being vulnerable,
deserved to be annulled. The learned Judge also noted the          o
alternative submission which was to the effect that the parties
had entered into a compromise and a petition seeking leave
to compromise though was filed before the learned trial Judge,
it did not find favour with him on the ground that the offence in
question was non-compoundable and, therefore, regard being E
had to the said factum the sentence should be reduced to the
period already undergone, which was slightly more than one
year.

     6. The High Court, as is manifest, has converted the          F
offence to one under 354 IPC and confined the sentence to
the period of custody already undergone.

     7. We have heard Mr. C.D. Singh, learned counsel for the
appellant-State and Ms. Asha Jain Madan, learned counsel G
who was engaged by the Court to represent the respondent.
Be it stated, this Court had appointed a counsel to argue on
behalf of the respondent, as despite service of notice, the
respondent chose not to appear.
                                                                   H
    8. It is contended by the learned counsel for the State that
1004        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    (2015] 7 S.C.R.


 A the High Court has not kept in mind the jurisdiction of the
   appellate court and dislodged the conviction and converted
   the conviction to one under Section 354 IPC in an extremely
   laconic manner and, therefore, the judgment deserves to be
   dislodged. It is urged by him that it is the bounden duty of the
 B appellate court to reappreciate the evidence in proper
   perspective and thereafter arrive at appropriate conclusion and
   that exercise having not been done, the impugned judgment
   does not commend acceptation. He has also seriously
 C criticized the quantum of sentence imposed by the High Court.

        9. Ms. Asha Jain Madan, learned counsel appearing for
   the respondent, per contra, would contend that the learned
   Single Judge, regard being had to the evidence on record,
   has come to hold that the prosecution had failed to prove the
 D offence under Section 376(2)(f) read with Section 511 IPC,
   and hence, the impugned judgment is absolutely impeccable.
   She would contend with immense vehemence that when the
   prosecutrix was a seven year old girl and the ingredients of
   the offence had not been established the conversion of the
 E offence to one under Section 354 IPC by the High Court cannot
   be found fault with. It is urged by her that once the view of the
   High Court is found defensible, the imposition of sentence
   under Section 354 IPC cannot be regarded as perverse.

 F       10. To appreciate the rivalised submissions advanced at
   the Bar, we have anxiously perused the judgment of the learned
   trial Judge as well as that of the High Court. As we notice, the
   trial court has scanned the evidence and arrived at the
   conclusion that the prosecution had been able to bring home
 G the charge on the base of credible evidence. The High Court,
   as is demonstrable, has noted the submissions of the learned
   counsel for the appellant therein to the effect that the trial court
   had failed to appreciate the evidence in proper perspective,
 H and had totally ignored the material contradictions in the
                      STATE OF M.P. v. MADANLAL                   1005
                          [DIPAK MISRA, J.]

  testimony of the prosecution witnesses, and thereafter abruptly A
  referred to the decisions in Ashok@Pappu v. State of M.P. 1 ,
. Phulki@Santosh @Makhan v. State of M.P. 2 and Jeevan
  v. State of M.P. 3 and the factual matrix in the said cases, and ·
  concluded thus:-
                                                                      B
       "Keeping in view the aforesaid position of law and the
       statement of prosecutrix who was aged 7 years only at
       the time of incident and the medical evidence on record,
       this Court is of the opinion that the learned Court below
       committed error in convicting the appellant under Section C
       376 of IPC. After going through the evidence, it can be
       said that at the most appellant can be held guilty of the
       offence punishable under Section 354 of IPC. In view of
       this, the appeal filed by the appellant is allowed in part
       and the conviction of appellant under Section 376 is set D
       aside and appellant is convicted under Section 354 of
       IPC. So far as sentence is concerned, keeping in view
       the aforesaid position of law and also the fact that appellant
       is in jail since last more than one year the purpose would
       be served in case the jail sentence is reduced to the period E
       already undergone. Thus, the same is reduced to the
       period already undergone. Respondent/State is directed
       to release the appellant forthwith, if not required in any
       other case."
                                                                     F
       11. In the instant appeal, as a reminder, though repetitive,
 first we shall dwell upon, in a painful manner, how some of the
 appellate Judges, contrary to the precedents and against the
 normative mandate of law, assuming a presumptuous role have
 paved the path of unbelievable laconicity to deal with criminal G

 1 2005 Cr.L.J. (M.P.) 471

 2
     2006 Cr.L.J. (M.P.) 157
 3
     2008 Cr.L.J. (M.P.) 1498                                        H
1006       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2015] 7 S.C.R.


