Holding

The bail order was perverse, unsupported by material facts and contrary to statutory and jurisprudential requirements, and therefore must be set aside.

Summary

The State of Karnataka appealed against a High Court order that granted bail to a celebrity actor (A2) and co‑accused in a murder‑conspiracy case involving Sections 302, 120B and 34 IPC, where the victim was allegedly kidnapped, tortured and killed after sending obscene messages to A2’s partner. The High Court had relied on alleged medical grounds and a mechanical assessment of the evidence to release the accused. The State contended that the bail order was perverse, ignored the gravity of the offence, the prima‑facia evidence, the risk of witness tampering and was based on a misrepresented medical plea. The Supreme Court examined the statutory framework under Section 439 CrPC, the requirement of a prima‑facia case, and the need for heightened discretion in serious offences, rejecting the High Court’s reasoning. It held that the bail order lacked cogent reasons, overlooked material facts, and treated the celebrity status as a mitigating factor, rendering the order legally untenable. Accordingly, the Court set aside the High Court’s order and cancelled the bail, directing the accused to be taken into custody.

Issues considered

Whether the High Court's grant of bail in a case involving murder, conspiracy and other serious offences is perverse and legally unsustainable.
Whether the bail should be cancelled on the ground of non‑consideration of material facts and the risk of interference with the trial.
Whether procedural lapses in furnishing written grounds of arrest under Article 22(1) and Section 50 CrPC justify bail.
Whether bail can be granted on alleged medical grounds without a proper medical board assessment.
Whether a celebrity's status can be treated as a mitigating factor in bail decisions under Article 14.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 27, s. 437(5), s. 439, s. 50
Constitution of Indias. Article 14, s. Article 22(1)
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 120B, s. 143, s. 147, s. 148, s. 149, s. 201, s. 204, s. 302, s. 34, s. 355, s. 364, s. 384

Headnote

Issue for Consideration Whether the order of the High Court granting bail to the respondents-accused persons in a case involving serious charges u/ss.302, 120B, and 34 IPC is perverse and legally unsustainable, warranting cancellation of bail. Headnotes† Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – When warranted – A2, a celebrity along with co-accused, was charged inter alia u/ss.120B, 364, 302, 201 and 204, IPC for the murder of a man, who was allegedly kidnapped, tortured, and beaten to death by the accused for sending objectionable messages to A1, partner of A2 –

Subjects

Section 439Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973MurderCancellation of bailCelebrityCelebrity statusActorNature and Gravity of the offenceSeriousness and heinous nature of the alleged offenceBrutal and custodial murder of a young manBail in serious casesPost-bail good conduct or the period of incarcerationAntecedentsInfluenceJail misconductSeriousness of the chargesLikelihood of tampering with evidenceInfluencing witnessesBail obtained on misrepresentation of medical groundsNon-consideration of material facts by the High CourtPremeditated and orchestrated crimePremeditated murder and conspiracyBribing co-accused to falsely surrenderJustice delivery systemRule of LawDestruction of evidenceObjectionable messagesObscene messages

Judgment

[2025] 9 S.C.R. 194 : 2025 INSC 979

State of Karnataka
v.
Sri Darshan Etc.
(Criminal Appeal No(s). 3528-3534 of 2025)
14 August 2025
[J.B. Pardiwala* and R. Mahadevan,* JJ.]

Issue for Consideration
Whether the order of the High Court granting bail to the
respondents-accused persons in a case involving serious charges
u/ss.302, 120B, and 34 IPC is perverse and legally unsustainable,
warranting cancellation of bail.

Headnotes†
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.439 – Cancellation of
bail – When warranted – A2, a celebrity along with co-accused,
was charged inter alia u/ss.120B, 364, 302, 201 and 204, IPC for
the murder of a man, who was allegedly kidnapped, tortured,
and beaten to death by the accused for sending objectionable
messages to A1, partner of A2 – Respondents granted bail by
the High Court – Propriety:
Held: Order of the High Court suffers from serious legal infirmities –
No special or cogent reasons are given for granting bail in a
case involving charges u/ss.302, 120B, and 34 IPC reflecting a
mechanical exercise of discretion, marked by significant omissions
of legally relevant and material facts – The allegation is of a brutal
and custodial murder of a young man who was allegedly kidnapped,
tortured, and beaten to death by the accused – This is not a case
of sudden provocation or emotional outburst – Evidence indicates
a pre-meditated and orchestrated crime where the accused also
engaged in systematic destruction of evidence – Granting bail in
such a serious case, without adequate consideration of the nature
and gravity of the offence, the accused’s role and the tangible risk
of interference with the trial, amounts to a perverse and wholly
unwarranted exercise of discretion – By treating A2’s stature as a
mitigating factor, the High Court committed a manifest perversity
in the exercise of its discretion, warranting cancellation of bail –
Furthermore, the well-founded allegations of witness intimidation,
* Author
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 195

State of Karnataka v. Sri Darshan Etc.

coupled with compelling forensic and circumstantial evidence,
further reinforce the necessity for cancellation of bail – Also, the
liberty granted under the impugned order poses a real and imminent
threat to the fair administration of justice and risks derailing the
trial process – A2’s antecedents, influence, jail misconduct, and
the seriousness of the charges against him make him unfit for bail,
and the order granting bail to him, is based on non-application of
mind, perverse, and hence, legally unsustainable – Present case
calls for the exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction u/s.439(2) –
Impugned order set aside – Bail granted to the respondents is
cancelled. [Paras 20.1.4, 22.1.3 - 22.1.5]

Bail – Constitution of India – Art.14 – No preferential treatment
to celebrities in matters of bail:
Held: Constitution of India enshrines equality before law u/Art.14,
and mandates that no individual however wealthy, influential, or
famous can claim exemption from the rigours of law – A celebrity
status does not elevate an accused above the law, nor entitle him
to preferential treatment in matters like grant of bail – Celebrities
are social role models their accountability is greater, not lesser –
By virtue of fame and public presence, they wield substantial
influence on public behaviour and social values – Granting
leniency to such persons despite grave charges of conspiracy and
murder, sends wrong message to society and undermines public
confidence in the justice system – Popularity cannot be a shield
for impunity – Influence, resources and social status cannot form
a basis for granting bail where there is a genuine risk of prejudice
to the investigation or trial – A2 is not a common undertrial – He
enjoys celebrity status, mass following, political clout and financial
muscle – His conduct inside the jail including recorded instances
of VIP treatment, violations of jail rules, and registered FIRs for
misuse of facilities reflects his capacity to defy the system even
while in custody – If a person can subvert the prison system,
the risk of interference with evidence, threatening or influencing
witnesses, and tampering with the course of justice is both real
and imminent – A2’s immediate return to social events, sharing a
stage with prosecution witnesses, and continued influence over
police witnesses, despite being on bail, establish that his liberty is
a threat to the integrity of the proceedings – In offences punishable
with life imprisonment or death, the bail court must be especially
cautious – However, the High Court’s order does not reflect any
196 [2025] 9 S.C.R.

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such higher scrutiny or cautious approach, despite the seriousness
of the charge and the wider societal impact of the case – Justice
delivery system. [Paras 22.4.5, 23, 23.5 - 23.8]

Bail – Courts not to render findings on the merits of the case
at the stage of bail:
Held: Courts are precluded from undertaking a detailed examination
of evidence or rendering findings that touch upon the merits of
the case – Only a prima facie assessment of the material is
warranted – It cannot conduct a mini-trial or record conclusions that
could influence the outcome of the trial – By the impugned order,
High Court proceeded to grant bail to the accused by delving into
the merits of the case and recording findings that fall within the
exclusive domain of the trial Court. [Paras 20.2.1, 20.2.4]
Bail – When may be annulled or cancelled – Annulment of
bail due to legal infirmity in the order; cancellation of bail i.e.
revocation of bail due to post-grant misconduct or supervening
circumstances – Jurisprudence, examined. [Paras 18.1-19]

Bail – Constitution of India – Art.22(1) – Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 – s.50 – Procedural lapses in furnishing
grounds of arrest, without prejudice, do not ipso facto render
custody illegal or entitle the accused to bail – Plea of the
respondents–accused that the arrest was illegal as the grounds
of arrest were not furnished immediately in writing, violating
Art.22(1) and s.50, Cr.P.C:
Held: The constitutional and statutory framework mandates that
the arrested person must be informed of the grounds of arrest –
But neither provision prescribes a specific form or insists upon
written communication in every case – Substantial compliance with
these requirements is sufficient, unless demonstrable prejudice
is shown – Mere absence of written grounds does not ipso facto
render the arrest illegal, unless it results in demonstrable prejudice
or denial of a fair opportunity to defend – In the present case,
the arrest memos and remand records clearly reflect that the
respondents were aware of the reasons for their arrest – They
were legally represented from the outset and applied for bail shortly
after arrest, evidencing an immediate and informed understanding
of the accusations – No material on record to establish that any
prejudice was caused due to the alleged procedural lapse – High
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 197

State of Karnataka v. Sri Darshan Etc.

Court treated it as a determinative factor while overlooking the
gravity of the charge u/s.302 IPC and the existence of a prima
facie case. [Paras 20.1.3, 20.1.5, 20.1.7]

Bail – Filing of a charge-sheet, does not justify grant of bail:
Held: Mere filing of a charge-sheet does not confer an indefeasible
right to bail – Likewise, the mere prospect of a prolonged trial cannot,
by itself, outweigh the gravity of the offence, the incriminating
material gathered during investigation, or the likelihood of tampering
with witnesses. [Paras 20.4.1, 20.4.6]
Bail – Evidence – Appreciation of, at the stage of bail –
Impermissibility. [Paras 20.3.1-20.3.6]

Bail – On medical grounds, must be based on credible, specific,
and urgent need, not on general or future apprehensions:
Held: Bail was obtained on misrepresentation of medical grounds –
A bare perusal of the medical records and subsequent conduct of
the accused reveals that the medical plea was misleading, vague,
and grossly exaggerated – A2 failed to demonstrate that the jail
hospital was incapable of managing his condition or that adequate
treatment could not be given in judicial custody – High Court
granted bail without recording a definitive finding on the urgency,
seriousness, or inadequacy of treatment in custody resulting in a
perverse and legally unsustainable bail order, liable to be cancelled.
[Paras 22.3.1, 22.3.6]

Bail – Post-bail good conduct of the accused, though relevant
to the question of continuation of bail, however, does not
retrospectively validate an otherwise unsustainable order:
Held: While post-bail good conduct or the period of incarceration
may be relevant considerations at the stage of continuing bail,
they cannot cure the fundamental defects in an order granting bail
which is otherwise perverse, legally untenable, or passed without
due consideration of material factors such as the gravity of the
offence, prima facie involvement, and the likelihood of influencing
witnesses or tampering with evidence – An unsustainable bail
order does not become valid with the mere passage of time or the
subsequent behaviour of the accused – Judicial scrutiny must focus
on whether the discretion to grant bail was exercised judiciously,
and in accordance with established principles, at the time of the
198 [2025] 9 S.C.R.

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grant, and not mechanically or on technicalities – The fact that
the accused were in custody for more than 140 days, or exhibited
good conduct post-release, does not ipso facto render the order
of bail sustainable, if it suffers from non-consideration of material
factors at the stage of grant – Order of the High Court granting
bail to the respondents-accused, set aside. [Paras 20.5.1, 20.5.6]

Case Law Cited
Prabir Purkayastha v. State (NCT of Delhi) [2024] 6 SCR 666 :
(2024) 8 SCC 254; Pankaj Bansal v. Union of India [2023] 12 SCR
714 : (2024) 7 SCC 576 – held inapplicable.
Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar [2019] 14 SCR 529 : (2020) 2 SCC
118; Dolat Ram v. State of Haryana [1994] Supp. 6 SCR 69 :
(1995) 1 SCC 349; State (Delhi Administration) v. Sanjay Gandhi
[1978] 3 SCR 950 : (1978) 2 SCC 411; Prahlad Singh Bhati v.
NCT of Delhi [2001] 2 SCR 684 : (2001) 4 SCC 280; Puran v.
Rambilas and Another [2001] 3 SCR 432 : (2001) 6 SCC 338;
Dr. Narendra K. Amin v. State of Gujarat and Another [2008] 6
SCR 1149 : 2008 (6) SCALE 415; Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis
Chatterjee [2010] 12 SCR 1165 : (2010) 14 SCC 496; Prakash
Kadam and Others v. Ramprasad Viswanath Gupta and Another
[2011] 6 SCR 800 : (2011) 6 SCC 189; Neeru Yadav v. State of
UP [2014] 12 SCR 453 : (2014) 16 SCC 508; Anil Kumar Yadav v.
State (NCT of Delhi) [2017] 11 SCR 195 : (2018) 12 SCC 129;
State of Kerala v. Mahesh [2021] 2 SCR 964 : AIR 2021 SC 2071;
Abdul Basit v. Abdul Kadir Choudhary [2014] 10 SCR 571 : (2014)
10 SCC 754; Deepak Yadav v. State of U.P. and Another [2022]
4 SCR 1 : Criminal Appeal No. 861 of 2022 (@ SLP (Crl.) No.
9655 of 2021 dated 20.05.2022; Pinki v. State of Uttar Pradesh
and Another, 2025 INSC 482 : [2025] 5 SCR 522; Vihaan Kumar v.
State of Haryana, 2025 SCC Online SC 456; Kasireddy Upender
Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2025 INSC 768 : [2025] 7
SCR 105; Niranjan Singh v. Prabhakar Rajaram Kharote [1980]
3 SCR 15 : (1980) 2 SCC 559; Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh
Ranjan @ Pappu Yadav (2004) 7 SCC 528; Satish Jaggi v. State
of Chhattisgarh [2007] 5 SCR 1049 : (2007) 11 SCC 195; Kanwar
Singh Meena v. State of Rajasthan [2012] 10 SCR 847 : (2012) 12
SCC 180; Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar [2021] 9 SCR 533 : SLP
(Crl.) No(s). 6335 and 7916 of 2021 dated 17.12.2021; Dinesh
M.N. (SP) v. State of Gujarat [2008] 6 SCR 1134 : AIR 2008 SC
2318; State of Orissa v. Mahimananda Mishra, 2018 INSC 827 :
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 199

State of Karnataka v. Sri Darshan Etc.

