Holding

Presiding Officers of Industrial Tribunals are entitled to pay parity with District Judges, and denial of such parity violates Article 14 of the Constitution.

Summary

The respondents, who were Presiding Officers of Kerala's Industrial Tribunals, had historically received pay scales equal to District Judges. After the 1998 Shetty Commission revised the pay of District Judges, the state granted the revised scales only to District Judges and not to the Tribunal officers, prompting the respondents to file a writ petition. The High Court directed the state to grant the Tribunal officers pay parity with District Judges, a decision the state appealed to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court examined whether the Tribunal officers, though not appointed under Article 234, performed judicial functions identical to District Judges and were therefore entitled to equal pay under Articles 14, 16 and 39(d). It held that the doctrine of "equal pay for equal work" is a fundamental right and that denying parity violated constitutional equality. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the High Court's order for pay parity.

Issues considered

Whether Presiding Officers of Industrial Tribunals are entitled to pay parity with District Judges despite not being appointed under Article 234.
Whether denial of equal pay violates Articles 14, 16 and 39(d) of the Constitution.
Whether the doctrine of equal pay for equal work constitutes a fundamental right in service law.
Whether the Industrial Tribunals fall within the definition of judicial service under Article 236.

Legislation cited

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947s. 7A

Subjects

pay parityequal pay for equal workArticle 14Article 16Article 39(d)Industrial TribunalsDistrict Judgesjudicial serviceconstitutional equalityservice law

Judgment

[2008] 9 S.C.R. 1078

A STATE OF KERA LA •
- ~

V.
B.RENJITH KUMAR & ORS.
(Civil Appeal No. 4104 of 2004)
JUNE 5,2008
B
[C.K. THAKKER AND LOKESHWAR SINGH PANTA,
JJ.] .,.
Service Law - Pay parity - Equal pay for equal work -
c Presiding Officers of Industrial Tribunal initially granted pay
at par with the District Judges - Pay parity denied after revi-
sion of pay of judicial officers as per recommendations of
National Judicial Commission (Sheffy Commission) - Pro-
priety of - Held: Presiding Officers of the Industrial Tribunals
were entitled to the pay parity with the District Judges - It was
D
not correct to deny the parity having accepted and recognized
the same for more than 30 years - The two categories cannot •
be treated differently as the nature of their functions and du-
•
ties and qualification for appointment are same - Denial of
equal pay for equal work would be violative of Fundamental
E Rights enshrined under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution
- Constitution of India 1950-Articles 234, 14, 16 and 39(d) -
Industrial Disputes Act 1947 - Section l(A){as amended by
Industrial Disputes (Kera/a Amendment) Act [Act No. 28 of
1961}
F
Doctrines - Doctrine of equal pay for equal work - na-
ture of - held: The doctrine was originally propounded as part
of Directive Principles of State Policy but in view of Constitu-
tional mandate of equality and inhibition against discrimina-
tion in service jurisprudence, it has assumed the status of Fun-
G
damental Right - Constitution of India, 1950, Articles 14, 16
and 39(d).
Respondents were appointed as Presiding Officer "'
of the Industrial Tribunals. Prior to year 1998 State Gov-
H 1078
..._
STATE OF KERALA v. B.RENJITH KUMAR 1079
..,. & ORS .
• ernment had granted them pay scales at par with the Dis- A
trict Judges. In 1998 National Judicial Pay Commission
(Shetty Commission) recommended pay revision to Dis-
trict Judges and members of Subordinate Judiciary with
retrospective effect i.e. March, 1996. By G.O. dated
30.5.1998, Judicial Officers were granted interim relief at B
~ v the rate of 35% of the pay. Since the same was not given
to the respondents, they approached High Court. They
were granted interim relief as per the direction of the High
..,.. Court. The state Government by G.O. (MS) No. 231/2001/
Home dated 12.12.2001 decided to grant pay scale to the c
members of the judiciary as per the recommendations of
the Shetty Commission. The respondents, since were
denied the said benefit, made representation requesting
for grant of same scales of pay as that of the District
,,... Judges in the State. The State Government by its order
D
~ (Exbt PB) granted the pay scale of Rs. 16, 300-400-18,300
w.e.f. March 1, 1997 while the District Judges had been
granted the scale of Rs. 16,750-400-19,150-420-20,500.
Respondents filed writ petition challenging the or-
der. State Government contended that since the Presid- E
ing Officers of the lntlustrial tribunals were not appointed
under Article 234 of the Constitution of India, they are not
entitled to same scales of pay as that of the Higher Judi-
ciary. High Court negating the contention of the State al-
lowed the writ petition and directed the State to modify F
its order so as to treat the writ petitioners at par with the
District Judges in the matter of time scale as well as se-
lection grade. Hence the present appeal.
Dismissing the appeal the Court
G
- ....
HELD: 1.1 The impugned judgment warrants no in-
terference inasmuch as no illegality, infirmity or error of
jurisdiction could be shown by the appellant-State. High
Court held that even the Presiding Officers of the Indus-
trial Tribunals are not outside the ambit of the Constitu-
H
1080 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 9 S.C.R. -
A tion as the protection of rules framed under Article 309 as
also under Article 311 of the Constitution is available to
them. The State Government had granted pay scale at
par with that of the District Judges before the recommen-
dations of the pay scales of the District Judges by the
B Shetty Commission by which District Judges were placed
in higher scales which benefit has been denied to the y 1
Presiding Officers of Industrial Tribunals merely on the
ground that the Presiding Officers of the Industrial Tribu-
nal are not appointed under Article 233 of the Constitu-
C tion of India nor they are appointed to the Judicial Ser-
vices of a State under Article 234 of the Constitution. The
action of the State Government in treating the officers
presiding over the Industrial Tribunal differently from the
District Judges in the matter of pay scales on its face is in
violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The
0
essential educational and professional qualifications for •
appointment of the Presiding Officer of the Industrial Tri-
bunals are identical to that of the appointment of District
Judge. [Paras 9 and 14] [1095-C, 1088-C-F]
E Chandra Mohan v. State of UP and Ors. AIR (1966) SC
1987 - distinguished.
State of Maharashtra v. Labour Law Practitioners' Asso-
ciation 1998 (2) SCC 688; Union of India v. Dineshan K.K.
2008 (1) sec 586 - relied on.
F
1.2 The Industrial Tribunals have been constituted
in the State of Kera la under Section 7A of Industrial Tribu-
nals Act, 1947. By the Industrial Disputes (Kerala Amend-
ment) Act, [Act No. 28 of 1961], in its application to the
G State of Kerala under sub-section (3) of Section 7A of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 Clause (a) has been substi-
tuted. In terms of the substituted clause (a), a judicial of-
ficer not below the rank of District Judge is qualified to
-
be appointed as Presiding Officer of the Industrial Tribu-
H nal. [Paras 7, 8 and 9] [1085-E,F, 1086-F,G,H, 1087-A]
STATE OF KERALA v. B.RENJITH KUMAR 1081
& ORS.