 A appeals which, if we permit ourselves to say, ruptures the
   sense of justice and punctures the criminal justice dispensation
   system.

       12 In this regard, reference to certain authorities of this
 B Court would be apposite. In Amar Singh v. Ba/winder Singh
   and Others' while dealing with the role of the appellate Court,
   a two-Judge Bench has observed thus:-

         "The learned Sessions Judge after placing reliance on
 c       the testimony of the eyewitnesses and the medical
         evidence on record was of the opinion that the case of the
         prosecution was fully established. Surprisingly, the High
         Court did not at all consider the testimony of the
         eyewitnesses and completely ignored the same. Section
 D       384 CrPC empowers the appellate court to dismiss the
         appeal summarily if it considers that there is no sufficient
         ground for interference. Section 385 CrPC lays down the
         procedure for hearing appeal not dismissed summarily
         and sub-section (2) thereof casts an obligation to send
 E       for the records of the case and to hearthe parties, Section
         386 CrPC lays down that after perusing such record and
         hearing the appellant or his pleader and the Public
         Prosecutor, the appellate court may, in an appeal from
         conviction, reverse the finding and sentence and acquit
 F       or discharge the accused or order him to be retried by a
         court of competent jurisdiction. It is, therefore, mandatory
         for the appellate court to peruse the record which will
         necessarily mean the statement of the witnesses. In a case
         based upon direct eyewitness account, the testimony of
 G       the eyewitnesses is of paramount importance and if the
         appellate court reverses the finding recorded by the trial
         court and acquits the accused without considering or
         examining the testimony of the eyewitnesses, it will be a
 H • (2003) 2 sec s1s
                 STATE OF MP. v. MADANLAL                       1007
                     [DIPAK MISRA, J.]

     clear infraction of Section 386 CrPC. In Biswanath Ghosh       A
     v. State of WB. 5 it was held that where the High .Court
     acquitted the accused in appeal against conviction without
     waiting for arrival of records from the Sessions Court and
     without perusing evidence adduced by the prosecution,
     there was a flagrant miscarriage of justice and the order      B
     of acquittal was liable to be set aside. It was further held
     that the fact that the Public Prosecutor conceded that there
     was no evidence, was not enough and the High Court had
     to satisfy itself upon perusal of the records that there was
     no reliable and credible evidence to warrant the conviction    C
     of the accused. In State of U. P. v. Saha1"6 it was observed
     that where the High Court has not cared to examine the
     details of the intrinsic merits of the evidence of the
     eyewitnesses and has rejected their evidence on general
                                                                    0
     grounds, the order of acquittal passed by the High Court
      resulted in a gross and substantial miscarriage of justice
     so as to invoke extraordinary jurisdiction of the Supreme
     Court under Article 136 of the Constitution."

    The said view was reiterated by a three-Judge Bench in E
the State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bhura Kunjda7 •

    13. Recently, in K. Anbazhagan v. State of Karnataka
and Others6 , a three-Judge Bench addressing the manner of
exercise of jurisdiction by the appellate court while deciding F
an appeal has ruled that:-

     "The appellate court has a duty to make a complete and
     comprehensive appreciation of all vital features of the case.
     The evidence brought on record in entirety has to be G
• (1987) 2sec 55
• (1982) 1 sec 352
1
 c2009) 17 sec 346
• Criminal Appeal No. 637 of 2015                                   H
1008       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     [2015) 7 S.C.R.


