SMT. LAVANYA C & ANR.versusVITTAL GURUDAS PAI SINCE DESEASED BY LRS. & ORS.

                  [2025] 3 S.C.R. 450 : 2025 INSC 325

                         Smt. Lavanya C & Anr.
                                   v.
           Vittal Gurudas Pai Since Deseased By LRs. & Ors.
                      (Civil Appeal No. 13999 of 2024)
                                05 March 2025
                 [Pankaj Mithal and Sanjay Karol,* JJ.]


                           Issue for Consideration
       Whether the High Court was correct in setting aside the order of the
       Trial Court holding the appellants not guilty of wilful disobedience
       of their undertaking given to the Court.

                                  Headnotes†
       Contempt of Court – When – Appellants gave undertaking
       before the Trial Court to not alienate the property which
       was the subject matter of the suit – Respondents filed
       application alleging violation thereof – Trial Court held that
       the Appellants were not guilty of wilful disobedience of
       the undertaking given by them – Order set aside by High
       Court – Correctness:
       Held: Plea of the appellants that the undertaking to not alienate
       the subject matter property was given by the lawyer without
       requisite authority, not accepted – The undertaking in question
       was given in July 2007 and reiterated in August 2007 –Trial Court
       made such an undertaking into an order of the Court in November
       2007, which was extended at regular intervals – The application
       for violation of the undertaking/order of the Court under Order
       XXXIX Rule 2A was made in 2011 i.e., after a period of four and a
       half years – Had the undertaking been without requisite authority,
       the appellants were well within their rights to seek discharge of
       that order, however, no such step was taken – Alienation of the
       subject matter property was despite express orders of the Court
       and thus, in violation thereof – High Court rightly punished the
       appellants for contempt of Court – However, order modified, as
       directed – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Or. XXXIX R. 2A.
       [Paras 6, 11, 12, 14]


* Author
[2025] 3 S.C.R.                                                            451

                        Smt. Lavanya C & Anr. v.
           Vittal Gurudas Pai Since Deseased By LRs. & Ors.

     Legal Profession – Relationship between Advocate and
     client – Nature:
     Held: A lawyer-client relationship is fiduciary in nature and the
     former is cast in terms of agency of the latter – The lawyer must
     respect the decision-making right of the client – Any undertaking
     given to a Court cannot be without requisite authority from the
     client. [Para 9]

                              Case Law Cited
     Samee Khan v. Bindu Khan [1998] Supp. 1 SCR 244 : (1998)
     7 SCC 59; Wander Limited & Anr. v. Antox India Pvt. Ltd. (1990)
     Supp. 1 SCC 727; Ramakant Ambalal Choksi v. Harish Ambalal
     Choksi, 2024 SCC OnLine 3538; Dalpat Kumar v. Prahlad Singh
     [1991] Supp. 3 SCR 472 : (1992) 1 SCC 719; Kanwar Singh
     Saini v. High Court of Delhi [2011] 15 SCR 972 : (2012) 4 SCC
     307; Kokkanda B. Poondacha v. K.D. Ganapathi [2011] 4 SCR
     417 : (2011) 12 SCC 600; State of U.P. v. U.P. State Law Officers'
     Assn. [1994] 1 SCR 348 : (1994) 2 SCC 204; Himalayan Coop.
     Group Housing Society v. Balwan Singh [2015] 4 SCR 616 :
     (2015) 7 SCC 373; Bar of Indian Lawyers v. National Institute
     of Communicable Diseases (2024) 8 SCC 430; Supreme Court
     Bar Assn. v. Union of India [1998] 2 SCR 795 : (1998) 4 SCC
     409 – referred to.

                                List of Acts
     Contempt of Courts Act, 1971; Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

                             List of Keywords
     Contempt of Court; Express violation of order of Court; Disobedience
     of Undertaking; Or. XXXIX R. 2A of Civil Procedure Code, 1908;
     Civil contempt; Fiduciary relationship between Advocate and client;
     Undertaking without requisite authority from client; Alienation of
     subject matter property; Disobedience of an order of temporary
     injunction.

                            Case Arising From
     CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 13999 of 2024
     From the Judgment and Order dated 23.02.2021 of the High Court
     of Karnataka at Bengaluru in MFA No. 7055 of 2013
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                               Appearances for Parties
       Advs. for the Appellants:
       Radhakrishna S Hegde, Rajeev Singh.
       Advs. for the Respondents:
       Vikram Hegde, Abhinav Hansaraman.

