SMT. N. USHA RANI AND ANR.versusMOODUDULA SRINIVAS

                [2025] 1 S.C.R. 1442 : 2025 INSC 129

                      Smt. N. Usha Rani and Anr.
                                  v.
                        Moodudula Srinivas
                     (Criminal Appeal No. 515 of 2025)
                               30 January 2025
       [B.V. Nagarathna and Satish Chandra Sharma,* JJ.]


                           Issue for Consideration
       Whether a woman is entitled to claim maintenance under Section
       125 CrPC from her second husband while her first marriage is
       allegedly legally subsisting.

                                  Headnotes†
       Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.125 – Maintenance –
       Appellant no.1-wife separated from her first husband by way of
       an MoU executed between them – Appellant no.1 married the
       respondent – Marriage declared null and void – Respondent
       and Appellant no.1 got re-married – However, differences arose
       between them, Appellant no.1 sought maintenance from the
       respondent – Awarded by Family Court – High Court set aside
       the maintenance – Challenge to:
       Held: Respondent was fully aware of the first marriage of the
       Appellant No.1 and knowingly entered into a marriage with
       Appellant No. 1 not once, but twice – The MoU of separation
       between the Appellant No.1 and her first husband though not a
       legal decree of divorce, shows that the parties have dissolved
       their ties, they have been living separately and Appellant No.1
       is not deriving maintenance from her first husband – Therefore,
       barring the absence of a legal decree, Appellant No.1 is de facto
       separated from her first husband and is not deriving any rights and
       entitlements as a consequence of that marriage – Maintenance
       cannot be denied to Appellant No.1 – Maintenance award granted
       by the Family Court restored. [Paras 17, 19]
       Interpretation of Statutes – Social welfare provisions –
       Interpretation of. [Para 18]
       Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.125 – Maintenance –
       Objective – Discussed. [Para 11]

* Author
[2025] 1 S.C.R.                                                           1443

           Smt. N. Usha Rani and Anr. v. Moodudula Srinivas


                             Case Law Cited
     Yamunabai Anantrao Adhav v. Anantrao Shivram Adhav and
     Another [1988] 2 SCR 809 : (1988) 1 SCC 530; Bakulabai and
     Another v. Gangaram and Another [1988] 2 SCR 787 : (1988) 1
     SCC 537 – distinguished.
     Mohd. Abdul Samad v. State of Telangana and Another [2024]
     7 SCR 1236 : (2024) SCC OnLine SC 1686; Captain Ramesh
     Chander Kaushal v. Veena Kaushal and Others [1978] 3 SCR 782:
     (1978) 4 SCC 70 – relied on.
     Chanmuniya v. Virendra Kumar Singh Kushwaha and Another
     [2010] 12 SCR 223 : (2011) 1 SCC 141; Rameshchandra
     Rampratapji Daga v. Rameshwari Rameshchandra Daga [2004]
     Supp. 6 SCR 888 : (2005) 2 SCC 33; Savitaben Somabhai
     Bhatiya v. State of Gujarat and others [2005] 2 SCR 638 : (2005)
     3 SCC 636; Vimala (K) v. Veeraswamy (K) [1991] 1 SCR 904 :
     (1991) 2 SCC 375; Dwarika Prasad Satpathy v. Bidyut Prava
     Dixit and Another [1999] Supp. 3 SCR 684 : (1999) 7 SCC 675;
     Badshah v. Urmila Badshah Godse and Another [2013] 10 SCR
     259 : (2014) 1 SCC 188 – referred to.

                                List of Acts
     Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Hindu Marriage Act, 1955;
     Family Courts Act, 1984; Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961; Penal
     Code, 1860.

                             List of Keywords
     Maintenance; Second husband; First marriage allegedly legally
     subsisting; Dissolution of Marriage; Marriage Null and Void;
     Marriage Void ab initio; De facto separated; First Marriage; Second
     Marriage; Re-married; Memorandum of Understanding (MoU);
     MoU of separation; Living Separately; No Legal Decree of Divorce;
     Social welfare provisions.

