Supreme Court of India

STATE OF HARYANA AND OTHERSversusDINESH SINGH AND ANOTHER

Citation: 2023 INSC 1070
Decided: 14 December 2023
Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed
Bench: M M SUNDRESHARAVIND KUMAR

Holding

The Court held that 01.11.2018 is the cut‑off only for age eligibility; for the disciplinary‑proceedings condition the relevant date is the date of consideration (31 August 2019), and because disciplinary action was contemplated on that date, the respondent was ineligible for selection.

Summary

The dispute concerned the eligibility of Dinesh Singh for inclusion in Register A‑1 of the Haryana Civil Service (Executive Branch) under Rule 9 of the 2008 Rules. The State argued that the cut‑off date of 1 November 2018 applied uniformly to all eligibility criteria, including the condition that a candidate must not be facing or have disciplinary action contemplated against him. Singh contended that the 1 November 2018 date was only relevant for the age limit and that the appropriate date for assessing disciplinary eligibility was the "date of consideration" when the Committee recommended names, i.e., 31 August 2019. The Supreme Court examined the language of Rule 9, the letters dated 30 May 2019 and 9 July 2019, and the meaning of "contemplated" in disciplinary contexts. It held that 1 November 2018 is a cut‑off solely for age eligibility, while the relevant date for disciplinary‑proceedings eligibility is the date of consideration. Since a decision to charge‑sheet Singh was taken before that date, disciplinary action was deemed contemplated, rendering him ineligible. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, setting aside the High Court’s decision and affirming the Single Judge’s order.

Issues considered

Whether the cut‑off date of 01.11.2018 under Rule 9 of the Haryana Civil Service (Executive Branch) Rules, 2008 applies uniformly to all eligibility conditions or only to the age‑limit condition.
Assuming the cut‑off date applies only to age, whether Dinesh Singh satisfied the remaining eligibility conditions, particularly whether any disciplinary action was pending or contemplated against him as on the date of consideration.

Legislation cited

Constitution of Indias. Article 311(2)
Haryana Civil Service (Executive Branch) Rules, 2008s. Rule 9(1)(a)(ii), s. Rule 9(1)(a)(iii), s. Rule 9(2)

Subjects

service lawrecruitmenteligibility criteriacut‑off datedisciplinary proceedingscontemplationHaryana Civil Servicerule interpretation

Judgment

[2023] 16 S.C.R. 1046 : 2023 INSC 1070

CASE DETAILS

STATE OF HARYANA AND OTHERS
v.
DINESH SINGH AND ANOTHER
(Civil Appeal No. 8142 of 2023)
DECEMBER 14, 2023
[M.M. SUNDRESH AND ARAVIND KUMAR, JJ.]
HEADNOTES
Issue for consideration: On a reading of r.9, Haryana Civil Service
(Executive Branch) Rules, 2008, letters dated 30.05.2019 and 09.07.2019,
whether 01.11.2018 can be said to be the cut-oﬀ period uniformly applicable
qua all the eligibility conditions provided in r.9(1)(a) and (b) or is such date
to be considered as the cut-oﬀ date only for the purpose of determining
age-related eligibility and; if 01.11.2018 is to be held as the cut oﬀ only for
the limited purpose, whether the respondent satisﬁed the other eligibility
conditions and whether it can be said that there was any disciplinary action
pending or contemplated against him as on date of consideration.
Haryana Civil Service (Executive Branch) Rules, 2008 – rr.7-
9 – Relevant cut-oﬀ date qua the eligibility condition of pending
disciplinary proceedings – Determination – Disciplinary proceedings
if were ‘contemplated’ against Respondent as on date of consideration:
Held: r.9 does not contemplate a uniform cut-oﬀ date qua all the
conditions of eligibility – 01.11.2018 was relevant only in so far as r.9(1)(a)
(ii) was considered – For the purpose of r.9(1)(a)(iii), the relevant date for
determining if there was any disciplinary action contemplated or pending
against a candidate “is the date of consideration”, which is the date on which
the Committee had recommended names to the Commission u/r.9(2), which,
in the facts of this case would be 31.08.2019 – The reason for declaring
the Respondent ineligible for selection as per r.9 was on the ground that
decision had been taken on ﬁle to charge sheet him u/r.7 – At no point was it
asserted by him that disciplinary proceedings were not contemplated against
him – His entire case from the very beginning has been that the cut-oﬀ date
1046
STATE OF HARYANA AND OTHERS v. DINESH SINGH 1047
AND ANOTHER

qua all eligibility conditions must be determined as on 01.11.2018 and since
there was no decision/contemplation to initiate any disciplinary proceedings
as of that date, he ought to have been recommended for appointment – The
main allegation against Respondent was that on 05.01.2019 and 06.01.2019,
he was directed to act as Duty Magistrate during the Haryana Teacher’s
Eligibility Test, 2018 and he remained absent from this duty and thus, was
negligent in performing his oﬃcial duties – The Deputy Commissioner,
Kurukshetra wrote letter dtd.9.01.2019 to the Additional Chief Secretary
and Finance Commissioner, Government of Haryana, Department of
Revenue and Disaster Management in this regard and recommended that
formal inquiry be initiated against the Respondent – In view of the same, a
decision was taken on 05.02.2019 to charge-sheet him – It is not relevant to
consider what happened beyond the date of consideration, that is, 31.08.2019
– However, subsequent to this date, there was a chargesheet issued against
the Respondent and ultimately, the entire proceedings came to be dropped
on 11.12.2019 – Since the eligibility conditions in r.9(1)(a)(iii), the validity
of which is not under challenge, requires this Court to limit the inquiry
into the question of eligibility as on date of consideration, what happens
after that becomes insigniﬁcant to the inquiry – On facts, as on the date of
consideration, disciplinary action was contemplated against the Respondent,
and therefore he was rightly held to be ineligible for selection of his name
in Register A-1 – Order of the Division Bench of the High Court is set aside
and order of the Single Judge is aﬃrmed – Service Law. [Paras 47-51]
Words and Phrases – ‘contemplation’ – Discussed – Service Law.
LIST OF CITATIONS AND OTHER REFERENCES
State of M.P. v. Bani Singh, 1990 Supp SCC 738; H. Surendra Shetty
v. Vijaya Bank, MG Road Bangalore & Ors., ILR 2000 Kar 2883; Union of
India Vs. KV Janakiraman, [1991] 3 SCR 790: (1991) 4 SCC 109; Govt. of
India Ministry of Home Aﬀairs & Ors. v. Tarak Nath Ghosh, [1971] 3 SCR
715 : 1971 AIR SC 823; P.R. Nayak v. Union of India, [1972] 2 SCR 695 :
(1972) 1 SCC 332; Kul Bhusan Chopra v. Punjab National Bank and Ors.,
(1979) IILLJ 86; State Of U.P v. Jai Singh Dixit and Others (1976) ILLJ
246; Santi Kumar Ganguly v. The State of Tripura and Ors. (1982 GLR 1
21); Champaklal Chimanlal Shah vs The Union of India, [1964] 6 SCR 190 :
1964 AIR SC 1854; S. Govinda Menon v. Union of India [1967] 2 SCR 566 :
1048 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 16 S.C.R.