                        Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

                                     Judgment

       Sanjay Karol J.

1.     This appeal arises out of judgment and order dated 23rd February
       2021/16 th March, 2021 passed in Miscellaneous First Appeal
       No.7055/2013(CPC) by the High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru,
       whereby the respondents before the High Court, appellants herein
       (defendants in Trial Court), were held guilty of disobedience of their
       undertaking before the Trial Court of not alienating the property,
       subject matter of the suit.
       The original defendants in the Trial Court through their counsel
       gave an undertaking which was allegedly disobeyed. The plaintiffs
       aggrieved thereby filed the case, which was dismissed, and they
       appealed to the High Court, ultimately resulting in a favourable order.
       The original defendants now aggrieved by being held in contempt,
       are appellants herein.
2.     A brief resume of facts leading to the appeal are :
       2.1 The respondents herein were the original plaintiffs in Original
           Suit No.4191 of 2007 seeking a declaration to the effect that
           agreement between the parties dated 30th April 2004, i.e.,
           ‘Joint Development Agreement’1 to be “revoked rescinded and
           terminated.” The JDA was entered into regarding the construction
           of residential apartments within a period of 24 months, on a
           turnkey basis.
       2.2 Said construction was to be completed by 31st October 2006.
           However, the same could not be done. Legal notice intimating


1    ‘JDA’, for short
[2025] 3 S.C.R.                                                               453

                          Smt. Lavanya C & Anr. v.
             Vittal Gurudas Pai Since Deseased By LRs. & Ors.

             the cancellation of the JDA was issued on 23rd March 2007,
             and eventually, the subject Original Suit came to be filed.
     2.3 The learned Trial Court eventually concluded vide judgment
         and order dated 2nd January 2017 that the plaintiffs could not
         prove that the construction made was in violation of the JDA and
         instead, the defendants proved that the construction made by
         them was in accordance thereof. It was held that the plaintiffs
         were not entitled to the declaration and permanent injunction,
         as prayed for.
     2.4 In the pendency of the above proceedings, record reveals that
         the counsel for the defendants undertook, on two occasions, i.e.,
         11th July 2007 and 13th August 2007 that they will not alienate
         the subject property to any third person. Allegedly, however,
         such undertaking was not abided by, which led to the filing of
         Interlocutory Application No.3 that came to be registered as
         Civil Misc. Application No.38 of 2011 under Order XXXIX Rule
         2A of the Civil Procedure Code, 19082.
     2.5 The concerned Court framed the following issues :
             "1)      Whether the petitioners have made out a case of
                      breach or willful disobedience by the respondents of
                      order passed by this court in pursuance of undertaking
                      given by the defendant and order of injunction dated
                      17.11.2007 beyond all reasonable doubts?
             2)       What order?”
     2.6 The Court considered the jurisdiction which has been agitated,
         observing that the said power is punitive in nature and akin to
         imposing punishment for civil contempt under the Contempt of
         Courts Act, 1971. It was concluded as under :
             “38. It is significant to note that advocate for petitioners
             have produced 10 photos of suit property, which
             depict that suit property is still vacant and foundation
             is lying. But, here in this case, the petitioners have
             contended that the flats were sold by the respondents



2   Hereafter ‘CPC’
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             inspite of Court Order. Moreover,, the description
             of the suit property is incomplete and ambiguous.
             Therefore, the averment/contention of the petitioners
             is not believable.
             39. In view of aforesaid reasons and observations made,
             I can safely conclude that the petitioners are failed to
             prove their case beyond all reasonable doubt that the
             respondents are knowingly and willfully disobeyed the
             injunction order of this Court. : There is no sufficient and
             satisfactory materials on record to come to conclusion that
             the respondents have knowingly and willfully disobeyed
             and committed the breach of order of this Court. Hence,
             respondents are entitled for benefit of doubt. Therefore, I
             answer aforesaid point No.1 in Negative.
             40. Point No.2 : For the foregoing reasons and in view of
             my findings and discussions, I proceed to pas the following :
                                           ORDER
                       In the result, therefore this Civil Misc. petition
                       (I.A. No.3) filed by the petitioners U/o XXXIX
                       Rule 2A and U/s.151 of CPC against the
                       respondents is liable to be rejected. Accordingly,
                       it is dismissed.
                       Parties shall bear their own costs.”
       2.7 Aggrieved by this order, the High Court was approached by way
           of Misc. First Appeal No.7055 of 2013 (CPC) under Order XLIII
           Rule 1(r) read with 104(i) of CPC. The question to be considered
           was whether the lower Court’s order is sustainable in law.

