STATE BANK OF INDIA AND ORSversusDR. VIJAY MALLYA

384                      [2022]REPORTS
               SUPREME COURT   15 S.C.R. 384             [2022] 15 S.C.R.


A                    STATE BANK OF INDIA AND ORS.
                                       v.
                             DR. VIJAY MALLYA
                 (Contempt Petition (C) Nos. 421-424 of 2016)
B                                JULY 11, 2022
           [UDAY UMESH LALIT, S. RAVINDRA BHAT AND
              PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA, JJ.]
             Contempt of Courts Act, 1971: s. 12 – Punishment for contempt
      of court – Purging of contempt – On facts, action on part of the
C
      contemnor in disbursing the amount of US$ 40 million against the
      text and tenor of orders passed by the High Court and the contemnor
      guilty of contempt – Orders regarding punishment for contempt and
      purging of contempt – Held: Apart from punishing the contemnor
      for his contumacious conduct, the majesty of law may demand that
D     appropriate directions be issued by the court so that any advantage
      secured as a result of such contumacious conduct is completely
      nullified – Approach may require the court to pass directions either
      for reversal of the transactions in question by declaring said
      transactions to be void or passing appropriate directions to the
      concerned authorities to see that the contumacious conduct on the
E
      part of the contemnor does not continue to enure to the advantage
      of the contemnor or any one claiming under him – On facts, to meet
      the ends of justice, the concept of purging of the contempt would
      call for complete disgorging of all the benefits secured as a result
      of actions found by the court to be contumacious – Thus, adequate
F     punishment to be imposed upon the Contemnor and must also pass
      necessary directions – Since the Contemnor never showed any
      remorse nor tendered any apology for his conduct, sentence of four
      months and fine of Rs.2,000/- imposed upon the Contemnor –
      Directions to the Government of India to secure the presence of the
      Contemnor to undergo the imprisonment imposed upon him – Further
G
      issuance of direction that the transactions referred to, in terms of
      which the amount of US$ 40 million was disbursed to the
      beneficiaries, the said order is held to be void and inoperative; and
      the Contemnor and the beneficiaries under said transactions to
      deposit the amount received along with interest at the rate of 8 %
H     p.a. with the Recovery Officer within the stipulated period.
                                      384
  STATE BANK OF INDIA AND ORS. v. DR. VIJAY MALLYA                         385


      Delhi Judicial Service Association, Tis Hazari Court,                A
      Delhi v. State of Gujarat and other (1991) 4 SCC 406:
      [1991] 3 SCR 936; Supreme Court Bar Association v.
      Union of India & Anr. (1998) 4 SCC 409 : [1998] 2 SCR
      795; Noorali Babul Thanewala v. K.M.M. Shetty & Ors.
      (1990) 1 SCC 259 : [1989] 2 Suppl. SCR 561; Rama
                                                                           B
      Narang v. Ramesh Narang (2009) 16 SCC 126 : [2007]
      3 SCR 1099; Pravin C. Shah v. K.A. Mohd. Ali & Anr.
      (2001) 8 SCC 650 : [2001] 3 Suppl. SCR 675 – referred
      to.
      Rose v. Laskington (1989) 3 AllER 306; Mir v. Mir                    C
      (1992) 1 AllER 765; Richardson v. Richardson (1989)
      3 AllER 779 – referred to.
                        Case Law Reference
[1991] 3 SCR 936                  referred to               Para 2(26)     D
[1998] 2 SCR 795                  referred to               Para 8
[1989] 2 Suppl. SCR 561           referred to               Para 8
[2007] 3 SCR 1099                 referred to               Para 8
                                                                           E
[2001] 3 Suppl. SCR 675           referred to               Para 8
     INHERENT JURISDICTION: Contempt Petition (C) Nos. 421-
424 Of 2016 in Special Leave Petition (C) Nos. 6828-6831 of 2016.
      Petition filed for willful disobidience of Court’s Order dated
                                                                           F
09.05.2017 passed by the Supreme Court of India in “I.A. Nos.9-12 &
13-16 of 2016 in SLP (C) Nos.6828-6831 of 2016 with I.A. Nos.1-4 of
2016 in and with Contempt Petition (C) Nos.421-424 of 2016 in SLP (C)
Nos.6828-6831 of 2016”.
       Jaideep Gupta, Sr. Adv., Kunal Chatterji, Sanjay Kapur, Ms. Megha   G
Karnwal, Arjun Bhatia, Ms. Shubhra Kapur, Lalit Rajput, Ankur Saigal,
E. C. Agrawala, Ms. Fereshte D. Sethna, Abhishek Tilak, Ms. B.
Vijayalakshmi Menon, M/s Dua Associates, Anand Sukumar, Dheeraj
Nair, Vipin Kumar Jai, Advs. for the appearing parties.

                                                                           H
386            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2022] 15 S.C.R.


