Holding

Section 32(a) and 32(c) are prospective, Section 32(b) is retrospective, and the 1983 G.O. under Section 26 retains overriding effect, so pending eviction proceedings continue under the general law.

Summary

The Supreme Court examined whether Section 32(c) of the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control (Amendment) Act, 2005 operates prospectively or retrospectively and how it affects eviction suits pending when the amendment came into force. It also considered the effect of the 1983 Government Order (G.O. Ms. 636) issued under Section 26, which exempts certain buildings from the Act, on the amended Section 32. The Court held that Sections 32(a) and 32(c) are prospective, while Section 32(b) is retrospective, and that the 1983 G.O. has overriding effect and remains valid for buildings with rent between Rs 1,001‑3,500 (municipal) or Rs 1,001‑2,000 (other areas). Consequently, pending eviction proceedings are to be decided under the general law, not affected by the amendment. The appeals filed by the tenants were dismissed.

Issues considered

Whether Section 32(c) of the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control (Amendment) Act, 2005 is prospective or retrospective.
Whether the 1983 Government Order issued under Section 26 overrides or is displaced by the amended Section 32.
Whether the amendment deprives landlords of vested rights to evict tenants in pending suits or appeals.
Whether a new law can be applied to appeals decided before its enactment.
Whether the exemption under Section 26 has overriding effect over the rest of the Act.

Legislation cited

Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960s. 10, s. 26, s. 2(iii), s. 2(ix), s. 32
Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control (Amendment) Act, 2005s. 32(c)
General Clauses Act, 1897s. 6(c)

Subjects

rent controlevictionprospective legislationretrospective legislationSection 26 exemptionSection 32landlord-tenant rightsnon obstante clausepending proceedingsstatutory interpretation

Judgment

[2015]4 S.C.R. 246

A SMT. NOORUNISSA BEGUM

v.

BRIJ KISHORE SANGH!
B (Civil Appeal Nos. 3467-3468 of2010 etc.)

FEBRUARY 24, 2015.

[SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA AND
C S.A. BOBDE, JJ.]

Andhra Pradesh Building (Lease, Rent and Eviction)
Control Act, 1960 - s.32 as amended by Andhra Pradesh
Building (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control (Amendment).
o Act, 2005 and s.26 -Applicability of s.32(c) (as inserted by
amendment Act) - Whether prospective or retrospective -
Effectofs.32(c), on GO. No. 636 dated 291h December, 1983
issued by Government of Andhra Pradesh u/s 26 - Held:
Partofs.32 i.e. s.32(a) and (c) are prospective while s.32(b)
E is retrospective in operation-s.26 and the GO. issued under
the said provision has overriding effect over rest of the
provisions of the Act- ss. 26 and 32 operate in different fields
and hence there is no clash between them - Clause (a) of
the G 0. has become redundant but clause (b) thereof cannot
F be said to have become redundant in view of the amended
s. 32 - In the present cases, the cases pending for
determination under general law would not be affected by
amended s.32 and would continue to be decided in
G accordance with general law.

Rent Control - Eviction of tenant...,.. Remedy - Held:
Right of landlord to evict tenant by way of suit, exists as long
as it is not abridged by a special legislation - Suit.
H
246
SMT. NOORUNISSA BEGUM v. BRIJ KISHORE 247
SANGH I

Appeal - Whether affected by a new law - Held: Ordinarily A
appellate court cannot take into account a new law brought
into existence after the judgment appealed from·has been
rendered - Rights of litigants in appeal are determined
applying the law which existed on the date of filing the suit.
B
Disposing of the appeals, the Court

HELD: 1.1 Under common law, the rights of the
landlord to evict a tenant by way of suit before a civil
court of competent jurisdiction exist as long as it is not c
abridged by a special legislation conferring protection
in favour of the tenant. [Para 21] [266-F]

1.2 Ordinarily a Court of appeal cannot take into
account a new law brought into existence after the o
judgment appealed from has been rendered, because
rights of the litigants in appeal are determined applying
the law in force at the date of the suit. [Para 25] [270-D-E]

1.3 In its original form the Andhra Pradesh Building E
{Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960 protected
tenants of all buildings, irrespective of rent, except (a)
the tenants of a building owned by the Government and
(b) the tenants of a building constructed on or after 26th
August, 1957. After striking down of Section 32(b) in F
Motor General Traders case, the tenants of all buildings,
including any building constructed on or after 26th
August, 1957 irrespective of rent were protected under
the Act except the tenants of a building owned by the
Government. After amendment of Section 32 by the G
Amendment Act, 2005, w.e.f 271hApril, 2005, tenants of a
building, rent of which is Rs.3,5001- p.m. or below in the
areas covered by the Municipal Corporations and the
tenants of a building, rent of which is Rs.2,0001- p.m. or H
248 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 4 S.C.R.

A below in other areas, only remain as protected tenants.
In effect, the rest of the tenants of any building rent of
which exceeds Rs.3,500/- p.m. in the area covered by
the Municipal Corporation and Rs.2,000/- p.m. in other
areas, no more remain tenant within the meaning of
B Section 2(ix) of the Act as the Act is not applicable to
them. Therefore, since, 271h April, 2005 this class of
tenants of building whose rent exceeds Rs.3,500/- p.m.
in Municipal Corporation areas and Rs.2,000/-per month
C in other areas, lost their right of protection under the Act
in view of amended Section 32(c). This apart the tenants
of any building constructed or substantially renovated,
either before or after the commencement of the Act for a ·
period of fifteen years from the date of completion of
o such construction or substantial renovation, no more
remain 'tenant' within the meaning of Section 2(ix) of the
Act and they also lost their right of protection in view of
the amended Section 32(b). The position with regard to
the building belonging to the Government remained the
E same. The tenants of building belonging to the
Cantonment Board or local authority also lost their rights
to claim protection in view of amended Section 32(a).
Thus, part of s.32 i.e. s.32(a) and (c) is prospective and
other part i.e. s.32(b) is retrospective in operation.
F [Paras 35, 36, 37 and 39] [287-A-H; 288-A]

Shah Bhojraj Kuverji Oil Mills and Ginning Factory v.
Subhash Chandra Yograj Sinha AIR 1961 SC 1596;
Mst. Rafiquennessa v. Lal Bahadur Chetri and Anr. AIR
G 1964 SC 1511: 1964 SCR 876 - followed.

Parripati Chandrasekha Rao &sons vs. Alapati Jalaiah
(1995) 3 SCC 709: 1995 (3) SCR 817; Garikapati
Veeraya v. N. Subbaiah Choudhary AIR 1957 SC
H
SMT. NOORUNISSA BEGUM v. BRIJ KISHORE 249
SANGH I

540:1957 SCR 488 ; Moti Ram v. Suraj Bhan AIR 1960 A
SC 655: 1960 SCR 896; Dayavati vs. lnderjit AIR
1966 SC 1423; Atma Ram Mittal vs. lshwar Singh Punia
(1988) 4 SCC 284:1988 (2) Suppl. SCR 528; Amba/a/
Sarabhai Enterprises Ltd. vs. Amrit Lal & Co. and Anr.
(2001) 8 sec 397: 2001 (2) Suppl. SCR 195; Mani B
Subraf Jain vs. Raja Ram Vohra (1980) 1SCC1: 1980
(2) SCR 141; Lakshmi Narayan Guin and Ors.
vs.Niranjan Modak (1985) 1 SCC 270: 1985 (2) SCR
202 - relied on.
c
2.1 Section 32 of the Act specifies the buildings
to which the Act will not apply. It is not an exemption
granted in the Act but a specific provision under the Act
stipulating non-application of the Act to certain buildings.
0
Section 26 is the power of exemption granted to the State
Government to exempt certain buildings or class of
buildings from all or any of the provisions of the said
Act. [Para 40) [289-B-C)

2.2 Clause (a) of G.0.Ms.636 dated 29th E
December, 1983 has become redundant. However,
clause (b) of the G.O.Ms.636 dated 29th December, 1983
still holds good. The suit(s), appeal(s), revision
application(s) or execution case(s) which are pending F
for determination under the General Law are not affected
by amended Section 32 and will contim.:~ to be decided
in accordance with General Law. The expression
notwithstanding is in contradistinction to the phrase
'subject to', the latter conveying the idea of a provision G
yielding place to another provision or other provisions
to which it is made subject. Thus, Section 26 and the
exemption granted by the State Government u/s 26 of
the Act by G.O.Ms.636 dated 29th December, 1983 has
H
250 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 4 S.C~R.

A overriding effect over rest of the provisions of the Act.
[Paras 42, 43 and 52] [290-F-H; 293-H; 394-A]

Union of India and Anr. vs. G.M. Kokil and Anr. 1984
(Suppl.) SCC 196: 1984 SCR 292; Chandavarkar
B Sita Ratna Rao vs. Ashalata S. Guram (1986) 4 SCC
447: 1986 (3) SCR 866- relied on.