1967 AIR SC 1274; Shahroj Anwar Khan v. State of U.P., 2007 SCC OnLine
All 389; Rajendra Shenkar Nigam v. State of U.P., 1973 SCC OnLine All
381; Dr. Subash Chand v. State of U.P., 2005 SCC OnLine All 1712; State
of U.P. v. Jawahar Lal Bhargava, 1974 SCC OnLine All 45 – referred to.
OTHER CASE DETAILS INCLUDING IMPUGNED
ORDER AND APPEARANCES
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.8142 of 2023.
From the Judgment and Order dated 08.03.2022 of the High Court of
Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh in LPA No.737 of 2021.
Appearances:
Ms. Aishwarya Bhati, A.S.G., Alok Sangwan, Sr. A.A.G., Sumit Kumar
Sharma, Rajat Sangwan, Vishnu Tallapragada, Samar Vijay Singh, Keshav
Mittal, Ms. Sabarni Som, Advs. for the Appellants.
Rameshwar Singh Malik, Sr. Adv., Jitesh Malik, Yogendra Kumar
Verma, N D Kaushik, Satish Kumar, D. S. Chauhan, Ms. Ruchi Singh,
Shikher Badial, Advs. for the Respondents.
JUDGMENT / ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT

JUDGMENT

JUSTICE ARAVIND KUMAR, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. The broad issue at hand relates to recruitment and appointment to
the posts in the Haryana Civil Service (Executive Branch)1. The process
of recruitment to the posts in the Service are governed by Haryana Civil
Service (Executive Branch) Rules, 2008 [for short, ‘the Rules’].
3. Part II2 of the Rules is titled ‘Recruitment to Service’. For a person
to be appointed in the Service, Rule 73 requires that such person’s name

1 Hereinafter referred to as ‘Service’
2 Part II runs from Rule 3 to Rule 34.
3 Rule 7 - Members of the Service shall be appointed from time to time as required from
amongst accepted candidates whose names have been duly entered in accordance with
STATE OF HARYANA AND OTHERS v. DINESH SINGH 1049
AND ANOTHER [ARAVIND KUMAR, J.]

must be found in ‘one or other of the registers of Accepted Candidates to
be maintained under these rules. Rule 84 requires the Chief Secretary to
maintain ‘Registers of Accepted Candidates’. From among the various
Registers to be maintained, what is of relevance to us for adjudicating this
dispute is the one found in Rule 8 (a): ‘Register A-I of District Revenue
Oﬃcer/Tehsildars accepted as candidates;’
4. Rule 9 deals with the selection of candidates for inclusion of their
names in Register A-1. According to this Rule, the Financial Commissioner
and Principal Secretary to Government (hereinafter referred as, the
Commissioner) is required to prepare a list of District Revenue Oﬃcer/
Tehsildars not more than ﬁve times the number of vacancies and submit
this list to the Committee5 for its consideration. Only such names are to be
forwarded to the Commission who satisfy the conditions set out in clauses
(a) and (b) of Rule 9. Clause (a) of Rule 9 contains four sub clauses. In
that sense, the conditions set out in clauses (a) and (b) of Rule 9 provide
the eligibility criteria for selection of candidates in Register A-1. We shall
advert to the relevant clauses in due course.
5. Once the names are entered in the Register, Rule 17 provides that
the Government of Haryana shall make appointments to the Service from
amongst the candidates whose names are entered in the various registers
on a rotational basis.

these rules in one or other of the registers of Accepted Candidates to be maintained
under these rules:
Provided that if in the opinion of the Government the exigencies of the Service so
require, the Government may make special recruitment to the Service by such methods
as it may by notiﬁcation specify, after consultation with the Commission.
4 Rule 8- The following Registers of Accepted Candidates shall be maintained by the
Chief Secretary, namely:-
(a) Register A-I of District Revenue Oﬃcers/Tahsildars accepted as candidates;
(b) Register A-II of members of Group C Service accepted as candidates;
(c) Register B of Persons accepted as candidates as a result of a competitive
examination for the post of the Haryana Civil Services (Executive Branch) ; and
(d) Register C of District Development and Panchayat Oﬃcer/Block Development
and Panchayat Oﬃcers.
5 Rule 9 of 2008 Rules states that the Committee shall comprise of a Chief Sectary as
the Chairman and two such other oﬃcers as members, as may be nominated by the
Government from time to time.
1050 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 16 S.C.R.

6. Dinesh Singh (Respondent no. 1) was one among several candidates,
who was seeking appointment to the post in the Service. He was appointed
in the Department of Revenue and Disaster Management (Appellant no.
3; hereinafter, ‘the Department’) on 12.08.2008 as a Naib Tehsildar, and
at the time of ﬁling the original Writ Petition, was serving in the post of
Tehsildar. The Department has found Dinesh Singh, among several others,
to be ineligible for selection to Register A-1 on the ground that he did not
satisfy the eligibility condition set out in sub clause (iii) of clause (a) of
Rule 9. Rule 9 (a)(iii) reads as follows:
“is not facing disciplinary proceedings and against whom action is
not being contemplated”.
7. According to the Department, Dinesh Singh, though was not facing
any disciplinary proceedings, there was action being contemplated against
him as on date of consideration, which resulted in him being declared
ineligible for selection. However, it is Dinesh Singh’s case that he was neither
facing disciplinary proceedings, nor was any action being contemplated
against him, and therefore, the action of declaring him ineligible was
erroneous and being excluded, resulted in same being challenged before
the High Court. The Ld. Single Judge dismissed the writ petition ﬁled by
Dinesh Singh and other similarly situated persons. On appeal, the High
Court has set aside the order of the Ld. Single Judge and directed the State
to take steps to consider the case of Dinesh Singh for appointment from
Register A-1.
8. Therefore, the crux of the litigation comes down to the question as
to whether Dinesh Singh was eligible for selection to be made in Register
A-1. In order to determine his eligibility, it will be necessary to identify the
relevant cut-oﬀ date as on which the eligibility is to be determined.
Submissions of Appellant’s Counsel:
9. The Division Bench of the High Court has erred in treating
01.11.2018 as the uniform cut-oﬀ date for the purpose of determining
eligibility qua all conditions set out under Rule 9 (a) and (b).
10. A literal reading of Rule 9 would make it clear that 01.11.2018
was the cut-oﬀ date only in so far as the condition provided in Rule 9 (a)
(ii); that date was relevant only to determine if the candidate was within
STATE OF HARYANA AND OTHERS v. DINESH SINGH 1051
AND ANOTHER [ARAVIND KUMAR, J.]

the age limit of ﬁfty years and nothing else; this was, in fact, clariﬁed by
the Government through its letter dated 09.07.2019, in which it was made
clear that the said date was relevant only for purpose of determining the
age-related eligibility criterion; and the other conditions of eligibility were
to be tested as on ‘date of consideration’.
11. Treating the said date as a uniform cut-oﬀ date vis-a-vis all the
eligibility conditions set out in Rule 9 would result in an anomaly. This is
because a candidate against whom no disciplinary action was contemplated
or pending as on 01.11.2018, but became pending subsequently as on date
of consideration, would still remain eligible under the Rules. Such could
not have been the intention of the Rule-maker.
12. In this case, the date of consideration is the date on which the
Committee had recommended names to the Commission under Rule 9 (2),
that is, 30.09.2018 and as on such date, there cannot be any dispute about
the fact that disciplinary action, though not same contemplated pending
against the Respondent.
Submissions of Respondent’s Counsel:
13. Per Contra, it is the Respondent’s case that Rule 9 contemplates
only one cut-oﬀ date. There cannot be separate cut oﬀ dates qua the diﬀerent
conditions of eligibility. That Rule 9 contemplated only one uniform cut-
oﬀ date qua all eligibility conditions is evidenced by notiﬁcation dated
30.05.2019 in which it had been speciﬁed that ‘The DRO’s/Tehsildars
whose names are to be recommended should fulﬁl the following conditions
as on 01.11.2018’. This included condition qua pendency/contemplation of
disciplinary proceedings. Therefore, the subsequent clariﬁcation6 brought out
by the Government through its letter dated 09.07.2018 amounts to nothing
but changing the rules of the game. It is further contended that at the previous
stages of the litigation, that is before the Single Judge and Division Bench,
it was never the pleaded stance of the State that the date of consideration
was 31.08.2019. In fact, there it was contended that 01.11.2018 was the
cut-oﬀ date qua all eligible conditions.

