Holding

The Supreme Court overruled the universal applicability of the Rangaiah principle, holding that vacancies are to be filled according to the rules in force at the time of consideration, and the State may lawfully fill pre‑amendment vacancies under the new rules if it adopts a rational policy decision.

Summary

The Himachal Pradesh government amended its Labour Officer recruitment and promotion rules in 2006, increasing the total posts from five to twelve and introducing a 75:25 ratio of promotion to direct recruitment. Three Labour Officers (respondents 1‑3) who were already in service argued that the vacancies created before the amendment should be filled only by promotion under the 1966 rules, while the state filled three posts by direct recruitment under the new rules. The High Court allowed the petitioners, relying on Y.V. Rangaiah, but the Supreme Court re‑examined the principle and held that Rangaiah’s proposition is not of universal application and has been effectively overruled. The Court emphasized that service rules, not any vested right, govern appointments and that the State may adopt policy decisions, such as cadre restructuring, provided they are reasonable and comply with Article 14. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court judgment and allowed the appeals, confirming the appointments made under the 2006 rules.

Issues considered

Whether vacancies that arose before the amendment of recruitment and promotion rules must be filled according to the old rules or the amended rules.
Whether the principle laid down in Y.V. Rangaiah v. J. Sreenivasa Rao is a universal rule applicable to all service vacancies.
Whether the State has a vested right to restructure a cadre and fill vacancies by direct recruitment despite earlier vacancies.

Legislation cited

Subjects

service lawpromotionrecruitment rulesvacancy fillingdoctrine of pleasureArticle 309Article 310Article 311Rangaiah overruledcadre restructuringpublic policyconstitutional law

Judgment

[2022] 15 S.C.R. 847 847

STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH & ORS. A
v.
RAJ KUMAR & ORS.
(Civil Appeal No. 9746 of 2011)
MAY 20, 2022 B
[UDAY UMESH LALIT, S. RAVINDRA BHAT AND
PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA, JJ.]
Service Law: Himachal Pradesh Recruitment and Promotion
Rules, 1966 – H.P. Labour and Employment Department, Labour
C
Officers, Class–II (Gazetted) Ministerial Services R & P Rules, 2006
– Conditions of service of public servant – Vacancies arose prior to
the promulgation of the new rules – To be filled only as per the old
rules or as per the amended rules – Five post of Labour Officer
governed by the 1966 Rules, to be filled by promotion – On
20.07.2006, seven additional posts sanctioned for labour officers, D
and total posts increased from 5 to 12 – Subsequently, the 1966
Rules amended – Under the New Rules of 2006, recruitment to the
post of Labour Officer is to be made by promotion as well as direct
recruitment in the ratio of 75 per cent and 25 per cent respectively
– Out of the total number of 12 posts, the promotional posts increased
E
from 5 to 9 (being 75 per cent) and direct recruitment posts came to
3 (being 25 per cent) – Respondent no. 1 to 3-Labour Inspector
challenged the filling up of 25 percent of the posts by direct
recruitment on the ground that the vacancies arose before the
promulgation of the New Rules and thus, all the vacancies must be
filled only by promotion – On direction by the tribunal, the State F
govt. considered the grievance and rejected the same – Challenged
again before the tribunal – During the pendency, State government
called up for applications for filling up the 3 posts of Labour Officers
under the quota of direct recruitment – Respondent no. 4 to 6
appointed to the post – Appointments challenged by the respondent
G
no.1 to 3 – Division Bench allowed the petition relying on Rangaiah’s
case – On appeal, held : Rangaiah’s case must be seen in the context
of its own facts, coupled with the declarations therein that there is
no rule of universal application to the effect that vacancies must
necessarily be filled on the basis of rules which existed on the date
H
847
848 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 15 S.C.R.

A which they arose – Statement in Rangaiah that the “vacancies which
occurred prior to the amended rules would be governed by the old
rules and not by the amended rules”, does not reflect the correct
proposition of law governing services under the Union and the
States, thus, it is overruled – There is no right for an employee
outside the rules governing the services – Services under the State
B
are in the nature of a status, a hallmark of which is the need of the
State to unilaterally alter the rules to subserve the public interest –
2006 Rules, governing the services of the respondents came into
force immediately after they were notified – There is no provision in
the said rules to enable the respondents to be considered as per the
C 1966 Rules – Furthermore, there is no other right that respondents
no. 1 to 3 can claim for such consideration – Plea of the Government
based on its policy decision to restructure the cadre by creating
additional posts and also providing for direct recruitment by
amending the rules is accepted – Thus, the judgment of High Court
is set aside – Art. 309, 310, 311 – Constitution of India.
D
Constitution of India : Art. 310 – Doctrine of pleasure –
Purpose/Object – Stated.
Allowing the appeals, the Court
HELD: 1.1 A review of the fifteen cases that have
E distinguished Rangaiah’s case would demonstrate that this Court
has been consistently carving out exceptions to the broad
proposition formulated in Rangaiah. The findings in these
judgments, that have a direct bearing on the proposition
formulated by Rangaiah are that there is no rule of universal
F application that vacancies must be necessarily filled on the basis
of the law which existed on the date when they arose, Rangaiah’s
case must be understood in the context of the rules involved
therein; that it is now a settled proposition of law that a candidate
has a right to be considered in the light of the existed rules,
which implies the “rule in force” as on the date consideration
G takes place; that the right to be considered for promotion occurs
on the date of consideration of the eligible candidates; The
Government is entitled to take a conscious policy decision not to
fill up the vacancies arising prior to the amendment of the rules.
The employee does not acquire any vested right to being
H considered for promotion in accordance with the repealed rules
STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH & ORS. v. RAJ KUMAR 849
& ORS.

in view of the policy decision taken by the Government. There is A
no obligation for the Government to make appointments as per
the old rules in the event of restructuring of the cadre is intended
for efficient working of the unit. The only requirement is that the
policy decisions of the Government must be fair and reasonable
and must be justified on the touchstone of Article 14. The principle
B
in Rangaiah need not be applied merely because posts were
created, as it is not obligatory for the appointing authority to fill
up the posts immediately. When there is no statutory duty cast
upon the State to consider appointments to vacancies that existed
prior to the amendment, the State cannot be directed to consider
the cases. [Para 36][895-F-G; 896-A-D] C
1.2 The said observations made in the fifteen decisions that
have distinguished Rangaiah’s case demonstrate that the wide
principle enunciated therein is substantially watered-down. Almost
all the decisions that distinguished Rangaiah hold that there is
no rule of universal application to the effect that vacancies must D
necessarily be filled on the basis of law that existed on the date
when they arose. This only implies that decision in Rangaiah is
confined to the facts of that case. [Para 37.1][896-E-F]
1.3 The consistent findings in these fifteen decisions that
Rangaiah’s case must be seen in the context of its own facts, E
coupled with the declarations therein that there is no rule of
universal application to the effect that vacancies must necessarily
be filled on the basis of rules which existed on the date which
they arose, compels the Court to conclude that the decision in
Rangaiah is impliedly overruled. However, as there is no
declaration of law to this effect, it continues to be cited as a F
precedent and this Court has been distinguishing it on some
ground or the other. For clarity and certainty, it is, therefore,
necessary to hold that the statement in Y.V. Rangaiah v. J.
Sreenivasa Rao that, “the vacancies which occurred prior to the
amended rules would be governed by the old rules and not by G
the amended rules”, does not reflect the correct proposition of
law governing services under the Union and the States under
part XIV of the Constitution, it is hereby overruled; and that the
rights and obligations of persons serving the Union and the States

H
850 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 15 S.C.R.

A are to be sourced from the rules governing the services. [Para
37.3][897-C-F]
Y. V. Rangaiah v. J. Sreenivasa Rao (1983) 3 SCC 284
– Overruled.
1.4 On facts, the Court noticed that the High Court
B proceeded on the premise that the vacancies occurring before
the amendment of the Rules on 25.11.2006 must be governed by
the 1966 Rules. The decision of the High Court took within its
sweep even the 7 new posts of Labour Officers that were
sanctioned by an inter–departmental letter dated 20.07.2006,
C which included even the 3 posts allocated for direct recruitment.
The direction of the High Court to encompass even the 3 posts
allocated for direct recruitment was on the ground that the posts
were sanctioned on 20.07.2006, which is prior to the amendment
of the Rules on 25.11.2006. [Para 38.1][897-F-H]

D 1.5 There is no right for an employee outside the rules
governing the services. That the services under the State are in
the nature of a status, a hallmark of which is the need of the State
to unilaterally alter the rules to subserve the public interest. The
2006 rules, governing the services of the Respondents came into
force immediately after they were notified. There is no provision
E in the said rules to enable the Respondents to be considered as
per the 1966 Rules. The matter must end here. There is no other
right that Respondents no.1 to 3 can claim for such
consideration.[Para 38.2][898-A-C]
Union of India v.Tulsiram Patel (1985) 3SCC 398 :
F [1985] 2 Suppl. SCR 131; Roshan Lal Tandon v. Union
of India (1968) 1 SCR 185 – Followed.
1.6 The alternative plea of the Government based on its
policy decision to restructure the cadre by creating additional
posts and also providing for direct recruitment by amending the
G rules, as a justification for not filling up the vacancies that arose
prior to the amendment is fully supported by the decisions of this
Court. [Para 39.1][898-C-D]
Dr. K. Ramulu & Anr v. Dr. S Suryaprakash Rao (1997)
3 SCC 59 : [1997] 1 SCR 287; Rajasthan Public
H
STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH & ORS. v. RAJ KUMAR 851
& ORS.

Service Commissionv. Chanan Ram (1998) 4 SCC 202 A
: [1998] 1 SCR 1099; G. Venkateshwara Rao v. Union
of India (1999) 8 SCC 455; Shyama Charan Dash v.
Stateof Orissa (2003) 4 SCC 218 : [2003] 2 SCR 899;
Stateof Punjab v. Arun Kumar Aggarwal (2007) 10 SCC
402 : [2007] 6 SCR 8; Deepak Agarwal v. State of U.P
B
(2011) 6 SCC 725 : [2011] 4 SCR 149; Stateof Tripura
v. Nikhil Ranjan Chakraborty (2017) 3 SCC 646; State
of Orissa v. Dhirendra Sundar Das (2019) 6 SCC 270
: [2019] 7 SCR 197; Union of India v. Krishna Kumar
(2019) 4 SCC 319 : [2019] 1 SCR 982; Rajasthan State
Sports Council v. Uma Dadhich (2019) 4 SCC 316 : C
[2019] 1 SCR 585 – relied on.
1.7 The material placed on record shows that the additional
posts of Labour Officers are created on 20.07.2006 and
immediately thereafter the 12 labour zones were created. This is
followed by amendment to the Rules with effect from on 25.11.2006 D
restructuring the cadre. The facts fully justify the alternative
submission made by the State and the Court has no hesitation in
accepting the said submission. Thus, the judgment of the High
Court dated 28.12.2009 is set aside. [Paras 39.2 and 40][898-D-
E]
E
D. Raghuv. R. Basaveswarudu 2020 SCC Online 124;
B. P. Singhal v. Union of India (2010) 6 SCC 331;
Union of India v. Arun Kumar Roy (1986) 1 SCC 677;
Narayana v. Purushotham (2008) 5 SCC 416 : [2008]
6 SCR 1055; Brij Lal Mohan v. Union of India (2012)
6 SCC 502 : [2012] 5 SCR 305; Syed Khalid Rizivi V F
Union of India 1993 Supp (3) SCC 575 : [1992] 3
Suppl. SCR 180; Hardev Singh v Union of India
(2011) 10 SCC 121; P. Ganeshwar Rao v. State of A.P.
(1988) Supp SCC 740 : [1988] Suppl. SCR 805; N. T.
Devin Katti v. Karnataka Public Service Commission G
(1990) 3 SCC 157; A. A. Calton v. Director of
Education and Anr (1983) 3 SCC 33; P. Mahendran
and Ors v. State of Karnataka (1990) 1 SCC 411 :
[1989] 2 Suppl. SCR 385; State of Rajasthan v. R.
Dayal (1997) 10 SCC 419 : [1997] 2 SCR 108; B. L.
H
852 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 15 S.C.R.

A Gupta v. M.C.D (1998) 9 SCC 223; Arjun Singh
Rathore v. B.N. Chaturvedi (2007) 11 SCC 605 : [2007]
11 SCR 320; Stateof Bihar v. Mithilesh Kumar (2010)
13 SCC 467 : [2010] 10 SCR 161; Kulwant Singh v.
Daya Ram (2015) 3 SCC 177 : [2014] 11 SCR 1053;
Richa Mishra v. Stateof Chhattisgarh (2016) 4 SCC 179
B
: [2016] 1 SCR 316; Union of India v. S.S. Uppal
(1996)2 SCC 168 : [1996] 1 SCR 230; Shankarshan
Dash v. Union of India (1991) 3 SCC 47 : [1991] 2
SCR 567; State Bank of India v. Kashinath Kher (1996)
8 SCC 762; Delhi Judicial Services Assn. v. Delhi High
C Court (2001) 5 SCC 145 : [2001] (3) SCR 314; M.I.
Kunjukunju v. Stateof Kerala (2015)11 SCC 440; D.
Raghuv. R. Basaveswarudu (2020) 18 SCC 1 – referred
to.
‘Law Relating to Public Services’, Samaraditya Pal, 3rd
D Edition, Lexis Nexis, 2011 Para 7.1 – referred to.
Case Law Reference
[1997] 1 SCR 287 relied on Para 3.2
[2011] 4 SCR 149 relied on Para 3.2
E [2019] 1 SCR 982 relied on Para 3.2
(2010) 6 SCC 331 referred to Para 8
(1986) 1 SCC 677 referred to Para 10
[2008] 6 SCR 1055 referred to Para 10
F [2012] 5 SCR 305 referred to Para 10
[1992] 3 Suppl. SCR 180 referred to Para 10(vi)
(2011) 10 SCC 121 referred to Para 10(vi)
[1998] 1 SCR 1099 relied on Para 10(vii)
G
[1988] Suppl. SCR 805 referred to Para 11
(1990) 3 SCC157 referred to Para 13.1
(1983) 3 SCC33 referred to Para 13.1
[1989] 2 Suppl. SCR 385 referred to Para 13.1
H
STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH & ORS. v. RAJ KUMAR 853
& ORS.