 A       scrutinized with care and caution. It is the duty of the Judge
         to see that justice is appropriately administered, for that
         is the paramount consideration of a Judge. The said
         responsibility cannot be abdicated or abandoned or
         ostracized, even remotely, solely because there might not
 B       have been proper assistance by the counsel appearing
        for the parties. The appellate court is required to weigh
        the materials, ascribe concrete reasons and the filament
        of reasoning must logically flow from the requisite analysis
        of the material on record. The approach cannot be cryptic.
 c       It cannot be perverse. The duty of the Judge is to consider
        the evidence objectively and dispassionately. The
        reasonings in appeal are to be well deliberated. They
        are to be resolutely expressed. An objective judgment of
        the evidence reflects the greatness of mind - sans passion
D
        and sans prejudice. The reflective attitude of the Judge
        must be demonstrable from the judgment itself. A judge
        must avoid all kind of weakness and vacillation. That is
        the sole test. That is the litmus test."
E       14. In the case at hand, the learned Single Judge has not
  at all referred to the evidence that has been adduced during
  the trial. We have, in fact, reproduced the entire analysis made
  by the learned Single Judge. Prior to that, as is manifest, he
  has referred to some authorities which are based on their own
F facts. The said pronouncements, in fact, lay down no
  proposition of law. As is noticeable, the learned Single Judge
  in his judgment has only stated that the prosecution has
  examined so many witnesses and filed nine documents. The
  said approach, we are afraid to say, does not satisfy the
G requirement of exercise of the appellate jurisdiction. That being
  the obtaining situation, we are inclined to set aside the
  judgment of the High Court and remit the matter to it for
  appropriate adjudication.
H       15. Having stated the aforesaid, ordinarily we would have
                STATE OF M.P. v. MADAN LAL                    1009
                    [DIPAK MISRA, J.]

proceeded to record our formal conclusion, but, an extremely A
pertinent and pregnant one, another aspect in the t;Cntext of
this case warrants to be addressed. As it seems to us the
learned Single Judge has been influenced by the compromise
that has been entered into between the accused and the
                                                              8
parents of the victim as the victim was a minor. The learned
trial Judge had rej~cted the said application on the ground
that the offence was not compoundable. In this context, it is
profitable to reproduce a passage from Shimbhu and
Another v. State of Haryana 9 wherein, a three-Judge Bench c
has ruled thus:-
    "Further, a compromise entered into between the parties
    cannot be construed as a leading factor based on which
    lesser punishment can be awarded. Rape is a non-
    compoundable offence and it is an offence against the          D
    society and is not a matter to be left for the parties to
    compromise and settle. Since the Court cannot always
    be assured that the consent given by the victim in
    compromising the case is a genuine consent, there is
    every chance that she might have been pressurised by           E
    the convicts or the trauma undergone b:' her all the years
    might have co!11pelled her to opt for a compromise. In fact,
    accepting this proposition will put an additional burden
    on the victim. The accused may use all his influence to        F
    pressurise her for a compromise. So, in the interest of
    justice and to avoid unnecessary pressure/harassment to
    the victim, it would not be safe in considering the
    compromise arrived at between the parties in rape cases
    to be a ground for the Court to exercise the discretionary     G
    power under the proviso of Sect_ion 376(2) IPC."
     16. The aforesaid view was expressed while dealing with
the imposition of sentence. We would like to clearly state that

• c2014) 13 sec 31a                                                H
1010       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     [2015] 7 S.C.R.


 A in a case of rape or attempt of rape, the conception of
    compromise under no circumstances can really be thought of.
    These are crimes against the body of a woman which is her
    own temple. These are offences which suffocate the breath of
    life and sully the reputation. And reputation, needless to
 B emphasise, is the richest jewel one can conceive of in life. No
   one would allow it to be extinguished. When a human frame is
   defiled, the "purest treasure", is lost. Dignity of a woman is a
   part of her non-perishable and immortal self and no one should
   ever think of painting it in clay. There cannot be a compromise
 C or settlement as it would be against her honour which matters
   the most. It is sacrosanct. Sometimes solace is given that the
   perpetrator of the crime has acceded to enter into wedlock
   with her which is nothing but putting pressure in an adroit
   manner; and we say with emphasis that the Courts are to
 0
   remain absolutely away from this subterfuge to adopt a soft
   approach to the case, for any kind of liberal approach has to
   be put in the compartment of spectacular error. Or to put it
   differently, it would be in the realm of a sanctuary of error. We
 E are compelled to say so as such an attitude reflects lack of
   sensibility towards the dignity, the elan vital, of a woman. Any
   kind of liberal approach or thought of mediation in this regard
   is thoroughly and completely sans legal permissibility. It has
   to be kept in mind, as has been held in Shyam Narain v.
 F State (NCT of De/hi)1° that:-