6 It was clariﬁed therein that 01.11.2018 was the cut-oﬀ date in order to determine the
age-related criterion while other conditions of eligibility was to be tested as on date of
consideration.
1052 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 16 S.C.R.

14. Even if 31.08.2019 is taken as the relevant cut-off date for
determining eligibility qua the pendency of disciplinary proceeding, in the
facts of the present case, it cannot be said that any disciplinary action was
contemplated against the Respondent.
ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION :
15. In this factual background, the following issues fall for
consideration: -
“1. On a reading of Rule 9, letter dated 30.05.2019 and letter dated
09.07.2019, whether 01.11.2018 can be said to be the cut-oﬀ period
uniformly applicable qua all the eligibility conditions provided in Rule
9(1)(a) and (b) or is such date to be considered as the cut-oﬀ date only
for the purpose of determining age-related eligibility?
2. If we are to hold that 01.11.2018 was the cut oﬀ only for the
limited purpose, whether Dinesh Singh satisﬁed the other eligibility
conditions? Most importantly, whether it can be said that there was
any disciplinary action pending or contemplated against him as on
date of consideration?7
ANALYSIS :
16. Rule 9 of the 2008 Rules, as it originally stood provided as follows:
“9. Selection of candidates for Register A-I:- (1) The Financial
Commissioner and Principal Secretary to Government, Haryana
Revenue and Disaster Management shall, by a date to be determined by
the Government prepare a list of District Revenue Oﬃcers/Tehsildars
not more than ﬁve times of the number of vacancies and submit the
same for the consideration of a Committee with Chief Secretary
as Chairman and two such other oﬃcers as members, as may be
nominated by the government from time to time provided that unless
the Government other directs regarding the age, the name of a person
shall be submitted who-

7 The answer to the second question would turn on the oﬃcial noting dating 05.02.2019
in which a decision was taken proposing to ﬁle a chargesheet against Dinesh Singh – in
connection with him having absented himself from some invigilation duty.
STATE OF HARYANA AND OTHERS v. DINESH SINGH 1053
AND ANOTHER [ARAVIND KUMAR, J.]

(a) (i) has completed eight years continuous Government service;
(ii) has not attained the age of forty-ﬁve years; on or before
the date on which the names are required to be submitted
before the Committee;
(iii) is not facing disciplinary proceedings against whom action
is being contemplated and
(iv) is clear from vigilance angle;
(b) is a graduate of a recognized University.”
17. Rule 9 came to be amended by notiﬁcation8 dated 16th February
2017 and the amended Rule read as follows:
“9. Selection of Candidates for Register A-I:-
(1) The Additional Chief Secretary and Financial Commissioner
to Government, Haryana, Revenue and Disaster Management
shall, by a date to be determined by the Government, prepare
a list of District Revenue Oﬃcers/Tehsildars not more than
ﬁve times of the number of vacancies and submit the same
for the consideration of a Committee with Chief Secretary as
Chairman and two such other oﬃcers as members, as may be
nominated by the Government from time to time, the name of
a person shall be submitted who-
(a) (i) has completed eight years continuous Government
service including service rendered as Naib-Tehsildar;
(ii) has not attained the age of ﬁfty years on the ﬁrst day of
November immediately preceding the date of submission
of names by the concerned authority;
(iii) is not facing disciplinary proceedings and against
whom action is being contemplated and
(b) is a graduate of a recognised University.”
18. On 17.04.2017, the Department issued a communication, in which
it was stated that the State Government was looking to ﬁll up vacancies (9

8 Notiﬁcation No. G.S.R.3/Const./Art.309/2017 dated 16th February 2017
1054 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 16 S.C.R.

vacancies) up to 2016, in the Service from the quota of Register A-1. The
relevant part of this communication is extracted below:
“ It is intimated that State Government has decided to ﬁll up nine
vacancies of HCS(Executive Branch) from Register A-I of District
Revenue Oﬃcer/Tehsildars upto the vacancies of the year 2016 in
terms of rule 9 of Haryana Civil Service (Executive Branch) Rules,
2008. The oﬃcers should fulﬁll the following conditions of eligibility
as on 01.11.2016:-
(a) (i) has completed eight years continuous Government service
including service rendered as Naib-Tehsildar;
(ii) has not attained the age of ﬁfty years;
(iii) is not facing disciplinary proceedings and against whom
action is not being contemplated.
(iv) is clear from vigilance angle;
(b) is a graduate from a recognized University.
It is, therefore, requested to bring the same in the notice of all
concerned Oﬃcers under your control. All the eligible and interested
Oﬃcers should send their application in this regard along with certiﬁed
documents regarding education to the Government either directly or
through proper channel latest by 24.04.2017. The applications received
after 24.04.2017 will not be entertained.”
19. It was clearly indicated therein that oﬃcers should fulﬁll the
conditions of eligibility as on 01.11.2016 as prescribed in clause(a)(i) to
(iv) therein (referred to supra): -
It was also indicated in the said letter to the following eﬀect: -
“It is, therefore, requested to bring the same in the notice of
all concerned Oﬃcers under your control. All the eligible and
interested Oﬃcers should send their application in this regard
along with certified documents regarding education to the
Government either directly or through proper channel latest by
24.04.2017. The applications received after 24.04.2017 will not
be entertained.”
STATE OF HARYANA AND OTHERS v. DINESH SINGH 1055
AND ANOTHER [ARAVIND KUMAR, J.]

20. It appears that there was no action taken in the direction of ﬁlling
up vacancies pursuant to communication dated 17.04.2017. Nearly two years
later, on 30th May, 2019, a fresh communication was issued from the Chief
Secretary’s Oﬃce requesting the Commissioner to forward ‘a list of eligible
District Revenue Oﬃcers/ Tehsildars not more than ﬁve times the number
of vacancies as per rules for the aforesaid recruitment’. The relevant part
of this communication is extracted below:
“2. The DROs/Tehsildars whose names are to be recommended should
fulﬁll the following conditions of eligibility as on 01.11.2018:-
(a) (i) has completed eight years continuous Government service.
However, the services rendered as Naib Tehsildars shall not be
included while determining the eligibility as per interim orders/
directions dated 26.04.2017 of Hon’ble High Court of Punjab and
Haryana, Chandigarh passed in CWP No. 8502 of 2017-Joginder
Sharma and others versus State of Haryana and others.
(ii) has not attained the age of ﬁfty years;
(iii) is not facing disciplinary proceedings and against whom
action is not being contemplated; and
(iv) is clear from vigilance angle;
(b) is a graduate from a recognized University.”
21. What needs to be noted at the very outset is that the Respondent has
not challenged the validity of Rule 9 (1)(a)(iii), which requires, as a matter
of eligibility for selection, that no disciplinary proceeding be pending, or
action be contemplated against him. This is signiﬁcant because, normally, in
the context of promotion-related disputes, this Court has consistently held 9
that mere pendency or contemplated initiation of disciplinary proceedings
against a candidate must be considered to have absolutely no impact upon his
right to be considered. Resort is often taken to the ‘sealed cover’ procedure
in cases where a candidate/employee seeking promotion to a higher grade
is facing disciplinary proceedings. As per this procedure, the candidate is
allowed to participate in the merit-based selection process, and the results