1.3 It is not in dispute that the officers who presided A ·
over the Labour Courts and those appointed as Presid-
ing Officers of the Industrial Tribunals do decide disputes
under the ID Act, 1947. There is no qualitative difference
in the nature of functions or duties attached to the cat-
egories of posts. This parity having been recognised and B
- '1
accepted by the State Government for more than 30 years,
the High Court, has rightly observed that the mere fact
that the Constitution refers to the appointment of District
Judges alone cannot, by itself, be a good ground for treat-
ing the Presiding Officers of the Industrial Tribunal and c
the District Judges differently. [Para 9] [1088-A,B]
1.4 The Industrial Tribunals are indisputably judicial
tribunals manned by legal professionals who are eligible
to be appointed as District Judges or Judges of the High
Courts. The Presiding Officers are exercising judicial D
powers and duties under the ID Act, 1947 and their deci-
sions are subject matter of challenge before the High
Court by way of writ petition. The only difference is their
source of recruitment. Looking to the nature of duties and
functions of these respondents, there is no reason to treat E
them differently. Once these persons are already work-
ing for more than three decades discharging the same
functions and duties, there is no reason why the same
benefit should not be given to the respondents and other
similarly situated Presiding Officers of the Tribunal who F
are the applicants before this Court. [Paras 10 and 11]
[1090-A,B,C,D]
2. The doctrine of "equal pay for equal work" was
originally propounded as part of the Directive Principles
of State Policy in Article 39(d) .of the Constitution. Thus, G
having regard to the Constitutional mandate of equality
and inhibition against discrimination in Articles 14 and 16,
in s&rvice jurisprudence, the doctrine of "equal pay for
equal work" h<1~ assumed the status of fundamental right.
[Para 13J[1094-F,G] H
1082 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 9 S.C.R.