       Impugned Judgment
3.     A question of maintainability of the application under Order XXXIX
       Rule 2A was raised. With reference to Samee Khan v. Bindu Khan,3 it
       was held that even if the injunction order was subsequently set aside,
       the disobedience thereof is not erased. The subsequent dismissal of
       a suit does not absolve the party of liability of breach of injunction


3    (1998) 7 SCC 59
[2025] 3 S.C.R.                                                        455

                        Smt. Lavanya C & Anr. v.
           Vittal Gurudas Pai Since Deseased By LRs. & Ors.

     order. That apart, it was observed that an appeal against the Trial
     Court’s dismissal of the Original Suit was also pending before the
     High Court bearing R.F.A.No.592/2017.
     3.1 The substance of the dispute is that on 11th July 2007, the
         counsel for the appellants herein filed memo as follows :
           “The undersigned counsel undertake that the defendants
           have not alienate the suit schedule property to any third
           person”
     3.2 Subsequently, on two dates 13th August and 17th November,
         2007 the proceedings of the Trial Court have been taken note
         of by the Trial Court in paras 26 to 28, which read as follows :
           “26. Then the matter was adjourned to 13.08.2007. On
           13.08.2007, the advocate for the defendants filed another
           memo which reads as follows :
                “The undersigned counsel undertake that they
                have not alienate the suit schedule property in
                the above case.”
           27. Then the trial Court ordered to list the matter on
           17.11.2007. On 17.11.2007, the defendants’ Counsel
           failed to appear before the Court. The plaintiffs’ Counsel
           submitted to the Court about the undertaking given by the
           defendants’ Counsel. Under such circumstances, the trial
           Court passed the following order:
                “Parties to the suit called out. Absent. Learned
                Counsel for the plaintiff is present. Learned
                Counsel for the defendant is absent. On
                the last date the learned Counsel for
                the defendants had undertaken that the
                defendants will not alienate suit property.
                Today neither defendants nor learned Counsel
                for the defendants are present. I.A. I & II
                cannot be heard as the defendants and learned
                Counsel for defendant Nos.1 to 3 are absent.
                Hence, it is hereby ordered that defendants
                1 to 3 shall not alienate the suit property
                till next date. For hearing of IA I & II and to
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                 call the parties under Section 89 of CPC. Call
                 on 08.12.2007.”
            28. That order was extended from time to time. Subsequent
            to 17.11.2007, the defendants executed the sale deeds
            under Exs.P3 to P5, Ex.P7 to P13, the dates of which
            are as follows :
                 Ex.P3–19.11.2007 Ex.P4-03.12.2008
                 Ex.P5–01.07.2008 Ex.P7-15.06.2009
                 Ex.P8–06.08.2008 Ex.P9-13.12.2011
                 Ex.P10–19.11.2007Ex.P11-01.07.2008
                 Ex.P12-03.12.2008 Ex.P13-15.06.2009 ”
       3.3 The Court citing various judicial pronouncements observed
           that there was no merit in the contention that injunction order
           is invalid. The order of the lower Court was set aside, and
           the appellants herein were held guilty of disobedience of their
           undertaking made before the Trial Court.
       3.4 Vide order dated 16th March 2021 the appellants were held guilty
           of contempt of Court. Contemnor No.3, namely, Chalsani R.B.
           who is the second appellant herein, was directed to be detained
           in a civil prison for a period of three months and his property,
           subject matter of suit, to be attached for a period of one year.
           Contemnor No.2, namely, Smt. Lavanya C., the first appellant
           herein, qua her it was directed that the subject matter property
           be attached for a period of one year. It was further directed
           that both the contemnors shall pay a sum of Rs.10 lakhs within
           four weeks, as compensation for the hardship caused to the
           respondents herein. The part of the order directing attachment
           was stayed for a period of 60 days.