Criminal Appeal No. 1175 of 2018 dated 18.09.2018; Naresh
Kumar Mangla v. Anita Agarwal, AIR 2021 SC 277; Ishwarji Nagaji
Mali v. State of Gujarat and Another [2022] 2 SCR 694 : Criminal
Appeal No. 70 of 2022 dated 18.01.2022; Imran v. Mohammed
Bhava [2022] 2 SCR 1093 : Criminal Appeal No(s). 658 and
659 of 2022 (@ SLP (Crl.) No(s). 27 and 1242 of 2022) dated
22.04.2022; Rahul Gupta v. State of Rajasthan, Criminal Appeal
Nos. 1343-44 of 2023 dated 04.05.2023; State through CBI v.
Amaramani Tripathi [2005] Supp. 3 SCR 454 : (2005) 8 SCC 21;
Ash Mohammad v. Shiv Raj Singh @ Lalla Bahu & Anr. [2012] 7
SCR 584 : (2012) 9 SCC 446; Ajwar v. Waseem [2024] 5 SCR
575 : (2024) 10 SCC 768; Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan
Singh [2002] 2 SCR 526 : (2002) 3 SCC 598; Panchanan Mishra v.
Digambar Mishra [2005] 1 SCR 484 : (2005) 3 SCC 143; Jagan
Kishore v. State of A.P., 2003 Crl. LJ 1919; P v. State of M.P.
[2022] 3 SCR 823 : (2022) 15 SCC 211; State of U.P. v. Narendra
Nath Sinha (2019) 10 SCC 528; Samarendra Nath Bhattacharjee v.
State of West Bengal (2004) 11 SCC 165; State of Maharashtra v.
Dhanendra Shriram Bhurle [2009] 3 SCR 143 : (2009) 11 SCC
541; Y.S. Jagan Mohan Reddy v. CBI [2013] 3 SCR 547 : (2013)
7 SCC 439; Rana Kapoor v. Directorate of Enforcement (2022) 8
SCC 1 – relied on.
Sant Shri Asaram Bapu v. State of Rajasthan, 2015 SCC Online
SC 1903; Ram Kishor Arora v. Directorate of Enforcement [2023]
16 SCR 743 : (2024) 7 SCC 599; Ramesh Harijan v. State of U.P.
[2012] 6 SCR 688 : (2012) 5 SCC 777 – referred to.

List of Acts
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Penal Code, 1860; Constitution
of India.

List of Keywords
Section 439, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Murder;
Cancellation of bail; Celebrity; Celebrity stauts; Actor; Nature and
Gravity of the offence; Seriousness and heinous nature of the
alleged offence; Brutal and custodial murder of a young man;
Bail in serious cases; Post-bail good conduct or the period of
incarceration; Antecedents; Influence; Jail misconduct; Seriousness
of the charges; Likelihood of tampering with evidence; Influencing
witnesses; Bail obtained on misrepresentation of medical grounds;
200 [2025] 9 S.C.R.

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Non-consideration of material facts by the High Court; Pre-meditated
and orchestrated crime; Premeditated murder and conspiracy;
Bribing co-accused to falsely surrender; Big or small the accused;
Justice delivery system; Rule of Law; Destruction of evidence;
Objectionable messages; Obscene messages.

Case Arising From
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No(s).
3528-3534 of 2025
From the Judgment and Order dated 13.12.2024 of the High Court
of Karnataka at Bengaluru in CRLP Nos. 11096, 11176, 11180,
11212, 11282, 11735 and 12912 of 2024

Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Appellant:
Sidharth Luthra, Sr. Adv., D. L. Chidananda, P Prasanna Kumar,
Anil C Nishani, Sachin, Mihir Joshi, Manthan Dayanad, Gaurav
Chauhan, Vishwesh R Murnal, Ravindera Kumar Verma, Ishan
Roy Chaudhary, Madhav B. Kashyap, Rahul K. Reddy.
Advs. for the Respondents:
Siddharth Dave, Gaurav Agarwal, K. Diwakar, Sr. Advs., Ms Tanisha
Kaushal, Himanshu Tyagi, Ashwin Vaish, Sunil Kumar S, Ashutosh
Thakur, Ajay R, Tarun Sharma, V Thomas, Ms. Shubi Vijaywargiya,
Uttam Panwar, Aaditya Sharma, Anuroop Chakravarti, Ms. Amrita
Sharma, Chandra Pratap, Parikshit Angadi, Anirudh Sanganeria,
Sunil Kumar S, Lakshmikanth G, H. Chandra Sekhar, Ms. Sanjana
Saddy, Aditya D, Hitesh Gowda, Santosh U, Ms. Mrinal Kanwar,
Abhishek Sandilya, Vaibhav Rajsingh Rathore.

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

R. Mahadevan, J.

Leave granted.
2. The appellant herein is the State of Karnataka, which has preferred
the present appeals challenging the common order dated 13.12.2024
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 201

State of Karnataka v. Sri Darshan Etc.

passed by the High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru1 in Criminal
Petition No.11096 of 2024 and six connected matters, whereby
the respondents / Accused Nos. 1, 2, 6, 7, 11, 12 and 14, were
enlarged on bail in connection with Crime No. 250 of 2024 registered
at Kamakshipalya Police Station, Bengaluru City, for the offences
punishable under Sections 120B, 364, 384, 355, 302, 201, 143, 147,
148, 149 and 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 18602.
3. Initially, the case was registered against unknown persons under
sections 302 and 201 IPC, on the basis of a complaint dated
09.06.2024 lodged by one Keval Ram Dorji, Security Officer of Satva
Anugraha Apartment, Sumanahalli, Bengaluru, after the dead body
of an unknown male aged approximately 30 to 35 years bearing
visible injuries, was discovered by the roadside near the drainage
in front of the said Apartment.
4. During the course of investigation, Accused Nos. 1, 2, 11, 12, and
14 were arrested on 11.06.2024, while Accused Nos. 6 and 7 were
arrested on 14.06.2024. All the arrested accused were remanded to
judicial custody. Upon completion of investigation, a total of 17 persons
were implicated as accused, and a charge sheet along with two
supplementary charge sheets was filed before the jurisdictional court.
5. The specific charges framed against the present respondents are
summarised below:

Accused Name Sections under IPC
No
2 DARSHAN @ D.BOSS, 302, 34, 120B, 355, 143,
ACTOR 147, 148, 149, 201, 364
11 NAGARAJU R. 149, 201, 302, 34, 120B,
143, 147, 148, 355
7 ANU KUMAR @ ANU, 149, 201, 364, 384, 302,
DRIVER 34, 120B, 143,147, 148
12 LAKSHMAN M. DRIVER 149, 201, 302, 34, 120B,
143, 147, 148

1 Hereinafter referred to as “the High Court”
2 For short, “IPC”
202 [2025] 9 S.C.R.

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1 PAVITRA GOWDA 120B, 355, 143, 147, 148,
149, 201, 364, 302, 34
6 JAGADEESH @ JAGGA, 149, 201, 364, 384, 302,
DRIVER 34, 120B, 143, 147, 148
14 PRADOOSH S. RAO @ 120B, 143, 147, 148, 149,
PRADOOSH 201, 302, 34

6. In a nutshell, the facts of the case as alleged by the prosecution
are as follows:
6.1. A1 was allegedly in a relationship with A2. The deceased,
Renukaswamy, a resident of Chitradurga, is said to have sent
obscene messages from his Instagram account to the account
of A1, since February 2024. Aggrieved by this, A1, A2, A3 (who
was working in the house of A1 and A2), and A10 (a friend of A2)
were allegedly conspired, through telephonic communication,
to trace the deceased, kidnap him, and murder him.
6.2. As part of this conspiracy, A1 reportedly initiated contact with
the deceased via Instagram on 03.06.2024, requesting his
phone number. In response, the deceased requested her phone
number. Acting on her intent to gather information about the
deceased and in furtherance of the plan, A1, portraying it as
her own number, sent the mobile number 9535289797 (which
actually belonged to A3) to the deceased via Instagram.
6.3. Subsequently, on 05.06.2024 at around 9.00 a.m., the deceased
called the mobile number of A3, believing it, belong to A1.
Through continued WhatsApp communication, he shared
personal information including his location (Chitradurga),
workplace (Apollo Pharmacy), and photograph.
6.4. A3 allegedly shared this information with A1, A2 and A10, and
the conspiracy was expanded to include fan associates of A2.
A2, through his associates including A4, instructed them to
abduct the deceased, and bring him to them. Thereafter, they
planned to assault and kill him. Subsequently, A3 called A4 and
instructed him to find the deceased, abduct him, and bring him
to A2’s house. A4 conveyed this plan to his friends and A2’s
fans from Chitradurga – A6 and A7.
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 203

State of Karnataka v. Sri Darshan Etc.

6.5. On 07.06.2024, following instructions from A1, A2, and A10,
A3 contacted the deceased via WhatsApp and learned that
he was near the court. A3 then informed A4, who, along with
A6 and A7, went to the court area to search for the deceased.
However, they were unsuccessful in locating him.
6.6. On 08.06.2024, A6 traced the residence of the deceased and
called A7 and A8 to the location. They waited, preparing to
abduct him. After some time, the deceased left his house on a
two- wheeler. He was followed by A4, A6, and A7 in A6’s auto
rickshaw (Reg. No. KA 16 AA 3421). At around 10.00 a.m., they
abducted him near Balaji Bar, Chitradurga, and took him to an
open area near Bharat Petrol Bunk on the highway outskirts. He
was then transferred to an Etios Car (Reg No. KA-11-B-7939)
owned by A8, and brought to a shed operated by Intact Auto
Packers India Pvt. Ltd., RR Nagar, allegedly under A13’s control.
6.7. Thereafter, the accused assembled at Stony Brook restaurant
to discuss further steps. Meanwhile, A3 arrived at the shed and
began beating the deceased with a stick. A5 also struck him and
threw him to the ground, and A4, A6 and A7 assaulted him with
branches. A9 struck the deceased on the head and used an
electric shock torch (megger) on his chest, back, arms, and legs.
6.8. Around 4.45 p.m., A2 along with A1, A3, A10, A11, and A14,
arrived at the shed in two Scorpio vehicles. The deceased was
further assaulted by the accused, forming an unlawful assembly.
A2 allegedly punched, kicked, and beat the deceased with
a tree branch. He was also attacked with a nylon rope and
wooden branches. A5 allegedly caused the deceased’s head
to hit the bumper of an Ashok Leyland Dost Vehicle, causing
head bleeding. A1 slapped him with her chappals and forced
him to touch her feet, while inciting the others to kill him.
6.9. A11 allegedly struck him repeatedly with his slipper and nylon
rope. A12 made further lethal attacks with his fists. After A1 left,
A13 arrived at the shed. A2 told A14 to check the deceased’s
mobile phone, which showed that he had sent obscene
messages to several women. A2 then allegedly punched him
in the stomach, pressed his chest with his shoe, and kicked
his left ear and head, causing bleeding.
204 [2025] 9 S.C.R.

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6.10. Further, A2 instructed A3 to remove the deceased’s pants and
then kicked him in his private parts with his shoe. A3, A4, A5,
A6, A7, A10, A11, A12 and A14, allegedly continued to assault
the deceased with hands, wooden sticks, batons, nylon ropes,
and other objects, causing severe injuries to his back, arms,
legs, and chest. The deceased succumbed to the injuries on
the spot. A4 and A5 then moved the body to the security room
inside the shed.
6.11. Thereafter, A2 allegedly instructed the others to dispose of the
body discreetly, promising to bear the expenses. A2 and A10
then left in A2’s Wrangler Jeep. Later, A10, A11, A12 and A14
returned to the shed and, following A2’s instructions, discussed
fabricating a false surrender narrative. A2 is also alleged to have
paid Rs.30 lakhs to A14, Rs.10 lakhs to A10, and Rs.5 lakhs
to A11 to suppress evidence and avoid implicating himself and
A1. A15 and A17 allegedly agreed to surrender in exchange
of money.
6.12. In the early hours of 09.06.2024, A10, A11, A12, A13, and
A14 with the help of A4, A6, A7, A8, A15 and A17, transported
the deceased’s body in a Scorpio vehicle brought by A11 and
dumped it near a stormwater drain in front of Satva Anugraha
Apartment, Sumanahalli, Bengaluru, with the intent to destroy
evidence and mislead the investigation. Thereafter, A4, A15,
A16 and A17 surrendered at Kamakshipalya Police Station.
7. According to the postmortem report, the deceased sustained 39
injuries, of which, 13 were bleeding injuries and 17 ribs were fractured.
8. The respondents / accused had earlier approached the LVI Additional
City Civil and Sessions Judge at Bengaluru (CCH-57) seeking bail
by filing Criminal Miscellaneous Petition Nos. 8580/2024, 8770/2024,
9126/2024, 8812/2024, 8799/2024, 8798/2024 and 9120/2024, which
were all dismissed.
9. Upon rejection of their bail petitions, the respondents / accused
approached the High Court by filing Criminal Petition Nos. 11096/2024,
11176/2024, 11180/2024, 11212/2024, 11282/2024, 11735/2024, and
12912/2024 under Section 439 of the Criminal Procedure Code,
19733. A2 also sought interim bail on medical grounds, which was

3 For short, “Cr.P.C”
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 205

State of Karnataka v. Sri Darshan Etc.

granted on 15.10.2024 for six weeks based on a medical report
submitted by the prison authorities.
10. Ultimately, the High Court allowed the criminal petitions and enlarged
the respondents / accused on bail, by the impugned order dated
13.12.2024. Aggrieved by the said order, the State has preferred
the present appeals.
11. Mr. Sidharth Luthra, learned senior counsel for the appellant – State,
at the outset, submitted that the impugned order dated 13.12.2024
passed by the High court is ex facie unsustainable as it is contrary
to the material evidence on record and suffers from serious non-
application of mind to the facts and law involved.
11.1. Insofar as the grant of bail to respondent (A2) on medical
grounds is concerned, the learned senior counsel made the
following submissions:
(i) The medical opinion dated 24.10.2024 did not disclose
the type of surgery, the prospective date of the surgery,
its nature, or the post-operative care required. Despite
the vagueness and absence of any indication of urgency,
the High Court proceeded to enlarge the first respondent
on medical bail for a period of six weeks, without even
constituting a medical board to assess the genuineness
of the claim. This is contrary to the law laid down in Sant
Shri Asaram Bapu v. State of Rajasthan4 wherein it
was held that expert medical opinion is essential before
grant of medical bail.
(ii) Subsequently, it was brought to the attention of the High
Court that Respondent No. 1 had not undergone any
surgery or substantial treatment even at the end of the
six-week period. The Court failed to consider this fact and
instead observed that there was no reason to disbelieve
the version of the accused. The contradictory conduct of
the respondent is apparent from the fact that although
he claimed surgery was scheduled on 11.12.2024, it was
not undertaken on the specious ground that his blood
pressure was not stable – a condition that can ordinarily

4 2015 SCC Online SC 1903
206 [2025] 9 S.C.R.