A Randhir Singh v. Union of India 1982 (1) SCC 618; D.S.
Nakara v Union of India 1983 (1) SCC 305 - relied on.

CIVILAPPELLATE JUISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 4104
of 2004

B From the final Judgment dated 5/12/2003 of the High Court
of Kerala at Ernakulam in O.P. No. 8947 of 2003 (M) "
G. Prakash for the Appellant.
Malini Poduval, C.K. Rai and Anindita Popli for the Re-
c spondents.
C.N. Sree Kumar, Prakash R. Nayak and Dushyant
Parashar for impleading party
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
D LOKESHWAR SINGH PANTA, J. 1. This appeal by the
State of Kerala, arises out of the judgment and order dated 5th
December, 2003, passed by the High Court of Kerala at
Ernakulam in O.P. No, 8947/03(M). By the impugned order,
while allowing the writ petition of the respondents herein, direc-
E tions have been issued that order at Exhibit P8 shall be modi-
fied so as to treat the writ petitioners at par with the District
Judges in the matter of time scale as well as the selection grade
and the needful should be done within three months from the
date of the certified copy of the judgment.
F 2. Facts, in brief leading to the filing of the present appeal
are as follows:-
The respondents herein were the members of the Bar. In
the year 1993, respondent Nos. 1 and 2 were selected and
G appointed as Presiding Officers of the Industrial Tribunals
whereas respondent No. 3 was selected and appointed as Pre-
siding Officer in the year 1996 in the State of Kerala. They -r
continued to work as such. The claim of the respondents in the
writ petition was that prior to the year 1998, the State Govern-
H ment had granted to them pay scales at par with the District
• STATE OF KERALA v. B.RENJITH KUMAR 1083
& ORS. [LOKESHWAR SINGH PANTA, J.]
i
Judges. However, when Judicial Officers were granted benefit A
of revision of pay scales in December, 2001 with retrospective
effect from March, 1996, similar benefit was denied to them.
The respondents submitted a representation to the State Gov-
ernment seeking extension of the benefit of interim relief in terms
of order vide G.O. dated 30.5.1998 granting interim relief at the B
.. ~
'r
rate of 35% of pay as on 1. 7.1996 to the members of the Sub-
ordinate Judiciary in the State. The said representation was
decided and rejected vi de order dated 15 .5.1999. On

-· 25.11.1999, the respondents filed O.P. No. 20490 of 1999 in
the High Court seeking direction to the State Government to c
grant interim relief at par with the District Judges. The said writ
petition was allowed, with a direction to the State Government
to issue necessary orders in this regard by extending the ben-
efit of interim relief at the rate of 35% (basic pay + D.A.) with
effect from 1.1.1996 as directed in Exhibit P4 to the Judicial
) D
Officers. It was the case of the respondents before the High
>
Court that the State Government on 18.4.2000 in pursuance of
the directions of the High Court sanctioned interim relief to the
Presiding Officers of the Industrial Tribunals as well. On
12.1.2001, Government of Kerala vide G.O.(MS) No. 231/2001/
Home dated 12.12.2001 decided to grant the scales of pay to E
the members of Subordinate Judiciary as recommended by the
National Judicial Commission (Shetty Commission). The re-
spondents were denied the said benefits of the scales of pay
and,..accordingly, they submitted representation on 7.1.2002 to
the Secretary to the Government, (Labour and Rehabilitation F
Department) requesting for the grant of same scales of pay as
that of the District Judges in the State. A copy of the order dated
4.2.2003 by which revision of pay was allowed to the District
Judges was placed on the record of the High Court as Exhibit
.PB. By the impugned order, the Presiding Officers (Industrial G
Tribunals) were granted the pay scale of Rs. 16,300-400-
,, 18,300/- with effect from March 1, 1997. However, the District
Judges had been placed in the scale of Rs. 16,750-400-19, 150-
420-20,500/-. They also had been granted a selection grade
of Rs. 18, 750-400-19, 150-450-20,500-500-23,850/-. The re- H
1084 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2008] 9 S.C.R.

A spondents complained that the action in treating them differ-
ently from the District Judges suffers from the vice of discrimi-
n.ation and arbitrariness. Thus, they sought the intervention of
the High Court to quash order - Exhibit P8 of the State Govern-
rwant and further direction to grant same scale of pay as has
B been sanctioned in the case of District Judges.