                            Case Arising From
     CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
     515 of 2025
     From the Judgment and Order dated 13.04.2017 of the High Court
     of Judicature at Hyderabad for the State of Telangana and the
     State of Andhra Pradesh in CRLR No. 1587 of 2012
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                        Appearances for Parties
     A.K. Thakur, Rishi Raj, Shekhar Kumar, Sujeet Kumar, Ningthem
     Oinam, Yogesh Sham Sonawane, Ashish Pratap Singh, Dhruv
     Singh, Ms. Santosh, Advs. for the Appellant.
     C. Mohan Rao, Sr. Adv., R. Santhnan Krishnan, Lokesh Kr. Sharma,
     D. Mahesh Babu, Advs. for the Respondent.

               Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

                               Judgment

     Satish Chandra Sharma, J.

1.   Leave granted.
2.   The present appeal is arising out of order dated 13.04.2017 passed in
     Criminal Revision No. 1587 of 2012 by the High Court of Judicature at
     Hyderabad for the State of Telangana and State of Andhra Pradesh.
3.   The facts of the case reveal that Appellant No.1 before this Court –
     Smt. N. Usha Rani married one Nomula Srinivas on 30.08.1999 at
     Hyderabad. During the period of their wedlock, she gave birth to a
     male child, namely, Sai Ganesh on 15.08.2000. The couple lived
     together until disputes arose between them. Following their return
     from the United States of America in February 2005, they began
     living separately. Eventually, on 25.11.2005, a Memorandum of
     Understanding (‘MoU’) was executed between the couple, dissolving
     their marriage. Meanwhile, Appellant No. 1 got acquainted with her
     neighbour, the Respondent, and the couple got married on 27.11.2005.
4.   The Respondent then preferred a petition u/s.12 of the Hindu
     Marriage Act, 1956 (‘HMA’) r/w. Section 7 of the Family Courts Act,
     1984 seeking dissolution of marriage dated 27.11.2005. The prayer
     was allowed by the Family Court, Hyderabad, in O.P. No. 29 of 2006
     vide decree dated 01.02.2006 and the marriage between Appellant
     No. 1 and the Respondent was declared null and void.
5.   On 14.02.2006, the Appellant No. 1 remarried the Respondent. This
     second marriage was registered and a certificate to that effect was
     issued by the Registrar of Marriage, Chikkadpally, Hyderabad on
     11.09.2006. The couple was blessed with a daughter, Venkata Harshini
[2025] 1 S.C.R.                                                      1445