9 State of M.P. v. Bani Singh, 1990 Supp SCC 738.
1056 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 16 S.C.R.

of such candidate’s selection is kept in a sealed cover and opened in the
event where the disciplinary proceedings are dropped/ or a ﬁnding of not
guilty is passed.
22. Since the rule disentitling a candidate for selection if disciplinary
proceeding is pending or contemplated is not under challenge in these
proceedings, we must apply it as it is.
Determination of the cut-oﬀ date qua the eligibility condition of
pending disciplinary proceedings
23. In order to ﬁnd an answer as to whether there was any disciplinary
proceeding contemplated/pending against Dinesh Singh, we are necessarily
required to determine the applicable cut-oﬀ date against which the eligibility
is to be tested. In that sense, the ﬁnding on the latter question has a direct
bearing on the outcome of the former question. Perhaps, this also explains
why the Ld. Single Judge and Ld. Division Bench have reached opposite
conclusions. According to the Ld. Single Judge, 01.11.2018 was to operate
as the cut-oﬀ period only in so far as Clause (2) of Rule 9(1)(a) is concerned
– that is to say eligibility in so far as age of the candidate is concerned.
The date 01.11.2018 was not to be treated as the cut-oﬀ date for all the
eligibility conditions set out in Rule 9. However, the Division Bench was of
the opinion that 01.11.2018 operated as the cut-oﬀ date qua all the clauses
found in Rule 9(1)(a).
24. If the Division Bench is right in its ﬁnding, then we need not
enter into the follow-up question as to whether any disciplinary proceeding
was pending/contemplated against Dinesh Singh, since, admittedly, as
on 1.11.2018, even as per the appellant-State, no case was pending or
contemplated against him. On the other hand, if we hold the cut-oﬀ date to
be the date of consideration, then it needs to be further examined if there
was any action contemplated against the Respondent as on that date.
25. We are of the view that Ld. Single Judge was correct in concluding
that 01.11.2018 was meant only for the purpose of determining the age-
related eligibility as provided for in Rule 9(1)(a)(ii). The cut oﬀ for the
purpose of determining eligibility in so far as Rule 9(1)(a)(iii) has to be
determined as on date of consideration.
26. The ﬁnding of the Division Bench to the contrary was on the
premise that the subject rule in itself had provided for 01.11.2018 to operate
STATE OF HARYANA AND OTHERS v. DINESH SINGH 1057
AND ANOTHER [ARAVIND KUMAR, J.]

as the cut-oﬀ date qua all conditions of eligibility found in Rule 9. The
relevant observation of the High Court is extracted herein below –
“the cut-oﬀ date, thus, has to be seen from the date which is provided
in the rules, which would be 01.11.2018 as per Rule 9(1)(a)(iii) of
the 2008 Rules, as the process was set into motion on 30.05.2019. It
is, thus, does not lie in the mouth of the State as such to say that on
account of the pending litigation and on account of the orders of the
Division Bench dated 21.08.2019 and 29.08.2019, a diﬀerent cut-oﬀ
date would come into play and there was a distinction as such qua the
names which had been sent later. The eligibility as such has to be seen
as provided in the rule itself and ﬁnding of the learned Single Judge
that the cut-oﬀ date is 12.07.2019 is based on a wrong presumption.’’
27. As could be seen from the above, the Ld. Division Bench opines
that the cut-oﬀ date has to be seen from the date provided in the Rules, which
according to it, is 01.11.2018. Rule 9(1)(a)(iii) does not contain any such
date; it merely provides that a candidate facing disciplinary proceedings or
against whom action is contemplated becomes ineligible for selection. Only
clause (2) in Rule 9(1)(a) ﬁnds the mention of a date (1st day of November
immediately preceding the date of submission of names by the concerned
authority) as such. Therefore, the ﬁnding that the rule itself clearly provides
for a cut-oﬀ date qua all the clauses in Rule 9(1)(a) appears to be perverse
and without any basis. The Ld. Single Judge has rightly relied on the letter
date 09.07.2019 in arriving at the conclusion that 01.11.2018 was the cut-oﬀ
date only for a limited purpose. That limited purpose can be understood if one
were to read the clariﬁcation provided for in the said letter. The clariﬁcation
is extracted herein below for easy reference: -
“2. The State Government has re-considered the matter and it has been
decided that the DROs/Tehsildars whose names are to be recommended
should fulﬁl the following conditions of eligibility:-
(a) (i) has completed eight years continuous Government Service.
(ii) has not attained the age of ﬁfty years as on 01.11.2018.
(iii) is not facing disciplinary proceedings and against whom
action is not being contemplated; and
1058 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 16 S.C.R.

(iv) is clear from vigilance angle;
(b) is a graduate from a recognised University.
It is clariﬁed for the condition (a) (i) that services rendered
as Naib Tehsildars shall not to be included while determining the
eligibility as per interim orders/directions dated 26.04.2017 of Hon’ble
High Court of Punjab and Haryana Chandigarh passed in CWP No.
8502 of 2017- Joginder Sharma and others versus State of Haryana
and others.
It is further clariﬁed that DROs/Tehsildars, who are otherwise
eligible being less than 50 years of age on and after 01.11.2018, their
ACRs be considered upto year 2018-2019 and experience be taken
into consideration upto the date of recommendation. The DROs/
Tehsildars, who had not attained the age of 50 years as on 01.11.2018
but attained the age of more than 50 years on and after 01.11.2018
till the date of recommendation their experience and ACRs record
be considered only upto 01.11.2018. However, pending disciplinary
proceedings, vigilance clearance and integrity be considered upto the
date of consideration in both cases.”
28. From this clariﬁcatory note, it becomes clear that if a candidate was
less than 50 years of age as on 01.11.2018 and continued to be so till the date
of recommendation, then his ACR and experience was to be counted till the
date of recommendation. However, if the candidate was less than ﬁfty years
as on 01.11.2018 but exceeded such age as on the date of recommendation,
such candidates ACR and experience was to be accounted for only till
01.11.2018. In that sense, the cut-oﬀ date (01.11.2018) was relevant only
to decide the question of how much of the ACR and experience had to be
considered and till what period. Such date was never meant to operate as the
date against which all the eligibility criteria had to be measured against. This
fact stands clariﬁed from the last paragraph of the letter dated 09.07.2019,
whereunder it has been stated that the eligibility criteria concerning
‘pending disciplinary proceedings, vigilance clearance and integrity’
was to be considered up to the date of consideration in both cases. This
aside, according to us ﬁxing 01.11.2018 as the cut-oﬀ date for determining
eligibility qua all conditions can bring about undesirable outcomes. For
example, if a candidate had a clean service record, had completed 8 years
STATE OF HARYANA AND OTHERS v. DINESH SINGH 1059
AND ANOTHER [ARAVIND KUMAR, J.]

