Holding

Delay alone is not sufficient to quash criminal proceedings; the seriousness of the offence and the accused’s contribution to the delay must be considered, and discharge under Section 245, CrPC is permissible only when no case is made out against the accused.

Summary

An FIR under Section 3 of the Railway Property (Unlawful Possession) Act, 1966 was filed in 1991 and a complaint was lodged before a Judicial Magistrate on 13‑01‑1992. After a series of revisions and a long period of inactivity—largely caused by the accused’s own challenges and absence—the case remained pending for more than seven years. The accused sought discharge; the trial magistrate rejected it, but the Patna High Court quashed the proceedings on the ground of delay, finding no evidence of laches on the part of the accused. The State appealed, and the Supreme Court held that delay alone cannot justify quashing; the seriousness of the offence and the accused’s contribution to the delay must be considered, and discharge under Section 245 CrPC is permissible only when no case is made out against the accused. Consequently, the High Court order was set aside and the trial court was directed to complete the prosecution within six months, with any delay attributable to the accused debited from the time‑frame.

Issues considered

Whether a delay of several years in a criminal trial, absent proof of laches by the accused, is sufficient to quash proceedings under Section 482, CrPC.
Whether Section 245, CrPC permits discharge of the accused in the present circumstances.
Whether the seriousness of the offence under the Railway Property (Unlawful Possession) Act precludes quashing solely on the ground of delay.
Whether the accused’s own role in causing the delay bars them from invoking delay as a ground for discharge.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 244, s. 245, s. 482

Subjects

criminal procedurequashing of proceedingsdelaySection 245 CrPCSection 482 CrPCRailway Property Actdischarge of accusedserious offencelaches

Judgment

STATE OF BIHAR A
v.
BAIDNATH PRASAD@ BAIDYANATH SHAH AND ANR.

OCTOBER 19, 2001

[K.T. THOMAS AND S.N. VARIAV A, JJ.] B

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 :

Section 482-Quashing of criminal proceedings-Prayer for discharge
in a long pending criminal matter before Judicial Magistrate-Rejected-
Accused moved the High Court-High Court observed that the case is pending
c
for several years-Nothing on record to show that delay in proceeding caused
due to !aches on the part of the accused-Hence quashed the criminal proceed-
ings-On appeal, held, the seriousness qf the qffence involved is not to be over-
looked while considering the question whether delay alone is sufficient to quash
criminal proceeding-High Court order set aside. D
Section 245-Applicability of-An order o.f discharge can be passed
when Magistrate considers that no case against the accused has been made-out
which if unrebutted, warrant conviction-Or when he considers the charges to
be groundless-Accused cannot seek advantage qf the delay (f their contribu-
tion towards the delay was substantial. E

An F.I.R. was registered under Section 3 of the Railway Property
(Unlawful Possession) Act, 1966. After completion of the inquiry, a com-
plaint was filed in the Court of Judicial Magistrate on 13.1.92. The Magis-
trate took cognizance of the offence and instituted proceedings against
F
accused persons including respondents. First respondent thereafter moved
the Sessions Court in revision. The Sessions Judge quashed the Criminal
proceeding on 29.5.92. Appellant moved the High Court on 1.4.94. The
High Court overturned the order of the Sessions Court. Thereafter on
account of the absence of accused the case remained in limbo till 14.10.96,
when all the accused made their appearance before the Magistrate. The G
Trial Magistrate collected evidence and the case was posted for framing
charge. On 5.1.1998, the accused filed a petition for discharging them,
which was dismissed by the trial Court. Against the said order, respondent
moved the High Court. The High Court quashed the criminal proceeding
holding that the case was pending for more than 7 years and there was H
461
462 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.
A nothing on record to show that the delay in proceeding with the case has
been caused due to laches on the part of petitioners and therefore the
proceeding. against petitioners should not continue any further. In this
appeal, the appellant-State challenged the Judgment of the High Court.

Allowing the appeal, the Court
B
HELD : 1. The interval between 13.1.1992 (the date on which the
Magistrate took cognizance of the offence) and 24.7.1998 (the date on
which the High Court quashed the proceedings) is too long a period. If the
criminal case remained without any progress during the said period it
portrays a sad picture of the administration of criminal justice. But the
c uncontroverted fact/situation in this case reflects t~at the respondents-
accused have no justification in seeking advantage of delay because their
contribution towards such delay was, by no means insubstantiaf. The ideal
situation is to have criminal proceedings completed swiftly. But the ideal is
far from practical attainment due to variety of reasons. If one has to abide
D by the ideal alone, then any p~riod of delay is enough to axe-down the
criminal proceedings. In considering the question whether delay alone is
sufficient to quash pending criminal proceedings, the seriousness of the
offence involved is not to be overlooked. (463-H; 464-A-B; 465-B; E-F]

Seeta Hemchandra Shashittal v. State of Maharashtra, (2001] 4 SCC
E
525, relied on.