3. The writ petition was contested by the State. In the
counter affidavit filed on its behalf by the Under Secretary, De-
partment of Finance, it was inter alia stated that in the State of
Kerala while the Presiding Officers of the Labour Court are
C appointed under the provisions of Article 234 of the Constitu-
ticn of India, the Presiding Officers of Industrial Tribunals are
not so appointed under Article 234 of the Constitution of India.
Thus, the Presiding Officers of the Industrial Tribunals are not
el'ltitled to the same scales of pay as recommended by the Na-
o tional Judicial Pay Commission (Shetty Commission) for the
members of the Higher Judiciary. On these premises, it was
claimed that the action of the State Government was legal and
valid.
4. Taking note of the contentions and claims and counter
E claims of the respective parties, the High Court has felt that the
mere fact that the Presiding Officers of the Industrial Tribunals
are not appointed on the recommendation of the High Court or
that they are not under the control of the High Court cannot, by
itself, be a good reason and adequate ground for treating them
F differently over a period of 30 years. Consequently, the High
Court issued the afore-noted directions which are in question
in this appeal by special leave.
5. Mr. G. Prakash, learned counsel appearing for the ap-
G pellant-State of Kerala, contended that the High Court erred in
holding that the Presiding Officers of the Industrial Tribunals are
entitled to the same revised scales of pay as recommended by
the National Judicial Commission (Shetty Commission) for the
rnttmbers of the Higher Judici?' Services merely on the assump-
tion that prior to the ye2 r 1998 the Presiding Officers of the
H
...
STATE OF KERALA v. B.RENJITH KUMAR 1085
"'( & ORS. [LOKESHWAR SINGH PANTA, J.]
• Industrial Tribunals were getting the same scale at par with the A
District Judges. He also contended that the services of the Pre-
siding Officers of the Industrial Tribunals cannot be equated with
that of the Judicial Officers who are appointed under Articles
233 and 234 of the Constitution of India.
...,, 6. Ms. Malini Poduval, learned counsel appearing on be- B
" half of respondent Nos. 1 to 3 and Mr. C.N . Sreekumar, ap-
pearing for C.N. Sasidharan and K. Kanakachandran, who have
filed I.A. No. 2 for their impleadment as additional respondents
in this appeal in support of the judgment of the High Court, have
contended that the claim of the Presiding Officers of the Indus- c
trial Tribunals before the High Court was that they be granted
scale of pay fixed for District Judges as the duties, functions
and volume of work of the Industrial Tribunals are equal to that
of District Judges and earlier they were placed in identical pay
scales till the revision of pay scale of the Judicial Officers in the D
year 1998. According to the learned counsel, the Presiding
Officers of the Industrial Tribunal do not claim that they belong
to the category of District Judges who are appointed under Ar-
ticle 233 of the Constitution of India. The learned counsel then
contended that the well-reasoned order of the High Court does E
not suffer from any infirmity or perversity and this Court normally
should not interfere in the well-merited order impugned by the
appellant-State before this Court while exercising its jurisdic-
tion under Article 136 of the Constitution of India.
7. The Labour Courts and the Industrial Tribunals have been F
constituted in the State of Kera la under Sections 7 and 7A of
the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as "the
ID Act, 1947"). In the present case, we are concerned with the
appointments of Presiding Officers of the Industrial Tribunals
constituted under Section 7A of the ID Act, 1947 which reads G
as under:-
"7A. Tribunals - ( 1) The appropriate Government may, by
notification in the Official Gazette, constitute one or more
Industrial Tribunals for the adjudication of industrial disputes
H
1086 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 9 S.C.R.

A relating to any matter, whether specified in the Second
Schedule or the Third Schedule, [and for performing such
other functions as may be assigned to them under this
Act].
(2) A Tribunal shall consist of one person only to be
B appointed by the appropriate Government. .., "
(3) A person shall not be qualified for appointment as the
presiding officer of a Tribunal unless-
(a) he is, or has been, a Judge of a High Court; or
c
(aa) he has, for a period of not less than three yeas, been
a District Judge or an Additional Judge
(b) ******