           Smt. N. Usha Rani and Anr. v. Moodudula Srinivas


     i.e., Appellant No. 2 on 28.01.2008. However, differences arose
     between the couple and the Appellant No. 1 preferred a complaint
     against the Respondent and his family members for offences u/s.
     498A, 406, 506, 420 of Indian Penal Code read with Sections 3
     and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961.
6.   The Appellants then preferred an application for maintenance u/s.
     125 CrPC before the Family Court. Vide order dated 26.07.2012,
     the Court awarded Rs. 3,500/- pm to the Appellant No.1 and Rs.
     5,000/- pm to the Appellant No. 2. Aggrieved, Respondent preferred
     a criminal revision petition against the award of maintenance. Vide
     the impugned order, the High Court upheld the award of maintenance
     to the daughter i.e., Appellant No. 2 but set aside the award of
     maintenance to the Appellant No. 1. The Court held that the Appellant
     No. 1 could not be considered the legal wife of the Respondent as
     her first marriage with Nomula Srinivas was not dissolved through
     a legal decree.
7.   Learned Counsel for the Appellants vehemently argued before this
     Court that as the Appellant No. 1 and the Respondent were de facto
     living as a married couple and raising a child together, the benefit
     of maintenance should be extended to Appellant No.1. Reliance is
     placed on judgement passed in Rameshchandra Rampratapji Daga
     Vs. Rameshwari Rameshchandra Daga (2005) 2 SCC 33 whereby
     a Division Bench of this Court upheld the grant of maintenance to
     a wife u/s.25 of the HMA from her second husband while her first
     marriage was still subsisting. The Court considered that although there
     was no legal decree of divorce from the first husband, (i) the wife
     had given customary divorce i.e., chhor chitthhi and (ii) the factum
     of the first marriage was not concealed from the second husband.
8.   Further reliance is placed on judgement passed in Chanmuniya vs.
     Virendra Kumar Singh Kushwaha and another (2011) 1 SCC 141
     whereby a Division Bench of this Court noted that considering the
     social object of Sec. 125 CrPC, the term “wife” should be expansively
     interpreted to include live-in partners. While the question of law was
     referred to a larger bench, the Court took the view that men should
     not be permitted to benefit from legal loopholes by enjoying the
     advantages of a de facto marriage without undertaking its duties
     and obligations.
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9.   On the contrary, learned counsel for the Respondent opposes the
     grant of maintenance on grounds that the Appellant No. 1 cannot be
     considered a “wife” u/s. 125 CrPC. Reliance is placed on judgement
     passed by a Division Bench of this Court in Savitaben Somabhai
     Bhatiya Vs. State of Gujarat and others (2005) 3 SCC 636 whereby
     the claim of maintenance made by the second wife was dismissed as
     the first marriage of the husband was subsisting. The Court therein
     noted that even if the husband was treating the claimant as his
     wife or the fact of first marriage was suppressed from the claimant,
     legislative intention was clear-- there was no scope for extending the
     definition of “wife” to include a woman not legally married. Learned
     Counsel contends that similarly, as Appellant No. 1 has a legally
     subsisting marriage with her first husband, she cannot be considered
     the wife of the Respondent and claim maintenance u/s. 125 CrPC.
10. We have heard learned counsels for the parties and perused the
    record. The short question before us is whether a woman is entitled
    to claim maintenance u/s. 125 CrPC from her second husband while
    her first marriage is allegedly legally subsisting.
11. At the risk of burdening this judgement, it is imperative to reiterate
    the objective of maintenance u/s. 125 CrPC as laid out by Justice
    Krishna Iyer in Captain Ramesh Chander Kaushal vs. Veena
    Kaushal and Others (1978) 4 SCC 70. While upholding an award
    of maintenance beyond the monetary limitation prescribed under the
    provision, the Court held:
          “9. This provision is a measure of social justice and specially
          enacted to protect women and children and falls within
          the constitutional sweep of Article 15(3) reinforced by
          Article 39. We have no doubt that sections of statutes
          calling for construction by courts are not petrified
          print but vibrant words with social functions to fulfil.
          The brooding presence of the constitutional empathy
          for the weaker sections like women and children must
          inform interpretation if it has to have social relevance.
          So viewed, it is possible to be selective in picking out that
          interpretation out of two alternatives which advance the
          cause — the cause of the derelicts.”
12. This purposive interpretation was pressed into service by a 3-Judge
    bench in Vimala (K) vs. Veeraswamy (K) (1991) 2 SCC 375 whereby
    maintenance was granted to the second wife as the Respondent
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           Smt. N. Usha Rani and Anr. v. Moodudula Srinivas