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be managed with medication if the surgery were truly
urgent.
(iii) The conduct of Respondent No. 1 clearly indicates the
lack of any immediate medical necessity. The continued
delay and vague justifications point to the falsity of
the medical claim. This respondent approached the
court with unclean hands, having misrepresented facts
regarding the urgency of surgery in order to obtain bail.
However, the High Court failed to take into consideration
the same.
(iv) Such approach of the High Court is contrary to the
settled principle of law that any party who misleads the
court is disentitled to discretionary relief, such as bail.
Therefore, the High Court ought to have rejected his
criminal petition, instead of granting regular bail to the
respondent / A2.
(v) Moreover, the High Court’s observation that the trial
would be prolonged due to the long list of charge-sheet
witnesses is premature and speculative, and cannot by
itself be a ground for granting bail in a case involving
grave offence punishable under Sections 120B, 302,
364, 384, 201 and other serious provisions of the IPC.
(vi) In light of the foregoing submissions, it was urged that
the impugned order of the High Court enlarging the first
respondent on medical grounds, is liable to be set aside.
11.2. Continuing further, the learned senior counsel raised the
following contentions, assailing the common order passed
by the High Court:
(i) The High Court erred in appreciating key legal provisions
and crucial material evidence on record. It failed to
properly analyse the offence of abduction under Sections
362 and 364 IPC. The act of forcibly confining the
deceased in a vehicle and transporting him against his will
to Bengaluru clearly falls within the ambit of Section 364.
Moreover, the prosecution case demonstrates deceitful
means used to lure the deceased from Chitradurga
to Bengaluru, which squarely attracts the offence
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 207

State of Karnataka v. Sri Darshan Etc.

of abduction under Section 362. The learned Judge
overlooked his own prior judgment in Criminal Revision
Petition No. 56 of 2023 wherein it was categorically
held that forcibly keeping a person inside a vehicle by
itself satisfies the ingredients of Section 364 IPC. The
High Court’s omission to even consider Section 362 is
a serious legal lapse.
(ii) The High Court further erred in holding that circumstantial
evidence cannot be evaluated at the stage of considering
bail. Such a proposition is contrary to settled legal
principles laid down by this Court, which mandates that
strong prima facie material, particularly in grave offences
like murder, must be duly weighed even at the bail
stage. In the present case, the brutality of the act stands
out starkly: the postmortem report records 39 external
injuries, 17 fractured ribs, testicular trauma, and electric
burns consistent with torture by shock. The nature and
multiplicity of injuries sustained by the deceased are
clearly indicative of an intent to murder.
(iii) The High Court also summarily disregarded vital forensic
and scientific evidence without any cogent explanation.
DNA of the deceased was found on the shoe worn by
Respondent No. 1(A2) recovered pursuant to a Section
27 disclosure made in the presence of two independent
witnesses. The serological and DNA reports further show
the deceased’s blood on various incriminating items,
including a nylon rope, lathi, the boot mat of the while
Scorpio vehicle (owned by A11) and the bumper of an
Ashok Leyland vehicle parked at the scene. Blood was
also found on clothing of multiple accused persons.
The mud/soil found on some of the accused’s shoes
matched the soil collected from the crime scene. These
are objective and scientific indicators that corroborate
the prosecution version and cannot be brushed aside
at this preliminary stage.
(iv) The digital and electronic evidence on record further
corroborates the prosecution case. CCTV footage from
toll booths and other locations establishes the movement
208 [2025] 9 S.C.R.

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of the accused and the vehicles used for transporting
the deceased. A photograph retrieved from the phone of
CW.91, a key eyewitness, shows A2 and A6 posing near
the deceased post-assault. Call Data Records (CDRs),
WhatsApp messages, and mobile location tracking clearly
establish planning, the act of abduction, the conduct
during the assault, and post-offence cover-up efforts.
These digital records are not isolated data points but are
interlocking pieces of a broader evidentiary framework
pointing toward a criminal conspiracy.
(v) The prosecution relies heavily on the testimonies of
two key eyewitnesses – CW. 76 (Kiran) and CW. 91
(Puneet) – who were present at the scene of offence
and whose presence is independently corroborated.
Both were employed at the crime location, a private
parking shed, and were well acquainted with the accused
persons. Their accounts, recorded under Sections 161
and 164 Cr.P.C, clearly point out the overt acts of assault,
torture, and subsequent disposal of the body. Delay in
recording their statements has been credibly explained
through verified travel records and other documents.
These testimonies are consistent and cogent, yet the
High Court has unjustifiably discarded them.
(vi) In Addition to these two direct witnesses, other shed
workers – CW.69, CW.77, CW.78 and CW.79 – have
confirmed the entry and exit of the accused and their
vehicles. Given that these workers operated in shifts
across the 5 – 6’ acre crime scene, their presence
at different locations and their ability to testify only to
movement and not the assault is understandable. The
High Court erred in discounting their statements on this
ground.
(vii) The prosecution also strongly contests the High Court’s
findings regarding non-compliance with Article 22(1) of
the Constitution and Section 50 Cr.P.C. The respondents
were informed of the grounds of arrest orally at the
time of arrest and served written grounds immediately
thereafter. This process is in line with this Court’s rulings
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 209

State of Karnataka v. Sri Darshan Etc.

in Ram Kishor Arora v. Directorate of Enforcement5
and Prabir Purkayastha v. State (NCT of Delhi)6. The
arrest memos, checklists, and intimation documents were
duly submitted before the Magistrate and counter-signed
by persons acquainted with the accused. The requirement
under Section 50A Cr.P.C to satisfy the Magistrate about
arrest intimation was duly fulfilled. The High Court’s
insistence that the actual grounds of arrest must be filed
in court, finds no support in law.
(viii) In fact, in Criminal Petition No. 9537/2024, the same
learned Judge had held that if grounds of arrest are orally
conveyed at the time of arrest and written communication
is furnished promptly thereafter, the requirement
under Article 22(1) stands satisfied. A diametrically
opposite view in the present case amounts to judicial
inconsistency. Furthermore, the High Court’s finding
that the grounds served on all accused were identical
is untenable. At the time of arrest, the investigation
was ongoing and roles were emerging. The grounds of
arrest served on the accused were based on material
then available and included the basic facts necessary
to justify arrest.
(ix) The continued liberty of the accused, particularly
Respondent No. 1 (A2) poses a serious threat to the
fairness of the trial. A2 is a public figure with a substantial
fan base and influence across the State. After being
granted medical bail, he was seen socializing with CW.80
(a prosecution witness) and attending public events,
despite claiming serious back pain before the court.
Such conduct reflects disregard for judicial process and
strengthens the apprehension of witness tampering and
coercion.
(x) This is not a case of sudden provocation or a spontaneous
act of violence. It is a premediated crime motivated by a
perceived grievance – that the deceased had allegedly

5 (2024) 7 SCC 599
6 (2024) 8 SCC 254
210 [2025] 9 S.C.R.

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sent obscene messages to A1. A1 and A2 then conspired
to eliminate the deceased, using a wide network of
associates (A3 to A17). The deceased was abducted
under false pretenses, forcibly transported to Bengaluru,
confined at a shed, and subjected to brutal torture before
being killed. The recovery of torture devices (shock torch,
lathi, nylon rope) and photographic evidence of the crime
stored in phones seized from the accused underscore
the cold-blooded nature of the crime.
(xi) The High Court has also erred in granting bail on the
ground that the trial may be delayed due to the listing
of 262 witnesses (as per the charge sheet and first
supplementary charge sheet). The case had just been
committed to the Sessions Court and had not even
reached the stage of charge framing. The High court’s
assumption of delay at this early stage is speculative and
unwarranted. Moreover, in comparable murder cases, the
same learned Judge has denied bail when presented
with similar prima facie material. This deviation, without
sufficient explanation, reveals a lack of consistency in
judicial approach.
(xii) In conclusion, the cumulative weight of the evidence –
eyewitness testimony, forensic reports, electronic data,
and confessions under Section 27 – establishes a strong
prima facie case against the respondents. The grant of
bail in a heinous offence such as murder, particularly
when supported by such overwhelming material,
undermines the sanctity of judicial process and erodes
public confidence in the administration of justice.
(xiii) Therefore, the impugned order granting bail to the
respondents, be set aside and the appeals be allowed.
12. On behalf of the respondents / accused, oral and written submissions
were made by their respective learned counsel, and the consolidated
submissions are as follows:
(i) The FIR was initially registered against unknown persons,
and during the investigation, Accused Nos. 1, 2, 11, 12 and
14 were arrested on 11.06.2024, while A6 and A7 were
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 211

State of Karnataka v. Sri Darshan Etc.

arrested on 14.06.2024. Although, the respondents were
produced before the Magistrate within 24 hours of arrest,
they were neither informed in writing of the grounds of
arrest nor provided timely access to legal counsel. No copy
of the remand application was furnished, thereby violating
procedural safeguards under the Criminal Procedure Code,
1973, and their fundamental rights under Article 22(1) of the
Constitution. Additionally, the arrest and detention process
lacked proper documentation such as the arrest memo,
intimation of rights, and a statutory checklist. Even the
checklist filed by the prosecution is identical and cyclostyled
for all accused. The attesting witness’s statement (CW. 76)
concerning the arrest was recorded later and is silent on the
service of written grounds of arrest. Mere oral intimation is
insufficient. General averments in the remand application
cannot substitute valid reasons for arrest.
(ii) The prosecution’s evidence is fraught with material
inconsistencies, procedural irregularities, and lacks probative
value sufficient to sustain allegations. These issues will be
demonstrated during trial through effective cross-examination
of prosecution witnesses and forensic experts.
(iii) The spontaneity and promptness of witness statements are
critical to credibility. However, one primary eyewitness, CW.
91, gave his Section 161 Cr.P.C statement, 12 days after
the incident (incident on 08.06.2024; statement recorded
on 20.06.2024). Such inordinate and unexplained delay
undermines reliability and suggests afterthought. Other
eyewitness statement is similarly plagued by contradictions
and delays.
(iv) The prosecution’s claim of bloodstains on clothes recovered
from A2 is contradicted by contemporaneous evidence. The
clothes were recovered three days after the incident, during
which they were washed and found hanging on a terrace. The
panchnama at seizure time makes no mention of bloodstains,
rendering the forensic claim suspect. Similar inconsistencies
extend to recoveries from other co-accused.
(v) CW. 76 and CW. 91’s statements, recorded belatedly raise
serious doubts about their reliability. No explanation is provided
212 [2025] 9 S.C.R.

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for their initial silence. This aligns with this Court’s view in
Ramesh Harijan v. State of U.P.7that unexplained delay
affects probative value. The High Court’s cautious approach
to such evidence is justified.
(vi) Statements of CW. 7 and CW. 8 (parents of the deceased)
and CW. 122 contradict the prosecutions’ abduction claim,
indicating the deceased voluntarily accompanied co-accused
to a location and even paid the bill himself. The reliance on
CCTV footage and photographs to allege abduction remains
a matter for trial.
(vii) There is no direct evidence linking the accused to weapons
allegedly used for assault. Statements implicating A2 were
recorded only after delay, despite witnesses being available
earlier. Further, statements of CW. 69, CW. 77, CW. 78,
and CW. 79 do not implicate A2 in the homicidal death of
Renukaswamy.
(viii) The autopsy report dated 11.06.2024 does not specify the
probable time of death of the deceased. The prosecution’s
reliance on a sketch prepared by CW. 195 (Head Constable
Surendera) is disputed, as it was a Google map printout with
pasted photographs.
(ix) The phone call records between A2 and other accused relate
to personal staff and friends; no adverse inference can be
drawn. CCTV footage only shows A2’s entry and exit from
his residence and hotel room during a scheduled film shoot.
(x) The prosecution does not allege that Respondent No. 5 (A1)
was involved in any manner in the abduction or assault of
the deceased, nor is there any telephone link between this
respondent and the persons alleged to have committed the
offences of kidnapping or murder. The only act attributed
to this accused is that she slapped the deceased with a
chappal. Here mere presence at the scene of occurrence, in
the absence of any further overt act, cannot attract the rigour
of Section 302 IPC.