(c) he has for not less than five years been a presiding
D
officer of a Labour Court, constituted under any law
for the time being in force;
(d) he holds a degree in law of a University established
by law in any part of India and is holding or has held
E an office not lower in rank than that of Assistant
Commissioner of Labour under the State
Government for not les than ten years.
(4) The appropriate Government may, if it so thinks fit,
appoint two persons as assessors to advise the Tribunal
F in the proceeding before it."
8. By the Industrial Disputes (Kerala Amendment) Act, [Act
No. 28 of 1961], in its application to the State of Kera la under
~b-Section (3) of Section 7A of the ID Act, 194 7 for Clause (a)
G '1e following clause has been substituted. The substituted
clause (a) in sub-Section (3) reads as under:-
"(a) He is or has been a Judicial Officer not below the rank
of a District Judge, or is qualified for appointment as a
Judge of a High Court; or"
H
STATE OF KERALA v. B.RENJITH KUMAR 1087
& ORS. [LOKESHWAR SINGH PANTA, J.]

9. Thus, in the State of Kerala, in terms of the above sub~ A
• stituted clause (a) in sub-Section (3) of Section 7A of the ID
Act, 1947, a judicial officer not below the rank of District Judge
is qualified to be appointed as Presiding Officer of the Indus-
trial Tribunal. Indisputably, prior to 1.7.1988 the pay scale of
the Presiding Officers of the Industrial Tribunals and District B
Judges was Rs.2600-3800/-. The District Judges were granted
selection grade in the scale of Rs. 3700-4200/-. All the three
Industrial Tribunals Services at that time were also placed in
the selection grade of Rs. 3700-4200/-. Government of Kerala
appointed Pay Commission chaired by Justice c
T.Chandrashekhara Menon to make recommendations in the
matter of revision of pay scales in the ·case of Government
employees. The Commission recommended revised scale of
Rs. 3175- 4605/- to the Industrial Tribunals (Entry Cadre) and
Rs. 4435-5285/- to the three Industrial Tribunals who were D
granted selection grade. The Commission recommended the
same scale of pay to the District Judges, Sessions Judges and
selection grade District Judges. The Government of Kerala
accepted the above recommendations and revised the pay
scales of Industrial Tribunals and District and Sessions Judges.
as recommended by the Pay Commission with effect from E
1. 7.1988. In the year, 1993, Government issued G.O. (P) No.
600/93/Fin. dated 08.12.1993 revising the pay scales of State
Government employees w.e.f. 01.03.1992. By the said order,
the scale of pay of Industrial Tribunals were revised to Rs. 5100-
5700/-. In the above pay revision order in respect of District F
Judges and members of Subordinate Judiciary, it was noted
that revised scale will be separately ordered. It was the admit-
ted case of the State Government that later on the Government
issued separate order revising the pay scales of District Judges
to Rs. 5100-5700/- which is the same scale of pay granted to G
the Industrial Tribunals. Indisputably, the Government of India
based on the recommendations of this Court by resolution dated
21.3.1994 constituted the First National Judicial Pay Commis-
sion to go into the question of the pay scales and to recom-
mend uniform scale of pay for the Subordinate Judiciary in the H
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1088 [2008] 9 S.C.R.
-
A States and Union Territories. Accordingly, National Judicial Pay
Commission (Shetty Commission) recommended pay revision •
to the District Judges and other members of the Subordinate
Judiciary in the year 1998. It is not in dispute that the officers
who presided over the Labour Courts and those appointed as
s Presiding Officers of the Industrial Tribunals do decide disputes
under the ID Act, 1947. There is no qualitative difference in the
nature of functions or duties attached to the categories of po~ts .
This parity having been recognised and accepted by the State
Government for more than 30 years, the High Court, in our view,
c has rightly observed that the mere fact that the Constitution re-
fers to the appointment of District Judges alone cannot, by it-
self, be a good ground for treating the Presiding Officers of the
Industrial Tribunal and the District Judges differently. The High
Court held that even the Presiding Officers of the Industrial Tri-
o bunals are not outside the ambit of the Constitution as the pro-
tection of rules framed under Article 309 as also under Article
311 is available to them. The State Government had granted
pay scale at par with that of the District Judges before the rec-
ommendations of the pay scales of the District Judges by the
Shetty Commission by which District Judges were placed in
E higher scales which benefit has been denied to the Presiding
Officers of Industrial Tribunals merely on the ground that the
Presiding Officers of the Industrial Tribunal are not appointed
under Article 233 of the Constitution of India nor they are ap-
pointed to the Judicial Services of a State under Article 234 of
F the Constitution. The action of the State Government in treating
the officers presiding over the Industrial Tribunal differently from
the District Judges in the matter of pay scales on its face is in
violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The essential
educational and professional qualifications for appointment of
G the Presiding Officer of the Industrial Tribunals are identical to
that of the appointment of District Judge. The High Court in its
order dated 25.11.1999 passed in 0 .P. No. 20490/1999-C filed
by the respondents noticed that in the counter affidavit filed by
the State Government in the said writ petition lt was stated:
H "that the duties, functions and sca les of pay of the Presiding
- STATE OF KERALA v. B.RENJITH KUMAR
& ORS. [LOKESHWAR SINGH PANTA, J.]
1089