[1997] 2 SCR 108 referred to Para 14 A
[1998] 9 SCC 223 referred to Para 15.1
[2007] 11 SCR 320 referred to Para 16.1
[2010] 10 SCR 161 referred to Para 17.1
[2014] 11 SCR 1053 referred to Para 18 B
[2016] 1 SCR 316 referred to Para 19.1
[1996] 1 SCR 230 referred to Para 21
[1991] 2 SCR 567 referred to Para 21
C
(1996) 8 SCC 762 referred to Para 22
(1999) 8 SCC 455 relied on Para 25.1
[2001] 3 SCR 314 referred to Para 26.1
[2003] 2 SCR 899 relied on Para 27.1
D
[2007] 6 SCR 8 relied on Para 28.1
(2015) 11 SCC 440 referred to Para 30.1
(2017) 3 SCC 646 relied on Para 31.1
[2019] 7 SCR 197 relied on Para 33.1
E
[2019] 1 SCR 585 relied on Para 34.1
(2020) 18 SCC 1 referred to Para 35
(1983) 3 SCC 284 overruled Para 37.3
[1985] 2 Suppl. SCR 131 followed Para 38.2 F
[1968] 1 SCR 185 followed Para 38.2
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.9746
of 2011.
From the Judgment and Order dated 28.12.2009 of the High Court
G
of Himachal Pradesh at Shimla in Civil Writ Petition No.3028 of 2008.
With
Civil Appeal No.9747 of 2011.
Abhinav Mukerji, AAG, P. S. Patwalia, Ms. Aprajita Singh,
Ravindra Kumar Raizada, Sr. Advs., Mrs. Bihu Sharma, Ms. Pratishtha H
854 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 15 S.C.R.

A Vij, Akshay C. Shrivastava, Vishal Sharma, Prasanjit Keswani, Mahesh
Kumar, Nikhilesh Kumar, Ms. Devika Khanna, Mrs. V. D. Khanna,
Vmz Chambers, Ms. Divya Roy, Akshay Amritanshu, Kartikey Singh,
Ashutosh Jain, Ankit Kumar Lal, Varinder Kumar Sharma, Umang
Shankar, Madhup Singhal, Nirmal Singh, Ramjee Pandey, Advs. for the
Appellants.
B
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA, J.
1.1 These appeals arise out of the decision of the High Court of
Himachal Pradesh allowing the writ petition and directing the State to
C consider the case of the writ petitioners, Respondents no. 1 to 3 herein,
for promotion under Rules that existed when the vacancies arose and
not as per the subsequently amended rules. These directions were based
on the decision of this Court in the case of Y.V. Rangaiah v. J. Sreenivasa
Rao1. As we noticed a number of decisions of this Court that have
D followed Rangaiah, and far more decisions that have distinguished it,
we had to examine the issue afresh. The question is whether
appointments to the public posts that fell vacant prior to the amendment
of the Rules would be governed by the old Rules or the new Rules.
After examining the principle in the context of the constitutional position
of services under the State, and having reviewed the decisions that
E have followed or distinguished Rangaiah in that perspective, we have
formulated the legal principles that should govern services under the
State. Applying the said principles, we have held that the broad proposition
formulated in Rangaiah does not reflect the correct constitutional position.
We have thus allowed the appeals following the principles that we have
F laid down.
1.2 We will first refer to the facts leading to the present
controversy.
Facts:
1.3 The Himachal Pradesh Recruitment and Promotion Rules,
G 2
1966 dated 01.03.1966 made in exercise of the powers under Article
309 of the Constitution govern the post of Labour Officer. There were5
posts of Labour Officers and these were to filled by promotion from (i)
1
Y.V. Rangaiah v. J. Sreenivasa Rao (1983) 3 SCC 284, hereinafter referred to as
‘Rangaiah’.
2
H hereinafter referred to as the ‘1966 rules’.
STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH & ORS. v. RAJ KUMAR 855
& ORS. [PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA, J.]

factory Inspectors, (ii) labour inspectors and (iii) sectt. A
superintendents, being the feeder category. On 20.07.2006, Secretary,
Labour and Employment Department addressed a letter to the Labour
Commissioner intimating sanction for creation of additional posts in the
department which inter alia included 7 more posts for Labour Officers.
As a consequence of the said decision, the total posts for Labour Officers
B
increased from 5 to 12. At this point in time Respondents No. 1 to 3
were working as Labour Inspectors in the service of the State.
1.4 Within four months from the sanction of the additional posts,
the 1966 Rules came to be amended on 25.11.2006. Under the New
Rules called the H.P. Labour and Employment Department, Labour
Officers, Class-II (Gazetted) Ministerial Services R & P Rules, 20063, C
recruitment to the post of Labour Officer is to be made by promotion as
well as direct recruitment in the ratio of 75 per cent and 25 per cent
respectively. The effect of the New Rules coupled with the 7 new posts
for Labour Officers is that, from out of the total number of 12 posts of
Labour Officers, the promotional posts increased from 5 to 9 (being 75 D
per cent)and direct recruitment posts came to 3 (being 25 per
cent).Immediately thereafter, the Government issued a notification
creating 12 Labour zones in the State.
1.5 It is in the above-referred background, that Respondents No.
1 to 3 approached the Administrative Tribunal challenging the proposed E
action of the State Government in filling up 25 per cent of the posts of
Labour Officers by direct recruitment. They contended that the vacancies
arose in July 2006, which is before the promulgation of the New Rules
and therefore all the vacancies must be filled only by promotion. By its
order dated 24.01.2007, the Tribunal directed the State Government to
consider the grievance raised in the Original Application as if it is a F
representation to it. The representation was considered and rejected by
the Government on 27.06.2007. Challenging the rejection, the second
Original Application was filed by the Respondents before the State
Administrative Tribunal.
1.6 While the matter was pending before the Tribunal, the State G
Government proceeded further and issued an advertisement through the
H.P. Public Service Commission, calling for applications for filling up the
3 posts of Labour Officers under the quota of direct recruitment. The
Public Service Commission completed the recruitment process and
3
hereinafter referred to as ‘the New Rules’. H
856 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 15 S.C.R.

A recommended the names of Respondents No. 4 to 6.The recommendation
was accepted and the said Respondents were appointed. It is not in
dispute that they joined duties on the 4th and 5thof November, 2008.
Questioning the legality and validity of the said appointments, Respondents
No. 1 to 3 filed Civil Writ Petition No. 3028/2008 before the High Court
of Himachal Pradesh, which came to be allowed by the Division Bench
B
of the High Court by the impugned order on 28.12.2009. Challenging the
decision of the Division Bench the State of Himachal Pradesh preferred
a Special Leave Petition before this Court, from which the present Civil
Appeal arises pursuant to leave being granted on 08.11.2011. Similarly,
the direct recruit appointees, Respondents No. 4 to 6 also filed a Special
C Leave Petition, which is numbered Civil Appeal no. 9747/2011 after leave
was granted.
2. The solitary argument advanced on behalf of Respondents No.
1 to 3, which was accepted by the Division Bench was that the vacancies
which arose prior to the promulgation of New Rules were to be filled
D only as per the 1966 Rules and not as per the New Rules. The High
Court formulated the issue and proceeded to allow the Writ Petition on
the ground that it is covered by the decision of this Court in Y.V. Rangaiah
v. J. Sreenivasa Rao (supra).The operative portion of the judgment is
extracted herein for ready reference:
E “The question whether the vacancies occurring before the
amendment to the Recruitment and Promotion Rules are to be
filled up as per the old Recruitment and Promotion Rules or
by way of new Recruitment and Promotion Rules is no more
res integra in view of the law laid down by their Lordships of
this Court in Y.V. Rangaiah and others versus J. Sreenivasa
F Rao, (1983) 3 SCC 284.”
Submissions:
3.1 In these appeals, we heard Shri P.S. Patwalia, Senior Advocate
assisted by Advocate-on-Record Shri Abhinav Mukerji, for the Appellant-
G State and Shri. Prasanjit Keshvani, Ld. Advocate representing the
Respondents and also Shri. Ravindra Kumar Raizada, Senior Advocate
assisted by Ms. Divya Roy, Advocate-on-Record appearing for some
other Respondents.
3.2 Shri P.S. Patwalia, learned Senior Advocate for the Appellant-
State made the following submissions. At the outset, he would submit,
H
STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH & ORS. v. RAJ KUMAR 857
& ORS. [PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA, J.]

that there was no challenge to the legality of the New Rules and therefore A
the Respondents cannot seek a relief which is contrary to the Rules i.e.,
filling up the posts by way of promotion as per the Old Rules. Secondly,
the inter-departmental letter dated 20.07.2006 followed by the notification
dated 02.01.2007 creating the posts was in furtherance of the new policy
which was brought into effect by the amendments made to the Rules. It
B
was therefore contended that the inter-departmental letter dated
20.07.2006 cannot be seen as a standalone event and that it is part of the
larger policy to restructure the cadre. Thirdly, there is no vested right to
promotion, though there is only a right to be considered for promotion as
per the rules which are in force at the time of such consideration. Fourthly,
the recruitment exercise undertaken by the State is completely based on C
the policy consideration of the State which the High Court failed to take
into account. In support of this submission, reliance was placed on
judgments of this Court in K. Ramulu4, Deepak Agarwal5 and Krishna
Kumar6. It was finally contended that the High Court erred in applying
the decision of Rangaiah which was the case of promotion, while the
D
present case is about direct recruitment to the post of Labour Officers.
3.3 Shri Keshwani followed by Shri Raizada, Senior Advocate for
the Respondents made the following submissions. They would contend
that the 7 new posts were created before the promulgation of the New
Rules and there was no Governmental Policy regarding the applicability
of the New Rules retrospectively. Secondly, there is no evidence to show E
that the State made a conscious decision to keep the posts vacant, to be
filled as per the New Rules. On the contrary, they would submit that the
communication dated 20.07.2006 sanctioning the creation of the posts
stated that they must be filled on a regular basis. Thirdly, the High Court
was right in applying the decision of Rangaiah which settled the law on F
appointments to posts falling vacant prior to the amendment of the rules
by holding that they must be governed by the old rules and not the new
rules. Finally, to apply the New Rules to the pending vacancies, the
appointing authority must demonstrate that they had (i) taken a conscious
decision not to fill the vacancies until the promulgation of the new rules
and (ii) such a decision must be for a good and a valid reason. For this G
purpose, reliance is placed on judgments of this Court in K. Ramulu7,
4
Dr. K. Ramulu & Anr v. Dr. S Suryaprakash Rao (1997) 3 SCC 59.
5
Deepak Agarwal v. State of U.P (2011) 6 SCC 725.
6
Union of India v. Krishna Kumar (2019) 4 SCC 319.
7
Dr. K. Ramulu & Anr v. Dr. S Suryaprakash Rao (1997) 3 SCC 59. H
858 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 15 S.C.R.

A Deepak Agarwal8 and D. Raghu9 to demonstrate that no such effort
was made.
Issue:
4.1 The real question is whether the vacancies which arose prior
to the promulgation of the new rules are to be filled only as per the old
B rules and not as per the amended rules? It is argued that this principle is
no more res-integra as the Supreme Court recognised such a right in
Rangaiah’s case and it has been followed in a large number of
subsequent decisions. A list of such judgments was forwarded to the
Court by the Respondents. On the other hand, while submitting that
C there is no such right, an even larger list of decisions of this Court that
distinguished Rangaiah was forwarded to us on behalf of the State.
4.2 We have taken note of the fact that there are a large number
of decisions that have either followed the principle in Rangaiah or have
distinguished it. The principle in Rangaiah’s case has given rise to a
D number of decisions, most of them have disapplied Rangaiah and have
in fact, watered-down the principle while distinguishing it. In this view of
the matter, and for clarity and certainty, it is necessary for us to review
the subject and restate the principle in simple and clear terms.
4.3 We will first examine the principle laid down in Rangaiah
E itself. We will verify it in the context of the constitutional position provided
in Chapter XIV of the Constitution relating to services under the State.
We will thereafter examine the decisions that followed Rangaiah and
also those that have distinguished it.After restating the principle, we will
apply it to the facts of the case for arriving at our decision.

