Holding

The Supreme Court held that the enquiry officer's findings were supported by documentary evidence and that the High Court could not interfere with the disciplinary authority's discretion on punishment; the order of the High Court was set aside and the case remitted to the appellate authority.

Summary

The respondent, a Branch Manager of State Bank of India, claimed reimbursement for moving his household goods after a transfer and was charged with five offences, including false claims and irregular loan disbursement. An enquiry officer found all charges proved on documentary evidence, and the disciplinary authority imposed removal, which was upheld by the Board of Appeal. The respondent obtained a writ of certiorari, and the High Court set aside the disciplinary findings on grounds that the enquiry report was not supplied, the appellate order was not a speaking order, and the findings were perverse and unsupported by evidence. The Supreme Court allowed the bank’s appeal, held that the enquiry officer’s findings were supported by evidence, and that judicial review under Article 226 is limited to ensuring procedural fairness, not re‑examining the merits or the quantum of punishment. Consequently, the High Court’s order was set aside and the matter remitted to the appellate authority to consider whether a lesser punishment is appropriate.

Issues considered

Whether the High Court was correct in holding that the enquiry officer's findings were perverse and based on no evidence.
Whether non‑supply of the enquiry report before imposing removal vitiates the punishment order.
Whether the appellate order’s lack of a speaking order violates Rule 51(2) of the SBI (Supervising Staff) Service Rules.
Whether the High Court can interfere with the quantum of punishment (removal) under Article 226.
Whether the punishment imposed is excessive and subject to judicial review.

Legislation cited

Constitution of Indias. 226, s. 309, s. 311(2)
State Bank of India (Supervising Staff) Service Ruless. 32(1), s. 32(4), s. 51(2)

Subjects

Service lawdisciplinary inquiryremovaljudicial reviewArticle 226Article 311State Bank of India (Supervising Staff) Service Rulesfalse claimpunishmentappellate authorityHigh Court

Judgment

A STATE BANK OF INDIA AND ORS.
v.
SAMARENDRA KISHORE ENDOW AND ANR.

JANUARY 18, 1994

B [B.P. JEEVAN REDDY AND B.L. HANSARIA, JJ.)

Service Law: State Bank of India (Supervising Staff) Service Rules : y-
Rules 32(1), 32(4), 51 (2 )-Bank Employee-Disciplinary Enquiry-Submis-
sion offalse claims in transfer allowances bill and commission of other ir-
C regularities-Removal from service-Writ petition by employee allowed by
High Court holding that findings of departmenta( authorities were based on
no evidence-Held, findings of Enquiry Officer were based on documentary
evidence--lf punishment of removal is harsh, it is a matter to be considered
by disciplinary authority or appellate authority and not by High Court or
D Administrative Tribunal-Case remitted to appellate authority.
---(
Constitution of India : Article 226-Bank employee-Disciplinary in-
quiry-Punishment-Imposition of~uantum of punishment-Held, imposi-
tion of appropriate punishment is within the discretion of disciplinary
au~ority-Appellate authority may inteifere, but not High Court-f'ower
E .under Article 226 is one of judicial review-It is not an appeal from a
decision, but a review of the manner in which the decision is made.

Article 311(2)-Bank Officer-Disciplinary Enquiry-Penalty-Enquiry.
report not furnished to employee-Whether vitiaties proceedings.

F Administrative Law : Judicial review-Power of judicial review is meant
to ensure that individual receives fair treatment and nor that tht~· authority
reaches a conclusion which is comet in the eyes of the Court.