       Our Consideration
4.     It is this order of the High Court which is sought to be challenged in
       this appeal. By way of the special leave petition, it has been urged,
       inter alia :
       a)   In the prayers made in the application under Order XXXIX Rule
            1 and 2, no specific prayer, restraining the parties from creating
            third party rights, has been made. The Trial Court has observed
            that the description of property is ambiguous, incomplete and
            that no satisfactory material has been brought on record to
[2025] 3 S.C.R.                                                              457

                           Smt. Lavanya C & Anr. v.
              Vittal Gurudas Pai Since Deseased By LRs. & Ors.

             show wilful disobedience on the part of the appellants, hence,
             they are entitled to the benefit of doubt.
      b)     There has been deliberate suppression of facts on the part of
             the respondents herein regarding construction of apartments and
             selling off a part thereof, even prior to filing of the original Suit.
      c)     An unconditional apology has been tendered before the Court
             and the appellants herein have no intent or desire to disrespect
             any order passed by a competent Court.
      d)     The sentence imposed, in the attending facts and circumstances,
             is unjustified given that the second appellant is a person of
             advanced years and suffers from various ailments.
5.    We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the
      record. The question to be considered is whether the High Court
      was correct in setting aside the order of the Court below, holding the
      appellants herein not guilty of wilful disobedience of their undertaking
      given to the Court.
6.    A few dates require immediate recall. The undertaking subject
      matter of controversy was given by the counsel on 11th July 2007
      and reiterated on 13th August 2007. The Trial Court made such an
      undertaking into an order of the Court on 17th November 2007. The
      same was extended at regular intervals. The application for violation
      of the undertaking/order of the Court under Order XXXIX Rule 2A was
      made in 2011. An order was made dismissing the application on 2nd
      August 2013. Immediately thereafter, an appeal was filed before the
      High Court. In the pendency of this appeal, the Original Suit came to
      be decided on 2nd January 2017. An appeal against such dismissal
      of the Original Suit was pending before the High Court on the date
      that the impugned judgment came to be passed.
7.    Although of primary concern, in this appeal is the sentence of
      imprisonment and compensation to be paid by the appellants herein,
      it would be apposite to take note of the contours of Order XXXIX
      Rule 1, Rule 2 and Rule 2A.
      7.1 A Three-Judge Bench in Wander Limited & Anr. v. Antox
          India Pvt. Ltd.4 observed as follows :


4    (1990) Supp. 1 SCC 727
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       “9. .....
              “...is to protect the plaintiff against injury by
              violation of his rights for which he could not
              adequately be compensated in damages
              recoverable in the action if the uncertainty were
              resolved in his favour at the trial. The need for
              such protection must be weighed against the
              corresponding need of the defendant to be
              protected against injury resulting from his having
              been prevented from exercising his own legal
              rights for which he could not be adequately
              compensated. The court must weigh one need
              against another and determine where the
              ‘balance of convenience’ lies.”
                   x             x           x             x
       14. The appeals before the Division Bench were against
       the exercise of discretion by the Single Judge. In such
       appeals, the appellate court will not interfere with the
       exercise of discretion of the court of first instance and
       substitute its own discretion except where the discretion
       has been shown to have been exercised arbitrarily, or
       capriciously or perversely or where the court had ignored
       the settled principles of law regulating grant or refusal of
       interlocutory injunctions. An appeal against exercise of
       discretion is said to be an appeal on principle. Appellate
       court will not reassess the material and seek to reach a
       conclusion different from the one reached by the court
       below if the one reached by that court was reasonably
       possible on the material. The appellate court would
       normally not be justified in interfering with the exercise
       of discretion under appeal solely on the ground that if it
       had considered the matter at the trial stage it would have
       come to a contrary conclusion. If the discretion has been
       exercised by the trial court reasonably and in a judicial
       manner the fact that the appellate court would have taken
       a different view may not justify interference with the trial
       court’s exercise of discretion. After referring to these
       principles Gajendragadkar, J. in Printers (Mysore) Private
[2025] 3 S.C.R.                                                           459

                          Smt. Lavanya C & Anr. v.
             Vittal Gurudas Pai Since Deseased By LRs. & Ors.