F The decision in the case of Y.V. Rangaiah v. J. Sreenivasa Rao:
5.1 The Petitioners in Rangaiah’s case were working as LDCs
in the Department of Registration and Stamps, Government of A.P. Under
Rule 4(a)(1)(i) of the A.P. Registration and Subordinate Service Rules,
appointments to the promotional posts of Sub-Registrar Grade II from
LDCs were to be made from the panel of “approved candidates” made
G
under Rule 34 (c). The panel was to be prepared by the prescribed
authority in the month of September every year and it could operate till
a list for the subsequent year was prepared. Importantly, the list had to
contain names of as many persons as there are vacancies. As the
8
Deepak Agarwalv. State of U.P (2011) 6 SCC 725.
H 9
D. Raghu v. R. Basaveswarudu 2020 SCC Online 124.
STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH & ORS. v. RAJ KUMAR 859
& ORS. [PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA, J.]

approved list was not prepared within the prescribed time, promotions A
could not take place in time. In the meanwhile, the amended rules came
into force, as per which the petitioners lost their chance to be considered
for promotion. They contended before this Court that their right to be
considered for appointment for promotion would not be lost with the
advent of new rules as the vacancies occurring prior to the amendment
B
of the rules were to be filled under the unamended rules. In other words,
the contention was that the mandatory requirement under the old rules
was violated. It is in this context that the Court observed as under:-
“9. ….Under the old rules a panel had to be prepared every
year in September. Accordingly, a panel should have been
prepared in the year 1976 and transfer or promotion to the C
post of Sub-Registrar Grade-II should have been made out
of that panel. In that event, the petitioners in the two
representation petitions who ranked higher than respondents
3 to 15 would not have been deprived of their right of being
considered for promotion. The vacancies which occurred prior D
to the amended rules would be governed by the old rules and
not by the amended rules. It is admitted by counsel for both
the parties that henceforth promotion to the post of Sub-
Registrar Grade II will be according to the new rules on the
zonal basis and not on the State-wide basis and, therefore,
there was no question of challenging the new rules. But the E
question is of filling the vacancies that occurred prior to the
amended rules. We have not the slightest doubt that the posts
which fell vacant prior to the amended rules would be
governed by the old rules and not by the new rules.”
(emphasis supplied) F

5.2 The question that arose in Rangaiah’s case related to the
mandatory obligation under the old rules to prepare an approved list of
candidates and also the number of persons to be placed in the list as per
the vacancies available. It is in this context that the Court observed that
the vacancies would be governed by the old rules. This decision is G
not to be taken to be laying down an invariable principle that vacancies
occurring prior to the amendment of the rules are to be governed by old
rules. It is important to note that the Court has not identified any vested
right of an employee, as has been read into this judgment in certain
subsequent cases. H
860 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 15 S.C.R.

A 5.3 However, as the observation in Rangaiah’s case has been
construed as a general principle that vacancies arising prior to the
amendment of rules are to be filled only as per the old rules, it is necessary
for us to examine the correct position of law. For this purpose, we will
examine the constitutional position and the status that governs the
relationship between an employee and the State.
B
Status of persons serving the Union and the States:
6.1 The relationship between the State and its employees is
provisioned in Part XIV of the Constitution. The provisions of this Part
empower the Union and the States to make Laws and executive Rules,to
regulate the recruitment, conditions of service 10, tenure 11 and
C termination12 of persons serving the Union or the States.
6.2 Article 310 provides that, except as expressly provided in the
Constitution, every person serving the Union or the States holds office
during the pleasure of the President or the Governor.
6.3 The legislative power conferred on the Parliament or a State
D Legislature, to make Laws, or the executive power conferred on the
President or the Governor to make Rules under Article 309 is controlled
by the doctrine of pleasure embodied in Article 310. This is clear from
the fact that Article 309 opens with the restrictive clause, ‘subject to
the provision of the Constitution. It is for this reason that the power of
E the legislature to make laws and the executive to make Rules, for laying
down conditions of services of a public servant is always subject to the
tenure at the pleasure of the President or the Governor under Article
310.
7.1 The Constitutional provision to provide public employment on
the basis of tenure at pleasure of the President or the Governor is
F
based on ‘public policy’, ‘public interest’ and ‘public good’. The concept
of holding public employment at pleasure is explained in Constitution
Bench decision of this Court in Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel13.The
relationship between the Government and its employees, as explained in
this judgment can be formulated as under14 :-
G 10
Article 309, Constitution of India.
11
Article 310, Constitution of India.
12
Article 311, Constitution of India.
13
Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel(1985) 3 SCC 398.
14
The relevant propositions in the Tulsiram case, as identified and extracted in ‘Law
Relating to Public Services’, Samaraditya Pal, 3rd Edition, Lexis Nexis, 2011is adopted
H for convenience.
STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH & ORS. v. RAJ KUMAR 861
& ORS. [PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA, J.]

I. Unlike in the United Kingdom, in India it is not subject to A
any law made by Parliament but is subject only to what is
expressly provided by the Constitution.15
II. The pleasure doctrine relates to the tenure of a Government
servant… , … means the period for which an incumbent of
office holds it. 16 B
III. The position that the pleasure doctrine is not based upon
any special prerogative of the Crown but upon public policy
has been accepted by this Court in State of U.P. v. Babu Ram
Upadhya and Moti Ram Deka v. General Manager, N.E.F.,
Railways, Maligaon, Pandu17. C
IV. The only fetter which is placed on the exercise of such
pleasure is when it is expressly so provided in the Constitution
itself, that is when there is an express provision in that behalf
in the Constitution. Express provisions in that behalf are to
be found in the case of certain Constitutional functionaries D
in respect of whose tenure special provision is made in the
Constitution as, for instance, in clauses (4) and (5) of Article
124 with respect to Judges of the Supreme Court, Article 218
with respect to Judges of the High Court. Article 148(1) with
respect to the Comptroller and Auditor-General of India,
Article 324(1) with respect to the Chief Election Commissioner, E
and Article 324(5) with respect to the Election Commissioners
and Regional Commissioners.18
V. Clauses (1) and (2) of Article 311 impose restrictions upon
the exercise by the President or the Governor of a State of his
pleasure under Article 310(1). These are express provisions F
with respect to termination of service by dismissal or removal
as also with respect to reduction in rank of a civil servant
and thus come within the ambit of the expression Exceptas
otherwise provided by this ‘Constitution’ qualifying Article
310(1). Article 311 is thus an exception to Article 310 and G
was described in Parshotam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India, 19
15
(1985) 3 SCC 398 @ 439
16
Ibid at 440.
17
Ibid at 441
18
Ibidat 447.
19
Ibid at 447 H
862 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 15 S.C.R.

A as operating as a proviso to Article 310(1) though set out in
a separate Article.20
VI. Article 309, is however, not such an exception. It does not
lay down any express provision which would derogate from
the amplitude of the exercise of pleasure under Article 310(1).
B It merely confers upon the appropriate legislature or executive
the power to make laws and frame rules but this power is
made subject to the provisions of the Constitution. Thus,
Article 309 is subject to Article 310(1) and any provision
restricting exercise of the pleasure of the President or
Governor in an Act or rule made or framed under Article 309
C not being an express provision of the Constitution, cannot
fall within the expression ‘Except as expressly provided by
this Constitution’ occurring in Article 310(1) and would be in
conflict with Article 310(1) and must be held to be
unconstitutional. 21
D VII. Clauses (1) and (2) of Article 311 expressly restrict the
manner in which a Government servant can be dismissed,
removed or reduced in rank and unless an Act made or rule
framed under Article 309 also conforms to these restrictions,
it would be void. The restrictions placed by clauses (1) and
E (2) of Article 311 are two- (i) with respect to the authority
empowered to dismiss or remove a Government servant
provided for in clause (1) of Article 311, and (ii) with respect
to the procedure for dismissal, removal or reduction in rank
of a Government servant provided for in clause (2).22

F (emphasis supplied)
7.2 Regardless of its origin, the doctrine of pleasure incorporated
under our constitutional scheme is to subserve an important public
purpose. In Para 44 and 45 of Tulsiram Patel (supra), this Court has
explained the purpose and object of incorporating this principle:
G “44. Ministers frame policies and Legislatures enact laws
and lay down the mode in which such policies are to be carried
out and the object of the legislation achieved. In many cases,
20
Ibid at 447.
21
Ibid at 447
22
H Ibid at 447
STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH & ORS. v. RAJ KUMAR 863
& ORS. [PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA, J.]

in a Welfare State such as ours, such policies and statutes are A
intended to bring about socio-economic reforms and the uplift
of the poor and disadvantaged classes. From the nature of
things the task of efficiently and effectively implementing these
policies and enactments, however, rests with the civil services.
The public is, therefore, vitally interested in the efficiency and
B
integrity of such services. Government servants are after all
paid from the public exchequer to which everyone contributes
either by way of direct or indirect taxes. Those who are paid
by the public and are charged with public administration for
public good must, therefore, in their turn bring to the discharge
of their duties a sense of responsibility. The efficiency of C
public administration does not depend only upon the top
echelons of these services. It depends as much upon all the
other members of such services, even on those in the most
subordinate posts. For instance, railways do not run because
of the members of the Railway Board or the General Managers
D
of different railways or the heads of different departments of
the railway administration. They run also because of engine-
drivers, firemen, signalmen, booking clerks and those holding
hundred other similar posts. Similarly, it is not the
administrative heads who alone can see to the proper
functioning of the post and telegraph service. For a service E
to run efficiently there must, therefore, be a collective sense
of responsibility. But for a Government servant to discharge
his duties faithfully and conscientiously, he must have a feeling
of security of tenure. Under our Constitution, this is provided
for by the Acts and rules made under Article 309 as also by
F
the safeguards in respect of the punishments of dismissal,
removal or reduction in rank provided in clauses (1) and (2)
of Article 311. It is, however, as much in public interest and
for public good that Government servants who are inefficient,
dishonest or corrupt or have become a security risk should
not continue in service and that the protection afforded to G
them by the Acts and rules made under Article 309 and by
Article 311 be not abused by them to the detriment of public
interest and public good. When a situation as envisaged in
one of the three clauses of the second proviso to clause (2) of
Article 311 arises and the relevant clause is properly applied
H
864 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 15 S.C.R.

A and the disciplinary inquiry dispensed with, the concerned
Government servant cannot be heard to complain that he is
deprived of his livelihood. The livelihood of an individual is
a matter of great concern to him and his family but his
livelihood is a matter of his private interest and where such
livelihood is provided by the public exchequer and the taking
B
away of such livelihood is in the public interest and for public
good, the former must yield to the latter. These consequences
follow not because the pleasure doctrine is a special
prerogative of the British Crown which has been inherited by
India and transposed into our Constitution adapted to suit
C the constitutional set-up of our Republic but because public
policy requires, public interest needs and public good demands
that there should be such a doctrine.
45. It is thus clear that the pleasure doctrine embodied in
Article 310(1), the protection afforded to civil servants by
D clauses(1) and (2) of Article 311 and the withdrawal of the
protection under clause (2) of Article 311 by the second
proviso thereto are all provided in the Constitution on the
ground of public policy and in the public interest and are for
public good.”
E 8. The principle of a public servant holding office at the pleasure
of the President or the Governor is incorporated in the Constitution
itself (under Article 310). This has a direct bearing on the powers of the
Parliament or the legislature to make Laws or the executive to make
Rules for specifying conditions of service provided under Article 309.
This position is clearly explained in the above-referred passages. In B.P.
F Singhal v. Union of India23 this Court explained the consequence of
holding the office during the pleasure of the President or the Governor:
“33. The doctrine of pleasure as originally envisaged in
England was a prerogative power which was unfettered. It
meant that the holder of an office under pleasure could be
G removed at any time, without notice, without assigning cause,
and without there being a need for any cause. But where the
rule of law prevails, there is nothing like unfettered discretion
or unaccountable action. The degree of need for reason may
vary. The degree of scrutiny during judicial review may vary.
23
H B.P. Singhal v. Union of India (2010) 6 SCC 331.
STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH & ORS. v. RAJ KUMAR 865
& ORS. [PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA, J.]

But the need for reason exists. As a result, when the A
Constitution of India provides that some offices will be held
during the pleasure of the President, without any express
limitations or restrictions, it should however necessarily be
read as being subject to the “fundamentals of
constitutionalism”.
B
9. It is in this background that the employment of a public servant
is to be understood. Though the relationship between the employee and
the State originates in contract, but by virtue of the constitutional
constraint, coupled with the legislative and executive rules governing the
service, the relation attains a unique position. Identifying such a
relationship as being a ‘status’, as against a contract, this Court in Roshan C
Lal Tandon v. Union of India 24,explained what such a ‘status’
constitutes. We have extracted hereinbelow the exposition of the concept
of ‘status’ as explained by the Constitution Bench for ready reference.
In this case, the petitioner Roshan Lal Tandon was appointed as Train-
Examiner – Grade ‘D’. At the time when he joined the service, the D
promotion to the next post in Grade ‘C’ was governed by certain rules
which later came to be amended. Questioning the amendment, he
contended that he had a right to be promoted to Grade ‘C’ when he
joined the service and such a right could not have been altered by way
of a subsequent amendment. Rejecting this argument, this Court explained
the relationship of Government employment as a ‘status’ as under: E

“6. We pass on to consider the next contention of the
petitioner that there was a contractual right as regards the
condition of service applicable to the petitioner at the time he
entered Grade ‘D’ and the condition of service could not be
altered to his disadvantage afterwards by the notification F
issued by the Railway Board. It was said that the order of the
Railway Board dated January 25, 1958, Annexure ‘B’, laid
down that promotion to Grade ‘C’ from Grade ‘D’ was to be
based on seniority-cum-suitability and this condition of service
was contractual and could not be altered thereafter to the G
prejudice of the petitioner. In our opinion, there is no warrant
for this argument. It is true that the origin of Government
service is contractual. There is an offer and acceptance in
every case. But once appointed to his post or office the
24
Roshan Lal Tandon v. Union of India (1968) 1 SCR 185. H
866 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 15 S.C.R.