A           The Order of the Court was passed by
            UDAY UMESH LALIT, J.
            1. These Contempt Petitions have come up before us pursuant to
      the Judgment and Order dated 9.5.2017 passed by this Court in “I.A
      Nos.9-12 & 13-16 of 2016 in SLP (C) Nos.6828-6831 of 2016 with I.A.
B     Nos.1-4 of 2016 in and with Contempt Petition (C) Nos.421-424 of 2016
      in SLP (C) Nos.6828-6831 of 2016”.
             2. After dealing with the facts which led to the filing of the
      aforestated Interim Applications and Contempt Petitions, this Court found
      Respondent No.3 (Dr. Vijay Mallya) guilty of committing contempt of
C     Court on two counts. Paragraphs 22 to 30 of said Judgment and Order
      dated 9.5.2017 were: -
            “22. We now turn to the alleged violation of orders dated 03.09.2013
            and 13.11.2013 passed by the High Court of Karnataka. It is not
            disputed that such orders were passed restraining the concerned
D           respondents including Respondent No.3 and that the orders were
            passed in proceedings arising from O.A. No.766 of 2013 before
            DRT Bengaluru. The present proceedings before this court have
            also arisen from the very same O.A. No.766 of 2013. The orders
            of restraints passed by the High Court were therefore in the very
            same proceedings with which we are presently concerned. Said
E
            orders bound the concerned respondents including Respondent
            No.3 and restrained them from transferring, alienating, disposing
            or creating third party rights in respect of movable as well as
            immovable properties belonging to them till further orders in the
            proceedings. A question has been raised by Mr. Vaidyanathan
F           learned senior advocate whether the orders would be restricted
            only so far as the properties which were in the hands of the
            concerned respondents as on the date when those orders of
            restraint were passed. In other words, whether any properties
            which in future or subsequent to the Orders had come in the hands
            or control of the concerned respondent would be covered by such
G
            orders or not. On plain reading of the Orders, in our view, whether
            the properties were in the hands of the concerned respondents on
            the date when the orders of restraint were passed by the High
            Court or had come in their hands or under their control at a later
            point in time, regardless of such qualification all properties whether
H           movable or immovable were governed by the orders of restraint.
STATE BANK OF INDIA AND ORS. v. DR. VIJAY MALLYA                             387
            [UDAY UMESH LALIT, J.]

  There is no ambiguity of any sort and the Orders of restraint are          A
  quite clear. Consequently, funds amounting to US$ 40 million which
  came to be under the control of and in the hands of Respondent
  No.3 were completely covered and governed by said orders of
  restraint.
  23. The memo dated 28.06.2016 filed by Respondent No.10 in                 B
  said O.A. No.766 of 2013 annexed, “Extract confirming payment
  of US$ (US Dollars) 40 Million to Defendant No.3 on 25.02.2016”.
  It is thus beyond any doubt that the payment of US$ 40Million
  was received by Respondent No.3 on 25.02.2016. These facts
  are admitted by Respondent No.3 in Paragraph 3 of his “further
  counter affidavit”. The explanation that the funds now stand               C
  transferred in favour of the trusts over which Respondent No.3
  has no control at all, in fact aggravates the extent of violation. It is
  clear that the funds which were in control of Respondent No.3
  have now been sought to be put beyond the reach of processes of
  court, which is reflective of the intent.                                  D
  24. The applications moved by the petitioners-banks on 02.03.2016
  themselves had made clear reference to the fact that as disclosed
  by respondent Nos.10 and 11 to London Stock Exchange and
  Bombay Stock Exchange respectively Respondent No.10 would
  pay to Respondent No.3 a sum of US$75 million and accordingly              E
  petitioners-banks had moved four interlocutory applications for
  orders against respondent Nos.10 and 11 for disbursing said amount
  of US$ 75 million. The amount of US$ 40 Million so received by
  Respondent No.3 was therefore subject matter of the present
  controversy. The least that was expected of Respondent No.3
  was to disclose relevant facts pertaining to receipt and                   F
  disbursement of US$ 40 million. The violation on that count is
  thus not only against the directions issued by this court but also
  against express mandate of orders dated 03.09.2013 and
  13.11.2013 passed in the proceedings in question.
  25. Having thus found that the actions on the part of Respondent           G
  No.3 in disbursing the amount of US$ 40 million was against the
  text and tenor of the orders passed by the High Court of Karnataka,
  the question then arises whether this Court can take cognizance
  of such violation or should it leave it to be decided by the High
  Court of Karnataka itself in a properly instituted legal proceeding.
                                                                             H
388                SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2022] 15 S.C.R.