Rajiv Gupta v. State of H.P., [2000] 1 SCC 68, held inapplicable.

2. An order of discharge of the accused after collecting the evidence
envisaged in Section 244 Cr.P.C., can be passed only when the Magistrate
F
considers, for reasons to be recorded, that no case against the accused has .
been made out which, if unrebutted, would warrant his conviction. This is
the legislative edict of Section 245 Cr.P.C. The only other exception to the
said percept is that is it open to the Magistrate to discharge the accused at
any previous stage of the case if for reasons to be recorded, the Magistrate
G considers the charge to be groundless. [464-G-H]

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 1075
of 2001.

From the Judgment and Order dated 24.7.98 of the Patna High Court in
H Cr!. M. No. 8235 of 1998.
STATE v. BAIDNATH PRASAD [THOMAS, J.] 463
B.B. Singh for the Appellant. A
S.N. Mishra, Mohd. Kazim Sher for N.S. Bisht for the Respondents.

---<
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

THOMAS, J. Leave granted.
B
The accused persons who succeeded greatly in procrastinating a criminal
proceedings against them, later succeeded in getting the criminal proceedings
quashed solely on the ground of procrastination of court proceedings in the
criminal case concerned. State of Bihar has now challenged the judgment of
a learned single Judge of the Patna High Court as per which the aforesaid C
criminal proceedings have been quashed.

An FIR was registered in 1991 for the offence under Section 3 of the
Railway Property (Unlawful Possession) Act, 1966, (for short 'the RPUP Act').
An inquiry was conducted under Section 8 of the said Act and on completion
of the inquiry a complaint was filed in the court of a judicial magistrate of First D
Class on 13.1.1992. The magistrate took cognizance of the offence and issued
proceedings against four persons arrayed ir. the complaint including the re-
spondents in this appeal. Thereafter, the case passed through many vicissi-
tudes. On 5.1.1998, the respondent moved an application in the trial court
praying that they may be discharged. The magistrate rejected the application E
and the said order of the magistrate was challenged before the High Court. On
24.7.1998, learned single Judge of the High Court quashed the criminal pro-
ceedings as per the impugned order. The reasoning of the learned single Judge
for adopting such a step is the following:

"Admittedly, the criminal case was registered against the petitioners F
on the basis of report on 22.2.1991 and cognizance was taken on
13.1.1992 on the basis of the charge-sheet submitted by the Railway
Police Force personnel. It is also admitted fact that till date charge has
not been framed although about 7 years have passed and the case is
pending for the last seven years. There is nothing on the record to
G
show that the delay in proceeding with the case has been caused due
to !aches on the part of the petitioners. In such circumstances, in my
opinion, for the ends of justice, the instant proceeding against the
petitioners should not continue any further."

The interval between 13.1.1992 (the date on which the magistrate took H
464 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.
A cognizance of the offence) and 24.7.1998 (the date on which the High Court
quashed the proceedings) is, no doubt, too long a period. If the criminal case
remained without any progress during the said period it portrays a sad picture
of the administration of criminal justice. But the uncon¥overted fact situation
in this case reflects that the respondents accused have no justification in
seeking advantage of the said delay because their contribution towards such
B
delay was, by no means, insubstantial.

We may now give an outlay of the said factual position which the
respondents, in their counter affidavit, did not dispute. The complaint was filed
on 13.1.1992 and process was issued against the four accused arrayed therein.
c First respondent thereafter moved the Sessions Court in revision by challenging
the order by which the magistrate took cognizance of the offence. Despite the
legal position casting burden of proof on the person who is found in possession
of railway property, the Sessions Judge had quashed the criminal proceedings
on 29.5.1992. The State thereupon moved the High Court in challenge of the
said order of the Sessions Judge. On 1.4.1994, the High Court overturned the
D said order of the Sessions Court.