A Government servant acquires a status and his rights and
obligations are no longer determined by consent of both
parties, but by statute or statutory rules which may be framed
and altered unilaterally by the Government. In other words,
the legal position of a Government servant is more one of
status than of contract. The hall-mark of status is the
B
attachment to a legal relationship of rights and duties imposed
by the public law and not by mere agreement of the parties.
The emolument of the Government servant and his terms of
service are governed by statute or statutory rules which may
be unilaterally altered by the Government without the consent
C of the employee. It is true that Article 311 imposes
constitutional restrictions upon the power of removal granted
to the President and the Governor under Article 310. Butit is
obvious that the relationship between the Government and its
servant is not like an ordinary contract of service between a
master and servant. The legal relationship is something entirely
D
different, something in the nature of status. It is much more
than a purely contractual relationship voluntarily entered into
between the parties. The duties of status are fixed by the law
and in the enforcement of these duties, society has an interest…
7. We are therefore of the opinion that the petitioner has no
E vested contractual right in regard to the terms of his service
and that Counsel for the petitioner has been unable to make
good his submission on this aspect of the case.”
10. The principle laid down in Roshan Lal Tandon’s case is
followed in a number of decisions of this Court.25 The following are the
F propositions emanating from the principles laid down in these precedents.
(i) Except as expressly provided in the Constitution, every
person employed in the civil service of the Union or the
States holds office during the pleasure of the President or
the Governor (Article 310). Tenure at pleasure is a
G constitutional policy for rendering services under the state
for public interest and for the public good, as explained in
Tulsiram Patel (supra).
25
Union of India v. Arun Kumar Roy, (1986) 1 SCC 677; Narayana v. Purushotham
(2008) 5 SCC 416; Brij Lal Mohan v. Union of India (2012) 6 SCC 502.
H
STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH & ORS. v. RAJ KUMAR 867
& ORS. [PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA, J.]

(ii) The Union and the States are empowered to make laws A
and rules under Articles 309, 310 and 311 to regulate the
recruitment, conditions of service, tenure and termination.
The rights and obligations are no longer determined by
consent of the parties but by the legal relationship of rights
and duties imposed by statute or the rules. The services,
B
thus, attain a status.
(iii) The hallmark of status is in the legal rights and obligations
imposed by laws that may be framed and altered unilaterally
by the Government without the consent of the employee.
(iv) In view of the dominance of rules that govern the C
relationship between the Government and its employee, all
matters concerning employment, conditions of service
including termination are governed by the rules. There are
no rights outside the provision of the rules.
(v) In a recruitment by State, there is no right to be appointed D
but only a right to be considered fairly. The process of
recruitment will be governed by the rules framed for the
said purpose.
(vi) Conditions of service of a public servant, including matters
of promotion and seniority are governed by the extant rules. E
There are no vested rights independent of the rules
governing the service.26
(vii) With the enactment of laws and issuance of rules governing
the services, Governments are equally bound by the mandate
of the rule. There is no power or discretion outside the F
provision of the rules governing the services and the actions
of the State are subject to judicial review.27
11. In view of the above principles, flowing from the constitutional
status of a person in employment with the State, we have no hesitation
in holding that the observations in Rangaiah that posts which fell vacant
G
prior to the amendment of Rules would be governed by old Rules
and not by new Rules do not reflect the correct position of law. We
have already explained that the status of a Government employee
26
Syed Khalid Rizivi V Union of India 1993 Supp (3) SCC 575 ;Hardev Singh v
Union of India 2011(10) SCC 121
27
Rajasthan Public Service Commission v. Chanan Ram, (1998) 4 SCC 202. H
868 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 15 S.C.R.

A involves a relationship governed exclusively by rules and that there are
no rights outside these rules that govern the services. Further, the Court
in Rangaiah’s case has not justified its observation by locating such a
right on any principle or on the basis of the new Rules.28As there are a
large number of judgments which followed Rangaiah under the
assumption that an overarching principle has been laid down in Rangaiah,
B
we have to necessarily examine the cases that followed Rangaiah. We
will now examine how subsequent decisions understood, applied or
distinguished Rangaiah.
Decisions that followed Y.V. Rangaiah & Ors. v. J. Sreenivasa
Rao
C
12.1 The first case which followed Rangaiah is P. Ganeshwar
Rao v. State of A.P.29 The Court was concerned about recruitment to
the post of Assistant Engineer governed by the special rules. 30 The
question that arose for consideration was whether the vacancies arising
in the category of Assistant Engineers before the amendment to the
D special rules were to be considered as per the amended or the unamended
rules. Having considered explanation (c) and the proviso of the special
rules which used the expression “vacancies arising in the category”,
the Court concluded that the intendment of the amended rule itself is to
fill vacancies based on the rules that existed prior to the amendment of
E the rules. This is a case that turned on the wording of the amended rule
itself. The Court observed as under:
“7. …The only question which has now to be considered is
whether the amendment made on April 28, 1980 to the Special
Rules applied only to the vacancies that arose after the date
F on which the amendment came into force or whether it applied
to the vacancies which had arisen before the said date also.
The crucial words in the Explanation which was introduced
by way of amendment in the Special Rules on April 28, 1980
were “37 1/2 per cent of the substantive vacancies arising in
the category of Assistant Engineers shall be filled by the direct
G 28
In fact, the case of Dr. K. Ramulu & Anr v. Dr. S Suryaprakash Rao(supra) is exactly
this where there was a specific requirement in the new amended rules to fill up the old
vacancies as per the new amended rules. The repealed rules had a provision for filling
up the past vacancies as per the new rules. Also, in P. Ganeshwar Rao v. State of A.P.,
1988 Supp SCC 740the intendment was to fill the vacancies as per the old rules.
29
P. Ganeshwar Rao v. State of A.P., 1988 Supp SCC 740.
H 30
AP Panchayat Raj Engineering Services (Special) Rules, 1963.
STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH & ORS. v. RAJ KUMAR 869
& ORS. [PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA, J.]

recruitment”. If the above clause had read “37 1/2 per cent A
of the substantive vacancies in the category of Assistant
Engineers shall be filled by the direct recruitment” perhaps
there would not have been much room for discussion. The
said clause then would have applied even to the vacancies
which had arisen prior to the date of the amendment but which
B
had not been filled up before that date. We feel that there is
much force in the submission made on behalf of the appellants
and the State Government that the introduction of the word
“arising” in the above clause made it applicable only to those
vacancies which came into existence subsequent to the date
of amendment.” C
12.2 The decision, in this case, is based on the position of the
amended rule. Even in this case, the Court has not identified any general
principle of vested right of a public servant to be considered for vacancies
arising prior to the amendment of the rules. Without any analysis, the
Court observed that the principle as laid down in Rangaiah is applicable D
and proceeded with the interpretation of the new rules.
13.1 N.T. Devin Katti v. Karnataka Public Service
Commission31, is a case concerning appointment to the post of Tehsildar,
a selection post governed under 1975 Rules32, to be filled from in-service
candidates. While the advertisement was issued in May 1975, the E
procedure for selection of candidates by following the rules of reservation
in favour of SC/ST candidates was brought into force on 09 July 1975.
The Court held that as the advertisement expressly stated that the
selection shall be made in accordance with the existing rules, the
candidates who have appeared in the written test and have undergone
viva voce acquired a vested right for being considered for selection in F
terms of the advertisement. The Court held that, as the rules have no
retrospective effect, the recruitment process cannot be affected. It is in
this context, that the Court referred to the case of Rangaiah and P.
Ganeshwar Rao. The Court also relied on Calton33 which was related
to the appointment for the post of Principal under the U.P. Intermediate G
Education Act, 1921, and Mahenderan’s34 case which was related to

31
N.T. Devin Katti v. Karnataka Public Service Commission, (1990) 3 SCC 157.
32
Karnataka Administrative Services (Tehsildars) Recruitment (Special) Rules, 1975.
33
A.A. Calton v. Director of Education and Anr (1983) 3 SCC 33.
34
P. Mahendran and Ors v. State of Karnataka (1990) 1 SCC 411.
H
870 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 15 S.C.R.

A the recruitment process for direct appointment to the post of Motor Vehicle
Inspector. Changes made to the rules after the issuance of the
advertisement was the question under consideration. The Court observed:
“11. There is yet another aspect of the question. Where
advertisement is issued inviting applications for direct
B recruitment to a category of posts, and the advertisement
expressly states that selection shall be made in accordance
with the existing rules or Government orders, and if it further
indicates the extent of reservations in favour of various
categories, the selection of candidates in such a case must be
made in accordance with the then existing rules and
C Government orders. Candidates who apply, and undergo
written or viva voce test acquire vested right for being
considered for selection in accordance with the terms and
conditions contained in the advertisement, unless the
advertisement itself indicates a contrary intention. Generally,
D a candidate has right to be considered in accordance with
the terms and conditions set out in the advertisement as his
right crystallises on the date of publication of advertisement,
however he has no absolute right in the matter. If the
recruitment Rules are amended retrospectively during the
pendency of selection, in that event selection must be held in
E accordance with the amended Rules. Whether the Rules have
retrospective effect or not, primarily depends upon the
language of the Rules and its construction to ascertain the
legislative intent. The legislative intent is ascertained either
by express provision or by necessary implication; if the
F amended Rules are not retrospective in nature the selection
must be regulated in accordance with the rules and orders
which were in force on the date of advertisement.
Determination of this question largely depends on the facts
of each case having regard to the terms and conditions set
out in the advertisement and the relevant rules and orders.
G Lest there be any confusion, we would like to make it clear
that a candidate on making application for a post pursuant
to an advertisement does not acquire any vested right of
selection, but if he is eligible and is otherwise qualified in
accordance with the relevant rules and the terms contained
H in the advertisement, he does acquire a vested right of being
STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH & ORS. v. RAJ KUMAR 871
& ORS. [PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA, J.]

considered for selection in accordance with the rules as they A
existed on the date of advertisement. He cannot be deprived
of that limited right on the amendment of rules during the
pendency of selection unless the amended rules are
retrospective in nature.”
13.2 This case concerns appointment to the post pursuant to an B
advertisement prescribing certain qualifications. Candidates who have
applied on the basis of such qualifications have a right to be considered
on the basis of the advertisement and such a right cannot be taken away
without making a retrospective amendment to rules is the ratio of this
case. The issue involved in this case is different from the one confronting
us. The case does not throw much light on the issue involved in the C
present case.
14. In State of Rajasthan v. R. Dayal35, selection for 9 existing
vacancies which were to be filled by the Rajasthan Service of Engineers
(Building and Roads Branch) Rules 1954 was in question. In a short
order, relying on Rangaiah, this Court observed that vacancies existing D
prior to the amendment of the rules are required to be filled in accordance
with the law existing as on the date when the vacancies arose. It was
held:
“6. As a consequence, any appointment made as on that date
should be consistent with the above Rule. In support thereof, E
he placed reliance on the decision of this Court in Y.V.
Rangaiah v. J. Sreenivasa Rao.
…
8. Therefore, it is not in dispute and cannot be disputed that F
while selecting officers, minimum requisite qualifications and
experience for promotion specified in the relevant column,
should be taken into consideration against vacancies existing
as on 1st April of the year of selection. But since the Rules
came to be amended and the amendment became effective
with immediate effect and clause (11-B) of Rule 24-A indicates G
that options have been given to the Government or the
Appointing Authority, as the case may be, to revise the select
list as existing as per the law as on the date of the appointment
or as may be directed by a competent court, selection is
35
State of Rajasthan v. R. Dayal (1997) 10 SCC 419. H
872 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 15 S.C.R.