A              26. In Delhi Judicial Service Association, Tis Hazari Court,
               Delhi v. State of Gujarat and others1, a question arose whether
               the power and jurisdiction of this Court under Article 129 of the
               Constitution is confined to “the contempt of this Court” alone.
               Submissions advanced in that behalf were noted in paragraph 14
               of the judgment which sets out the submission of the learned
B
               Attorney General:
                   “...The Supreme Court as the Apex Court is the protector and
                   guardian of justice throughout the land, therefore, it has a right
                   and also a duty to protect the courts whose orders and judgments
                   are amenable to correction, from commission of contempt
C                  against them.”
                   The subsequent paragraphs of the judgment namely paragraph
               26 onwards show that the contentions so advanced by the learned
               Attorney General were accepted by this Court. It is true that the
               discussion was in the context of the contempt of a subordinate
D              court. However, the nature of power exercisable by this Court
               was considered in the backdrop that this Court has supreme
               appellate jurisdiction over all courts and tribunals in the country
               which is clear from the observations in paragraph 31 of the
               judgment. We must say that Mr. Vaidyanathan did not seriously
E              contend to the contrary but his submission was that if the
               jurisdiction is so assumed and cognizance is taken by this Court,
               Respondent No.3 would lose one opportunity of having the matter
               assessed at the level of the High Court. In our considered view,
               since we are dealing with the very same cause in which the orders
               of restraint were passed by the High Court and since it is coupled
F              with the violation of orders of this Court as well, the matter can
               and ought to be dealt with by this Court.
               27. The record shows that by order dated 11.01.2017 the violation
               of those orders for restraint passed by the High Court of Karnataka
               was taken note of by this Court and the Counsel appearing for
G              respondent had sought time to file an appropriate reply. However,
               no such reply was filed. Respondent No.3 was thus put to clear
               notice about the violation of those orders of restraints passed by
               the High Court of Karnataka. As such, no prejudice has been
               caused or visited upon Respondent No.3.

H     1
          (1991) 4 SCC 406
STATE BANK OF INDIA AND ORS. v. DR. VIJAY MALLYA                         389
            [UDAY UMESH LALIT, J.]

  28. We find that the allegations against Respondent No.3 of            A
  committing of contempt are on two counts, in that –
     a) He is guilty of disobeying the Orders passed by this Court in
     not disclosing full particulars of the assets as was directed by
     this Court.
     b) He is guilty of violating the express Orders of Restraint        B
     passed by the High Court of Karnataka in the same Cause
     from which the present proceedings have arisen.
     Though the contempt on the second count is theoretically of
  the orders passed by the High Court of Karnataka since those
  orders pertain to the very same Cause and the actions on part of       C
  Respondent No.3 in not disclosing the account in question through
  which the transfers were affected also fall with respect to contempt
  on first count, we proceed to exercise our contempt jurisdiction
  even with regard to the second count. As stated above, Respondent
  No.3 was adequately put to notice and no prejudice has been
  caused as a result of such assumption of jurisdiction by this court.   D
  29. Having considered the entirety of the matter, we find that
  Respondent No.3 is guilty of having committed contempt of court
  on both the counts. At this stage it must be stated that in terms of
  Rule 6 (1) of Rules to Regulate Proceeding for Contempt of
  Supreme Court 1975, Respondent No.3 was obliged and duty               E
  bound to appear in person in response to the notice issued by this
  Court in Contempt Petition. Instead, he chose to file application
  seeking recall of the orders issuing notice. Having considered the
  matter, we see no reason to recall that order and dismiss I.A.
  Nos.1 to 4 of 2016 preferred by Respondent No.3 in Contempt
                                                                         F
  Petition Civil Nos.421-424 of 2016. Respondent No.3 is therefore
  duty bound to appear in person in the present contempt proceedings.
  30. Since Respondent No.3 has not filed any reply to the Contempt
  Petition nor did he appear in person, though we have found him
  guilty of having committed contempt of court, we deem it necessary
  to give him one more opportunity and also hear him on the proposed     G
  punishment. We therefore adjourn matter to 10.07.2017 for hearing
  Respondent No.3 in person on matters in issue including one
  regarding the proposed punishment to be awarded to him for
  contempt of court. The instant contempt petitions and connected
  cases shall now be listed at 2 o’clock on 10.07.2017. Respondent       H
390            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2022] 15 S.C.R.


A           No.3 may keep his affidavit ready to be tendered on the same
            day by stating mitigating circumstances, if any and any other
            submissions he chooses to advance.
            31. We direct the Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India,
            New Delhi to secure and ensure presence of Respondent No.3
B           before this Court on 10.07.2017. A copy of this Judgment be sent
            to the Ministry of Home Affairs for compliance”.
             3. The disbursement of US$ 40 million which had entered the
      account held in Edmond De Rothschild (Suisse) S.A. was dealt with in
      detail and paragraph 3 of the “further counter affidavit” filed by
C     Respondent No.3 was also quoted by this Court as follows: -
            “16. Respondent No.3 thereafter filed “further counter affidavit”
            in aforementioned I.A. Nos.9-12 of 2016 on 23.11.2016. The
            affidavit enclosed letter dated 18.11.2016 issued by Edmond De
            Rothschild (Suisse) S.A. Paragraph 3 of the affidavit was to the
D           following effect:
               “On a mere perusal of the letter dated 18th November, 2016
            issued by Edmond De Rothschild (Suisse) S.A. (Annex. “R-2”
            hereto), it is evident that the US$ 39,999,994 million paid by Diageo
            Plc was received on 25th February, 2016. On instructions of
E           Respondent No.3, an aggregate sum of US$ 39,999,993.99 was
            paid to the following parties on 26th and 29th February, 2016
            respectively:

                     NAME OF PARTY                     AMOUNT
                S. Three Gift Settlement (a        US$13,000,000
F               Trust the sole beneficiary of      (On 26.02.2016) &
                which is Siddartha Mallya, son     US$ 333,331.33
                of Respondent No.3)                (on 29.02.2016)
                L. Three Gift Settlement (a        US$13,000,000
                Trust the sole beneficiary of      (On 26.02.2016) &
                which is Leena Mallya, daughter    US$ 333,331.33
G               of Respondent No.3)                (on 29.02.2016)
                T. Three Gift Settlement (a        US$13,000,000
                Trust the sole beneficiary of      (On 26.02.2016) &
                which is Tanya Mallya,             US$ 333,331.33
                daughter of Respondent No.3)       (on 29.02.2016)
                            TOTAL                  US$ 39,999,993.99
H
  STATE BANK OF INDIA AND ORS. v. DR. VIJAY MALLYA                          391
              [UDAY UMESH LALIT, J.]

          Each of the three children of Respondent No.3, who are the        A
      sole beneficiaries of the aforesaid Trusts, are majors and are
      citizens of the United States of America. Respondent No.3 is
      neither the Settlor nor the Trustee nor the beneficiary of any of
      the aforesaid named Trusts, and has no control over the Trusts or
      the manner in which the respective corpuses of each of the
                                                                            B
      aforesaid Trusts is utilized. However, the respective corpuses as
      they stood on 31 st March, 2016 have been included in the
      statements of assets of the three children handed over to this
      Hon’ble Court in sealed envelope on 26th April, 2016.” “
      4. As stated in paragraphs 29 and 30 quoted hereinabove, an
opportunity was given to Respondent No.3 (hereafter referred to as the      C
Contemnor) to file his response and advance submissions on the proposed
punishment. The matter was accordingly adjourned to 10.7.2017.
       5. The Contemnor however sought review of the Judgment and
Order dated 9.5.2017, which application remained pending for some time
and was rejected by this Court vide Order dated 03.08.2020. By said         D
order the Contemnor was directed to appear before this Court; and the
Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, New Delhi, was directed
to facilitate and ensure the presence of the Contemnor on the date of
such appearance.
      6. The subsequent developments in the matter stand captured in        E
the Order dated 30.11.2021 passed by this Court, which for facility, is
extracted here:-
         “By judgment dated 09.05.2017 passed by this Court in I.A.
      Nos.9-12 and 13-16 of 2016 in SLP (Civil) Nos.6828-6831 of 2016
      and I.A. Nos.1-4 of 2016 in Contempt Petition (C) Nos.421-424         F
      of 2016 in SLP (Civil) Nos.6828-6831 of 2016, respondent no.3
      Dr. Vijay Mallya was found to be guilty of having committed
      contempt of court. The judgment directed that the matter be listed
      on 10.07.2017 to hear respondent no.3 on matters in issue including
      one regarding the proposed punishment to be awarded to him for        G
      contempt of court. However, because of proceedings, which at
      the relevant time, were going on in the Courts of United Kingdom,
      the presence of respondent no.3 could not be secured.
         In its subsequent order dated 02.11.2020, this Court noted that
      certain proceedings were going on in United Kingdom, though the
                                                                            H
392      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2022] 15 S.C.R.