2.3 It cannot be said that by amending Section
32, the legislature intended to bring about a remedial
c situation relating to certain classes of buildings which
were the subject matter of exceptions under Section 26
granted in the year 1983. Such classes of buildings
enjoying the benefit of exemption from the operation of
the Act since 1983 cannot be said to have lost the benefit
D of exemption by way of such amendment. [Para 44] [291-
A-B]

2.4 It is wrong to state that buildings whose
rent are upto Rs.3,500/- in the municipal area and
E Rs.2,000/- in other area have been brought into the fold
of the Act by amended Section 32(c). In fact, such
buildings were already covered by the Act in view of
original Section 32. But the tenant of such building could
not claim protection in view of exemption granted by the
F State under Section 26 by G.O.Ms. No. 636 dated 291h
December, 1983. [Para 45] [291-C-D]

2.5 Sections 26 and 32 of the Act operate in two
different fields. Section 32 has been enacted to enable
G the legislature to provide for non-application of the Act
in its entirety without any qualifications. It is open to the
legislature to. choose any subject for such rion-
application. It can be an area, class of buildings etc.
H Section 32 is an independent provision in respect of the
SMT. NOORUNISSA BEGUM v. BRIJ KISHORE 251
SANGH I

non-application of the Act. On the other hand, Section A
26 confers power on the Government to exempt
buildings or classes of buildings to which Act is
applicable from all or any of the provisions of the Act.
Section 26 has a non-obstante clause, which is widely
worded. The Government need not, for the purposes of B
exercise of power under Section 26 take any guidance
or be influenced by the provisions of Section 32.
[Paras 46 and 47] [291-E-G]

2.6 Though clause (a) of G.0.Ms.636 dated 29th C
December, 1983 has become redundant, clause (b) of
the said G.O. still applies to the building the monthly rent
of which exceeds Rs.1,000/- i.e. the building monthly rent
of which is between Rs.1001/- to Rs.3,500/- in the
0
Municipal areas and Rs.1001/- to Rs.2,000/- in other
areas. The aforesaid buildings whose monthly rent.
exceeds Rs.1,000/- still continue to enjoy the exemption
granted to them under Section 26 of the Act. The larger
Bench of the High Court wrongly held that clause (b) of E
the G.0.Ms.636 dated 29th December, 1983 has become
a redundant in view of the amended Section 32.
[Para 51] [292-G-H; 293-A-B]

Dilip vs. Mohd. Azizul Haq & Anr. AIR 2000 SC F
1976: 2000 (2) SCR 280; Motor General Traders and
Anr. vs. State of Andhra Pradesh and Ors. (1984) 1
SCC 222:1984 (1) SCR 594- referred to.

3. The suit(s), appeal(s), revision application(s) or G
execution case(s) which are pending for determination
under the General Law are not affected by amended
Section 32 and will continue to be decided in accordance
with General Law. [Para 52] [294-B]
H
252 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015]4S.C.R

A Case Law Reference

1984 (1) SCR 594 referred to. Para 4
B 2000 (2) SCR 280 referred to. Para 8

1995 (3) SCR 817 relied on. Para 22

1957 SCR 488 relied on. Para 23
c 1960 SCR 896 relied on. Para 24

AIR 1966 SC 1423 relied on para 25

1988 (2) Suppl. SCR 528 relied on. Para 26
D
2001 (2) Suppl. SCR 195 relied on. Para 27

1980 (2) SCR 141 relied on. Para 28

1985 (2) SCR 202 relied on. Para 29
E
AIR 1961 SC 1596 relied on. Para 30

1964 SCR 876 relied on. Para 31

1984 SCR 292 relied on. Para 41
F
1986 (3) SCR 866 relied on. Pa.-~ i!2

CIVILAPPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos.
3467-3468 of2010.
G
From the Judgment and Order dated 30.04.2007 and
12.06.2007 of the High Court of JudicatureAndhra Pradesh
at Hyderabad in Civil Revision Petition No. 1669 of 2006.

H
SMT. NOORUNISSA BEGUM v. BRIJ KISHORE 253
SANGH I

WITH .A

C.A. Nos. 3471, 3472, 3473, 3474-3475, 3476 of2010, 7825-
7826 of 2012, 2569 of 2013, 2403-2405 of 2015, 2406, 2407,
2408-2409 of 2015,
B
Dhruv Mehta, Yashraj Singh Deora, Abhishek P., Mitter
& Mitter Co., Promila, S. Thananjayan, T. V. Ratnam, V. Sridhar
Rao, V. N. Raghupathy, D. Bharathi Reddy, Roy Abraham,
Ranjit Chad ha, Seema Jain, Aabhas Parimal, Himinder Lal,
Pramod B. Agarwala, Prashant M., Vishnu Shakar Jain, c
Prasant Shukla, Sri ram P., Ajay Choudhary for the Appellant.

R. Venkataramani,A. C. Pradhan, M. ShoebAlam, T.
Abdul Rahman, Yashraj B., S. Babu, Neelam Singh,Anil Kumar
Tandale, P. Niroop, Chandan Kumar, M. Srinivas R. Rao, o
Govardhan, Sudha Gupta, Amit Pawan, D. Bharat Kumar, S.
Mohandas M., Balasubrahamanyam K., Abhijit Sengupta, T.
Anamika, Ashok Mathur, C. K. Sucharita, Pattabhiram V., M.
Vijaya Bhaskar, S. Udaya Kumar Sagar, Rajiv S. Roy, A.
Chatterjee, Rahul Baidya, Pranab Kumar Mullick, Sum it Kumar, E
Sridhar Potaraj, Arjun Singh for the Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J 1. Leave F
granted.

2. All these appeals involves common question of law
as to the applicability of Section 32(c) of the Andhra Pradesh
Buildings (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control (Amendment) Act, G
2005 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Amendment Act, 2005')
to eviction cases pending on the date of its coming into force
and the effect of the said Section on G.O. dated 29th December,
1983 issued by the Government of Andhra Pradesh. Therefore
H
254 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 4 S.C.R.

A they were heard together and being disposed of by this
common judgment.

3. The background of Section 32 of Andhra
Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Act,
B 1960 (Act No. XV of 1960):

The State of Andhra Pradesh came into existence on
1st October, 1953 under the provisions of Andhra State Act,
1953. By virtue of the provisions of the said Act, the Madras
C Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1949 continued to be
in operation in the State of Andhra Pradesh. By the States
Reorganisation Act, 1956 with the merger of Telangana area,
which formerly formed a part of the erstwhile State of
Hyderabad, to the territories of State of Andhra Pradesh the
D new State of Andhra Pradesh came into existence by
Notification dated 1st November, 1956. By virtue of States
Reorganisation Act, Hyderabad House (Rent, Eviction and
Lease) Control Act, 1954 continued to be in force in the
Telangana area. In the Andhra area, the Madras Buildings
E (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1949 also continued to be in
force. In this background both the Madras Act and Hyderabad
Act were repealed and replaced by the Andhra Pradesh
Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960
(hereinafter referred to as the 'Act'). The Section 32 of the Act,
F as it stood on the date of enactment exempted buildings owned
by the Government and buildings constructed on and after 26th
August, 1957 from the purview of the Act.

4. The constitutional validity of Section 32(b) of the Act
G which exempted buildings constructed on or after 26th August,
1957 from the operation of the Act was challenged before this
Court in Motor General Traders and another vs. State of
Andhra Pradesh and others, (1984) 1SCC222. This Court
H by judgment dated 26th October, 1983 held the said section to
SMT. NOORUNISSA BEGUM v. BRIJ KISHORE 255
SANGHI [SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J.]

be unconstitutional being violative of Article 14 of the A
Constitution of India.

5. Section 26 of the Act authorizes the State
Government to exempt any building or class of building from
all or any of the provisions of the Act. B

Later, in exercise of power under Section 26 of the Act
the GovernmentofAndhra Pradesh issued G.O.Ms. No.636
dated 291h December, 1983 whereby it exempted from
operation of the provisions of the Act, (a) all buildings for a C
period of 10 years from the date on which the construction is
completed, and (b)buildings, the monthly rent of which exceeds
Rs.1,000/-.

The exemption was given effect from 26th October, 1983 D
i.e. the date on which this Court struck down Section 32(b) of
the Act.

6. After declaration of Section 32(b) unconstitutional and
invalid, Section 32 (a) ~hich exempted buildings owned by E
the Government from the operation of the Act stood till Section
32 was amended bytheAmendmentAct, 2005. By amended
Section 32, the Act was made inapplicable to buildings the
rent of which as on the date of commencement of the
AmendmentAct, 2005, exceeds Rs.3,500/- per month in the F
areas covered by the Municipal Corporations in the State and
Rs.2,000/- per month in other areas.

7. All the buildings with respect to which these appeals
are preferred belong to the category of buildings of which rent G
was more than Rs.1,000/-(one thousand).i.e. who were
exempted by G.O.Ms.No.636 dated 291h December, 1983. On
the amendment of Section 32 the tenants of such buildings
against whom eviction cases or appeal or revision or
H
256 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 4 S.C.R.

A execution cases were pending before various courts
approached the Andhra Pradesh High Court raised a
contention before the learned Single Judge that in view of the
amended Section 32, the pending suits cannot be adjudicated
by the civil courts and the decrees already passed cannot be
B executed because courts which passed the decrees will be
deemed to have become "coram non judice".

8. The learned Single Judge of the High Court referred the
matter to the Division Bench.
c
The Division Bench noticed the judgments in Shah
Bhojraj Kuverji Oil Mills and Ginning Factory vs.
Subhash Chandra Yograj Sinha, AIR 1961SC1596;
Rafeequnnesa vs. Lal Bahadur Chetri, AIR 1964 SC
D 1511; Dilip vs. Mohd. Azizul Haq & Anr., AIR 2000
SC 1976 and other cases including unreported
judgment of Full Bench of the said High Court in Second
Appeal No.532 of 2002 dated 61hJanuary,2005 and felt
that the issue raised in the cases needs to be addressed
E by a Full Bench and accordingly ~ferred the matter to
Full Bench.

9. The Full Bench, after hearing the cases at some
length, by an elaborate order, observed that the judgment
F rendered by a Bench of equal strength in Second Appeal
No.532 of2002 requires reconsideration by a Larger Bench
in the light of various judgments referred to in the reference
order.
G 10. On such reference, the matter was heard by the
Larger Bench of 5-Judge of the High Court of Judicature of
Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad. By the impugned common
judgment dated 30 1hApril, 2007 in S.A.No.1475, 1449 of
H 2005 etc., the Larger Bench by majority held theAmen?ment
SMT. NOORUNISSA BEGUM v. BRIJ KISHORE 257
SANGH I [SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J.]

