Supreme Court of India
SRI MAHESHversusSANGRAM & ORS
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 14
- Decided
- 1 January 2025
- Disposal
- Case Partly allowed
- Bench
- C T RAVIKUMAR
Holding
Adoption by a widow relates back to the husband's death, giving the adoptive mother absolute ownership that validates subsequent alienations such as the sale deed, while a gift deed lacking acceptance and delivery is void.
Summary
The appellant, an adopted son, claimed entitlement to half of his adoptive mother's joint family property and challenged two alienations— a sale deed (2007) and a gift deed (2008) executed by the adoptive mother after his adoption. The dispute hinged on whether the adoption of a widow’s son relates back to the husband's death, thereby granting the adoptive mother absolute ownership and making subsequent alienations binding, and whether the gift deed satisfied the statutory requirements of offer, acceptance, and delivery. The Court held that the doctrine of relation back applies, making the adoptive mother an absolute owner and the sale deed valid, but the gift deed was void for lack of acceptance and delivery. Consequently, the appellant could not contest the sale but was entitled to the B and C schedule properties as the sole heir of the deceased adoptive mother. The Supreme Court partially allowed the appeal, upholding the sale deed, quashing the High Court’s reversal of the trial court’s decision on the gift deed, and restoring the trial court’s finding that the gift deed was null and void. No costs were awarded.
Issues considered
- Whether adoption by a widow relates back to the date of her husband's death, rendering the adoptive mother an absolute owner of the joint family property prior to the adoption.
- Whether the sale deed executed by the adoptive mother in 2007 is valid and binding on the adopted son.
- Whether the gift deed executed by the adoptive mother in 2008 is a valid gift under the Transfer of Property Act, 1882.
- Whether the appellant is entitled to a half share in the schedule A property.
- Whether the appellant, as the sole legal heir of the deceased adoptive mother, is entitled to the schedule B and C properties.
Legislation cited
- Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956s. 12, s. 16
- Hindu Succession Act, 1956s. 12(c), s. 13, s. 14(1)
- Transfer of Property Act, 1882s. 122
Subjects
AdoptionAbsolute ownerAdoptive son’s right in propertiesRelation Back PrincipleExecution of sale deed by adoptive motherExecution of gift deed by adoptive motherNature of alienationLawful alienationsConstituents of valid giftOffer and acceptance of giftNo delivery of giftNo acceptance of gift in legal senseAdoptive mother as absolute ownerAdoptive son sole legal heir
Judgment
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 62 : 2025 INSC 14
Sri Mahesh
v.
Sangram & Ors.
(Civil Appeal No(s). 36-37 of 2025)
02 January 2025
[C.T. Ravikumar* and Prashant Kumar Mishra, JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
Issue arose whether by virtue of operation of the provisions of
ss. 14(1) and 12(c) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, the defendant
no.1-adoptive mother would become absolute owner of the property
prior to the adoption of appellant-adopted son; and as regards the
effect of adoption on sale deed and gift deed executed thereafter
by adoptive mother.
Headnotes†
Hindu Succession Act, 1956 – ss.13, 14 – Hindu Adoptions
and Maintenance Act, 1956 – ss.12, 16 – Transfer of Property
Act, 1882 – s.122 – Effects of adoption – Principle of Relation
Back – Death of the original owner of the property – Following
his death, property dispute between his two wives – Property
divided among the two on basis of a compromise decree –
Thereafter, the first wife-defendant no. 1 who was issueless,
adopted the appellant – Thirteen years later, the defendant no. 1
executed sale deed in respect of schedule A properties and
gift deed in respect of schedule B and C properties in favour
of defendants – Appellant filed suit for partition and separate
possession of the schedule properties as also challenged the
execution of sale deed and gift deed – Trial court declared gift
deed as null and void and granted the entire suit schedule B
and C properties to the appellant since he was the sole legal
heir of defendant No.1 and rejected his claim as regards the
sale deed upholding the sale deed – High Court set aside
the order as regards alienation under the gift deed, however,
upheld the sale deed – Interference:
Held: Principle of Relation Back is that an adoption by a widow
would relate back to the date of death of her husband, creating an
* Author
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 63
Sri Mahesh v. Sangram & Ors.