continuous government service, had no disciplinary proceedings pending
or contemplated against him, was clear from the vigilance angle but in
between 01.11.2018 and the date of consideration if he were to be facing
disciplinary action concerning serious misconduct, such a candidate would
remain eligible for selection. It is in this background the communication
dated 9th July, 2019 has to be read and understood.
29. The Respondent had relied on letter dated 30.05.2019 to contend
that 01.11.2018 was to operate as a cut-oﬀ date qua all eligibility conditions.
In order to deal with this submission, we may have to refer to the contents
of the letter dated 30.05.2019 and the letter dated 09.07.2019.
30. The State Government vide letter dated 30.05.2019 showed interest
in ﬁlling up the 23 vacancies of HCS(EB) and in this regard informed the
Additional Chief Secretary and Financial Commissioner, requesting him to
send a list of eligible candidates as contemplated under Rule 9 Paragraph
2 of this letter stated that the DROs/Tehsildars whose names are to be
recommended should fulﬁl the eligibility conditions provided for in Rule
9 as on 01.11.2018. What is interesting to note here is that the cut-oﬀ date
has not been conﬁned to apply only to the eligibility criteria pertaining to
the age but to all the four criteria uniformly. This letter was followed up
by another letter dated 09.07.2019, in which the State Government appears
to have reconsidered the matter. According to this letter, the names had to
be recommended as per the conditions of eligibility found in the amended
Rule 9(1)(a) and (b). It was requested therein that the recommended names
be sent to the Committee by 12.07.2019. What we notice here is that the
uniform application of the cut-oﬀ qua all eligibility conditions was deleted
and the cut-oﬀ was restricted to the condition relating to the age of the
candidate. Thus, the Respondent cannot take umbrage under the contents
of letter dated 30.05.2019, when it had been followed up with another letter
on the same subject and with speciﬁc clariﬁcation regarding the scope and
relevance of the date 01.11.2018.
31. Therefore, it cannot be held that Rule 9 contemplated a uniform
cut-oﬀ date qua all the conditions of eligibility. 01.11.2018 was relevant only
in so far as Rule 9(1)(a)(ii) was considered. For the purpose of Rule 9(1)(a)
(iii), the relevant date for determining if there was any disciplinary action
contemplated or pending against a candidate “is the date of consideration,”
1060 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 16 S.C.R.

which is the date on which the Committee had recommended names to
the Commission under Rule 9(2), which, in the facts of this case would be
31.08.2019.
Whether disciplinary proceedings were ‘contemplated’ against Mr.
Dinesh Singh as on date of consideration, that is, 31.08.2019
32. What does the word ‘contemplate’ entail in the context of Rule
9(1)(a)(iii)? Said rule provides for two conditions, both of which have to
be satisﬁed since the two conditions are separated by the conjunction ‘and’
instead of ‘or’. To put it diﬀerently, what Rule 9 (1)(a)(iii) mandates is that
not only there must be no pending disciplinary proceeding but there must
also not be any action contemplated against the candidate as on date of
consideration.
33. It is now trite that a disciplinary proceeding is said to be pending
when a formal charge-sheet is issued to the employee. 10 The stage at which
action can be contemplated has to, quite obviously, come before the time
at which a disciplinary proceeding becomes pending (i.e. at the time of
issuing a formal chargesheet). At what point between the employer having
received information/knowledge of an alleged misconduct committed by the
employee and the ultimate initiation of disciplinary proceedings by issuing
chargesheet, can it be said that disciplinary proceedings are contemplated?
The entire challenge before us is to ﬁnd that point.
34. The word contemplate has diﬀerent meanings in the English
Dictionary. It can mean ‘to think deeply at length’; ‘to have in view as a
probable intention’; to think about. According to us, the second meaning
comes closest to the sense in which the rule-maker intended the rule to
operate. Probability is a step ahead of possibility but falls short of certainty.
With this basic logic in mind, we can glance through some of the rulings
which have interpreted the word ‘contemplate’ in similar contexts.
Meaning of the term “Contemplation” :
35. In H.Surendra Shetty v. Vijaya Bank, MG Road Bangalore &
Ors., ILR 2000 Kar 2883 wherein the disciplinary proceedings were initiated

10 Union of India Vs. KV Janakiraman (1991) 4 SCC 109.
STATE OF HARYANA AND OTHERS v. DINESH SINGH 1061
AND ANOTHER [ARAVIND KUMAR, J.]

against the petitioner with respect to certain irregularities. The Karnataka
High Court explained the meaning “contemplation” and made the following
observations:
“20. The meaning given in Black's Law Dictionary, 5th edition (1979)
for the word 'contemplation' is as follows: "The act of the mind in
considering with attention. Continued attention of the mind to a
particular subject. Consideration of an act or series of acts with the
intention of doing or adopting them. The consideration of an event
or state of facts with the expectation that it will transpire". Thus,
contemplation is a process that goes on in the mind and falls far
short of a 'decision' which refers to the culmination of the process
of contemplation in arriving at a deﬁnite conclusion as to the next
course of action to be taken under a set of facts with the intention of
carrying out a certain act. Thus, mere contemplation cannot serve as
the basis for adopting the sealed cover procedure as it does not answer
to the tests adopted in the decisions relied upon by learned Counsel
Ramadass to justify the adoption of the sealed cover procedure.”
21. …If the petitioner is denied promotion merely on the basis that a
charge-sheet is contemplated or some investigation is ordered by the
bank, it would amount to interfering with or denying a right to which
the petitioner was rightfully entitled to which is per se improper and
opposed to principles of natural justice. No man can be denied his
due without even letting him have an inkling as to why he is being
denied it.”
36. In Govt. of India Ministry of Home Aﬀairs & ors. v. Tarak Nath
Ghosh 1971 AIR SC 823 this Court while dealing with the disciplinary
proceedings initiated against the respondent, an IPS oﬃcer, made the
following remarks:
“13. In substance, disciplinary proceedings can be said to be started
against an oﬃcer when complaints about his integrity or honesty
are entertained and followed by a preliminary enquiry into them
culminating in the satisfaction of the Govt. that a prima facie case
has been made out against him for the framing of charges. When the
order of suspension itself shows that the Govt. was of the view that
such a prima facie case for departmental proceedings had been made
1062 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 16 S.C.R.

out the fact that the order also mentions that such proceedings were
contemplated makes no diﬀerence. Again, the fact that in other rules
of service an order of suspension may be made when ‘disciplinary
proceedings were contemplated’ should not lead us to take the view
that a member of an All-India Service should be dealt with diﬀerently.”
37. Similarly, in P.R. Nayak v. Union of India, (1972) 1 SCC 332
this Court had the opportunity to consider the meaning of contemplation
of disciplinary proceedings under the All-India Services (Discipline and
Appeal) Rules, 1969 and while doing so, this Court made the following
observations:
“69. …Rule 3 of the All-India Services (Discipline and Appeal)
Rules, 1969, which has already been set out in extenso, provides
for suspension during disciplinary proceedings. Sub-rule (1) of this
rule on its plain reading…does not suggest that suspension can be
ordered merely when disciplinary proceedings are contemplated.
The language used in sub-rules (4) to (7) also suggests that these
rules do not authorise order of suspension of the delinquent member
of the Service merely because disciplinary proceedings against him
are contemplated. Suspension under those sub-rules may be ordered
only either after conviction [deeming provision under sub-rule (4)]
or when criminal proceedings are actually in progress [sub-rule (5)]
or when after the penalty imposed on him having been set aside,
the disciplinary authority decides to hold further enquiry [deeming
provision under sub-rule (6)]… The legislative scheme underlying Rule
3 is thus clearly indicative of the intention of the rule-making authority
to restrict its operation only to those cases in which the Government
concerned is possessed of suﬃcient material whether after preliminary
investigation or otherwise and the disciplinary proceedings have
in fact commenced and not merely when they are contemplated. An
order of suspension before the actual initiation or commencement of
disciplinary proceedings appears to us therefore, to be clearly outside
the ambit of Rule 3 and we ﬁnd no cogent ground for straining the plain
language of Rule 3(1) so as to extend it to cases in which disciplinary
proceedings are merely contemplated and not actually initiated or
commenced. It is no doubt true that this Court (G.K. Mitter and A.N.
STATE OF HARYANA AND OTHERS v. DINESH SINGH 1063
AND ANOTHER [ARAVIND KUMAR, J.]