The respondent, a Branch Manager in the appellant Bank, on his
transfer, claimed a certain amount by way of reimbursement for expenses
G incurred by him in shifting his house·hold goods. He was subjected to a
disciplinary inquiry on the ground of false claims made by him in the ~-
transfer allowance bill and in respect of certain other irregularities com-
mitted by him while working as Branch Manager. The Enquiry Officer held
that all the charges had been proved. The disciplinary authority agreed
H with the findings except on one charge, and imposed the pc:nalty of removal
154
- S.B.I. v. S.K. ENDOW 155
__.;..,.
upon the respondent. The respondent's appeal was dismissed by the A
Board. He filed a writ petition, which was allowed by the High Court on
the grounds that the findings of the Enquiry Officer and the disciplinary
authority were based on no evidence and were perverse; non-supply of
Enquiry Officer's report before imposing the penalty vitiated the order of
punishment; and the appellate order was not a speaking order as con-
,-
templated byr.51(2) of the S.B.I. (Supervising Staff) Service Rules. Hence
B
the appeal by special leave.
-•{

Allowing the appeal, setting aside the order of the High Court and
remitting the matter to the appellate authority on the question of punish·
ment, this Court c
HELD : 1. The power of judicial review is meant to ensure that the
individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the authority,
after according fair treatment, reaches on a matter which it is authorised
by I.aw to decide for itself, a conclusion which is correct in the eyes of the
.. > Court. [162-E] D
Chief Constable of North Wales Police v. Evans, (1982) 3 All.E.R. 141
at 155, referred to.

2. Imposition of appropriate punishment is within the discretion and
judgment of the disciplinary authorify. It may be open to the appellate E
authority to interfere with it, but not to the High Court-or the Ad-
ministrative Tribunal- for the reason that the jurisdiction of the Tribunal
is similar to the powers of the High Court under Article 226 of the
Constitution. The power under Article 226 is one of judicial review. It is
not an appeal from a decision, but a review of the manner in which the
F
decision was made. (162-D]

A.B. Ganghi v. M/s. Gopinath & Sons, [1992] Suppl. 2 S.C.R. 312 and
State of Andhra Pradesh and Ors. v. S. Sree Rama Rao, A.I.R. (1963) S.C.
1723, relied on.
G
Chief Constable of the North Wales Police v. Evans, (1982) 3 All.E.R.
._.z
141 at lSS,.referred to.

3. The findings of the Enquiry Officer on charges in respect of false
claims in tht transfer allowance bill were based on documentary evidence,
and the High Court was not right in holding otherwise. (161-B] H
156 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1994) 1 S.C.R.

A 4. The finding of the Enquiry Officer with regard to the violation of
rules regarding disbursement of construction loan is certainly based upon
the terms and conditions of the loan contained in the loan documents and
the fact that the entire amount ofloan was disbursed in the course of three
days. Therefore, it cannot be said that the finding is based on no evidence.
~ (162-A, BJ
B
5. The order of punishment being prior to 20.11.1990, non-supply of
Enquiry Officers' report before imposing the penalty does not vitiate the
order of punishment. (159-H; 160-A]

Managing Director ECIL Hyderabad v. B. Karunakar & Ors., (1963) 6
C J.T.I., relied on. .

6.1. The main charge against the respondent is putting forward a
false claim for reimbursement of expenditure incurred for transporting his
belongings. So far as the charge in respect of disbursement of construction
D loan is concerned there is no finding that the account became irregular or
that any loss was incurred by the bank on account of the irregularity
committed by the respondent. [166-F]

6.2. In the circumstances, it may be that the punishment of removal
imposed upon the respondent is harsh but this is a matter which the
disciplinary authority or the appellate authority should consider and not
E the High Court or the Administrative Tribunal. The proper course to be
adopted iat such a situation would be to send the matter either to the
disciplinary authority or the Appellate authority to impose appropriate
punishment. Accordingly, the matter is remitted to the appellate authority
to consider whether a lesser punishment is not called for in the facts and
F circumstances of the case. (166-G-H, 167-A]

Orissa and Ors. v. Bidyabhushan Mohapatra, A.I.R. (1963) S.C. 779,
followed.

Railway Board Delhi and Anr. v. Niranjan Singh, A.I.R. (1969) S.C.
G 766 and State of Orissa v. Vidya Bhushan Mohapatra, A.I.R. (1963) S.C. 779,
relied -on.

Bhagat Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh and Ors., A.I.R. (1988) S.C.
454, inapplicable.·

H Union of India v. Tulsiram Pate~ A.l.R. (1985) S.C.1416; Shankar.Das
)-
S.B.1. v. SX ENDOW 157

v. Union of India, [1985] 2 S.C.C. 358, inapplicable. A
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 392 of
1994.