        "Respect for reputation of women in the society shows
        the basic civility of a civilised society. No member of society
        can afford to conceive the idea that he can create a hollow
        in the honour of a woman. Such thinking is not only
G
        lamentable but al~o deplorable. It would not be an
        exaggeration to say that the thought of sullying the physical
        frame of a woman is the demolition of the accepted
        civilised norm i.e. "physical morality". In such a sphere,
H 10 (2013) 1 sec n
                   STATE OF M.P. v. MADANLAL                   1011
                       [DIPAK MISRA, J.]

       impetuosity has no room. The youthful excitement has no A
       place. It should be paramount in everyone's mind that, on
       the one hand, society as a whole cannot preach from the
       pulpit about social, economic and political equality of the
       sexes and, on the other, some perverted members of the
       same society dehumanise the woman by attacking her B
       body and ruining her chastity. It is an assault o.n__the
       individuality and inherent dignity of a woman with the
       mindset that she should be elegantly servile to men."

    17. At this juncture, we are obliged to refer to two C
authorities, namely, Baldev Singh v. State of Punjab 11 and
Ravindra v. State of Madhya Pradesh 12• Baldev Singh
(supra) was considered by the three-Judge Bench in
Shimbhu (supra) and in that case it has been stated that:-
                                                                   D
       "18.1. In Baldev Singh v. State of Punjab, though the
       courts below awarded a sentence often years, taking note
       of the facts that the occurrence was 14 years old, the
       appellants therein had undergone about 3Y2 years of
       imprisonment, the prosecutrix and the appellants married E
       (not to each other) and entered into a compromise, this
       Court, while considering peculiar circumstances, reduced
       the sentence to the period already undergone, but
       enhanced the fine from Rs. 1000 to Rs. 50,000. In the light
       of series of decisions, taking contrary view, we hold that F
       the said decision in Baldev Singh v. State of Punjab
       cannot be cited as a precedent and it should be confined
       to that case."
     18. Recently, in Ravindra (supra), a two-Judge Bench G
taking note of the fact that there was a compromise has opined
thus:-
        "17. This Court has in Baldev Singh v. State of Punjab,
11
     c2011) 13 sec 705                                            H
12 (2015) 4   sec 491
1012          SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2015] 7 S.C.R.


 A          invoked the proviso to Section 376(2) IPC on the
            consideration that the case was an old one. The facts of
            the above case also state that there was compromise
            entered into between the parties.

 B          18. In the light of the discussion in the foregoing
            paragraphs, we are of the opinion that the case of the
            appellant is a fit case for invoking the proviso to Section
            376(2) IPC for awarding lesser sentence, as the incident
            is 20 years old and the fact that the parties are married
 c          and have entered into a compromise, are the adequate
            and special reasons. Therefore, although we uphold the
            conviction of the appellant but reduce the sentence to the
            period already undergone by the appellant. The appeal
            is disposed of accordingly."
 D
            19. Placing reliance on Shimbhu (supra), we also say
       that the judgments in Baldev Singh (supra) and Ravindra
       (supra) have to be confined to the facts of the said cases and
       are not to be regarded as binding precedents.
 E      20. We have already opined that matter has to be remitted
   to the High Court for a reappraisal of the evidence and for a
   fresh decision and, therefore, we have not referred to the
   evidence of any of the witnesses. The consequence of such
 F remand is that the order of the High Court stands lancinated
   and as the respondent was in custody at the time of the
   pronouncement of the judgment by the trial Court, he shall be
   taken into custody forthwith by the concerned Superintendent
   of Police and thereafter the appeal before the High Court be
 G heard afresh. A copy of judgment be sent to the High Court of
   Madhya Pradesh, Bench at Gwalior.
           21. The appeal stands allowed to the extent indicated
       herein above.
 H     Nidhi Jain                                   Appeal partly allowed.