immediate coparcenary interest in the joint property, meaning that
the adopted child is treated as if they were born to the deceased
husband, thus entitled to inherit his property – Adoption by
defendant No.1-widow of the original owner would relate back
to the date of death of the adoptive father but then all lawful
alienations made by defendant No.1-adoptive mother would
be binding on the appellant-adopted son – Adoptive son’s
right to impeach previous alienations would depend upon the
capacity of defendant No.1 who made the alienation as well
as on the nature of the action of alienation – First alienation is
the one where defendant no.1 effected sale of the properties –
Concurrent findings by the courts below that defendant no.1
got absolute right to effect the sale of the property warrant
no interference – By applying the ‘Doctrine of Relation Back’,
the appellant is bound by the said alienation – As regards the
alienation by gift deed, the nature of action of alienation is gift –
In order to be valid gift, acceptance of the gift is a pre-requisite –
Gift deed has no reference about the delivery of property
by the donor and taking possession of property by the
donee – Trial court’s holding that the appellant is entitled to
entire 'B' and 'C' schedule properties as the sole legal heir
of deceased defendant no.1, not faulty as it is the inevitable
consequence of application for the ‘Doctrine of Relation
Back’; and that the prerequisite for making the gift valid was
absent and as such defendant nos. 4 and 5 could not become
absolute owners of the schedule properties through gift deed –
High Court interfered with the sound reasoning of the trial court,
and set aside without providing any good and sustainable
reason – Such finding could be reversed only if it is found that
the said finding was based on perverse precision of evidence –
Concurrent finding of the courts below that the sale deed is valid
is upheld – Impugned judgment pertaining to the alienation of
properties through gift deed quashed and set aside. [Paras 16-31]
Hindu Succession Act, 1956 – s.12 – Effects of adoption –
'Relation Back Principle':
Held: Principle is that the adoption by a widow would relate
back to the date of death of her husband, creating an immediate
coparcenary interest in the joint property, meaning that the adopted
child is treated as if they were born to the deceased husband, thus
entitled to inherit his property. [Para 18]
64 [2025] 1 S.C.R.
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Case Law Cited
Kasabai Tukaram Karvar and Others v. Nivruti (Dead) Through
Legal Heirs and Others, 2022 INSC 733 : [2022] 5 SCR 899 :
2022 SCC Online 918; Shripad Gajanan Suthankar v. Dattaram
Kashinath Suthankar, 1974 INSC 43 : [1974] 3 SCR 474 : (1974)
2 SCC 156 – relied on.
Mst. Deu and Ors. v. Laxmi Narayan and Ors. (1998) 8 SCC
701 – referred to.
List of Acts
Hindu Succession Act, 1956; Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance
Act, 1956; Transfer of Property Act, 1882.
List of Keywords
Adoption; Absolute owner; Adoptive son’s right in properties;
Relation Back Principle; Execution of sale deed by adoptive
mother; Execution of gift deed by adoptive mother; Nature of
alienation; Lawful alienations; Constituents of valid gift; Offer and
acceptance of gift; No delivery of gift; No acceptance of gift in
legal sense; Adoptive mother as absolute owner; Adoptive son
sole legal heir.
Case Arising From
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 36-37
of 2025
From the Judgment and Order dated 14.02.2024 of the High Court
of Karnataka Circuit Bench at Dharwad in RFA Nos. 100168 and
100247 of 2018
Appearances for Parties
Ms. Aparajita Singh, Sr. Adv., Rahul Pratap, Mahadev Ganpat Patil,
Shubham Rajhans, Advs. for the Appellant.
Shailesh Madiyal, Sr. Adv., M/s. Dharmaprabhas Law Associates,
Chandrashekhar A. Chakalabbi, S.K Pandey, Awanish Kumar,
Anshul Rai, Abhinav Garg, Ms. G. Anusha, Mahesh Thakur,
Ms. Divija Mahajan, Ranvijay Singh Chandel, Mrs. Geetanjali
Bedi, Chinmay Deshpande, Anirudh Sanganeria, Advs. for the
Respondents.
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 65
Sri Mahesh v. Sangram & Ors.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
C.T. Ravikumar, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. In the captioned appeals by Special Leave the appellant calls in
question the common judgment dated 14.02.2024 of the Karnataka,
High Court, Dharwad Bench, passed in RFA Nos.100168 and 100247,
of 2018 which emanated from the judgment and preliminary decree
dated 31.03.2018 in OS No.122 of 2009 of the Court of IIIrd Additional
Senior Civil Judge, Belagavi.
3. The self-same appellant was the plaintiff in OS No.122 of 2009 filed
for partition of the suit schedule properties and separate possession
against the defendants. Respondent Nos.1 to 4 herein were the
original defendant Nos. 2 to 5 respectively in the said suit. Pending the
first appeals, respondent No.5/defendant No.6 died and consequently,
his legal representatives were impleaded as additional respondent
Nos.5A to 5F and they are respondent Nos.5 to 10 in these appeals.
4. The facts of the case necessary for disposal of the captioned appeals
are as follows:-
One Bhavakanna Shahapurkar was the original owner of the suit
schedule properties and original defendant No.1-Smt. Parvatibai
was his legally wedded wife. They had no issues in their wedlock
and hence, with the consent of defendant No.1 the said Bhavakanna
married one Laxmibai without dissolving his first marriage with
defendant No.1. In his wedlock with Smt. Laxmibai, Bhavakanna
Shahpurkar got two children, namely, Parashuram and Renuka.
On 04.03.1982, Bhavakanna Shahapurkar died leaving behind two
widows. After his demise, OS No.266/1982 was filed by defendant
No.1 against Laxmibai, and her children Parashuram and Renuka
for partition and separate possession of suit schedule properties.
Based on a compromise, a decree was drawn in the said suit and
later, in the final decree proceedings defendant No.1 was allotted
and thereby acquired 9/32 share in schedule ‘A’ and ‘D’ properties.
The appellant herein/the plaintiff was adopted by defendant
No.1-Parvatibai on 16.07.1994. The adoption deed was signed and
66 [2025] 1 S.C.R.