            Ltd. v. Pothan Joseph [(1960) 3 SCR 713 : AIR 1960 SC
            1156] : (SCR 721)
                   “... These principles are well established, but
                   as has been observed by Viscount Simon in
                   Charles Osenton & Co. v. Jhanaton [1942 AC
                   130] ‘...the law as to the reversal by a court of
                   appeal of an order made by a judge below in
                   the exercise of his discretion is well established,
                   and any difficulty that arises is due only to
                   the application of well settled principles in an
                   individual case’.”
            The appellate judgment does not seem to defer to this
            principle.”
                                                     (Emphasis supplied)

     7.2 A recent judgment of this Court in Ramakant Ambalal Choksi
         v. Harish Ambalal Choksi,5 referring to Dalpat Kumar v.
         Prahlad Singh 6 has reiterated the principles governing the
         grant of temporary injunction.
     7.3 The aspect of disobedience of an order of temporary injunction
         has been discussed in detail in Kanwar Singh Saini v. High
         Court of Delhi,7 in the following terms :
            “17. Application under Order 39 Rule 2-A CPC lies only
            where disobedience/breach of an injunction granted or
            order complained of was one that is granted by the court
            under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC, which is naturally to
            enure during the pendency of the suit. However, once a
            suit is decreed, the interim order, if any, merges into the
            final order. No litigant can derive any benefit from mere
            pendency of case in a court of law, as the interim order
            always merges in the final order to be passed in the case
            and if the case is ultimately dismissed, the interim order
            stands nullified automatically. (Vide A.R. Sircar v. State


5   2024 SCC OnLine 3538
6   (1992) 1 SCC 719
7   (2012) 4 SCC 307
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           of U.P. [1993 Supp (2) SCC 734 : 1993 SCC (L&S) 896 :
           (1993) 24 ATC 832], Shiv Shanker v. U.P. SRTC [1995
           Supp (2) SCC 726 : 1995 SCC (L&S) 1018 : (1995) 30
           ATC 317], Arya Nagar Inter College v. Sree Kumar Tiwary
           [(1997) 4 SCC 388 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 967 : AIR 1997 SC
           3071], GTC Industries Ltd. v. Union of India [(1998) 3 SCC
           376 : AIR 1998 SC 1566] and Jaipur Municipal Corpn. v.
           C.L. Mishra [(2005) 8 SCC 423].)
           18. In case there is a grievance of non-compliance
           with the terms of the decree passed in the civil suit, the
           remedy available to the aggrieved person is to approach
           the execution court under Order 21 Rule 32 CPC which
           provides for elaborate proceedings in which the parties
           can adduce their evidence and can examine and cross-
           examine the witnesses as opposed to the proceedings in
           contempt which are summary in nature. Application under
           Order 39 Rule 2-A CPC is not maintainable once the suit
           stood decreed. Law does not permit to skip the remedies
           available under Order 21 Rule 32 CPC and resort to the
           contempt proceedings for the reason that the court has
           to exercise its discretion under the 1971 Act when an
           effective and alternative remedy is not available to the
           person concerned. Thus, when the matter relates to the
           infringement of a decree or decretal order embodies rights,
           as between the parties, it is not expedient to invoke and
           exercise contempt jurisdiction, in essence, as a mode of
           executing the decree or merely because other remedies
           may take time or are more circumlocutory in character.
           Thus, the violation of permanent injunction can be set
           right in executing the proceedings and not the contempt
           proceedings. There is a complete fallacy in the argument
           that the provisions of Order 39 Rule 2-A CPC would also
           include the case of violation or breach of permanent
           injunction granted at the time of passing of the decree.”
       7.4 In Samee Khan (supra), it was observed that :
           “12. But the position under Rule 2-A of Order 39 is
           different. Even if the injunction order was subsequently
           set aside, the disobedience does not get erased. It may
           be a different matter that the rigour of such disobedience
[2025] 3 S.C.R.                                                               461

                           Smt. Lavanya C & Anr. v.
              Vittal Gurudas Pai Since Deseased By LRs. & Ors.

             may be toned down if the order is subsequently set aside.
             For what purpose is the property to be attached in the
             case of disobedience of the order of injunction? Sub-rule
             (2) provides that if the disobedience or breach continues
             beyond one year from the date of attachment, the court
             is empowered to sell the property under attachment and
             compensate the affected party from such sale proceeds.”
8.    There is no question as to the maintainability of the application before
      this Court. It is also true that the order, in the challenge against which
      the impugned judgment was passed, was made in the pendency of
      the original suit and, therefore, it is saved from that bar as well. No
      error, therefore, can be found on the exercise of such jurisdiction.
9.    The next point which needs consideration is the relationship
      between an advocate and his client. The appellants have cast
      certain aspersions on their counsel to the effect that he, allegedly,
      gave the undertaking, germane to the instant controversy, without
      express authorization. This Court has, time and again, taken note
      of the fiduciary relationship between an advocate and his client. We
      may notice a few decisions as follows:
      9.1 In Kokkanda B. Poondacha v. K.D. Ganapathi,8 it was held :
             “12. At this stage, we may also advert to the nature of
             relationship between a lawyer and his client, which is
             solely founded on trust and confidence. A lawyer cannot
             pass on the confidential information to anyone else. This
             is so because he is a fiduciary of his client, who reposes
             trust and confidence in the lawyer. Therefore, he has a
             duty to fulfil all his obligations towards his client with care
             and act in good faith. Since the client entrusts the whole
             obligation of handling legal proceedings to an advocate,
             he has to act according to the principles of uberrima fides
             i.e. the utmost good faith, integrity, fairness and loyalty.
                             x             x              x
             14. An analysis of the above reproduced Rules shows
             that one of the most important duties imposed upon an
             advocate is to uphold the interest of the client fearlessly