From the Judgement and Order dated 7.2.1991 of the High Court in
Civil Rule No.3 of 1986. B
Kailash Vasdev for the Appellants.

Anil Srivastava for Mrs. Hemantika W ahi for the Respondents.

The following Order of the Court was delive~ed : c
1. This appeal is preferred by the State Bank of India agains~ the
decision of the Gauhati High Court allowing the writ petition filed by the
respondent.

2. The respondent was appointed as a Cashier in the appellant- Bank D
in the year 1968. He was promoted to Officer Grade II and then to Grade
I. While he was working at Phek Branch in Nagaland, he was promoted to
the rank of Branch Manager and was transferred to Amarpur Branch in
the State of Tripura in January, 1981. The appellant joined at Amarpur
and claimed certain amount by way of reimbursement for the expenses E
incurred by him in shifting his belongnings and other articles to Amarpur
from Phek. An enquiry was made into the correctness of the receipts and
other documents produced by him in that connection (and into some other
I alleged irregularities committed by him) and he was subjected to a discipli-
'r nary enquiry on five charges. The charges read as follows :-
F
"CHARGE I

That on 10.2.1982, you submitted a Travelling Allowance
Bill for Rs.12,194,80p in connection with your permanent
transfer from Phek Branch to Amarpur branch. In the said
bill you make a claim of Rs.9,500,00 being the hiring G
charges incurred by you for a full truck and in support of
your claim you submitted a false money receipt dated
9.1.1982 for Rs.9,500,00 obtained from M/s Bairam
Hariram. Church Road, Dimapur, whereas you neither
engaged- a full truck nor spent Rs.9,500,00 for the H
[1994] 1 S.C.R.
-
158 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

A transport of household goods. By your above act you failed
to discharge your duties with utmost integrity, honesty,
devotion and diligence and h!lve violated Rule 32(4) of
the State Bank of India (Supervising Staff) Service Rules.

CHARGE II
B
That in your Travelling Allowance Bill for Rs.12,194.80p
dated 10.2.1982 you made another claim for Rs.120 sup-
ported by two false separate money receipts dated
9.2.1982. for Rs.60 each obtained from one Shri Ram
c Prasad being the loading and unloading charges incurred
for household goods at Phek and Amarpur respectively.
By your above act again you have failed to discharge your
duties with utmost integrity, honesty, devotion and
dilige~ce and violated Rule 32(4) of the State Bank of
India (Supervising Staff) Service Rules.
D
CHARGE Ill

That along with the Travelling Allowance Bill for
Rs.12,194.SOp dated 10.2.1982 you furnished a list of 19
packages of household items claimed to have been
E transported from Phek to Amarpur·whereas only 8 pack-
ages of household goods were transported. Thus you
knowingly furnished an inflated list of goods transported
with an intention to derive undue pecuniary benefit and
thereby infringed rule 32(4) of the State Bank of India
F (Supervising Staff) Service Rules.

CHARGEW

That d,uring the period of your posting at our Phek Branch
your S.B. Account there at showed frequent deposits by
G means of cash as well as transfer transactions. These
deposits and various T.D. Rs.S.T.D. Rs. and other assets
acquired as detailed in the Statement of Allegation
enclosed herewith, indicate that you were having assets
disproportionate to your known sources of inc<;>me the fact
>-
H which reflect adversely on your conduct which is unbe-
}
S.BJ. v. S.K. ENDOW 159

coming of a Bank official cmd thus you infrill;ged Rule A
32(4) of the State Bank of India (Supervising Staff) Service
Rules.