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got registered by his natural father and the adoptee mother (defendant
No.1) and other witnesses. Later, the appellant came and started
residing with defendant No.1 as her adopted son after relinquishing
all his rights in his natural family. At the time of his adoption the
appellant was aged 21 years. The case of the appellant/plaintiff in
OS No.122 of 2009 is that on being adopted he became the legal
heir of Bhavakanna and, therefore, entitled to half share in the
suit schedule properties. According to him, in such circumstances,
defendant No.1 was not having absolute right or title to execute sale
deed dated 13.12.2007 in favour of defendants 2 and 3 without his
consent as also to execute gift deed dated 27.08.2008 in favour of
defendant Nos.4 and 5. Earlier, the appellant demanded for partition
of the suit schedule properties. However, defendant No.1 refused
to effect partition which made him to institute the aforementioned
Original Suit. In fact, in the said suit beside seeking partition and
separate possession of the suit schedule properties he also sought
to set aside a sale deed executed on 13.12.2007 by defendant No.1
in favour of defendant Nos.2 and 3 (respondent Nos.1 and 2 herein)
and a gift deed dated 27.08.2008 made by defendant No.1 in favour
of defendant Nos.4 and 5 as null and void.
5. Defendant No.1 filed written statement stating, inter alia, that the
suit schedule properties are wrongly described. While admitting the
adoption of the appellant/plaintiff on 16.07.1994 as also the fact that
subsequently, he came to stay with her, defendant No.1 would state
that she became the full and absolute owner of the suit schedule
properties after the death of her husband Bhavakanna and further
that by virtue of adoption of the appellant/plaintiff she was not
divested off her ownership over the suit schedule properties. She
had also refuted the claims of the appellant/plaintiff that without his
consent she could not have sold the property covered under sale
deed dated 13.12.2007 and that she had played fraud in creating
gift deed dated 27.08.2008 in respect of properties described in
para 1B and C of the plaint, in favour of defendant Nos.4 and 5
viz., respondent Nos.3 and 4. Above all, defendant No.1 denied the
claim of acquisition of half share of the suit schedule properties by
virtue of his adoption by her and thereby becoming the legal heir of
her husband Sri Bhavakanna Shahapurkar.
6. Defendant Nos.2 and 3 jointly filed a separate written statement, but
adopting the contentions raised by defendant No.1. They claimed
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 67
Sri Mahesh v. Sangram & Ors.
that they are in possession of suit schedule property covered by the
sale deed dated 13.12.2007 from the date of its purchase.
7. Defendant Nos.4 and 5 also jointly filed a separate written statement,
essentially, reiterating the stand of defendant Nos.1 to 3 regarding
the absolute ownership of defendant No.1 over the suit schedule
properties and especially, stating that defendant No.1 was having
absolute right and title over the property gifted to them under gift
deed dated 27.08.2008 and that since its execution they became
the absolute owners of the same.
8. Defendant No.6 filed a separate written statement even denying the
adoption of the appellant/plaintiff by defendant No.1. He would further
state that based on the compromise decree in OS No.266/1982
filed by defendant No.1 whereunder she consented to give him half
share in each of the suit schedule properties and after the demise
of defendant No.1 he became the only legal heir of Bhavakanna and
defendant No.1 as his sister Renuka died in her early age itself on
12.05.1990.
9. Based on the rival pleadings the trial Court framed the following
issues and additional issues:-
“ISSUES
1) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for ½ share in the suit
schedule property?
2) Whether the plaintiff proves that the sale deed executed
on 13/12/2007 is not at all binding upon the plaintiff?
3) Whether the defendant No.1 was competent to sell
the suit schedule property to the defendant No. 2 and 3?
4) What other relief is the plaintiff entitled to?
5) What order or decree?
Additional issue dtd: 10/02/2012
1) Whether the plaintiff proves that he is the only legal
representative of the deceased defendant No. 1?
Additional Issues dtd: 20/10/2012.
1) Whether the plaintiff proves that he is the only legal
representatives of deceased defendant No. 1?
68 [2025] 1 S.C.R.
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2) Whether the defendants No. 4 and 5 prove that they are
the only legal representatives of the deceased defendant
No. 1?
3) Whether the defendants No. 4 and 5 prove that they
became the absolute owners of the properties mentioned
in para 1B and 1C of the plaint by virtue of the gift deed
executed by deceased defendant No.1 in their favour
on 27/08/2008 and the said gift deed is valid and so the
plaintiff has no right over the said properties?
Additional issues framed on 29/07/2017:
1) Whether the defendant No. 6 proves that the plaintiff got
executed an adoption deed dtd: 19/07/1994 fraudulently,
by force by taking undue advantage of the old age of
defendant No.1?
2) Whether the defendant No.6 proves that the defendant
No.2 and 3 got executed a sale deed dtd: 13/12/2007 with
respect to “A” schedule property from defendant No.1 by
undue influence and coercion?
10. It is to be noted that during the pendency of the suit the defendant
No.1 died.