A required to be made by the concerned DPC. An appointment
made, after selection as per the procedure, to the vacancies
existing prior to the amendment, is valid. But the question is
whether selection would be made, in the case of appointment
to the vacancies which admittedly arose after the amendment
of the Rules came into force, according to the amended Rules
B
or in terms of Rule 9 read with Rules 23 and 24-A, as
mentioned hereinbefore. This Court has considered the similar
question in para 9 of the judgment above-cited. This Court
has specifically laid that the vacancies which occurred prior
to the amendment of the Rules would be governed by the
C original Rules and not by the amended Rules. Accordingly,
this Court had held that the posts which fell vacant prior to
the amendment of the Rules would be governed by the original
Rules and not the amended Rules. As a necessary corollary,
the vacancies that arose subsequent to the amendment of the
Rules are required to be filled in in accordance with the law
D
existing as on the date when the vacancies arose. Undoubtedly,
the selection came to be made prior to the amendment of the
Rules in accordance with law then existing since the
anticipated vacancies also must have been taken into
consideration in the light of Rule 9 of the Rules. But after the
E amended Rules came into force, necessarily the amended Rules
would be required to be applied for and given effect to. But,
unfortunately, that has not been done in the present case.
The two courses are open to the Government or the Appointing
Authority, viz., either to make temporary promotions for the
ensuing financial year until the DPC meets or in exercise of
F
the power under Rule 24-A(11-B), they can revise the panel
already prepared in accordance with the Rules and make
appointments in accordance therewith.”
15.1 In B.L Gupta v. M.C.D.36, appointment to the post of Assistant
Accountant of DESU under MCD was under consideration. These posts
G were to be filled in accordance with the statutory rules framed in 1978
which provided for an examination. 171 vacancies arose for the said
posts in 1993. Only 79 persons who appeared in the examination were
appointed. Writ petitions were filed in the High Court of Delhi praying
36
B.L.Guptav. M.C.D (1998) 9 SCC 223.
H
STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH & ORS. v. RAJ KUMAR 873
& ORS. [PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA, J.]

for all 171 vacancies to be filled as per the examination. During the A
pendency of the writ petitions, the rules were amended in 1995 which
provided that 80% of the posts to be filled by promotion and the remaining
20% by examination. The High Court while deciding these writ petitions
held that 79 posts were validly filled and the remaining vacancies were
to be filled as per the amended rules. The question was whether the
B
remaining vacancies are to be filled as per the amended rules or the
unamended rules. Allowing the appealsthe Court held:
“9. When the statutory rules had been framed in 1978, the
vacancies had to be filled only according to the said Rules.
The Rules of 1995 have been held to be prospective by the
High Court and in our opinion this was the correct conclusion. C
This being so, the question which arises is whether the
vacancies which had arisen earlier than 1995 can be filled
as per the 1995 Rules. Our attention has been drawn by Mr
Mehta to a decision of this Court in the case of N.T. Devin
Katti v. Karnataka Public Service Commission [(1990) 3 SCC D
157]. In that case after referring to the earlier decisions in
the cases of Y.V. Rangaiah v. J. Sreenivasa Rao [(1983) 3
SCC 284] , P. Ganeshwar Rao v. State of A.P. [1988 Supp
SCC 740] and A.A. Calton v. Director of Education [(1983)
3 SCC 33] it was held by this Court that the vacancies which
had occurred prior to the amendment of the Rules would be E
governed by the old Rules and not by the amended Rules.
Though the High Court has referred to these judgments, but
for the reasons which are not easily decipherable its
applicability was only restricted to 79 and not 171 vacancies,
which admittedly existed. This being the correct legal position, F
the High Court ought to have directed the respondent to
declare the results for 171 posts of Assistant Accountants and
not 79 which it had done.
10. …The Rules of 1978 prescribe the mode in which the
promotions can be made. This mode has to be followed before G
the appointments could be made. If no statutory rules had
existed, it may have been possible, though we express no
opinion on it, that the existing incumbents may have been
regularised. Where, however, statutory rules exist, the
appointments and promotions have to be made in accordance
H
874 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 15 S.C.R.

A with the statutory rules specially where it has not been shown
to us that the Rules gave the power to the appointing authority
of relaxing the said Rules. In the absence of any such power
of relaxation, the appointment as Assistant Accountant could
only be made by requiring the candidates to take the
examination which was the method which was prescribed by
B
the 1978 Rules.”
15.2 In this short judgment, the Court proceeded on the premise
that Rangaiah and the subsequent decisions such as N.T. Devin Katti
held that vacancies occurring prior to the amendment should be governed
by the old rules. There is neither a discussion on the Constitutional position,
C nor is there a reference to the principle governing service conditions of
a Government servant as laid down in Roshan Lal Tandon’s case. Suffice
to say that the Court has in its order referred to and followed Rangaiah.
This is the fourth case which has merely followed Rangaiah without
examining the principle.
D 16.1 In Arjun Singh Rathore v. B.N. Chaturvedi,37 the Court
followed Rangaiah in its short order. The case related to promotion to
the post of Area Managers or Senior Managers under the relevant Rules
of 1988. While 15 vacancies were available for promotion, the rules
came to be amended in 1998. Reversing the decision of the High Court,
E this Court observed that the vacancies had to be filled as per the vacancies
that existed prior to the amendment of the rules under which the process
of interviews and selection had already taken place.The Court followed
Rangaiah and observed:
“6. The above legal position has not been seriously disputed
F by the learned counsel for Respondents 6 and 7. We are
therefore of the opinion that the vacancies which had occurred
prior to the enforcement of the Rules of 1998 had to be filled
in under the Rules of 1988 and as per the procedure laid
down therein...”

G 16.2 It is only to ensure a detailed analysis and review of the
decisions that have followed Rangaiah that we are referring to each of
these judgments. We notice that the follow up cases have simply referred
to Rangaiah when the Court felt that the selection process must be as
per the rules which existed prior to the amendment. None of these cases
37
H Arjun Singh Rathore v. B.N. Chaturvedi, (2007) 11 SCC 605.
STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH & ORS. v. RAJ KUMAR 875
& ORS. [PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA, J.]

recognise the existence of any vested right, nor do they referred to A
Constitutional position or the principle laid down in Roshan Lal Tandon’s
case.
17.1 In State of Bihar v. Mithilesh Kumar,38 the Court was
concerned with the appointment to the posts of Instructors and Assistant
Instructors as per an advertisement published on 30.12.2001. Pursuant B
to the advertisement, the writ petitioner applied and was called for an
interview on 09.11.2002. Thereafter, on 14.11.2002, instructions were
issued not to send any further recommendations to the said post as the
scheme under which the appointments to the post were called for was
no longer valid. The respondent therein was declared successful in the
interview but was not appointed and therefore he approached the Court. C
While upholding the decision of the High Court and dismissing the appeal,
this Court following Rangaiah held:
“14. The learned counsel submitted that the conditions of the
advertisement inviting applications for filling up the posts of
Assistant Instructor (Electronics) in Kamla Nehru Social D
Service Institute for Handicapped and Rehabilitation Training
Centre, Patna, could not have been altered to the prejudice
of the respondent on account of a decision taken subsequently
to have persons with disabilities trained by professionally
established NGOs/institutions. Reliance was placed on the E
decision of this Court in Y.V. Rangaiah v. J. Sreenivasa Rao,
where this Court in similar circumstances had held that when
service rules are amended, vacancies which had occurred
prior to the amended Rules would be governed by the old
Rules and not by the amended Rules.
F
…..
23. While a person may not acquire an indefeasible right to
appointment merely on the basis of selection, in the instant
case the fact situation is different since the claim of the
respondent to be appointed had been negated by a change in G
policy after the selection process had begun.”
17.2 This is a case of selection by way of an advertisement and
not promotion of a Government servant from a post held by him. The
Court observed that the terms of the advertisement could not have been
38
State of Bihar v. Mithilesh Kumar (2010) 13 SCC 467. H
876 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 15 S.C.R.

A altered to the prejudice of the respondent on the basis of a decision
taken subsequently. There was no occasion for the Court to consider
the status of a public servant in the context of rules governing his service.
18. In Kulwant Singh v. Daya Ram39, the Punjab Police Rules,
1934 dealt with the promotion of Constables to the post of Head
B Constables. The 1982 amendment to the Rule 13.7 mandated that
constables considered for promotion to be sent to a promotional course
on the basis of seniority-cum-merit. A batch of 15 constables was selected
on the basis of the 1982 rules and was sent for the course in April 1988.
Thereafter, 71 vacancies arose and another amendment to the rule in
1988 was made which provided for sending constables to the promotional
C course on merit-cum-seniority basis. The issue arose when the Senior
Superintendent of Police issued a letter to the effect that new rules
would apply to the said promotions. Interdicting the decision and reiterating
the decision of the Tribunal which followed Rangaiah and the subsequent
decisions referred to in paras 38 to 41, the Court observed:-
D “41. In B.L. Gupta [B.L. Gupta v. MCD, (1998) 9 SCC 223]
the Court reiterated the principle stated in Y.V. Rangaiah [Y.V.
Rangaiah v. J. Sreenivasa Rao, (1983) 3 SCC 284] , P.
Ganeshwar Rao [P. Ganeshwar Rao v. State of A.P., 1988
Supp SCC 740] and A.A. Calton v. Director of
E Education [(1983) 3 SCC 33] wherein it had been held that
the vacancies which had occurred prior to the amendment of
rules were governed by the old rules and not by the amended
rules. In Arjun Singh Rathore [Arjun Singh Rathore v. B.N.
Chaturvedi, (2007) 11 SCC 605] the views stated in Y.V.
Rangaiah [Y.V. Rangaiah v. J. Sreenivasa Rao, (1983) 3 SCC
F 284] and R. Dayal [State of Rajasthan v. R. Dayal, (1997)
10 SCC 419] were reiterated.
42. The reference to the aforesaid proposition of law makes it
vivid that the decision rendered by the Tribunal in Acchhar
Chandcase was in accordance with the precedent of this Court
G and, in fact the Tribunal clearly meant that.”
19.1 In Richa Mishra v. State of Chhattisgarh40, the issue related
to appointment to the post of DSP. The State Government sent a

39
Kulwant Singh v. Daya Ram, (2015) 3 SCC 177.
40
H Richa Mishra v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2016) 4 SCC 179.
STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH & ORS. v. RAJ KUMAR 877
& ORS. [PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA, J.]

requisition for filling up various vacancies including the post of DSP in A
accordance with the 2000 Rules. Thereafter, the Chhattisgarh Police
Executive (Gazetted) Service Recruitment and Promotion Rules, 2005
were published. The appellant therein participated in the selection process
and she qualified at each stage. However, her name was still not included
in the list of successful candidates since the 2000 Rules provided that
B
the upper age limit for appointment to the post of DSP was 25 years and
she had already crossed the said age limit and therefore was ineligible
for the post in question. The question that arose for consideration was
whether the 2000 rules or the 2005 rules would apply. Having examined
the requisition for appointment, which was made prior to the advent of
the new rules and further applying the principle of Rangaiah the Court C
observed as under:
“18. The High Court held that the first and second requisitions
to commence recruitment process against the vacant seats to
the post of DSP were made when the 2000 Rules were in force.
Therefore, recruitment was rightly undertaken under the 2000 D
Rules. The admitted facts are that the process of selection
started before the 2005 Rules were promulgated with the
requisitions dated 27-9-2004 and 26-3-2005 sent by the State
Government to CPSC. At that time, the 2000 Rules were in
vogue. For this reason, even in the requisition it was mentioned
that appointments are to be made under the 2000 Rules. E
Further, it is also an admitted fact that the vacancies in
question which were to be filled were for the period prior to
2005. Such vacancies needed to be filled in as per those Rules
i.e. the 2000 Rules. This is patent legal position which can be
discerned from Y.V. Rangaiah v. J. Sreenivasa Rao [Y.V. F
Rangaiah v. J. Sreenivasa Rao, (1983) 3 SCC 284]….”
19.2 As is evident from the above, this decision also applied
Rangaiah in the context of the facts and without any reference to the
Constitutional position of the employment of a Government servant and
the principle laid down in Roshan Lal Tandon’s case. G
Analysis:
20.1 Except in the case of P. Ganeshwar Rao, which not only
followed Rangaiah but also observed that the new Rules enabled the
vacancies to be filled as per the Rules that existed prior to the amendment,
H
878 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 15 S.C.R.

A all the other judgments adopted the principle in Rangaiah and directed
appointments to be made as per the rules that existed when the vacancies
arose. These cases do not discuss any source of such a right of a
Government employee. There is also no reference to any rule, be it old
or new, to enable effectuation of such a right. None of these cases refer
to constitutional position of status or the principle laid down in Roshan
B
Lal Tandon’s case.
20.2 We will now discuss cases that have distinguished Rangaiah.
These decisions adopt different reasons for not following the principle
laid down in Rangaiah.
C Decisions that have distinguished Rangaiah’scase:
21. In Union of India v. S.S. Uppal41 the respondent therein
was being considered for absorption to IAS for a vacancy that arose in
01.02.1989. The Indian Administrative Services (Regulation of Seniority)
Rules, 1987 were amended on 03.02.1989. The respondent who was
D appointed on 15.02.1989 claimed that his seniority must be calculated
from the date on which the vacancy arose, i.e., 01.02.1989 and for this
purpose he relied on the decision in Rangaiah and that was accepted by
the Tribunal. Reversing the decision of the Tribunal, this Court held that
Rangaiah has no application at all. Further, relying on the decision in
Shankarshan Dash v. Union of India42, which held that the existence
E of a vacancy does not give rise to a legal right to a selected candidate,
the Court held as under:
“15. The facts in the case before us are entirely different.
There has been no infraction of any rule or violation of any
instruction issued by the Government. Respondent 1 has not
F been able to point out any violation of rules or regulations
on the part of the Government by which he was prejudicially
affected.
….
17. …He was actually inducted into the service on 15-2-1989.
G
The rules which were in force on that day for determination
of seniority will clearly apply to his case. It is true that Uppal’s
name was included in a panel drawn up sometime in August
41
Union of India v. S.S. Uppal, (1996) 2 SCC 168.
42
Shankarshan Dash v. Union of India (1991) 3 SCC 47.
H
STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH & ORS. v. RAJ KUMAR 879
& ORS. [PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA, J.]