Ray, JJ.) has in Government of India, Ministry of Home Aﬀairs v. Tarak
Nath Ghosh, [(1971) 1 SCC 734 : AIR 1971 SC 823] ‘expressed the
view that under Rule 7(1) of the All India Services (Discipline and
Appeal) Rules, 1955 [replaced in 1969 by Rule 3(1) with which we
are concerned] the Government is entitled to place an oﬃcer under
suspension even before deﬁnite charges are communicated to him when
preliminary investigation has been made into his conduct following
allegations of corrupt or malpractice levelled against him. In support
of this view, reliance in that decision was placed on S. Govinda Menon
v. Union of India, [(1967) 2 SCR 566 : AIR 1967 SC 1274] ’ an earlier
decision by a bench of two Judges.”
38. In Kul Bhusan Chopra v. Punjab National Bank and Ors. (1979)
IILLJ 86 Del the Delhi High Court while considering the suspension of the
petitioner under Clause 12 of the Punjab National Bank Oﬃcer Employees
(Discipline and Appeal) Regulation 1977 elucidated the meaning of the
term contemplation as follows:
“11. When can the disciplinary proceedings be said to be “contemplated”
must then be determined. Can an oﬃcer be suspended merely during
the investigation by the Bank or during the pendency of some sort of
a preliminary of conﬁdential enquiry by it and must the suspension be
resorted to, if at all, only after a formal charge or accusation has been
made against an oﬃcer? What does the expression “contemplated”
connote? Does it merely mean that proceedings are likely in the
foreseeable future or are imminent in the near future or are about
to be initiated. These are some of the questions that were posed
in the course of arguments. The expression “contemplated” is not
deﬁned in the Regulations. According to the dictionary meaning, the
word “contemplate” would mean to have in view, to expect, to take
into account as contingency, to propose. In the case of P.R. Nayak,
(5) the diﬀerence between “contemplation” and “initiation” was
brought out. The relevant rule in that case empowered the authority
to suspend where the proceedings had been initiated. The order of
suspension was, however, made before the initiation of proceedings
on the ground that the same were “contemplated”. It was held that
the rules did not authorise suspension “merely because disciplinary
1064 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 16 S.C.R.

proceedings against him are contemplated”. In the case of State
of U.P. v. Jai Singh Dixit, (6) a Full Bench of the Allahabad High
Court was concerned with Rule 49A of the U.P. Civil Services
(Classiﬁcation, Control and Appeal) Rules which empowered the
authority to suspend a Government servant “against whose conduct
an enquiry is contemplated or is proceeding” which is in pari materia
with the Regulation in the present case. According to the Allahabad
High Court, the proper meaning which could be assigned to the word
“contemplated” in the context of the aforesaid rule was when it was
in the mind of the appointing authority that in due course a formal
departmental enquiry shall be held or there existed a contingency
for such an enquiry. It was observed that a departmental enquiry
could be said to be contemplated when on objective consideration
of the material, the appointing authority considered the case as one
which would lead to a departmental enquiry irrespective of whether
any preliminary enquiry summary or detailed, had or had not been
made or if made is not completed, and that there could be suspension
pending enquiry even before a ﬁnal decision was taken to initiate the
disciplinary proceedings i.e. even before the framing of the charge and
the communication thereof to the Government servant.”
39. In State Of U.P v. Jai Singh Dixit and Others(1976) ILLJ 246 All
the Allahabad High Court made the following observations regarding the
contemplation of inquiry while considering the suspension of the respondent
under Rule 49-A of the Uttar Pradesh Civil Services (Classiﬁcation, Control
and Appeal) Rules:
“35. The inquiry contemplated by Rule 49-A cannot have reference to
an informal preliminary inquiry or a fact-ﬁnding inquiry preceding
the actual disciplinary proceeding, otherwise it shall be permissible
to, suspend a Government servant pending such informal inquiry,
but not after charges have been framed and regular departmental
proceeding is pending. This shall lead to an anomalous situation. We
are, therefore, of opinion that the “inquiry” contemplated by Rules
49-A and 1-A has reference to the formal departmental inquiry, and
not to any informal preliminary or fact-ﬁnding inquiry preceding the
initiation of the formal disciplinary proceeding.
STATE OF HARYANA AND OTHERS v. DINESH SINGH 1065
AND ANOTHER [ARAVIND KUMAR, J.]

39. The meaning of the word “contemplate” has been given in Shorter
Oxford English Dictionary, Volume I, as:
“1. To look at the continued attention, gaze upon, observe.
Behold. 2. To view mentally; to med tate upon, ponder, study. 3.
To consider in a certain aspect, regard. 4. To have in view; to
expect, take into account as a contingency; to purpose”
and in the New in ernational Dictionary, Volume I, as:
“1. To view with sustained attention: give at though fully for
a noticeable time: observe with ostensibly steady reﬂection.
2. to view mentally with continued thoughtfulness, attention,
or reﬂection: muse or ponder about. 3. to view mentally in
a stated or implied way with thoughtfulness and reﬂection:
A. to think about or regard from a certain view point or in
a certain light or respect, b: to have in view as a purpose:
anticipate doing or performing: plan on: INTEND, PLAN
e. to dream of as a Cherished Aim: ENVISION—d: to
presume or imply as a concomitant or result: POSTULATE,
PRESIOND—d: to presume or imply as a concomitant or
result: POSTULATE, PRESUPPOSE 4: to view or regard
(as an object or an objective fact) with deachment.”
40. The proper meaning which can be assigned to the word
“contemplate” used in Rule 49-A or in Rule 1-A, therefore, is to
have in view’, ‘to expect’, ‘take into account as a contingency’.
Therefore, whenever it is in the mind of the appointing authority that
in due course a formal departmental inquiry shall be held or there
exists a contingency for such an inquiry, one can say that a formal
departmental inquiry is contemplated. It is, however, necessary that
there should be application of mind, in the eye of law, in good faith,
and not arbitrarily.
41. A formal departmental inquiry is invariably preceded by an
informal preliminary inquiry which itself can be in two phases. There
can be a summary investigation to ﬁnd out if the allegations made
against the Government servant have any substance. Such investigation
or inquiry is followed by a detailed preliminary or fact-ﬁnding inquiry
1066 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 16 S.C.R.

whereafter ﬁnal decision is taken whether to initiate disciplinary
proceeding. The ﬁrst preliminary inquiry may be in the shape of
secret inquiry and the other, of an open inquiry. In the alternative,
when complaints containing serious allegations against a government
servant are received, the authority may peruse the records to satisfy
itself if a more detailed preliminary inquiry be made.”
40. The Gujarat High Court in Santi Kumar Ganguly v. The State of
Tripura and Ors. (1982 GLR 1 21) while dealing with the suspension of
petitioner under the Central Civil Services (Classiﬁcation-(SIC) Control
and Appeal) Rules, 1965 held that:
“7. The dictionary meaning of the word 'contemplate' leads to conclude
that whenever it is in the mind of the appointing authority that a formal
disciplinary proceeding shall be or there exists a contingency for
such a proceeding, one can say that a formal disciplinary proceeding
is contemplated. To contemplate in the context is to have in view to
expect, or take into account as a contingency. A disciplinary proceeding
is contemplated when on an objective consideration of the materials,
the appointing authority considers the case as one which might lead
to a formal disciplinary proceeding.The formation of such an opinion
may be, on the basis of inspection of the records, though further
investigation in some cases may be considered necessary to collect
more materials for formal disciplinary proceeding, The Disciplinary
Authority at that early stage can have in view of a contingency for
disciplinary proceeding and suspend the Government servant, in
exercise of its power under Rule 10(l)(a) of the said Rules.”
41. In Champaklal Chimanlal Shah vs The Union of India 1964
AIR SC 1854=1964 SCR (6) 190 this Court while considering the action
taken against the petitioner who claimed to be a quasi permanent employee
under the Central Civil Services (Temporary Services) Rules, 1949 made
the following remarks:
“16. …The circumstances in this case are in our opinion very similar to
the facts in Shayamlal case the diﬀerence being that in that case he was
compulsorily retired and in this case the appellant's services have been
terminated. In Shayamlal case also at one stage, the government made
imputation against his conduct but later withdrew them and did not
STATE OF HARYANA AND OTHERS v. DINESH SINGH 1067
AND ANOTHER [ARAVIND KUMAR, J.]