11. As per judgment dated 31.03.2018 in OS No.122/2009, the suit was
partly decreed and declared gift deed executed by defendant No.1
dated 27.08.2008 in favour of respondent Nos.3 and 4 (defendant
Nos.4 and 5) as null and void and granted the entire suit schedule
B and C properties to the appellant as he being the sole legal heir
of defendant No.1. However, the trial Court rejected his claim in
regard to suit schedule A property and thereby, upheld the sale deed
executed by defendant No.1 in favour of respondent No.1 and 2 viz.,
defendant Nos.2 and 3. In such circumstances, RFA No.100247/2018
was filed by the appellant herein and RFA No.100168/2018 was filed
by defendant Nos.4 and 5 wherein the plaintiff is the respondent No. 1
and defendant Nos.2,3 & 6 were respondent Nos.2 to 4 respectively.
On perusing the records and considering the rival submissions, the
High Court formulated the following points for consideration:-
1) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for half share in the
suit schedule properties.
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 69
Sri Mahesh v. Sangram & Ors.
2) Whether the plaintiff proves that defendant No.1 is not
competent to sell ‘A’ schedule property in favour of
defendant Nos.2 and 3 under registered sale deed?
3) Whether plaintiff proves that defendant No. l had no
right to execute the gift deed in respect of ‘B’ and
‘C’ schedule properties in favour of defendant Nos.4
and 5 and the gift deed is not binding on the plaintiff?
4) Whether the plaintiff proves that dismissal of the suit
for the relief of declaration that registered sale deed
executed by defendant No.1 in favour of defendant
Nos. 2 and 3 is arbitrary and erroneous?
5) Whether defendant Nos.4 and 5 prove that judgment
and decree passed by the trial court declaring that
registered gift deed executed by defendant No. l in
favour of defendant Nos.4 and 5 as null and void, is
arbitrary and erroneous?
6) What order or decree?
12. While considering the first point formulated the High Court took
note of the compromise decree passed in OS No.266/1982 filed by
defendant No.1 which was followed Ext.D14 and the consequential
allotment of shares in favour of defendant No.1 Paragraph 22 of
the impugned common judgment would reveal that as per Ext.D14
only 9/32 share in schedule ‘A’ to ‘D’ properties were allotted to and
acquired by the defendant. Ultimately, the High Court found that as
relates to the properties acquired pursuant to Ext.D14, the defendant
No.1 became its absolute owner.
13. As per the impugned common judgment dated 14.02.2024 the
High Court, dismissed RFA No.100247/2018 filed by the appellant
herein and allowed RFA No.100168/2018 filed by respondent Nos.4
and 5, and the judgment and decree by the trial Court was set
aside. Consequent to the setting aside of the decree the suit filed
by the appellant viz., OS No.122/2009 was dismissed. In view of
the dismissal of RFA No.100247/2018, the Interlocutory Application
being IA No.1/2018 therein for temporary injunction was held as not
surviving and consequently the same was also dismissed. It is in the
said circumstances that the appellant herein who was the plaintiff
filed the captioned appeals.
70 [2025] 1 S.C.R.
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14. In view of the narration of the facts as above, before considering the
rival contentions, we think it apposite to refer to the relevant provisions
of law as well as the law settled in regard to the questions involved
in this matter. Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (for
short ‘the Act’) reads thus:-
“14. Property of a female Hindu to be her absolute
property.―(1) Any property possessed by a female Hindu,
whether acquired before or after the commencement of
this Act, shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not
as a limited owner.
Explanation.―In this sub-section, “property” includes both
movable and immovable property acquired by a female
Hindu by inheritance or devise, or at a partition, or in lieu
of maintenance or arrears of maintenance, or by gift from
any person, whether a relative or not, before, at or after her
marriage, or by her own skill or exertion, or by purchase
or by prescription, or in any other manner whatsoever, and
also any such property held by her as stridhana immediately
before the commencement of this Act.
(2) Nothing contained in sub-section (1) shall apply to
any property acquired by way of gift or under a will or
any other instrument or under a decree or order of a civil
court or under an award where the terms of the gift, will or
other instrument or the decree, order or award prescribe
a restricted estate in such property.”
15. Section 13 of the Act reads thus:-
“13. Computation of degrees.―(1) For the purposes of
determining the order of succession among agnates or
cognates, relationship shall be reckoned from the intestate
to the heir in terms of degrees of ascent or degrees of
descent or both, as the case may be.
(2) Degrees of ascent and degrees of descent shall be
computed inclusive of the intestate.
(3) Every generation constitutes a degree either ascending
or descending.”
16. We will firstly consider the law relating to adoption in view of the
case of the appellant that he was adopted by defendant No.1.
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 71
Sri Mahesh v. Sangram & Ors.
Though there was an attempt on the part of the defendants to defy
adoption concurrently it was found that defendant No.1 had adopted
the appellant/the plaintiff as her son. The trial Court and the High
Court found that plaintiff has succeeded in proving adoption orally
and by producing Ext.P1 registered adoption deed. The Courts have
also found that defendant No.1 in her written statement admitted
that she had taken plaintiff in adoption. In the contextual situation,
it is relevant to refer to the decision in Mst. Deu and Ors. v. Laxmi
Narayan and Ors.,1 where this Court held by virtue of Section 16
the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 (for brevity ‘The
Act of 1956’), that wherever any document registered under the law
is produced before the court purporting to record an adoption made
and is signed by the persons mentioned therein, the court should
presume that the adoption has been made in compliance with the
provisions of the said statute unless and until it is disproved. It was
further held therein in view of Section 16 of the Act of 1956 that it
would be open to the persons who challenge the registered deed of
adoption to disprove the same by taking independent proceedings.