A     details of such proceedings were not forthcoming. This Court
      rejected the submission made by Mr. E.C. Agrawala, learned
      Advocate seeking discharge and it was directed that the learned
      Advocate would continue to appear for respondent no.3. Mr. Tushar
      Mehta, learned Solicitor General was then granted time to place
      Status Report on record.
B
         The matter was thereafter adjourned on few occasions and
      because of COVID-19 pandemic situation, the matter could not
      be listed and taken up.
          Today when the matter was called out, Mr. Tushar Mehta,
C     learned Solicitor General invited our attention to the Office
      Memorandum dated 30.11.2021 issued under signature of Deputy
      Secretary (Extradition), CPV Division, Ministry of External Affairs,
      Government of India. Paragraphs 2 to 5 of the Memorandum read
      as under:
D        “2. It may be recalled that an extradition request in respect of
         VM was forwarded to UK side on 9 February 2017 in CBI
         Case under Sections 120B read with 420 of the Indian Penal
         Code and Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the
         Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. On 10 December 2018,
         the Senior District Judge Westminster Magistrate’s Court,
E        London recommended VM’s extradition to India. VM appealed
         the Order of his extradition before the High Court of London.
         The appeal was admitted on the sole ground of sufficiency of
         prima facie case. The High Court of London dismissed the
         appeal on 20 April 2020. VM applied leave to appeal to the
F        Supreme Court in the High Court. On 14 May 2020 the High
         Court of London rejected his application for permission to appeal
         to Supreme Court. VM has thus exhausted all avenues of
         appeal in the UK.
         3. Following the refusal of leave to appeal, VM’s surrender to
G        India should, in principle, have been completed within 28 days.
         However, the UK Home Office intimated that there is a further
         legal issue which needs to be resolved before VM’s extradition
         may take place. The UK side further said that this issue is
         outside and apart from the extradition process, but it has the
         effect that under the United Kingdom law, extradition cannot
H
STATE BANK OF INDIA AND ORS. v. DR. VIJAY MALLYA                          393
            [UDAY UMESH LALIT, J.]

     take place until it is resolved. The High Commission was further     A
     informed that the issue is confidential and so it cannot be
     disclosed.
     4. In compliance with the Order of the Hon’ble Supreme Court
     dated 31.08.2020, the Government of India again took up the
     pending extradition case of VM with the Government of UK             B
     so as to seek his early extradition and facilitate his presence
     before the Hon’ble Supreme Court on 5 October 2020.
     5. The UK side has informed that extradition of VM cannot
     take place until a separate legal issue, which is judicial and
     confidential in nature is resolved. The UK side emphasized           C
     that neither they can provide any more details nor intervene in
     the process. They have also indicated that through the
     designated channel, the UK Home Office has received a
     request to serve summons on VM for his hearing before the
     Hon’ble Supreme Court. The British Home Office has
     forwarded the Hon’ble Supreme Court’s Order through the              D
     Hertfordshire Police on 17 September 2020 for serving it to
     VM.”
     As indicated in paragraph 2 of the Memorandum, the
  proceedings for extradition have attained finality and respondent
  no.3 has exhausted all avenues of appeal in the United Kingdom.         E
  However, paragraphs 4 and 5 deal with some proceedings which
  are stated to be confidential and with regard to which no details
  are forthcoming. It appears that these are the same proceedings
  which were referred to in the order dated 02.11.2020.
     Having considered all the circumstances on record, it is directed:   F
     a. The matter in terms of the directions issued by this Court in
     its order dated 09.05.2017 shall now be listed on 18.01.2022.
     b. Respondent No.3 is at liberty to advance such submissions,
     as are deemed appropriate, pertaining to the issues set out in
     the order dated 09.05.2017.                                          G
     c. If, for any reason, respondent no.3 is not present to advance
     such submissions, learned counsel on his behalf can advance
     such submissions as are open to respondent no.3, in law.
     d. We request Mr. Jaideep Gupta, learned Senior Advocate of
     this Court to assist the Court as Amicus Curiae in the matter.       H
394            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2022] 15 S.C.R.


A              Mr. Gupta will be at liberty to avail services of any Advocate-
               on-Record of his own choice in the instant matter.
               The Registry is directed to supply papers of this matter to Mr.
               Gupta within a week.
               e. The matter shall be dealt with finally on 18.01.2022.”
B
           7. The matter thereafter came up before this Court on 10.03.2022
      on which date the following Order was passed: -
            “1. Pursuant to orders passed from time to time and more
            particularly orders dated 30.11.2021 and 10.02.2022, the matter is
C           posted today for hearing.
            2. In terms of Directions (b) and (c) issued by this Court vide
            order dated 30.11.2021, the contemnor was given specific liberty
            to advance submissions pertaining to the issues set-out in the
            judgment dated 09.05.2017. Additionally, he was given further
D           liberty to advance such submissions through his learned Counsel.
            3. Mr. Ankur Saigal, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
            contemnor submits that all the orders including the orders dated
            30.11.2021 and 10.02.2022 were brought to the notice of the
            contemnor and that there was exchange of communications
            between the learned counsel and the contemnor. A copy of the
E
            communication dated 17.01.2022 has been placed for our perusal
            which communication inter alia states inability on part of the
            Solicitors of the contemnor to provide any information about the
            nature of proceedings and the relief sought in the pending
            proceedings in the United Kingdom.
F
            4. We then invited Mr. Ankur Saigal, learned counsel to advance
            submissions on merits of the matter in keeping with the directions
            issued in last two orders. Mr. Saigal expressed his inability to
            advance the submissions.
            5. We have heard Mr. Jaideep Gupta, learned Senior Advocate,
G           who has assisted this Court as Amicus Curiae very ably. He has
            invited our attention to various aspects of the record including the
            judgment dated 09.05.2017 in State Bank of India & Others v.
            Kingfisher Airlines Ltd. & Others, (2017) 6 SCC 654, provisions
            of the Contempt of Courts Act and the Supreme Court Rules,
H           2013. He has also relied upon various decisions of this Court
  STATE BANK OF INDIA AND ORS. v. DR. VIJAY MALLYA                              395
              [UDAY UMESH LALIT, J.]