Act, 2005 to be prospective and observed that: A

"A reading of the amended Section 32 makes it clear
that Section 32(b) as it originally stood has been
substituted with Section 32(c) and with this,
G.O.Ms.No.636 dated 29.12.1983 issued by the State B
·Government under Section 26 of the Act has become
redundant."

The Larger Bench further answered the reference as
follows: C

. "(a) Section 32(c)of the Andhra Pradesh Buildings
(Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960 as brought
into force by Section 3 oftheAndhra Pradesh Buildings
(Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control (Amendment) Act, o
2005 is prospective in operation and this provision does
not affect the proceedings pending as on the date of its
coming into force before the Civil Courts or Appellate,
Revisional or Executing Courts. These cases are
required to be decided without reference to and E
application of the provisions of the amendment Act of
2005."

11. In his minority judgment, one of the Judges held the
Amended Section to be retrospective and answered the F
reference as follows:

"i) with effect from28.05.2005, when the amended
Section 32(c) came into force, persons, by whom rent
payable for a building does not exceed Rs.3, 500/-p.m. G
within the Municipal Corporations of the State and does
not exceed Rs. 2, 0001- p.m. in other areas, would come
within the definition of "tenant" under Section 2(ix) of
Act 15of1960.
H
258 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 4 S.C.R.

A ii) even if such persons have suffered a decree for
eviction prior thereto, they are entitled for the protection
ofAct 15of1960 provided they continue in possession
of the building.

B iii) after 28.05.2005, such tenants cannot be evicted
in execution of a decree in view of the protection
conferred on them by Section 10(1) of Act 15of1960.

iv) after the amended Section 32(c)came into force,
c with effect from 28.05.2005, the civil court must be
held to have become coram non judice, not to have
jurisdiction to pass a decree of eviction in respect of
buildings the rent of which in areas within Municipal
Corporations of the State does not exceed Rs. 3, 5001-
D p. m. and in other areas not exceeding Rs.2,0001-
p.m. and its proceedings, resulting in the decree, a
nullity.

v) even if at the time of institution of the suit, or when a
E decree for eviction was passed, the amended Section
32(c) was not in force, but was introduced during the
pendency of the appeal a tenant, who continues to
remain in possession of a building whose rent is
below the limits prescribed in the amended Section
F 32(c), for being exempted from the provisions of the
Act, is entitled for the protection of Act 15 of 1960,
more particularly Section 10(1) thereof, and the
Appellate Court is divested of its jurisdiction to pass a
decree of eviction."
G
12. As one or other party in all these appeals addressed
the Court either supporting the majority decision of the Larger
Bench or minority decision, it is not necessary to record the
H individuals' submissions made by the learned counsel.
SMT. NOORUNISSA BEGUM v. BRIJ KISHORE 259
SANGHI [SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J.]

13. THE STATUTORY PROVISIONS: A

To determine the issue involved it is necessary to refer to
relevant provisions of the Act. Section 2(iii) of the Act
defines 'building' as under:
B
"Section 2(iii)-'Bui/ding' means any house or hut or
part of a house or hut, let or to be let separately for
residential or non-residential purposes and includes:-

a. the gardens, grounds, garages and out-houses if
any, appurtenant to such house, hut or part of such of
c
house or hut and let or to be let along with such house
or hut or part of such house or hut; \

b. any furniture supplied or any fittings affixed by the
D
landlord for use in such house or hut or part of a house·
or hut, but does not include a room in a hotel or boarding
house;

Section 2(ix) of the Act defines 'tenant' for the purpose
of the Act as under: E

"Section 2(ix)-'Tenant' means any person by whom or
on whose account tent is payable for a building and
includes the surviving spouse, or any son or daughter,
of a deceased tenant who had been living with the tenant F
in the building as a member of tenant's family up to the
death of the tenant and a person continuing in
possession after the termination of the tenancy in his
favour, but does not include a person placed in
G
occupation of a building, by its tenant or a person to
whom the collection of rents or fees in public market,
cart-stand or slaughter-house or of rents for shops has
been framed out or leased by a local authority.
H
260 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 4 S.C.R.

A Section 10 of the Act deals with 'eviction of tenants'. It
protects the tenant from eviction in execution of a decree or
otherwise in all cases except in those cases where the
eviction is in accordance with the provisions of the Section
10 or Sections 12 and 13 of the Act. Relevant portion of the
B said section reads as under:

"Section 10(1):-A tenant shall not be evicted whether
in execution of a decree or otherwise except in
accordance with the provisions of this Section or
c Sections 12 and 13:

Pro"vided that where the tenant, denies the title of the
landlord or claims right of permanent tenancy, the
Controller shall decide whether the denial or claim is
D bona fide and if he records a finding to that nffect, the
landlord shall be entitled to sue for eviction of the tenant
in Civil Court and the Court may pass a decree for
eviction on any of the grounds mentioned in the said
sections, notwithstanding that the Court finds that such
E denial does not involve forfeiture of the lease or that
the claim is unfounded."

Section 26 of the Act empowers the State Government
to exempt any building or class of building from all or any of
F the provisions of the Act subject to such conditions and terms,
if any, the State may specify. Section 26 reads as follows:

"Section 26. Exemptions:- Notwithstanding anything
in this Act the Government may, by notification in the
G Andhra Pradesh Gazette, exempt subject to such
conditions and terms, if any, as they may specify in the
notification, any building or class of building from all
or any of the provisions of the Act."
H
SMT. NOORUNISSA BEGUM v. BRIJ KISHORE 261
SANGH I [SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J.]

Section 32 of the Act as it stood on the date of A
enactment is as follows:

"32. Act not to apply to certain buildings.- The provisions
of this Act shall not apply:
B
a. To any building owned by the Government;

b. to any building constructed on and after August 26,
1957."

Upon striking down of Section 32(b) by this Court on C
26th October, 1983 only Government buildings were exempted
from the purview of the Act.

14. Since enactment of the Act in 1960 the State
Government never exercised its power under Section 26 of D
the Act to grant exemption to any building or class of building
from or any of the provisions of the Act, till it issued G.O. Ms.
No.636 dated 29th December, 1983 exempting all buildings
for a period of 10 years from the date of completion of their
construction and the building(s) the monthly rent of which E
exceeds Rs.1,000/- from the provisions of the Act. The said
G.O. Ms is quoted here under:

"[G.O.Ms.No.636, General Administration
(Accommodation-A) 291h December, 1983] F

In exercise of the powers conferred by Section 26 of the
Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction)
Control Act, 1960 (Andhra Pradesh Act XV of 1960),
the Governor of Andhra Pradesh hereby exempts with G
effect on and from the 261h October, 1983, from the
operation of the provisions of the said Act, -

a. all buildings for a period of ten years from the
H
262 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 4 S.C.R.

A date on which their construction is completed and;

b. buildings the monthly rent of which exceeds
rupees one thousand.

Explanation:- For the purpose of clause (a) the
B
construction of a building shall be deemed to have
been completed on the date on which the completion
thereof is reported to or otherwise recorded by, the
local authority having jurisdiction and in the absence
c of any such report or record the date on which it is
actually occupied (not including occupation merely
for the purpose of supervising the construction o~
guarding the buildings under construction) for the first
time:
D
Provided that there may be different dates of
completion of construction in respect of different parts
of building which are either designed as separate
units or occupied separately by the /and-lord and one
E or more tenants or by different tenants."

The said G.O.Ms was issued by the State Government
in exercise of its power under Section 26 of the Act to fill up
the void created by the judgment of this Court in 'Motor
F General Traders'. The said G.O.Ms was issued on 29th
December, 1983 and was made applicable from 26th October,
1983, i.e., the date of the judgment in 'Motor General
Traders'.

G 15. Section 32 as amended by Amendment Act, 2005:

32.Act not apply to certain buildings:- The provisions
of this Act shall not apply,-

(a) to any building belonging to the State Government
H
SMT. NOORUNISSA BEGUM v. BRIJ KISHORE 263
SANGH! [SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J.]

or the Central Government, or Cantonment Board or any A
local authority;

(b) to any building constructed or substantially renovated,
either before or after the commencement of this Act for
a period of fifteen years from the date of cc;>mpletion of B
such construction or substantial renovation.

Explanation 1:- A building may be said to be
substantially renovated if not less than seventy five
percent of the premises is built new in accordance of c
completion of such construction or substantial
renovation.

Explanation 11:- Date of completion of construction shall
be the date of completion as intimated to the concerned o
authority or of assessment of property tax, whichever is
earlier, and where the premises have been constructed
· in stages the date on which the initial building was
completed and an intimation thereof was sent to the
concerned authority or was assessed to property tax, E
whichever is earlier.

(c) to any building the rent of which as on the date of
commencement of the Andhra Pradesh Buildings
(Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control (Amendment) Act, F
2005, exceeds rupees three thousand and five hundred
per month in the areas covered by the Municipal
Corporations in the State and rupees two thousand per
month in other areas.
G
16. The submission made by the learned counsel on
behalf of the tenants is summarised as follows:

1. The amended Section 32 would make the provisions
of the Act applicable to pending proceedings. H
264 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2015] 4 S.C.R.

A 2. The definition of "Tenant" in Section 2(ix) of the Act
would even include a former tenant continuing
possession after the termination of the tenancy in his
favour. Thus, irrespective of any decree for eviction
which may have been passed, ifthe tenant continues
B in possession, he would be covered by the statutory
definition of "Tenant".