As noticed hereinbefore in the case on hand the appellant plaintiff
had succeeded in proving the factum of his adoption by defendant
No.1 and in that regard, he had produced and proved Ext.P1 which
is a registered deed of adoption and above all defendant No.1
herself admitted the factum of his adoption in her written statement.
In such circumstances, the position is that the appellant/plaintiff was
indisputably adopted by defendant No.1 on 16.07.1994.
17. We have already extracted Sections 14(1) of the Hindu Succession
Act. For a proper consideration of the questions involved in the
case on hand it is only apposite to refer to Section 12(c) of the Act
of 1956. It reads thus:-
“12. Effects of adoption.―An adopted child shall be
deemed to be the child of his or her adoptive father or
mother for all purposes with effect from the date of the
adoption and from such date all the ties of the child in the
family of his or her birth shall be deemed to be severed
and replaced by those created by the adoption in the
adoptive family;
1 (1998) 8 SCC 701
72 [2025] 1 S.C.R.
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(a)…
(b)…
(c) the adopted child shall not divest any person of any
estate which vested in him or her before the adoption.”
18. Thus, going by proviso (c) to Section 12 of the Act of 1956, it is
clear that an adopted child shall not divest any person of any estate
which vested him or her before the adoption. We have already taken
note of the fact that the date of adoption was 16.07.1994. In the
contextual situation it is also relevant to refer to the ‘Relation Back
Principle’. The said principle is that adoption by a widow would relate
back to the date of death of her husband, creating an immediate
coparcenary interest in the joint property, meaning that the adopted
child is treated as if they were born to the deceased husband, thus
entitled to inherit his property. In Kasabai Tukaram Karvar and
Others v. Nivruti (Dead) Through Legal Heirs and Others,2 this
Court extracted Paragraph 6 of Shripad Gajanan Suthankar v.
Dattaram Kashinath Suthankar,3 with agreement thus:-
“10. As far as the doctrine of relation back goes, we need
only notice decisions of this Court in Govind Hanumantha
Rao Desai v. Nagappa alias Narahari Laxman Rao
Deshpande and Sever (1972) 1 SCC 515 and Shripad
Gajanan Suthankar v. Dattaram Kashinath Suthankar
(1974) 2 SCC 156. We may only further expatiate by
referring to paragraphs 6, 7 and 9 of Shripad Gajanan
Suthankar (Supra).
6. It is established law that the adoption by a widow relates
back to the date of the death of the adoptive father, which,
in this case, took place in 1921. Indeed, the complexity
of the present case arises from the application of this
legal fiction of “relation-back” and the limitations on the
amplitude of that fiction visa-vis the partition of 1944, in the
light of the rulings of the various High Courts and of the
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, and of this Court,
the last of which is Govind v. Nagappa. According to the
2 2022 INSC 733 : [2022] 5 SCR 899 : 2022 SCC Online 918
3 1974 INSC 43 : [1974] 3 SCR 474 : (1974) 2 SCC 156
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 73
Sri Mahesh v. Sangram & Ors.
appellant, the rights of the adopted son, armed as he is
with the theory of “relation-back”, have to be effectuated
retroactively, the guidelines wherefor are available from the
decided cases. It is no doubt true that “when a member
of a joint family governed by Mitakshara law dies and the
widow validly adopts a son to him, a coparcenary interest
in the joint property is immediately created by the adoption
co-extensive with that which the deceased coparcener
had, and it vests at once in the adopted son”. (See Mulla
on Hindu Law, 13th Edn. p.516.)
11. The same author, however, points out that:
“the rights of an adopted son arise for the first time on his
adoption. He may, by virtue of his rights as adopted son,
divest other persons in whom the property vested after
the death of the adoptive father, but all lawful alienations
made by previous holder would be binding on him. His right
to impeach previous alienations would depend upon the
capacity of the holder who made the alienation as well as
on the nature of the action of alienation. When the holder
was a male, who had unfettered right of transfer, e.g., the
last surviving member of a joint family, the adopted son
could not impeach the transfer. In case of females who had
restricted rights of transfer even apart from any adoption,
the transfers would be valid only when they are supported
by legal necessity”. (ibid; pp. 516 – 517; para 507.)
“An adopted son is bound by alienations made by his
adoptive father prior to the adoption to the same extent
as a natural-born son would be. (ibid; p. 517 : para 508.)
7. It is settled law that the rights of an adopted son spring
into existence only from the moment of the adoption and
all alienations made by the widow before the adoption, if
they are made for legal necessity or otherwise lawfully,
such as with the consent of the next reversioners, are
binding on the adopted son.”
19. In fact, the defendants who refuted the claim of the appellant,
including defendant No.1 would rely on Section 14(1) of ‘the Act’ and
Section 12(c) of the Act of 1956, besides the compromise decree in OS
74 [2025] 1 S.C.R.