      including the decision in Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union          A
      of India & Another, (1998) 4 SCC 409.
      6. Mr. Gupta may file his written submissions on or before
      12.03.2022.
      7. Even though Mr. Ankur Saigal, learned counsel has expressed
      his inability to advance submissions though he was invited to do          B
      so, we still grant one more opportunity to file his submissions on
      or before 15.03.2022, with an advance copy to the learned Amicus
      Curiae.”
     8. The oral arguments advanced by Mr. Jaideep Gupta, learned
Amicus Curiae were summarized in his Written Submissions as under: -            C
      “A. The sum of the money which was received by Edmond
      deRothschild (Suisse) M.A. was, on the instruction of the
      Respondent No.3/ contemnor, paid to three trusts wherein the
      sole beneficiaries were the son and two daughters of the
      Respondent No.3/ Contemnor. The aforementioned amount had                 D
      been transferred in violation of order of court by taking advantage
      of the very act of contempt which has been held against the
      Contemnor/ Respondent No.3. It is, therefore, submitted that this
      Hon’ble Court may give appropriate direction for reversal of the
      aforesaid transactions by declaring the said transactions to be
      void.                                                                     E
      B. The present contempt proceedings arise out of recovery
      proceedings by Banks. It is stated by the Counsel on behalf of
      State Bank of India that decrees have been passed against the
      Respondent No.3 in the said recovery proceedings and Recovery
      Officer has been appointed for enforcement and execution of the           F
      said decree. It thought fit, this Hon’ble Court may give appropriate
      direction to the said Recovery Officer to trace the said funds into
      the hands of whoever they may have been transferred to and use
      the same in execution of the decree.
      C. In the event the said funds are found inadequate to purge the          G
      said contempt, appropriate orders may be passed for sequestration
      of the assets of the respondent no.3/ contemnor both in India and
      outside. Assistance of the Banks and/ or the Union of India may
      be taken to find out all assets that may be available to the respondent
      No.3/ Contemnor. Alternatively, a forensic auditor may be
      appointed to undertake such an exercise.”                                 H
396              SUPREME COURT REPORTS                        [2022] 15 S.C.R.


A            Reliance was placed by the learned Amicus Curiae on the
      decisions of this Court in Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union of
      India & Anr.2, Noorali Babul Thanewala v. K.M.M. Shetty & Ors.3,
      Rama Narang v. Ramesh Narang4, Pravin C. Shah v. K.A. Mohd. Ali
      & Anr.5 to submit that in contempt jurisdiction the Court can direct the
      contemnor to purge the contempt by reversing the very transaction that
B
      was found to be contumacious. On the remedy of sequestration of assets,
      reliance was placed on Rose v. Laskington6, Mir v. Mir7 and Richardson
      v. Richardson8.
             9. In spite of repeated opportunities afforded to the Contemnor,
      no submissions were advanced on his behalf either on purging of contempt
C
      or on the quantum of punishment.
            10. The actions on part of the Contemnor having been found to be
      contumacious and established in the Judgment and Order dated
      09.05.2017, we are presently concerned with the issues as to what orders
      be passed regarding punishment and purging of contempt. The approach
D
      in such cases was succinctly stated by this Court in Pravin C. Shah v.
      K.A. Mohd. Ali & Anr.5 as under:
             “23. Now we have to consider the crucial question — how can a
             contemnor purge himself of the contempt? According to the
             Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of India, purging oneself
E
             of contempt can be done by apologising to the court. The said
             opinion of the Bar Council of India can be seen from the following
             portion of the impugned order:
                 “Purging oneself of contempt can be only by regretting or
                 apologising in the case of a completed action of criminal
F
                 contempt. If it is a case of civil contempt, by subsequent
                 compliance with the orders or directions the contempt can be
                 purged of. There is no procedural provision in law to get purged
                 of contempt by an order of an appropriate court.”

G     2
        (1998) 4 SCC 409.
      3
        (1990) 1 SCC 259.
      4
        (2009) 16 SCC 126.
      5
        (2001) 8 SCC 650.
      6
        (1989) 3 AllER 306.
      7
        (1992) 1 AllER 765.
      8
H       (1989) 3 AllER 779.
STATE BANK OF INDIA AND ORS. v. DR. VIJAY MALLYA                            397
            [UDAY UMESH LALIT, J.]