follow up the matter by holding a departmental enquiry. This is exactly
what happened in the present case and it was more than six months
after that the appellant who had in the meantime been transferred to
Bombay was discharged in the terms of Rule 5 because his work and
conduct were found unsatisfactory. The order terminating his services
makes no imputation whatsoever against him and in the circumstances
it cannot be said that the termination of his service is visited with any
evil consequences as explained in Parshotam Lal Dhingra case. We
are therefore of opinion that on the facts of this case Article 311(2) has
no application and the appellant was not entitled to the protection of
that Article before his services were terminated under Rule 5, for the
termination of service here does not amount to inﬂiction of the penalty
of dismissal or removal.”
42. In S. Govinda Menon v. Union of India 1967 AIR SC 1274= 1967
SCR (2) 566 this Court while dealing with the suspension of appellant under
Rule 7 of the All-India Services (Discipline & Appeal) Rules, 1955 made
the following observations:
“14. …Rule 5(2) prescribes that the grounds on which it is proposed
to take action shall be reduced to the form of a deﬁnite charge or
charges. Under Rule 5(3) a member of the Service is required to
submit a written statement of his defence to the charge or charges.
The framing of the charge under Rule 5(2) is necessary to enable the
member of Service to meet the case against him. The language of Rule
7(1) is however diﬀerent and that rule provides that the Government
may place a member of the Service under suspension “having regard
to the nature of the charge/charges and the circumstances in any case”
if the Government is satisﬁed that it is necessary to place him under
suspension. In view of the diﬀerence of language in Rule 5(2) and Rule
7 we are of the opinion that the word “charges” in Rule 7(1) should
be given a wider meaning as denoting the accusations or imputations
against the member of the Service.”
43. The Allahabad High Court in the case of Shahroj Anwar Khan v.
State of U.P., 2007 SCC OnLine All 389 while dealing with the question
whether Rule 17(1)(a) of the Uttar Pradesh Police Oﬃcers of Subordinate
Ranks (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1991 prohibits passing of a
1068 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 16 S.C.R.

suspension order during the pendency of preliminary enquiry considered
the meaning of the term contemplation as follows:
“16. …The term ‘contemplation’ is quite a wide term. Webster
Comprehensive Dictionary, amongst other deﬁnes ‘contemplation’ as
a deliberation on something to be done. The Oxford Dictionary gives
four diﬀerent shades of meaning of the verb ‘to contemplate’. They
are as follows: —(1) to survey with the eyes, or in mind, (2) to regard
an event as possible, (3) to intend, to have as one's purpose, and (4)
to meditate. When a disciplinary authority contemplates holding of
an inquiry, it may take variety of steps, which may include collecting
material for ﬁnding out the nature and details of the allegations. For
that purpose, a preliminary inquiry can certainly be held, but as the
rule stands, can it be read to mean that an oﬃcer cannot be suspended
before a preliminary inquiry. It is also to be noted that a preliminary
inquiry and the full-ﬂedged departmental inquiry are not to be confused
with each other as observed in the case of Amalendu Ghosh (supra).
29. In view of what is stated above, it is clear that the phrase ‘when an
inquiry is contemplated’ will have to be read as meaning that an inquiry
is under consideration or is thought of or is proposed. It cannot mean
that a decision to hold an inquiry is arrived at. After that decision is
arrived at, undoubtedly, a full-ﬂedged departmental inquiry follows.
Therefore, the phrase ‘an inquiry is contemplated’ will cover an earlier
stage. It will certainly cover a stage when even a preliminary inquiry is
under consideration. A preliminary inquiry cannot be excluded from the
term ‘inquiry’ as covered under this clause. That would place a fetter
on the powers of the administration. As noted earlier, the authority
may be confronted with various situations and they ought to have the
freedom to deal with those situations. It will be for them to decide what
steps they ought to take. The authorities may, undoubtedly, initiate a
preliminary inquiry, or may even be required to resort to suspension
while initiating a preliminary investigation. It cannot be said that the
authorities will hold the preliminary investigation or inquiry for quite
some time, allow the oﬃcer.”
44. In Rajendra Shenkar Nigam v. State of U.P., 1973 SCC OnLine
All 381 the Allahabad High Court while dealing with the suspension
STATE OF HARYANA AND OTHERS v. DINESH SINGH 1069
AND ANOTHER [ARAVIND KUMAR, J.]

of the respondent for allegation of corruption observed the meaning of
contemplation as follows:
14. The material and relevant expression in Rule 49-A is an inquiry
is contemplated or is proceeding. The term “contemplated” is not
a term of art. It has been used in its plain ordinary meaning. The
Shorter Oxford Dictionary, Volume I at page 380 deﬁnes the word
‘contemplated’ to man “to have in view, to expect, to take into account
as a contingency”. It indicates a stage where an inquiry into the
conduct of a government servant is imminently expected with a view to
impose some punishment upon him. On receipt of complaints against
the conduct of a government servant the competent authority sets in
motion an informal inquiry to certify the correctness of the allegations
or to collect material with a view to hold a disciplinary inquiry so
that if the alleged misconduct is established suitable punishment be
awarded. The inquiry which will result in imposition of punishment
can be said to be expected or contemplated. When the Government
sets in motion its machinery for investigating the alleged complaints
so that it may hold a formal inquiry more properly the formal inquiry
is clearly contemplated, and the power to suspend comes into play. In
S.C. Kharbdanda v. State of U.P. , a Division Bench observed:— “The
mere fact that a preliminary enquiry has been admittedly instituted is
proof positive of the fact that the departmental enquiry is contemplated.
Were, it otherwise, the authorities would decline to undertake the
preliminary enquiry.”
45. In Dr. Subash Chand v. State of U.P., 2005 SCC OnLine All 1712
the Allahabad High Court while considering the suspension of the Veterinary
oﬃcer in Animal Husbandry Department of the State Government following
a government order explained the meaning of the term contemplation of
Inquiry as follows:
“13. …So far as the meaning of phrase "against whose conduct an
inquiry is contemplated" is concerned, the full Bench observed that
against whose conduct an inquiry is expected or to be initiated under
Rule-55 of the C.C.A. Rules. That will be when a decision has been
taken on the basis of material collected on preliminary investigation
and the Appointing Authority is prima facie satisﬁed that they have
1070 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 16 S.C.R.