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No.266 of 1982 to contend that defendant No.1 became the absolute
owner of the suit schedule properties by virtue of the adoption and
the operation of the aforesaid provisions much earlier to the adoption
of the appellant/plaintiff on 16.07.1994. In fact, it is so contended by
them to drive home the point that since defendant No.1 became the
absolute owner of the suit schedule property prior to the adoption of
the appellant/plaintiff and the sale deed dated 13.12.2007 in favour
of defendant Nos.2 and 3 (respondent Nos.1 and 2 herein) as also
the gift deed dated 27.08.2007 in favour of defendant No.4 and 5
(respondent Nos.3 and 4 herein), the appellant/plaintiff was bound
by such alienation made by defendant No.1.
20. In view of the position of law referred above and the factual position
obtained in the case on hand the crucial legal position to be looked
into is what is the effect of the compromise decree passed in OS
No.266 of 1982 and whether it would be binding on the appellant. In
this context, it is also relevant to note that indisputably the adoption
of the appellant/plaintiff was on 16.07.1994 and the adoption deed
is a registered one which was not disproved by defendants though
it is permissible under Section 16 of the Act of 1956. Furthermore,
it is relevant to note that it is indisputable that the sale deed in
question was executed only on 13.12.2007 by defendant No.1
and the gift deed was executed by her only on 27.08.2007.
In other words, the sale deed and the gift deed were executed only
subsequent to the adoption of the appellant by defendant No.1 on
16.07.1994. It is in this context that the aforementioned question
assumes relevance.
21. As noticed hereinbefore, defendant No.1 filed OS No.266 of 1982
against her husband Bhavakanna, Smt. Laxmibai, the second wife of
Bhavakanna, Parsuram and Renuka who are the children of Laxmibai
through Bhavakanna. True that the said suit was compromised
and a decree was passed in terms of the compromise petition.
Defendant No.1 filed Final Decree Proceedings No.75/1988 and in
the said proceedings the parties entered into compromise and the
compromise petition was marked as Ext.D14 and by virtue of the
same defendant No.1 was allotted 9/32 share in A to D schedule
properties. Indisputably the adoption of the appellant/plaintiff was
subsequent to the compromise decree and Ext.D14 in terms of which
defendant No.1 was allotted the shares mentioned as above. In such
circumstances, the question is whether by virtue of operation of the
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 75
Sri Mahesh v. Sangram & Ors.
provisions of Section 14(1) of the Act and Section 12(c) of the Act
of 1956, the defendant No.1 would become the absolute owner of
the property prior to the adoption of appellant on 16.07.1994.
22. Obviously, in the case on hand, the factum of adoption of the
appellant/the plaintiff by defendant No.1 after the death of adoptive
father, on 16.07.1994 is established by the appellant/the plaintiff and
it is pertinent to note that the same was admitted by defendant No.1
as well, in her written statement. In such circumstances, in view of
the ‘Doctrine of Relation Back’ and by applying the law laid down in
Sripad Gajanan Suthankar’s case (supra) relied on with agreement
in Kasabai Tukaram Karvar’s case (supra) the adoption by defendant
No.1, the widow of Bhavakanna Shahpurkar, would relate back to
the date of death of the adoptive father which is 04.03.1982 but then
all lawful alienations made by defendant No.1 would be binding on
the appellant/plaintiff. As held in Sripad Gajanan Suthankar’s case
(supra) in paragraph 11 his right to impeach previous alienations
would depend upon the capacity of defendant No.1 who made the
alienation as well as on the nature of the action of alienation.
23. The first among the alienations under challenge in the case on hand
is the one where defendant No.1 effected sale of the properties
covered by registered sale deed dated 13.12.2007 in respect
of ‘A’ schedule property in favour of defendant Nos.2 and 3. There
is concurrency with respect to the said issue between the trial Court
and the High Court. The Courts have held that defendant No.1 got
absolute right to effect the sale of the property covered thereunder
and that the sale was done in favour of defendant Nos.2 and 3 in
accordance with the law. Admittedly, in regard to the sale, defendant
No.1 executed the sale deed dated 13.12.2007 and she was not
having a case that she had not received sale consideration. By
applying the ‘Doctrine of Relation Back’ and the ratio of decisions
in Kasabai Tukaram Karvar’s case (supra) and Sripad Gajanan
Suthankar’s case (supra) it can only be held that the appellant/plaintiff
is bound by the said alienation. This is because of the cumulative
effect of the compromise decree in OS No.122 of 2009 followed
by Ext.D14 and the allotment of share based on the same. In this
context it is also relevant to note that the factum of execution of the
sale deed is not disputed by the appellant but his contention is only
that defendant No.1 could not have sold the property without his
consent and knowledge. Though the alienation was subsequent to
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his adoption by virtue of the fact that defendant No.1 got absolute
right and title in regard to the property covered by the said sale deed
dated 13.12.2007 and that a valid sale was effected following the
procedures, the challenge of the appellant against the said alienation
of property by defendant No.1 in favour of defendant Nos.2 and 3 is
not liable to be interfered with. We have no hesitation to hold that the
concurrent findings of the trial Court and the High Court in regard to
the said sale deed warrant no interference. In such circumstances,
dismissal of RFA No.100247 of 2018 filed by the appellant/plaintiff
challenging the alienation under the registered sale deed dated
13.12.2007 is only to be confirmed.