CHARGE V

That while you were holding temporary charge of the Phek B
Branch you disbursed a construction loan to Shri Asong
Snock in two instalments i.e. Rs.90,000,00 on 7.5.1981 i.e,.
as soon as you received the sanction from Regional Office
- -.(_ and Rs.10,000,00 on 10.5.1981, without taking into account
the progress of the construction of the building as in-
structed by Regional Office. The said loan was not utilised
c
for the construction of the building and as a result of which
the account become irregular. Thus you have infringed
Rules 32(1), 32(4) of the State Bank of India (Supervising
Staff) Service Rules."
D
3. An Enquiry Officer was appointed by the disciplinary authority
(the Chief General Manager) who held, after due enquiry that all the five
charges are proved. The disciplinary authority perused the entire material
and agreed with the findings of the Enquiry Officer on charges 1,2,3, and
5 but did not agree with the finding on charge 4. He imposed the penalty
of removal upon the respondent. An appeal preferred by the respondent E
was dismissed by the Board whereupon the respondent approached the
High Court by way of a writ petition. The High Court allowed the writ
petition on three grounds, namely, (1) non-supply of Enquiry Officer's

-
+
\,-
/
report before imposing the penalty vitiates the order of punishment, (2)
the appellate order is not a speaking order and is therefore not in con-
formity with Rule 51(2) of the S.B.I. (Supervisory Staff) Service Rules and
(3) the findings of the Enquiry Officer and the disciplinary authority on
F

charges 1 to 3 and 5 are based on no evidence and must therefore be
characterised as perverse.

4. In this appeal, Mr. Goswami, learned counsel for the appellant- G
Bank assailed the correctness of all the said three findings. Sofar as the
first ground given by the High Court is concerned, it must be held to be
not sustainable in law in view of the recent decision of the Constitution
Bench of this Court in Managing Director ECIL, Hyderabad v. B. Kanmakar
& Ors., (1993) 6 IT 1, inasmuch as the order of punishment in this case is. H
160 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994] 1 S.C.R.

A prior to 20th November, 1990.

5. Before dealing with the second ground, we think it appropriate to ,
deal with the third ground, in the facts an.cl circumstances of this case. Sofar
as the charge No.1 is concerned, the respondent had produced a receipt
in a sum of Rs.9,500 claiming that to be the expenses incurred by him for
B transporting his belongings. It appears that when .he came to know that
certain enquiries were being made by the Bank into the correctness of the
receipts produced by him, he produced the second receipt (in June, 1982)
in a sum of Rs.2,755. (The first receipt was produced in January, 1982).
The respondent's case was that though initially the transporter charged him
c the sum of Rs.9.500, which he paid partly in cash and partly through a
post-dated cheque, the transporter later revised the charges downwards to
Rs.2,755. P.W.1. - the transporter, examined by the Bank, supported the
respondent's case in full. However, the Enquiry Officer refused to believe
his evidence for the various reasons given by him in his report. After
D examining the evidence of P.W.1 and other documentary evidence at
length, the Enquiry Officer found that "there was no actual movement of
household goods belonging to Shri S.K. Endow on the dates represented
by the documents". The High Court, however, proceeded on the assump-
tion that the finding of the Enquiry Officer was to the effect that there was
no actual movement of household goods belonging to him at all. In other
E words, it ignored the words "on the dates represented by the documents"
in the above finding. The High Court, held on that basis that the Enquiry
Officer was in error in holding that there was absolutely no oral evidence
in support of the finding that there was no movement of goods. We are not
satisfied with the reasoning of the High Court. Firstly, it is based upon an
incomplete reading - or if we may call it, misreading - of the finding
F
recorded 'by the Enquiry Officer. Secondly, it cann0t be said that the
finding of the Enquiry Officer was based on no evidence. Once the ex-
11lanation offered by the Respondent is disbelieved, there are two con-
tradictory receipts-produced by him - the earlier one claiming a far higher
amount and the latter one claiming a far lesser amount. Apart from that
G the Enquiry Officer has relied upon several documents, namely, P .Ex.23,
P.Ex.10 and 9 in support of his finding. It cannot therefore be said that the
Enquiry Officer's finding is based on no evidence.