1988. But mere inclusion of his name in the panel did not A
confer upon him any right to automatic appointment to the
IAS. Nor can it be said that he was to be treated as to have
been appointed from the date when a suitable post fell vacant.
… The seniority of an officer appointed into the IAS is
determined according to the seniority rules applicable on the
B
date of appointment to the IAS. Weightage in seniority cannot
be given retrospective effect unless it was specifically provided
in the rule in force at the material time…”
22. State Bank of India v. Kashinath Kher 43 is again a case
where the employee relied on the principle in Rangaiah to contend that
promotion to the post of Middle Management Grade Scale- II is to be C
made on the basis of vacancies that arose in 1988, 1989 and 1990 without
applying the new policy that came into effect from 1990. In the first
place, this is a case involving service under the State Bank of India, not
being a service under the State governed by laws or rules made under
Article 309. However, as we are considering the principle laid down in D
Rangaiah and also the decisions that followed and dissented it, we have
examined this case. It is interesting to note that the learned Judges
assumed that Rangaiah’s case considered a question of “retrospective
application of therule to the vacancies existing prior to the rules”. In
fact, Rangaiah does not observe anything like that and we would leave
it at this. This Court observed: E

“14. The learned counsel for the respondents is not right in
contending that the vacancies have arisen in 1988, 1989 and
1990 and that the rule of relaxation cannot be given in 1990
to the vacancies that have arisen in 1988, 1989 and 1990
and be considered according to the rules in vogue when the F
vacancies had arisen. It is seen that the policy decision was
taken for the first time on 21-3-1990 effective from 1-8-1988.
In other words, the promotions are required to be considered
retrospectively in the light of the decision to fill up the
vacancies existing as on August 1988. Therefore, it is not a G
case of applying a rule which was made later to a vacancy
which was existing anterior thereto. Equally, it is not correct
to state that this principle is an unjust principle. It is true that
this Court in Y.V. Rangaiah v. J. Sreenivasa Rao [(1983) 3
43
State Bank of India v. Kashinath Kher (1996) 8 SCC 762. H
880 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 15 S.C.R.

A SCC 284] had considered the question of retrospective
application of the rule to the vacancies existing prior to the
rules, in paragraphs 7 and 8 of the judgment. But in that
case, the rule was in vogue for Sub-Registrars Grade II in
Registration Department of Andhra Pradesh. But no list was
prepared, promotion was not made according to the existing
B
rules. The list of eligible candidates was prepared according
to the amended Rules, consequential to the zonal system
introduced in Andhra Pradesh under Article 371-D of the
Constitution and Presidential Order. It was held that the
vacancies that had arisen prior to making the amendment to
C the Rules should be filled in accordance with the rules that
were in vogue prior to the amendment and vacancies that
arose subsequently should be filled according to the amended
Rules. That situation does not apply to the factual matrix.”
23.1 K.Ramuluv. S. Suryaprakash Rao44, is an important decision.
D The issue related to applicability of the A.P. Animal Husbandry Services
Rules, 1996(which repealed the existing 1977 rules) to vacancies that
arose before the 1996 amendment to the promotional post of Assistant
Director. Under Rule 4,the Government was to prepare and operate the
panel for the year 1995-96 for promotion to the said post. However, a
conscious decision was taken in 1988 by the Government not to fill up
E any vacancies until the repealed rules were duly amended. In light of
this, the Government did not prepare and finalise the panel for promotion
to the post of Assistant Veterinary Surgeons to Assistant Director for
the year 1995-96. It was held that:
“12. …But the question is whether the ratio in Rangaiah case
F would apply to the facts of this case. The Government therein
merely amended the Rules, applied the amended Rules without
taking any conscious decision not to fill up the existing
vacancies pending amendment of the Rules on the date the
new Rules came into force. It is true, as contended by Mr
G H.S. Gururaja Rao, that this Court has followed the ratio
therein in many a decision and those cited by him are P.
Ganeshwar Rao v. State of A.P., P. Mahendran v. State of
Karnataka, A.A. Calton v. Director of Education, N.T. Devin
Katti v. Karnataka Public Service Commission, Ramesh Kumar
44
H K. Ramulu v. S. Suryaprakash Rao (1997) 3 SCC 59.
STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH & ORS. v. RAJ KUMAR 881
& ORS. [PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA, J.]

Choudha v. State of M.P. In none of these decisions, a A
situation which has arisen in the present case had come up
for consideration.
13. It is seen that since the Government have taken a conscious
decision not to make any appointment till the amendment of
the Rules, Rule 3 of the General Rules is not of any help to B
the respondent...
….
15. Thus, we hold that the first respondent has not acquired
any vested right for being considered for promotion in
accordance with the repealed Rules in view of the policy C
decision taken by the Government which we find is justifiable
on the material available from the record placed before us.
We hold that the Tribunal was not right and correct in directing
the Government to prepare and operate the panel for
promotion to the post of Assistant Directors of Animal D
Husbandry Department in accordance with the repealed Rules
and to operate the same.”
23.2 This judgment clearly recognises the principle that a policy
decision taken by the Government in public interest would prevail over
any claim to fill up the vacancies. Further, when such a decision is taken, E
the employee has no vested right for being considered for promotion in
accordance with repealed rules.
24.1 In Rajasthan Public Service Commission v. Chanan Ram45
an advertisement for direct recruitment to 23 posts of Assistant Director
(Junior) under Rules, 198646 was released on 05.11.1993. The respondent
F
therein applied in pursuance of the said advertisement. Further, the last
date for applying in pursuance of this advertisement was 31.12.1993.
However, on 28.12.1993, three days prior to the last date for applications,
the State Government asked the RPSC not to proceed with the
recruitments. Thereafter, on 19.04.1995, the rules were amended and
consequently, the aforementioned advertisement was cancelled. Another G
consequence of the amendment was that the post of Assistant Director
(Junior) was abolished and restructured as Marketing Officer. A fresh
advertisement for 26 posts of Marketing Officer was released and the
45
Rajasthan Public Service Commission v. Chanan Ram, (1998) 4 SCC 202.
46
Rajasthan Agricultural Marketing Services Rules, 1986. H
882 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 15 S.C.R.

A 23 posts, in respect of which the advertisement was issued, were carried
forward. The respondent successfully contended before the High Court
that the recruitment must be based on the rules that existed at the time
of vacancies by relying on the decision on Rangaiah and the subsequent
cases that followed it. Rejecting the argument and allowing the appeal
this Court held:
B
“15…..On the contrary a three-Judge Bench judgment of this
Court in the case of Jai Singh Dalal v. State of Haryana would
squarely get attracted on the facts of the present case. A.M.
Ahmadi J., speaking for the three-Judge Bench in para 7 of
the Report relying on an earlier judgment of this Court in
C case of State of Haryana v. Subash Chander Marwaha laid
down that when the special process of recruitment had not
been finalised and culminated into select list the candidate
did not have any right to appointment. In this connection, it
was observed that the recruitment process could be stopped
D by the Government at any time before a candidate has been
appointed. A candidate has no vested right to get the process
completed and at the most the Government could be required
to justify its action on the touchstone of Article 14 of the
Constitution.

E 16.In the facts of the present case it cannot even be suggested
that the action of the State of Rajasthan was in any way
arbitrary in intercepting the earlier recruitment process
pursuant to the first advertisement dated 05-11-1993 Annexure
P-1 as the Rules themselves had got amended and the posts
earlier advertised had ceased to exist.”
F 24.2 As is evident from the above, after referring to the decisions
in Rangaiah, P. Ganeshwar and other decisions, the Court adopted the
principle that the State has a right to stop a recruitment process at any
time before the appointment takes place. This is to say that there is no
vested right to get the process completed. This is important for the reason
G that while it holds that there is no right of an employee, it recognises the
obligation of a State to justify its action on the touchstone of the Article
14 of the Constitution.
25.1 In G. Venkateshwara Rao v. Union of India47 the appellant
therein expected appointment by promotion against a vacancy that arose
47
H G. Venkateshwara Rao v. Union of India (1999) 8 SCC 455.
STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH & ORS. v. RAJ KUMAR 883
& ORS. [PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA, J.]

in 1991, being the very next candidate on the panel. However, the proposal A
remained pending till 1993 and in the meanwhile cadre restructuring
took place and as a result of which another candidate became eligible to
be appointed. Relying on Rangaiah he contended that vacancies must
be filled as per the rules that existed prior to the restructuring. Rejecting
the argument, the Court observed as under:
B
“4….the learned advocate appearing in support of this appeal
reiterated the same contentions and urged that the view taken
by CAT, Hyderabad is erroneous and cannot be sustained.
While dealing with the first contention, he urged that if the
Railway Board were to take the decision expeditiously, the
appellant could have been accommodated on such dereserved C
vacancy. He urged that there was no impediment in taking
the decision of dereservation and it was merely an inaction
on the part of the Railway Board which had deprived the
appellant of being appointed against the vacancy. We do not
set any substance in this contention because nothing has been D
pointed out to us from the record which would justify this
contention. The learned counsel for the appellant drew our
attention to the decision of this Court in Y.V. Rangaiah v. J.
Sreenivasa Rao [(1983) 3 SCC 284 : 1983 SCC (L&S) 382]
and in particular, he relied upon paras 4 and 9. We have
gone through the judgment and in our opinion, the ratio E
thereof has no application. It was a case dealing with delay
in preparing panel for promotional cadre under the then
existing rules which were substituted by new rules. The panel
was prepared under the new rules.
5. Coming to the second contention as regards restructuring F
of the cadre, it is quite clear that the restructuring appears to
have been made for the efficient working in the Workshop
Unit. We, therefore, do not see any substance in this
contention.”
25.2 While distinguishing Rangaiah’s principle this Court
G
recognised yet another factor on the basis of which the Government
need not fill up the vacancies as per the old rules. The reason mentioned
in this case is restructuring the cadre. While upholding the contention
that restructuring is undertaken for efficient working of the unit, this
Court justified the decision of the Government not to fill up the vacancies
as per the principle in Rangaiah. H
884 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 15 S.C.R.

A 26.1 In Delhi Judicial Services Association v. Delhi High
Court,48 the Court formulated the issue as, “in view of the submission
made at the Bar, the first question that requires consideration is
whether the temporary posts having been created prior to the
amendment of Rules, is it the law that require those posts to be filled
up only in accordance with the unamended Rules and not
B
otherwise?”Rejecting the contention and distinguishing Rangaiah on
the facts of the case, the Court held as under:
“5… In Rangaiah case [(1983) 3 SCC 284] this Court on a
consideration of the relevant rules as well as the instructions
issued by the Government, came to hold that a list of approved
C candidates was required to be prepared as of 1-9-1976 for
making appointments to the grade of Sub-Registrar Grade II
by transfer, but no such list having been prepared and instead,
the same having been drawn up in 1977, by which time the
amended rules had come into force, it was held that the
D legitimate right and expectations of those who were entitled
to be included in the list which ought to have been prepared
in September 1976 cannot be frustrated on account of the
fact that the panel had not been prepared and it was so
prepared only in the year 1977. It is on this conclusion, the
Court had held that the vacancies available prior to 1-9-1976
E ought to be filled up under the unamended rules. The aforesaid
decision will have no application to the case in hand inasmuch
as in the Delhi Higher Judicial Service there is no requirement
of preparation of any panel or list of candidates eligible for
promotion by any particular date. Then again, merely because
F posts were created under Rule 16, it was not obligatory for
the appointing authority to fill up those posts immediately…”
26.2 This decision recognised yet another exception to the
application of the principle in Rangaiah case. Court held that even if
vacancies were created prior to the amendment of the Rules, there is no
G obligation upon the authorities to fill those vacancies immediately. The
decision made direct inroads into the principle of Rangaiah.
27.1 In Shyama Charan Dash v. State of Orissa49 the appellant
therein was working as a Block Level Extension Officer which is a
48
Delhi Judicial Services Assn. v. Delhi High Court, (2001) 5 SCC 145.
49
H Shyama Charan Dash v. State of Orissa, (2003) 4 SCC 218.
STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH & ORS. v. RAJ KUMAR 885
& ORS. [PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA, J.]

feeder category to the post of Sub-Assistant Registrar. While he was A
eligible to be appointed to the vacancies in the post of Sub-Registrar, the
rules came to be amended in 1991 reducing his chances to be appointed.
Relying on Rangaiah he contended that the vacancies that arose prior
to the amendment must be filled as per the rules existing prior to the
amendment.This Court held that:
B
“5. It is appropriate at this stage to make reference to some of
the decisions relied upon by the learned counsel on either
side. Y.V. Rangaiah v. J. Sreenivasa Rao [(1983) 3 SCC 284]
being a case where not only there was omission to prepare
the promotion panel in time as per rules then in force but the
amended rules dispensed with the original provision for C
considering LDCs along with UDCs for promotion, adversely
affecting their promotional prospects, has no application to
the case on hand…
….
D
9. …As long as the IPOs, as a class or category, are rendered
eligible even from 1986 and that is not challenged, the
differences, if any, existing and based on the scales of pay
among them, when resolved to be done away with in the
undoubted exercise of its power by the State, as a matter of
policy, cannot be legitimately challenged by the appellants E
merely because due to the enlargement of the horizon of
consideration resulting therefrom, the chances of consideration
for promotion of Industrial Supervisors become diminished.
The reasons, which weighed with the State Government in
doing so, are found to be genuine, real and substantive and F
meant to do substantial justice to all categories or grades of
posts equated for purposes of Rule 7 of the Rules. The fact
that in different proceedings where claim for identical scales
of pay came to be contested by the Government or rejected
by the Tribunal, is no justification to countenance the claim
of the appellants in these proceedings inasmuch as the criteria G
to be applied in dealing with such claims are totally different
or, at any rate, may be one only among several requirements
to be satisfied. Consequently, the challenge on behalf of the
appellants has no merit whatsoever and shall stand rejected.”
H
886 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 15 S.C.R.