8    (2011) 12 SCC 600
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            by all fair and honourable means. An advocate cannot
            ordinarily withdraw from engagement without sufficient
            cause and without giving reasonable and sufficient notice
            to the client. If he has reason to believe that he will be
            a witness in the case, the advocate should not accept a
            brief or appear in the case.”
       9.2 The nature of the profession was highlighted by a Bench of
           this Court in State of U.P. v. U.P. State Law Officers’ Assn.,9
           in the following terms :
            “14. Legal profession is essentially a service-oriented
            profession. The ancestor of today’s lawyer was no more
            than a spokesman who rendered his services to the needy
            members of the society by articulating their case before
            the authorities that be. The services were rendered without
            regard to the remuneration received or to be received.
            With the growth of litigation, lawyering became a full-time
            occupation and most of the lawyers came to depend
            upon it as the sole source of livelihood. The nature of
            the service rendered by the lawyers was private till the
            Government and the public bodies started engaging them
            to conduct cases on their behalf. The Government and the
            public bodies engaged the services of the lawyers purely
            on a contractual basis either for a specified case or for a
            specified or an unspecified period. Although the contract in
            some cases prohibited the lawyers from accepting private
            briefs, the nature of the contract did not alter from one of
            professional engagement to that of employment. The lawyer
            of the Government or a public body was not its employee
            but was a professional practitioner engaged to do the
            specified work. This is so even today, though the lawyers
            on the full-time rolls of the Government and the public
            bodies are described as their law officers. It is precisely
            for this reason that in the case of such law officers, the
            saving clause of Rule 49 of the Bar Council of India Rules
            waives the prohibition imposed by the said rule against the
            acceptance by a lawyer of a full-time employment.


9   1994 (2) SCC 204
[2025] 3 S.C.R.                                                             463

                           Smt. Lavanya C & Anr. v.
              Vittal Gurudas Pai Since Deseased By LRs. & Ors.

             15. The relationship between the lawyer and his client is
             one of trust and confidence. The client engages a lawyer
             for personal reasons and is at liberty to leave him also, for
             the same reasons. He is under no obligation to give reasons
             for withdrawing his brief from his lawyer. The lawyer in turn
             is not an agent of his client but his dignified, responsible
             spokesman. He is not bound to tell the court every fact or
             urge every proposition of law which his client wants him
             to do, however irrelevant it may be. He is essentially an
             adviser to his client and is rightly called a counsel in some
             jurisdictions. Once acquainted with the facts of the case, it
             is the lawyer’s discretion to choose the facts and the points
             of law which he would advance. Being a responsible officer
             of the court and an important adjunct of the administration
             of justice, the lawyer also owes a duty to the court as well
             as to the opposite side. He has to be fair to ensure that
             justice is done. He demeans himself if he acts merely as
             a mouthpiece of his client. This relationship between the
             lawyer and the private client is equally valid between him
             and the public bodies.”
      9.3 Observations made in Himalayan Coop. Group Housing
          Society v. Balwan Singh,10 by a Bench of three Judges are
          also instructive for our purposes presently :
             “22. Apart from the above, in our view lawyers are
             perceived to be their client’s agents. The law of agency
             may not strictly apply to the client-lawyer’s relationship
             as lawyers or agents, lawyers have certain authority and
             certain duties. Because lawyers are also fiduciaries, their
             duties will sometimes be more demanding than those
             imposed on other agents. The authority-agency status
             affords the lawyers to act for the client on the subject-
             matter of the retainer. One of the most basic principles
             of the lawyer-client relationship is that lawyers owe
             fiduciary duties to their clients. As part of those duties,
             lawyers assume all the traditional duties that agents
             owe to their principals and, thus, have to respect the