24. The other alienation of property by defendant No.1 which is under
challenge is the alienation of ‘B’ and ‘C’ schedule properties by
registered gift deed dated 27.08.2008 in favour of defendant Nos.4
and 5. It is to be noted that the trial Court and the High Court are at
issue in regard to the said alienation. Obviously, the trial Court held
that the gift deed dated 27.08.2008 executed by defendant No.1 in
favour of defendant Nos.4 and 5 is null and void and is not binding
on the plaintiff. Consequent to such declaration the trial Court found
that the appellant/plaintiff is entitled to entire ‘B’ and ‘C’ schedule
properties as he being the sole legal heir of deceased defendant
No.1. Per contra, the High Court found that since defendant No.1
was the absolute owner of the said suit schedule properties as well
the appellant/plaintiff got no locus standi to challenge the registered
gift deed executed by defendant No.1 in favour of defendant Nos.4
and 5. It is the said finding that resulted in allowing RFA No.100168
of 2018 filed by defendant Nos.4 and 5. Consequently, the High Court
set aside the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court to that
extent and resultantly dismissed the suit filed by the appellant/plaintiff.
25. In the light of the ‘Doctrine of Relation Back’ and the ratio in the
decisions in Kasabhai Tukaram Karwar’s case (supra) and Sripad
Gajanan Suthankar’s case (supra) we have already found that all
lawful alienations made by defendant No.1 will bind the appellant/
plaintiff and his right to impeach previous alienation would depend
upon the capacity of the holder who make the alienation as well
as on the nature of the action of alienation. The nature of action
of alienation is gift and it is allegedly made in favour of defendant
Nos.4 and 5. It is to be noted that defendant Nos.4 and 5 though got
a case that earlier defendant No.1 executed a Will in regard to the
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 77
Sri Mahesh v. Sangram & Ors.
said properties in their favour they themselves would admit and plead
that subsequently the properties were given in gift as per registered
gift deed dated 27.08.2008. The very fact that the defendant Nos.4
and 5 themselves relied on the gift deed would go to show that if
at all there was a Will that was revoked. At any rate, it is a fact that
even defendant Nos.4 and 5 did not rely on the same.
26. Section 122 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (for short, ‘the TP
Act’) defines gift as under:-
“122. “Gift” defined.—“Gift” is the transfer of certain
existing moveable or immoveable property made voluntarily
and without consideration, by one person, called the
donor, to another, called the donee, and accepted by or
on behalf of the donee.
Acceptance when to be made.— Such acceptance must
be made during the lifetime of the donor and while he is
till capable of giving,
If the donee dies before acceptance, the gift is void.”
27. A perusal of Section 122 of the TP Act would make it clear about
the pre-requisites of a valid gift. Going by the same, two things are
necessary to constitute a valid gift, namely, (i) an offer and, (ii) its
acceptance. A scanning of the judgment of the trial Court in regard to
the alienation by a gift by the defendant No.1 in favour of defendant
Nos.4 and 5 it is to be noted that several reasons have been given
for holding the same as null and void. To start with, it is to be noted
that in the gift deed dated 27.08.2008 it is recited thus:-
“WHEREAS, the Donees are natural Grand Childrens of
Donor i.e., (Donor’s own daughter’s own childrens), the
Donor is full and absolute owner of the Properties, more
fully described in the Schedule hereunder and hereinafter
referred to as the Schedule Property’, by virtue of Final
Court Decree No. FDP-75/88, dated 02.01.1990 & Exe.
Nos. 319/90 R. No.: 1799 dated 05.09.1990. And the said
Schedule mentioned properties are exclusive properties
which are in actual physical possession and enjoyment
of the said Donor.”
28. Going by the afore extracted recital in the deed of gift, the donees
are natural grand-children of donor i.e., donor’s own daughter’s own
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children. But the fact is that even the defendant witnesses who are
related to defendant Nos.2 and 3 would admit the fact that defendant
Nos.4 and 5 are not the children of own daughter of defendant No.1.
The adoption deed itself would go to show that the adoptive mother
who is defendant No.1 was issueless. Thus, when the admitted
position is that defendant No.1 got no children, the defendant Nos.4
and 5 cannot claim the status that they are the own children of the
own daughter of defendant No.1. That apart, going by the afore
extracted recital, the schedule mentioned properties in the gift deed
viz., the suit schedule ‘B’ and ‘C’ properties are exclusive properties
in the actual physical possession and enjoyment of defendant No.1.
It is to be noted that the very case of appellant/plaintiff is that he
is in exclusive possession of the said suit schedule properties. In
the contextual situation, it is to be noted that in Ext.D6(a) gift deed
there is no reference about the delivery of property by the donor
and taking possession of property by the donee. Defendant No.4
was examined in the suit as DW-3. During cross-examination he
would depose that he did not know as to who are in possession of
properties comprised in CTS No.667 and CTS No.4879/67 and 278,
he also would say that he is absolutely unaware as to who is using
CTS 667 and who is residing in CTS No.4879/67, it is to be noted that
they are the properties described as ‘B’ and ‘C’ schedule properties
in the suit and also as properties gifted to defendant Nos.4 and 5
as per Ext.D6(a) gift deed dated 27.08.2008. It is also relevant to
note that while being cross-examined as DW-3 the fourth defendant
would also depose that when the gift deed was registered the said
properties covered by the same were not in his possession and he
voluntarily stated that it was with defendant No.1 till her lifetime. It
is also evident from his oral testimony that he would admit that the
possession of the said property was not taken either on the date of
Ext.D6 or even thereafter. It is in the said circumstances specifically
dealt with in detail that the trial Court arrived at the conclusion that
defendant No.1 was not knowing the contents of Ext.D6(a) gift deed
and further that ‘B’ and ‘C’ schedule properties referred to in Ext.