3. The purpose oftheAmendmentAct is to bring within
its fold buildings, whose rent are upto Rs.3,500/-p.m.
c Thus, on the date the Amendment Act came into force,
all those persons who were in possession of buildings
the rents of which were below Rs.3,500/- p.m. would
come under the definition of "Tenant" as defined in
Section 2(ix) of the Act and such buildings would come
D
under the definition of "building" as given in Section
2(iii) of the Act.

4. For the purposes of the Act a person ceases to be a
tenant only when he loses possession of the building,
E i.e. on the date of execution of a decree of eviction
passed against him. Therefore, it is with reference to
the date of execution of the decree that it has to be
determined whether or not the person is a "Tenant". If
F the person falls within the definition of "Tenant",
irrespective of whether or not there exists a decree of
eviction against him, the provisions of the Act would
apply.

5.As a result of the coming into force of the Amendment
G
Act, the cases of tenants are brought within the
protective umbrella of Section 10(1) of the Act.
Accordingly, the power of civil courts to evict the tenant
(which includes a tenant continuing in possession after
H the termination of the tenancy) who is in possession of
SMT. NOORUNISSA BEGUM v. BRIJ KISHORE 265
SANGH I [SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J.]

the buildings whose rents do not exceed Rs.3,500/-p.m. A
is taken away. The Civil Court therefore, becomes
coram non judice.

6. An appeal is in continuation of the suit and an appeal,
arising from a suit which was decided before the B
amendment came into force, would be governed by the
amendment provided the original or the appellate
decree has not been executed by the date the
amendment came into force.
c
7. The State Legislature was aware of GO.Ms dated
291h December, 1983 when amendment to Section 32
was passed. The State Government while exercising
power made Section 26 is merely a delegate which
otherwise originally vests in the State Legislature. The D
. State Legislature by amendment of Section 32 has
taken over the occupied field. In such an event the G. 0.
dated 29 1h December, 1983 issued by the delegatee
cannot eclipse or undermine the exercise of power by
E
the delegator itself.

8. Even though, Section 26 is a non-obstante clause,
the same cannot override Section 32, in as much as
Section 32 is a non-obstante clause itself. In the event
Section 26 is held to invest power with the de legatee F
to override or eclipse the intention of the delegator itself,
the said Section would be open to challenge on the
ground of excessive delegation.

17. Learned counsel appearing for the landlords submitted G
that all the above said contentions were advanced before the
Full Bench of the High Court and on careful consideration of
these contentions the Full Bench rightly came to the conclusion
that Section 32(c) of the Act brought into force by Section 3 of H
266 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 4 S.C.R.

A Amendment Act, 2005 is prospective in operation and does
not affect proceedings pending at various stages.

18. Further according to the learned counsel for the
landlord retrospective amendment of a law is always resorted
B to only when the Legislature intends to deal with a situation
which deserves a remedial process. By amending a law
retrospectively, a benefit or an interest which has been put in
jeopardy owing to any reason or cause is retrieved. In other
words a retrospective amendment intends to achieve a
C specific object or purpose remedial in character. If no purpose
or object is discernible, retrospectively will not be imputed or
assumed.

19. In support of the contentions both the learned
D ·counsel relied on the judgments of this Court relevant of which
will be noticed at the appropriate stage.

20. Before dealing with the rival contentions in the light
of the judgments relied on by the learned counsel for the parties,
E we deem it appropriate to consider the precise nature of rights
of landlord and tenant in the common law and under the
provisions of the Act.

21. The rights of the landlord to evict a tenant by way of
F suit before a civil court of competent jurisdiction exist as long
as it is not abridged by a special legislation conferring
protection in favour of the tenant.

22. In Parripati Chandrasekharrao & sons vs. Alapati
G Jalaiah, (1995) 3 SCC 709, this Court drew a distinction
between the rights which accrue to the landlord under the
common law and the protection which is available to the tenant
under the Act. While upholding the GO.Ms. No.636 dated 29th
December, 1983 this Court observed as under:
H
SMT. NOORUNISSA BEGUM v. BRIJ KISHORE 267
SANGH! [SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J.]

"12. According to us there is a material difference A
between the rights which accrue to a landlord under
the common law and the protection which is afforded
to the tenant by such legislation as the Act. In the former
case the rights and remedies of the landlord and tenant
are governed by the law of contract and the law B
governing the property relations. These rights and
remedies continue to govern their relationship unless
t~ey are regulated by such prott>ctive legislation as the
present Act in which case the said rights and remedies
remain suspended till the protective legislation
c
continues in operation. Hence while it can legitimately
be said that the landlord's normal rights vested in him
by the general law continue to exist till and so long as
they are not abridged by a special protective legislation D
in the case of the tenant, the protective shield extended
to him survives only so long as and to the extent the
special legislation operates. In the case of the tenant,
therefore, the protection does not create any vested
right which can operate beyond the period of protection E
or during the period the protection is not in existence.
When the protection does not exist, the normal relations
of the landlord and tenant come into operation. Hence
the theory of the vested right which may validly be
pleaded to support the landlord's case is not available F
to the tenant. It is for this reason that the analogy sought
to be drawn by Shri Subbarao between the landlord's
and the tenant's rights relying upon the decision of this
Court in Atma Ram Mittal, J 1988' 4 sec 284 · is misplaced. In
.G
that case the landlord's normal right to evict the tenant
from the premises was not interfered with for the first
ten years of the construction of the premises by an
exemption specifically incorporated in the protective
rent legislation ir. question. The normal right was H
268 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 4 S.C.R.

A obviously the vested right under the general law and
once accrued it continued to operate. The protection
given to the tenant by the rent legislation came into
operation after the expiry of the period of ten years.
Hence, notwithstanding the coming into operation of
B the protection and in the absence of the provisions to
the contrary, the proceedings already commenced on
the basis of the vested right could not be defeated by
mere passage of time consumed by the said
proceedings. It is for this reason that the Court there'
c held that the right which had accrued to the landlord
being a vested right could not be denied to him by the
efflux of time."

23. In Garikapati Veeraya v.. N. Subbaiah Choudhary,
D AIR 1957 SC 540, while dealing with the golden rule of
construction this Court held that in the absence of anything in
the enactment to show that the amendment is to have
retrospective operation it cannot be so construed so as to have
E the effect of altering the law applicable to a claim in litigation
at the time when the Act was passed. The Constitution Bench
held: ·

"(25)1n construing the articles of the Constitution we must
F
bear in mind certain cardinal rules of construction. It
has been said in Hough v. Windus, 1884-12 QBD 224
at p.237(V)that "statutes should be interpreted, if
possible, so as to respect vested right." The golden rule
of construction is that, in the absence of anything in the
G enactment to, show that it is to have retrospective
operation, it cannot be so construed as to have the effect
of altering the law applicable to a claim in litigation at
the time when the Act was passed. Leeds and County
Bank Ltd.v.Walker,(1883) 11QBD84 at p.91(W); Moon
H
SMT. NOORUNISSA BEGUM v. BRIJ KISHORE 269
SANGHI [SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J.]

v. Durden,(1948) 2 Ex 22:76RR 479 at p.495 (X). The A
following observation of Rankin C.J. in Sadar Ali v.
Dalimuddin (supra) at page 520 (of /LR Cal); (at p. 643
ofAIR) is also apposite and helpful: "Unless the contrary
can be shown the provision which takes away the
jurisdiction is itself subject to the implied saving of the B
litigant's right." In Janardan Reddy v. The State, 1950
SCR 940atpp.946, 947); (AIR 1951SC124 atpp.126-
127) (Y) Kania C.J. in delivering the judgment of the
Court observed that our Constitution is generally
speaking prospective in its operation and is not to have
c
retroactive operation in the absence of any express
provision to that effect. The same principle was
reiterated in Keshavan Madhava Menon v. The State
of Bombay, 1951 SCR 228; (AIR 1951 SC 128)(Z) and D
I finally in Dajisaheb Mane and Others v. Shankar Rao
Vitha/ Rao, 1955-2 SCR 872 at pp.876-877; (S) AIR
I 1956 SC 29atp.31) (Z1)to which reference will bemade
in greater detail hereafter."
E
24. In Moti Ram v. Suraj Bhan, AIR 1960 SC 655,
this Court decided a case of ejectment of tenant by the landlord
under Section 13(1) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction
Act, 1949. Under Section 13 of the said Act, a tenant in
possession of a building cannot be evicted therefrom except F
in accordance with the said Section.·

This Court held that where an amendment affects
vested rights, the amendment would operate prospectively
unless it is expressly made retrospective or its retrospective G
operation follows as a matter of necessary implication. It was
held:

"It is well settled that where an amendment affects
vested rights, the amendment would operate H
270 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 4 S.C.R.

A prospectively unless it is expressly made retrospective
or its retrospective operation follows as a matter of
necessary implication. The amending Act obviously
does not make the relevant provision retrospective in
terms and we see no reason to accept the suggestion
B that the retrospective operation of the relevant provision
can be spelt out as a matter of necessary implication .... "

This Court further held:

c "Where the legislature intends to make substantive
provisions of law retrospective in operation it generally
makes its intention clear by express provision in that
behalf."

o 25. Ordinarily a Court of appeal cannot take into account a
new law brought into existence after the judgment appealed
from has been rendered, because the rights of the litigants in
appeal are determined applying the law in force at the date of
the suit. This view was expressed by this Court in Dayavati v.
E lnderjit, AIR 1966 SC 1423. This Court further held that if the
new law speaks a language which expressly or by clear
intendment takes in even pending matter the Court of trial as
well as the Court of appeal must have regard to the intention
so expressed and the Court of appeal may give effect to such
F a law even after the judgment of the Court of first instance.