  24. Purging is a process by which an undesirable element is               A
  expelled either from one’s own self or from a society. It is a cleaning
  process. Purge is a word which acquired implications first in
  theological connotations. In the case of a sin, purging of such sin
  is made through the expression of sincere remorse coupled with
  doing the penance required. In the case of a guilt, purging means
                                                                            B
  to get himself cleared of the guilt. The concept of purgatory was
  evolved from the word “purge”, which is a state of suffering after
  this life in which those souls, who depart this life with their deadly
  sins, are purified and rendered fit to enter into heaven where
  nothing defiled enters (vide Words and Phrases, Permanent Edn.,
  Vol. 35-A, p. 307). In Black’s Law Dictionary the word “purge”            C
  is given the following meaning: “To cleanse; to clear. To clear or
  exonerate from some charge or imputation of guilt, or from a
  contempt.” It is preposterous to suggest that if the convicted person
  undergoes punishment or if he tenders the fine amount imposed
  on him the purge would be completed.                                      D
  25. We are told that a learned Single Judge of the Allahabad High
  Court has expressed a view that purging process would be
  completed when the contemnor undergoes the penalty [vide Madan
  Gopal Gupta (Dr) v. Agra University [AIR 1974 All 39] ]. This is
  what the learned Single Judge said about it: (AIR p. 43, para 13)
                                                                            E
     “In my opinion a party in contempt purged its contempt by
     obeying the orders of the court or by undergoing the penalty
     imposed by the court.”
  26. Obeying the orders of the court would be a mode by which
  one can make the purging process in a substantial manner when it          F
  is a civil contempt. Even for such a civil contempt the purging
  process would not be treated as completed merely by the
  contemnor undergoing the penalty imposed on him unless he has
  obeyed the order of the court or he has undone the wrong. If that
  is the position in regard to civil contempt the position regarding
                                                                            G
  criminal contempt must be stronger. Section 2 of the Contempt of
  Courts Act categorises contempt of court into two categories.
  The first category is “civil contempt” which is the wilful
  disobedience of the order of the court including breach of an
  undertaking given to the court. But “criminal contempt” includes
  doing any act whatsoever, which tends to scandalise or lowers             H
398            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2022] 15 S.C.R.


A           the authority of any court, or tends to interfere with the due course
            of a judicial proceeding or interferes with, or obstructs the
            administration of justice in any other manner.
            27. We cannot therefore approve the view that merely undergoing
            the penalty imposed on a contemnor is sufficient to complete the
B           process of purging himself of the contempt, particularly in a case
            where the contemnor is convicted of criminal contempt. The
            danger in giving accord to the said view of the learned Single
            Judge in the aforecited decision is that if a contemnor is sentenced
            to a fine he can immediately pay it and continue to commit contempt
            in the same court, and then again pay the fine and persist with his
C
            contemptuous conduct. There must be something more to be done
            to get oneself purged of the contempt when it is a case of criminal
            contempt.”
            11. Similarly, following observations were made and directions
      were issued by this Court in Noorali Babul Thanewala v. K.M.M.
D
      Shetty & Ors.3:
            “11. ……..It is settled law that breach of an injunction or breach
            of an undertaking given to a court by a person in a civil proceeding
            on the faith of which the court sanctions a particular course of
            action is misconduct amounting to contempt. The remedy in such
E           circumstances may be in the form of a direction to the contemnor
            to purge the contempt or a sentence of imprisonment or fine or all
            of them. On the facts and circumstances of this case in the light
            of our finding that there was a breach of the undertaking we think
            that mere imposition of imprisonment or fine will not meet the
F           ends of justice. There will have to be an order to purge the
            contempt by directing respondent 1-contemnor to deliver vacant
            possession immediately and issuing necessary further and
            consequential directions for enforcing the same.
            12. In the foregoing circumstances, we find respondent 1 guilty
G           of committing contempt by wilful disobedience of the undertaking
            given by him in this Court and accordingly we convict him and
            sentence him to pay a fine of Rs 500 within the period of four
            weeks, failing which he shall suffer simple imprisonment for one
            month, and also direct him to deliver vacant possession of the
            premises forthwith to the petitioner to the extent possible by him.
H
  STATE BANK OF INDIA AND ORS. v. DR. VIJAY MALLYA                           399
              [UDAY UMESH LALIT, J.]

      We further direct the District Magistrate, Thane, to evict all those   A
      who are in physical possession of the property including respondent
      2 and his men and if necessary, with police help and give vacant
      possession of the premises to the petitioner forthwith.”
      12. The importance of passing appropriate directions, apart from
imposing punishment upon the contemnor, was stressed by the Constitution     B
Bench of this Court in Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union of
India & Anr.2 as follows:
      “33. Thus, the recognised and accepted punishments for civil or
      criminal contempt of court in English law, which have been followed
      and accepted by the courts in this country and incorporated in the     C
      Indian law insofar as, civil contempt, is concerned are:
           (i) sequestration of assets;
           (ii) fine;
           (iii) committal to prison.                                        D