7 (2012) 5 SCC 777
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 213

State of Karnataka v. Sri Darshan Etc.

(xi) Statements regarding assaults by co-accused are
uncorroborated by independent or contemporaneous
evidence. Allegations of destruction of evidence relate to
bailable offences.
(xii) Conflicting statements regarding A12’s presence and
involvement raise credibility issues. CW. 76 does not mention
A12 at the crime scene, while CW.91 alleges assault by A12.
(xiii) Respondent No. 7 (A14) asserts false implication. Allegations
that A14 received Rs. 30 lakhs from A2 and conspired to
conceal the crime are based solely on co-accused statements.
His role is limited to offence under Section 201 IPC (causing
disappearance of evidence). No overt acts or substantive
allegations are attributable to him.
(xiv) The charge sheet and statements do not establish any
conspiracy or involvement of Accused Nos. 6 and 7 in the
murder. Their role was limited to transporting the deceased,
unaware of any plan to assault or eliminate him.
(xv) Overall, the FIR, chargesheet, and statements fail to establish
a prima facie case of direct involvement by the respondents.
Allegations are omnibus and do not specify overt acts
attributable to each accused. No weapons or bloodstained
clothing linked to respondents have been recovered.
Serological and DNA reports are inconclusive. As held in
Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar8, seriousness of offence alone
does not justify bail cancellation unless the accused’s role is
clearly established.
(xvi) The law on cancellation of bail is well settled: interference is
warranted only if there are supervening circumstances such
as (i)misuse of liberty by the accused (ii)attempt to influence
witnesses or tamper with evidence, or (iii)the order granting
bail is perverse or ignores material facts. Mere disagreement
with the High Court’s reasoning is insufficient. [See: Dolat
Ram v. State of Haryana9].

8 (2020) 2 SCC 118
9 (1995) 1 SCC 349
214 [2025] 9 S.C.R.

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(xvii) The respondents have not misused their liberty since release.
They have cooperated with the investigation and have not
attempted to influence witnesses. Allegations of presence at
public events or associations do not amount to trial interference.
(xviii) The respondents are entitled to constitutional protections under
Article 21. Celebrity status does not warrant different bail
standards. Media scrutiny and public outrage cannot replace
legal evidence in judicial proceedings.
(xix) Despite the charge sheet being filed and appeal pending
since January 2025, no charges have been framed and trial
has not commenced. Prolonged pre-trial incarceration without
meaningful progress violates constitutional principles against
punishment before conviction. There is no apprehension of
evidence tampering or witness influence.
(xx) In light of the above, the present appeals are misconceived,
untenable in law, and liable to be dismissed at the threshold.
The High Court’s order dated 13.12.2024 granting regular
bail to the respondents after due consideration of facts and
binding precedents, warrants no interference by this Court.
13. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the submissions made
by the parties and carefully perused the materials placed before us.
14. On 24.01.2025, when the present matters were taken up for
consideration, this Court clarified that if any other co-accused were
to apply for bail, the Court concerned shall not place reliance on
the impugned order. Any such bail application must be decided
independently, on its own merits.
15. The statutory framework governing cancellation of bail is well-settled.
Section 439(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 empowers
the High Court or the Court of Sessions to direct the re-arrest of an
accused who has been released on bail, if such direction is deemed
“necessary”. Similarly, Section 437 (5) enables a Magistrate to
cancel bail granted under Section 437(1) or (2). These provisions
underscore the legislative intent that the power to grant bail is not
absolute but is always subject to judicial reconsideration in light of
emerging facts or legal infirmities in the original order.
16. It is equally well established that the considerations for grant of
bail and for its cancellation are not identical. While the grant of bail
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 215

State of Karnataka v. Sri Darshan Etc.

involves a preventive evaluation of the likelihood of misuse of liberty,
the cancellation of bail entails a review of the prior decision – either on
account of supervening circumstances or because the original order
was legally flawed. As laid down in State (Delhi Administration)
v. Sanjay Gandhi10, “Rejection of bail when bail is applied for, is
one thing; cancellation of bail already granted is quite another”. This
principle reflects a recognition of the sanctity of liberty once granted,
and the requirement of compelling justification for its withdrawal.
17. However, it is equally well recognized that bail granted without
due application of mind to relevant factors – such as the gravity
of the offence, the strength of the evidence, or the conduct and
antecedents of the accused – may be cancelled. Even in the absence
of subsequent misconduct, a bail order that is perverse, unjustified,
or legally untenable is vulnerable to interference. In Dolat Ram v
State of Haryana (supra), this Court held that “where a bail order
is passed in disregard of material facts or in an arbitrary manner, it
can be set aside”.
18. Let us now examine the jurisprudence on when bail may be annulled
or cancelled. Two distinct categories have emerged in this regard:
(A) Annulment of Bail due to legal infirmity in the order; and
(B) Cancellation of Bail, i.e., revocation of bail due to post-grant
misconduct or supervening circumstances.

(A) Annulment of bail orders
18.1. This refers to the appellate or revisional power to set aside a
bail order that is perverse, unjustified, or passed in violation of
settled legal principles. It is concerned with defects existing at
the time the bail was granted, without reference to subsequent
conduct.
18.2. In Prahlad Singh Bhati v. NCT of Delhi11, this court laid
down guiding principles:
“(a) While granting bail the court has to keep in
mind not only the nature of the accusations, but

10 (1978) 2 SCC 411
11 (2001) 4 SCC 280
216 [2025] 9 S.C.R.

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the severity of the punishment, if the accusation
entails conviction and the nature of evidence in
support of the accusations.
(b) Reasonable apprehensions of the witnesses being
tampered with or the apprehension of there being a
threat for the complainant should also weigh with the
court in the matter of grant of bail.
(c) While it is not expected to have the entire
evidence establishing the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt but there ought always to be a prima
facie satisfaction of the court in support of the charge.
(d) Frivolity in prosecution should always be considered
and it is only the element of genuineness that shall
have to be considered in the matter of grant of bail,
and in the event of there being some doubt as to the
genuineness of the prosecution, in the normal course
of events, the accused is entitled to an order of bail.”
18.3. In Puran v. Rambilas and another12, it was held that a
bail order can be set aside even in the absence of post-bail
misconduct if it is found to be unjustified, illegal, or perverse.
18.4. Similarly, in Dr. Narendra K. Amin v. State of Gujarat and
another13, a three-Judge Bench held that consideration of
irrelevant materials renders the bail order vulnerable and
liable to be set aside.
18.5. In Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee14, this Court
held that where the High Court grants bail mechanically and
without application of mind to material factors such as the
gravity of the offence or antecedents of the accused, such
an order must be set aside.
18.6. In Prakash Kadam and others v. Ramprasad Viswanath
Gupta and another 15, this Court distinguished between

12 (2001) 6 SCC 338
13 2008 (6) SCALE 415
14 (2010) 14 SCC 496
15 (2011) 6 SCC 189
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 217

State of Karnataka v. Sri Darshan Etc.

cancellation of bail by the same court and annulment by an
appellate / revisional court. It observed:
“18. In considering whether to cancel the bail the
court has also to consider the gravity and nature of
the offence, prima facie case against the accused,
the position and standing of the accused, etc. If there
are very serious allegations against the accused his
bail may be cancelled even if he has not misused the
bail granted to him. Moreover, the above principle
applies when the same court which granted bail
is approached for cancelling the bail. It will not
apply when the order granting bail is appealed
against before an appellate/Revisional Court.
19….. There are several other factors also which may
be seen while deciding to cancel the bail.”
18.7. In Neeru Yadav v. State of UP16, this court annulled a bail order
where the High Court had ignored the criminal antecedents
of the accused and relied mechanically on parity. It held that
consideration of irrelevant factors and omission of relevant
considerations renders the order perverse. As the court noted:
“15. …. It is clear as a cloudless sky that the High
Court has totally ignored the criminal antecedents of
the accused. What has weighed with the High Court
is the doctrine of parity. A history-sheeter involved
in the nature of crimes which we have reproduced
hereinabove, are not minor offences so that he is
not to be retained in custody, but the crimes are of
heinous nature and such crimes, by no stretch of
imagination, can be regarded as jejune. Such cases
do create a thunder and lightning having the effect
potentiality of torrential rain in an analytical mind. The
law expects the judiciary to be alert while admitting
these kind of accused persons to be at large and,
therefore, the emphasis is on exercise of discretion
judiciously and not in a whimsical manner.”

16 (2014) 16 SCC 508
218 [2025] 9 S.C.R.

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It further clarified:
“18. Before parting with the case, we may repeat
with profit that it is not an appeal for cancellation
of bail as the cancellation is not sought because
of supervening circumstances. The annulment of
the order passed by the High Court is sought as
many relevant factors have not been taken into
consideration which includes the criminal antecedents
of the accused and that makes the order a deviant
one. Therefore, the inevitable result is the lancination
of the impugned order.”
18.8. In Anil Kumar Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi)17, this Court
reiterated that while no exhaustive list can be laid down, courts
must always consider the totality of circumstances, including
the seriousness of the offence, prima facie evidence, and
potential for interference with the trial.
18.9. In State of Kerala v. Mahesh18, it was observed that even
under Article 136, where interference with bail orders is rare,
this Court will exercise its powers if the bail order is found
to be lacking application of mind or based on irrelevant
considerations.

(B) Cancellation of bail
18.10. As per Halsbury’s Laws of England, the grant of bail does not
set the accused at liberty in the absolute sense but merely
shifts custody from the State to the sureties. Consequently,
cancellation of bail entails an assessment of whether the
accused has abused the liberty so conferred.
18.11. In Dolat Ram v. State of Haryana (supra), this Court
delineated broad, though not exhaustive, grounds justifying
cancellation of bail, including:
• Interference or attempt to interfere with the due course
of justice;

17 (2018) 12 SCC 129
18 AIR 2021 SC 2071
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 219

State of Karnataka v. Sri Darshan Etc.

• Evasion of justice;
• Abuse of the concession of bail;
• Likelihood of the accused fleeing from justice.
18.12. In Abdul Basit v. Abdul Kadir Choudhary19, this Court
elaborated the circumstances in which bail granted under
Section 439(2) Cr.P.C. may be cancelled, including where
the accused:
• engages in similar criminal activity post-bail;
• interferes with or obstructs the investigation;
• tampers with evidence or influences witnesses;
• intimidates or threatens witnesses;
• attempts to abscond or evade judicial process;
• becomes unavailable or goes underground;
• violates the conditions imposed or evades the control
of sureties.
18.13. In Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar (supra), Justice D.Y.
Chandrachud explained:
“An appellate court is empowered to set aside a bail
order if it is found to be based on a misapplication of
legal principles or where relevant considerations have
been ignored. On the other hand, cancellation of bail
typically arises from post-bail conduct or supervening
circumstances.”
18.14. Finally, in Deepak Yadav v. State of U.P. and another20
, this Court reaffirmed that bail already granted should
not be cancelled in a routine or mechanical manner. Only
cogent and overwhelming circumstances, which threaten the
fairness of the trial or the interest of justice, would warrant
such interference.

19 (2014) 10 SCC 754
20 Criminal Appeal No. 861 of 2022 (@ SLP (Crl.) No. 9655 of 2021) dated 20.05.2022
220 [2025] 9 S.C.R.

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18.15. Thus, it is clear that while cancellation of bail is a serious
matter involving deprivation of personal liberty, the law
does permit annulment of a bail order that is unjustified,
legally untenable, or passed without due regard to material
considerations. The distinction between annulment of bail
orders due to perversity and cancellation for post-bail
misconduct must be clearly understood and applied, ensuring
a careful, calibrated, and constitutionally sound approach to
the administration of criminal justice.
19. At this juncture, it is apposite to refer to the decision of this Bench
in Pinki v. State of Uttar Pradesh and another21, wherein, the
bail granted to the accused therein was cancelled, after a detailed
consideration of the facts and the gravity of the offence, namely, child
trafficking as well as the legal principles. The Court underscored that
while personal liberty is a cherished constitutional value, it is not
absolute. Liberty must yield where it poses a threat to the collective
interest of society. No individual can claim a liberty that endangers the
life or liberty of others, as the rational collective cannot tolerate anti-
social or anti-collective conduct. Emphasizing that bail jurisprudence is
inherently fact-specific, the Court reiterated that each bail application
must be decided on its own merits, in light of the well settled on its
own merits, in light of the well-settled parameters governing grant
or denial of bail. The following paragraphs from the judgment are
particularly relevant in this context:
“i. Broad Principles for Grant of Bail.
53. In Gudikanti Narasimhulu and Others v. Public
Prosecutor, High Court of Andhra Pradesh reported in
(1978) 1 SCC 240, Krishna Iyer, J., while elaborating on
the content of Article 21 of the Constitution of India in the
context of personal liberty of a person under trial, has
laid down the key factors that should be considered while
granting bail, which are extracted as under: -
“7. It is thus obvious that the nature of the charge
is the vital factor and the nature of the evidence
also is pertinent. The punishment to which the

21 2025 INSC 482
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 221

State of Karnataka v. Sri Darshan Etc.

party may be liable, if convicted or conviction is
confirmed, also bears upon the issue.
8. Another relevant factor is as to whether the
course of justice would be thwarted by him who
seeks the benignant jurisdiction of the Court
to be freed for the time being [ Patrick Devlin,
The Criminal Prosecution in England (Oxford
University Press, London 1960) p. 75 — Modern
Law Review, Vol. 81, Jan. 1968, p. 54.]
9. Thus the legal principles and practice
validate the Court considering the likelihood of
the applicant interfering with witnesses for the
prosecution or otherwise polluting the process
of justice. It is not only traditional but rational, in
this context, to enquire into the antecedents of
a man who is applying for bail to find whether
he has a bad record — particularly a record
which suggests that he is likely to commit
serious offences while on bail. In regard to
habituals, it is part of criminological history that
a thoughtless bail order has enabled the bailee
to exploit the opportunity to inflict further crimes
on the members of society. Bail discretion, on
the basis of evidence about the criminal record
of a defendant, is therefore not an exercise in
irrelevance.”
(Emphasis supplied)

54. In Prahlad Singh Bhati v. NCT, Delhi & Anr. reported in
(2001) 4 SCC 280, this Court highlighted various aspects
that the courts should keep in mind while dealing with an
application seeking bail. The same may be extracted as
follows:
“8. The jurisdiction to grant bail has to be
exercised on the basis of well-settled principles
having regard to the circumstances of each
case and not in an arbitrary manner. While
granting the bail, the court has to keep in
222 [2025] 9 S.C.R.