6. Charge Nci.2 relates to claim of Rs.120 towards loading and
H unloading charges, evidenced by two receipts dated 9.1.1982. The Enquiry
)-
S.B.I. v. SJ(. ENDOW 161
~ Officer found that in view of the grave discrepancies with respect to the A
date.s of transportation and also because Ram Prasad who is said to have
accompanied the goods in the truck was not examined, the charge must be
held proved. The Enquiry Officer found that the loading and unloading did
not take place on the dates mentioned therein. This fmding is again based
upon the documentary evidence and cannot be said to be not supported
by any evidence. The High Court was of the opinion that there was no
B
evidence in support of the Enquiry Officer's fmding that Ram Prasad is a
·-< ficticious person. We have perused the finding of Enquiry Officer closely.
The fmding is not that Ram Prasad is a ficticious person but that his
non-examination goes to show that the respondent's case that the said
person accompanied the goods is not established. No doubt, he also added c
that Ram Prasad appears to be a ficticious persons, but that is only by way
of an additional reason; it is not the main reason.

7. With respect to charge No.3, the reasoning of the High Court is
the same as is assigned by it with respect to charge No.2. The High Court
~
has further proceeded on the assumption that the fmding of the Enquiry
D
Officer is to the effect that there was no movement of goods. We have
pointed out hereinabove that the fmding is not that movement of goods did
not take place but that it did not take place on the dates assigned by the
respondent.
E

. the respondent
8. Now coming to charge No.5, the Enquiry Officer has found that
has acted in violation of the instructions of the bank that a
r loan sanctioned to be disbursed in instalments, must be released in instal-
ment/instalments after verifying that the previous instalment/instalments
have been properly utilised. The charge is that he released two instalments F
in a sum of Rs.90,000 on a single day, namely, 7.5.1981 and again released
the balance amount of Rs.10,000 on 10.5.1981, i.e. within three days,
without verifying the progress of construction of the building for which the
loan was sanctioned. The Enquiry Officer found that Ex.20 which con-
tained terms and conditions of the loan does specifically provide for
disbursement of a loan in a phased manner and that the release of the G
_,....._
entire amount almost at once was in violation of the said condition. The
High Court found fault with the Enquiry Officer for not recording the
finding that the account become irregular due to the .said disburSem.ent and
that there wa'i no finding also that the building was not constructed. The
High Court concluded that the finding of Enquiry Officer on this charge H
162 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994) 1 S.C.R.

A too is not based on evidence. We are unable to agree with the approach
and opinion of the High Court. The finding of the Enquiry Officer is
certainly based upon the terms and conditions of the loan contained in the
. loan document and the fact that the entire amount of loan was disbursed
ip the course of three days. We are unable to see how it can be said that
the said finding is based on no evidence.
B
9. For the above reasons, the judgment of the High Court is liable to
be set aside and. is accordingly set aside. ·

10. On the question of punishment, learned counsel for the respon-
C dent submitted that the punishment awarded is excessive and tha.t lesser
punishment would meet the ends of justice. It may be noticed that the
imposition of app~opriate punishment is within the discretion and judg-
ment of the disciplinary authority. It may be open to the appellate authority
to interfere with it but not to the High Court - or to the Administrative
D Tribunal for the reason that the jurisdiction of the Tribunal is similiar to ·
the powers of the High Court under Article 226. The power under Article
226 is one of judicial review. It "is not an appeal from a decision, but a
review of the manner inwhich the decision was made". Per Lord Brightman
in Chief Constable of the North Wales Police v. Evans, (1982) 3 All.E.R. 141
at 155, and A.B. Ganghi v. M/s. Gopinath & Sons, [1992] Suppl. 2 S.C.R.
E 312. In other words the power of judicial review is meant "to ensuie that
the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the authority,-
after according fair treatment, reaches on a matter which it is authorised
by law to decide for itself a conclusion which is correct in the eyes of the
Court". (Per LJ?rd Marylebone in Chief Constable v. Evans,.) In fact in
F sen?ce matters, it was held by this Court as far back as 1963 that :
t
"The High Court is not constituted under Article 226
of the Ctmstitution a Court of appeal over the decision of
tP.e authorities. holding a departmental enquiry against a
public servant; it is concerned to determine whether the
G inquiry. is held by an authority competent in that behalf,
and whether the rules of natural justice are not violatad.
Where there is some evidence, which the authority
entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted
and whicp evidence may reasonably support the con-
H clusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge,
}-