The next stage should have commenced in the trial court soon after the
receipt of the records from the High Court, but on account of the absence of
one or the other accused the case remained in limbo till 14.10.1996 by which
E time alone all the accused made their appearance before the magistrate. The
trial court adopted the procedure prescribed in Chapter XIX of the Code of
Criminal Procedure (for short 'the Code') for trial of warrant cases instituted
otherwise than on police report. The trial magistrate collected preliminary
evidence envisaged in Section 244 of the Code and then the case was posted
for framing charge. On 5.1.1998, the accused filed a petition for discharging
F them. That petition was dismissed by the trial court on 10.2.1998. It was
against the said order of the magistrate that the respondents moved the High L
Court and learned single Judge passec! the impugned order. ....
An order of discharge of the accused after collecting the evidence en-
visaged in Section 244 of the Code can be passed only when "the magistrate
G considers, for reasons to be recorded, that no case against the accused has been
made out· which, if unrebutted, would warrant his conviction." This is the
legislative edict of Section 245 of the Code. The only other exception to the
said precept is that it is open to the magistrate to discharge the accused at any
previous stage of the case "if for reasons to be recorded by such magistrate,
H he considers the charge to be groundless." The magistrate had no reason to
STATE v. BAIDNATH PRASAD [THOMAS, J.] 465
discharge the accused at that stage as he felt that there is evidence to frame the A
charge he could not but dismiss the plea for a discharge. The High Court did
not consider the case from the angle provided in Section 245 of the Code. As
extracted above, the High Court was persuaded to discharge the accused only
on the ground that "the case was pending for the last seven years."

The ideal situation is to have criminal proceedings completed swiftly. B
But the ideal is far from practical attainment due to a variety of reasons. If
one has to abide by the ideal alone, then any period of delay is enough to axe
down the criminal proceedings. In Seeta Hemchandra Shashitta.Z v. State of
Maharashtra, [2001] 4 SCC 525 this Court made the following observations:

"This Court has emphasised, time and again, the need for speeding up
c
the trial as undue delay in culminating the criminal proceedings is
antithesis to the Constitutional protection enshrined in Article 21 of the
Constitution. Nonetheless the court has to view it from pragmatic
perspectives and the question of delay cannot be considered entirely
from an academic angle. In other words, the High Court and this D
Court, wheri approached by accused to quash proceedings on the
ground of delay, must consider each case on its own facts. Unfortu-
nately the delay has so permeated in our legal system that at all levels
tardiness has become the leitmotif. Such a malady has been judicially
reprobated and efforts have been made to curtail the delay which has
E
developed as a systemic canker."

In considering the question whether delay alone is sufficient to quash
pending criminal proceedings the seriousness of the offence involved is not to
1

be overlooked. This aspect has been highlighted in the aforecited decision after
extracting the observations made by the Constit~tion Bench in A.R. Antuley v. F
R.S. Naik, [1992] 1 SCC 225. In the present case~ the offence charged against
the respondents is Section 3 of the RPUP Act. Th~t offence is punishable with
imprisonment for a term which may extend to five years and in the absence
of special and adequate reasons to be mentioned in the judgment such impris-
onment shall not be less than one year. If it is found that the accused had
committed the second or a subsequent offence such minimum term of impris-
G
.1 onment shall be two years. We point out this aspect to show that the offence
now pitted against the respondents is serious in nature.

Learned counsel for the respondents invited our attention to the decision
of this Court in Rajiv Gupta v. State of H.P., [2000] 1 SCC 68. In paragraph H
466 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.
A 7 of the said judgment learned Judges pointed out that if the trial of a case for
an offence punishable with imprisonment up to three years has been pending
for more than two years without commencing the trial the criminal court is
required to discharge and acquit the accused. As indicated by this Court in
Common Cause v. Union of India, [1996] 6 SCC 775, it is apparent that the
said decision has no application to the facts of this case.
B
In the present case, cause of the delay is mostly due to the accused either
because they challenged the various orders passed or because they were not
present in the court and hence proceedings could not be continued on many
occasions. Causes attributable to the prosecution or even to the court are
C comparably much less as to permit the accused to take advantage of the delay
in registering progress of the proceedings.

We, therefore, set aside the impugned order and direct the trial court to
proceed with the case and complete the prosecution evidence within six months
from the date on which the accused would appear before. the trial court. We
D make it clear that if the accused is instrumental in causing the delay, then so
much of the period would be debited from the time frame fixed by us above.

S.K.S.
This appeal is allowed in the above. terms.

Appeal allowed.
-