26. In Atma Ram Mittal vs. lshwar Singh Punia,
(1988) 4 SCC 284, this Court dealt with the provisions of
Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction)Act, 1973 which
G mandates that the tenant in possession of a building or a rented
land shall not be evicted therefrom except in accordance with
the provisions of that Act. Section 1(3) of the said Act provides
that "nothing in this Act shall apply to any building the
H construction of which is completed on or after the
SMT. NOORUNISSA BEGUM v. BRIJ KISHORE 271
SANGH! [SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J.]

commencement of this Act for a period of ten years from the A
date of its completion.

The appellant-landlord in the said case filed a suit for
possession in the civil court of Hissar in Haryana on the basis
that the respondent was in arrears of rent from December 1, B
1981 to May 31, 1982 and the tenancy of the respondent had
been terminated by giving him notice. The suit was filed for
recovery of possession on the termination or expiry of the
period of tenancy. Later the respondent-tenant moved an
application for dismissal of suit stating that shop in question C
was constructed in June, 1974 and ten years had elapsed by
June, 1984 and in terms of Section 1(3) of the said Act,
immunity from application of Act had expired. It was contecided
that jurisdiction of Civil Courts stood barr~d cjue to the said
provision. This Court held that the exemption lppplies for ten- D
years and landlord was entitled to the exemption until the final
disposal of the suit. This Court held:

"8. It is we/I-settled that no man should suffer because
of the fault of the court or delay in the procedure. Broom \ E
has stated the maxim "actus curiae neminem gravabit"
- an act of court shall prejudice no man. Therefore,
having regard to the time normally consumed· for
adjudication, the ten years' exemption or holiday from F
the application of the Rent Act would become illusory,
·if the suit has to be filed within that time and b€1 disposed
offina/ly. It is common knowledge that unless a suit is 1
instituted soon after the date of letting it would never
be disposed of within ten years and even then within G
that time it may not be disposed of. Thaf'will make the
ten years holiday from the Rent Act illu~qry and provide
no incentive to the landlords to build new houses to
solve problem of shortages of houses. The purpo~e of
H
272 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 4 S.C.R.

A legislation would thus be defeated. Purposive
interpretation in asocial amelioration legislation is an
imperative irrespective of anything else."

This Court further held:
B
"11 ...... In our opinion, bearing in mind the well-settled
principle that the rights of the parties crystallise to (sic
on) the date of the institution of the suit .as enunciated
by this Court in Om Prakash Gupta v. Digvijendrapal
c Gupta, (1982) 2 sec 61, the meaningful construction
must be that the exemption would apply for a period of
ten years and will continue to be available until suit is
disposed of or adjudicated. Such suit or proceeding
must be instituted within the stipulated period of ten
D years. Once rights crystallise the adjudication must be
in accordance with law."

27. The learned counsel for the landlord placed much reliance
on this Court's decision in Amba/al Sarabhai Enterprises
E Ltd. vs. Amrit Lal & Co. and another, (2001) 8 SCC 397.
The said case was related to Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958. An
amendment was made in the Act making the Act inapplicable
to the tenancy of any premises monthly rent of which exceeds
Rs.3,500/-. In the said case, the Division Bench of this Court
F held that the said amendment would not affect the pending
proceedings and observed as follows:

"17. The aforesaid decision holds that tenants have no.
vested right under the Rent Act. In effect, the law is well
G settled. Prior to the enactment of the Rent Act the
relationship between the landlord and the tenant was
governed by the general law, maybe the Transfer of
Property Act or any other law in relation to the property.
The Rent Act merely provides a protection to a tenant
H
SMT. NOORUNISSA BEGUM v. BRIJ KISHORE 273
SANGH! [SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J.)

as against the unbridled power of the landlord under A
the general law of the land. The Rent Act gives
protection to the tenant from being ejected except on
the grounds referred to under the Rent Act. In other words,
it protects the tenant from ejectment, it protects a tenant
from the drastic enhancement of the rent by the landlord B
which may otherwise the landlord could do under the
general law. Thus the right of a tenant under the Rent
Act at the best could be said to be a protective right,
which cannot be construed to be a vested right. In effect,
in view of this special enactment of the Rent Act, the
c
right and remedies available to a landlord under the
general law remain suspended. In other words the
landlord's vested right under the general law continues
so long it is not abridged by such protective legislation, D
but the moment when this protection is withdrawn the
landlord's normal vested right reappears which could
be enforced by him.

xx xxx xxx xxx E
36. In view of the aforesaid legal principle emerging,
we come to the conclusion that since proceeding for
the eviction of the tenant was pending when the
repealing Act came into operation, Section 6 of the F
General Clauses Act would be applicable in the present
case, as it is the landlord's accrued right in terms of
Section 6. Clause (c) of Section 6 refers to "any right"
which may not be limited as a vested right but is limited
to be an accrued right. The words "any right accrued" in G
Section 6(c) are wide enough to include the landlord's
right to evict a tenant in case proceeding was pending
when repeal came in. Thus a pending proceeding
before the Rent Controller for the eviction of a tenant
H
274 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 4 S.C.R.

A on the date when the repealing Act came into force
would not be-affected by the repealing statute and will
be continued and concluded in accordance with the law
as existed under the repealed statute.

B 37;. In view of the aforesaid findings, we conclude by
recording our findings on the question posed earlier by
holding:

(1) A landlord or tenant are relegated to seek their rights
c and remedies under the common law once the
protection given to a tenant under the Rent Act is
withdrawn, except in cases where Section 6 of the
General Clauses Act, 1897 is applicable.

o (2) A ground of eviction based on illegal sub-letting
under proviso (b) to Section 14 of the Rent Act would
not constitute to be a vested right of a landlord, but it
would be a right and privilege accrued within the
meaning of Section 6(c) of the General Clauses Act in
E a matter if proceeding for eviction is pending.
(3) When the tenant has no vested right under a Rent
Act having only protective right, withdrawal of such
protection would not confer on a landlord a vested right
F to evict a tenant under the Rent Act except where clause
(c) of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act is applicable.

38. In view of these findings we hold that the landlord
has a right under the repealed Rent Act by virtue of
G Section 6(c) of the General Clauses Act, which would
save the pending proceedings before the Rent
Controller, which may continue to be proceeded with as
if the repealed Act is still in force."

H 28. In Mani Subrat Jain vs. Raja Ram Vohra, (1980)
. SMT. NOORUNISSA BEGUM v. BRIJ KISHORE 275
SANGH I [SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J.]

1SCC1, this Court dealt with the case of an advocate who A
belonged to 'sched1.Jled' class of tenants whose dwellings enjoy
special protection. The appellant-advocate tenanted a building
belonging to the respondent-landlord. The latter sued for
possession and the former, entered into a compromise and
agreed to vacate by a certain date on certain terms regarding B
rent. A decree in terms thereof was passed on October 9, 1972.
Then came the East Punjab Rent Restriction Act, 1949, which
by extension of its operation, applied to Chandigarh where
the suit premises was situated w.e.f. November 4, 1972. Had C
the decree been passed but a few days later, the Act would
have admittedly interdicted the eviction because of Section
13. In the said case having noticed the definition of tenant
[Section 2(i)] and Section 13(1) of the Act, the Court held:
D
"6. Section 2(i) reads:

"'tenant' means any person by whom or on whose
account rent is payable for a building or rented land
and includes a tenant continuing in possession after
E
the termination of the tenancy in his favour, but does
not include a person placed in occupation of a building
or rented land by its tenant, unless with the consent in
writing of the landlord, or a person to whom the collection
of rent or fees in a public market, cart-stand or slaughter F
house or of rents for shops has been farmed out or
leased by a municipal, town or notified area committee;

In this context, we may also read Section 13(1) which is
integral to and makes impact upon the meaning of
G
Section 2(i) even if there be any marginal obscurity.

"13. Eviction oftenants.-(1) A tenant in possession
of a building or rented land shall not be evicted therefrom
in execution of a decree passed before or after the
H
276 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015) 4 S.C.R.

A commencement of this Act or otherwise and whether
before or after the termination of the tenancy, except in
accordance with the provisions of this section, or in
pursuance of an order made under Section 13 of the
Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 194 7, as
B subsequently amended.

The expres'sion "tenant" includes "a tenant continuing
in possession after the termination of the tenancy in
his favour''. It thus includes, by express provision, a
c quondam tenant whose nexus with the property is
continuance in possession. The fact that a decree or
any other process extinguishes the tenancy under the
general law of real property does not terminate the status
of a tenant under the Act having regard to the carefully
D
drawn inclusive clause. Even here, we may mention by
way of contrast that Subudhi case,(1969) 2 SCR
559)related to a statute where the definition in Section
2(5) of that Act expressly included "any person against
E whom a suit for ejectment is pending in a Court of
competent jurisdiction" and more pertinent to the point
specially excluded "a person against whom a decree
or order for eviction has been made by such a court".
We feel no difficulty in holding that the text, reinforced
F by the context, especially Section 13, convincingly
includes ex-tenants against whom decrees for eviction
might have been passed, whether on compromise or
otherwise. The effect of the compromise decree, in
counsel's submission, is that the tenancy has been
G terminated. Nobody has a case that the appellant is
not continuously in possession. The conclusion is
inevitable that he remains a tenant and enjoys immunity
under Section 13(1). The execution proceedings must,
therefore, fail because the statutory road-block cannot
H
SMT. NOORUNISSA BEGUM v. BRIJ KISHORE 277
SANGH I [SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA J.)

be removed. Indeed, an application under the Act was A
filed by the landlord defendant which was dismissed
because the ground required by the Act was not made
out.