     husband was unable to conclusively establish his first marriage.
     The Court noted:
           “3. Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is
           meant to achieve a social purpose. The object is to
           prevent vagrancy and destitution. It provides a speedy
           remedy for the supply of food, clothing and shelter to the
           deserted wife. When an attempt is made by the husband
           to negative the claim of the neglected wife depicting
           her as a kept-mistress on the specious plea that he
           was already married, the court would insist on strict
           proof of the earlier marriage. The term ‘wife’ in Section
           125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, includes a
           woman who has been divorced by a husband or who
           has obtained a divorce from her husband and has not
           remarried. The woman not having the legal status of a
           wife is thus brought within the inclusive definition of
           the term ‘wife’ consistent with the objective. However,
           under the law a second wife whose marriage is void on
           account of the survival of the first marriage is not a legally
           wedded wife and is, therefore, not entitled to maintenance
           under this provision. Therefore, the law which disentitles
           the second wife from receiving maintenance from her
           husband under Section 125, CrPC, for the sole reason
           that the marriage ceremony though performed in the
           customary form lacks legal sanctity can be applied
           only when the husband satisfactorily proves the
           subsistence of a legal and valid marriage particularly
           when the provision in the Code is a measure of social
           justice intended to protect women and children. We are
           unable to find that the respondent herein has discharged the
           heavy burden by tendering strict proof of the fact in issue.
           The High Court failed to consider the standard of proof
           required and has proceeded on no evidence whatsoever
           in determining the question against the appellant. We are,
           therefore, unable to agree that the appellant is not entitled
           to maintenance.”
13. Similarly, this Court in Dwarika Prasad Satpathy vs. Bidyut Prava
    Dixit and Another (1999) 7 SCC 675 granted maintenance where
    proof of marriage was inconclusive. The Court noted that the standard
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     of proof of marriage while claiming maintenance is not as strict as
     is required in a trial for offence u/s. 494 IPC. It held:
          “10. After not disputing the paternity of the child and
          after accepting the fact that the marriage ceremony was
          performed, though not legally perfect as contended, it
          would hardly lie in the mouth of the appellant to contend
          in a proceeding under Section 125 CrPC that there was
          no valid marriage as essential rites were not performed
          at the time of the said marriage. The provision under
          Section 125 is not to be utilised for defeating the
          rights conferred by the legislature on the destitute
          women, children or parents who are victims of the
          social environment…”
14. A different view was taken by this Court in Yamunabai Anantrao
    Adhav vs. Anantrao Shivram Adhav and Another (1988) 1 SCC
    530 whereby maintenance was denied to a second wife during the
    subsistence of the husband’s first marriage on a strict interpretation
    of the term “wife” u/s. 125 CrPC. The Court gave supremacy to the
    intention of the legislature which specifically included divorced women
    within the purview of Sec. 125 CrPC but did not mention de facto
    wives whose marriages are void ab initio. This view found favour
    in Bakulabai and Another vs. Gangaram and Another (1988) 1
    SCC 537 where maintenance was similarly denied on the plea of
    previously subsisting marriage. The case relied on by the Respondent
    i.e., Savitaben (supra) comes on the heels of these decisions.
15. This divergence in judicial opinion has been noted by the Court in
    Chanmuniya (supra) and therefore the question of whether women
    in live-in relationships can claim maintenance u/s. 125 CrPC was
    referred to a larger bench. The discussion, to the extent relevant,
    is reproduced below:
          “24. Thus, in those cases where a man, who lived
          with a woman for a long time and even though they
          may not have undergone legal necessities of a valid
          marriage, should be made liable to pay the woman
          maintenance if he deserts her. The man should
          not be allowed to benefit from the legal loopholes
          by enjoying the advantages of a de facto marriage
          without undertaking the duties and obligations. Any
[2025] 1 S.C.R.                                                            1449