Officers of the Industrial Tribunals are equal to that of the Dis- A
• trict Judges. The request for granting 35% of .the interim relief
was taken up with the Pay Revision Committee and on the ba-
sis of the remarks of the Pay Revision Committee the respon-
dents have informed the Industrial Tribunals that they would con-
tinue. to get two instalments to interim relief and they need not B
be allowed 35% of the interim relief." On this premise, the High
Court in paragraph 6 of its order observed as under:-
"When the Government admits that the duties, functions
and scales of pay of the Industrial Tribunals are equal to
that of District Judges, I do not find any justification for not C
granting the interim relief of 15% granted to the Judicial
Officers as per Exhibit P4 to the Petitioners. Anyway, the
Government has promised that they will implement the
report of the First National Judicial Pay Commission. In
Exhibit P4 also it has been stated that the interim relief of D
;- 35% granted will be fully adjusted against and included in
, the package on the· final recommendation of the First
National Judicial Pay Commission. Therefore, there was
no justifiable reason not to apply these principles to the
petitioners." E
10. The ratio of the judgment in Chandra Mohan v. State
of UP & Ors. AIR (1966) SC 1987, relied upon by the appel-
lant-State has no bearing upon the legal proposition and fac-
tual situation involved in the case on hand. In the said case, the
question before this Court was in regard to the interpretation of F
the expression, "the service" in Clause (2) of Article 233 of the
Constitution. This Court held that the Chapter dealing with "sub-
ordinate courts" in which the expression "the service" appears
indicate..; that the service mentioned therein is the service per-
taining to courts. That apart, Article 236(2) defines the expres- G
sion "judicial service" to mean a service consisting exclusively
of persons intended to fill the post of District Judge and other
'Y civil judicial posts inferior to the post of District Judge. The ex-
pressions "exclusively" and "intended" emphasise the fact that
the judicial service consists only of persons intended to fill up H
1090 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 9 S.C.R.

1'
A the posts of District Judges and other civil judicial posts and i
that is the exclusive service of judicial officers. In the present
case, the respondents' claim before the High Court was con-
fined to equal scale of pay to that of the District Judges. This
was based on the fact that the respondents are discharging
B similar duties and functions in the administration of justice and
their scale of pay was equal to that of District Judges till revi-
sion of pay scales of the Judicial Officers in the year 1998. The '(

Industrial Tribunals are indisputably judicial tribunals manned
by legal professionals who are eligible to be appointed as Dis-
c trict Judges or Judges of the High Courts, The Presiding Offic-
ers are exercising judicial powers and duties under the ID Act,
1947 and their decisions are subject matter of challenge be-
fore the High Court byway of writ petition. The only difference is
their source of recruitment.
D 11. Looking to the nature of duties and functions of these
-.\_
respondents, we are of the opinion that there is no reason to
treat them differently. Once these persons are already working '
for more than three decades discharging the same functions
and duties, we see no reason why the same benefit should not
E be given to the respondents and other sirp.itarly situated Pre-
siding Officers of the Tribunal who are the applicants before us
in IA No. 212004.

12. In State of Maharashtra v. Labour Law Practitioners'
Association [(1998) 2 SCC 688], the question before the High
F Court was whether notification dated 8.3.1979 issued by the
State of Maharashtra under the ID Act, 1947 and the Bombay
Industrial Relations Act and the amended Section 7 of the ID
Act, 1947 insofar as these provisions authorised the appoint-
ment of Assistant Commissioners of Labour working as Judges
G of the Labour Court were void and illegal and contrary to Article
234 of the Constitution. There was also a prayer in the writ pe-
tition for a direction to the State of Maharashtra to comply with
~
the provisions of Article 234 of the Constitution while making
appointments of judges of the Labour Court. A learned Single
H Judge of the High Court set aside the notification of 8.3.1997
STATE OF KERALA v. B.RENJITH KUMAR · 1091
& ORS. [LOKESHWAR SINGH PANTA, J.]