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mind the nature of accusations, the nature of
evidence in support thereof, the severity of the
punishment which conviction will entail, the
character, behaviour, means and standing of the
accused, circumstances which are peculiar to
the accused, reasonable possibility of securing
the presence of the accused at the trial,
reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being
tampered with, the larger interests of the public
or State and similar other considerations. It has
also to be kept in mind that for the purposes
of granting the bail the Legislature has used
the words “reasonable grounds for believing”
instead of “the evidence” which means the court
dealing with the grant of bail can only satisfy it
(sic itself) as to whether there is a genuine case
against the accused and that the prosecution
will be able to produce prima facie evidence in
support of the charge. [...]”
(Emphasis supplied)

55. This Court in Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan
Singh reported in (2002) 3 SCC 598, speaking through
Banerjee, J., emphasised that a court exercising discretion
in matters of bail, has to undertake the same judiciously.
In highlighting that bail should not be granted as a matter
of course, bereft of cogent reasoning, this Court observed
as follows: -
“3. Grant of bail though being a discretionary
order — but, however, calls for exercise of
such a discretion in a judicious manner and
not as a matter of course. Order for bail bereft
of any cogent reason cannot be sustained.
Needless to record, however, that the grant of
bail is dependent upon the contextual facts of
the matter being dealt with by the court and
facts, however, do always vary from case to
case. While placement of the accused in the
society, though may be considered but that by
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 223

State of Karnataka v. Sri Darshan Etc.

itself cannot be a guiding factor in the matter
of grant of bail and the same should and ought
always to be coupled with other circumstances
warranting the grant of bail. The nature of the
offence is one of the basic considerations for
the grant of bail — more heinous is the crime,
the greater is the chance of rejection of the
bail, though, however, dependent on the factual
matrix of the matter.”
(Emphasis supplied)

56. In Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan reported
in (2004) 7 SCC 528, this Court held that although it is
established that a court considering a bail application
cannot undertake a detailed examination of evidence and
an elaborate discussion on the merits of the case, yet
the court is required to indicate the prima facie reasons
justifying the grant of bail.
57. In Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee reported
in (2010) 14 SCC 496, this Court observed that where a
High Court has granted bail mechanically, the said order
would suffer from the vice of non-application of mind,
rendering it illegal. This Court held as under with regard
to the circumstances under which an order granting bail
may be set aside. In doing so, the factors which ought to
have guided the Court’s decision to grant bail have also
been detailed as under:
“9. [...] It is trite that this Court does not,
normally, interfere with an order passed by
the High Court granting or rejecting bail to
the accused. However, it is equally incumbent
upon the High Court to exercise its discretion
judiciously, cautiously and strictly in compliance
with the basic principles laid down in a plethora
of decisions of this Court on the point. It is well
settled that, among other circumstances, the
factors to be borne in mind while considering
an application for bail are:
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(i) whether there is any prima facie or
reasonable ground to believe that the
accused had committed the offence;
(ii) nature and gravity of the accusation;
(iii) severity of the punishment in the event of
conviction;
(iv) danger of the accused absconding or
fleeing, if released on bail;
(v) character, behaviour, means, position and
standing of the accused;
(vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated;
(vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses
being influenced; and
(viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted
by grant of bail.”
(Emphasis supplied)

58. In Bhoopendra Singh v. State of Rajasthan reported
in (2021) 17 SCC 220, this Court made observations with
respect to the exercise of appellate power to determine
whether bail has been granted for valid reasons as
distinguished from an application for cancellation of bail i.e.
this Court distinguished between setting aside a perverse
order granting bail vis-à vis cancellation of bail on the
ground that the accused has misconducted himself or
because of some new facts requiring such cancellation.
Quoting Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar reported in (2020) 2
SCC 118, this Court observed as under: -
“16. The considerations that guide the power of
an appellate court in assessing the correctness
of an order granting bail stand on a different
footing from an assessment of an application
for the cancellation of bail. The correctness
of an order granting bail is tested on the anvil
of whether there was an improper or arbitrary
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State of Karnataka v. Sri Darshan Etc.

exercise of the discretion in the grant of bail.
The test is whether the order granting bail is
perverse, illegal or unjustified. On the other
hand, an application for cancellation of bail is
generally examined on the anvil of the existence
of supervening circumstances or violations of
the conditions of bail by a person to whom bail
has been granted. [...]”
(Emphasis supplied)

59. One of the judgments of this Court on the aspect of
application of mind and requirement of judicious exercise
of discretion in arriving at an order granting bail to the
accused is Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar reported in (2022)
4 SCC 497, wherein a three-Judge Bench of this Court,
while setting aside an unreasoned and casual order [Pappu
Kumar v. State of Bihar reported in (2021) SCC OnLine
Pat 2856 and Pappu Singh v. State of Bihar reported in
(2021) SCC OnLine Pat 2857] of the High Court granting
bail to the accused, observed as follows: -
“35. While we are conscious of the fact that liberty
of an individual is an invaluable right, at the same
time while considering an application for bail
courts cannot lose sight of the serious nature
of the accusations against an accused and the
facts that have a bearing in the case, particularly,
when the accusations may not be false, frivolous
or vexatious in nature but are supported by
adequate material brought on record so as
to enable a court to arrive at a prima facie
conclusion. While considering an application for
grant of bail a prima facie conclusion must be
supported by reasons and must be arrived at
after having regard to the vital facts of the case
brought on record. Due consideration must be
given to facts suggestive of the nature of crime,
the criminal antecedents of the accused, if any,
and the nature of punishment that would follow
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a conviction vis-à-vis the offence(s) alleged
against an accused.”
(Emphasis supplied)

60. In Manoj Kumar Khokhar v. State of Rajasthan and
Another reported in (2022) 3 SCC 501, Her Ladyship B.V.
Nagarathna, J, speaking for the Bench observed as under:
“37. Ultimately, the court considering an
application for bail has to exercise discretion in
a judicious manner and in accordance with the
settled principles of law having regard to the
crime alleged to be committed by the accused
on the one hand and ensuring purity of the trial
of the case on the other.
38. Thus, while elaborate reasons may not
be assigned for grant of bail or an extensive
discussion of the merits of the case may not
be undertaken by the court considering a bail
application, an order dehors reasoning or bereft
of the relevant reasons cannot result in grant
of bail. In such a case the prosecution or the
informant has a right to assail the order before
a higher forum. As noted in Gurcharan Singh v.
State (Delhi Admn.) [Gurcharan Singh v. State
(Delhi Admn.), (1978) 1 SCC 118 : 1978 SCC
(Cri) 41 : 1978 Cri LJ 129], when bail has been
granted to an accused, the State may, if new
circumstances have arisen following the grant
of such bail, approach the High Court seeking
cancellation of bail under Section 439(2) CrPC.
However, if no new circumstances have cropped
up since the grant of bail, the State may prefer
an appeal against the order granting bail, on the
ground that the same is perverse or illegal or
has been arrived at by ignoring material aspects
which establish a prima facie case against the
accused.”
(Emphasis supplied)
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State of Karnataka v. Sri Darshan Etc.

61. We have referred to the above authorities solely
for the purpose of reiterating two conceptual principles,
namely, factors that are to be taken into consideration while
exercising power of admitting an accused to bail when
offences are of serious nature, and the distinction between
cancellation of bail because of supervening circumstances
and exercise of jurisdiction in nullifying an order granting
bail in an appeal when the bail order is assailed on the
ground that the same is perverse or based on irrelevant
considerations or founded on non-consideration of the
factors which are relevant.
62. We are absolutely conscious that liberty of a person
should not be lightly dealt with, for deprivation of liberty of
a person has immense impact on the mind of a person.
Incarceration creates a concavity in the personality of
an individual. Sometimes it causes a sense of vacuum.
Needless to emphasise, the sacrosanctity of liberty is
paramount in a civilised society. However, in a democratic
body polity which is wedded to the rule of law an individual
is expected to grow within the social restrictions sanctioned
by law. The individual liberty is restricted by larger social
interest and its deprivation must have due sanction of law.
In an orderly society an individual is expected to live with
dignity having respect for law and also giving due respect
to others’ rights. It is a well-accepted principle that the
concept of liberty is not in the realm of absolutism but
is a restricted one. The cry of the collective for justice,
its desire for peace and harmony and its necessity for
security cannot be allowed to be trivialised. The life of an
individual living in a society governed by the rule of law
has to be regulated and such regulations which are the
source in law subserve the social balance and function as
a significant instrument for protection of human rights and
security of the collective. This is because, fundamentally,
laws are made for their obedience so that every member
of the society lives peacefully in a society to achieve his
individual as well as social interest. That is why Edmond
Burke while discussing about liberty opined, “it is regulated
freedom”.
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63. It is also to be kept in mind that individual liberty cannot
be accentuated to such an extent or elevated to such a
high pedestal which would bring in anarchy or disorder in
the society. The prospect of greater justice requires that law
and order should prevail in a civilised milieu. True it is, there
can be no arithmetical formula for fixing the parameters in
precise exactitude but the adjudication should express not
only application of mind but also exercise of jurisdiction
on accepted and established norms. Law and order in
a society protect the established precepts and see to it
that contagious crimes do not become epidemic. In an
organised society the concept of liberty basically requires
citizens to be responsible and not to disturb the tranquility
and safety which every well-meaning person desires. Not
for nothing J. Oerter stated: “Personal liberty is the right
to act without interference within the limits of the law.”
64. Thus analysed, it is clear that though liberty is a greatly
cherished value in the life of an individual, it is a controlled
and restricted one and no element in the society can act
in a manner by consequence of which the life or liberty
of others is jeopardised, for the rational collective does
not countenance an anti-social or anti-collective act. [See:
Ash Mohammad v. Shiv Raj Singh, reported in (2012) 9
SCC 446].

H. CONCLUSION
67. Considering the serious nature of the crime and the
modus operandi adopted by the accused persons we are
of the view that the High Court should not have exercised
its discretion in favour of the accused persons. We are
sorry to say but the High Court dealt with all the bail
applications in a very callous manner. The outcome of
this callous approach on the part of the High Court has
ultimately paved way for many accused persons to abscond
and thereby put the trial in jeopardy. …
…
72. Modern political scientist and philosopher, also favours
certain limitation on liberty, for safeguarding the societal
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State of Karnataka v. Sri Darshan Etc.

interest and professes the proportionality between the
liberty and restriction, thus laying down exception for the
personal liberty, in following words:
“Men are qualified for civil liberty in exact
proportion to their disposition to put moral
chains upon their own appetites, in proportion
as their love to justice is above their rapacity,
in proportion as their soundness and sobriety
of understanding is above their vanity and
presumption, in proportion as they are more
disposed to listen to the counsels of the wise
and good, in preference to the flattery of knaves.
Society cannot exist, unless a controlling power
upon will and appetite be placed somewhere;
and the less of it there is within, the more there
must be without. It is ordained in the eternal
constitution of things, that men of intemperate
minds cannot be free. Their passions forge
their fetters.”
(Emphasis supplied)

73. Thus, certain restrictions or limitations, on the exercise
of personal liberty, by the State or other such human
agency, are necessary elements, in the interest of liberty
of a well-ordered society or societal interest.
74. This Court has also held that unlimited and unqualified
liberty cannot be said to be in favour of societal interest.
In Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab reported in (1994) 3
SCC 569, this Court observed:
“Liberty cannot stand alone but must be paired
with companion virtue i.e. virtue and morality,
liberty and law, liberty and justice, liberty and
common good, liberty and responsibility which
are concomitants for orderly progress and social
stability. Man being a rationale individual has to
live in harmony with equal rights of others and
more differently for the attainment of antithetic
desires. This intertwined network is difficult to
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delineate within defined spheres of conduct
within which freedom of action may be confined.
Therefore, liberty would not always be an
absolute licence but must arm itself within the
confines of law. In other words, there can be no
liberty without social restraint. Liberty, therefore,
as a social conception is a right to be assured
to all members of a society. Unless restraint is
enforced on and accepted by all members of
the society, the liberty of some must involve the
oppression of others. If liberty be regarded a
social order, the problem of establishing liberty
must be a problem of organising restraint which
society controls over the individual. Therefore,
liberty of each citizen is borne of and must
be subordinated to the liberty of the greatest
number, in other words common happiness
as an end of the society, lest lawlessness and
anarchy will tamper social weal and harmony
and powerful courses or forces would be at
work to undermine social welfare and order.
Thus the essence of civil liberty is to keep
alive the freedom of the individual subject to
the limitation of social control which could be
adjusted according to the needs of the dynamic
social evolution.”
(Emphasis supplied)