           Smt. N. Usha Rani and Anr. v. Moodudula Srinivas


           other interpretation would lead the woman to vagrancy and
           destitution, which the provision of maintenance in Section
           125 is meant to prevent.
           25. The Committee on Reforms of Criminal Justice System,
           headed by Dr. Justice V.S. Malimath, in its Report of 2003
           opined that evidence regarding a man and woman living
           together for a reasonably long period should be sufficient
           to draw the presumption that the marriage was performed
           according to the customary rites of the parties. Thus, it
           recommended that the word “wife” in Section 125 CrPC
           should be amended to include a woman who was living
           with the man like his wife for a reasonably long period…
           42. We are of the opinion that a broad and expansive
           interpretation should be given to the term “wife” to
           include even those cases where a man and woman
           have been living together as husband and wife for
           a reasonably long period of time, and strict proof of
           marriage should not be a precondition for maintenance
           under Section 125 CrPC, so as to fulfil the true spirit and
           essence of the beneficial provision of maintenance under
           Section 125. We also believe that such an interpretation
           would be a just application of the principles enshrined in
           the Preamble to our Constitution, namely, social justice
           and upholding the dignity of the individual.”
16. Most recently, in Badshah vs. Urmila Badshah Godse and Another
    (2014) 1 SCC 188, this Court granted maintenance to a second
    wife who was kept in the dark about her husband’s first subsisting
    marriage. The Court noted:
           “13.3. Thirdly, in such cases, purposive interpretation needs
           to be given to the provisions of Section 125 CrPC. While
           dealing with the application of a destitute wife or hapless
           children or parents under this provision, the Court is dealing
           with the marginalised sections of the society. The purpose
           is to achieve “social justice” which is the constitutional
           vision, enshrined in the Preamble of the Constitution of
           India. The Preamble to the Constitution of India clearly
           signals that we have chosen the democratic path under
           the rule of law to achieve the goal of securing for all its
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          citizens, justice, liberty, equality and fraternity. It specifically
          highlights achieving their social justice. Therefore, it
          becomes the bounden duty of the courts to advance
          the cause of social justice. While giving interpretation
          to a particular provision, the court is supposed to
          bridge the gap between the law and society.”
17. This encapsulates the full scope and gravity of considerations before
    this Court as we deliberate on the issue at hand. The present case
    does not concern a live-in relationship. The Family Court made a
    factual finding that Appellant No. 1 married the Respondent and that
    finding is not disputed by the Respondent. Instead, the Respondent
    seeks to defeat the right to maintenance by claiming that his
    marriage to Appellant No. 1 is void ab initio as her first marriage is
    still subsisting. Two other pertinent facts must be considered: firstly,
    it is not the case of the Respondent that the truth was concealed
    from him. In fact, the Family Court makes a specific finding that
    Respondent was fully aware of the first marriage of the Appellant
    No. 1. Therefore, Respondent knowingly entered into a marriage
    with Appellant No. 1 not once, but twice. Secondly, Appellant No. 1
    places before this Court an MoU of separation with her first husband.
    While this is not a legal decree of divorce, it also emerges from this
    document and other evidence that the parties have dissolved their
    ties, they have been living separately and Appellant No. 1 is not
    deriving maintenance from her first husband. Therefore, barring the
    absence of a legal decree, Appellant No. 1 is de facto separated
    from her first husband and is not deriving any rights and entitlements
    as a consequence of that marriage.
18. In the opinion of this Court, when the social justice objective of
    maintenance u/s. 125CrPC is considered against the particular facts
    and circumstances of this case, we cannot, in good conscience,
    deny maintenance to Appellant No. 1. It is settled law that social
    welfare provisions must be subjected to an expansive and
    beneficial construction and this understanding has been extended
    to maintenance since Ramesh Chander (supra). An alternate
    interpretation would not only explicitly defeat the purpose of the
    provision by permitting vagrancy and destitution, but would also give
    legal sanction to the actions of the Respondent in knowingly entering
    into a marriage with Appellant No.1, availing its privileges but escaping
    its consequent duties and obligations. The only conceivable mischief
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           Smt. N. Usha Rani and Anr. v. Moodudula Srinivas