' S.B.I. v. SX ENDOW 163

it is not the function of the High Court in a petition for a A
writ under Art 226 to review the evidence and to arrive
at an independent finding on the evidence. The High
Court may undoubtedly interfere where the departmental
authorities have held the proceedings against the delin-
quent in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural
justice or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the
B
mode of enquiry or where the authorities have disabled
- - ....<'., themselves from reaching a fair decision by some con-
siderations extraneous to the evidence and the merits of
the case or by allowing themselves to be influenced by
irrelevant considerations or where the conclusion on the c
very face of it is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that
no reasonable person could ever have arrived at that
conclusion, or on similar grounds. But the departmental
authorities are, if the enquiry is otherwise properly held,
the sole judges of facts and if there be some legal evidence
D
on which the findings can be based, the adequacy or
reliability of that evidence is not a matter which can be
permitted to be canvassed before the High Court in a
proceeding .... under Article 226 of the Constitution".

(State of Andhra Pradesh and others v. S. Sree Rama E
Rao, A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 1723)

11. Now, coming to the power of the Court exercising Judicial Review
to interfere on the question of penalty, it was held by a Constitution Bench
in State of Orissa and others v. Bidyabhushan Mohapatra, A:I.R. 1963 S.C. F
779, thus:

"But the Court in a case in which an order of dismissal
of a public servant is impugned, is not concerned to decide
whether the sentence imposed, provided it is justified by
the rules, is appropriate having regard to the gravity of G
the misdemeanour established. The reasons which induce
the punishing authority, if there has been an enquiry
consistent with the prescribed rules, are not justiciable :
nor is the penalty open to review by the Court. If the High
Court is satisfied that if some but not all of the findings H
{
/

164 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1994] 1 S.C.R.

A of the Tribunal were "unassailable'\ the order of the
Governor on whose powers by the rules no restrictions in
determining the appropriate punishment are placed, was
final, and the High Court had no j1:1risdiction to direct the
Governor to review the penalty for as we have already
observed the_ order of dismissal passed by a competent
B authority on a public servant, if the conditions of the
constitutional protection have been complied with, is not
justiciable. Therefore if the order may be supported on
any finding as to substantial misdemeanour for which the
punishment can lawfully be imposed, it is not for the Court
c to ·consider whether that ground alone would have
weighed with the authority in dismissing the public ser~
vant. The' Court has no jurisdiction if the findings of the
enquiry officer or the Tribunal prima f acie make out a
case of misdemeanour, to direct the authority to recon-
sider that order because in respect of some of the findings
D
but not all it appears that there had been violation of the
. rules of natural justice".

12. This principle was reiterated in Railway Board, Delhi and another
v. Niranjan Singh, A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 966.
E
The same view was reitrated by this Court in Union of India v. Panna
Nanda, A.I.~. 1989 S.C. 1185. It was an appeal from the judgment and
order of an Administrative Tribunal. K. Jagannatha Shetty, J. speaking for
the Bench observed in the first instance that the jurisdiction of the Tribunal
F is similar to the jurisdiction of the High Court in a writ proceeding and
then dealt with the power of the Tribunal to interfere with the penalty
imposed by the Disciplinary authority. The learned Judge referred to the
holding in State of Orissa v. Bidya Bhushan Mohapatra, (quoted by us
hereinabove) and after referring to several other judgments of this Court,
concluded thus :
G
"We must unequivocally state that the jurisdiction of
the Tribunal to interfere with the disciplinary matters or
punishment cannot be equated with an appellate jurisdic-
tion. The Tribunal cannot interfere with the findings of
H the Inquiry Officer or competent authority where they are
}
S.B.I. v. S.K. ENDOW 165

not arbitraty or utterly perverse. It is appropriate to A
remember that the power to impose penalty on a delin-
quent officer is conferred on the competent authority
either by an Act of legislature or rules made under the
proviso in Article 309 of the Constitution. If there has been
an enquiry consistent with the rules and in accordance
with principles of natural justice what punishment would
B
meet the ends of justice is a matter exclusively within the
jurisdiction of the competent authority. If the penalty can
lawfully be imposed and is imposed on the proved mis-
..-.(. conduct, the Tribunal has no power to substitute its own
I
discretion for that of the authority. The adequacy of penalty c
unless it is mala fide, is certainly not a matter for the
Tribunal to concern with. The Tribunal also cannot inter-
fere with the penalty if the conclusion of the Inquiry
Officer or the competent authority is based on evidence
even if some of it is found to be irrelevant or extraneous
D
to the matter."