substance to justify either of the major punishments and initiation of
formal proceeding would be justiﬁed. At any point of time prior to
taking of such a decision it could not be said that an inquiry under
Rule-55 was contemplated. This stage would not be Cached unless the
appointing authority decides in circumstances of the case that it will
proceed to hold an inquiry under Rule-55. It is framing of charge or
charges and their communication to the charged government servant,
virtually initiates the formal departmental proceeding.
14…In as much under Clause (1) of Rule 49-A, the power of suspension
can be exercised only when decision has been taken to start an
inquiry under Rule-55 which can be done only when on preliminary
investigation, such material has been collected which have substance
to justify the formal departmental proceeding and it is expected that on
evidence brought before inquiry oﬃcer, such misconduct on the part
of government servant will be established, which in normal course
would justify either of the major penalties viz. dismissal, removal or
reduction in rank, suspension is resorted to". The court further held
that the expression "as a rule" occurring in the beginning of the note
implies that that is always the rule to be observed.
38. Thus, we are of considered opinion that there can be no scope for
doubt to hold that on receipt of such complaint containing allegations
against government servant, the appointing authority has to be
satisﬁed about the allegations contained therein and further such
allegations have any substance enabling to hold formal disciplinary
inquiry against the government servant for imposition of major penalty
against him. Before such satisfaction is arrived at with regard to
such allegations, it is not open for the appointing authority to place a
government servant under suspension. In this connection it is necessary
to make it clear that such satisfaction need not be in shape of a ﬁnal
and ﬁrm decision, otherwise the "inquiry" instead of being "expected"
or "as contingency", it would be sure and certain, which could not
be said to be intention of rule-making authority while employing the
phrase "an inquiry is contemplated.”
46. In State of U.P. v. Jawahar Lal Bhargava, 1974 SCC OnLine
All 45 the Allahabad High Court while considering suspension order of
STATE OF HARYANA AND OTHERS v. DINESH SINGH 1071
AND ANOTHER [ARAVIND KUMAR, J.]

a Judicial oﬃcer presumably under Rule 49A of the U.P. Civil Services
(Classiﬁcation, control and Appeal) Rules considered the meaning of the
term “Inquiry” and “contemplation” as follows:
“13. …Thus the word 'inquiry' means nothing hut the formal
disciplinary proceeding and not the investigation of an informal
character which must often precedes the initiation of formal
disciplinary proceeding envisaged by Rule 55. When the appointing
authority takes a decision to start formal proceedings, then within
15 days of taking that decision charge or charges should be handed
over to the charged oﬃcer. Thus there is a time lag of 15 days
permitted between taking the decision to start formal proceedings
and the service of charges on the charged oﬃcer. The direction
given by the Governor envisages that at the time when a decision
is taken by the appointing authority to start formal proceedings
it must also simultaneously decide whether the Oﬃcer should be
placed under suspension pending the inquiry. It is at this stage that
it can be said that an inquiry is contemplated against the conduct
of the Government servant. The only meaning that can be given
to the phrase 'against whose conduct an inquiry is contemplated',
occurring in Clause (I) of Rule 49-A, would be against whose
conduct an inquiry under Rule 55 is to be initiated." This will be
when a decision has been taken on the basis of the material collected
on preliminary investigation and the appointing authority is prima
facie satisﬁed that they have substance and the starting of formal
proceedings would be justiﬁed. At any point of time prior to the
taking of such a decision it could not be said that an inquiry under
Rule 55 was contemplated.
14. Though the verb 'contemplate' has many meanings and has
somewhat an ambiguous import, yet it has to be given a deﬁnite
meaning in the context in which it has been used in harmony with the
scheme laid down in the Civil Services (Classiﬁcation, Control and
Appeal) Rules pertaining to conduct and discipline of the Government
servant who fall within the rule making power of the Governor under
Article 309 of the Constitution. With great respect the meaning given
by Seth, J. in Rajendra Shanker Nigam v. State of U.P. appears to be
1072 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 16 S.C.R.

correct, that is to have in view an inquiry under Rule 55 or to hold
an inquiry under Rule 55. This stage would not be reached unless the
appointing authority decides in the circumstances of the case that it
will proceed to hold an inquiry under Rule 55. Mewed in this light
and the directions of the Governor as given in para 2 of the Appendix
IV, quoted above, the substance of which is contained in the Note, the
phrase 'suspension, where deemed necessary should, as far as possible
immediately precede the framing of charges and their communication
to the Government servant charged occurring in the Note will mean
where it is decided to suspend a Government servant pending an formal
inquiry under Rule 55 the order of suspension as far as possible be
passed immediately preceding the framing of the charges and their
communication…The Note does not permit the appointing authority
to suspend a Government servant before it decides to initiate a formal
inquiry under Rule 55 against the Government servant. The Note ﬁxes
the earliest point of time for the exercise of the power of suspension.
The phrase as far as possible' cannot be construed as leaving a power
with the appointing authority to suspend a Government servant at a
point of time earlier than the earliest point of time ﬁxed by the Note.”
47. The reason for declaring the Respondent (Dinesh Singh) ineligible
for selection as per Rule 9 was on the ground that ‘decision has been taken
on ﬁle to charge sheet him under Rule 7’11. At no point has it been asserted
by Dinesh Singh (Respondent no. 4) that disciplinary proceedings were not
contemplated against him. His entire case from the very beginning has been
that the cut-oﬀ date qua all eligibility conditions must be determined as on
01.11.2018 and since there was no decision/contemplation to initiate any
disciplinary proceedings as of that date, he ought to have been recommended
for appointment. In fact, in the Counter-Aﬃdavit submitted on his behalf,
there is an implicit admission that a decision to initiate disciplinary action
against him (Dinesh Singh) was taken on 09.01.2019.
48. We have already noted above that the relevant cut-oﬀ date qua Rule
9 (1)(a)(iii) is 31.08.2019 and therefore, it was not necessary for us to decide
anything further. However, we have surveyed the relevant authorities dealing

11 Rule 7 of Haryana Civil Services (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 2016
STATE OF HARYANA AND OTHERS v. DINESH SINGH 1073
AND ANOTHER [ARAVIND KUMAR, J.]

with the meaning of ‘contemplation’ only to satisfy ourselves that there
was, in fact, a contemplation to initiate disciplinary proceedings as per law.
49. The main allegation against Respondent No.1 is that on 05.01.2019
and 06.01.2019, he was directed to act as Duty Magistrate during the
Haryana Teacher’s Eligibility Test, 2018 and he remained absent from this
duty and as such he was negligent in performing his oﬃcial duties. The
Deputy Commissioner, Kurukshetra wrote a letter dated 9.01.2019 to the
Additional Chief Secretary and Finance Commissioner, Government of
Haryana, Department of Revenue and Disaster Management in this regard
and recommended that formal inquiry be initiated against the Respondent. In
view of this communication, a decision was taken on 05.02.2019 to charge-
sheet Respondent No. 1. It is not relevant for us to consider what happened
beyond the date of consideration, that is, 31.08.2019. However, it may be
recorded here that subsequent to this date, there was a charge-sheet issued
against the Respondent and ultimately, the entire proceedings came to be
dropped on 11.12.2019. Since the eligibility conditions in Rule 9 (1)(a)(iii),
the validity of which is not under challenge before us, requires us to limit
our inquiry into the question of eligibility as on date of consideration, what
happens after that becomes insigniﬁcant to the inquiry.
50. In the background of the above facts and position of law analysed
hereinabove, it has to be concluded that as on the date of consideration,
disciplinary action was contemplated against the writ petitioner Dinesh
Singh, and therefore he was rightly held to be ineligible for selection of his
name in Register A-1.
51. Accordingly, this appeal is allowed. The impugned order of the
Division Bench of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana is set aside
and order of the Ld. Single Judge dated 23.04.2021 is aﬃrmed subject to
observations made hereinabove.
Costs made easy.

Headnotes prepared by: Appeal allowed.
Divya Pandey

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