7. We have been told by counsel, and supporting B
citations have been brought to our notice, that the High
Court at Chandigarh has taken the contrary view for
some time. It is better to be ultimately right rather than
consistently wrong. The interpretation we have given in
Section 2(i) is strengthened by our conviction that a c
beneficial statute intended to quieten a burning issue
affecting the economics of the human condition in India
should be so interpreted as to subserve the social
justice purpose and not to subvert it. Even apart from
D
this value-vision, the construction we have adopted is
sustainable."

29. In Lakshmi Narayan Guin and others vs.Niranjan
Modak, (1985) 1SCC270, the Court dealt with a case where E
West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 was made extended
to the location of suit premises during the pendency of the
appeal. The Court held that the appeal would be governed by
the said Act and the provisions of the Act would retrospective
operate from the date of the filing of the eviction suit. The F
relevant portion of the said judgment reads as follows:

"7. As has been stated earlier; sub-section (1) of Section
13 of the Act provides that no order or decree for the
recovery of possession shall be made by any court in a
G
landlord's suit against the tenant except on certain
enumerated grounds. Does the decree here refer to the
decree of the trial court or; where an appeal has been
preferred, to the appellate decree? Plainly, reference
is intended to the decree which disposes of the suit H
278 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2015] 4 S.C.R.

A finally. It is well settled that when a trial court decrees a
suit and the decree is challenged by a competent
appeal, the appeal is considered as a continuation of
the suit, and when the appellate decree affirms, modifies
or reverses the decree on the merits, the trial court
B decree is said in law to merge in the appellate decree,
and it is the appellate decree which rules. The object of .
sub-section ( 1) of Section 13 is to protect the possession
of the tenant, subject to the exceptions specified in the
sub-section, and that protection is ensured if we
c
construe the sub-section to mean that, subject to those
exceptions, no effective or operative order or decree
can be made by the court in a landlord's suit for
possession against a tenant. To our mind, therefore,
D sub-section (1) of Section 13 of the Act can be invoked
by a tenant during the pendency of an appeal against a
trial court decree.

8. The next point is whether sub-section (1) of Section
E 13 can be invoked where the suit was instituted before
the Act came into force. In the instant case, the suit was
instituted long before the Act was extended to Memari.
Sub-section (1) of Section 13 directs the court not to
make any order or decree for possession subject, of
F course, to the statutory exceptions. The legislative
command in effect deprives the Court of its unqualified
jurisdiction to make such order or decree. It is true that
when the suit was instituted the court possessed such
jurisdiction and could pass a decree for possession.
G But it was divested of that jurisdiction when the Act was
brought into force. The language of the sub-section
makes that abundantly clear, and regard must be had
to its object. In Shah Bhojraj Kuverji Oil Mills and
Ginning Factory v. Subhash Chandra Yograj Sinha
H
SMT. NOORUNISSA BEGUM v. BRIJ KISHORE 279
SANGHI [SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J.]

(1962)2 SCR 159, a Bench of five Judges of this Court A
had occasion to consider sub-section (1) of Section 12
of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates
Control Act, 1947. Sub-section (1) of Section 12
provided:
B
"A landlord shall not be entitled to the recovery of
possession of any premises so long as the tenant pays,
or is ready and willing to pay, the amount of the standard
rent .... "
c
On the question whether the provision applied to
pending suits for possession, the learned Judges drew
attention to the point of time specifically mentioned in
the sub-section. It operated, they said, "when the decree
for recovery of possession will have to be passed" and D
did not refer back to the institution of the suit. By a
unanimous judgment the learned Judges held that the
sub-section applied to pending suits. In passing, it may
be noted that the learned Judges expressed a degree
of hesitation on whether a statutory injunction of that
E
nature could be applied retrospectively to appeals
against decrees already made. But any doubt on the
point must be considered lo have been finally removed
by this Court when in Rafiquennessa v. Lal Bahadur F
Chetri, (1964)6 SCR 876, another Bench of five Judges,
which included J.C. Shah, J. who was a member of the
Bench in the earlier case, held on an interpretation of
clause (a) of sub-section (1) of the Assam Non-
Agricultural Urban Areas Tenancy Act, 1955, which G
prohibited the eviction of a tenant, that the statutory
provision came into play for the protection of the tenant
even at the appellate stage. The learned Judges relied
on the principle that an appeal was a continuation of
H
280 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015) 4 S.C.R.

A the suit and that the appeal would be governed by the
newly enacted clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section
5 even though the trial court decree had been passed
earlier."

B 30. A Constitution Bench offive-Judge in Shah Bhojraj
Kuverji Oil Mills and Ginning Factory v. Subhash Chandra
Yograj Sinha, AIR 1961SC1596, considered the question
as to whether a section is prospective or retrospective. This
Court dealt with a case where during the pendency of
C possession suit by respondent-landlord a notification was
issued u/s 6 of Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates
Control Act, 1947, applying part 11 of the said Act to the area
where the suit property was situated. The appella.nt-tenants
claimed protection of Section 12 as part II of the said Act which
0
deprived the landlord of the right to possession under certain
circumstances. The Court allowed the appeal filed by the tenant
holding Section 12(1) to be retrospective. The Court in the
said case held that a section may be prospective in some
E parts and retrospective in other parts. The relevant portion of
said judgment reads as follows:

"(11) The second contention urged by the learned
Attorney-General thats. 12(1) applied from the date on
F which the Act was extended to the area in question is, in
our opinion, sound. Section 12(1) enacts a rule of
decision, and it says that a landlord is not entitled to
possession if the tenant pays or shows his readiness
and willingness to pay the standard rent and to observe
G the other conditions of the tenancy The word "tenant" is
defined in the Act to include not only a tenant, whose
tenancy subsists but also any person remaining, after
the determination of the lease, in possession with or
without the assent of the landlord. The present
H
SMT. NOORUNISSA BEGUM v. BRIJ KISHORE 281
SANGHI [SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J.]

appellants, as statutory tenants, were within the rule A
enacted bys. 12(1) and entitled to its protection, ifthe
sub-section could be held applicable to this suit.

(12) Both the Bombay High Court and this Court had,
on the previous occasions, observed that s. 12 of the B
Act was prospective. In those cases, the teamed Judges
were concerned with the interpretation of sub ss. (2) and
(3) only, which, as the words of those subsections then
existing show, were clearly prospective, and were
applicable to suits to be instituted after the coming into c
force of the Act. But a section may be prospective in
some parts and retrospective in other parts. While it is
the ordinary rule that substantive rights should not be
held to be taken away except by express provision or
D
clear implication, many Acts, though prospective in form,
have been given retrospective operation, ifthe intention
of the legislature is apparent. This is more so, when
Acts are passed to protect the public against some evil
or abuse. (See Craies on Statute Law, 5th Edn., p. 365). E
The sub-section says that a landlord Shall not be
entitled tothe recovery of possession of any premises
so long as the tenant pays or is ready and willing to pay
the standard rent etc., and observes and performs the
other conditions of the tenancy. In other words, no decree F
can be passed granting possession to the landlord, if
the tenant fulfils the conditions above mentioned. The
Explanation to S. 12 makes it clear that the tenant in
case of a dispute may make an application to the Court
under sub-s. (3) of S. 11 for fixation of a standard rent G
and may thereafter pay or tender the amount of rent or
permitted increases specified in the order to be made
by the Court. The tenants, in the present case, have
expressed their readiness and willingness to pay, and
H
282 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 4 S.C.R.

A it is clear that they fulfil the requirements of sub-s. ( 1) of
S. 12, and the landlord is, therefore, not entitled to the
relief of possession.

(13) Both the High Court as well as this Court in their
B previous decisions, referred to above, were not called
upon to interpret sub-s. (1) of the Act. They were dealing
with appeals arising out of decrees already passed. The
observations that S. 12 was prospective were made with
reference to sub-ss. (2) and (3) and not with respect to
c sub-s. (1), which did not even find a mention in those
judgments. The question then was whether S. 12 by itself
or read with the proviso to S. 50 was applicable
retrospectively to appeals. That is not the question which
has arisen here. Then again, S. 12(1) enacts that the
D
landlord shall not be entitled to recover possession, not
"no suit shall be instituted by the landlord to recover
possession". The point of time when the sub-section
will operate is when the decree for recovery of
E possession would have to be passed. Thus, the
language of the subsection applies equally to suits
pending when Part 11 comes into force and those to be
filed subsequently. The contention of the respondent
that the operation at S. 12(1) is limited to suits filed after
F the Act comes into force in a particular area cannot be
accepted. The conclusion must follow that the []rr>sent
suit cannot be decreed in favour of the respondent. The
decisions of the High Court and the Court of First
Instance are thus erroneous, and must be set aside."
G
31. Subsequently, another Constitution Bench offive-
Judge of this Court in Mst. Rafiquennessa v. Lal Bahadur
Chetri and another, AIR 1964 SC 1511, having noticed the
scope of Assam Non-Agricultural Urban Areas Tenancy Act
H
. SMT. NOORUNISSA BEGUM v. BRIJ KISHORE 283
SANGHI [SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J.]