     that could arise in permitting a beneficial interpretation is that the
     Appellant No.1 could claim dual maintenance--however, that is not
     the case under the present facts. We are aware that this Court has
     previously denied maintenance in cases of subsisting marriages
     (See Yamunabai (supra) and Bakulabai (supra)). However, a plea
     of separation from the first marriage was not made in those cases
     and hence, they are factually distinguishable. It must be borne in
     mind that the right to maintenance u/s.125 CrPC is not a benefit
     received by a wife but rather a legal and moral duty owed by the
     husband. A recent landmark judgement of this Court in Mohd. Abdul
     Samad vs. State of Telangana and Another (2024) SCC OnLine
     SC 1686 has shed greater light on this duty in the Indian context:
           “43. In this context, I would like to advert to the vulnerability
           of married women in India who do not have an independent
           source of income or who do not have access to monetary
           resources in their households particularly for their personal
           expenses. In Indian society, it is an established practice that
           once a daughter is married, she resides with her husband
           and/or his family unless due to exigency of career or such
           other reason she has to reside elsewhere. In the case
           of a woman who has an independent source of income,
           she may be financially endowed and may not be totally
           dependent on her husband and his family. But what is the
           position of a married woman who is often referred to as
           a “homemaker” and who does not have an independent
           source of income, whatsoever, and is totally dependent for
           her financial resources on her husband and on his family? It
           is well-known that such an Indian homemaker tries to save
           as much money as possible from the monthly household
           budget, not only to augment the financial resources of the
           family but possibly to also save a small portion for her
           personal expenses. Such a practice is followed in order
           to avoid making a request to the husband or his family
           for her personal expenses. Most married men in India do
           not realise this aspect of the predicament such Indian
           homemakers face as any request made for expenses may
           be bluntly turned down by the husband and/or his family.
           Some husbands are not conscious of the fact that the wife
           who has no independent source of finance is dependent
           on them not only emotionally but also financially. On the
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        other hand, a wife who is referred to as a homemaker is
        working throughout the day for the welfare of the family
        without expecting anything in return except possibly love
        and affection, a sense of comfort and respect from her
        husband and his family which are towards her emotional
        security. This may also be lacking in certain households.
        44. While the contributions of such a homemaker get judicial
        recognition upon her unfortunate death while computing
        compensation in cases under the Motor Vehicles Act,
        1988 vide Kirti vs. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., (2021) 2
        SCC 166, the services and sacrifices of homemakers for
        the economic well- being of the family, and the economy
        of the nation, remain uncompensated in large sections of
        our society.
        45. Therefore, I observe that an Indian married man
        must become conscious of the fact that he would have to
        financially empower and provide for his wife, who does not
        have an independent source of income, by making available
        financial resources particularly towards her personal needs;
        in other words, giving access to his financial resources.
        Such financial empowerment would place such a vulnerable
        wife in a more secure position in the family. Those Indian
        married men who are conscious of this aspect and who
        make available their financial resources for their spouse
        towards their personal expenses, apart from household
        expenditure, possibly by having a joint bank account or
        via an ATM card, must be acknowledged.
        46. Another aspect of vulnerability of a married Indian
        woman is regarding her security of residence in her
        matrimonial home. In this context in the case of Prabha
        Tyagi vs. Kamlesh Devi, (2022) 8 SCC 90, this Court while
        considering Section 17 along with other provisions of the
        Domestic Violence Act, 2005 opined as under:
        “60. In our view, the question raised about a subsisting
        domestic relationship between the aggrieved person
        and the person against whom the relief is claimed must
        be interpreted in a broad and expansive way, so as to
        encompass not only a subsisting domestic relationship in
        praesenti but also a past domestic relationship. Therefore,
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              Smt. N. Usha Rani and Anr. v. Moodudula Srinivas


             Parliament has intentionally used the expression “domestic
             relationship” to mean a relationship between two persons
             who not only live together in the shared household but
             also between two persons who “have at any point of time
             lived together” in a shared household.”
             47. Thus, both ‘financial security’ as well as ‘security of
             residence’ of Indian women have to be protected and
             enhanced. That would truly empower such Indian women
             who are referred to as ‘homemakers’ and who are the
             strength and backbone of an Indian family which is the
             fundamental unit of the Indian society which has to be
             maintained and strengthened. It goes without saying
             that a stable family which is emotionally connected and
             secure gives stability to the society for, it is within the
             family that precious values of life are learnt and built. It
             is these moral and ethical values which are inherited by
             a succeeding generation which would go a long way in
             building a strong Indian society which is the need of the
             hour. It is needless to observe that a strong Indian family
             and society would ultimately lead to a stronger nation.
             But, for that to happen, women in the family have to be
             respected and empowered!
19. In light of the aforesaid, the appeal is allowed and the maintenance
    award granted by the Family Court vide order dated 26.07.2012 is
    restored.

     Result of the case: Appeal allowed.



     †
         Headnotes prepared by: Divya Pandey