A 27.2 This is again a case where the Court upheld the decision of
the Government not to fill up the vacancies as per the old rules. The
decision of the Government was upheld because the Court found that
the policy decision is genuine, real and substantive and meant to do
substantial justice to all categories or grades of posts equated for the
purpose of Rule 7.These decisions demonstrate that this Court never
B
applied the principle in Rangaiah’s case when the policy decision of the
Government required amendment of rules for a justifiable reason.
28.1 In State of Punjab v. Arun Kumar Aggarwal,50 the second
issue in the casewas “whether the old 1941 Rules or the new 2004
Rules, which became effective from 09.07.2004 will be applied for
C filling up the vacancies which arose during 2000-2001 under the
old 2001 Rules for promotion to the post of SDO in the State of
Punjab”. The respondents therein contended that they have an
indefeasible right to be promoted to the post of SDO as per the decision
in Rangaiah case. Rejecting the argument, the Court held as under:-
D “30. There is no quarrel over the proposition of law that normal
rule is that the vacancy prior to the new Rules would be
governed by the old Rules and not by the new Rules. However,
in the present case, we have already held that the Government
has taken conscious decision not to fill the vacancy under
E the old Rules and that such decision has been validly taken
keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case.
…..
35. All the decisions referred to above are related to
amendment of the Rules. We have already held that the 1941
F Rules were repealed by the 2004 Rules. The facts of those
cases are, therefore, not applicable to the facts of the present
case.
…..
38. We hold that the Government has taken a conscious
G
decision not to fill up the posts under the old 1941 Rules. The
impugned order of the High Court is set aside. We may at this
stage point out that the problem seems to have been
compounded by the inaction/casual approach of the
50
State of Punjab v. Arun Kumar Aggarwal (2007) 10 SCC 402.
H
STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH & ORS. v. RAJ KUMAR 887
& ORS. [PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA, J.]

Government detrimental to public interest. The State A
Government shall now fill up the vacant posts in accordance
with the 2004 Rules within a period of three months from today.
All the eligible candidates who satisfy the criteria laid down
under the 2004 Rules shall be considered. The entire process
of recommendation and appointment shall be completed within
B
three months from today.”
28.2 This is yet another case where deviating from Rangaiah’s
principle this Court recognized the decision of the Government not to fill
the vacancies arising prior to the amendment as per the old rules for the
reason that there is a conscious decision of the Government.
C
29.1 In Deepak Agarwal v. State of U.P.51, the question arose
as to whether the appellants therein were entitled to be considered for
promotion to the post of Deputy Excise Commissioner under the U.P.
Excise Group ‘A’ Service Rules, 1983. The prayer was for consideration
to the vacancies which occurred prior to the amendment of 1999 Rules.
Reliance was placed on Rangaiah which was rejected. The Court D
observed as under:-
“24. We are of the considered opinion that the judgment in
Y.V. Rangaiah case would not be applicable in the facts and
circumstances of this case. The aforesaid judgment was
rendered on the interpretation of Rule 4(a)(1)(i) of the Andhra E
Pradesh Registration and Subordinate Service Rules, 1976.
The aforesaid Rule provided for preparation of a panel for
the eligible candidates every year in the month of September.
This was a statutory duty cast upon the State. The exercise
was required to be conducted each year. Thereafter, only F
promotion orders were to be issued. However, no panel had
been prepared for the year 1976. Subsequently, the Rule was
amended, which rendered the petitioners therein ineligible to
be considered for promotion. In these circumstances, it was
observed by this Court that the amendment would not be
applicable to the vacancies which had arisen prior to the G
amendment. The vacancies which occurred prior to the
amended Rules would be governed by the old Rules and not
the amended Rules.
51
Deepak Agarwal v. State of U.P., (2011) 6 SCC 725.
H
888 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 15 S.C.R.

A 25. In the present case, there is no statutory duty cast upon
the respondents to either prepare a yearwise panel of the
eligible candidates or of the selected candidates for promotion.
In fact, the proviso to Rule 2 enables the State to keep any
post unfilled. Therefore, clearly there is no statutory duty
which the State could be mandated to perform under the
B
applicable Rules. The requirement to identify the vacancies
in a year or to take a decision as to how many posts are to be
filled under Rule 7 cannot be equated with not issuing
promotion orders to the candidates duly selected for
promotion. In our opinion, the appellants had not acquired
C any right to be considered for promotion. Therefore, it is
difficult to accept the submissions of Dr. Rajeev Dhavan that
the vacancies, which had arisen before 17-5-1999 had to be
filled under the unamended Rules.
26. It is by now a settled proposition of law that a candidate
D has the right to be considered in the light of the existing rules,
which implies the “rule in force” on the date the consideration
took place. There is no rule of universal or absolute
application that vacancies are to be filled invariably by the
law existing on the date when the vacancy arises. The
requirement of filling up old vacancies under the old rules is
E interlinked with the candidate having acquired a right to be
considered for promotion. The right to be considered for
promotion accrues on the date of consideration of the eligible
candidates. Unless, of course, the applicable rule, as in
Rangaiah case lays down any particular time-frame, within
F which the selection process is to be completed.In the present
case, consideration for promotion took place after the
amendment came into operation. Thus, it cannot be accepted
that any accrued or vested right of the appellants has been
taken away by the amendment.
G ….
28. In our opinion, the matter is squarely covered by the ratio
of the judgment of this Court in Dr. K. Ramulu. In the aforesaid
case, this Court considered all the judgments cited by the
learned Senior Counsel for the appellant and held
H thatRangaiah case would not be applicable in the facts and
STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH & ORS. v. RAJ KUMAR 889
& ORS. [PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA, J.]

circumstances of that case. It was observed that for reasons A
germane to the decision, the Government is entitled to take a
decision not to fill up the existing vacancies as on the relevant
date. It was also held that when the Government takes a
conscious decision and amends the rules, the promotion have
to be made in accordance with the rules prevalent at the time
B
when the consideration takes place.”
29.2 This is a very important case which recognises many points
of distinction. (a) The Court found that there is no statutory duty cast on
the Government to prepare panels as in the case of Rangaiah, (b)a
candidate has a right to be considered only as per the existing rules, i.e.,
“the rule in force”, (c) the rule applicable is the rule in force as on the C
date of consideration, (d) the principle in Rangaiah has no universal
application, (e) for reasons germane to its decision, the Government is
entitled to take a conscious decision about the filling of the vacancies
and the rules applicable. This decision made deep inroads into the principle
laid down in Rangaiah’s case. D
30.1 M.I. Kunjukunju v. State of Kerela52, related to a claim
made by the appellant therein to the post of Industrial Extension Officers.
In this case that the selection process commenced on 25.06.1992 when
the Commission invited applications and prescribed the method of
appointment and qualifications for the post of Industrial Extension E
Officers. It was contended that the new rules issued in 2001 could not
have a retrospective effect to take away the vested right. The vested
right argument was considered in detail and the Court rejected the same
on the ground that no vested right exists and held as under:
“19. Therefore, it is clear that a candidate on making F
application for the post pursuant to an advertisement does
not acquire any vested right for selection. If he is eligible
and is otherwise qualified in accordance with the relevant
rules, he does acquire right for being considered for selection
as per existing rules.
G
….
22. In the present case, the Rules have not been framed under
the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India. The
legislature has framed the 1968 Act in exercise of power
52
M.I. Kunjukunju v. State of Kerala(2015) 11 SCC 440. H
890 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 15 S.C.R.

A conferred under Article 309 of the Constitution of India.
Under the 1968 Act, the State Government was empowered to
make Rules either prospectively or retrospectively to regulate
the recruitment and condition of service of persons appointed
to public services and posts in question with the Department
of Industry and Commerce of the State of Kerala.
B
23. In view of such delegation of power of the legislature to
the State under the 1968 Act, the Special Rules framed by the
State Government giving retrospective effect from 1-7-1983
cannot be held to be illegal or invalid.
C ….
26. In the present case, we find that the appellants have not
derived any benefit out of the old Government order which
was in force at the time of advertisement. We, therefore, hold
that no vested right or benefit accrued to the appellants have
D been taken away by sub-rule (2) of Rule 1 of the Special
Rules.”
30.2 This is a case where the Government made rules which
clearly applied retrospectively to facts that existed before and after the
amendment. The Court held that no right subsists for consideration to
E the vacancies that existed prior to the commencement of the rules.
31.1 In State of Tripura v. Nikhil Ranjan Chakraborty,53 the
Court considered a submission that additional posts in ‘Group A’ and
‘Group B’ of Schedule IV must be considered only on the basis of the
rules that existed prior to the amendment on 24.12.2011. The Court found
F no difficulty in straight away applying the decision of this Court in Deepak
Agarwal (supra) which distinguishes Rangaiah to hold as under: -
“9. The law is thus clear that a candidate has the right to be
considered in the light of the existing rules, namely, “rules in
force on the date” the consideration takes place and that
there is no rule of absolute application that vacancies must
G
invariably be filled by the law existing on the date when they
arose. As against the case of total exclusion and absolute
deprivation of a chance to be considered as in Deepak
Agarwalin the instant case certain additional posts have been

53
H State of Tripura v. Nikhil Ranjan Chakraborty (2017) 3 SCC 646.
STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH & ORS. v. RAJ KUMAR 891
& ORS. [PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA, J.]

included in the feeder cadre, thereby expanding the zone of A
consideration. It is not as if the writ petitioners or similarly
situated candidates were totally excluded. At best, they now
had to compete with some more candidates. In any case, since
there was no accrued right nor was there any mandate that
vacancies must be filled invariably by the law existing on the
B
date when the vacancy arose, the State was well within its
rights to stipulate that the vacancies be filled in accordance
with the Rules as amended. Secondly, the process to amend
the Rules had also begun well before the Notification dated
24-11-2011.
10. In our view, the instant case is fully covered by the law C
laid down by this Court in Deepak Agrawal and the High
Court was completely in error in allowing the writ petition
and in dismissing the writ appeals. We, therefore, allow these
appeals, set aside the judgment under appeal and dismiss
Writ Petitions (Civil) Nos. 104, 105, 106, 153 and 181 of D
2012.”
31.2 The Court reiterated that there is no rule of absolute
application that vacancies must be filled as per the law existing on the
date when they arose. The Court held that there is neither an accrued
right nor is there a mandate under the rules to fill the vacancies as per E
the law that existed. The Court recognised the right of the Government
to stipulate the vacancies in accordance with rules as amended.
32.1 By 2019 the perspective in which this Court has considered
the decision in Rangaiah was clear. By this time, the Court recognized
many exceptions to the principle. In Union of India v. Krishna F
Kumar 54,this Court noted that, “the decision of this Court in Y.V.
Rangaiah v. J. Sreenivasa Rao has been construed in subsequent
decisions as a case where the applicable rule required the process
of promotion or selection to be completed within a stipulated time-
frame”. This case relates to a claim made by Havaldars for being
considered for the post of Naib Subedar for the vacancies which occurred G
prior to the changes that were made in the structure of Assam Rifles in
2011. The High Court accepted the submission and directed the applicants
to be considered for the posts as per the pre-amended rules. Allowing
the appeal this Court held as under:-
54
Union of India v. Krishna Kumar (2019) 4 SCC 319. H
892 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 15 S.C.R.

A “10. In considering the rival submissions, it must, at the outset,
be noted that it is well settled that there is no vested right to
promotion, but a right be considered for promotion in
accordance with the Rules which prevail on the date on which
consideration for promotion takes place. This Court has held
that there is no rule of universal application to the effect that
B
vacancies must necessarily be filled in on the basis of the law
which existed on the date when they arose. The decision of
this Court in Y.V. Rangaiah v. J. Sreenivasa Rao [Y.V. Rangaiah
v. J. Sreenivasa Rao, (1983) 3 SCC 284 :] has been construed
in subsequent decisions as a case where the applicable Rules
C required the process of promotion or selection to be completed
within a stipulated time-frame. Hence, it has been held in H.S.
Grewal v. Union of India [H.S. Grewal v. Union of India,
(1997) 11 SCC 758 : 1998 SCC (L&S) 420] that the creation
of an intermediate post would not amount to an interference
with the vested right to promotion…..
D
….
13. In view of this statement of the law, it is evident that once
the structure of Assam Rifles underwent a change following
the creation of the intermediate post of Warrant Officer,
E persons holding the post of Havaldar would be considered
for promotion to the post of Warrant Officer. The intermediate
post of Warrant Officer was created as a result of the
restructuring exercise. The High Court was, in our view, in
error in postulating that vacancies which arose prior to the
amendment of the Recruitment Rules would necessarily be
F governed by the Rules which existed at the time of the
occurrence of the vacancies. As the decided cases noted
earlier indicate, there is no such rule of absolute or universal
application. The entire basis of the decision of the High Court
was that those who were recruited prior to the restructuring
G exercise and were holding the post of Havaldars had acquired
a vested right of promotion to the post of Naib Subedar. This
does not reflect the correct position in law. The right is to be
considered for promotion in accordance with the Rules as
they exist when the exercise is carried out for promotion.”

H
STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH & ORS. v. RAJ KUMAR 893
& ORS. [PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA, J.]