and also gave a direction to the State of Maharashtra to comply A
with the provisions of Article 234 of the Constitution while ap-
pointing Judges of the Labour Court.- Being aggrieved by this
judgment and order, the appellant-State of Maharashtra pre-
ferred an appeal before Division Bench of the High Court which
appeal has been dismissed. Thus the State of Maharashtra B
filed an appeal before this Court. This Court while dealing with
"' )"
and interpreting the provisions of Articles 233, 234, 235, 236(a)
and (b) and Section 3(17) of General Clauses Act, Bombay
Industrial Relations Act, 1946 and Maharashtra Recognition of
Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, c
1971, held: (Para 5 SCC p. 692)
"5. There is not much difficulty in holding that the Labour
Court performs judicial functions and is a Court. The Labour
Court adjudicates upon disputes that, had it not been for
)- the Industrial Disputes Act, the Bombay Industrial Relations D
> Act and the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions
and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, would have
been within the jurisdiction of the ordinary civil courts to
decide, although the ordinary civil courts may not be able
to grant all the reliefs that are contemplated by these Acts. E
The Labour Courts are, therefore, courts and decide
disputes that are civil in nature."
In paragraph 6 (see pp. 692-693), it was held:-
.... • "6. In the case of Bharat Bank Ltd. v. Employees AIR F
[1950] SC 459, this Court considered whether an Industrial
Tribunal was a court. It said that one cannot go by mere
nomenclature. One has to examine the functions of a
Tribunal and how it proceeds to discharge those functions.
It held that an Industrial Tribunal had all the trappings of a
G
court and performed functions which cannot but be
regarded as judicial. The Court referred to the Rules by
'i

.. which proceedings before the Tribunal were regulated.
The Court dwelt on the fact that the powers vested in it are
similar to those exercised by civil courts under the code
H
1092 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2008] 9 S.C.R.

y
A of Civil Procedure when trying a suit. It had the power of
ordering discovery, inspection etc. and forcing the
attendance of witnesses, compelling produciion of
documents and so on. It gave its decision on the basis of
evidence and in accordance with law. Applying the test
B laid down in the case of Cooper v Wilson, [1937] 2 K.B.
309 at p. 340, this Court said that "a true judicial decision
,.__
presupposes an existence of dispute between two or more '1

parties and then involves four requisites :- (1) the
presentation of their case by the parties; (2) ascertainment
c of facts by means of evidence adduced by the parties
often with the assistance of argument; (3) if the dispute
relates to a question of law, submission of legal, arguments
by the parties; and (4) by decision which disposes of the
whole matter by findings on fact and application of law to
facts so found, Judged by the same tests, a Labour Court
D
would undoubtedly be a court in the true sense of the term. ~

The question, however, is whether such a court and the '
presiding officer of such a court can be said to hold a post
in the judicial service of the State as defined in Article 236
of the Constitution."
E
Further paras 10, 11 and 12(see pp694-695:
"10. The District Judge, therefore, covers a judge of any
Principal Civil Court of Original Jurisdiction. With an

F
increase in the numbers of a specialised courts and •'
tribunals which are being set up to deal with specific kinds
of civil litigation which would otherwise have been dealt
with by the ordinary civil courts, we now have a number of
specialised courts exercising different categories of civil
original jurisdiction. It can be specialised civil original
G jurisdiction pertaining to Labour and Industrial disputes
specified in the relevant Acts as in the case of Labour and
Industrial Courts, or it could be pertaining to recovery of .,.