75. In Gudikanti Narasimhulu (supra) this Court observed
thus: -
“After all, personal liberty of an accused or
convict is fundamental, suffering lawful eclipse
only in terms of ‘procedure established by law’.
The last four words of Art. 21 are the life of
that human right. The doctrine of Police Power
constitutionally validates punitive processes
for the maintenance of public order, security
of the State, national integrity and the interest
of the public generally. Even so, having regard
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State of Karnataka v. Sri Darshan Etc.

to the solemn issue involved, deprivation of
personal freedom, ephemeral or enduring, must
be founded on the most serious considerations
relevant to the welfare objectives of society,
specified in the Constitution.”
(Emphasis supplied)

76. In no circumstances, the High Court could have
released Santosh Sao, Jagveer Baranwal & Manish Jain
respectively on bail.
77. In such circumstances referred to above, we are of
the view that we should set aside all the orders passed by
the High Court granting bail to the accused persons and
they should be asked to surrender before the trial court.
78. The final word: The true test to ascertain whether
discretion has been judiciously exercised or not is to
see whether the court has been able to strike a balance
between the personal liberty of the accused and the
interest of the State, in other words, the societal interests.
Each bail application should be decided in the facts and
circumstances of the case having regard to the various
factors germane to the well settled principles of grant or
refusal of bail. In the words of Philip Stanhope, “Judgment
is not upon all occasions required, but discretion always is”.
79. In the result all these appeals succeed and are allowed.
The impugned orders of bail passed by the High Court
are hereby set aside.”
20. In the present case, the High Court, by the impugned order, enlarged
the respondents on bail, primarily relying on a set of factual and legal
findings. However, a closer examination of these findings reveals
serious infirmities that warranting interference. We shall discuss the
same in detail.
20.1. Delay in furnishing the grounds of arrest cannot, by itself,
constitute a valid ground for grant of bail.
20.1.1. The learned counsel for the respondents – accused
contended that the arrest was illegal as the grounds
of arrest were not furnished immediately in writing,
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thereby violating Article 22 (1) of the Constitution and
Section 50 Cr.P.C (now Section 47 of the Bharatiya
Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita). This submission,
however, is devoid of merit.
20.1.2. Article 22(1) of the Constitution mandates that “no
person who is arrested shall be detained in custody
without being informed, as soon as may be, of the
grounds for such arrest, nor shall he be denied
the right to consult, and to be defended by, a legal
practitioner of his choice”. Similarly, Section 50 (1)
Cr.P.C. requires that “every police officer or other
person arresting any person without warrant shall
forthwith communicate to him full particulars of the
offence for which he is arrested or other grounds for
such arrest.
20.1.3. The constitutional and statutory framework thus
mandates that the arrested person must be informed
of the grounds of arrest – but neither provision
prescribes a specific form or insists upon written
communication in every case. Judicial precedents
have clarified that substantial compliance with these
requirements is sufficient, unless demonstrable
prejudice is shown.
20.1.4. In Vihaan Kumar v. State of Haryana22, it was
reiterated that Article 22(1) is satisfied if the accused
is made aware of the arrest grounds in substance,
even if not conveyed in writing. Similarly, in Kasireddy
Upender Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh23, it
was observed that when arrest is made pursuant a
warrant, reading out the warrant amounts to sufficient
compliance. Both these post- Pankaj Bansal decisions
clarify that written, individualised grounds are not an
inflexible requirement in all circumstances.
20.1.5. While Section 50 Cr.P.C is mandatory, the consistent
judicial approach has been to adopt a prejudice-

22 2025 SCC Online SC 456
23 2025 INSC 768
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 233

State of Karnataka v. Sri Darshan Etc.

oriented test when examining alleged procedural
lapses. The mere absence of written grounds does
not ipso facto render the arrest illegal, unless it
results in demonstrable prejudice or denial of a fair
opportunity to defend.
20.1.6. The High Court, however, relied heavily on the alleged
procedural lapse as a determinative factor while
overlooking the gravity of the offence under Section
302 IPC and the existence of a prima facie case. It
noted, inter alia, that there was no mention in the
remand orders about service of memo of grounds
of arrest (para 45); the arrest memos were allegedly
template-based and not personalised (para 50); and
eyewitnesses had not stated that they were present
at the time of arrest or had signed the memos (para
48). Relying on Pankaj Bansal v. Union of India24
and Prabir Purkayastha v. State (NCT of Delhi)
(supra), it concluded (paras 43, 49 – 50) that from
03.10.2023 onwards, failure to serve detailed, written,
and individualised grounds of arrest immediately after
arrest was a violation entitling the accused to bail.
20.1.7. In the present case, the arrest memos and remand
records clearly reflect that the respondents were
aware of the reasons for their arrest. They were legally
represented from the outset and applied for bail shortly
after arrest, evidencing an immediate and informed
understanding of the accusations. No material has
been placed on record to establish that any prejudice
was caused due to the alleged procedural lapse.
In the absence of demonstrable prejudice, such as
irregularity is, at best, a curable defect and cannot,
by itself, warrant release on bail. As reiterated above,
the High Court treated it as a determinative factor
while overlooking the gravity of the charge under
Section 302 IPC and the existence of a prima facie
case. Its reliance on Pankaj Bansal and Prabir

24 (2024) 7 SCC 576
234 [2025] 9 S.C.R.

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Purkayastha is misplaced, as those decisions turned
on materially different facts and statutory contexts.
The approach adopted here is inconsistent with the
settled principle that procedural lapses in furnishing
grounds of arrest, absent prejudice, do not ipso facto
render custody illegal or entitle the accused to bail.
20.2. Courts are not expected to render findings on the merits
of the case at the bail stage.
20.2.1. It is a settled principle that at the bail stage, courts are
precluded from undertaking a detailed examination
of evidence or rendering findings that touch upon the
merits of the case. Only a prima facie assessment of
the material is warranted. The court cannot conduct
a mini-trial or record conclusions that could influence
the outcome of the trial.
20.2.2. In Niranjan Singh v. Prabhakar Rajaram Kharote25,
this Court held as under:
“Detailed examination of the evidence and
elaborate documentation of the merits should
be avoided while passing orders on bail
applications. To be satisfied about a prima
facie case is needed but it is not the same as
an exhaustive exploration of the merits in the
order itself”.
20.2.3. In Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan @
Pappu Yadav 26, the Court reiterated that while
detailed evaluation is not required, some reasoning
must support the grant of bail, especially when the
offence is grave. However, even in such cases, the
reasoning must be confined to prima facie satisfaction,
not merit-based findings.
20.2.4. By the impugned order, the High Court proceeded to
grant bail to the accused by delving into the merits

25 (1980) 2 SCC 559
26 (2004) 7 SCC 528
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 235

State of Karnataka v. Sri Darshan Etc.

of the case and recording findings that fall within the
exclusive domain of the trial Court. For instances,
in para 24, the High Court observed that the nature
of weapons used did not suggest premeditation to
assault and murder the deceased, and concluded
that the intention to commit murder would have to
be determined during trial. In the same paragraph, it
further held that since the deceased had voluntarily
accompanied certain accused to Bengaluru and had
even stopped at a bar en route, the question whether
he was abducted or kidnapped also required full-
fledged trial consideration. In para 29, the High Court
noted that there was no prima facie material revealing
conspiracy as no witness statements supported the
prosecution’s theory of a pre-planned murder. In para
32, the High Court discounted the evidentiary value of
the recovery of weapons merely because they were
seized from an open place. With regard to medical
evidence, in para 31 the Court found that a further
opinion of the doctor issued later (stating that 13 of
39 injuries were blood-oozing) was contrary to the
post-mortem report, and held that this discrepancy
ought to be evaluated at trial. These are indicative of
a premature judicial evaluation of guilt or innocence,
which is impermissible at the bail stage.
20.2.5. Further, such an approach of the High Court is
contrary to the judicial precedents of this court,
including Satish Jaggi v. State of Chhattisgarh27,
Kanwar Singh Meena v. State of Rajasthan 28,
wherein, it was held that courts, while considering
bail, should not assess the credibility of witnesses,
as this function squarely lies within the domain of
the trial Court. Thus, the impugned order of the High
Court violates this principle by commenting on the
delay in the witness statements and imputing lack
of credibility at this stage.

27 (2007) 11 SCC 195
28 (2012) 12 SCC 180
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20.2.6. In Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar 29, the Court
cautioned that there cannot be elaborate details
recorded to give an impression that the case is one
that would result in a conviction or, by contrast, in an
acquittal while passing an order on an application for
grant of bail. The following paragraphs are pertinent:
“25.While we are conscious of the fact that liberty
of an individual is an invaluable right, at the same
time while considering an application for bail
Courts cannot lose sight of the serious nature
of the accusations against an accused and the
facts that have a bearing in the case, particularly,
when the accusations may not be false, frivolous
or vexatious in nature but are supported by
adequate material brought on record so as
to enable a Court to arrive at a prima facie
conclusion. While considering an application for
grant of bail a prima facie conclusion must be
supported by reasons and must be arrived at
after having regard to the vital facts of the case
brought on record. Due consideration must be
given to facts suggestive of the nature of crime,
the criminal antecedents of the accused, if any,
and the nature of punishment that would follow a
conviction vis-à-vis the offence/s alleged against
an accused.
26. We have extracted the relevant portions of
the impugned orders above. At the outset, we
observe that the extracted portions are the only
portions forming part of the “reasoning” of the
High court while granting bail. As noted from
the aforecited judgments, it is not necessary
for a Court to give elaborate reasons while
granting bail particularly when the case is
at the initial stage and the allegations of the
offences by the accused would not have been

29 SLP (Crl.) No(s). 6335 and 7916 of 2021 dated 17.12.2021
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 237

State of Karnataka v. Sri Darshan Etc.

crystalised as such. There cannot be elaborate
details recorded to give an impression
that the case is one that would result in a
conviction or, by contrast, in an acquittal
while passing an order on an application for
grant of bail. At the same time, a balance would
have to be struck between the nature of the
allegations made against the accused; severity
of the punishment if the allegations are proved
beyond reasonable doubt and would result in
a conviction; reasonable apprehension of the
witnesses being influenced by the accused;
tampering of the evidence; the frivolity in the
case of the prosecution; criminal antecedents
of the accused; and a prima facie satisfaction
of the Court in support of the charge against
the accused.”
20.2.7. In the present case, the reading of the High Court’s
order gives an unmistakable impression that it has
pre-judged the outcome of the trial, thereby setting
the stage for discharge or acquittal, which, according
to this court, is contrary to law.
20.2.8. In Dinesh M.N. (SP) v. State of Gujarat 30, the court
clarified:
“Even though the re-appreciation of the evidence
as done by the court granting bail is to be
avoided, the court dealing with an application
for cancellation of bail under section 439(2)
can consider whether irrelevant materials were
taken into consideration. That is so because it
is not known as to what extent the irrelevant
materials weighed with the court for accepting
the prayer for bail.”
20.2.9. Thus, this Court has made it clear that the findings of
the High Court, while deciding bail, are to be treated

30 AIR 2008 SC 2318
238 [2025] 9 S.C.R.

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as expressions of opinion only for that purpose and
should not, in any manner, prejudice the trial or
other proceedings. In the present case, however, the
High Court has relied upon irrelevant and premature
assessments, and entered into questions best left
for the trial, thereby committing a grave jurisdictional
error.
20.3. Appreciation of evidence at the bail stage is impermissible.
20.3.1. In State of Orissa v. Mahimananda Mishra31, this
Court observed:
“11. It is common knowledge that generally
direct evidence may not be available to prove
conspiracy, inasmuch as the act of conspiracy
takes place secretly. Only the conspirators would
be knowing about the conspiracy. However, the
Court, while evaluating the material, may rely
upon other material which suggests conspiracy.
Such material will be on record during the course
of trial. However, at this stage, prima facie, the
Court needs to take into consideration the overall
material while considering the prayer for bail.
12. Though this Court may not ordinarily interfere
with the orders of the High Court granting or
rejecting bail to the accused, it is open for this
Court to set aside the order of the High Court,
where it is apparent that the High Court has
not exercised its discretion judiciously and in
accordance with the basic principles governing
the grant of bail. It is by now well settled that
at the time of considering an application for
bail, the Court must take into account certain
factors such as the existence of a prima facie
case against the accused, the gravity of the
allegations, position and status of the accused,

31 Criminal Appeal No. 1175 of 2018 dated 18.09.2018
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 239

State of Karnataka v. Sri Darshan Etc.

the likelihood of the accused fleeing from justice
and repeating the offence, the possibility of
tampering with the witnesses and obstructing
the Courts as well as the criminal antecedents
of the accused. It is also well settled that the
Court must not go into deep into merits of the
matter while considering an application for bail.
All that needs to be established from the record
is the existence of a prima facie case against
the accused.”
20.3.2. In Naresh Kumar Mangla v. Anita Agarwal32, this
court cancelled the anticipatory bail granted to the
accused on perusal of the chargesheet and material
evidence found prima facie adverse to the accused.
The court also clarified that examination of evidence
at the bail stage shall not influence the trial.
20.3.3. In Ishwarji Nagaji Mali v. State of Gujarat and
another33, the Court examined the chargesheet
evidence to hold that prima facie there was sufficient
material, which was ignored by the High Court while
granting bail, and accordingly set aside the bail order.
(This case is discussed below in dept for another
proposition).
20.3.4. In Imran v. Mohammed Bhava34, a three-Judge
Bench held as follows:
“32. This court in Neeru Yadav Vs. State of U.P. &
Anr., has reiterated that it is the duty of the Court
to take into consideration certain factors and they
basically are, (i) the nature of accusation and the
severity of punishment in cases of conviction and
the nature of supporting evidence, (ii) reasonable
apprehension of tampering with the witnesses
for apprehension of threat to the complainant,

32 AIR 2021 SC 277
33 Criminal Appeal No. 70 of 2022 dated 18.01.2022
34 Criminal Appeal Nos. 658 and 659 of 2022 (@ SLP (Crl.) No(s). 27 and 1242 of 2022) dated 22.04.2022
240 [2025] 9 S.C.R.