      34. The object of punishment being both curative and corrective,
      these coercions are meant to assist an individual complainant to
      enforce his remedy and there is also an element of public policy
      for punishing civil contempt, since the administration of justice
      would be undermined if the order of any court of law is to be          E
      disregarded with impunity. Under some circumstances, compliance
      of the order may be secured without resort to coercion, through
      the contempt power. For example, disobedience of an order to
      pay a sum of money may be effectively countered by attaching
      the earnings of the contemner. In the same manner, committing          F
      the person of the defaulter to prison for failure to comply with an
      order of specific performance of conveyance of property, may be
      met also by the court directing that the conveyance be completed
      by an appointed person. Disobedience of an undertaking may in
      the like manner be enforced through process other than committal
      to prison as for example where the breach of undertaking is to         G
      deliver possession of property in a landlord-tenant dispute. Apart
      from punishing the contemner, the court to maintain the majesty
      of law may direct the police force to be utilised for recovery of
      possession and burden the contemner with costs, exemplary or
      otherwise.”                                                            H
400             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2022] 15 S.C.R.


A            13. It is, thus, well settled that apart from punishing the contemnor
      for his contumacious conduct, the majesty of law may demand that
      appropriate directions be issued by the court so that any advantage
      secured as a result of such contumacious conduct is completely nullified.
      The approach may require the court to pass directions either for reversal
      of the transactions in question by declaring said transactions to be void
B
      or passing appropriate directions to the concerned authorities to see that
      the contumacious conduct on the part of the contemnor does not continue
      to enure to the advantage of the contemnor or any one claiming under
      him. It is precisely for these reasons that the direction to have vacant
      possession delivered to the rightful claimant was passed by this Court in
C     Noorali Babul Thanewala v. K.M.M. Shetty & Ors.3 Mere passing of
      an order of punishment as stated by this Court in Pravin C. Shah v.
      K.A. Mohd. Ali & Anr.5 would not be enough or sufficient. In a given
      case, to meet the ends of justice, the concept of purging of the contempt
      would call for complete disgorging of all the benefits secured as a result
      of actions which are found by the court to be contumacious.
D
            14. In its Judgment and Order dated 09.05.2017, this Court had
      found that the action on part of the Contemnor in disbursing the amount
      of US$ 40 million was against the text and tenor of orders passed by the
      High Court of Karnataka and that the Contemnor was guilty of contempt.
E           15. In the circumstances, in order to maintain the majesty of law,
      we must impose adequate punishment upon the Contemnor and must
      also pass necessary directions so that the advantages secured by the
      Contemnor or anyone claiming under him are set at naught and the
      amounts in question are available in execution of the decrees passed in
      the concerned Recovery Proceedings.
F
             16. Considering the facts and circumstances on record and the
      facts that the Contemnor never showed any remorse nor tendered any
      apology for his conduct, we impose sentence of four months and fine in
      the sum of Rs.2,000/- (Rupees Two Thousand Only) upon the Contemnor.
      The fine shall be deposited in the Registry of this Court within four
G     weeks and upon such deposit, the amount shall be made over to the
      Supreme Court Legal Services Committee. In case the amount of fine is
      not deposited within the time stipulated, the Contemnor shall undergo
      further sentence of two months.
          We direct the Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India,
H     New Delhi to secure the presence of the Contemnor to undergo the
   STATE BANK OF INDIA AND ORS. v. DR. VIJAY MALLYA                               401
               [UDAY UMESH LALIT, J.]

imprisonment imposed upon him. Needless to say, Government of India               A
including the Ministry of External Affairs and all other agencies or
instrumentalities shall carry out the directions issued by this Court with
due diligence and utmost expediency. A Compliance Report shall
thereafter be filed in the Registry of this Court.
        17. We also direct:                                                       B
        A.    The transactions referred to in the Judgment and Order
              dated 09.05.2017 in terms of which the amount of US$ 40
              million was disbursed to the beneficiaries detailed in
              paragraph 16 of the said judgment and order is held to be
              void and inoperative;                                               C
        B.    The Contemnor and the beneficiaries under said transactions
              referred to in the said Paragraph 16 shall be bound to deposit
              the amount received by such beneficiaries along with
              interest at the rate of 8 per cent per annum with the
              concerned Recovery Officer within four weeks.                       D
        C.    In case the amounts are not so deposited, the concerned
              Recovery Officer shall be entitled to take appropriate
              proceedings for recovery of said amounts; and Government
              of India and all the concerned agencies shall extend
              assistance and complete cooperation. It shall be open to            E
              take such appropriate steps including the appointment of
              Forensic Auditor(s).
      18. In the end, we must express our sincere gratitude and
appreciation for the efforts put in by Mr. Jaideep Gupta, learned Senior
Advocate who assisted this Court very ably as Amicus Curiae.                      F
        19. These contempt petitions, thus, stand disposed of.


Nidhi Jain                                      Contempt petitions disposed of.

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