H
bank debts and so on. The structure of civil courts
exercising original jurisdiction is no longer monolithic. The
judge of the Principal Civil Court heading the concerned
-
...
+ .• """
STATE OF KERALA v. B.RENJITH KUMAR 1093
& ORS. [LOKESHWAR SINGH PANTA, J.]
•.
~
-..
.. " set of courts under him and exercising that jurisdiction can A
also fall in the category of a "District Judge" by whatever
name called. Learned single judge and learned Judges of
the Division Bench have, therefore, held that and Industrial
Court is a civil court exercising civil original jurisdiction;
and the person presiding over it could well be termed as B
a District Judge. The term "District Judge" should not be
y a confined only to the judge of the Principal Civil Court in
_, the hierarchy of general civil courts. The term would now
have to include also the hierarchy of specialised civil
courts, such as a hierarchy of Labour Courts and Industrial c
Courts. The fact that the Chief Presidency Magistrate and
the Sessions Judge were also included in the definition of
"District" Judge indicates that a wide interpretation is to
be given to the expression "District Judge". The extensive
definition of a District Judge under Article 236 is indicative
D
of the same.
~
~> 11. Under Article 236(b) the expression "judicial service"
is defined to mean "a service consisting exclusively of
persons intended to fill the post of district judge and other
civil judicial posts inferior to the post of district judge." E
Judicial service thus postulates a hierarchy of courts with
the District Judge as the head and other judicial officers
under him discharging only judicial functions.
12. In the case of Chandra Mohan v. State of Uttar Pradesh
, ~
and Ors., AIR (1966) SC 1987 this Court was required to F
consider the question of eligibility of "judicial officers" for
appointment as District Judges under Article 233 of the
Constitution. Under the U.P. Higher Judicial Service Rules
"Judicial Officers" were eligible for appointment as District
Judges and the expression was meant to cover members G
·of the executive department who discharged some
revenue and magisterial duties also. When selection of
.,, such persons was challenged, this Court was required to
consider and interpret the provisions of Articles 233 to
23~ of the Constitution. The procedure for selection under H
1094 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 9 S.C.R.

A the said Rules was also challenged as violative of Article ..
233. The Court said that the Governor could not appoint
as District Judge persons from services other than the
judicial services. A person who is in the police, excise,
revenue or such other service cannot be appointed as a ,_
\

B District Judge. Dealing with the definition of "judicial
service" in Article 236, this Court said that the judicial
service consists only of persons intended to fill up the
posts of District Judges and other civil judicial posts and
that is an exclusive service only consisting of judicial
c officers. In so interpreting judicial service in
contradistinction to executive service where some
executive officers may also be performing judicial or quasi-
judicial functions, this Court was at pains to emphasis the
Constitutional scheme for independence of the judiciary.
It said that the acceptance of this (i.e. Government's)
D
position would take us back to pre-independence days
and would also cut across the well-knit scheme of the
Constitution providing for independence of the judiciary.
This Court, therefore, defined judicial service in exclusive
terms as consisting only of judicial officers discharging
E entirely judicial duties. It said that having provided for
appointments to that service and having entrusted the
control of the said service to the care of the High Court,
the makers of the Constitution would not have conferred
a blanket power on the Governor to appoint any person
F
...
from any service as a District Judge."
13. The principle of "equal pay for equal work" has been
considered, explained and applied in a catena of decisions of
this Court. The doctrine of "equal pay for equal work" was origi-
G nally propounded as part of the Directive Principles of State
Policy in Article 39(d) of the Constitution. Thus, having regard
to the Constitutional mandate of equality and inhibition against
discrimination in Articles 14 and 16, in service jurisprudence,
the doctrine of "equal pay for equal work" has assumed the sta-
~ tus of fundamental right. (see Randhir Singh v. Union of India
H
STATE OF KERALA v. B.RENJITH KUMAR 1095
y & ORS. [LOKESHWAR SINGH PANTA, J.]

(1982) 1SCC618 and D.S. Nakara v: Union of India (1983) 1 A
SCC 305]. In the latest judgment, a two-Judge Bench this Court
in the case of Union of India v: Dineshan K.K. (2008) 1 SCC
586 held that ifthe necessary material on the basis whereof the
claim for parity of pay scale is made is available on record with
necessary proof and that there is equal work of equal quality B
and all other relevant factors are fulfilled the decision of the Cen-
tral Government denying the benefits of same rank and pay struc-
ture to a Radio Mechanic in Assam Rifle as was given to other
Central Paramilitary Forces was held to be clearly irrational and
arbitrary and thus, violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. c
14. Having regard to the well-reasoned judgment of the
Division Bench, we are of the view that the impugned judgment
warrants no interference inasmuch as no illegality, infirmity or
error of jurisdiction could be shown before us by the appellant-
State.. D
15. In the result, for the reasons stated above, we find no
merit in this appeal. The appeal is dismissed accordingly. The
parties, however, are left to bear their own costs.
16. In view of the above, no orders on the I.A. Nos. 2 & 3 of
2004.
K.K.T. Appeal dismissed.