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and (iii) Prima facie satisfaction of the court in
support of the charge.”
33. Applying the ratio of the decisions of this
court referred to above to the facts of the case
in hand, we have no hesitation in observing that
the High Court erred in not considering the basic
principles for grant of bail, well established by
various judicial pronouncements. The High Court
lost sight of the fact that there exists sufficient
material against the accused Respondents
herein, so as to establish a prima facie case
against them.”
20.3.5. In Prakash Kadam v. Ramprasad Vishwanath
Gupta (supra), this Court held that even without
misuse, bail can be cancelled for grave allegations
if the lower court ignored material.
20.3.6. In the present case, the High Court also proceeded
to analyse and discount the credibility of certain
prosecution witnesses and forensic material. It
observed contradictions in the eyewitness statements
concerning the overt acts of the accused (para 26). It
expressed doubts about the prosecution’s explanation
for the delay in recording the statements of CW. 76
and CW. 91 (para 27). It questioned the timing of
the doctor’s supplementary opinion and weighed its
evidentiary worth (para 31). As already pointed out,
the credibility or reliability of witnesses is a matter
for the trial Court to determine after full-fledged cross
examination. It is a trite law that statements recorded
under section 161 Cr.P.C are not substantive, and their
evidentiary value can only be determined after cross
examination during trial. Any opinion rendered at the
bail stage risks prejudging the outcome of the trial
and must be avoided. Thus, the court’s assessment
of these aspects amounts to a premature appreciation
of the probative value of prosecution evidence.
20.4. Filing of charge sheet or lengthy list of witnesses does
not justify grant of bail.
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 241

State of Karnataka v. Sri Darshan Etc.

20.4.1. It is well settled that the mere filing of a charge-sheet
does not confer an indefeasible right to bail. Likewise,
the mere prospect of a prolonged trial cannot,
by itself, outweigh the gravity of the offence, the
incriminating material gathered during investigation,
or the likelihood of tampering with witnesses.
20.4.2. In Kalyan Chandra Sarkar vs. Rajesh Ranjan
(supra), this Court categorically held that:
“The High Court could not have allowed the
bail application on the sole ground of delay
in the conclusion of the trial without taking
into consideration the allegation made by
the prosecution in regard to the existence
of prima facie case, gravity of offence, and
the allegation of tampering with the witness
by threat and inducement when on bail. ...
non-consideration of the same and grant of
bail solely on the ground of long incarceration
vitiated the order...”
20.4.3. In Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar (supra), this Court
held that the possibility of the accused absconding
or threatening witnesses had a direct bearing on
the fairness of the trial. In serious offences, such
apprehensions – when reasonably supported by
record – must weigh against the grant of bail.
20.4.4. Similarly, in Ishwarji Nagaji Mali v. State of Gujarat
(supra), this Court reiterated that the fact that the
prosecution case rests on circumstantial evidence
is not a valid ground to release the accused on bail,
especially where a complete chain of circumstances
has been prima facie established during investigation.
The Court cancelled the bail granted by the High
Court in that case holding that:
“6. …. the High Court has not at all adverted
to the material collected during the course of
the investigation. The High Court has not at
all considered the material/evidence collected
242 [2025] 9 S.C.R.

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during the course of the investigation even prima
facie and has directed to release respondent
no.2 in such a serious offence of hatching
conspiracy to kill his wife, by simply observing
that as it is a case of circumstantial evidence,
which is a weak piece of evidence, it is not
legal and proper to deny bail to respondent
no.2. Merely because the prosecution case
rests on circumstantial evidence cannot be
a ground to release the accused on bail, if
during the course of the investigation the
evidence/material has been collected and
prima facie the complete chain of events
is established. As observed hereinabove,
while releasing respondent no.2 on bail, the
learned Single Judge of the High Court has
not at all adverted to and/or considered any
of the material/evidence collected during the
course of the investigation, which is a part of
the charge-sheet.
7. One another reason given by the High Court
to release respondent no.2 on bail is that the
accused has deep root in the society and no
apprehension as to flee away or escape trial
or tampering with the evidence/witnesses is
expressed. In a case of committing the offence
under Section 302 read with 120B IPC and in a
case of hatching conspiracy to kill his wife and
looking to the seriousness of the offence, the
aforesaid can hardly be a ground to release the
accused on bail.”
20.4.5. In Rahul Gupta v. State of Rajasthan35, this Court
further emphasized that once the accused has
been charge-sheeted after investigation, the High
Court must consider the material collected during
investigation to determine whether a prima facie

35 Criminal Appeal No(s). 1343-44 of 2023 dated 04.05.2023
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 243

State of Karnataka v. Sri Darshan Etc.

case exists and whether bail is justified. The Court
quashed the bail order, directing the accused to
surrender and remanding the matter to the High
Court for fresh consideration, after examining the
evidence on record.
20.4.6. In the present case, the High Court failed to
engage with the incriminating material collected
during investigation, despite the seriousness of the
offence under Section 302 IPC and the allegation of
conspiracy. The mere filing of the charge-sheet, the
existence of a long list of witnesses, or the possibility
of delay in trial, cannot, by themselves, constitute
valid reasons to dilute the gravity of the offence or to
disregard the case put forth by the prosecution. As
repeatedly held by this Court, such factors are not
standalone grounds for the grant of bail in heinous
offences involving murder. The reasoning adopted by
the High Court to justify the grant of bail is, therefore,
contrary to settled legal principles.
20.5. Post-bail good conduct of the accused, while relevant to
the question of continuation of bail, cannot retrospectively
validate an otherwise unsustainable order.
20.5.1. The fact that the accused were in custody for more
than 140 days, or exhibited good conduct post-
release, does not ipso facto render the order of bail
sustainable, if it suffers from non-consideration of
material factors at the stage of grant.
20.5.2. In State through CBI v. Amaramani Tripathi36, this
Court reaffirmed that “...the mere fact that the accused
has undergone certain period of incarceration... by
itself would not entitle the accused to being enlarged
on bail... when the gravity of the offence alleged is
severe...”
20.5.3. In Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan (supra),
this Court held:

36 (2005) 8 SCC 21
244 [2025] 9 S.C.R.

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“….the High Court has given the period of
incarceration already undergone by the accused
and the unlikelihood of trial concluding in
the near future as grounds sufficient to
enlarge the accused on bail, in spite of the
fact that the accused stands charged of
offences punishable with life imprisonment
or even death penalty. In such cases, in our
opinion, the mere fact that the accused has
undergone certain period of incarceration (three
years in this case) by itself would not entitle the
accused to being enlarged on bail, nor the fact
that the trial is not likely to be concluded in the
near future either by itself or coupled with the
period of incarceration would be sufficient for
enlarging the appellant on bail when the gravity
of the offence alleged is severe and there are
allegations of tampering with the witnesses by
the accused during the period he was on bail.”
It was further held that
“While a vague allegation that accused may
tamper with the evidence or witnesses may
not be a ground to refuse bail, if the accused
is of such character that his mere presence at
large would intimidate the witnesses or if there
is material to show that he will use his liberty
to subvert justice or tamper with the evidence,
then bail will be refused.”
20.5.4. In Ash Mohammad v. Shiv Raj Singh @ Lalla
Bahu & Anr.37, the Court reiterated that the period
of custody, while relevant, must be weighted against
the totality of circumstances, including the nature of
the crime and criminal antecedents. It was held that:
“31. Be it noted, a stage has come that in
certain States abduction and kidnapping have

37 (2012) 9 SCC 446
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 245

State of Karnataka v. Sri Darshan Etc.

been regarded as heroism. A particular crime
changes its colour with efflux of time. The
concept of crime in the contextual sense of
kidnapping has really undergone a sea change
and has really shattered the spine of the orderly
society. It is almost nauseating to read almost
every day about the criminal activities relating to
kidnapping and particularly by people who call
themselves experts in the said nature of crime.
32. We may usefully state that when the
citizens are scared to lead a peaceful life and
this kind of offences usher in an impediment
in establishment of orderly society, the duty of
the court becomes more pronounced and the
burden is heavy. There should have been proper
analysis of the criminal antecedents. Needless
to say, imposition of conditions is subsequent
to the order admitting an accused to bail. The
question should be posed whether the accused
deserves to be enlarged on bail or not and only
thereafter issue of imposing conditions would
arise. We do not deny for a moment that period
of custody is a relevant factor but simultaneously
the totality of circumstances and the criminal
antecedents are also to be weighed. They are
to be weighed in the scale of collective cry and
desire. The societal concern has to be kept in
view in juxtaposition of individual liberty. Regard
being had to the said parameter we are inclined
to think that the social concern in the case at
hand deserves to be given priority over lifting
the restriction of liberty of the accused.
33. In the present context the period of
custody of seven months, in our considered
opinion, melts into insignificance. We repeat
at the cost of repetition that granting of bail
is a matter of discretion for the High Court
and this Court is slow to interfere with
such orders. But regard being had to the
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antecedents of the accused which is also
a factor to be taken into consideration as
per the pronouncements of this Court and
the nature of the crime committed and the
confinement of the victim for eight days,
we are disposed to interfere with the order
impugned.
34. We may note with profit that it is not an appeal
for cancellation of bail as cancellation is not
sought because of supervening circumstances.
The present one is basically an appeal
challenging grant of bail where the High
Court has failed to take into consideration
the relevant material factors which make the
order perverse.”
Accordingly, the bail order was set aside and the accused
was directed to surrender.
20.5.5. More recently, in Ajwar v. Waseem38, this Court
set aside four bail orders granted by the Allahabad
High Court in a murder case involving double
homicide under Sections 147, 148, 149, 302, 307,
352, and 504 IPC, despite the fact that the accused
had remained in custody for over two years and
eight months. The Court found that the bail was
granted without proper consideration of material
facts. Accordingly, the accused were directed to
surrender within two weeks. The following paragraph
is relevant:
“33. Furthermore and most importantly, the High
Court has overlooked the period of custody of the
respondents-accused for such a grave offence
alleged to have been committed by them. As
per the submission made by learned counsel
for the State of UP, before being released on
bail, the accused-Waseem had undergone

38 (2024) 10 SCC 768
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 247

State of Karnataka v. Sri Darshan Etc.

custody for a period of about two years four
months, the accused-Nazim for a period of
two years eight months, the accused-Aslam
for a period of about two years nine months
and the accused Abubakar, for a period of
two years ten months. In other words, all the
accused-respondents have remained in custody
for less than three years for such a serious
offence of a double murder for which they have
been charged.”
20.5.6. In conclusion, while post-bail good conduct or the
period of incarceration may be relevant considerations
at the stage of continuing bail, they cannot cure the
fundamental defects in an order granting bail which
is otherwise perverse, legally untenable, or passed
without due consideration of material factors such as
the gravity of the offence, prima facie involvement, and
the likelihood of influencing witnesses or tampering
with evidence. An unsustainable bail order does
not become valid with the mere passage of time or
the subsequent behaviour of the accused. Judicial
scrutiny must focus on whether the discretion to grant
bail was exercised judiciously, and in accordance with
established principles, at the time of the grant, and not
mechanically or on technicalities. Therefore, the order
of the High Court granting bail to the respondents /
accused, deserves to be set aside.
21. The learned senior counsel for the appellant – State mainly challenged
the bail granted to A2, by emphasizing his status, the influence he
wields, and his role in obstructing the investigation. It was submitted
that A2 has actively mobilized widespread media support and shaped
the public narrative in his favour, thereby creating an atmosphere
capable of prejudicing the ongoing investigation and undermining
the fairness of the trial. It was further contended that A2 was not a
passive onlooker but an active conspirator who played a pivotal role in
the planning and executing the crime. However, the High Court failed
to consider these vital aspects while granting bail, raising serious
concerns about the legality and propriety of the impugned order.
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22. We now turn to a detailed examination of the above contentions.

(a) Nature and Gravity of the offence
22.1. The seriousness and heinous nature of the alleged offence
is a significant factor for consideration, while evaluating
a plea for cancellation of bail.
22.1.1. In Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan
Singh39, this Court held that “the nature of the
offence is one of the basic considerations for
the grant of bail – the more heinous the crime,
the greater the chance of refusal of bail, though
the exercise of judicial discretion in such matters
cannot be exhaustively defined.”
22.1.2. Similarly, in Panchanan Mishra v. Digambar
Mishra40, the Court observed that “the object
underlying the cancellation of bail is to protect
the fair trial and secure justice being done to
the society by preventing the accused who is
set at liberty from tampering with the evidence
in heinous crimes.”
22.1.3. In the present case, the accused along with
the co-accused, is charged under Sections
120B, 302, 201 and 204 IPC, which relate to
conspiracy, murder, destruction of evidence,
and causing disappearance of evidence. The
allegation is of a brutal and custodial murder
of a young man, who was allegedly kidnapped,
tortured, and beaten to death by the accused
for sending objectionable messages to A2. The
victim was a 26-year-old daily wage earner, and
the crime was allegedly committed to protect the
reputation of A1, the partner of A2, a celebrity.
22.1.4. This is not a case of sudden provocation or
emotional outburst. The evidence indicates a

39 (2002) 3 SCC 598
40 (2005) 3 SCC 143
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 249

State of Karnataka v. Sri Darshan Etc.

pre-meditated and orchestrated crime, where
the accused not only allegedly took the law into
his own hands, but also engaged in systematic
destruction of evidence, including: deleting
CCTV footage, bribing co-accused to falsely
surrender, and using police and local influence
to derail the investigation.
22.1.5. As this Court warned in Jagan Kishore v. State
of A.P.41, the grant of bail in cases involving
custodial torture and extra-judicial execution of
an alleged offender erodes public confidence
in the rule of law. Thus, the very gravity of the
offence justifies cancellation of bail, especially
when the liberty granted to A2 is likely to subvert
the integrity of the trial process.