10   (2015) 7 SCC 373
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       client’s autonomy to make decisions at a minimum, as to
       the objectives of the representation. Thus, according to
       generally accepted notions of professional responsibility,
       lawyers should follow the client’s instructions rather than
       substitute their judgment for that of the client. The law
       is now well settled that a lawyer must be specifically
       authorised to settle and compromise a claim, that merely
       on the basis of his employment he has no implied or
       ostensible authority to bind his client to a compromise/
       settlement. To put it alternatively that a lawyer by virtue
       of retention, has the authority to choose the means for
       achieving the client’s legal goal, while the client has the
       right to decide on what the goal will be. If the decision
       in question falls within those that clearly belong to the
       client, the lawyer’s conduct in failing to consult the client
       or in making the decision for the client, is more likely to
       constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.
                       x            x              x
       30. The Privy Council in Sourendra Nath Mitra v. Tarubala
       Dasi [(1929-30) 57 IA 133 : (1930) 31 LW 803 : AIR 1930
       PC 158] , has made the following two observations which
       hold relevance to the present discussion : (IA pp. 140-41)
            “Two observations may be added. First, the
            implied authority of counsel is not an appendage
            of office, a dignity added by the courts to the
            status of barrister or advocate at law. It is
            implied in the interests of the client, to give the
            fullest beneficial effect to his employment of
            the advocate. Secondly, the implied authority
            can always be countermanded by the express
            directions of the client. No advocate has actual
            authority to settle a case against the express
            instructions of his client. If he considers such
            express instructions contrary to the interests
            of his client, his remedy is to return his brief.”
       (See: Jamilabai Abdul Kadar v. Shankarlal Gulabchand
       [(1975) 2 SCC 609] and Svenska Handelsbanken v. Indian
       Charge Chrome Ltd. [(1994) 2 SCC 155])
[2025] 3 S.C.R.                                                         465

                        Smt. Lavanya C & Anr. v.
           Vittal Gurudas Pai Since Deseased By LRs. & Ors.

           31. Therefore, it is the solemn duty of an advocate not to
           transgress the authority conferred on him by the client.
           It is always better to seek appropriate instructions from
           the client or his authorised agent before making any
           concession which may, directly or remotely, affect the
           rightful legal right of the client. The advocate represents
           the client before the court and conducts proceedings on
           behalf of the client. He is the only link between the court
           and the client. Therefore his responsibility is onerous. He
           is expected to follow the instructions of his client rather
           than substitute his judgment.
           32. Generally, admissions of fact made by a counsel
           are binding upon their principals as long as they are
           unequivocal; where, however, doubt exists as to a
           purported admission, the court should be wary to
           accept such admissions until and unless the counsel
           or the advocate is authorised by his principal to make
           such admissions. Furthermore, a client is not bound
           by a statement or admission which he or his lawyer
           was not authorised to make. A lawyer generally has no
           implied or apparent authority to make an admission or
           statement which would directly surrender or conclude
           the substantial legal rights of the client unless such
           an admission or statement is clearly a proper step
           in accomplishing the purpose for which the lawyer
           was employed. We hasten to add neither the client
           nor the court is bound by the lawyer’s statements or
           admissions as to matters of law or legal conclusions.
           Thus, according to generally accepted notions of
           professional responsibility, lawyers should follow the
           client’s instructions rather than substitute their judgment
           for that of the client. We may add that in some cases,
           lawyers can make decisions without consulting the client.
           While in others, the decision is reserved for the client.
           It is often said that the lawyer can make decisions as
           to tactics without consulting the client, while the client
           has a right to make decisions that can affect his rights.”
                                                (Emphasis supplied)
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       9.4 Recently, a coordinate Bench of this Court in Bar of Indian
           Lawyers v. National Institute of Communicable Diseases,11
           which also comprised one of us (Mithal J.) speaking through
           Trivedi J., observed :
             “51. When we examine the relationship between an
             advocate and his client from this point of view, the following
             unique attributes become clear:
             51.1. Advocates are generally perceived to be their client’s
             agents and owe fiduciary duties to their clients.
             51.2. Advocates are fastened with all the traditional duties
             that agents owe to their principals. For example, advocates
             have to respect the client’s autonomy to make decisions
             at a minimum, as to the objectives of the representation.
             51.3. Advocates are not entitled to make concessions
             or give any undertaking to the court without express
             instructions from the client.
             51.4. It is the solemn duty of an advocate not to transgress
             the authority conferred on him by his client.
             51.5. An advocate is bound to seek appropriate instructions
             from the client or his authorised agent before taking any
             action or making any statement or concession which may,
             directly or remotely, affect the legal rights of the client.
             51.6. The Advocate represents the client before the court
             and conducts proceedings on behalf of the client. He is
             the only link between the court and the client. Therefore,
             his responsibility is onerous. He is expected to follow the
             instructions of his client rather than substitute his judgment.”
                                                     (Emphasis supplied)