D6(a) were not delivered to the possession of defendant Nos.4 and 5
even on the date of execution of Ext.D6(a) and even at the time of
examination before the Court defendant Nos.4 was not aware as to
who are the persons who are in possession of ‘B’ and ‘C’ schedule
properties. Same was the case with respect to defendant No.5.
Moreover, the trial Court took note of the fact that the evidence on
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 79
Sri Mahesh v. Sangram & Ors.
record would reveal that defendant No.1 was residing at Nanawadi
at the time of her death along with DW-5. As noticed hereinbefore
when the fact is that the properties covered by the gift deed are not
delivered either at the time of the alleged execution of the gift deed
or at any later point of time and the fact that the defendant(s) got
no case that at any later point of time that they had initiated any
steps to get possession of the same either during the lifetime of
defendant No.1 or even after her lifetime, we do not find any reason
as to how the trial Court could be said to have erred in holding that
defendant Nos.4 and 5 could not become absolute owners of ‘B’ and
‘C’ schedule properties through Ext.D6(a) gift deed.
29. It is the said finding of the trial Court that was set aside by the High
Court in the first appeal with respect to the alienation under the gift
deed dated 27.08.2008. A careful scanning of the impugned common
judgment of the High Court would reveal that the sound reasoning of
the trial Court in regard to this issue was interfered with and set aside
without detailed discussion and at the same time without providing
any good and sustainable reason therefor. It appears that the High
Court was carried away by the fact that the gift deed is a registered
one. We have already taken note of the fact that in order to be valid,
acceptance of the gift is a pre-requisite. When the very case of one
of the donees of the gift viz., the defendant No.4 that the property
was in the possession of the donor herself till her death itself would
reveal that the properties were not delivered and in other words in
the legal sense there was no acceptance. The fact that defendant
No.4 himself depose before the Court that he was not aware of the
fact as to in whose possession the gifted properties lie with, would
justify the conclusions arrived at by the trial Court. True that the
First Appellate Court will be having the power to reappreciate the
entire evidence and to substitute any finding of the trial Court if it
is legally required. At the same time, when once it is found that a
sound reasoning given by a trial Court for returning a finding with
respect to a definite issue the same cannot be likely interfered without
giving appropriate sustainable reasons. The position with respect
to the gift deed is discussed in detail by the trial Court and when it
arrived at the conclusion that the pre-requisite for making the same
valid was absent such a finding could be reversed only if it is found
that the said finding was based on perverse precision of evidence.
In the case on hand, the discussion as above would reveal that the
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pre-requisite to constitute a valid gift is lacking and the evidence
discussed by the trial Court would support the said finding we do not
find any reason for the Appellate Court to interfere with the same.
The declaration that gift deed dated 27.08.2008 is null and void is
made by the trial Court in the aforesaid circumstances and it is only
as a necessary sequel that the trial Court held that the appellant/
plaintiff is entitled to entire ‘B’ and ‘C’ schedule properties as the
sole legal heir of deceased defendant No.1. As noted hereinbefore,
DW-1 herself in her written statement admitted the adoption of the
appellant/plaintiff as her son and the registered adoption deed could
fortify the same. When that be so the finding that the appellant is
entitled to the said properties being the sole legal heir of deceased
defendant No.1 cannot be said to be faulty as it is the inevitable
consequence of application for the ‘Doctrine of Relation Back’ and
the ratio of the decisions in Kasabai Tukaram Karvar’s case (supra)
and Sripad Gajanan Suthankar’s case (supra).
30. In the result the appeal is partly allowed. The concurrent finding
of the courts below that the sale deed dated 13.12.2007 in favour
of defendant Nos.2 and 3 is valid and that the appellant/plaintiff is
not entitled to any share in ‘A’ schedule property is confirmed and
consequently the appeal against the judgment in RFA No.100247 of
2018, viz., SLP (C) No.10558 of 2024 is dismissed.
31. The appeal against the judgment in RFA No.100168 of 2018 against
the reversal of the judgment and the decree of the trial Court pertaining
to the alienation of properties through gift deed dated 27.08.2008 and
the gift deed itself, is allowed and the judgment of the High Court in
RFA No.100168/2018 is quashed and set aside. Consequently, the
judgment and decree of the trial Court holding the gift deed dated
27.08.2008 as null and void and the finding that the appellant/plaintiff
is entitled to entire ‘B’ and ‘C’ schedule properties as the sole heir
of deceased defendant No.1 are restored.
32. In the circumstances there will be no order as to costs.
Result of the case: Appeal partly allowed.
†
Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain
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