(b) Likelihood of tampering with evidence and influencing
witnesses
22.2. The record reveals concrete acts of interference with the
investigation including:
• A2’s role in orchestrating false surrenders by co-
accused (A10, A14);
• Payments made to cover up the crime (as per co-
accused statements);
• Connections with police officials who delayed and
diluted the FIR and postmortem procedures;
• Deletion of CCTV evidence from A1’s residence;
• Continued influence over prosecution witnesses, as
seen from public appearances after bail.
22.2.1. In Puran v. Rambilas42, this Court categorically
held that “Cancellation of bail is permissible
where the order granting bail was perverse, or if

41 2003 Crl. LJ 1919
42 (2001) 6 SCC 338
250 [2025] 9 S.C.R.

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the accused tampers with evidence or attempts
to influence witnesses.”
22.2.2. In State v. Amarmani Tripathi (supra), this
Court stated that “the Court must examine
the likelihood of the accused tampering with
prosecution witnesses or attempting to subvert
justice. Bail should not be granted if the accused
is likely to interfere with the trial process.”
22.2.3. Further, it was held that “even the likelihood of the
accused influencing witnesses or tampering with
evidence is sufficient to deny bail.” In Deepak
Yadav v. State of UP43, bail was cancelled owing
to apprehension of tampering with witnesses.
22.2.4. In P v. State of M.P.44, the Court held that bail
can be cancelled if the accused:
• attempts to tamper with evidence;
• influences witnesses;
• induces others to make false statements;
• or even if there is a genuine apprehension
of miscarriage of justice.
22.2.5. The appellant alleged that A2 is not merely
misusing liberty post-bail but is the mastermind
of efforts to derail the investigation. In such
circumstances, the preponderance of probabilities
test applies (as per Sanjay Gandhi v. Delhi
Administration case) and the prosecution
need not prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt
at this stage.

(c) Bail obtained on misrepresentation of medical grounds
22.3. The bail order dated 13.12.2024 passed by the High Court,
was granted primarily on the basis of the alleged urgent

43 (2022) 8 SCC 559
44 (2022) 15 SCC 211
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 251

State of Karnataka v. Sri Darshan Etc.

medical condition of the 1st respondent / A2. However,
a bare perusal of the medical records and subsequent
conduct of the accused reveals that the medical plea was
misleading, vague, and grossly exaggerated.
22.3.1. This Court has consistently held that bail granted
on medical grounds must be based on credible,
specific, and urgent need, not on general or
future apprehensions. [Refer: State of U.P. v.
Amarmani Tripathi and Dinesh M.N. v. State
of Gujarat, (supra)].
22.3.2. The discharge summary dated 28.11.2024
issued by the hospital, mentions that A2 is a
patient with a history of diabetes, hypertension,
and prior cardiac issues, and that he may require
a CABG surgery in the future. However, the
report does not indicate: any current emergency
or need for immediate medical intervention;
any life-threatening condition warranting urgent
release; and any inability of the prison medical
system to manage his current state. Thus,
there is no compelling medical necessity for
grant of bail.
22.3.3. In Puran v. Rambilas (supra), this Court held
that “if it is shown that a party obtained bail by
misrepresentation or fraud, or by suppressing
material facts, such bail is liable to be cancelled
on that ground alone”. Similarly, in State of
U.P. v. Narendra Nath Sinha45, it was observed
that “bail obtained by concealing facts or
misleading the court vitiates the order, as it
defeats the interest of justice”.
22.3.4. Contrary to the impression created before
the High Court, A2 has made multiple public
appearances, including participation in

45 (2019) 10 SCC 528
252 [2025] 9 S.C.R.

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high-profile social events, was seen in fine health
and mobility, and did not undergo any surgery
or serious medical procedure post-release. This
establishes that he abused the liberty of bail,
which was obtained on a false and misleading
premise.
22.3.5. In Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan
(supra), this Court cautioned that “bail on medical
grounds can be granted only in exceptional
cases where the medical condition is serious,
cannot be treated in custody, and necessary
facilities are not available in jail”. The burden
to prove such necessity lies on the accused.
22.3.6. In the present case, A2 failed to demonstrate
that the jail hospital was incapable of managing
his condition or that adequate treatment could
not be given in judicial custody. Instead, the
High Court proceeded to grant bail without
recording a definitive finding on the urgency,
seriousness, or inadequacy of treatment in
custody. This results in a perverse and legally
unsustainable bail order, liable to be cancelled
as per the principles laid down in Puran and
Samarendra Nath Bhattacharjee v. State of
West Bengal46.

(d) Non-consideration of material facts by the High Court
22.4. An order that overlooks material evidence or proceeds on
an erroneous premise is perverse, and such perversity
forms a valid ground for cancellation or setting aside of
bail.
22.4.1. In Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar (supra), this
Court laid down that “where the order granting
bail is founded on irrelevant considerations, or
non-consideration of material facts, the same is

46 (2004) 11 SCC 165
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 253

State of Karnataka v. Sri Darshan Etc.

rendered perverse and is liable to be set aside.”
Similarly, in State of U.P. v. Amarmani Tripathi
(supra) the Court held that “bail orders must be
founded on a careful and judicious application
of mind to the facts of the case and the
seriousness of the offence. Non-consideration
of relevant material renders the order vulnerable
to challenge.”
22.4.2. In the present case, the High Court failed to
properly evaluate the nature of allegations,
involving premeditated murder and conspiracy,
attracting Section 302 IPC read with section
120B IPC; the chain of circumstantial evidence,
including CCTV footage, call records, and the
forensic report showing deliberate attempt
to destroy evidence (e.g., disposal of blood-
stained clothes and vehicle cleaning); and the
incriminating role of A2, who was in constant
touch with A1 and other co-accused before
and after the incident, and who facilitated the
conspiracy and cover-up. On the other hand,
it simply recorded that A2 had “no direct role”
and there was “no prima facie case”, without
discussing or analysing the incriminating
material on record. This amounts to non-
application of mind, and renders the order
unsustainable in law.
22.4.3. In Neeru Yadav v. State of U.P. (supra), this
Court reversed the grant of bail observing
that “Where the High Court ignores vital
circumstances and material facts, the order
becomes indefensible”.
22.4.4. In the present case, the High Court, while
granting bail, recorded that A2 was not present
at the crime scene, but at the same time,
accepted that he was in telephonic contact with
other accused at crucial times. Similarly, it noted
that there was no strong motive, while also
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acknowledging post hostility and prior enmity
with the deceased. These contradictory findings
neutralize the basis for bail and indicate that the
order was passed without a coherent or legally
consistent rationale.
22.4.5. In offences punishable with life imprisonment or
death, the bail court must be especially cautious.
In Ash Mohammed v. Shiv Raj Singh (supra),
this Court emphasized that in serious offences,
“the gravity of the offence and its impact on
society must weigh heavily with the court, and
such cases must be considered with greater care
and circumspection”. However, in the present
case, the High Court’s order fails to reflect any
such higher scrutiny or cautious approach,
despite the seriousness of the charge and the
wider societal impact of the case.
23. The Constitution of India enshrines equality before law under Article
14, and mandates that no individual – however wealthy, influential,
or famous – can claim exemption from the rigours of law. A celebrity
status does not elevate an accused above the law, nor entitle him
to preferential treatment in matters like grant of bail.
23.1. In State of Maharashtra v. Dhanendra Shriram Bhurle47, it
was observed that “grant of bail in serious offences involving
public confidence must be handled with great caution,
especially where the accused enjoys influence”.
23.2. In Prakash Kadam v. Ramprasad Vishwanath Gupta48, this
Court held that “the position and standing of the accused in
society are relevant. If the accused is so influential that his
very presence at large may intimidate witnesses or subvert
justice, bail can be denied or cancelled.”
23.3. In Y.S. Jagan Mohan Reddy v. CBI49, this Court cautioned
that “the position or status of the accused in society, if likely

47 (2009) 11 SCC 541
48 (2011) 6 SCC 189
49 (2013) 7 SCC 439
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 255

State of Karnataka v. Sri Darshan Etc.

to affect the investigation or trial, is a valid consideration in
rejecting bail”.
23.4. Similarly, in Rana Kapoor v. Directorate of Enforcement50,
this Court reaffirmed that “influential persons are more capable
of tampering with evidence or influencing witnesses. This factor
must be carefully weighed in bail matters”.
23.5. Popularity cannot be a shield for impunity. As this Court held,
influence, resources and social status cannot form a basis for
granting bail where there is a genuine risk of prejudice to the
investigation or trial.
23.6. In the present case, by treating A2’s stature as a mitigating
factor, the High Court committed a manifest perversity in the
exercise of its discretion, thereby warranting cancellation of
bail. As demonstrated earlier, A2 is not a common undertrial.
He enjoys celebrity status, mass following, political clout,
and financial muscle. His conduct inside the jail – including
recorded instances of VIP treatment, violations of jail rules,
and registered FIRs for misuse of facilities – reflects his
capacity to defy the system even while in custody. If a person
can subvert the prison system, the risk of interference with
evidence, threatening or influencing witnesses, and tampering
with the course of justice is both real and imminent.
23.7. Moreover, A2’s immediate return to social events, sharing a
stage with prosecution witnesses, and continued influence
over police witnesses, despite being on bail, establish that his
liberty is a threat to the integrity of the proceedings.
23.8. Notably, celebrities serve as social role models – accountability
is greater, not lesser. They, by virtue of their fame and public
presence, wield substantial influence on public behaviour and
social values. Granting leniency to such persons despite grave
charges of conspiracy and murder, sends wrong message to
society and undermines public confidence in the justice system.
23.9. Accordingly, A2’s antecedents, influence, jail misconduct, and
the seriousness of the charges against him make him unfit

50 (2022) 8 SCC 1
256 [2025] 9 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

for bail, and the order granting bail to him, is based on non-
application of mind, perverse, and hence, legally unsustainable.
24. On a cumulative analysis, it is evident that the order of the High
Court suffers from serious legal infirmities. The order fails to record
any special or cogent reasons for granting bail in a case involving
charges under Sections 302, 120B, and 34 IPC. Instead, it reflects a
mechanical exercise of discretion, marked by significant omissions of
legally relevant facts. Moreover, the High Court undertook an extensive
examination of witness statements at the pre-trial stage, highlighting
alleged contradictions and delays – issues that are inherently matters
for the trial Court to assess through cross-examination. The trial
Court alone is the appropriate forum to evaluate the credibility and
reliability of witnesses. Granting bail in such a serious case, without
adequate consideration of the nature and gravity of the offence, the
accused’s role, and the tangible risk of interference with the trial,
amounts to a perverse and wholly unwarranted exercise of discretion.
The well-founded allegations of witness intimidation, coupled with
compelling forensic and circumstantial evidence, further reinforce the
necessity for cancellation of bail. Consequently, the liberty granted
under the impugned order poses a real and imminent threat to the
fair administration of justice and risks derailing the trial process. In
light of these circumstances, this Court is satisfied that the present
case calls for the exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction under
Section 439(2) Cr.P.C.
25. In a democracy governed by the rule of law, no individual is exempt
from legal accountability by virtue of status or social capital. Article 14
of the Constitution guarantees equality before the law and prohibits
arbitrariness. It mandates that all persons – regardless of their
popularity, power, or privilege – are equally subject to the law.
26. In view of the foregoing, all these appeals are allowed. The order
dated 13.12.2024 passed by the High Court is set aside. The bail
granted to the respondents / accused persons is hereby cancelled. The
concerned authorities are directed to take the accused into custody
forthwith. Given the gravity of the offence, the trial shall be conducted
expeditiously, and a judgment rendered on merits, in accordance with
law. It is made clear that the observations made herein are strictly
confined to the issue of bail and shall not influence the trial on merits.
27. Pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of.
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 257

State of Karnataka v. Sri Darshan Etc.

Order

J.B. Pardiwala, J.

1. My esteemed brother Justice R. Mahadevan has just pronounced a
very erudite judgment. All that I can say in one sentence is that the
judgment penned by my esteemed brother is ineffable. The judgment
conveys a very strong message that whoever the accused may
be, howsoever big or small the accused may be, he or she is not
above the law. This judgment contains a very strong message that
the justice delivery system at any level should ensure at any cost
that the Rule of Law is maintained. No man is above the law and
no man is below it; nor de we ask any man’s permission when we
ask him to obey it. Obedience to the law is demanded as a right;
not asked a favor. The need of the hour is to maintain the rule of
law at all times.
2. The day we come to know that the accused persons are provided
with some special or five-star treatment within the jail premises, the
first step in the process will be to place the jail superintendent under
suspension including all other officials involved in such misconduct.
3. The Registry is directed to circulate one copy each of this Judgment
to all the High Courts and all the Jail Superintendents across the
country through their respective State Governments.

Result of the case: Appeals allowed.

†
Headnotes prepared by: Divya Pandey