10. The above judgments make clear that a lawyer-client relationship is
    fiduciary in nature and the former is cast in terms of agency of the
    latter. It is also clear that the lawyer is to respect the decision-making
    right of the client. It flows from this that any undertaking given to a
    Court cannot be without requisite authority from the client.


11   (2024) 8 SCC 430
[2025] 3 S.C.R.                                                              467

                           Smt. Lavanya C & Anr. v.
              Vittal Gurudas Pai Since Deseased By LRs. & Ors.

11. The appellants herein would have us believe that the undertaking
    to not alienate the subject matter property, which, undoubtedly, has
    far-reaching implications, extending over a large period of time. We
    find such a situation difficult to accept. The undertaking, subject
    matter of controversy, was given in July 2007 and the miscellaneous
    application was filed in the year 2011, i.e., after a period of four and
    a half years. Had the situation been that the said undertaking was
    without requisite authority, the clients were perfectly within their rights
    to seek discharge of that order, however, no such step was taken.
12. The same undertaking was re-emphasized a month later, on 13th
    August 2007 and was later made into an order of the Court which, as
    already observed supra, was extended from time to time. Alienation
    of the subject matter property despite express orders of the Court,
    in our view, entirely justify the stand taken by the High Court in
    punishing the appellants for contempt of Court.
13. The powers of contempt of Court have been provided for the purposes
    of ensuring that the dignity and majesty of law is always maintained.
    Such purpose is aptly captured in the words of the Constitution
    Bench in Supreme Court Bar Assn. v. Union of India12, as follows:
             “42. The contempt of court is a special jurisdiction to be
             exercised sparingly and with caution whenever an act
             adversely affects the administration of justice or which tends
             to impede its course or tends to shake public confidence
             in the judicial institutions. This jurisdiction may also be
             exercised when the act complained of adversely affects
             the majesty of law or dignity of the courts. The purpose of
             contempt jurisdiction is to uphold the majesty and dignity
             of the courts of law. It is an unusual type of jurisdiction
             combining “the jury, the judge and the hangman” and it is
             so because the court is not adjudicating upon any claim
             between litigating parties. This jurisdiction is not exercised
             to protect the dignity of an individual judge but to protect
             the administration of justice from being maligned. In the
             general interest of the community it is imperative that the
             authority of courts should not be imperilled and there should
             be no unjustifiable interference in the administration of


12   (1998) 4 SCC 409
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               justice. It is a matter between the court and the contemner
               and third parties cannot intervene. It is exercised in a
               summary manner in aid of the administration of justice, the
               majesty of law and the dignity of the courts. No such act
               can be permitted which may have the tendency to shake
               the public confidence in the fairness and impartiality of
               the administration of justice.”
       When there has been an express violation of an order of a Court, as
       is in the present case, the exercise of contempt jurisdiction cannot be
       faulted with. The judgment of the High Court is, therefore, confirmed.
14. In the attending facts and circumstances, keeping in view the fact
    that at the time of filing of this appeal, the appellant No.1 herein,
    who was the contemnor No.3 before the High Court, was 63 years
    of age and today must approximately be of 68 years of age, we
    modify the impugned order to the extent that the three months
    confinement in civil prison shall stand deleted. The rest of the order
    regarding attachment of property remains undisturbed. Additionally,
    the amount of compensation payable by the appellants herein shall
    stand enhanced from a sum of Rs.10 lakhs to Rs.13 lakhs.
15. The appeal is partly allowed and disposed of with the above
    modification to the impugned order. The amount of compensation
    shall also carry simple interest @6% from the date of the judgment
    of the lower Court, i.e., 2nd August 2013.
       Pending application, if any, shall stand disposed of.

       Result of the case: Appeal partly allowed.



       †
           Headnotes prepared by: Divya Pandey