32.2 Apart from holding that there is no rule of universal application A
to the effect that vacancies must necessarily be filled on the basis of the
law that existed on the date when they arose, this Court also held that
the right is to be considered for promotion in accordance with rules as
they exist when the exercise is carried out for promotion.
33.1 In State of Orissa v. Dhirendra Sundar Das55, the Court B
was concerned with appointment by promotion to Orissa Administrative
Service, Class II Cadre. The employees contended that OAS Class II
Rules, 1978 read with OAS Class II, Regulations, 1978 were in force at
the time when the State decided to fill up the 150 OAS Class II posts on
28.4.2008. It was their contention that the subsequent restructuring cannot
affect their right to be considered for the 150 posts as per the 1978 C
Rules. For this purpose, reliance was placed on Rangaiah. Rejecting
this contention, the Court allowed the appeal by holding:
“9.14. Reliance placed by the counsel for the respondents on
Y.V. Rangaiah v. J. Sreenivasa Raoin order to submit that the
vacancies which had arisen under the old Rules would be D
governed by the old Rules, is of no avail.
9.15. A similar submission was rejected by this Court in
Deepak Agarwal v. State of U.P. [Deepak Agarwal v. State of
U.P., (2011) 6 SCC 725 : (2011) 2 SCC (L&S) 175]…
E
….
10. On the aforesaid grounds, we hold that the judgment of
the Division Bench is liable to be set aside since the contesting
respondents did not have a vested or fructified right of
promotion to OAS Class II posts which had arisen during the F
recruitment year 2008. The names of the contesting
respondents were merely recommended for consideration. In
the meanwhile, in 2009 the State had restructured the cadre,
and abolished the OAS Class II cadre. The reconstituted cadre
viz. the Orissa Revenue Service Group ‘B’ cadre came in its
place. Hence, the direction of the Division Bench to appoint G
the contesting respondents in the vacancies which had
occurred in the abolished cadre, in accordance with the
repealed 1978 Rules, was contrary to law, and liable to be
set aside.”
55
State of Orissa v. Dhirendra Sundar Das, (2019) 6 SCC 270. H
894 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 15 S.C.R.

A 33.2 Following the line adopted in Deepak Agarwal v. State of
U.P. (supra) this Court held that the respondents therein do not have a
vested and fructified right and therefore held that the appointments need
not be made as per the old rules.
34.1 In Rajasthan State Sports Council v. Uma Dadhich 56, the
B respondent therein was appointed under the Rajasthan State Sports
Council on the posts of Coach Grade-III on 20.03.1986. She was
promoted to Coach Grade-II in 1990 and Coach Grade-I in 1997.
Promotion to the post of Sports Officer from the Cadre of Coach Grade-
I was challenged by the respondent on the ground that the postsfell
vacant in the year 2003-2004, for which the 2006 Rules changed the
C qualification from mere seniority to seniority-cum-merit could not be
applied. Allowing the appeal this Court has held as under:-
“5. There is merit in the submission which has been urged on
behalf of the appellants that the respondent had no vested
right to promotion but only a right to be considered in
D accordance with the rules as they existed on the date when
the case for promotion was taken up. This principle has been
reiterated in several decisions of this Court. (See H.S. Grewal
v. Union of India [H.S. Grewal v. Union of India, (1997) 11
SCC 758], Deepak Agarwal v. State of U.P. [Deepak Agarwal
v. State of U.P., (2011) 6 SCC 725], State of Tripura v. Nikhil
E Ranjan Chakraborty [State of Tripura v. Nikhil Ranjan
Chakraborty, (2017) 3 SCC 646] and Union of India v.
Krishna Kumar [Union of India v. Krishna Kumar, (2019) 4
SCC 319]).
6. The judgment in Y.V. Rangaiah v. J. Sreenivasa Raodealt
F with a situation where the rules required that the promotional
exercise must be completed within the relevant year. Rangaiah
case [Y.V.Rangaiah v. J. Sreenivasa Rao, (1983) 3 SCC 284],
has hence been distinguished in the judgments noted above.
7. Rule 9(4) of the Rajasthan State Sports Council Service
G Rules, 2006 on which reliance has been placed on behalf of
the appellant does not indicate that the vacancies must be
filled in on the basis of Rules as they prevail in the year in
which they have occurred. Rule 9(4) is in the following terms:
“9. (4) The appointing authority shall determine the vacancies
56
H Rajasthan State Sports Council v. Uma Dadhich (2019) 4 SCC 316.
STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH & ORS. v. RAJ KUMAR 895
& ORS. [PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA, J.]

of earlier years, year-wise which were required to be filled in A
by promotion, if such vacancies were not determined and filled
earlier in the year in which they were required to be filled
in.”
34.2 The Court considered a large number of decisions that
distinguished Rangaiah’s case and held as a matter of principle that
B
rules that exist on the date when the case for promotion was taken up
would hold the field. The Court further observed that there is no rule
which specifically mandates that the vacancies prior to the amendment
must be filled as per the rules that existed and not the new rules. This is
a complete reversal of the principle set to have been laid down in
Rangaiah’s case. C
35. Finally,the case of D. Raghu v. R. Basaveswarudu57, is yet
another decision that has not followed the principle in Rangaiah’s case.
The Court held as under:-
“129.8. The High Court was in error in holding that it has to
be necessarily held that the vacancies which arose prior to D
the revised Recruitment Rules coming into force has to be
filled up under the then existing Rules (the 1979 Rules) relying
upon case law includingRangaiah. There was a conscious
decision taken to not fill up vacancies based on the
restructuring, and what is more, letters dated 28-10-2002 and
14-11-2002 show that promotion to the post of Inspector was E
to be effected based on the new Recruitment Rules.”
Analysis:
36. A review of the fifteen cases that have distinguished Rangaiah
would demonstrate that this Court has been consistently carving out
exceptions to the broad proposition formulated in Rangaiah. The findings F
in these judgments, that have a direct bearing on the proposition formulated
by Rangaiah are as under:
1. There is no rule of universal application that vacancies must
be necessarily filled on the basis of the law which existed
on the date when they arose, Rangaiah’s case must be
understood in the context of the rules involved therein.58 G
2. It is now a settled proposition of law that a candidate has a
right to be considered in the light of the existed rules, which
57
D. Raghu v. R. Basaveswarudu, (2020) 18 SCC 1.
58
Deepak Agarwal v. State of U.P., (2011) 6 SCC 725, Para 26; Union of India v.
Krishna Kumar, (2019) 4 SCC 319, Para 10. H
896 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 15 S.C.R.

A implies the “rule in force” as on the date consideration takes
place. The right to be considered for promotion occurs on
the date of consideration of the eligible candidates59.
3. The Government is entitled to take a conscious policy
decision not to fill up the vacancies arising prior to the
amendment of the rules. The employee does not acquire
B
any vested right to being considered for promotion in
accordance with the repealed rules in view of the policy
decision taken by the Government.60 There is no obligation
for the Government to make appointments as per the old
rules in the event of restructuring of the cadre is intended
C for efficient working of the unit.61 The only requirement is
that the policy decisions of the Government must be fair
and reasonable and must be justified on the touchstone of
Article 14.62
4. The principle in Rangaiah need not be applied merely
because posts were created, as it is not obligatory for the
D appointing authority to fill up the posts immediately.63
5. When there is no statutory duty cast upon the State to
consider appointments to vacancies that existed prior to the
amendment, the State cannot be directed to consider the
cases. 64
E 37.1 The above-referred observations made in the fifteen decisions
that have distinguished Rangaiah’s case demonstrate that the wide
principle enunciated therein is substantially watered-down. Almost all
the decisions that distinguished Rangaiah hold that there is no rule of
universal application to the effect that vacancies must necessarily be
filled on the basis of law that existed on the date when they arose. This
F only implies that decision in Rangaiah is confined to the facts of that
case.
59
Deepak Agarwal v. State of U.P., (2011) 6 SCC 725, Para 26; Union of India v.
Krishna Kumar, (2019) 4 SCC 319, Para 10.
60
K. Ramulu v. Suryaprakash Rao, (1997) 3 SCC 59, Paras 12 and 13, Shyam Chandra
Das v. State of Orissa, (2003) 4 SCC 218, Para 9, State of Punjab v. Arun Kumar
G Aggarwal, (2007) 10 SCC 402, Para 38; Deepak Agarwal v. State of U.P., (2011) 6 SCC
725, Para 28.
61
G. Venkateshwara Rao v. Union of India, (1999) 8 SCC 455, Para 4.
62
Rajasthan Public Service Commission v. Charan Ram, (1998) 4 SCC 202, Para 15; K.
Ramulu v. Suryaprakash Rao, (1997) 3 SCC 59, Para 15.
63
In Delhi Judicial Services Association v. Delhi High Court, (2001) 5 SCC 145, Para
5.
H 64
Deepak Agarwal v. State of U.P., (2011) 6 SCC 725, Para 25.
STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH & ORS. v. RAJ KUMAR 897
& ORS. [PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA, J.]

37.2 The decision in Deepak Agarwal (supra) is a complete A
departure from the principle in Rangaiah,in as much as the Court has
held that a candidate has a right to be considered in the light of the
existing rule.That is the rule in force on the date the consideration
takes place. This enunciation is followed in many subsequent decisions
including that of Union of India v. Krishna Kumar (supra). In fact, in
Krishna Kumar Court held that there is only a “right to be considered B
for promotion in accordance with rules which prevail on the date on
which consideration for promotion take place.”
37.3 The consistent findings in these fifteen decisions that
Rangaiah’s case must be seen in the context of its own facts, coupled
with the declarations therein that there is no rule of universal application C
to the effect that vacancies must necessarily be filled on the basis of
rules which existed on the date which they arose, compels us to conclude
that the decision in Rangaiah is impliedly overruled. However, as there
is no declaration of law to this effect, it continues to be cited as a
precedent and this Court has been distinguishing it on some ground or
the other, as we have indicated hereinabove. For clarity and certainty, it D
is, therefore, necessary for us to hold;
(a) The statement in Y.V. Rangaiah v. J. Sreenivasa Rao
that, “the vacancies which occurred prior to the amended
rules would be governed by the old rules and not by the
amended rules”, does not reflect the correct proposition of
E
law governing services under the Union and the States under
part XIV of the Constitution. It is hereby overruled.
(b) The rights and obligations of persons serving the Union
and the States are to be sourced from the rules governing the
services.
Application of the principle to the facts of the present case: F
38.1 Returning to the facts of the present case, we have noticed
that the High Court has proceeded on the premise that the vacancies
occurring before the amendment of the Rules on 25.11.2006 must be
governed by the 1966 Rules. The decision of the High Court took within
its sweep even the 7 new posts of Labour Officers that were sanctioned G
by an inter-departmental letter dated 20.07.2006, which included even
the 3 posts allocated for direct recruitment. The direction of the High
Court to encompass even the 3 posts allocated for direct recruitment
was on the ground that the posts were sanctioned on 20.07.2006, which
is prior to the amendment of the Rules on 25.11.2006.
H
898 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 15 S.C.R.

A 38.2 We have already held that there is no right for an employee
outside the rules governing the services. We have also followed and
applied the Constitution Bench decisions in Union of India v. Tulsiram
Patel (supra) and more particularly the decision in Roshan Lal Tandon
v. Union of India (supra) that the services under the State are in the
nature of a status, a hallmark of which is the need of the State to
B unilaterally alter the rules to subserve the public interest. The 2006 rules,
governing the services of the Respondents came into force immediately
after they were notified. There is no provision in the said rules to enable
the Respondents to be considered as per the 1966 Rules. The matter
must end here. There is no other right that Respondents no. 1 to 3 can
claim for such consideration.
C
39.1 The alternative plea of the Government based on its policy
decision to restructure the cadre by creating additional posts and also
providing for direct recruitment by amending the rules, as a justification
for not filling up the vacancies that arose prior to the amendment is fully
supported by the following decisions of this Court. 65
D 39.2 The material placed on record shows that the additional posts
of Labour Officers are created on 20.07.2006 and immediately thereafter
the 12 labour zones were created. This is followed by amendment to the
Rules with effect from on 25.11.2006 restructuring the cadre. The facts
fully justify the alternative submission made by the State and we have
no hesitation in accepting the said submission.
E
40. For these reasons stated above we set aside the judgment of
the High Court in CWP No. 3028 of 2008 dated 28.12.2009 and allow
Civil Appeal No. 9746 and Civil Appeal No. 9747 of 2011. There shall be
no order on cost.

F Nidhi Jain Appeals allowed.
(Assisted by : Tamana, LCRA)

65
K. Ramulu v. S. Suryaprakash Rao, (1997) 3 SCC 59;Rajasthan Public Service
G Commission v. Chanan Ram, (1998) 4 SCC 202; G. Venkateshwara Rao v. Union of
India, (1999) 8 SCC 455;Shyama Charan Dash v. State of Orissa, (2003) 4 SCC
218;State of Punjab v. Arun Kumar Aggarwal, (2007) 10 SCC 402;Deepak Agarwal v.
State of U.P., (2011) 6 SCC 725;State of Tripura v. Nikhil Ranjan Chakraborty, (2017)
3 SCC 646;Union of India v. Krishna Kumar (2019) 4 SCC 319;State of Orissa v.
Dhirendra Sundar Das, (2019) 6 SCC 270;Rajasthan State Sports Council v. Uma
H Dadhich, (2019) 4 SCC 316.