13. It is significant to mention that the learned Judge also referred
to the decision of this Court in Bhagat Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh
and Others, A.LR. 1983 S.C. 454, and held, on a consideration of the facts
and principle thereof, that "this decision is therefore no authority for the E
proposition that the. High Court or the Tribunal has jurisdiction to impose
any punishment to meet the end of justice". And then added significantly
"it may be noted that this Court exercise the equitable Jurisdiction under
Article 136 (in Bhagat Ram) and the High Court and Tribunal has no such
power or jurisdiction". The learned Judge also quoted with approval the
F
observations of Mathew J. in Union of India v. Sardar Bahadur, [1972] 2
S.C.R. 218, to the following effect :

"Now it is settled by the decision of this Court in State
of Orissa v. Bidyabhushan Mohapatra, A.I.R. 1963 S.C.
779, that if the order of a punishing authority can be G
supported on any finding as to substantial misdemeanour
for which the punishment can be imposed, it is not for the
Court to consider whether the charge proved alone would
have weighed with the authority in imposing the punish-
ment. The Court is not concerned to decide whether the H

'
166 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1994) 1 S.C.R.

A punishment imposed, provided it is justified by the rules,
is appropriate having regard to the misdemeanour estab-
lished".

14. It would perhaps be. appropriate to mention at this stage that
B there are certain observations in Union of India v. Tulsiram Pate~ A.I.R.
1985 S.C. 1416, which, at first look appear to say that the· Court can
interfere where the penalty imposed is "arbitrary or grossly excessive or out
of all proportion to the offence committed or not warranted by the facts
and circumstances of the case or the requirements of that particular
government service". It must however be remembered that Tulsiram Patal
C Jealt with cases arising under proviso (a) to Article 311 (2) of the Con-
stitution. Tulsiram Patel overruled the earlier decision of this Court in
Challappan A.LR. 1975 S.C. 2216. While holding that no notice need be
given before imposing the penalty in a <.-ase dealt with under the said
proviso, the· Court held that it a disproportionate or harsh punishment is
imposed by the disciplinary authority, it can be corrected either by the
D Appellate Court or by the High Court. These observations are not relevant
to cases of penalty imposed after regular inquiry. Indeed this is how the
said observations have been understood in Panna Nanda referred to above
vide para 29. The same comment holds with respect to the decision in
Shankar Das v. Union of India, (1985) 2 S.C.C. 358, which too was a case
E arising the proviso (a) to Article 311(2).

15. Now coming to the facts of this case it .would appear that the
main charge against the respondent is putting forward a false claim for
reimbursement of expenditure incurred for transporting his belongings
F from Phek to Amarpur. So far as charge No.5 is concerned 'there is no
finding that the account become irregular or that any loss was incurred by
the bank on account of the irregularity committed by the respondent. In
the circumstances it may be that the punishment of removal imposed upon
the respondent is harsh but this is a matter which the disciplinary authority
or the Appellate authority should consider and not the High Court or the
G Administrative Tribunal. In our opinion, the proper course to be adopted
in such situations would be to send the matter either to the Disciplinary
authority or the Appellate authority to impose appropriate punishment.
)-
16. For the above reasons, the appeal is allowed and the order of the
H High Court is set aside, with the observation that the Appellate authority
}-
S.B.I. v. S.K. ENDOW 167

shall consider whether a lesser punishment is not called for in the facts and A
circumstances of the case. The Appellate authority shall pass orders in this
behalf within four months of the receipt of the copy of this Order. No
costs".

R.P. Appeal allowed.