~~:- A
"(9) ..... ln order to make the statement of the law relating
to the relevant rule of construction which has to be
adopted in dealing with the effect of statutory provisions
in this connection, we ought to add that retroactive B
operation of a statutory provision can be inferred even
in cases where such retroactive operation appears to
be clearly implicit in the

Provision construed in the context where it occurs. In c
other words, a statutory provision is held to be
retroactive either when it is so declared by express
terms, or the intention to make it retroactive clearly
follows from the relevant words and the context in which
they occur. D

(10) Bearing in mind these pn"nciples, let us look at s.
S. Before doing so, it is necessary to considers. 2 which
provides that notwithstanding anything contained in any
contract or in any law for the time being in force, the E
provisions of this Act shall apply to all non-agricultural
tenancies whether created before or after the date on
which this Act comes into force. This provision clearly
indicates that the legislature wanted the beneficent
provisions enacted by it to take within their protection F
not only leases executed after the Act came into force,
but also leases executed prior to the operation of the
Act. In other words, leases which bad been created
b~fore the Act applied are intended to receive the
G
.,/'benefit of the provisions of the Act, and in that sense,
the Act clearly affects vested rights of the landlords who
had let out their urban properties to the tenants prior to
the date of the Act. That is one important fact which is
material in determining the scope and effect of s. 5. H
284 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015) 4 S.C.R.

A (11) Now, s. 5 itself gives an unmistakable indication
of the legislative inten.tion to make its provisions
retrospective. What does s. 5 provide? It provides
protection to the tenants who have actually built within
five years from the date of leases executed in their
B favour, permanent structures on the land let out to them
for residential or business purposes, and this protection
is available either when the construction of the
permanent structure has been made by the tenant in
pursuance of the terms of the lease, or even without
c any term of that kind and the landlord had knowledge
of it and had acquiesced in it. Thus, the plain object of
s. 5 is to protect the tenants who have built a permanent
structure either for business or for residence, provided
D it has been built within 5 years from the date of contract
of tenancy. Therefore, cases where permanent
structures had been built within 5 years of the terms of
contract, would fall withins. 5 ( 1) (a), even though those
constructions had been made before the date of the
E Act. Thus, the very scheme of 5 (1) (a) clearly
postulates the extension of its protection to
constructions already made. That is another point which
is significant in dealing with the controversy between
the parties before us.
F
(12) There is yet another point which is relevant in this
connection. S. 5(1)(a) provides that the tenant shall not
be evicted by the landlord from the tenancy except on
the ground of non-payment of rent, provided, of course,
G the conditions prescribed by it are satisfied. If the
legislature had intended that this protection should
operate prospectively. it would have been easy to say
that the tenant shall not be sued in ejectment; such an
expression would have indicated that the protection is
H
SMT. NOORUNISSA BEGUM v. BRIJ KISHORE 285
SANGHI [SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J.]

afforded to the suits brought after the Act came into A
force, and that might

have introduced the element ofprospective operation;
instead, what is prohibited bys. 5 (1)(a) is the eviction
of the tenant, and so, inevitably, the section must come B
into play for the protection of the tenant even at the
appellate stage when it is clear that by the proceedings
pending before the appellate court, the landlord is
seeking to evict the ten an!, and that obviously indicates
that the pending proceedings are governed by s. C
5(1){a), though they may have been initially instituted
before the Act came into force."

32. In the present case Section 2(ix) of the Act defines 'tenant'
as any person by whom or on whose account rent is payable D
for a building and includes the surviving spouse, or any son or
daughter, of a deceased tenant who had been living with the
with the tenant in the building as a member of tenant's family
up to the death of the tenant including a person continuing in
possession after the termination of the tenancy in his favour. E
Thus it is clear that even if any person after termination of
tenancy in his favour is continuing in possession, is covered
by definition of 'tenant'.

33. Section 1O of the Act relates to 'eviction of tenants'. It F
protects the tenant from eviction in execution of a decree or
otherwise except where eviction is in accordance with the
provisions of Section 10 or Sections 12 and 13. A tenant,
including a person continuing in possession of the premises G
after the termination of his tenancy thereby cannot be evicted
by execution of a decree or otherwise except in accordance
with the provisions of Section 10 or Sections 12 and 13.
Therefore, it is clear that till the execution of a decree, the tenant
including a person continuing in possession after termination H
286 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 4 S.C.R.

A of tenancy in his favour is protected under the Act.

34. Section 32, as it originally stood, consequent to its
striking down in 'Motor General Traders' case and after
AmendmentAct, 2005 is reproduced below:
B
Orignal Section 32 p-ior to Section 32 con~ent on its Section 32 as amerded '1f Amendmert
striking down striking d:7Mt Act, 2005

c 32.Actnottoapplytocertain 32.ActnctloaRJlylocertain 32Act net •RJIY to certain buidngs:-
8.Jidngs:· Blildings:- The µrcMsionsc:JthisActshal net apply.-

The µrcMsionc:Jthis Ad shal net Tl'e provison ctths Act ml net (a) lo any bLilding beloajng to the Stale
apply. appy. Go\ernment ortl'e Central Go.!emrrent, or
Cantonrrent Board or any local authorit~
(a) to any bLilding CMt1ed I>/ the (a) to any blilding CM1ned I>/ Ire
~ Govemrrent; (b) to any bLilding conslructed or
D rubstantialy renovaled, either be!cre or
after the oomrrencerrent c:J Ills Ad for a
(b) to any bLilcing conslructed on
or itter the '26" August 1957. period c:J fifteen yea"!l fi"orn the dale c:J
oomr)etion d such conS:nxtion oc
rubstantia renovaion.

Elqjanation 1:-A bcilclng rmy be said to
be substanfialy renovaed if net less than
seventy fi1.e percent ct lhe premses is
E blilt """ in aa:ordance c:J oompelion c:J
such construction or substantial
retlO\.ation.

Elqjanation 11:- Date ct cornpelion ct
construction ml be the dale c:J
oompelion as infimaed to the coocerned
authority or c:J =essrrent c:J property tax.
Wlichewr is earlier, and Wlere the
F prenises have been cmstructed in stages
the dae on Wich the initial blilding Y.m
oompeled and an intimation thereof v.as
sent to the a:incerned auttxlrity or v.as
assessed lo property ta~ l'.llich""3f is
earlier.

(c) to any blild1ng the rent c:J l'llich as on
the date c:J oomrrencerrent c:J the Andhra
G Pra:leSl BLildngs (lease, Rent and
faktion) Contrd (Arrerdment) Act 2005,
e>a::eeds rupees three troosand and five
hundred per rronth in the areas COl.efed
I>/ tl'e Mlridpa CO!)lQ"81ions in tl'e Stale
and rupees too thousand per month in
dher areas

H

I
SMT. NOORUNISSA BEGUM v. BRIJ KISHORE 287
SANGHI [SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J.]

35. In its original form the Act protected tenants of all A
buildings, irrespective of rent, except (a) the tenants of a
building owned by the Government and (b) the tenants of a
building constructed on or after 26th August, 1957.

36. After striking down of Section 32(b), the tenants of B
all buildings, including any building constructed on or after 26th
August, 1957 irrespective of rent were protected under the
Act except the tenants of a building owned by the Government.

37. After amendment of Section 32 by the Amendment c
Act, 2005, w.e.f 2Th April, 2005, tenants of a building, rent of
which is Rs.3,500/- p.m. or below in the areas covered by the
Municipal Corporations and the tenants of a building, rent of
which is Rs.2,000/- p.m. or below in other areas, only remain
as protected tenants. l_n effect, the rest of the tenants of any D
building rent of which exceeds Rs.3,500/- p.m. in the area
covered by the Municipal Corporation and Rs.2,000/- p.m. in
other areas, no more remain tenant within the meaning of
Section 2(ix) of the Act as the Act is not applicable to them.
Therefore, since, 27th April, 2005 this class of tenants of E
building whose rent exceeds Rs.3,500/- p.m. in Municipal
Corporation areas and Rs.2,000/-per month in other areas,
lost their right of protection under the Act in view of amended
Section 32(c). This apart the tenants of any building constructed F
or substantially renovated, either before or after the
commencement of the Act for a period of fifteen years from
the date of completion of such construction or substantial
renovation, no more remain 'tenant' within the meaning of
Section 2(ix) of the Act and they also lost their right of protection G
in view of the amended Section 32(b). The position with regard
to the building belonging to the Government remained the
same. The tenants of building belonging to the Cantonment
Board or local authority also lost their rights to claim protection
H
288 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 4 S.C.R.

A in view of amended Section 32(a).

38. lfthe effect of Section 32 in the inception of the Act,
after striking down in Motor General Traders case and after
amendment of the Act in 2005 is shown in a tabular chart, it
B will be as follows:
Original Section 32 prior Section 32 consequent on Section 32 as amended
to striking down its striking down by Amendment Act,
2005

(a)tenants of a building (a) tenants of a building (a)tenants of building
c owned by the Government
and building constructed.
owned by the Government
(State or Central
belonging to State
Government or Central
on or a ft er the 26ti Government) do not fall Government or
August, 1957 do not come v.ithin the meaning of tenant cantonment Board or any
v.ithin the definition of under the Act. other local authority do
tenant - Section 2(ix) of the not cane v.ithin the
Act; (b) tenant of all other rreaning of tenant;

D buildings. irrespective of
(b) tenanls of all other rent. including the tenant of (b)tenants of building
buildings, inespective of Cantonment Board or any constructed or
rent including belonging to local authority cane within substantially renovated for
cantonrrent Board or any the definition of tenant of the a period of 15 years fran
local authority corre v.ithin Acl the date of completion of
the rreaning of tenant such construction or
under the Acl This includes the building substantial renovation do
E v.!lo se rent is betv.een not cane v.ithin the
This indudes the building Rs.1001-Rs.3500 p.m. in meaning of tenant under
v.tiose rent is between the municipal area and from the Act;
Rs.1001-Rs.3500 p.m. in Rs. 1001 to Rs.2000/- in
the municipal area and other areas. (c) tenanlls of any building
fi"om Rs.1001/- to Rs.2000/- the rent of which exceeds
in other areas. c. Rs.3.500/- p.m in the
F areas covered by
Mmicipal Qlrporation and
Rs.2.000/- p.m. in other
areas do not corre v.ithin
the rreaning of tenant
under the Act

G (d) tenants of all other
buildings rent of which is
Rs.3.500/- p.m. or beow
* in the Mmicipal area and
Rs.2.000/- p.m. or beow
in other areas continued
to be protected tenant
H
SMT. NOORUNISSA BEGUM v. BRIJ KISHORE 289
.SANGH I [SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J.]

39. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we hold that A
part of Section 32 i.e. Section 32(a) and (c) is prospective
and other part i.e. Section 32(b) is retrospective. ·

40. Effect of G.O.Ms.No.636 dated 29!!1 December,
1983 on the Act Section 32 of the Act specifies the buildings B
to which the Act will not apply. It is not an exemption granted in
the Act but a specific provision under the Act stipulating non-
application of the Act to certain buildings. Section 26 is the ·
power of exemption granted to the State Government to exempt
certain buildings or class of buildings from all or any of the C
provisions of the said Act. With the cost of repetition, it is
desirable to produce Section 26 again as follows:

"Section 26. Exemptions:- Notwithstanding anything
in this Act the Government may, by notification in the D
Andhra Pradesh Gazette, exempt subject to such
conditions and terms, if any; as they may specify in the
notification, any building or class of building from all or
any of the provisions of the Act."
E
41. Nature and effect of a non obstante clause was
considered by this Court in Union of India and another vs.
G.M. Kokil and another, 1984 (Suppl.) sec 196. In the said
case this Court held as follows:
F
"11 ...•...... i.lt is we/I-known that a non obstante clause
is a legislative device which is usually employed to give
overriding effect to certain provisions over some
contrary provisions that may be found either in the same
enactment or some other enactment, that is to say, to G
avoid the operation and effect of all contrary
provisions ............ "

42. In Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Rao vs. Ashalata
H
290 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 4 S.C.R.

A S. Guram, (1986) 4 SCC 447, this Court while dealing with a
case of statutory tenant discussed the merit of non obstante
clause and held as follows:

"67. A clause beginning with the expression
B "notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or in
some particular provision in the Act or in some
particular Act or in any law for the time being in force,
or in any contract" is more often than not appended to
a section in the beginning with a view to give the
c enacting part of the section in case of conflict an
overriding effect over the provision of the Act or the
contract mentioned in the non obstante clause. It is
equivalent to saying thatin spite of the provision of the
Act or any other Act mentioned in the non obstante
D
clause or any contract or document mentioned the
enactment following it will have its full operation or that
the provisions embraced in the non obstante clause
would not be an impediment for an operation of the
E enactment. See in this connection the observations of
this Court in South India Corpn. (P) Ltd. v. Secretary,
Board of Revenue, Trivandrum, AIR 1964 SC 207."

This Court further held that the expression
F notwithstanding is in contradistinction to the phrase 'subject
to', the latter conveying the idea of a provision yielding place
to another provision or other provisions to which it is made
subject.

G 43. In view of the aforesaid decision, we hold that
Section 26 and the exemption granted by the State Government
under Section 26 of the Act by G.O.Ms.636 dated 29 1h
December, 1983 has overriding effect over rest of the
provisions of the Act.
H
SMT. NOORUNISSA BEGUM v. BRIJ KISHORE 291
SANGH! [SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J.]

44. It cannot be said that by amending Section 32, the A
legislature intended to bring about a remedial situation relating
to certain classes of buildings which were the subject matter
of exceptions under Section 26 granted in the year 1983. Such
classes of buildings enjoying the benefit of exemption from
the operation of the Act since 1983 cannot be said to have B
lost the benefit of exemption by way of such amendment.

45.· uis ~rang to state th.C:; buildings whose rent are
upto Rs.3,500/- in the municipal area and Rs.2,000/- in other
area have been brought into the fold of the Act by amended C
Section 32(c). In fact, as noticed above: a building whose rent
were upto Rs.3;500/- in the municipal area and Rs.2,000/- in
. other area were already covered by the Act in view of original
Section 32. But the tenant of such building could not claim .
0
protection in view of exemption granted by the State under
Section 26 by GO.Ms. No. 636 dated 291h December, 1983.

46. Sections 26 and 32 of the Act operate in two different
fields. Section 32 has been enacted to enable the legislature
to provide for non-application of the Act in its entirety without E
any qualifications; It is open to the legislature to choose any
subject for such non-application. It can be an area, class of
buildings etc. Section 32 is an independent provision in respect
of the non-application of the Act. · •.'.. F
- . ~~-

47. On the other hand, Section 26 confers power on
the Government to exempt buildings or classes of buildings to
which Act is applicable from all or any of the provisions of the
Act. Section 26 has a non-obstante clause, which is widely G
worded. The Government need not, for the purposes of
exercise of power under Section 26 take any guidance or be
= influenced by the provisions of Section 32. · ·'

48. We have ~roticed that at the inception of th~ Act, H
292 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 4 S.C.R.

A tenants of all the buildings, irrespective of rent, were covered
under the Act and were tenants within the meaning of the Act,
except the tenant of any building owned by the Government or
building constructed on or after 26th August,· 1957, the Act was
applied to all tenants.
B
49. After striking down of Section 32(b) w.e.f. from 26th
October, 1983, though the Act applied to all the buildings, by
virtue of G.O.Ms.636 dated 29th December." 1983 issued by
State Government under Section 26 of the Act all buildings for
C a period of ten years from the date on which their construction
is completed and buildings the monthly rent of which exceeds
rupees one thousand were exempted from the operation of
the provisio[ns of the said Act.

D 50. The effect is that except the tenant whose rent is
Rs.1,000/- or below, rest of the tenants in view of exemption
could not claim protection.

51. By amended Section 32 (clause (b) of Section 32),
E the Act has been made not applicable to any building
constructed or substantially renovated, for a period of 15 years
from the date of such construction or substantial renovation. In
view of such amendment the first part of exemption granted by
G.O.Ms.636 dated 29th December, 1983 with regard to all
F buildings for a period of 10 years from the date of construction
has become redundant.

Though clause (a) of GO.Ms.636 dated 29th December,
1983 has become redundant, clause (b) of the said G.O.Ms.636.
G dated 29th December, 1983 still applies to the building the
monthly rent of which exceeds Rs.1,000/- i.e. the building
monthly rent of which is between Rs.1001/-to Rs.3,500/- in
the Municipal areas and Rs.1001/- to Rs.2,000/- in other areas.
H The aforesaid buildings whose monthly rent exceeds Rs.1,000/
SMT. NOORUNISSA BEGUM v. BRIJ KISHORE 293
SANGHI [SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J.]

- still continue to enjoy the exemption granted to them under A
Section 26 of the Act. The larger Bench of the High Court
wrongly held that clause (b) of the G.O.Ms.636 dated 29th
December, 1983 has become a redundant in view of the
amended Section 32.
B
52. In view of the discussion above, we hold:-

(a) Part of Section 32 is prospective and some part of it
· is retrospective.

(b) The exemption granted by the State Government
c
under Section 26 of the Act by G.O.Ms.636 dated 29th
December, 1.983 has overriding effect over rest of the
provisions of the Act.
D
(c) The buildings whose rents are upto Rs.3,500/- in the
Municipal areas and Rs.2,000/- in other areas were
already covered by the Act and after amendment it
continues to be covered by the Act but the tenants of
buildings, rent of which is more tlian Rs.1,000/- and does E
not exceed Rs.3,500/- in the Municipal are .l or Rs.2,000/
- in other area even after amendment of Section 32
cannot claim protection in view of the exemption granted
under Section 26 of the Act.
F
(d) Section 26 and Section 32 of the Act operate in two
different fields. Section 32 relates to non applicability of
the Act to a class of building(s) whereas Section 26 deals
with the power of the State to exempt the building or class
of buildings to which Act is applicable. In fact, there is no G
clash between Section 26 and Section 32, as they operate
in two different fields and, therefore, the question of
overriding of one over another does not arise.

(e) Clause (a) of G.O.Ms.636 dated 29th December, 1983 H
294 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 4 S.C.R.

A has become redundant. However, clause (b) of the
G.O.Ms.636 dated 29th December, 1983 still holds good.

(f) The suit(s), appeal(s), revision application(s) or
execution case(s) which are pending for determination
B under the General Law are not affected by amended
Section 32 and will continue to be decided in accordance
with General Law.

53. In view of the aforesaid discussion and the judgment
c (majority) dated 30th April, 2007 passed by the High Court of
Andhra Pradesh is upheld in so far as it relates to prospective
operation of Section 32(c) and its effec!'Jton the pending
proceedings.

D The finding of majority decision dated 30th April, 2007 in regard
to clause (b) of G.O.Ms.636 dated 29th December, 1983
declaring the said part of the G.O.Ms. 636 as redundant is
declared bad in law and is set aside. Civil Appeal Nos.3467-
3468, 3471, 3472, 3473, 3474-3475. 3476 OF 2010 and Civil
E Appeal No. 2406 of 2015 [@ SLP (C)No.16508 of 2012], Civil
Appeal Nos.7825-7826 OF 2012, Civil Appeal No.2569 of
2013, Civil Appeal Nos. '2408-2409 of 2015[@ SLP
(C)Nos.15154-15155 of2014] and Civil Appeal No. 2407 of
2015 [@ SLP (C) No.35787 of 2012] all filed by the tenants
F are dismissed. Civil Appeal Nos. 2403-2405 of 2015 [@ SLP
{C)NOS.15230-15232 of 2012] stand disposed of in terms of
the finding as recorded above. However, on the facts and
circumstances, there shall be no order as to costs.

G Kalpana K. Tripathy Appeals disposed of.